Full opinion text
Opinion BIRD, C. J. These consolidated mandate proceedings raise difficult questions concerning referenda challenges to the 1981 Congressional, Senate and Assembly reapportionment statutes passed by a majority of the Legislature and signed by the Governor. (Stats. 1981, chs. 535, 536, 537.) (1) Are the referendum petitions defective because, in violation of Elections Code section 3516, subdivision (c), they required the signer to use his or her “address as registered to vote” rather than “residence address,” thereby making it impossible for election officials to determine if the signers were qualified registered voters? (2) Even if the petitions contain a substantial defect, should the court allow them to qualify so the referenda may be voted upon by the people of this state? (3) Even if the petitions would otherwise technically qualify, may the referendum process be used to challenge reapportionment statutes? Does the stay provision of the referendum section of the state Constitution apply to the effective date of the reapportionment statutes? (4) If the referenda stay the effect of the 1981 reapportionment statutes, how should the 1982 elections be conducted? Should the old, unconstitutional districts be adopted by this court and used in the 1982 elections? Should the court defer to the Legislature and adopt the newly drawn, equally apportioned districts enacted by the Legislature and signed into law by the Governor? If the court has no choice but to mandate the use of the 1981 congressional reapportionment plan, is there a legally compelling reason why the court should not also use the 1981 Assembly and Senate reapportionment plans? I. Statement of Facts In September 1981, the Legislature passed three reapportionment statutes revising the boundaries of the state’s Congressional, Senate and Assembly districts respectively to conform to the results of the 1980 federal census. These statutes were signed by the Governor and enrolled into law by the Secretary of State on September 16, 1981. That same day, real parties in interest, the chairman of the California Republican Party and the Republican National Committee, began a petition drive aimed at qualifying for the ballot a referendum on each of these reapportionment statutes. (See Cal. Const., art. II, §§ 9, 10.) The Attorney General prepared titles and summaries to appear on the face of the referenda. (See Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (d); Elec. Code, § 3503.) The summaries stated that if signed by the requisite number of electors, the petitions would require the reapportionment statutes to be placed on the ballot for approval or rejection by the voters and would prevent the statutes from taking effect unless approved by a majority vote. On November 18, 1981, real parties submitted their completed petitions to the Secretary of State. On December 15, the Secretary of State announced that the petitions contained the requisite number of signatures. (See Cal. Const., art. II, § 9, subd. (b) [petitions must contain signatures equalling 5 percent of the votes cast for all candidates for governor at the last gubernatorial election].) However, she also announced that she was refraining from directing the county clerks to place the referenda on the June ballot, pending this court’s resolution of these mandate proceedings. (See §§ 3520-3523.) In the interim, she directed the county clerks and registrars to prepare to conduct the primary election under either the old election boundaries or the new districts approved by the Legislature. The instant mandate proceedings were filed by various members of the Assembly, Senate and House of Representatives and other interested parties. Petitioners attack defects in the referendum petitions which, they allege, render the petitions invalid. They also assert that even if the petitions are valid, the referenda do not operate to stay the implementation of the new reapportionment statutes. Petitioners seek writs of mandate compelling state and local officials to omit the referenda from the June ballot and to use the new districts in the 1982 elections. Mandate is an appropriate remedy under these circumstances. (See Gage v. Jordan (1944) 23 Cal.2d 794, 800 [147 P.2d 387] [mandate proper to compel Secretary of State to omit initiative measure from ballot]; Legislature v. Reinecke (Reinecke I) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 595 [99 Cal.Rptr. 481, 492 P.2d 385].) This court issued alternative writs of mandate to resolve the impasse. II. Challenges to the Referendum Petitions Petitioners contend that the referendum petitions fail to comply with several requirements of the Elections Code and are, therefore, fatally defective. The most serious of these asserted flaws is the failure of the petitions to require a signer to affix his or her residence address, as mandated by section 3516, subdivision (c). The referendum petitions were circulated by two methods: direct mail and public distribution by hand. Neither version contained a “residence address” instruction. Instead, both versions provided a space for each signer to affix an address, with the words “Your Address as Registered to Vote” printed beneath. In addition, the cover of the direct mail version, which was sent to all Republican voters at their addresses as registered, bore the following directions: “Attention! ... When Signing Your Petition, Please Use the Name and Address Information Exactly as it Is Listed Here (Even if Incorrect) to Insure Your Petitions Qualify ....” (Italics added.) Nowhere do the referendum petitions specifically call upon signers to provide the “residence address” information required by section 3516, subdivision (c). The reason for this requirement is quite simple. With minor exceptions, an individual must continue to reside at the address stated in his or her affidavit of registration in order to be qualified to vote. (See generally, Elec. Code, div. 1, ch. 2, §§ 300-320.) It is the duty of the county clerk or registrar of voters to compare a signer’s current residence address on the petition with that individual’s address as registered to vote in the records of registration maintained by the county clerk. If the addresses match, the requirement of section 3516 that the signer be “a qualified registered voter at the time of signing the petition” has been satisfied. However, without the petition signer’s current residence address on the petition, it is impossible for the clerk to determine whether the signer was a “qualified registered voter.” In the case of the petitions circulated by real parties, if the signer dutifully followed the instructions on those petitions and provided his or her “address as registered to vote” or “address ... as it is listed here (even if incorrect),” the address on the petition and the address in the records of registration would automatically be the same. Thus the clerk, whose examination is limited to a comparison of the petition and the records of registration, can come to no other conclusion than that the signer was properly registered at the time he or she signed the petition. Accordingly, 100 percent of the signatures determined by the clerk to be genuine would also be determined to be those of qualified registered voters. All would be counted as valid signatures for purposes of qualifying the referendum petition for the ballot. (See §§ 3520, 3521.) Of course, that determination may not be correct. The signer may have moved to a new residence subsequent to registering without having reregistered or executed an address change with the county clerk. (See §§ 305, 315.) In such a situation, the signer would not be a “qualified registered voter at the time of signing the petition.” Nevertheless, had he or she complied with the petition instructions regarding address, the clerk would be unable to discern that fact. Far from being a mere technical shortcoming, real parties’ failure to comply with the requirements of section 3516, subdivision (c), goes to the very heart of that section’s purpose—to enable the clerk to ensure that petitions have been signed by those entitled to do so—and prevents that purpose from being effectuated. The language of section 3516 is mandatory: “petition sections shall be designed so that each signer shall personally affix his or her . .. [residence address....” (Italics added.) In the past, when a petition’s deficiencies have threatened the proper operation of the election procedures involved, this court has regularly upheld a refusal to file the petition. (See Muehleisen v. Forward (1935) 4 Cal.2d 17, 20 [46 P.2d 969]; Gerth v. Dominguez (1934) 1 Cal.2d 239 [34 P.2d 135]; Mayock v. Kerr (1932) 216 Cal. 171 [13 P.2d 717].) In Muehleisen, the court stated that “[t]he question is not [one] of strict or liberal construction, nor is the case one of immaterial or unsubstantial departure from formal requirements. The ... provision is clear and requires no interpretation; and the requirements which were not followed are among the most important elements of the ... system established by the statute.” (Muehleisen, supra, 4 Cal.2d at p. 20.) Real parties assert that they have substantially complied with the applicable Elections Code provisions regarding address. However, “[substantial compliance . .. means actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute.” (Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman (1962) 58 Cal.2d 23, 29 [22 Cal.Rptr. 657, 372 P.2d 649].) The “reasonable objective” of section 3516, subdivision (c), is to enable the clerks to perform their duty to determine whether signers are “qualified registered voter[s] at the time of signing the petition” and thus “entitled to sign it.” That objective is totally thwarted when signers are instructed to provide residences that may or may not reflect their current addresses. Under such circumstances, real parties’ claim of substantial compliance cannot be sustained. Real parties further contend that should their petitions be deemed deficient, the deficiency nevertheless should be excused as a form of harmless error, based on the fact that the total number of signatures collected was substantially in excess of the number of valid signatures needed to qualify the referenda for the ballot. Such a contention, however, begs the question—how many of the total signatures collected are actually valid? That is a question that cannot be answered because of the failure to request the signers’ current residence addresses. Real parties urge that the standard set forth in section 20024, defining the circumstances under which illegal votes may undo an election, should apply to the cases before this court. That section provides that “[a]n election shall not be set aside on account of illegal votes” unless the number of illegal votes would be sufficient to alter the election results, were they deducted from the total votes of the person whose right to office is being contested. Real parties’ attempt to utilize that same test here is unsound. No comparable statutory provision exists for referendum petitions. Moreover, the postelection context is significantly different from a preballot-qualification setting. An election is a completed act, a fait accompli. In contrast, the circulation and qualification of referendum petitions are part of an ongoing process that portends, at most, the potential of an election. Most importantly, even were a standard analogous to that of section 20024 applicable here, it would not be of assistance to real parties because of the very nature of the defect in their petitions. Without residence address information, the county clerk is unable to identify accurately how many signers are not properly registered. Without an accurate count of such invalid signatures, no determination can be made as to whether or not the requisite number of valid signatures has been obtained. Finally, real parties seek to excuse their noncompliance with section 3516, subdivision (c) by asserting that they were given incorrect advice by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General. However, the record suggests that real parties may well have been aware of the “residence address” requirements. Petitioners have directed this court’s attention to a document dated July 22, 1981, entitled “Backstop—Operational Plan to Qualify The Referendum On Reapportionment.” In addition to the title and date, the cover page also lists the name of Real Party del Junco, in his capacity as chairman of the California Republican Party. In Addendum C to this document, under the heading “Legal Requirements,” section 3516 is quoted in its entirety. On September 17, 1981, three days before Real Party del Junco obtained from the Secretary of State’s office the list of registered voters used in the mailings, the Secretary of State sent him a copy of referendum instructions provided to all the county clerks and registrars. Those instructions included a separate paragraph entitled “Note to Proponent,” specifically directing his attention to sections 3516 and 41, inter alia. Further, in October 1981, while the petitions were circulating, the Secretary of State’s office telephoned counsel for del Junco to inform him that the direct mail petition’s cover instruction to “please use the . . . address information exactly as it is listed here (even if incorrect)” was “questionable and could cause some problems.” (Declaration of Richard B. Maness, staff counsel to the Secretary of State.) Real parties’ asserted reliance on the advice of a deputy attorney general in an informal letter to State Senator Kenneth Maddy is misplaced. The Attorney General is not the official charged with ensuring proper application of the state’s elections laws. That is the role of the Secretary of State, California’s chief elections officer. (Gov. Code, § 12172.5.) Such vicarious advice does not constitute “official” misinformation. Real parties also purport to rely on a 1980 handbook from the Secretary of State’s office to excuse their failure to comply with section 3516, subdivision (c). However, that handbook correctly indicates that the signer of an initiative petition should enter his or her “residence address.” These circumstances would not, by themselves, justify sustaining real parties’ claim of excuse. However, real parties do raise more troubling justifications for their failure to substantially comply with the provisions of section 3516. Real parties note that several past, pending, and currently circulating initiative and referendum measures have contained similar instructions regarding “address as registered to vote” or “address as registered.” Many of these petitions were subjected to vigorous legal challenge in the courts by competent counsel, and not once was the issue of the “residence address” defect raised by the challengers or addressed by the courts. (See, e.g., Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].) Further, real parties emphasize that from 1977 until 1980 the Secretary of State’s California Ballot Initiative Handbook incorrectly used the phrase “address as registered to vote” in a recommended sample format for initiative petitions. When the error was corrected in a 1980 edition of the handbook, the Secretary of State’s office neither publicly announced the correction. nor explained its significance. Apparently, neither the Secretary of State nor the county clerks have ever refused to accept a tendered referendum petition on the basis of this defect. Thus, real parties relied on a practice that not only had been accepted by the government entities charged with enforcing the referendum procedures but also had never been subjected to a challenge from any source. Finally, “‘it has long been our judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to [the] power [of initiative and referendum] wherever it is challenged in order that the right be not improperly annulled. If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power, courts will preserve it. [Citations.]’” (Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591 [135 Cal.Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473, 92 A.L.R.3d 1038], quoting Mervynne v. Acker (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 558, 563-564 [11 Cal.Rptr. 340].) Under the unusual and unique circumstances of this case, real parties’ failure to comply with the requirements of section 3516, subdivision (c) will not be deemed to render the referendum petitions invalid. The Secretary of State should proceed to perform her duties, including those set forth in section 3520. All other petitions which either have qualified for the ballot or are in the circulation process as of the date this decision becomes final shall be treated similarly. However, all petitions which have not yet been provided by the Attorney General to the Secretary, of State following the preparation of title and summary (§ 3503) will be subject to the express requirements of section 3516, subdivision (c) and their failure to so comply will render them invalid per se. Petitioners raise three additional challenges to the technical sufficiency of the referendum petitions. First, they claim that the use of preprinted dates on the declarations signed by the petition circulators violated the Elections Code requirement that the declarations contain “[t]he dates between which all signatures were obtained.” (See § 3519, subd. (d).) Second, petitioners assert that the text of the reapportionment statutes reprinted in the petitions contained errors, in violation of the requirement that “a full and correct copy of the title and text of the proposed measurefs]” be printed in each section of the petition. (See § 3515.) Finally, they allege that the use of small type size and of interleaved pages in the petitions made them virtually unreadable. This court has stressed that technical deficiencies in referendum and initiative petitions will not invalidate the petitions if they are in “substantial compliance” with statutory and constitutional requirements. (California Teachers Assn. v. Collins (1934) 1 Cal.2d 202, 204 [34 P.2d 134].) A paramount concern in determining whether a petition is valid despite an alleged defect is whether the purpose of the technical requirement is frustrated by the defective form of the petition. “The requirements of both the Constitution and the statute are intended to and do give information to the electors who are asked to sign the ... petitions. If that be accomplished in any given case, little more can.be asked than that a substantial compliance with the law and the Constitution be had, and that such compliance does no violence to a reasonable construction of the technical requirement of the law.” (Ibid.) None of the three errors ásserted here has interfered with the statutory purpose behind the technical regulations. First, the petitions contained the phrase, “All signatures to this document were obtained between _ and _.” The blanks were filled in with printed dates, 9/22/81 and 12/13/81 on the street petitions, and 9/17/81 and 12/15/81 on the direct mail petitions. Petitioners point out that the signatures were apparently obtained in a much shorter time range, between mid-October and mid-November. Petitioners claim that the preprinted, longer time period impeded the ability of the clerks to determine whether those who signed the petitions were actually registered to vote at the time that they signed. However, the declarations literally complied with the Elections Code requirement that they contain “[t]he dates between which all signatures were obtained.” (§ 3519, subd. (d).) The range of dates was sufficient to enable the clerks to make the important determination that all of the signatures were obtained within the proper time limits. Further, although the precise dates might have been useful to the clerks in determining the number of qualified voters who had signed the petitions, no showing has been made that the more general information provided prevented the clerks from carrying out that function. Nevertheless, the objectives of section 3519 will be better served in the future by requiring circulators personally to enter on their declarations the actual dates between which all the signatures on the petition were obtained. Preprinted dates are not a desirable substitute for such personal entries. Second, the alleged errors in the text of the petitions concern only typographical errors in the listing of census tract numbers. The errors were so minor as to pose no danger of misleading the signers of the petitions. They, therefore, do not affect the validity of the petitions. Finally, the petitions were fully readable, despite the size of the type. The color-coded referenda packets were sufficiently labeled and differentiated to meet the requirements of the substantial compliance test. Neither of these defects frustrated the signer’s ability to understand what he or she was being asked to sign. Accordingly, neither of them renders the petitions invalid. III. The Referendum Stay Provision Next, the court must decide whether the referendum provisions of the state Constitution apply to reapportionment statutes passed by both houses of the Legislature and signed by the Governor. Article II, section 9, subdivision (a) provides: “The referendum is the power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts of statutes except urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, and statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations for usual current expenses of the State.” Subdivision (b) sets forth the manner in which a referendum may be proposed. “A referendum measure may be proposed by presenting to the Secretary of State, within 90 days after the enactment date of the statute, a petition certified to have been signed by electors equal in number to 5 percent of the votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election, asking that the statute or part of it be submitted to the electors.” Subdivision (c) sets forth the procedure to be followed by the Secretary of State on receipt of a referendum measure which has been duly qualified. “The Secretary of State shall then submit the measure at the next general election held at least 31 days after it qualifies or at a special statewide election held prior to that general election ...” if the Governor calls such a special election. Petitioners do not seriously contend that reapportionment statutes are exempt from the referendum power. In passing, they observe that reapportionment statutes might be deemed “statutes calling elections” and, therefore, exempted from the referendum process under article II, section 9, subdivision (a). While it is obvious that a reapportionment statute relates to elections, it is equally clear that such statutes do not call elections. (Boggs v. Jordan (1928) 204 Cal. 207, 220 [267 P. 696]; Ortiz v. Board of Supervisors (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 866, 872 [166 Cal.Rptr. 100].) Petitioners do, however, seriously contend that the filing of a referendum against a reapportionment or any other statute does not stay the effective date of the statute. The focus of the controversy thus centers initially on the interpretation of article II, section 10, subdivision (a) of the Constitution. Subdivision (a) provides: “An initiative statute or referendum approved by a majority of votes thereon takes effect the day after the election unless the measure provides otherwise. If a referendum petition is filed against a part of a statute the remainder shall not be delayed from going into effect.” (Italics added.) Petitioners acknowledge that the negative implication of the italicized language is that a referendum filed against the entirety of a statute stays that statute pending voter approval. An explicit stay provision was set forth in a predecessor to article II, section 10. Former article IV, section 1, which was repealed in 1966, read in pertinent part, “Upon presentation to the Secretary of State within 90 days after the final adjournment of the Legislature of a [qualified and certified referendum] asking that any act or section or part of any act of the Legislature be submitted to the electors for their approval or rejection, the Secretary of State shall submit to the electors for their approval or rejection, such act [or part thereof] ... and no such act [or part thereof] shall go into effect until and unless approved by a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon', but if a referendum petition is filed against any section or part of ány act the remainder of such act shall not be delayed from going into effect.” (Italics added.) Petitioners concede that while this predecessor article was in effect, this court assumed that the filing of a properly qualified referendum asking that a reapportionment statute be put to a popular vote stayed the effective date of such a statute. (See Silver v. Brown (1965) 63 Cal.2d 270, 277-278 [46 Cal.Rptr. 308, 405 P.2d 132] [dictum]; Boggs v. Jordan, supra, 204 Cal. 207, 211.) Petitioners point out, however, that the referendum provisions of article IV of the California Constitution were revised in 1966, and in 1976 were placed in sections 9 and 10 of article II. One result of the 1966 revision was the elimination of the express stay provision of former article IV. Petitioners attach substantive significance to this omission. They argue that the filing of a referendum no longer stays the challenged statute, despite the clear negative implication to the contrary which remains in the current constitutional provision. Petitioners ask too much of this court. The 1966 revision of article IV was intended “to shorten and simplify the Constitution, deleting unnecessary provisions. ..(Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore, supra, 18 Cal.3d 582, 595, fn. 12.) In commenting on the referendum provisions of former article IV, section 1, the Constitution Revision Commission declared that the proposed revision would effect only one substantive change—the effective date of a statute challenged by a referendum but subsequently approved by the voters. “Otherwise,” the commission declared, “no change in meaning has been effected” by the proposed revision. (Cal. Const. Revision Com., Proposed Revision (1966) at pp. 46-47.) There remains in the current provision, article II, section 10, subdivision (a), a clear negative implication that a statute challenged in its entirety by a duly qualified referendum is stayed from taking effect until it has been approved by the voters at the required election. This interpretation is consistent with the nature of a referendum. “The referendum is the power of the electors to approve or reject statutes. ...” (Cal. Const., art. II, § 9, subd. (a).) As the Secretary of State has pointed out, “In a Referendum, Voters are asked to Approve the Bill which the Legislature has enacted (‘Yes’ Vote) or to Disapprove (‘No’ Vote) .... The question which is put to the voters is ‘Shall (the bill) Become Law? (Yes or No).’” (Memo, from Sect, of State’s office to county clerks and registrars of voters (Sept. 24, 1981).) Approval of the referendum is approval of the bill. Thus, to declare, as does the first sentence of subdivision (a) of article II, section 10, that a “referendum approved by a majority of votes thereon takes effect the day after the election unless the measure provides otherwise ...” is to say that the challenged bill takes effect the day after the election. Obviously, there would be no need to define the date on which the challenged law becomes effective if it were already in effect. (Compare, Walters v. Cease (Alaska 1964) 388 P.2d 263.) Therefore, under the mandate of article II of the state Constitution, the filing of a valid referendum challenging a statute normally stays the implementation of that statute until after the vote of the electorate. The statute takes effect only if approved by the voters. No express provision in article II excludes reapportionment statutes from the reach of the referendum process or from application of the stay. IV. Alternatives Available to the Court for 1982 Elections There remains the problem as to what districts are to be used for the 1982 primary and general elections. Absent the filing of referenda challenging the 1981 reapportionment statutes, each of those laws would have gone into effect on January 1, 1982. (See Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c).) But referenda have been filed, and this court has concluded that they are valid and that their filing stays the date upon which the challenged statutes become law unless and until they are approved by the voters. As a result, the new districts, although presumptively valid, are not now in effect. The old districting scheme, in effect since its establishment by this court in 1973 (see Legislature v. Reinecke (Reinecke IV) (1973) 10 Cal.3d 396 [110 Cal.Rptr. 718, 516 P.2d 6]), no longer meets the one-person, one-vote requirement embodied in the equal protection clauses of our state and federal Constitutions. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) All parties agree that the population changes revealed by the 1980 census demonstrate that the old districts contain population disparities that are clear violations of the state and federal Constitutions’ one-person, one-vote mandate. The old districts are, therefore, no longer valid. Moreover, the old congressional district boundaries have been repealed. (Stats. 1981, ch. 535, § l.) With no valid districts in effect, the state’s election machinery cannot operate. In order for the 1982 elections to proceed, some temporary districting scheme must be established. The impasse now confronting the state must be resolved. Courts have repeatedly affirmed that reapportionment is a task best performed by the state legislatures. “[T]he institution that is by far the best situated to identify and then reconcile traditional state policies within the constitutionally mandated framework of substantial population equality ...” is the Legislature. (Connor v. Finch (1977) 431 U.S. 407, 414-415 [52 L.Ed.2d 465, 473-474, 97 S.Ct. 1828].) Since that is not a viable alternative prior to the June primary, this court is forced to assume the “unwelcome obligation” (id., at p. 415 [52 L.Ed.2d at p. 474]) of stepping into the reapportionment fray. The options available to the court are limited. Were time constraints less pressing, the court might consider requesting the Legislature to develop an interim plan. However, the June primary is less than five months away. Respondents Eu, the Secretary of State, and Panish, the Registrar of Voters of Los Angeles County, report that it is too late to use any districts except those in either the out-dated plan or the Legislature’s plans. Computer programming requiring two to four months of work has already been performed for both of those plans. There is no time to do similar preliminary programming for any other plan. Further, no new districts could be put into effect in time to inform the electorate and the candidates of their districts before the primary election. Real parties argue that the 1981 reapportionment measures are not among the options this court may consider. However, decisions of the Supreme Court are to the contrary. Those decisions demonstrate that any practical alternative available to this court may be given consideration, including reapportionment plans which are not yet in effect and which are scheduled to be submitted to the electorate. The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that regardless of the requirements of state constitutions, “the delay inherent in following [a] state constitutional prescription for approval of [ reapportionment measures] cannot be allowed to result in an impermissible deprivation of [the citizens’] right to an adequate voice in the election of legislators to represent them.” (Roman v. Sincock (1964) 377 U.S. 695, 711 [12 L.Ed.2d 620, 630, 84 S.Ct. 1449]; Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533, 584 [12 L.Ed.2d 506, 540, 84 S.Ct. 1362].) When the delay caused by such state constitutional prescriptions conflicts with a citizen’s federal constitutional right to cast an equally weighted vote, a court has the power to set aside the state constitutional provision. “Acting under general equitable principles,” the court must determine whether circumstances require the immediate effectuation of the federal constitutional right. (Roman v. Sincock, supra, 377 U.S. at pp. 711-712 [12 L.Ed.2d at pp. 630-631].) From these principles, it follows that a court, in the exercise of its equitable powers, may not only consider but also adopt reapportionment plans which are not yet final within the framework of a state constitution. This is precisely the action affirmed by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533. In 1962, during the pendency of a federal suit challenging the apportionment of the Alabama Legislature, that body adopted two reapportionment plans. Neither was to take effect until the 1966 election. One of the plans was a proposed constitutional amendment which was scheduled to be submitted to the voters for ratification at the November 1962 general election. The other plan was statutory. It was enacted as a standby measure and was to take effect only if the voters rejected the constitutional amendment, or, should the amendment pass, if a court subsequently declared the amendment unconstitutional. (Id., at pp. 537, 542-544 [12 L.Ed.2d at pp. 513, 515-517].) After trial, the district court declared the existing apportionment of the Legislature unconstitutional. (Id., at p. 545 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 517].) The court fashioned a temporary remedy comprised of certain aspects of the two proposed plans for use in the 1962 election only. (Id., at p. 552 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 521].) The Supreme Court held that “the District Court acted properly in considering [the] proposed plans, although neither was to become effective until the 1966 election and the proposed constitutional amendment was scheduled to be submitted to the State’s voters in November 1962.” (Id., at p. 570 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 532].) Why? Because “[consideration by the court below of the two proposed plans was clearly necessary . .. in ascertaining what sort of judicial relief, if any, should be afforded ...” for the 1962 elections. (Id., at p. 571 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 532]; see also, Reinecke I, supra, 6 Cal. 3d at p. 602.) Given the breadth of a court’s equitable powers in reapportionment cases under federal law, it is clear that this court may give consideration to the Legislature’s 1981 reapportionment plans, even though those plans are not yet in effect and are now scheduled to be submitted to a popular vote. In ascertaining the remedy to be applied in a given case, a court may give consideration to any practical alternative which is available. In addition, a ruling that the stay provision of article II, section 10, subdivision (a) precludes consideration of the Legislature’s reapportionment plans would create serious conflicts with other provisions of our state Constitution. Article XXI, adopted in 1980, requires that the Legislature reapportion the Senate, Assembly, and Congressional districts “[i]n the year following the year in which the national census is taken under the direction of Congress at the beginning of each decade. ...” It also requires that all members of the Legislature and Congress be elected from single-member districts. (Art. XXI, § 1, subd. (a).) Further, article I, section 7, the state equal protection clause, adopted in 1974, mandates a recognition of the one-person, one-vote principle. To construe the referendum stay provision so as to prohibit consideration of the 1981 reapportionment plan would frustrate the requirements of both of these newly reaffirmed constitutional provisions. It would substantially delay redistricting of the state, despite the constitutional requirement that reapportionment occur immediately after the federal census. This court would be left with no practical alternative but to impose the old, now seriously malapportioned districts on the state, in violation of the equal protection clause. (See discussion, ante, at p. 658.) Further, the Legislature’s reapportionment plan is the only available option that provides for 45 congressional districts, rather than the 43 formerly allotted to California. If that plan were eliminated from consideration, there would be no way to implement the constitutional requirement that all members of Congress be elected from single-member districts. (See discussion, post, at pp. 661-664.) Nothing in our state Constitution dictates that the stay provision of article II should have more force and effect than the commands of article XXI or the equal protection clause of article I, section 7. Rather than promoting any particular constitutional provision at the expense of other, equally important provisions, this court must harmonize the various articles of our Constitution so as to minimize any potential conflicts. The conclusion that the referendum stay provision of article II does not remove the 1981 reapportionment statutes from this court’s consideration saves that constitutional provision from a potential conflict with the mandates of article XXI and the state equal protection clause. Petitioners’ claim that the referendum provisions of the Constitution do not apply to reapportionment statutes seems unfounded. Similarly without merit is real parties’ assertion that the qualification of the referenda prohibits this court from considering the Legislature’s plans. The federal Constitution, federal precedent, and our own Constitution all require that the court weigh all the options currently available, including those challenged by the referenda. V. Constitutional Mandates The impasse facing the state as a result of the qualification of the referenda challenging the Legislature’s reapportionment statutes leaves this court no choice but to resolve the pressing problem of what districts should be used in the upcoming primary and general elections. The only alternatives available are either the new plan approved by the Legislature and the Governor or the old districts used in the last decade. From a practical point of view, which of these plans is available to this court for congressional reapportionment? California is now entitled to 45 representatives instead of 43. Real parties argue that this court should use the 43 old districts and fill the 2 new seats by statewide elections. Every member of this court agrees that this is not a viable alternative. As this court pointed out in Reinecke I, supra, 6 Cal.3d at page 603, federal law forbids the use of statewide elections to fill congressional seats. Section 2c of title 2 of the United States Code provides that, “In each State entitled ... to more than one Representative under an apportionment made [by the President of the total number of Representatives among the several States], there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established. ... ” Real parties assert that Reinecke I was wrong in holding that section 2c commands the election of congressional representatives from single-member districts. They contend that section 2a(c), of title 2 commands at-large elections. The flaw in their argument is that the legislative history of section 2c reveals, as does its plain language, that Congress intended 2c to supersede the provisions of section 2a(c). During the Senate debate on section 2c, proposed by Senator Howard Baker, the following colloquy occurred. After observing that by its terms section 2c would require that each state establish “by law” single-member districts for the election of its representatives, Senator Birch Bayh posed this question to Senator Baker: “/ would interpret ‘by law’ to mean if the reapportionment is done either by the State legislatures or by the court. I should like to know whether the Senator from Tennessee [Senator Baker] agrees with that interpretation.” (Debate before the Senate, 113 Cong. Rec. 31719 (1967), italics added.) Senator Baker responded that it was, of course, in the first instance the province of the legislatures to establish congressional districts and that a court should only intervene if the legislature failed to do so. (Ibid.) Senator Bayh, stating that perhaps the Senator had misunderstood his question, went on to observe: “[I]f it is bad government for the legislature to say that Congressmen should run at large, then it is bad government for the court to have an entire group of Congressmen running at large in a State.” (Ibid.) Senator Baker responded: . I agree....” (Ibid.) Senator Bayh then returned to his original question. “When we say ‘. . . there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative,’ we are talking about either of two situations—whether the legislature reapportions or whether the court reapportions.” (Id., at p. 31720.) Senator Baker replied, “The Senator is correct.” (Ibid.) During the floor debate, Senator Bayh again asked: “This will make it mandatory for all Congressmen to be elected by single-Member districts, whether the reapportionment is done by State legislatures or by a Federal court.” Senator Baker responded: “That is my understanding.” Thereafter, section 2c was adopted by the Senate by voice vote. (Ibid.) The bill then went to the House for its consideration. An amendment was proposed to allow those states which had been conducting congressional elections at large (i.e., Hawaii and New Mexico) to do so for the 91st or next congressional election as well. (See Debate before the House, 113 Cong. Rec. 34032 (1967).) Most of the debate focused on the desirability of this proposed amendment. Little was said about the merits of the provision itself. However, one remark is instructive. “The language .. . will prohibit any State from running [its representatives] at large in any future elections.” (Remarks of Representative Smith, id., at p. 34035.) The measure passed the House, as amended, and was returned to the Senate. (See Debate before the Senate, 113 Cong. Rec. 34364 (1967).) There, the debate focused on whether the House amendment allowing Hawaii and New Mexico to elect their representatives at large in 1968 should be accepted. (See id., at pp. 34364-34370.) In the course of that debate, it was observed that, “Beginning with the 1970 elections, and for every congressional election thereafter, every state of the Union, with no exception, must elect its Congressman [sic] from single-member districts.” (Remarks of Sen. Fong, id., at p. 34364, italics added.) At the close of debate, the Senate passed the bill as amended by the House. (Id., at pp. 34369-34370.) Given the legislative history of section 2c and this court’s observations in Reinecke I, supra, 6 Cal.3d at page 603, it is clear that the use of the 43 old districts and an at-large election of the 2 new representatives would contravene the congressional mandate set forth in section 2c. This interpretation is consistent with the decisions of other state and federal courts. As this court stated in Reinecke I, supra, 6 Cal.3d at page 603, the mandate of Congress to elect all representatives from single-member districts is one with which this court fully agrees. “[T]o conduct statewide elections to fill [the new] congressional seats in a state of California’s geographical size and large population would not only tremendously increase the burdens and expenses of effective campaigning but, by increasing the choices confronting the electorate .. ., would seriously impede the casting of informed ballots.” (Ibid.) Further, an at-large election would allow the voters of California to select three representatives instead of the one that they are entitled to under law. The only practical and constitutional alternative available for use as a temporary court plan for this election year is the 1981 congressional reapportionment law. (Stats. 1981, ch. 535.) If this court must adopt the 1981 congressional reapportionment plan so that the 1982 House elections can go forward, is there any reason this court should not also adopt the 1981 Assembly and Senate plans? Although few definitive rules guide the choice of an interim election plan, decisions of the United States Supreme Court do provide standards. The primary federal concern is equal protection—here, the principle of one-person, one-vote. Further, equitable considerations such as the potential disruption of the state’s election process must also be considered. (Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. at p. 585 [12 L.Ed.2d 506, 541].) Thus, this court must adopt the plan that best ensures equal protection of the law while minimizing any disruptive impact on the election process. In addition, any decision by this court should recognize the basic rule that reapportionment is primarily a legislative task, undertaken by this court only when circumstances permit no alternative. (Id., at p. 586 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 541].) A weighing of the diverse and at times conflicting factors involved in this case leads to the conclusion that the election plans developed by the Legislature in 1981 must be used, as a temporary measure, in the 1982 legislative elections. The equal protection clauses of both the federal and state Constitutions (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7) mandate that this court adopt the reapportionment plan that most nearly meets the constitutional ideal, absent extraordinary circumstances. (Cosner v. Dalton (E.D.Va. 1981) 522 F.Supp. 350, 363-364; Cummings v. Meskill (D.Conn. 1972) 347 F.Supp. 1176, 1177; Klahr v. Williams (D.Ariz. 1970) 313 F.Supp. 148, 153; Jones v. Falcey (1966) 48 N.J. 25 [222 A.2d 101, 109-110]; see also Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. at p. 585 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 541 ].) Given the imminence of the 1982 primary election, only two options are available. This court must choose between the two districting plans currently available, selecting that plan which more nearly comports with the requirements of the federal and state equal protection clauses and is least disruptive of the electoral process. The old districts contain enormous population variances. The population of the largest old Assembly district is more than 200 percent that of the smallest. The populations of the new districts appear to be within 4 to 7 percent of equality. Clearly, the new districts are far closer to the constitutional goal than the old. According to figures supplied by real parties, the current population of the old 76th Assembly District (530,643) is 236 percent of the population of the old 16th Assembly District (224,488). The vote of a resident of the former 16th District would, therefore, be worth more than twice that of a resident of the former 76th District. Compared to the current ideal district size, the old 76th District is 79.4 percent greater than the ideal, while the old 16th District is 24.1 percent less than the ideal. The total deviation between the two districts is 103.5 percent. Overall, 2 of the old Assembly districts vary by more than 50 percent from the ideal population size of 295,857; 2 vary by 30 to 50 percent from the ideal size; and 48 of the 80 districts vary by 10 to 30 percent from the ideal. Only 28 of the districts are within 10 percent of the ideal district size. In the Senate, old Senate District 5 now contains 458,587 people, 22.5 percent less than the ideal number, while old Senate District 38 contains 904,725 people, 52.9 percent more than the ideal. Thus, the vote of a resident of former District 5 would be worth almost twice that of a resident of former District 38. The total deviation between the two districts is 75.4 percent. Real parties’ figures show that the population of one old Senate district is more than 50 percent greater than the ideal; another is 41 percent greater than the ideal; 19 vary by 10 to 30 percent from the ideal; and 19 are within 10 percent of the ideal population size. The Supreme Court has not established a rigid numerical limit for legislative districts. However, the high court has developed guidelines for permissible deviations. As summarized by one federal district court, a maximum deviation of less than 10 percent between the largest and smallest districts is permissible and need not be justified by the state. However, a maximum deviation of 10 to 16.4 percent is permissible only if the state can demonstrate that the deviation is the result of a rational state policy. A maximum deviation greater than 16.4 percent is intolerable under the equal protection clause. (Sims v. Amos (M.D.Ala. 1973) 365 F.Supp. 215, 222, affd. sub nom. Wallace v. Sims (1974) 415 U.S. 902 [39 L.Ed.2d 460, 94 S.Ct. 1394]; Cosner v. Dalton, supra, 522 F.Supp. at pp. 357-358; see also White v. Regester (1973) 412 U.S. 755 [37 L.Ed.2d 314, 93 S.Ct. 2332]; Mahan v. Howell (1973) 410 U.S. 315 [35 L.Ed.2d 320, 93 S.Ct. 979]; see 1 Dorsen et al., Political and Civil Rights in the United States (4th ed. 1976) pp. 1107-1108.) Under this standard, the old districting plan—with maximum deviations of 103.5 percent (Assembly) and 75.4 percent (Senate)—is a per se violation of the United States Constitution. As the Supreme Court stated in Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. at page 585 [12 L.Ed.2d at page 541], “once a State’s legislative apportionment scheme has been found to be unconstitutional, it would be the unusual case in which a court would be justified in not taking appropriate action to insure that no further elections are conducted under the invalid plan” (Italics added.) Further, the high court has held that a court-ordered plan, such as that which established California’s old districts, must be held to higher standards than a state legislature’s plan. (Chapman v. Meier (1975) 420 U.S. 1, 26 [42 L.Ed.2d 766, 784, 95 S.Ct. 1988].) California’s Constitution provides a further reason to prefer adoption of the Legislature’s 1981 reapportionment plans rather than to perpetuate the out-dated, malapportioned districts followed in the past decade. Article XXI of the state Constitution, adopted in 1980, requires the Legislature to reapportion the state in the year following the federal census. This constitutional provision expresses a clear mandate that properly apportioned districts be in effect by the time of the first election following the decennial census. Use of the Legislature’s 1981 plans will also minimize the potential disruption of the electoral and political processes of the state. At the primary, the new reapportionment plans will be either affirmed or rejected. The court cannot and should not attempt to predict the outcome of the referenda. The will of the people, except as already expressed through their chosen representatives, is as yet unspoken. The referenda may be voted up or down. Both possibilities must be considered in fashioning a temporary remedy that will do least violence to the orderly conduct of the 1982 elections, regardless of the ultimate result of the referenda. California faces a unique situation in which the plan by which the elections should be conducted is the subject of a vote at those same elections. Use of the Legislature’s 1981 plan for the 1982 elections minimizes any disruption of the electoral process. If the reapportionment statutes are ratified by the voters at the primary, use of them now will cause no disruption at all. The 1982 elections will proceed according to the new plan—a statute approved by the Legislature, the Governor, and the people of the state. Real parties argue that use of the old legislative districts would cause less disruption. That conclusion, however, rests on an implicit and impermissible assumption—that the referenda will result in the rejection of the Legislature’s reapportionment statutes. That is an assumption this court cannot legally make. To do so would thrust the court into the political realm, prejudging an issue which is exclusively for the voters of the state to decide. If the court orders the use of the old districts in 1982 and the reapportionment statutes then are affirmed, the state will be faced with the anomalous situation of an election run under seriously malapportioned, unconstitutional districts, despite the fact that the Legislature, the Governor and the people of the state all have concurred in adopting a new reapportionment statute. The legislators elected in those malapportioned, unconstitutional districts would serve terms of two and four years before the districts chosen by the people and their elected representatives could be given effect. If the reapportionment statutes are rejected at the primary election, some disruption of the election process will occur no matter which plan is adopted now. The Legislature will be faced with the task of formulating new districts in time for the 1984 elections. That new plan will be subject to possible challenge in the courts and by referendum. At least, however, if the new plans are adopted temporarily in June and November, the 1982 elections will be run under a districting plan that is far closer to federal and state constitutional mandates than the out-dated plan of the last decade. In sum, then, giving equal weight to the possibilities that the referenda may succeed or fail, use of the 1981 reapportionment statutes minimizes the potential disruption of the electoral process. It eliminates the danger of the worst possible scenario—use of the old, unconstitutional plans in June and November despite approval of the new plans at the primary election. Further, the use of the 1981 reapportionment plans maximizes the likelihood that there will be no disruption at all. Adoption of the Legislature’s reapportionment plans for temporary use in 1982 also furthers the related goals of judicial restraint and deference to the Legislature. This court passes no judgment on the wisdom of the Legislature’s 1981 plans or on the likelihood that the people will affirm or reject those statutes at the primary election. However, in choosing whether to use an out-of-date plan that no longer conforms to equal protection requirements or a new statute passed by the Legislature, the court cannot be blind to the fact that the Legislature and the Governor have given their assent to the latter plan. Although stayed by the referenda, these statutes were the product of the political give and take of the legislative branch of government, the branch delegated responsibility for reapportionment both by federal precedent and by California’s Constitution. Use of the old plan would also perpetrate a potentially grave injustice on the majority of the people of this state. The effect of reverting to the old plan would be to allow 5 percent of the voters, by signing referendum petitions, to delay implementation of a constitutionally required reapportionment plan for two to four years. Not until 1986 would the voters in some Senate districts electing representatives this year have the opportunity to vote in properly apportioned districts. Although the Constitution of our state grants the power to initiate a referendum to 5 percent of the voters, it does not require that the effect of that referendum be articulated in a manner that does such serious injury to conflicting and equally compelling constitutional mandates. (See discussion, ante, at pp. 660-661.) Any decision by this court requires a balancing of competing constitutional considerations. In light of the strong factors weighing in favor of the use of a revised, up-to-date reapportionment plan, it is simply untenable to argue that the constitutional provision on stays must be followed blindly, no matter what the cost to the equal protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions and article XXI of the state Constitution. Maintaining the old election districts for the upcoming election would raise troubling questions about the future of reapportionment in our state. It would create a serious risk that every reapportionment plan would be delayed at least two years before it could be implemented. Each decade, the losers in the reapportionment battle could obtain a two-year grace period on the strength of the signatures of 5 percent of the voters, thereby delaying implementation of the new plan until years after the referendum election. Cognizant of the seemingly interminable reapportionment lawsuits of the last two decades, this court should take care to avoid creating a system whereby delay becomes the rule and constitutionally required reapportionment may never be achieved within constitutionally imposed deadlines. The decision to implement the 1981 reapportionment statutes for the 1982 elections will not circumvent the people’s right to vote on those plans at the primary. The outcome of that vote will determine the future of reapportionment for the rest of the decade. This court’s decision affects only the districts to be used temporarily for the 1982 elections. It is an unfortunate but unavoidable consequence of the timing of the referenda that the results of those referenda must necessarily be one step behind the reality of the 1982 elections. For this one year only, the elections must be conducted in ignorance of the preference of a majority of the voters. This is the unhappy result of the unique situation now confronting the state. Further, use of the unconstitutional, out-dated plan would increase the likelihood that the will of the people, as expressed in the primary vote, might be thwarted. It is important to remember that the Legislature’s plans have not been rejected by the voters. The statutes have been placed on the ballot, based on the signatures of 5 percent or more of the actual number of votes cast for all candidates for Governor in the last gubernatorial election. The ultimate disposition of the plans, although put to a vote by the referendum petitions, is as yet undecided. Thus, this case is substantially different from Reinecke I, supra, 6 Cal.3d at page 595. There this court held that it would not order use of the results of a “truncated” legislative process absent “the most compelling considerations.” (Id., at p. 602.) The reapportionment bill in Reinecke I had been vetoed by the Governor. By way of contrast, the statutes here have never been rejected by any governmental entity. They were signed by the Governor and will be put to a vote of the people. To use the adjective “truncated” to describe both of these situations would seriously stretch the descriptive power and distort the definition of the word. The legislative process in Reinecke I was “truncated” by a sharp, final veto by the Governor. The legislative, process here has been lengthened but not terminated. A small percentage of the voters has exercised its right to put the question to a vote of the whole. Pending that vote, the legislative process here has been stalled but not derailed, slowed but not “truncated.” The situation facing this court today is distinguishable from Reinecke I in another crucial respect; the applicable law has changed in the intervening 10 years. First, the voters of the state amended the state Constitution in 1980 to provide, “In the year following the year in which the national census is taken under the direction of Congress at the beginning of each decade, the Legislature shall adjust the boundary lines of the Senatorial, Assembly, Congressional, and Board of Equalization districts....” (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 1, italics added.) This provision replaced former provisions th