Full opinion text
Opinion GRODIN, J. Employer Harry Carian Sales (HCS) seeks review of a decision of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB or Board) finding that HCS committed 30 unfair labor practices, and ordering HCS to bargain with the United Farm Workers (UFW). The principal issue raised in this case is whether the ALRB has authority to certify a union and issue a bargaining order as a remedy for an employer’s egregious unfair labor practices though the union has not won a secret ballot election. Although such bargaining orders are frequently issued by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), this is the first case in which the ALRB has issued such an order. We conclude that the ALRB does have the authority to issue bargaining orders and that the Board’s order in this case was appropriate. As an initial matter, we also conclude that the Board’s unfair labor practice findings are supported by substantial evidence, although two of the eighteen challenged findings must be set aside on other grounds. We therefore enforce the Board’s order. HCS is a table grape producer operating in Coachella Valley. In January of 1977 the UFW initiated an organizational campaign among HCS’s employees. This campaign included daily visits to the fields and labor camps by union organizers, radio announcements, distribution of leaflets, weekly organizational meetings, and a highly publicized march led by UFW President Cesar Chavez. Between March and May 1977, the UFW filed four charges with the ALRB alleging that HCS had committed a total of twenty-three unfair labor practices in violation of Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA or Act) section 1153, subdivisions (a) and (c). These charges were consolidated and heard by an administrative law judge (ALJ-1). In September of 1977, ALJ-1 rendered a decision finding that HCS had committed a number of the 23 unfair labor practices charged. Meanwhile, on June 20, 1977, while ALJ-1’s decision was pending, the UFW filed a certification petition and a secret ballot election was held among HCS’s agricultural employees on June 27, 1977. The official tally of ballots showed 80 votes for the UFW, 88 votes for no union and 142 challenged ballots. Both the UFW and HCS filed objections to the election. In addition, the UFW filed additional unfair labor practice charges concerning incidents that allegedly occurred during the month of June. These objections and charges were consolidated and heard by a second administrative law judge (ALJ-2). In December of 1978, ALJ-2 rendered his decision, finding that HCS had committed a number of the additional unfair labor practices alleged and recommending that the election be set aside. ALJ-2 also found that HCS’s conduct was sufficiently egregious to preclude a fair rerun election and therefore recommended that the ALRB certify the UFW and order HCS to bargain with the union. HCS and the UFW filed exceptions to the decision of both ALJs, and all of these exceptions were consolidated and heard by the ALRB. On October 3, 1980, the Board issued a decision affirming and modifying in part the ALJs’ decisions. In all, the Board found that HCS had committed 30 unfair labor practices. These violations included surveillance of union activities; unlawful interrogation of HCS employees; threats of discharge and deportation; discriminatory hiring, layoffs and discharges; acts of violence against UFW organizers; an illegal wage increase; and election-eve promises made to HCS employees. Finding that HCS’s “pervasive and outrageous conduct . . . clearly undermined the union’s support, chilled the employees’ union sentiment, and precluded holding a fair and free election” the Board set aside the election, certified the UFW as the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative and ordered HCS to bargain with the UFW. HCS challenges the Board’s findings as to 18 of the unfair labor practices charged, as well as the Board’s authority to issue a bargaining order as a remedy for unfair labor practices. I. Unfair Labor Practices We will uphold the Board’s findings concerning unfair labor practices if supported by substantial evidence on the whole record. (Rivcom Corp. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 743, 757 [195 Cal.Rptr. 651, 670 P.2d 305].) “Of course, we do not reweigh the evidence. If there is a plausible basis for the Board’s factual decisions, we are not concerned that contrary findings may seem to us equally reasonable, or even more so.” (Citation omitted.) (Rivcom, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 756-757.) Furthermore, those findings and conclusions that are within the Board’s realm of expertise are entitled to special deference. (Rivcom, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 758.) And, because the evaluation of witnesses’ credibility is a matter particularly for the trier of fact, the Board’s findings based on the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed unless the testimony is “incredible or inherently improbable.” (Montebello Rose Co., Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 1, 20 [173 Cal.Rptr. 856]; Perry Farms, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 448, 463-464 [150 Cal.Rptr. 495].) Applying these standards of review, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings on all of the challenged unfair labor practice charges although, as we shall explain, considerations of due process require that the findings concerning two uncharged incidents be set aside. We agree with the Court of Appeal's analysis of the challenged findings, and adopt the Court of Appeal’s discussion as our own. The relevant portion of the Court of Appeal’s opinion is set out in an appendix. II. ALRB ’s Authority to Issue Bargaining Orders Any discussion of bargaining orders must begin with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. (1969) 395 U.S. 575 [23 L.Ed.2d 547, 89 S.Ct. 1918]. The court in Gissel reaffirmed the NLRB’s authority to issue bargaining orders as a remedy where an employer has committed “unfair labor practices which have made the holding of a fair election unlikely or which have in fact undermined a union’s majority and caused an election to be set aside.” (Id., at p. 610 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 576].) The court reasoned that “[i]f the Board could enter only a cease- and-desist order and direct an election or a rerun, it would in effect be rewarding the employer and allowing him ‘to profit from [his] own wrongful [conduct],’ while at the same time severely curtailing the employees’ right freely to determine whether they desire a representative. The employer could continue to delay or disrupt the election processes and put off indefinitely his obligation to bargain; and any election held under these circumstances would not be likely to demonstrate the employees’ true, undistorted desires.” (Id., at pp. 610-611 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 576], citations and fns. omitted.) The Gissel court established a tripartite categorization of unfair labor practices for determining whether a bargaining order could be issued though the union had not won an election. First, in “exceptional” cases marked by “outrageous” and “pervasive” unfair labor practices, the NLRB may issue a bargaining order even without a showing that the union at one point enjoyed a card majority. (Gissel, supra, 395 U.S. at pp. 613-614 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 578]; see United Dairy Farmers Coop. Assn. v. N.L.R.B. (3d Cir. 1980) 633 F.2d 1054, 1066, 1069; but cf. Conair Corp. v. N.L.R.B. (D.C. Cir, 1983) 721 F.2d 1355, 1377-1384.) Second, the NLRB may issue bargaining orders in “less extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive practices . . . [where] at one point the union had a majority . . . [and] the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though present, is slight and that employee sentiment once expressed through cards would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order.” (Gissel, supra, 395 U.S. at pp. 614-615 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 578].) Finally, the Gissel court held, there is a “third category of minor or less extensive unfair labor practices, which, because of their minimal impact on the election machinery, will not sustain a bargaining order.” (Id., at p. 615 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 578].) The ALRA, like the NLRA, neither expressly authorizes nor expressly prohibits the issuance of “Gissel bargaining orders”—-i.e., bargaining orders issued as a remedy for egregious employer unfair labor practices in the absence of an election won by the union. In issuing its order in this case, the ALRB relied on its general remedial authority under section 1160.3 to provide such “relief as will effectuate the policies of” the Act. HCS argues that the general language of section 1160.3 is insufficient authority to support the Board’s bargaining order. On the contrary, HCS argues, the language and legislative history of the ALRA demonstrate a legislative intent to preclude the issuance of Gissel bargaining orders. HCS correctly notes that those sections of the ALRA dealing with the recognition and certification of unions (see § 1156 et seq.) refer only to secret ballot elections as the means by which a union can become the exclusive bargaining representative of a group of agricultural employees. In addition, HCS quotes extensively from hearings held by legislative committees prior to the ALRA’s enactment, in which the drafters of the ALRA indicated that a union could obtain recognition under the ALRA only by winning a secret ballot election. For instance, during the Senate hearings, Chief Justice Bird, then Secretary of Agriculture and Services, stated that, “under our Act, we only allow one way of recognition and that’s through a secret ballot election.” (Hearing before Sen. Industrial Relations Com., May 21, 1975, p. 51.) Similarly, Senator Dunlap, one of the bill’s authors, stated that under the ALRA, unlike the NLRA, “there is a secret ballot [election] in all cases.” (Id., at p. 59.) Similar statements were made at the Assembly hearings. For instance, Assemblyman Berman, another author of the bill, commented that the ALRA “above all else, requires secret ballot elections in every instance.” (Hearing before Assem. Com. on Labor Relations, May 12, 1975, p. 2.) In addition to these comments, HCS quotes from a law review article by Professor Herman M. Levy who acted as a labor law consultant to the Agriculture and Services Agency in drafting the ALRA. In his article, Professor Levy wrote that, under the ALRA, “The sole means by which a labor organization can achieve certification as bargaining representative is to win a secret ballot election conducted by the board.” (Levy, The Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975—La Esperanza De California Para El Futuro (1975) 15 Santa Clara Law. 783, 789-790, fn. omitted.) There seems to be no doubt that the ALRA expressly provides only one means (i.e., secret ballot elections) by which a union seeking to represent a group of workers can ordinarily obtain recognition, and that this was the intent of those who drafted the legislation. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the Legislature intended to prohibit the Board from issuing a bargaining order as an extraordinary remedy where an employer’s egregious unfair labor practices have made it impossible to hold a free and fair election. On the contrary, as we shall explain, the Legislature’s intent in limiting the means of union recognition was unrelated to the issue of bargaining orders and the express purpose of the Act would seem to require—rather than preclude—the Board having authority to issue bargaining orders under certain circumstances. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that statutory language “must be given such interpretation as will promote rather than defeat the general purpose and policy of the law.” (People v. Centr-O-Mart (1950) 34 Cal.2d 702, 704 [214 P.2d 378].) This, in turn, requires us to “ ‘take into account matters such as context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of legislation upon the same subject, public policy, and contemporaneous construction.’” (Cassack v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 726, 733 [114 Cal.Rptr. 460, 523 P.2d 260].) The preamble to the ALRA states that: “In enacting this legislation the people of the State of California seek to ensure peace in the agricultural fields by guaranteeing justice for all agricultural workers and stability in labor relations, [t] This enactment is intended to bring certainty and a sense of fair play to a presently unstable and potentially volatile condition in the state.” (Stats. 1975, Third Ex. Sess., ch. 1, § 1, p. 4013.) More specifically, section 1140.2 declares that it is “the policy of the State of California to encourage and protect the right of agricultural employees to full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing . . . and to be free from the interference, restraint or coercion of employers ... in the designation of such representatives.” (Italics added.) As the Supreme Court recognized in Gissel, were we to interpret the ALRA to prohibit the issuance of bargaining orders, employers would be free to commit egregious unfair labor practices as a means of avoiding union organization, or defeating a union in an election, without fear of significant sanction. Clearly such an interpretation would defeat rather than promote the general purpose and policy of the Act. Indeed, in many cases it would make almost meaningless the agricultural employees’ right to “be free from the interference, restraint or coercion of employers ... in the designation of [their] representatives.” (§ 1140.2.) The fact that the Legislature restricted the means by which a union could seek recognition does not require us to adopt an interpretation so at odds with the purpose of the Act. In its decision in the instant case, the ALRB noted that the Legislature, in requiring secret elections, was not concerned with the propriety of bargaining orders. Rather, the “evil” sought to be remedied by the Legislature was the voluntary recognition of unions by employers, especially so-called “sweetheart” deals between employers and unions who lacked the support of the employees. This interpretation by the Board, “drawing upon its familiarity with the history of the ALRA and the ‘general understanding of the times’ ” must be given great weight. (Highland Ranch v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 848, 859 [176 Cal.Rptr. 753, 633 P.2d 949].) Moreover, the Board’s interpretation is fully supported by the historical context of the Act and by the very comments quoted by HCS. Prior to the ALRA’s enactment, the voluntary recognition of unions by agricultural employers, often without even consulting the employees, had become a major problem. This is graphically illustrated by the facts presented in Englund v. Chavez (1972) 8 Cal.3d 572 [105 Cal.Rptr. 521, 504 P.2d 457]. In Englund, an association of 27 growers in the Salinas Valley approached the Teamsters union to “feel out” the prospects of negotiating a bargaining agreement. The following day all 27 growers signed recognition agreements with the union and, within a week, all had executed 5-year exclusive “union shop” agreements. Neither the Teamsters nor the employers had informed or consulted the employees, upon whose behalf the agreements were purportedly signed. In fact, as the court noted, a substantial number of the workers, probably a majority, actually favored the UFW over the Teamsters. (Id., at p. 579.) The court characterized the employers’ conduct as “the ultimate form of favoritism, completely substituting the employer’s choice of unions for his employees’ desires.” (Id., at p. 591.) As a direct result of this sort of voluntary recognition by employers throughout California, a bitter struggle ensued between the UFW and the Teamsters that was “disorderly, occasionally bloody, and never the showplace of self-determination.” (Segur & Fuller, California’s Farm Labor Relations: An Analysis of the Initial Results (1976) 99 Monthly Lab. Rev. 25, 26; see also Comment, California’s Attempt to End Farmworker Voicelessness: A Survey of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975 (1976) 7 Pacific L.J. 197, 206-211.) In Highland Ranch, supra, 29 Cal.3d at page 858, we quoted with approval the Board’s observation in an earlier case (Kaplan’s Fruit & Produce Co., Inc. (1977) 3 ALRB No. 28, p. 7), that the facts in Englund v. Chavez, supra, 8 Cal.3d 572, were an integral part of the history leading to the enactment of the ALRA, and we affirmed the Board’s conclusion that section 1153, subdivision (f) (making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to bargain with a union that has not won a secret election) “was adopted for the purpose of prohibiting an employer from entering into a ‘sweetheart’ arrangement with one of two or more competing unions.” (Highland Ranch, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 859-860.) It was against this background of voluntary recognition and “sweetheart” deals that the ALRA was enacted. The comments of those who drafted the ALRA, quoted by HCS, are perfectly consistent with the Board’s conclusion that the secret ballot provisions were intended to preclude voluntary recognition, not bargaining orders. When considered in context, it is clear that all of the comments were made in reference to the importance of having worker-initiated secret elections as opposed to various means of voluntary recognition that had been abused by employers (and unions) in the past. For instance, Assemblyman Berman stated: “Now, A.B. 1533 is a measure which, above all else, requires secret ballot elections in every instance. The primary theme of this bill is self-determination by the workers. Recognition cannot be obtained by recognitional strikes; it cannot be obtained by pressures on the growers through the secondary boycott; it cannot be obtained by sweetheart contracts.” (Hearing before Assem. Com. on Labor Relations, supra, at p. 2.) Similarly, in response to a question concerning why employers are not given the right to call an election under the ALRA, as they are under the NLRA, Secretary Bird stated: “Now, under our Act, we only allow one way of recognition and that’s through a secret ballot election. We don’t allow recognitional strikes, we don’t allow authorization cards as they do under the NLRA, and it was a strong feeling after due deliberation on this issue that if you were going to bring some kind of resolution on the question of legitimacy, that if you allowed the employer to trigger the election mechanism, there would always be raised the question of whether or not he coerced the employees and forced an election upon employees in some way.” (Hearing before Sen. Industrial Relations Com., supra, at p. 51.) Similarly, in the sentence immediately following that quoted by HCS (ante, at p. 223), Professor Levy concluded that the secret election provisions of the Act “thus prohibit voluntary recognition of a labor organization by an employer. ...” (Levy, supra, at p. 789.) It appears from these comments and from the historical context of the Act that the Legislature provided for secret ballot elections, but precluded other means of recognition that had historically been abused by employers, because it felt this scheme would best ensure worker self-determination—the underlying purpose of the Act. There is nothing inconsistent between this intent to prevent coercion by employers, and the Board having authority to issue bargaining orders in extraordinary cases where an employer’s extreme and coercive tactics preclude the employees from expressing their choice in a free election. Indeed, as already discussed, a bargaining order may be the only way of ensuring worker self-determination under such circumstances. HCS next contends that the high court’s decision in Gissel was based on NLRA section 9(a) [29 U.S.C. § 159(a)] which implicitly allows for certification by means other than secret ballot elections. Since certification under the ALRA is limited to secret elections, HCS argues, Gissel is not “applicable precedent.” HCS misconstrues the holding in Gissel. In three of the cases consolidated in Gissel, the union had obtained authorization cards from a majority of employees and, on the basis of the cards, demanded recognition by the employers. All three employers refused to bargain with the union. The NLRB held that the employers’ refusal to bargain violated NLRA section 8(a)(5) and that this violation, in conjunction with other unfair labor practices committed by the employers, justified a bargaining order. In all three cases the Fourth Circuit reversed the Board’s findings of section 8(a)(5) violations on the grounds that an employer’s duty to bargain arose only after the union won a secret ballot election. Since the employers had no duty to bargain based solely on authorization cards, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, there were no section 8(a)(5) violations and bargaining orders were unwarranted. Thus, the Supreme Court in Gissel was faced with two independent questions: whether an employer’s duty to bargain under NLRA section 8(a)(5) can arise without a Board election and, if so, whether a bargaining order is an appropriate remedy where an employer rejects a card majority and refuses to bargain while at the same time committing unfair labor practices that tend to undermine the union’s majority and make a fair election an unlikely possibility (395 U.S. at p. 579 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 558]). It was in answering the first question that the court discussed NLRA section 9(a) and held that because section 9(a) allows for recognition by means other than secret ballot election, an employer’s duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5) could arise even in the absence of a Board election. (Id., at pp. 595-600 [23 L.Ed.2d at pp. 567-570].) Having so held, the court went on to address the second question—whether a bargaining order was an appropriate remedy. In upholding the Board’s authority to issue bargaining orders, the court did not in any way rely on its earlier discussion of section 9(a) or its conclusion that a union could obtain recognition under the NLRA by means other than a secret election. (Id.., at pp. 610-616 [23 L.Ed.2d at pp. 576-579].) Gissel is therefore not rendered inapplicable by the fact that, unlike under the ALRA, a union ordinarily may obtain recognition under the NLRA even in the absence of a secret election. Nor is Gissel rendered inapplicable by virtue of the fact that each of the cases consolidated in Gissel involved an unlawful refusal to bargain (i.e., a violation of NLRA § 8(a)(5)), whereas, in the instant case, there was no unlawful refusal to bargain. The Gissel court itself expressly approved the Board’s long standing policy of issuing bargaining orders, under certain circumstances, “in the absence of a § 8(a)(5) violation or even a bargaining demand” (Gissel, supra, at p. 614 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 578]), and there is considerable pre- and post -Gissel precedent for issuing bargaining orders to remedy violations of NLRA sections 8(a)(1) and (3) (which are identical, in pertinent part, to ALRA § 1153, subds. (a) and (c)) in the absence of any duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5). (See, e.g., N. L. R. B. v. Bighorn Beverage (9th Cir. 1980) 614 F.2d 1238, 1243; N. L. R. B. v. Production Plating Co. (6th Cir. 1980) 614 F.2d 1117; Appletree Chevrolet, Inc. (1980) 251 NLRB 666 [105 L.R.R.M. 1220]; Coating Products, Inc. (1980) 251 NLRB 1271 [105 L.R.R.M. 1399, 1400]; Drug Package, Inc. v. N. L. R. B. (8th Cir. 1978) 570 F.2d 1340, 1345; J.C. Penny Co. v. N. L. R. B. (10th Cir. 1967) 384 F.2d 479, 486; United Steelworkers of America v. N. L. R. B. (D.C. Cir. 1967) 376 F.2d 770, 772; N. L. R. B. v. Delight Bakery, Inc. (6th Cir. 1965) 353 F.2d 344, 346-347; Piasecki Aircraft Corp. v. N. L. R. B. (3d Cir. 1960) 280 F.2d 575, 591-592.) HCS makes four additional arguments to support its contention that bargaining orders are precluded under the ALRA. None of these arguments is persuasive. First, HCS argues that since it is an unfair labor practice only for an employer to refuse to bargain with a union that has won a secret election (§ 1153, subd. (e)), it would not be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain following a Gissel bargaining order. Since the Board’s remedial authority applies only to unfair labor practices (§ 1160.3), HCS argues, the Board is without authority to enforce a bargaining order where the union has not won an election. HCS concludes that the Legislature could not have intended to authorize bargaining orders yet provide no remedy if the employer refused to comply with the order. This argument is without merit. Although the Board’s remedial authority is restricted to unfair labor practices, the Board’s bargaining order in this case was issued expressly to remedy the 30 unfair labor practices it found HCS had committed. The Board can therefore seek court enforcement of its order under section 1160.8 whether or not the employer’s failure to comply with the order would, itself, constitute an independent unfair labor practice. Second, relying on its contention that the holding in Gissel was based on the fact that the NLRA does not limit the means of obtaining union recognition to secret elections, HCS argues that had the Legislature intended to allow Gissel bargaining orders despite the fact that the ALRA does limit the means of obtaining recognition, it would have expressly authorized such orders. As we have already discussed, this was not the basis of the holding in Gissel. HCS’ argument is therefore without merit. Next, noting that the ALRA expressly authorizes a make-whole remedy (§ 1160.3), HCS argues that had the Legislature intended to authorize bargaining orders it would have been similarly explicit. HCS’ reliance on the provision for a make-whole remedy is misplaced. Section 1148 mandates that the ALRB follow applicable precedent of the NLRA. The Legislature expressly authorized the make-whole remedy because this remedy was not clearly established NLRA precedent and therefore was not automatically incorporated through section 1148. As Secretary Bird explained: “[T]his language [concerning the make-whole remedy] was just placed in because there has been a good deal of discussion with the National Labor Relations Act that it ought to be amended to allow the ‘make whole’ remedy, and this is something that the people who have looked at this Act carefully believe is a progressive step and should be taken. And we decided since we were starting anew here in California, that we would take that progressive step.” (Hearing before Sen. Industrial Relations Com., supra, at pp. 64-65.) Because bargaining orders were well-established precedent at the time the ALRA was enacted, there was no similar need to make their authorization explicit. Finally, HCS notes that in 1979 the Legislature failed to enact Assembly Bill No. 840—an amendment to the ALRA that, among other things, would have expressly authorized the Board to issue bargaining orders. HCS argues that the Legislature’s failure to enact Assembly Bill No. 840 demonstrates both an absence of such authorization in the ALRA and a “reaffirmation” that bargaining orders should not be permitted. Of course, contrary to HCS’s contention, the Legislature’s failure to enact the amendment in 1979 demonstrates nothing about what the Legislature intended in 1975. At most it might arguably reflect an intent on the part of the Legislature in 1979 that bargaining orders not be permitted. As a general matter, the inferences that can be drawn merely from the Legislature’s failure to enact a bill are quite limited. As this court has warned, “At best, ‘Legislative silence is a Delphic divination.’” (Citation omitted.) (Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 392, 418 [128 Cal.Rptr. 183, 546 P.2d 687].) For a number of reasons, the Legislature’s failure to enact Assembly Bill No. 840 does not justify an inference that the Legislature thereby intended to preclude bargaining orders. First, the circumstances surrounding the demise of Assembly Bill No. 840 were rather pedestrian and unrevealing. The legislative history shows that the bill was read for the first time on March 12, 1979, and referred to the Committee on Labor, Employment and Consumer Affairs where it was held without recommendation until January 30, 1980, at which time it was filed with the chief clerk “pursuant to Joint Rule 56,” and “died pursuant to Art. IV, sec. 10(a) of the Constitution.” Second, there was another major provision in the amendment, unrelated to bargaining orders, that might have been responsible for the Legislature’s failure to enact Assembly Bill No. 840. This other provision declared make-whole relief inappropriate where the employer refuses to bargain in order to seek judicial review of the certification of an election by the Board. Finally, the Legislature may well have felt that Assembly Bill No. 840 was unnecessary since section 1148 requires the Board to follow applicable NLRA precedent and bargaining orders were already well-established precedent under the NLRA. Under these circumstances, we cannot infer from the Legislature’s failure to enact Assembly Bill No. 840 that the Legislature intended to prohibit bargaining orders. Where an employer forecloses the possibility of holding a free and fair election by committing egregious unfair labor practices, a bargaining order may be the only way to ensure worker self-determination, “free from the interference, restraint and coercion of employers” (§ 1140.2). Were we to construe the ALRA’s mandate for secret ballot elections to prohibit the Board from issuing remedial bargaining orders we would, in essence, be transforming the workers’ most effective shield into the employers’ most formidable sword. We find nothing in the language or legislative history of the Act to compel such a construction. We therefore hold that the ALRB has authority to issue remedial bargaining orders in appropriate cases. We turn now to the question whether a bargaining order was an appropriate remedy in this case. III. Appropriateness of Bargaining Order in This Case In fashioning its remedies, “the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, and its choice of remedy must therefore be given special respect by reviewing courts.” (Gissel, supra, at p. 612, fn. 32 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 577].) A reviewing court will reverse the Board’s choice of remedy only if it amounts to an abuse of discretion. (Butte View Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 961, 967 [157 Cal.Rptr. 476].) In issuing the bargaining order in this case, the ALRB held that HCS’s unfair labor practices were so outrageous and pervasive that they fell within the first category of cases described by the Gissel court (see, ante, at p. 221), thus making a bargaining order appropriate even in the absence of a card majority. It is unclear, however, whether the Board relied on this finding in issuing its bargaining order. After summarizing HCS’s 30 unfair labor practices the Board held: “We affirm the ALJ’s conclusion that a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit had signed cards authorizing the UFW to represent them prior to the eléction. We therefore rely on these cards to establish that a majority of the employees had indicated their support for the UFW, and implement a bargaining order to return events to the status quo prior to the unfair labor practices.” Because we conclude that the bargaining order issued in this case was appropriate under the second Gissel category, we need not decide whether it could also be sustained on the basis of the first Gissel category. In order to support a “second category” bargaining order, the Board must find that “the possibility of erasing the effects of past [unfair labor] practices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though present, is slight and that the employee sentiment once expressed through cards would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order.” (Gissel, supra, at pp. 614-615 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 578], italics added.) HCS makes a number of challenges to the authorization cards relied on by the Board in holding that a bargaining order was justified under the second category of Gissel. First, HCS argues that the authorization cards signed by a majority of HCS employees were improperly admitted into evidence before the ALJ. The general counsel’s complaint did not allege that the UFW had obtained a card majority, nor did it specifically request a bargaining order remedy. When the UFW moved to amend the complaint (apparently to include a bargaining order request) the general counsel, as well as HCS, objected to the amendment and to the introduction of any evidence—including authorization cards—relating to the propriety of a bargaining order. The ALJ denied the UFW’s motion to amend the complaint and refused to admit evidence of majority status on the grounds that, since there were no allegations in the complaint concerning majority status, such evidence was “immaterial and irrelevant.” The UFW sent a mail-o-gram to the ALRB requesting immediate review of the ALJ’s decision and the Board, while upholding the denial of the UFW’s motion to amend the complaint, apparently instructed the ALJ to admit evidence relating to majority support. HCS argues that the authorization cards were immaterial and irrelevant and therefore should not have been admitted. Although the general counsel’s complaint did not specifically request a bargaining order, the prayer for relief did include a request that the Board provide “such other and further relief as will effectuate the purposes of the Act.” The Board has broad discretion in choosing the most appropriate remedy and there is nothing in the ALRA or the regulations to suggest that the Board may grant only those remedies specifically requested in the prayer for relief. Thus, evidence concerning any remedy potentially appropriate on the facts alleged in the complaint is material and relevant. Evidence of a card majority is clearly both material and relevant to the propriety of a bargaining order and therefore the authorization cards were properly admitted into evidence. HCS next argues that, even if the cards were relevant, the Board “violated and abrogated” the general counsel’s final authority under section 1149 by ordering the ALJ to admit the cards into evidence over the general counsel’s objections. While the general counsel does have final authority with respect to the investigation and prosecution of unfair labor practice charges, it is the Board’s responsibility to decide the merits of the case and to fashion an appropriate remedy. Obviously, the Board cannot determine the appropriate remedy if it is denied information critical to make that determination. In this case, the Board’s order to the ALJ simply required the admission of evidence necessary to consider, and possibly fashion, a remedy for the unfair labor practice charges which the general counsel had alleged in its complaint. This order therefore did not unduly infringe upon the general counsel’s sphere of authority. HCS next argues that, even if the authorization cards were properly admitted, they are not reliable indicators of majority support in this case. In affirming the ALJ’s conclusion that a majority of employees had signed authorization cards and that the cards “establish that a majority of the employees had indicated their support for the UFW,” the Board relied to some extent on N.L.R.B. v. Cumberland Shoe Corp. (1963) 144 NLRB 1268 [54 L.R.R.M. 1233], enforced (6th Cir. 1965) 351 F.2d 917. Under the Cumberland Shoe doctrine, “if the card itself is unambiguous (/. e., states on its face that the signer authorizes the Union to represent the employee for collective bargaining purposes and not to seek an election), it will be counted unless it is proved that the employee was told that the card was to be used solely for the purpose of obtaining an election.” (Gissel, supra, at p. 584 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 561].) Thus, even if employees are told that the purpose of the cards is to obtain an election, the cards will be valid so long as the employees are not told that this is the sole purpose of the cards. (Cumberland Shoe, supra, 351 F.2d at p. 920.) It is undisputed that the cards in this case clearly and unambiguously stated (in English and Spanish) that employees who signed the card authorized the UFW to represent them for collective bargaining purposes. HCS nonetheless argues that the cards do not pass the Cumberland Shoe test. First, HCS argues that the testimony of UFW organizers reveals that, in speaking with employees, each of them emphasized the need to have a majority of cards in order to secure an election. HCS also notes the testimony of six HCS employees that organizers told them the cards would be used to obtain an election and that the workers would receive certain benefits if the union won the election. As already discussed, even if organizers told HCS employees only that the cards would be used for an election, the cards would still be valid under the Cumberland Shoe doctrine as long as the employees were not told that the cards would be used solely for the purpose of obtaining an election. Furthermore, there was testimony that union organizers did not tell HCS employees only that the cards would be used for an election but, in addition, emphasized that the cards indicated support for the UFW and authorized the union to represent them; discussed the benefits that would accrue to workers if the UFW was their representative; and asked workers to read the cards before signing them or in some cases, read the cards to the workers. HCS makes a second argument which is a bit more troubling. In warning against too mechanical an application of the Cumberland Shoe doctrine, the Gissel court quoted with approval the following statement by the NLRB in Levi Straus & Co. (1968) 172 NLRB 732 [68 L.R.R.M. 1338]: “The foregoing does not of course imply that a finding of misrepresentation [in the solicitation of cards] is confined to situations where employees are expressly told in haec verba that the “sole” or “only” purpose of the cards is to obtain an election. The Board has never suggested such a mechanistic application of the foregoing principles, as some have contended. The Board looks to substance rather than to form. It is not the use or nonuse of certain key or “magic” words that is controlling, but whether or not the totality of circumstances surrounding the card solicitation is such, as to add up to an assurance to the card signer that his card will be used for no purpose other than to help get an election.’ ” (Gissel, supra, at p. 608, fn. 27 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 575].) HCS argues that a consideration of the “totality of circumstances surrounding the card solicitation” in this case, reveals that employees who signed the cards knew that the cards would be used for the sole purpose of obtaining an election. In particular, HCS notes that at the time of its enactment the ALRA was represented to legislators, the public and, most importantly, agricultural workers, as allowing union recognition only through secret ballot elections. This has been reinforced by the fact that, in practice, unions have been certified under the ALRA only after winning an election. HCS argues that, in addition, the literature and comments of UFW organizers gave HCS employees the clear impression that workers would obtain the benefits of union representation only if the UFW won an election. There is some merit to HCS’s argument. If employees believed that by signing the cards they were, in effect, “voting” only for an election and not necessarily for the union, it is arguable that their signatures do not necessarily represent a strong commitment to or support for the union. On the other hand, in the bargaining order context, “we need only decide whether the cards are reliable enough to support a bargaining order where a fair election probably could not have been held, or where an election that has been held was in fact set aside.” (Gissel, supra, at p. 601, fn. 18 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 571], italics added.) There is substantial evidence in the record that UFW organizers, in speaking with HCS employees, encouraged them to read the cards and emphasized the benefits of union representation. Except for the testimony of one current HCS employee, there is no evidence that union organizers urged workers to sign cards regardless of their feelings about the union, or simply to support the democratic process. (See, e.g., Cumberland Shoe, supra, 351 F.2d at p. 920.) Under these circumstances, we believe the authorization cards obtained by the UFW are “reliable enough” to support the Board’s bargaining order. Even if the authorization cards are considered reliable, however, a second category bargaining order is justified only if the Board finds that “the possibility of erasing the effects of past [unfair labor] practices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though present, is slight. ...” (Gissel, supra, at p. 614 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 578].) HCS argues that a bargaining order is not appropriate in this case because traditional remedies are sufficient. HCS relies primarily on its contention that sufficient time has passed since the alleged unfair labor practices, and worker turnover has been so extensive that the “taint” has been dissipated and a fair rerun election could now be held. The Board takes the position that, in determining whether to issue a bargaining order, it need not consider events occurring subsequent to the employer’s unfair labor practices. There is a great deal of confusion under the NLRA whether “subsequent events,” such as the passage of time and employee turnover, should be considered by the NLRB and/or reviewing courts in deciding the appropriateness of a bargaining order. (See Comment, “After All, Tomorrow is Another Day”: Should Subsequent Events Affect the Validity of Bargaining Orders? (1979) 31 Stan.L.Rev. 505, 512-521, and cases cited therein.) Much of this confusion stems from a failure of the circuit courts, in particular, to make clear which “subsequent events” are at issue in a given case: those occurring between the unfair labor practices and the Board’s order; those occurring between the Board’s order and the reviewing court’s decision; or both. We think it clear that in reviewing the propriety of a bargaining order issued by the Board, appellate courts should not consider events that occur subsequent to the Board’s bargaining order. As the Ninth Circuit stated in N.L.R.B. v. L. B. Foster Company (9th Cir. 1969) 418 F.2d 1: “[Delay] is an unfortunate but inevitable result of the process of hearing, decision and review prescribed in the Act. And to deny enforcement, with or without remand for reconsideration on the basis of facts occurring after the Board’s decision, is to put a premium upon continued litigation by the employer; it can hope that the resulting delay will produce a new set of facts, as to which the Board must then readjudicate. Suppose that the Board does so, and again finds against the employer. There can then be a petition to this court, a decision by it, and a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. By that time there will almost surely be another new set of facts. When is the process to stop?” (Id., at p. 4.) The employer in Foster specifically urged, as does HCS, that rapid turnover in its workforce eliminated the necessity of a bargaining order. In Foster, the Ninth Circuit answered: “Emphasis is given to the rapid turnover in the employer’s personnel as a reason for not enforcing the order. But we think that this is a reason to enforce. Otherwise there will be an added inducement to the employer to indulge in unfair practices in order to defeat the union in an election. He will have as an ally, in addition to the attrition of union support inevitably springing from delay in accomplishing results, the fact that turnover itself will help him, so that the longer he can hold out the better his chances of victory will be.” (Id., at p. 5.) (See also, Justak Bros, and Co., Inc. v. N. L. R. B. (7th Cir. 1981) 664 F.2d 1074, 1082; Curlee Clothing Co. v. N.L.R.B. (8th Cir. 1979) 607 F.2d 1213, 1216; N.L.R.B. v. Pacific Southwest Airlines (9th Cir. 1977) 550 F.2d 1148, 1153; N.L.R.B. v. Henry Colder Company (7th Cir. 1971) 447 F.2d 629, 630.) For similar reasons, we approve the ALRB’s position that, in determining the propriety of a bargaining order, it need not consider the passage of time or employee turnover which has occurred between the time of the employer’s unfair labor practices and the time of the Board’s order. Prior to Gissel, the Supreme Court had repeatedly held that the NLRB, in deciding whether to issue a bargaining order, could properly ignore events subsequent to the employer’s unfair labor practices. (See, e.g., Labor Board v. Katz (1962) 369 U.S. 736, 748, fn. 16 [8 L.Ed.2d 230, 239, 82 S.Ct. 1107]; Franks Bros. Co. v. Labor Board (1944) 321 U.S. 702, 704-706 [88 S.Ct. 1020, 1022-1023, 64 S.Ct. 817]; Labor Board v. P. Lorillard Co. (1942) 314 U.S. 512, 513 [86 L.Ed. 380, 382, 62 S.Ct. 397].) Since Gissel, the NLRB has consistently adhered to its position that events subsequent to an employer’s unfair labor practices should be ignored. (See, e.g., Bandag, Incorporated (1977) 228 NLRB 1045, 1045, fn. 1, enforced (5th Cir. 1978) 583 F.2d 765; Gibson Products Company (1970) 185 NLRB 362, 363, supplemented by 199 NLRB 794, enforcement den. (5th Cir. 1974) 494 F.2d 762; cf., N.L.R.B. v. American Cable Systems, Inc. (5th Cir. 1970) 427 F.2d 446, 448-449; Clark’s Gamble Corporation v. N. L. R. B. (6th Cir. 1970) 422 F.2d 845, 846-847.) The rationale for the NLRB’s position was stated in Gibson Products Company, supra, 185 NLRB 362, 363: “[I]n determining whether the employer’s unfair labor practices are of such a nature as to preclude a fair election and thus necessitate a bargaining order based on a past card showing of majority status, the situation must be appraised as of the time of the commission of the unfair labor practices, and not currently. For, in virtually every case, by the time a Board decision is reached, there is likely to be sufficient employee turnover and other changes to make it arguable, where the employer has meanwhile refrained from committing new unfair labor practices, that an election held now would be free of the taint of the old unfair labor practices. But, the union and the employees then supporting it were entitled to an election at an earlier time, and, if the employer’s original unfair labor practices were of such a nature as to deprive them of an election at that time, to permit one now, when the union’s support has been unlawfully dissipated, ‘would in effect be rewarding the employer and allowing him “to profit from [his] own wrongful refusal to bargain” ’ Gissel, supra, 395 U.S. at 610.” (Id., at p. 363, fn. omitted.) The NLRB’s policy of refusing to consider “subsequent events” is particularly appropriate in the ALRA context. The agricultural workforce is, in large part, a migratory one. Agricultural employees typically work for several employers during the course of the year and frequently do not work for the same employers from one year to the next. Thus, high employee turnover is inherent in agricultural employment. If agricultural employers could rely on employee turnover to prevent the Board from issuing bargaining orders, employers would have not just an “added inducement” (Foster, supra, 418 F.2d at p. 5) but an absolute inducement to engage in unfair labor practices in order to prevent a union from obtaining or winning an election, for they could be virtually certain that by the time their case reached the Board, there would be sufficient employee turnover to preclude a bargaining order. We are mindful of the potential conflict between the Board’s position and the ALRA’s goal of effectuating employee free choice. Ignoring events that occur between the employer’s unfair labor practices and the Board’s order will inevitably lead to cases in which a union is certified notwithstanding that only a minority of the workers employed at the time of certification had signed authorization cards or, worse yet, wished to be represented by the certified union. However, even in the absence of unfair labor practices and Gissel bargaining orders, it is often the case that a majority of the employees at any given time were not employed when the authorization cards were solicited and the election held. In the agricultural context this may well be the rule rather than the exception. Yet the ALRA, and labor law generally, are premised on a legal fiction of sorts that the union elected by past employees is the freely chosen representative of current employees. In addition, it should be remembered, as the court in Gissel noted, that “[tjhere is, after all, nothing permanent in a bargaining order, and if, after the effects of the employer’s acts have worn off, the employees clearly desire to disavow the union, they can do so by filing a [decertification] petition.” (Gissel, supra, at p. 613 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 577]; see § 1156.7.) Finally, it is not at all clear that by considering subsequent events, the Board would actually be promoting the free choice of current employees. Were the Board to adopt a policy of considering subsequent events it would be forced, in almost all cases, to order a rerun election rather than issue a bargaining order. This would effectively remove the threat, and therefore the deterrent value of bargaining orders. Thus, while current workers would be given the chance to have their own election, the employer would be relatively free to interfere with the new election, just as it had with the earlier one. Given the rapid and extensive worker turnover inherent in agricultural employment, we believe the policies of the ALRA are best served by the Board’s position that, in deciding whether to issue a bargaining order, it may properly ignore the passage of time and employee turnover subsequent to the employer’s unfair labor practices. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Board’s order in this case was both authorized and appropriate. Let a decree issue enforcing the order of the Board. Broussard, Acting C. L, Kaus, L, Reynoso, L, and Levins, J., concurred. Appendix Employee Information Cards On March 15, 1977, petitioner began distributing “information cards” which requested that employees disclose their name, address, and social security number. At the bottom of each card was a typewritten statement which read: “I Do Want []” “I Do Not Want []” “. . . the information contained on/in this card to remain confidential.” This was followed by a space for the date and employee’s signature. Although the cards were printed in both English and Spanish, no explanation for the confidentiality clause was provided. As a result, many employees refused to sign believing that it constituted an attempt to ascertain their union sentiments. Owner, Harry Carian, testified that he had inserted the new clause based on employee request. The ALJ determined that these cards, although innocuous on their face, constituted unlawful interrogation in violation of section 1153, subdivision (a). The Board affirmed this finding. [] [In Carian v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 654 (205 Cal.Rptr. 657, 685 P.2d 701), we recently upheld the Board’s finding that another “employee information card” solicitation conducted by HCS violated section 1153, subdivision (a). The cards involved in Carian stated that the information requested “may be given by the Agricultural Labor Relations Board to union organizers,” and attributed to each employee, through a printed statement above his signature, the pronouncement that he was “ ‘not willing to supply any information that I have not written on this card.’ ” (Id., at p. 671.) We upheld the Board’s finding that distribution of the cards “ ‘constitutes interrogation in violation of Section 1153(a) in that the workers were in effect being asked to disclose their attitudes for or against the union by giving or refusing their addresses.’” (Id., at p. 671.) As we explained in Carian, where the issue before the court is whether the ALRB is justified in finding the “employee information cards” to be a form of prohibited interrogation, “that issue does not turn upon whether the employer intended them to be interrogative of his employee’s attitudes toward the union, or whether he intended thereby to coerce or intimidate them [citation omitted], or whether there was evidence that some employees actually felt coerced or intimidated. The issue turns, rather, upon whether the ALRB could properly find that employees were likely to perceive the language on the cards as calling upon them to indicate, to their employer, whether they wished to have further communication with the union and its organizers.” (Id., at p. 672, original italics.) Although the “information cards” at issue in this case did not include a warning that the information might be given to union organizers, the cards were distributed, with no explanation, during the UFW’s intensive organizing campaign. At the same time, the provision allowing employees to request that the information be kept confidential is quite similar to the statement printed on the cards at issue in Carian stating that the employee was unwilling to supply certain information. Under these circumstances, the Board “could properly find that employees were likely to perceive the language on the cards as calling upon them to indicate, to their employer, whether they wished to have further communication with the union and its organizers.” (Id., at p. 672.) Accordingly, the Board’s finding is affirmed.] Termination of Mayo Crew On March 28, 1977, employee Vitaliano Mayo and 43 members of his “grape thinning” crew were discharged by petitioner. A UFW organizer testified that the Mayo crew was 85 percent “pro-union.” Many members signed authorization cards, participated in UFW projects, donated funds for radio spots, passed out leaflets, and displayed posters. Others joined Cesar Chavez in a union march the day before the discharge. Petitioner asserted unproductivity as the reason for the discharge. Comparative records were introduced which revealed that other crews worked considerably faster than the Mayo crew. Petitioner did not, however, rely on his usual method of gauging productivity and no mass firing of an entire crew had occurred in over 19 years. The ALJ determined that the motivating reason for the discharge was lack of productivity rather than union sympathy or activity. Accordingly, he refused to find a section 1153, subdivision (a) or (c), violation. The Board rejected this finding. Section 1153, subdivision (c), of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “[b]y discrimination in regard to the hiring or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment, to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” The Board’s general counsel has the burden of establishing that the employer has engaged in discriminatory conduct which could have adversely affected employee rights. (Rivcom Corp. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 743, 757-758 [195 Cal.Rptr. 651, 670 P.2d 305].) Among the factors to be weighed in determining the general counsel’s prima facie case are the employer’s antiunion animus, the timing of the alleged conduct, and the extent to which the employer knew that discharged employees were union sympathizers or activists. Once the prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that he was motivated by legitimate objectives. If the proffered justifications are not “legitimate and substantial,” an unfair labor practice results without reference to intent. (Id.) In this instance, the record is replete with evidence of antiunion animus. Petitioner was found to have engaged in a number of unfair labor practices, including unlawful surveillance, interrogation, and threats. These incidents all occurred within a six-week period during a pre-election campaign. Petitioner’s knowledge of employee union sympathy or activity may be inferred from the highly visible and vocal activities of the Mayo crew. Finally, the timing of the discharge—one day following a major march by Cesar Chavez in which a member of the Mayo crew was prominently visible—buttresses the suggestion that the discharge was discriminatory. This evidence clearly establishes a prima facie case of discrimination. Both the ALJ and the Board reached this conclusion. The ALJ, however, accepted petitioner’s stated justification, while the Board rejected it. [] The “substantial evidence” standard is not modified when the Board and ALJ disagree. If the Board “can point to evidence” which supports its inference and if this evidence is “substantial” when measured against the ALJ’s contrary findings as well as the opposing evidence, its finding must be upheld. (Abatti Farms, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 317, 336 [165 Cal.Rptr. 887]; Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (9th Cir. 1977) 565 F.2d 1074, 1078.) In this instance, the Board in rejecting the ALJ’s finding of economic justification indicated the evidentiary reasons for this rejection. It noted the production records allegedly relied on by the petitioner contained a number of discrepancies and dealt this evidence a fatal blow by pointing out that these records were not received by the petitioner until after the termination of the Mayo crew. We, therefore, affirm the Board’s unfair labor practice finding. Wage Increase On March 29, 1977, one day after the Mayo crew had been fired and two days after a UFW-sponsored march through the Coachella Valley, petitioner conferred a wage increase on all workers (from $2.70 per hour to $3.15 per hour). The raise was communicated to workers in two ways: by anti-union leaflet, and by supervisor Jose Castro who also informed them that petitioner would raise wages to $3.40 if the union went that high. Petitioner characterized the pay raise as a merit increase which had been discussed well in advance of its announcement. The ALJ determined that petitioner’s conduct constituted unlawful interference in violation of Labor Code section 1153, subdivision (a). The Board affirmed this finding. Conduct immediately favorable to employees may constitute a section 1153, subdivision (a), violation in the same manner and degree as threats. (Labor Board v. Parts Co. (1964) 375 U.S. 405, 409 [11 L.Ed.2d 435, 438, 84 S.Ct. 457].) “‘Interference is no less interference because it is accomplished through allurements rather than coercion.’ ” (National Labor Relations Board v. Crown Can Co. (8th Cir. 1943) 138 F.2d 263, 267 [quoting Western Cartridge Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (7th Cir. 1943) 134 F.2d 240, 244].) Despite petitioner’s arguments to the contrary, the absence of a formally pending election petition does not alter this result. (Royal Packing Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 826, 840 [161 Cal.Rptr. 870].) The test is whether the benefits promised or conferred are intended to and do interfere with workers’ organization rights. {Id.) Given the fact that the grant of benefits was presented in an employer speech and leaflet at the peak of a preelection campaign, one day after the firing of an