Full opinion text
Opinion EAGLESON, J. Defendant Keith Edward Adcox was convicted of the first degree murder of David Orozco (Pen. Code, § 187), robbery (§ 211), and grand theft auto (§ 487, subd. 3). The jury made an express finding “that the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.” Defendant was found to have personally used a firearm in the commission of the robbery. (§ 12022.5). Two special circumstance allegations under the 1978 death penalty law were found true: that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)), and that the murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)). The jury fixed the penalty at death; this appeal is automatic. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; § 1239, subd. (b).) We conclude that the murder-for-financial-gain special circumstance must be set aside under People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731 [209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994, 64 A.L.R.4th 723]. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. I. Guilt Phase A. Facts Prosecution Case On May 23, 1982, defendant, age 20, his girlfriend Annette Tillery, age 16, and acquaintance Howard Love, age 18, left Modesto to go on a camping trip in Tuolumne County. Defendant brought camping and fishing gear, a knife, and his .22 caliber rifle. The group purchased dried beans and potatoes with $23 obtained from Tillery’s uncle. A friend of defendant’s drove them to Twain Harte. They hitched a ride up the mountain to MiWuk Village, continued walking toward Long Barn, and eventually left the highway and made camp. Defendant used his rifle to shoot at small animals near the campsite. The following day they walked to a campground at Lyons Lake and set up camp in an undesignated area. Tillery and Love cut into a tent and stole canned foods. The manager told them to move to a proper camping space. According to Tillery, defendant became upset that evening. Fearing he was “going to do something,” she put his rifle under her coat and took a walk with Love. Upon their return, Love unloaded the weapon. The group stayed at Lyons Lake for two days. When advised they would have to pay for the campsite, they moved on. On the fourth day they walked to the north fork of the Tuolumne River and set up camp alongside a footpath paralleling the river bank. Defendant had possession of his rifle which he kept in his sleeping bag. The three ate meals of beans, potatoes and fish caught by defendant and Love. On the fifth day, May 27, Tillery became tired of eating potatoes and fish and announced she wanted cinnamon rolls. She suggested selling her coat to get money for them, but defendant and Love said no. Two fishermen, Richard Smith and the victim, David Orozco, walked past the campsite at different times. Smith spoke briefly with defendant about the fishing. Tillery offered to use herself as “bait” to set one of the men up for a mugging. Defendant refused, stating he was not interested in her plan. At one point Tillery asked if she could leave to hitchhike home alone. She then suggested that they hit someone over the head and throw him into the river to get some money. The matter was discussed; defendant and Love ultimately agreeing to rob someone in that manner. Tillery walked out to the dirt parking area, observed two vehicles: a Volkswagen Scirocco and a small truck, and reported back to defendant and Love. Richard Smith testified that he fished for about an hour and again exchanged a few words with defendant about the fishing as he walked past their campsite en route back to his truck. Love then went to the parking area and returned, reporting that the Volkswagen was now the only car left in the area. After further discussion it was agreed that defendant and Love would rob the victim “to get some money to get back home and transportation.” Love asked Tillery, “Are you ready for this?” She replied, “I am.” Defendant told Tillery to stay at the campsite. Defendant took his rifle, Love picked up a “club” from the ground, and the two walked off in the direction taken by David Orozco. Defendant and Love were gone 30 to 45 minutes when defendant came running down the trail and stated to Tillery, “Let’s get out of here.” Tillery asked “if the guy was dead”; defendant replied that he did not know. Defendant and Tillery quickly gathered their belongings and headed for the dirt parking area. Love followed “shortly behind.” Love had the keys to the Volkswagen. They loaded their gear into the vehicle and Love drove off, with defendant in the passenger seat and Tillery on his lap. Tillery testified that defendant had the victim’s wallet. He removed the money and threw the wallet out of the car. Defendant told Tillery he had shot Orozco, that it was “horrible,” and that “there was blood bubbling out of his nose and mouth.” The group drove back to Modesto in the victim’s Volkswagen. Defendant devised a plan to push the car into a canal. He enlisted the assistance of his brother, Michael Adcox, who was told to follow them to the canal in his own car to assist in disposing of “Love’s” vehicle because “it had too many tickets on it.” En route, defendant removed the in-dash stereo cassette player from the victim’s car. At the canal, defendant, Love and Tillery removed additional items from the vehicle, including the victim’s red baby carrier, and placed them in Michael’s vintage 1957 Chevrolet station wagon. Defendant and Love then pushed the car into the canal. Tillery was dropped off at her grandmother’s house; she took her belongings and the baby carrier. When she asked defendant for some money, he obtained $5 from Love and gave it to her. Michael Adcox then drove defendant and Love to Love’s father’s residence in a trailer park. Defendant and Love told Michael not to tell anyone they were back in town. They offered to sell him the victim’s car stereo for $50, but Michael declined. Defendant kept the stereo cassette player and gave it to friends with whom he was staying on the following day. A farmer was disking his field on the evening of May 27 when he saw a vehicle partially submerged in the canal and a distinctive 1957 Chevrolet station wagon speeding away from the scene. He attempted to pull the Volkswagen from the water with his tractor and then notified the police of his find. On the morning after the murder the body of David Orozco was discovered by another fisherman who alerted the Tuolumne County Sheriff’s office. An autopsy was performed and a .22 caliber bullet removed from the victim’s head. Sheriff’s divers found defendant’s .22 caliber rifle in the river 100 feet upstream from where the body was found. Criminalist William Chisum reviewed the crime scene and physical evidence, and conducted experiments in an attempt to reconstruct the shooting. It was clear from the evidence that the victim was kneeling, looking down, and placing a salmon egg on his fishhook when he was shot from behind. Powder burns and other evidence established that the muzzle of the rifle was between six and ten feet from the entry wound when the fatal shot was fired from a ledge of rocks overlooking the victim’s position. The victim fell on his face onto a rock directly in front of where he was kneeling. Bloodstains evidenced that he had been rolled over while still alive. His wallet, car keys and vehicle were missing. An all-points bulletin was put out for the victim’s Volkswagen. The investigation focused on defendant when his father learned that a car matching the description of his son Michael’s 1957 Chevy station wagon was seen speeding from the site where the victim’s car was pulled from the canal. Defendant’s father and brother went to the Stanislaus County Sheriff’s office where Michael furnished a statement regarding his involvement in defendant’s and Love’s attempt to dispose of the car. On May 30, Tuolumne County Sheriff’s deputies executed a search warrant at Tillery’s grandmother’s house and recovered the baby carrier stolen from the victim’s vehicle. As they were leaving, defendant and Tillery were observed walking down the street. Tillery was taken into custody; defendant fled and managed to escape. He was apprehended the following day at the home of friends with whom he had been staying. The stereo cassette player stolen from the victim’s vehicle was seized from the house. Tillery initially gave a false statement; thereafter she furnished a second statement admitting her role in the robbery and implicating defendant and Love in the crimes. She returned to the crime scene with police and also led them to the roadside location from which the victim’s wallet was recovered. At trial, the prosecution and defense entered into broad stipulations covering several major aspects of the People’s case. The jury was told that the parties had stipulated to all of the following: that David Orozco was shot and killed on May 27, 1982; that the fatal bullet removed from his skull was fired by the .22 caliber rifle recovered from the river in the vicinity where his body was found; that defendant had brought the rifle into Tuolumne County on a camping trip; that on May 27 defendant, Love and Tillery left the scene near where the victim’s body was found in the victim’s vehicle; that defendant rode as a passenger in the vehicle to the location in Modesto where it was pushed into a canal; and that the car stereo introduced into evidence had been taken from the victim’s vehicle. The rifle, the stereo, the bullet removed from the victim’s head, and a photograph of the victim’s vehicle were all stipulated into evidence without objection. Defense Defendant testified in his own behalf. Tillery was his girlfriend and slept with him during the camping trip. “Just about everything” Tillery testified to was true, although she lied in stating that he was upset on the first night of the trip and that she and Love had to take the rifle away from him. On the day of the shooting, Tillery suggested that they knock a victim over the head and throw him into the river; “anything to get sweet rolls, rob them, whatever.” Defendant admitted agreeing with Love and Tillery to rob Orozco “just to keep them quiet.” He and Love walked to within 30 feet of the victim’s position near the river bank. Defendant was armed with his rifle. Love had taken a “club” but dropped it “somewhere along the way”; defendant conceded he alone was armed when they approached the victim. They stood and watched Orozco for several minutes. Defendant decided he didn’t want anything to do with the robbery, “sort of tossed” the rifle to Love, turned and ran. Three seconds later he heard a shot. Defendant walked back out of curiosity to see what had happened and saw blood coming from the victim’s nose and mouth. He denied shooting the victim or taking his wallet. He denied throwing the rifle into the river or seeing who did; Love had it and could have done so. Defendant was scared and ran back to camp. He and Tillery gathered up most of their belongings. As they were starting down the trail Love appeared and announced that he had the car keys. They loaded their gear into the victim’s car; Love drove, Tillery sat on defendant’s lap in the passenger seat. En route to Modesto, Love gave defendant the victim’s wallet, telling him to remove the money (approximately $30) and throw the wallet away, which defendant did. When Tillery asked what had happened, defendant told her he shot Orozco. Defendant testified he did so because, “I thought it would make me look bigger to her in her eyes. I’m not sure.” Tillery suggested the car stereo could be sold, so defendant removed it. Love wanted to burn the vehicle. Defendant devised the plan to push it into a canal instead, enlisted his brother Michael’s assistance, and personally helped push the vehicle into the water. Defendant testified he gave the car stereo to friends as payment for their letting him stay with them. Upon Tillery’s arrest, defendant fled and escaped out of fear that authorities would not believe his side of the story. For similar reasons, upon his own arrest, when questioned by officers and confronted with Tillery’s statement, he denied any complicity in the murder or even having been in Tuolumne County at the relevant times. The defense also called Richard Carr, who while an inmate in the Tuolumne County jail, was allegedly told by Howard Love, “I’m here for first degree murder, I did it, I’m proud of it, if I had to, I would do it again.” Carr recalled that Love said only that he “did it,” not that he had personally shot the murder victim. Carr also testified that he viewed Love’s statement as merely an attempt to establish a “tough guy” reputation at the jail. In a second conversation, Love told Carr that defendant had done the shooting. B. Guilt Phase Issues Defendant raises a number of contentions relating to the issue of guilt. None, as we shall show, warrants reversal. 1. Change of Venue Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for change of venue under section 1033 on grounds that pretrial publicity and strong community sentiment prejudiced potential jurors against him. a) Pretrial Publicity Section 1033 states in pertinent part: “In a criminal action . . . the court shall order a change of venue . . . [o]n motion of the defendant, to another county when it appears that there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial jury cannot be had in the county. . . .” We have explained that “Whether raised on petition for writ of mandate or on appeal from judgment of conviction, the reviewing court must independently examine the record and determine de novo whether a fair trial is or was obtainable. [Citations.] The factors to be considered are the nature and gravity of the offense, the nature and extent of the news coverage, the size of the community, the status of the defendant in the community, and the popularity and prominence of the victim. [Citation.]” (People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 948 [171 Cal.Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240].) When our review is posttrial, we also examine the voir dire of both prospective and actual jurors to determine whether the pretrial publicity in fact had a prejudicial effect. (Harris, supra, at p. 949.) Our evaluation of the record in consideration of these five factors satisfies us that defendant could obtain a fair and impartial trial in Tuolumne, the county of original venue. (Frazier v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 287, 293 [95 Cal.Rptr. 798, 486 P.2d 694].) First, the nature and gravity of the charged offense—capital murder—must weigh heavily in our determination, for we have recognized that murder is a crime of the utmost gravity. (People v. Harris, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 948.) However, the sensationalism inherent in all capital murder cases will not in and of itself necessitate a change of venue. (Odle v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 932, 942-943 [187 Cal.Rptr. 455, 654 P.2d 225].) We have recognized that “[i]t is . . . difficult to envision an eventual capital case which will not receive extensive media coverage, at least for a short period of time. If the early publicity attendant on a capital case alone suffices to raise a doubt as to the likelihood of a fair and impartial trial, a change of venue would perforce be required in every such case.” (Odle v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 942.) “The peculiar facts or aspects of a crime which make it sensational, or otherwise bring it to the consciousness of the community, define its ‘nature’. . . .” (Martinez v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 574, 582 [174 Cal.Rptr. 701, 629 P.2d 502].) Defendant states that “the homicide involved in the present case, viewed broadly, was rather unremarkable. . . .” He nevertheless asserts that, when viewed in context, the fact that the crime was committed in a “wilderness area” generated “extraordinarily strong feelings of fear and vulnerability” in rural Tuolumne County. The Attorney General responds that “[e]ven the most urban counties have isolated areas which could arouse the same fears. . . .” Although this “ambush of a fisherman” was a senseless and pitiless murder, we observe that it was not unusually atrocious or as overly sensational as were the multiple and bizarre serial killings which were the object of media attention in Corona v. Superior Court (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 872 [101 Cal.Rptr. 411] and Frazier v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.3d 287. Nor was it a crime involving sensational racial or sexual overtones. (See, e.g., Williams v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 584, 593 [194 Cal.Rptr. 492, 668 P.2d 799].) The second factor—the nature and extent of the news coverage—weighed against a change of venue. Defendant submitted only nine newspaper articles and one short letter to the editor in support of his motion. Seven articles appeared in the Union-Democrat published in Sonora, Tuolumne County (average daily circulation approximately 8,500), and two articles appeared in the Modesto Bee (neighboring Stanislaus County—average daily circulation approximately 70,000). All of the articles were relatively brief, six were not printed as first page news, and all essentially reported a brief account of the crimes and subsequent procedural events (e.g., continuances of both defendant’s and Love’s trials). None of the articles was sensational in any way. The three lead articles appeared during the first week of June 1982, several days after the shooting and ten months prior to commencement of jury selection. The “letter to the editor,” whose author expressed outrage at the crime and concern that “the lawyers are going to get [defendant] off,” appeared alongside the television listings in the September 9, 1982, Union-Democrat seven months prior to jury selection, and there is no indication in the record that any juror, actual or prospective, read it. The last article appeared in that newspaper on December 22, 1982, three months prior to jury selection. Through the passage of time, any potential prejudice was thereby significantly reduced. In short, the press coverage in this case was neither extensive nor inflammatory, and appears “no different in degree or intensity than the usual reporting of other homicides of the kind involved here.” (Odle v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 939.) Nor was there any evidence of extensive or inflammatory pretrial media coverage. As a precaution against pretrial publicity, defendant’s and Love’s preliminary hearing was ordered closed to the public. The trial judge thereafter ordered the transcripts sealed and imposed a gag order in the case. The third factor—size of the community—weighed on the side of a change of venue in this case. “The smaller the community, the greater the likelihood the accused will not get a fair trial in a case of this nature.” (People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1131 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306]; Martinez v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.3d 574, 581.) It was uncontested below that the population of Tuolumne County at the time of the murder was 36,555. It is true, as the Attorney General points out, that at the time there were 15 less populous counties in California. (See Cal. Dept. Health Services, Vital Statistics of Cal.—983 (Mar. 1986) Table 1-4, p. 19.) But “[i]n Fain [Fain v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 46 (84 Cal.Rptr. 135, 465 P.2d 23)] at page 52, we determined that Stanislaus County, with a population of 184,600, was too small to dissipate the effects of extensive pretrial publicity. In Frazier [Frazier v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.3d 287], we rendered the same finding with respect to Santa Cruz County which had a population of 123,700. And in Steffen v. Municipal Court [(1978)] 80 Cal.App.3d 623 [145 Cal.Rptr. 782], the court ordered a change of venue from San Mateo County, the 11th most populous county in the state with almost 600,000 residents.” (Martinez v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 581-582.) The fourth factor—the status of the defendant in the community—did not weigh in favor of a change of venue. Although defendant was not a resident of Tuolumne County, he was referred to in the articles only as a youthful “roofer” from Modesto. He was not associated with an organization or group which aroused community hostility (cf. Frazier, supra, 5 Cal.3d at 290 [community suspicion that “hippie” element was responsible for execution-type mass killings]). Like many other nonresidents frequenting the area to camp or fish, defendant appears to have been relatively anonymous in the community. (People v. Jurado (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 470, 488 [171 Cal.Rptr. 509].) The fifth factor—the popularity and prominence of the victim—was at best neutral. Although one of the newspaper articles reported that the victim was “very well liked in the community,” he had moved to the area from San Jose only six months earlier. The Tuolumne County Sheriff was quoted in that same article as calling the murder a “freak, random-type killing that could have happened to anybody who’d been up there at that time.” And although the press coverage did report that the victim was a Vietnam veteran who left behind a six-month-old daughter and pregnant wife, the tragedy of these circumstances would have struck the same sympathetic chord in any community. (Odle v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.3d 932 at p. 942.) We conclude that the balance of factors fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that defendant could not receive a fair trial in Tuolumne County. The fact that defendant was on trial for capital murder in relatively sparsely populated Tuolumne County weighed heavily in favor of a change of venue, but was not alone determinative. (Odle v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 942-943; Martinez v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 581-582.) As a recreational visitor to the county, defendant was relatively anonymous in the community. The victim had only recently moved into the area and enjoyed no particular prominence or notoriety. The press coverage was routine, neither extensive nor inflammatory, and did not prematurely disclose anything of evidentiary value in the case. Finally, the passage of time reduced the danger of prejudice from exposure to the articles. We have further assessed the record of voir dire of the prospective and actual jurors to determine if the pretrial publicity had any prejudicial effect. “[T]he controlling cases ‘cannot be made to stand for the proposition that juror exposure ... to news accounts of the crime with which he is charged alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due process.’ [Citation.] ... ‘It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.’ (Irvin v. Dowd (1961) 366 U.S. 717, 722-723 [6 L.Ed.2d 751, 755-756, 81 S.Ct. 1639].)” (People v. Harris, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 949-950.) It is true that several prospective jurors indicated they had heard discussion of the incident generally within their communities. However, five of the seated jurors had no prior knowledge of the case. Of the remainder, two knew no details, the others had only general knowledge through hearing or reading about the case, and each declared he had formed no opinion and could set aside whatever information he had received and decide the case on the evidence. Our review of the record in consideration of the Harris factors convinces us that “the jury was not influenced by any of the pretrial publicity and that defendant was not deprived of a fair and impartial trial by reason thereof.” (People v. Salas (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 819 [103 Cal.Rptr. 431, 500 P.2d 7, 58 A.L.R.3d 832].) b) Community Sentiment In a separate argument, defendant asserts that the particular facts of this murder—“the killing of a man fishing alone in an isolated area”—independent of the pretrial publicity, itself generated such strong negative community sentiment as to preclude defendant from receiving a fair trial in predominantly rural Tuolumne County. We have already rejected this as a sole determinative factor in discussing the “nature and gravity of the offense” under the Harris factors. (Ante, at p. 231.) Moreover, none of the actual jurors who heard the case had expressed the view during voir dire that they found the circumstances of the murder unusually shocking. All but two of the jurors were themselves originally from metropolitan areas; none was a native of Tuolumne County. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s motions for change of venue were properly denied. 2. Prosecutorial Misconduct—Guilt Phase Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his direct examination of Tillery. After she testified about her idea to sell her coat to get money for sweet rolls, the prosecutor asked her: “This is before any agreement to commit a robbery or murder, is that correct?” Defendant’s objection on grounds that she had testified there was an agreement to commit robbery, not murder, was overruled. In fact her testimony, subsequently corroborated by defendant, was that they all agreed to rob the victim by hitting him over the head and throwing him into the river in order to get money and transportation back home. The logical consequence of such a plan was the victim’s demise. Thus the question as phrased was a reasonable interpretation of evidence properly before the jury. (People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1061, 1085 [80 Cal.Rptr. 567, 458 P.2d 479].) In any case, the jury was instructed that statements made by the attorneys during trial are not evidence. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor committed numerous instances of misconduct in his closing argument at the guilt phase. The prosecutor argued: “The three of them [defendant, Love and Tillery] sat there in camp and discussed robbing David Lee Orozco. And they discussed hitting him on the head. And they discussed taking his money. And they discussed throwing him in the river, [fl] And ladies and gentlemen, that is a discussion of murder.” Closing argument presents a legitimate opportunity to argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record. (People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 212 [152 Cal.Rptr. 141, 589 P.2d 396].) For the reasons discussed above, we reject defendant’s claim that such argument misstated the evidence. Similarly, the prosecutor did not misstate the evidence in arguing that, when in the victim’s car, defendant admitted to Tillery that he had murdered Orozco. When asked, “Did [defendant] say anything about the death of David Orozco?”, Tillery testified defendant told her he had shot Orozco, that it was “horrible,” and that “there was blood bubbling out of his nose and mouth.” From such testimony an inference could fairly be drawn that defendant in essence admitted murdering the victim. Next, defendant misplaces reliance on People v. Kirkes (1952) 39 Cal.2d 719 [249 P.2d 1], in claiming that it was misconduct for the prosecutor “to state facts to which non-testifying witnesses would have testified.” The record lends no support to defendant’s claim that in his closing argument “the prosecutor improperly characterized what the witnesses would have testified to but for the stipulation.” In Kirkes we reiterated the well-settled rule that “statements of facts not in evidence by the prosecuting attorney in his argument to the jury constitute misconduct.” (Id., at p. 724.) There was no such misconduct here. The prosecution and defense had entered into broad stipulations covering several major aspects of the physical evidence in the case (ante, p. 229), and therefore the prosecutor argued to the jury: “I didn’t have to call witnesses to establish any one of those things that were considered in that stipulation.” Defense counsel himself conceded the propriety of such argument, objecting only to the prosecutor’s further statement that testimony of 20 witnesses to prove the stipulated facts had been spared (a matter which had already been explained to the jury by the trial judge). Moreover, counsel never requested an admonition to lessen any possible prejudicial effect he perceived such argument might have on the jury. (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 34 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) Defendant next contends that the prosecutor, through “expressions of personal belief’ during opening and closing arguments,” impermissibly “cast his own testimonial doubts on [defendant’s] version of the affair.” A prosecutor may not express a personal opinion or belief in a defendant’s guilt “where there is substantial danger that jurors will interpret this as being based on information at the prosecutor’s command, other than evidence adduced at trial.” (People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 848 [97 Cal.Rptr. 684, 489 P.2d 564].) We have scrutinized the prosecutor’s arguments and find no such misconduct. “[E]xamination of his arguments to the jury demonstrates that he was merely presenting his views of deductions and inferences warranted by the evidence.” (People v. Pineiro (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 915, 924 [179 Cal.Rptr. 883].) In most of the complained-of instances he merely used the pronoun “I” (e.g., “The term reasonable doubt, look at the instruction, and after you’ve weighed the evidence, can you really say in good conscience that there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant. I don't see that you can” (italics added)). Such phraseology hardly establishes that he was impermissibly injecting his own personal beliefs into his argument. (Pineiro, supra, at p. 924.) In any event, defendant raised no objection, hence the claim is waived on appeal. (People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 34.) Nor was it misconduct for the prosecutor to characterize defendant’s version of the incident as “fabrication, and I believe it is a fabrication as the evidence shows it to be, of trying to abandon the crime.” It is long settled that a prosecutor may use appropriate epithets warranted by the evidence. (People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 580 [189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144].) Characterization of defendant’s claim of abandoned intent as “fabrication” was fair comment on the state of the evidence, which included defendant’s own testimony that he initially agreed to rob Orozco, the circumstance that the fatal bullet was fired from his rifle with which he admittedly was armed, his admission to Tillery that he shot the victim, his possession of the victim’s wallet according to her testimony, his complicity in the theft of the victim’s car after the murder, and his removal of the car stereo and personally devised plan to dispose of the vehicle. So too did these facts support the prosecutor’s use of the epithet “cold-blooded murder.” The portions of the argument to which defendant has directed us fail to support his further claim that the prosecutor attempted to impugn defense counsel’s honesty and integrity by suggesting he improperly conspired with defendant to fabricate the defense. (Compare People v. Bain, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 847 [unsupported implication that defense counsel fabricated a defense]; see People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 762 [239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) Failure to object to this line of argument has waived any claim of misconduct on appeal. (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 34.) There is no merit to defendant’s claim that it was misconduct to argue to the jury that under the felony-murder rule, “If you are involved in the commission of the robbery, and the murder occurs, whether it’s intentional or not, you had the intent to rob, that is first degree murder.” Such was an accurate statement of the law. (See People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 476-477 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697].) Finally, defendant seeks to overcome the waiver rule by asserting that in those instances where counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct, or failed to request a curative admonition, such omissions deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel. (People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 584.) We have found no misconduct. Even were we to conclude otherwise, none of the claimed errors were of such significance that it is reasonably probable the jury would have reached a more favorable result but for counsel’s omissions. (Ibid.) 3. Admission of Tillery’s Testimony Defendant maintains that Tillery’s testimony was erroneously admitted because the trial court found the plea bargain she entered into with the district attorney was “unconstitutional.” “[Ajlthough there is a certain degree of compulsion inherent in any plea agreement or grant of immunity, it is clear that an agreement requiring only that the witness testify fully and truthfully is valid. [Citations.]” (People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1252 [232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115].) The record establishes that Tillery agreed to testify truthfully for the People “at all hearings and/or trials” in defendant’s prosecution, in exchange for immunity from prosecution for the murder and acceptance of her guilty “plea” to robbery in juvenile court. The written terms of the plea bargain expressly provided only that “if any of her statements or testimony proved to be untruthful, then the above bargain would be rescinded.” At the time of defendant’s trial, Tillery had already admitted the truth of the robbery petition pursuant to the terms of the plea bargain and been sentenced to the California Youth Authority. Relying on People v. Medina (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 438 [116 Cal.Rptr. 133], and People v. Green (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 831 [228 P.2d 867], defendant moved to exclude Tillery’s testimony on grounds that, under the plea bargain, she would feel pressured to testify in conformance with her earlier statement to police, or her preliminary hearing testimony, in order to ensure that the terms of her plea bargain would remain in effect. In Medina it was held that “a defendant is denied a fair trial if the prosecution’s case depends substantially upon accomplice testimony and the accomplice witness is placed, either by the prosecution or the court, under a strong compulsion to testify in a particular fashion.” (People v. Medina, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 455.) “Thus, when the accomplice is granted immunity subject to the condition that his testimony substantially conform to an earlier statement given to police ([Medina, ] id., at p. 450), or that his testimony result in the defendant’s conviction ([Green, supra,] 102 Cal.App.2d 831, 837-839), the accomplice’s testimony is ‘tainted beyond redemption’ [citation] and its admission denies the defendant a fair trial.” (People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1251-1252, fn. omitted.) We have recognized that these principles are equally applicable to plea bargain agreements. {Id., at p. 1252, fn. 5, and cases cited.) Medina and Green, however, are distinguishable from the instant case. Nothing in Tillery’s plea bargain resembles the evils inherent in the immunity agreements condemned in those cases. Nothing in the record suggests Tillery was ever told or led to believe that the benefits of her plea bargain would remain in force only if she testified in conformity with her statements to police or her preliminary examination testimony. Nor did the trial court so find; it did not determine Tillery’s plea bargain to be unlawfully coercive or “unconstitutional.” Rather, the court was concerned that the prosecution not be permitted to repudiate the plea bargain should Tillery’s trial testimony prove at variance with that which she gave at the preliminary examination. For that reason, the court ruled that her prior testimony could not be used by the People for impeachment purposes, nor as a basis for a collateral prosecution for perjury. The fact that Tillery may have felt some inherent compulsion to testify in accord with her earlier testimony does not, in itself, render the agreement invalid. (Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1253.) There was substantial evidence presented by the People which more than met the corroboration requirement for Tillery’s testimony. (People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 100 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) Crucially, defendant himself testified that “just about everything” Tillery testified to was true. We conclude that Tillery’s plea bargain was not unlawfully coercive, and that admission of her testimony did not deny defendant a fair trial. 4. Sufficiency of Evidence of Premeditation and Deliberation Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support an instruction on willful, premeditated first degree murder. In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 [73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942], we identified three categories of evidence which might sustain a finding of premeditated murder: (1) facts showing prior planning of the killing; (2) facts about any prior relationship or conduct with the victim from which the jury could infer a motive-, and (3) facts about the manner of the killing from which the jury could infer that the defendant intentionally killed the victim according to a preconceived plan. (Id., at pp. 26-27; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 86.) In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must draw all inferences that can be reasonably deduced in support of the verdict and must uphold the judgment if, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576-577 [162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255]; People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425 [90 Cal.Rptr. 417, 475 P.2d 649].) The record here shows evidence of willful premeditation under each of the three Anderson categories. There was evidence of prior planning. “[T]he fact that defendant brought his loaded gun ... [to the victim’s position on the river bank] and shortly thereafter used it to kill an unarmed victim reasonably suggests that defendant considered the possibility of murder in advance.” (People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 87.) The preconceived plan to rob the victim and throw him into the river further supports that inference. Defendant’s motive was robbery. The evidence showed a preconceived plan to rob the victim, in Tillery’s words, “to get some money to get back home and transportation.” That defendant and his cohorts planned to steal the victim’s vehicle as a means of flight back to Modesto with the proceeds of the robbery lends further support to the inference that the victim’s demise was intended. The manner of killing—a single fatal shot to the back of the head of the unarmed victim from a distance of six to ten feet as he kneeled, baiting his fishhook—further establishes that the shooting was conceived in advance. The evidence showed that defendant and Love crept up to a ledge of rocks and then onto a boulder overlooking the unwitting victim’s position. Defendant testified Love had dropped his club and that he (defendant) alone was armed as they approached the victim. We conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, supports the jury’s verdict of willful, deliberate and premeditated first degree murder. 5. CALJIC No. 2.27 and the Corroboration Requirement for Accomplice Testimony Defendant contends that CALJIC No. 2.27, which instructs the jury that the testimony of one witness is sufficient for the proof of any fact, misled the jury as to the need for corroboration of accomplice Tillery’s testimony. In People v. Chavez (1985) 39 Cal.3d 823 [218 Cal.Rptr. 49, 705 P.2d 372], we held that the giving of CALJIC No. 2.27 in conjunction with accomplice instructions was not error per se, but we agreed with the suggestion of the Court of Appeal in People v. Stewart (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 967, 975 [193 Cal.Rptr. 799], that it should contain an explicit reference to testimony requiring corroboration. (Chavez, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 831.) As in Chavez, here, looking to the instructions as a whole we find no error. (39 Cal.3d at pp. 830-831.) The full panoply of standard CALJIC instructions on accomplice testimony and the requirement of corroboration was given here. Both the prosecution and the defense proceeded on the premise that corroboration was needed. (Id., at p. 831.) In his opening statement and closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the accomplice instructions, acknowledged that Tillery was an accomplice, and argued that her testimony was amply corroborated by the evidence. Defendant’s own testimony supplied the requisite corroboration; he acknowledged that “just about everything” Tillery testified to was true. “As a result, the jury was not misled as to the need for corroboration and no prejudice resulted. The emphasis placed on the corroboration requirement, and on the other accomplice instructions, demonstrates that the jury was properly instructed on the proper standard of evaluating [Tillery’s] testimony.” (Ibid.) 6. Instruction Pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.75 Pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.75 (1982 New), the jury was instructed as to how to proceed in returning verdicts with respect to the charge of first degree murder and the lesser included offense of murder in the second degree. CALJIC No. 8.75 was derived from Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809]. In Stone, the jury had unanimously concluded the defendant should be acquitted of murder, but remained deadlocked on the lesser included offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. (Id., at p. 509.) We were concerned with formulation of a procedure for the receipt of a partial verdict consistent with the double jeopardy clause. Accordingly, we held that a trial court must permit entry of a verdict of acquittal on the greater charge when the jury has reached unanimous, final agreement on acquittal, but remains deadlocked on lesser included offenses. (Id, at pp. 514-519.) We have since clarified that our holding in Stone does not preclude a jury from considering lesser offenses during its deliberations. (People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 329 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].) Nor does CALJIC No. 8.75 purport to instruct the jury to determine whether the defendant is guilty of the greater offense before “considering” any lesser offense. (Id., at pp. 330-331.) Moreover, CALJIC No. 17.10, also given here, instructs that “[i]f the jury is not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged and it unanimously so finds, it may convict him of any lesser offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in the offense charged, if the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of such lesser offense.” The only lesser included offense herein concerned was second degree murder; there were no manslaughter instructions. Thus, defendant’s guilt of either offense turned only on a finding of premeditation and deliberation. There is nothing in the record of deliberations to suggest that the jury had great difficulty, or was divided, on the proof and existence of this element. There was no request for a rereading of testimony. The jury commenced deliberations at 2:45 p.m. on June 2, 1983; by 11 a.m. the following morning they had reached a unanimous verdict of willful, deliberate and premeditated first degree murder. Finally, the jury was instructed in the exact language of CALJIC No. 8.75; there was no further embellishment by the court advising them not to “consider” or deliberate upon the lesser offense of second degree murder before reaching a verdict on the greater charge. Accordingly, no error is shown. 7. CALJIC No. 2.90—Reasonable Doubt Instruction Defendant next contends that CALJIC No. 2.90 (1979 Rev.), the standard instruction defining the presumption of innocence, the state’s burden of proof, and reasonable doubt, is “unintelligible.” Acknowledging that the language of the instruction is taken verbatim from section 1096, and without proffering any authority in support of his position, he nevertheless urges us to declare the instruction and statute unconstitutional. We long ago declined the invitation. Since CALJIC No. 2.90 is a verbatim copy of a statute—section 1096—the remedy for any perceived deficiency in that section’s codification of the “reasonable doubt” standard is not judicial but legislative. (See People v. Brigham (1979) 25 Cal.3d 283, 290, fn. 11 and 293 [157 Cal.Rptr. 905, 599 P.2d 100] (cone. opn. by Mosk, J.).) 8. Jury Unanimity on Theory of First Degree Murder Defendant maintains that the jury should have been required to unanimously agree on the theory of first degree murder underlying its verdict. We have long since rejected this argument: “[I]n a prosecution for first degree murder it is not necessary that all jurors agree on one or more of several theories proposed by the prosecution; it is sufficient that each juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder as that offense is defined by the statute.” (People v. Milan (1973) 9 Cal.3d 185, 194-195 [107 Cal.Rptr. 68, 507 P.2d 956]; People v. Chavez (1951) 37 Cal.2d 656, 670-672 [234 P.2d 632].) Moreover, the verdict in this case was unanimous as to theory, the jury having found defendant guilty of first degree murder “other than under the felony murder rule, to-wit: that the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated,” and having further found that he personally used a firearm in its commission. 9. Beeman Error Defendant contends that the court committed prejudicial error in failing to instruct on intent with regard to accomplice liability for the crimes. (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].) The standard CALJIC aiding and abetting instructions found deficient in Beeman were given here. Former CALJIC Nos. 3.00 and 3.01 were erroneous “because they did not advise the jury that conviction as an aider and abettor required not only that the defendant have knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator of the offense, but also that the defendant share that purpose or intend to commit, encourage, or facilitate the commission of the crime.” (People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1, 11-12 [221 Cal.Rptr. 592, 710 P.2d 392]; People v. Caldwell (1984) 36 Cal.3d 210, 223-224 [203 Cal.Rptr. 433, 681 P.2d 274]; People v. Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d 547, 560.) Prejudice from Beeman error is assessed under the Chapman “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” test. (See People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 60-64 [246 Cal.Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1].) However, in this instance we need not employ such review, for we have recognized that “in some circumstances it is possible to determine that although an instruction . . . was erroneously omitted, the factual question posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions. In such cases the issue should not be deemed to have been removed from the jury’s consideration since it has been resolved in another context, and there can be no prejudice to the defendant. . . .” (People v. Sedeño (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913]; People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 335 [185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311].) Defendant was found guilty of “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” first degree murder. The jury further found that in the commission of the robbery defendant had personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5. In light of that finding, it is clear the jury conclusively determined defendant to be the actual killer. They were instructed the finding could be found true only if defendant personally used the firearm in the commission of the robbery, and were expressly told that the aiding and abetting instructions did not apply to the firearm-use finding. The term “used a firearm” was defined as: “to display a firearm in a menacing manner, intentionally to fire it, or intentionally to strike or hit a human being with it.” (CALJIC No. 17.19 (1980 Rev.), italics added.) Here, the rifle was never displayed to the victim in a menacing manner, nor was he struck with it. Rather, he was ambushed from behind as he kneeled baiting his hook, and felled with a single bullet to the back of his head. Since defendant was found to be the actual killer who personally, intentionally fired the fatal shot, the aiding and abetting instructions given here had no effect upon the guilty verdict. 10. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Guilt Phase We have already rejected the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding failure to object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct at the guilt phase. {Ante, pp. 237-238.) In a separate argument, defendant raises five additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. As will be shown, none is meritorious. First, defendant argues that Attorney Victor Lamb, who represented him briefly early in the proceedings in superior court and prior to appointment of trial counsel Paul Giudice, rendered ineffective assistance in failing to move for a change of venue. Since trial counsel thereafter raised the motion pretrial and renewed it during voir dire, and since we have found no error in the court’s denial of a change of venue (ante, pp. 230-234), Attorney Lamb’s omission did not prejudice defendant’s case. (People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572.) Next, Tillery testified at the preliminary hearing that one evening early in the camping trip, defendant had complained about headaches and possible ulcers and was crying while holding his loaded rifle. She and Love became concerned, took the gun from defendant and unloaded it. At trial, on direct examination regarding the episode, Tillery testified that defendant was upset, that she and Love “thought he was going to do something, so we took [the gun],” and that she put it under her coat, after which Love unloaded it. Defendant argues that the clear inference from Tillery’s preliminary hearing testimony was that defendant was emotionally distraught, perhaps suicidal, and that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to fully develop such facts in his cross-examination of Tillery at trial. The argument overlooks the fact that defendant claimed “just about everything” Tillery had testified to was truthful, with one exception. He testified she lied in stating that he was upset on the night in question, and that she and Love had to take his rifle away from him. Such being his testimony, trial counsel can hardly be faulted for not eliciting further testimony from Tillery which would have directly contradicted and impeached his client’s story. Defendant next asserts trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate a prior hunting accident in which defendant accidently shot himself in the head. It is asserted that Tillery’s testimony that defendant was emotionally distraught and experiencing headaches during the camping trip would have “take[n] on added dimension” had the fact of his prior head injury been brought out at trial. The only information in the record alluding to the injury is found in the probation report, in which it is stated: “Prior to quitting school, the defendant accidentally shot himself in the head when a pistol discharged while he was hunting. He was out of school for approximately four months and got behind and it was at that time he started ditching school.” The report was prepared nearly a month after the trial. The source of the information regarding defendant’s injury is not indicated. The record is completely silent as to whether trial counsel knew of the fact of the injury at the time of trial, whether medical documentation or evidence existed to substantiate it, its nature and severity, whether there was full recovery, and whether, if counsel was in fact alerted to its existence, there was a valid tactical reason for its omission at trial. In view of the inadequacy of the record on appeal we are unable to discern why counsel failed to act in the manner challenged. This claim of ineffective assistance must therefore be rejected on appeal. (People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426, 428 [152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1].) Defendant also faults counsel for failing to object to his cross-examination regarding his statement to police, on grounds that the prosecutor had failed to foundationally establish that he had been admonished per Miranda (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]). Since the record is silent on whether there was a Miranda waiver, the claim must be rejected on appeal. Given that trial counsef skillfully obtained an overly generous ruling excluding the taped statement from the People’s case-in-chief, it can be inferred that, had there been a Miranda violation, counsel would have challenged the statement on such ground. Lastly, there is no merit to defendant’s claim that counsel’s failure to request a pinpoint Sears instruction (People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180 [84 Cal.Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847]) relating specific evidence to his “lack of motive to kill” prejudiced the verdict. Defense counsel argued exhaustively to the jury that Tillery, not defendant, had the motive to rob the victim, and that defendant had no motive to kill. The facts were not complicated, and thus the relevance and materiality of the circumstantial evidence were readily apparent to the jury. (Id., at p. 190.) C. Special Circumstance Issues 1. Murder-for-financial-gain Special Circumstance The jury found true two special circumstances: felony-murder-robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)) and that “[t]he murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain” (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant correctly contends that the latter special circumstance finding is invalid on these facts. In People v. Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d 731, “We adopt[ed] a limiting construction under which the financial gain special circumstance applies only when the victim’s death is the consideration for, or an essential prerequisite to, the financial gain sought by the defendant.” (Id., at p. 751.) The present case does not fall within the financial-gain special circumstance as so limited. Orozco was robbed of his wallet and car and murdered in the course of the robbery. It cannot be said that the murder was an “essential prerequisite” to the robbery. The financial-gain special circumstance must therefore be set aside. 2. Intent to Kill (Carlos Error) Defendant contends that the felony-murder-robbery special circumstance must be set aside on the ground that the court failed to instruct on intent to kill. In Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862], we held that intent to kill is an element of the felony-murder special circumstance of the 1978 death penalty law, whether applied to accomplices or to actual killers. (Id., at pp. 153-154.) We have since overruled Carlos in People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104, wherein we held that, with respect to the actual killer, the court need not instruct on intent to kill in connection with felony-murder special circumstances. Such an instruction is required only where there is evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant was an accomplice rather than the actual killer. (Id., at pp. 1138-1139.) Defendant argues that the court should have so instructed the jury here. The claim, however, is unavailing. The jury found defendant guilty of “willful, deliberate and premeditated” first degree murder; such a verdict “necessarily embraces” a finding of intent to kill. (People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 762; People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 59 [222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423].) They further found that defendant had personally used a firearm in the commission of the robbery and intentionally fired the fatal shot, thereby determining that he was the actual killer. Finally, they found the murder intentional in conjunction with the murder-for-financial-gain special circumstance. (See People v. Garcia (1984) 36 Cal.3d 539, 555, fn. 11 [205 Cal.Rptr. 265, 684 P.2d 826].) 3. Accomplice Corroboration and the Firearm-use and Special Circumstance Allegations Defendant argues it was prejudicial error for the court to have failed to instruct sua sponte that Tillery’s testimony as it related to the firearm-use and special circumstance findings was also subject to the requirement of corroboration for accomplice testimony (§ 1111). No such special instruction was required. Defendant’s argument assumes that the jury was told to differentiate between Tillery’s testimony as it tended to prove his guilt of the crimes, and the truth of the firearm-use and special circumstance findings. No such distinction was made or required. Section 190.4, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part: “Wherever a special circumstance requires proof of the commission or attempted commission of a crime, such crime shall be charged and proved pursuant to the general law applying to the trial and conviction of the crime.” The jury was given all the standardized CALJIC instructions defining an “accomplice” (CALJIC No. 3.10), advising that Tillery was an accomplice as a matter of law (CALJIC No. 3.16), and explaining that her testimony had to be viewed with distrust (CALJIC No. 3.18) and needed to be corroborated (CALJIC Nos. 3.11 and 3.12). Both the prosecution and the defense proceeded on the premise that corroboration was needed. In his opening statement and closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the accomplice instructions, acknowledged that Tillery was an accomplice, and argued that her testimony was amply corroborated by the evidence. Defendant’s own testimony supplied the requisite corroboration; he acknowledged that “just about everything” Tillery testified to was true. Taken as a whole, the instructions and arguments apprised the jury that Tillery’s testimony, on whatever subject—the commission of the crimes, or the truth of the related firearm-use and special circumstance findings—required corroboration and was to be viewed with distrust. (Cf. People v. Espinoza (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 44, 48-49 [159 Cal.Rptr. 803].) II. Penalty Phase A. Facts Evidence in Aggravation At the penalty phase, by stipulation, the prosecution introduced documentary evidence of three prior felony convictions as aggravating circumstances. (§ 190.3, factor (c).) These included convictions on January 18, 1980, of shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246) and driving under the influence of alcohol resulting in bodily injury (former Veh. Code, § 23101), for which crimes defendant was committed to the California Youth Authority, and a conviction on April 2, 1980, of receiving stolen property (§ 496), for which offense he was also sentenced to the Youth Authority. Evidence in Mitigation Phyllis Adcox, defendant’s mother, testified that defendant, the eldest of her three sons, had lived at home most of his adult life. He completed school through the 11th grade, and was committed to the California Youth Authority in 1980-1981. While at the Youth Authority he went to school; after his release he enrolled in a junior college. Thereafter he worked in the CETA program until obtaining employment as a roofer for Valley Roofing. Defendant would give most of his paycheck to the family for rent and food. To her knowledge defendant was a good and regular worker. Prior to dropping out of school, defendant had attended church regularly with his family. Tuolumne County Deputy Sheriff Robert Mildenberger testified that while confined in the Tuolumne County jail, defendant was a good inmate who followed jail policy, never got into fights, and had no disciplinary actions taken against him. When defendant was housed in an isolation cell, Mildenberger arranged to have a television set brought in for him. Kenneth Coombs, owner of Valley Roofing and defendant’s former employer, testified