Full opinion text
Opinion ARGUELLES, J. Defendant Constantino Carrera was charged with the first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) and robbery (§211) of Carol and Jack Hayes. Special circumstances of felony murder-robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)) and multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) were alleged. Defendant was convicted on the two counts of first degree murder and on the robbery count, and both special circumstances were found to be true. The jury fixed the penalty at death. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm. FACTS On the morning of April 8, 1982, the bodies of Jack and Carol Hayes, the managers of the Imperial 400 Motel in Mojave, California, were discovered on the floor of their living quarters adjoining the motel office. They had been stabbed to death. Carol Hayes was fully dressed and had been stabbed 20 to 30 times. Jack Hayes was clad only in a T-shirt and undershorts; his body had 14 or 15 large stab wounds, including one to the head where a knife had broken off at the surface of the skull leaving a 3-inch portion embedded inside. Circumstantial evidence—including the testimony of one motel guest who had spoken to Jack Hayes between 9 and 9:30 p.m. the prior evening and testimony that Carol Hayes generally handled the motel office duties before but not after 10 p.m., while Jack took a nap—indicated that the couple was killed on April 7 sometime between 9 and 10 p.m. Judging from the motel records, approximately $238 was missing from the office receipts. The attention of police investigators was soon drawn to defendant and Ramiro Ruiz Gonzales (Ruiz), who were arrested without a warrant on April 12, 1982, the police fearing the two might flee after they saw their mutual friend and intimate, Teresa F. (Teresa), in the company of a detective. A complaint charging defendant with the murder and robbery of Jack and Carol Hayes, and with felony murder-robbery and multiple-murder special circumstances, was filed in municipal court two days later. That afternoon, certain of defendant’s family members and friends were allowed to visit him at the county jail. His conversations with these visitors, in which he made several arguably incriminating statements, were secretly monitored and recorded. Defendant was arraigned the following morning. At defendant’s trial, the prosecution endeavored to show that the robbery and murders were committed by defendant and Ruiz, painting defendant as the main actor or, alternatively, as at least an accomplice under theories of intentional murder and felony murder-robbery. The defense attempted to place responsibility for the crimes on Ruiz and Teresa, characterizing defendant as at most an accessory after the fact who had assisted the destruction of evidence to help his friends escape detection. Guilt Phase Evidence The pivotal evidence at trial fell largely into five discrete categories: (1) testimony from defendant and others regarding who was present at or absent from a gathering between the critical hours of 9 and 10 p.m. on April 7, 1982; (2) testimony from Mike Santana (Santana) and Teresa, who, charged as accessories after the fact, testified under grants of immunity from prosecution regarding statements made by defendant; (3) testimony of two inmate witnesses, who had been incarcerated with defendant at the county jail, regarding his statements to them about the murders; (4) physical evidence, including bloody shoe prints at the motel and items of clothing that defendant and Ruiz had attempted to burn, tending to link defendant to the murders; and (5) defendant’s jailhouse conversations with his visitors and letters to friends. Events of April 7, 1982. By all accounts, defendant (20 years old at the time) spent the early afternoon of April 7 with Ruiz (age 17) and Santana (age 19), and possibly with his younger brother Efrain Carrera as well, drinking beer and smoking marijuana. Santana, Ruiz and defendant each took a small amount of LSD (acid) as well. Early that evening, they joined a group of friends at the house of Santana’s older sister, Carmen Santana Valadez. Among the others present during the evening, in addition to Carmen, were Teresa (age 14), Tina and Sherry H. (12 and 14 years old, respectively), and Maria Carrera Nunez, defendant’s older sister. Patience S. (age 15) was a latecomer, arriving shortly before defendant and Ruiz left the gathering with a few of the others. With the exception of Ruiz, all of these testified to defendant’s movements. Sherry H. saw defendant and Ruiz leave the party around 9 p.m. and return around 10. Her younger sister Tina testified similarly that defendant and Ruiz left the party around 8:30 or 9 and returned about 9 or 10. Patience S. testified that she and her boyfriend, on their way to Carmen’s house, drove past defendant and Ruiz walking toward the house at 10 to 10:30. Teresa saw defendant and Ruiz leave the party between 9 and 10. She did not see their return, as she was inside the house at the time. Santana testified that defendant and Ruiz left the party at 9 or 9:30 and returned a half-hour later. Defendant’s brother Efrain offered the first variation from this scenario, testifying that Ruiz left the party alone about 8:30 and that defendant left with Tina H. about 15 minutes later. Defendant and Tina allegedly returned to Carmen’s house later that evening, and Ruiz came back later yet, still alone, about 10:30 or 11. Defendant’s sister Maria and Santana’s sister Carmen did not see anyone come or go that evening. Defendant’s story varied subtly from that of the other witnesses, not so much in the various events as in when those events took place. According to him, Teresa, and Tina and Sherry H., did not even arrive at Carmen’s house until 9 p.m.—well after the arrival time each of them had estimated. He and Tina went to his sister Maria’s house about 9:30 to “mess[] around a little while”—an episode not mentioned by Tina herself or any other witnesses, except for defendant’s sister, who placed the event earlier in the afternoon, and his brother Efrain. Ruiz and Teresa allegedly left Carmen’s house about 10 to go out to Ruiz’s car and came back in the house 30 to 45 minutes later, at which time Teresa was crying hysterically. According to Santana, Teresa had remained in the house during this period, and Teresa testified that she had gone with Ruiz to his car much earlier in the evening. Defendant admitted leaving the house with Ruiz that evening, but testified that he did so only to help find a battery for Ruiz’s car and only after Ruiz and Teresa had returned from their own absence, and that he and Ruiz met Patience S. and her boyfriend while on the way back from this errand. The bulk of this testimony placed defendant and Ruiz away from the gathering during the time that Jack and Carol Hayes were probably killed. The evidence similarly tended to place Teresa and Santana at the party throughout that period. Immunized Witness Testimony. Teresa and Santana testified, as did defendant, and Tina and Sherry H., that the six of them left Carmen’s house in Ruiz’s car after getting a jump start from Patience S.’s boyfriend. Teresa and Santana both also testified that Ruiz stopped the car in a deserted area a little while later, that defendant, Ruiz and Santana got out, and that defendant and Ruiz changed their clothes. The two also said that, after dropping off Tina and Sherry H. at their home, Ruiz stopped the car at a liquor store. Teresa testified that Santana and Ruiz went into the store, while she and defendant remained outside in the car. At this time, defendant told her what had happened that evening. Defendant first told her that he had “messed up his whole life” and that he “had stabbed someone.” Defendant said he and Ruiz had gone to the Imperial 400 Motel to get some money that was owed Ruiz, who had formerly worked there. Ruiz stabbed the woman at the motel many times; defendant said that he cut her on the arm when he saw her reaching for something. Defendant also told her that the man came out “and they hit him with scissors in the head.” Santana and Ruiz then came back to the car from the store, and the four drove to a motel. When Santana and Ruiz again left the car to rent rooms, defendant told Teresa that “a knife broke off in the lady’s neck, in the throat.” Two rooms were rented at this motel. Defendant and Santana spent the night in one of the rooms; Ruiz and Teresa shared the other. Santana’s testimony differed somewhat from Teresa’s. According to Santana, defendant and Ruiz went into the liquor store while he remained in the car with Teresa. He agreed, however, that he and Ruiz rented the motel rooms while defendant and Teresa remained in the car. Santana testified that defendant told him about the events at the Imperial 400 Motel while they were in the room they shared. Defendant told Santana that he and Ruiz went to the motel to rob it and that Ruiz stabbed the lady a couple of times. Defendant said he cut her once on the wrist when she reached for the telephone and then froze while Ruiz continued to stab her. Ruiz then walked into a room where the man was sleeping and stabbed him. The man got up and hit Ruiz, but Ruiz continued to stab him until he fell down. Defendant also told Santana that while Ruiz was stabbing the people, “the knife broke and he went inside the kitchen and got a bigger knife.” Santana further testified that he saw defendant and Ruiz divide more than $100 and that some of the money had specks of blood on it. Despite the conflict over who went into the liquor store with Ruiz, the testimony of Teresa and Santana coincided on three main points. Defendant and Ruiz planned to rob the Imperial 400 Motel, defendant cut Carol Hayes on the arm when she reached for something, and both victims were stabbed many times. Defendant’s account of the events, according to both Teresa and Santana, consistently placed the greater portion of responsibility for the murders on Ruiz. Inmate Informant Testimony. Julius Jones, a trustee inmate at the county jail while defendant was incarcerated there, testified during the prosecution’s case-in-chief that defendant had often talked to him about the murders at the Imperial 400 Motel. At first, defendant denied being involved; later, defendant told Jones that he, Ruiz and Ruiz’s girlfriend were involved. The girl had waited outside in the car while defendant and Ruiz went inside. They had only meant to rob the motel, but it ended up as a murder. Defendant said that the lady reached for the telephone and he “chopped her hand off, cut her hand off.” The man had tried to help his wife and defend himself but Ruiz had him cornered, and defendant and Ruiz went on and killed him. A further inmate witness, Thomas Hill (also known as Thomas Morse), testified in rebuttal for the prosecution. Hill said that defendant told him about the killings at the Imperial 400 Motel. Defendant had tried to get him to read some legal papers, but Hill had not done so and defendant had finally told him about the case. Defendant and “another guy” whose name “started with an R” had planned to rob the place. They left a party, but the other guy’s car would not start and they got a ride to the place from another friend, “this guy, Mike Santana.” They stabbed the woman and the man. “When they stabbed the man in the chest, the knife broke, and . . . [defendant] ran into the kitchen, got another knife and came back and stuck him in the head . . . .” Defendant denied having talked to Hill or offering him a copy of a transcript to read. Defendant testified that he had two transcripts and a police report in his cell and that Hill would often remain in the cell when defendant would go out in the yard. Hill denied having read any of the legal papers that defendant had in his cell. Although the inmates’ testimony varied in some respects, and that of Hill was perhaps questionable in light of his inability to recall Ruiz’s name while remembering that of the minor character “this guy, Mike Santana” without difficulty, each inmate reported a number of details consistent with the testimony of other witnesses in the case. Each denied receiving or being offered any inducements for testifying. Physical Evidence. What clothing the principal actors in these events were wearing, and in particular what shoes, played a large role in this case. Two separate types of shoe prints had been found in the blood on the floors at the motel. One was a herringbone pattern determined to be typical of Cornet brand shoes. The other was a rectangular pattern matching Trax brand tennis shoes. All witnesses, including defendant, put him in gray pants, probably corduroy and possibly Levi’s, at the start of the evening. Tina H., Patience S. and others, including Teresa and Santana, testified that they saw a blood spot on defendant’s pants when he and Ruiz were leaving Carmen’s house at the end of the evening. According to Tina, Teresa and Santana, defendant changed into green or a different type of gray pants after the smaller group left Carmen’s house. Defendant agreed that he had gotten out of the car with Ruiz and Santana during a short stop, but denied changing his clothes. Teresa, Santana and Patience put defendant in gray Trax brand tennis shoes originally, and Teresa and Santana had him changing into black dress shoes when he changed his pants. Defendant, and his brother and sister, testified that he was wearing his brother’s blue Nike tennis shoes with orange stripes. The various witnesses, with the exception of defendant, put Teresa in Bon Jour jeans and white Trax brand tennis shoes throughout the evening. Defendant testified that she changed into blue Levi’s jeans and white or slightly darker tennis shoes with blue stripes after returning to Carmen’s house with Ruiz. The witnesses put Ruiz in blue pants and tan tennis shoes at the start. Teresa and Santana testified that Ruiz changed from his tennis shoes into black slippers while the car was stopped. Defendant agreed that Ruiz had changed his shoes, and he testified that he saw a pair of pants, presumably the jeans he said Teresa had been wearing earlier, and Teresa’s tennis shoes in the trunk of the car. Defendant admitted going into the desert with Ruiz and Santana the day after the murders to burn some shoes and clothing. He testified that they burned the pair of brown tennis shoes Ruiz had changed out of the night before, and the blue Levi’s and white or grayish tennis shoes with blue stripes that Teresa had been wearing. Santana testified that they burned the jacket, corduroy pants, and gray Trax tennis shoes that defendant had been wearing. At the desert site where defendant had helped Ruiz burn the various items, detectives found a small zipper tab and Levi Strauss button from a pair of pants or a coat, and four burned shoe soles. Two of the soles had a herringbone Cornet brand pattern and two had a rectangular Trax brand pattern. The burned soles with the herringbone pattern matched in size and style a pair of new shoes, brown in color, that Ruiz purchased the day after the murders. Greater uncertainty developed over the soles with the rectangular Trax pattern and whether they could have been worn by defendant or Teresa. Teresa testified that she wore Trax tennis shoes in a boy’s size 5 in April 1982. A pair of Trax in a boy’s size 6 was too big for her at the time of trial; defendant testified that the same pair felt too small for him, but that he could probably wear them. An expert testified, after measuring Teresa’s feet, that she could wear a boy’s size 4½ or 5, which would be the equivalent of a girl’s size 6 or 6½. Defendant, on the other hand, would wear a boy’s size 6½; a girl’s size 6 did not fit him during an in-court experiment. The Trax soles found in the remains of the fire proved to have the number “6” inside layers of the sole. The police investigator, however, did not know if the number referred to a girl’s size 6 or a boy’s size 6. The best preserved of the two soles measured 9½ inches in length, but part of the sole, perhaps as much as half an inch, was burned off. The expert witness testified that the sole of a Keds brand jogging shoe in a girl’s size 6 measured 9½ inches in length. As the expert also testified that each half size accounts for a sixth of an inch in length, a 10-inch sole would correspond to a girl’s size 7½ or boy’s size 6, which defendant, but not Teresa, might wear. The sole of a Trax shoe in a boy’s size 6 submitted as a prosecution exhibit, however, proved to measure approximately 10½ inches in length, and a 10-inch sole in that brand would then correspond to a boy’s size 4½ or girl’s size 6, which Teresa, but not defendant, could wear. This evidence, especially the showing that Cornet brand tennis shoes had been burned, strongly supported Ruiz’s involvement in the crime, but was less conclusive as to defendant. Given that only defendant, and his brother and sister, had him wearing Nike tennis shoes and that all other witnesses testified he was wearing Trax brand tennis shoes, the burned Trax shoe soles tended to link defendant to the murders, as did the Levi Strauss button and the zipper tab. Defendant’s attempt to suggest that the latter items were from Teresa’s jeans was internally inconsistent since his testimony had her changing from the pair of bloody pants he supposedly burned into Levi’s jeans. Defendant’s Jailhouse Conversations. On the afternoon of April 14, 1982, the day before he was arraigned, defendant was allowed to have several visitors—including his father, his brother Armando, his sister Maria, and Santana’s sister Carmen—at the county jail and was allowed to see them in a group rather than two at a time, as was the more usual jail practice. Portions of the transcript of these secretly recorded conversations were introduced into evidence. In the conversations, defendant asserted his innocence of the charges but also made several arguably incriminating statements. He asked Carmen, and requested that his visitors ask Santana, and Tina and Sherry H., not to testify against him. He suggested to his brother and sister stories they could tell to suggest that Teresa was hallucinating from acid and thus discredit her testimony. He asked his sister to say that he was babysitting her children on the night of April 7, that he did not go out that evening, and that Ruiz went out alone. He also asked her to testify, as she did, that he was wearing Efrain’s Nike tennis shoes that evening, and talked to his brother about his and Efrain’s different shoe sizes. He directed his brother to the location of the partially burned clothing and asked him to collect this evidence and dump it in a mine shaft in the desert. He complained that Ruiz had messed everything up by purchasing new Cornet tennis shoes that had the same footprint as the old ones and, when told the police had seized Ruiz’s pants, said he thought Ruiz had burned them. While in jail, defendant wrote several letters to Patience S., Tina H., Sherry H. and Ruiz’s former girlfriend. Excerpts from a few of these letters—asking the recipients to back him up, complaining about “snitches,” and worrying that he and Ruiz would be “up [the] creek” if Teresa and Santana testified—were read to the jury. Defendant’s conversations and letters cast significant doubt on the credibility of the few witnesses who testified that defendant was not gone from the gathering at Carmen’s house between 9 and 10 p.m. on April 7, that he was not wearing gray Trax brand tennis shoes that evening, or that they could not remember his movements or what clothing he was wearing. Penalty Phase Evidence The prosecution called two additional witnesses at the penalty phase of the trial. Dorothy Hahnenkratt, the mother of Carol Hayes, testified that both Jack and Carol Hayes needed to wear glasses to see, that she had told Carol, if there was ever a robbery, to give the robbers the money or whatever they wanted, and that her daughter always avoided physical confrontation and never quarreled. Julius Jones, one of the inmate witnesses, testified that after his testimony at the guilt phase, he overheard defendant telling three trustee inmates that Jones was a dead man when he got to prison and that defendant would kill him. He said that these inmates later brought him defendant’s message. The defense presented extensive evidence of defendant’s behavior and drug use. Defendant’s sister Maria testified she had seen him smoke marijuana, drink and take acid. He had used all three on the day of the murders. He was drunk and slurring his words that day. Defendant’s cousin testified that he had seen defendant take drugs and that when he took “reds” and “yellows” he would act wild and nervous. Defendant testified that he had used marijuana, cocaine, alcohol, “crank” (a substance “like cocaine . . . kind of like a speed”), PCP and heroin. He claimed that he had experienced flashbacks from taking acid, but did not point to any particular effect on the day in question and, indeed, had testified at the guilt phase that he had not been affected by the acid he took the day of the murders. Defendant’s mother testified that he was her eldest son and that she had no problems with him when he was in school. Defendant’s father was a good man when he was sober, but would become violent and beat her and the children when he got drunk. She divorced him in 1975, and defendant had since lived with his father. Defendant had always been respectful to her, had never hurt her, and she had never seen him fight or exhibit violent behavior. A psychopharmacologist testified for the defense on the effects of taking LSD, and on the cumulative effect of taking LSD on top of marijuana and alcohol usage. He indicated that the effects of the LSD could be intensified by use of the other substances and that a person in that state might be subject to “hypersuggestability,” capable of being easily influenced to commit a robbery he would not otherwise commit. He further testified that such a person might become overly aggressive and commence stabbing a victim without thinking, impulsively responding to a perceived threat. The witness also acknowledged on cross-examination, however, that the effects of the drugs would be difficult to assess and that he would tend to respect an individual’s subjective evaluation that LSD had, on a given occasion, had no effect. Finally, the defense challenged the prosecution’s allegation that defendant had threatened inmate witness Jones. The three trustee inmates to whom defendant had allegedly communicated the threat each denied having a conversation with defendant on the day the threat was allegedly made and denied being told such a threat or passing it on to Jones. Defendant testified that he had been returned to a different cell block than Jones after the guilt phase of the trial and thus could not have made the threat. DISCUSSION Guilt Phase Issues Defendant raises 12 allegations of error, some with subsidiary arguments, at the guilt phase. As we shall point out, his contentions for the most part lack any merit. And where error appears, it must be viewed as harmless. 1. Aiding and Abetting Instructions. Defendant contends that the jury was not properly instructed under People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318] and People v. Caldwell (1984) 36 Cal.3d 210 [203 Cal.Rptr. 433, 681 P.2d 274], that an alleged aider and abettor must have and act with his own “intent or purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense” (Bee-man, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 560), in addition to knowing the criminal purpose of the actual perpetrator. The People concede error, but contend that the error was not prejudicial in the circumstances of this case. We agree. Under defendant’s version of the events, he was not present at the Imperial 400 Motel on April 7, 1982, and took no part in the killings. He claimed his only participation in the crimes lay in assisting with the destruction of evidence the day after the killings. Defendant contends the jury could have believed his testimony and still have convicted him of murder and robbery, by finding that he had acted with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the crimes and that his actions had aided the commission of the offenses, because (1) no instruction was given on his potential liability under section 32 as an accessory after the fact, and (2) the jury was instructed under CALJIC No. 4.51 that “if the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant aided and abetted the commission of the offense charged in this case, the fact, if it is a fact, that he was not present at the time and place of the commission of the alleged offense ... is immaterial and does not, in and of itself, entitle him to an acquittal.” (Cf. People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1, 15 & fn. 9 [221 Cal.Rptr. 592, 710 P.2d 392].) Defendant’s failure to request an instruction on the elements of accessory after the fact to murder would bar any direct challenge to the verdicts on the ground that such an instruction was not given (People v. Hall (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 624, 626 [214 Cal.Rptr. 289] [no duty to instruct sua sponte on lesser related offenses]; see People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal.3d 510, 530 [199 Cal.Rptr. 45, 674 P.2d 1303, 50 A.L.R.4th 1055]), and defendant has not attempted to mount such a challenge here. He contends, however, that the absence of such an instruction precludes us from finding the Beeman error harmless on the rationale that the jury must have rejected defendant’s alibi defense. (Cf. People v. Leach (1985) 41 Cal.3d 92, 105-106 [221 Cal.Rptr. 826, 710 P.2d 893]; People v. Johnson (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 314, 322 [227 Cal.Rptr. 917].) Not so. The Beeman error must be viewed as harmless if, under other proper instructions, the jury necessarily determined that defendant acted with the requisite intent to aid the commission of the crimes. {Crop, supra, 41 Cal. 3d at p. 13; People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913].) As the People point out, the jury was instructed that to find the special circumstance of felony murder-robbery to be true, it must find, inter alia, that defendant “[i]f. . . not the actual killer, . . . intentionally aided ... or assisted the actual killer in the commission of the murder in the first degree” and that “the murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime of robbery.” The People assert that the jury’s finding on the special circumstance under these instructions demonstrates that the jury necessarily determined defendant intended to aid and abet the underlying robbery. (People v. Gonzales (1986) 192 Cal.App.3d 799, 806-808 [238 Cal.Rptr. 554].) Defendant’s argument to the contrary hinges on the proposition that the special circumstance instructions still left open the possibility that the jury could have based its decision on a finding that defendant committed an intentional act that aided the robbery without necessarily finding that defendant had the intent to bring about the crime. That is, he argues that although the jury found he “intentionally aided” the commission of first degree murder, the predicate finding of first degree murder could itself have been based on the felony murder-robbery theory. The jury’s decision, he asserts, thus does not compel the conclusion that the jury found he intended, within the meaning of Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d 597, to aid the commission of the crime. (See Crop, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 11-12 & fn. 5.) In People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471 [247 Cal.Rptr. 172, 754 P.2d 218], we rejected the possibility that a reasonable juror would read the special circumstance instruction in such a “hypertechnical manner” (id. at p. 488), and we concluded that the instruction adequately advised a jury of the need to find that an aider and abettor had the intent to kill before the felony-murder and multiple-murder special circumstances could be found to be true. (Id. at pp. 487-488; but see id. at p. 490 [conc. opn. of Arguelles, J.]; Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 560-561.) Our conclusion there that the instruction was adequate compels the conclusion here that the jury necessarily rejected defendant’s version of the events and that the Beeman error accordingly was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]; People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 64 [246 Cal.Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1].) 2. Failure to Give Jury Unanimity Instruction. Defendant next challenges the robbery conviction alone, seeking independently of the Beeman error to set aside his convictions for felony murder-robbery by contending that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury under CALJIC No. 17.01 that it had to agree unanimously on the act or acts constituting the underlying crime of robbery. Defendant was charged with one count of robbery of two victims, and he asserts the instruction was required to avoid the possibility that some jurors may have found him guilty of robbing one of the victims and the rest guilty of robbing the other. By asserting that multiple acts were involved, defendant incorrectly assumes that the critical question is whether one or two robberies was committed. But here Jack and Carol Hayes were the joint custodians of the motel receipts, and the funds were taken from the immediate presence of both of them by force or violence as to both. Although two counts of robbery could have been charged (People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 589 [180 Cal.Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908], revd. on other grounds sub nom. California v. Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992 [77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 103 S.Ct. 3446]), defendant can hardly complain that he was charged here with but one count of robbing two victims. It was not necessary that the jury distinguish between the two victims as there was no evidence here from which the jury could have found defendant was guilty of robbing one of the victims and not the other. (Cf. People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282-283 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971].) Defendant did not proffer different defenses as to the allegedly different acts, and even the testimony of Teresa and Santana—which suggested that defendant took no part in the attack on Jack Hayes—would not affect his culpability as an aider and abettor for the robbery as to Jack. 3. Instruction on Nonprosecution of Others. Defendant next objects that the jury was instructed under CALJIC No. 2.11.5 not to consider why other persons were not being prosecuted for the crimes. He contends that this instruction undercut his defense—that Teresa, not he, was Ruiz’s accomplice—and that the instruction prevented the jury from evaluating the bias of Teresa and of Santana, both of whom testified under grants of immunity from prosecution. The instruction should not have been given. Two witnesses—a mother and daughter—had testified that, while they were watching a Little League baseball game in Mojave, Teresa admitted to them that she committed the crimes and that defendant was covering for her. The daughter and her two stepsisters testified to a second set of substantially identical admissions made by Teresa later that day while they were playing in a Mojave park. Defendant contends the jury might have understood the instruction to mean that it should not consider the testimony that Teresa, not defendant, committed the crimes. In addition, the testimony as to Teresa’s alleged admissions and the testimony of the inmate witnesses that Santana drove defendant and Ruiz to the motel and acted as a lookout also suggested that the grants of immunity to Teresa and Santana might have exonerated them from potential murder charges. But the jury might have understood the instruction to preclude it from considering whether this gave Teresa or Santana a strong incentive to testify favorably to the prosecution. (See People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 779-780 [254 Cal.Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419]; People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1312-1313 [248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].) The potential for such a misunderstanding of the instruction appears minimal, however, and the error in giving the instruction accordingly harmless. The jury was instructed under CALJIC No. 1.01 “to consider all the instructions as a whole and ... to regard each in light of all the others. . . The jurors were also instructed in the language of CALJIC No. 2.20 (1980 rev.) that “[i]n determining the believability of a witness you may consider anything that has a tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the testimony of the witness, including . . . [t]he existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive [and] [e]vidence of the existence or nonexistence of any fact testified to by the witness . . . .” Rather than being “countermanded” or “nullified” by CALJIC No. 2.11.5, as defendant posits, CALJIC No. 2.20, considered with other instructions given, delivered a correct interpretation of the law. (See Garrison, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 780; People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 621 [247 Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070].) Whether we apply a Chapman “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 710-711] [error affecting defendant’s right to confront witnesses and present a defense]) or merely seek to determine if it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached had CALJIC No. 2.11.5 not been given (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243] [error affecting jury’s evaluation of witness credibility]), defendant cannot have been prejudiced. 4. Instruction on Flight as Evidence of Guilt. The jury was instructed under CALJIC No. 2.52 that flight after crime may be considered as evidence of guilt. Relying on People v. Parrish (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 942, 946-948 [230 Cal.Rptr. 118], and a line of cases running back to People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189, 199-202 [160 Cal.Rptr. 669], defendant asserts that the instruction should not have been given because he denied participation in the crimes and proffered an alibi defense. Defendant’s reliance on these cases is misplaced, and the giving of CAL-JIC No. 2.52 was not error. (See also People v. Cowger (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1066, 1073-1076 [249 Cal.Rptr. 240].) The instruction was not directed at an immediate flight after crime, but at defendant’s later escape from the county jail. His escape from jail after being arrested and charged with the crimes was properly admissible as indicating consciousness of guilt. (People v. Holt (1984) 37 Cal.3d 436, 455 [208 Cal.Rptr. 547, 690 P.2d 1207].) Although it would have been preferable had the trial court deleted any reference in the instruction to flight “immediately after the commission of a crime” and instructed the jury only as to flight after defendant was “accused of a crime,” the prosecutor’s argument made clear to the jury that only defendant’s escape from jail was implicated by this instruction. 5. Informant Witness Instruction. Defendant next challenges the failure of the trial court sua sponte to instruct the jury that the testimony of informants, like that of accomplices, should be viewed with care and caution, and with distrust. Although conceding that, under People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604 [205 Cal.Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126], the testimony of informants is not subject to the same corroboration requirements as that of accomplices, defendant contends that the giving of cautionary instructions as to accomplice testimony and the failure to give such instructions as to informant testimony permitted the jury to infer that the highly damaging testimony of the inmate informant witnesses in this case was entitled to greater credence than the relatively more favorable testimony of Teresa and Santana. In People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 565-566 [244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776], relying on Alcala’s rationale, we concluded that there was no sua sponte duty to give cautionary instructions on informant testimony. We are not persuaded that any different rule is warranted simply because such instructions were properly given as to accomplice testimony. Moreover, the jury was fully instructed here on the credibility of witnesses generally, and with CALJIC No. 2.23 (Credibility of Witnesses— Conviction of Felony), specifically. It is not reasonably probable a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached had cautionary instructions been given. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) 6. Prosecutorial Misconduct. Defendant raises a series of objections to the prosecutor’s conduct in this case and separately complains of (a) the trial court’s failure to restrain the prosecutor, (b) limitations placed by the court on the defense cross-examination of Santana, and (c) the admission of hearsay evidence from Santana’s younger brother. Although framed by defendant as separate issues on appeal, whether the trial court erred on those other points is mainly relevant to a determination whether defendant’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s actions bars him from assigning them as error on this appeal. As such, the contentions are sufficiently interrelated to warrant consideration under the general rubric of prosecutorial misconduct. A. Use of Tainted Testimony. Defendant’s first objection is that the prosecutor presented testimony from Santana that contradicted testimony the same prosecutor had elicited from Santana at the separate trial of Ruiz a few weeks before. Defendant asserts that Santana’s testimony was false on at least one of the occasions and that his conviction cannot stand due to the attendant corruption of the fact-finding process. As noted previously, Santana (along with Teresa) was one of the prosecution’s main witnesses. He provided critical testimony on defendant’s whereabouts the night of the killings, on defendant’s clothing and changes in clothing that evening, and on defendant’s statements to him of what transpired at the Imperial 400 Motel. On a few points, however, Santana’s testimony at defendant’s trial arguably differed from the testimony he gave at Ruiz’s trial. At Ruiz’s trial, Santana testified that Ruiz told him about the killings; at defendant’s trial, Santana testified that defendant told him about the killings. Defendant does not make much of this discrepancy, and in fact there may be no conflict. Santana also testified at defendant’s trial that Ruiz went back and forth between the motel room that Santana shared with defendant and the one Ruiz shared with Teresa, and both Ruiz and defendant may at different times have told Santana what happened earlier that evening. Supporting this interpretation is the fact that Santana also testified at Ruiz’s trial that defendant was in the room while Ruiz told him what happened, while he testified at defendant’s trial that Ruiz was not present when defendant told him what happened. Neither of these inconsistencies amounts to much, except that at each trial Santana also put substantially the same words in the mouth of a different speaker. At Ruiz’s trial, Santana testified that Ruiz—before leaving the gathering at Carmen’s house—asked him “if I had the nerve to kill somebody.” The prosecutor had Santana verify that Ruiz made the statement and returned to the point later, asking “[w]hen did Ramiro [Ruiz] ask you the question if you had any guts to kill anybody?” At defendant’s trial, Santana testified that defendant was the one who asked him—before leaving the gathering— “[i]f I had the guts to kill someone.” While the phrasing was very similar, this alleged conflict might also be due to nothing more than both Ruiz and defendant making similar comments. At Ruiz’s trial, Santana testified that Ruiz told him about a knife breaking when Ruiz was stabbing the male victim. “Q. Did Ramiro [Ruiz] say anything about what he used on the man? A. Said he had a knife. Q. What did he say about the knife in reference to the man? A. When he stabbed him it broke, and after he broke [it] he went inside his kitchen and got a bigger knife. Q. Ramiro told you that the knife he used on the man broke? A. Yes, he did. Q. Did he say where in the kitchen he got this other bigger knife? A. One of the drawers.” The prosecutor allegedly argued to the Ruiz jury that the knife broke while Ruiz was stabbing the man and that Ruiz went into the kitchen to get another knife. At defendant’s trial, Santana’s testimony on this point was ambiguous. “Q. Did defendant tell you anything more in reference to what he and Ramiro [Ruiz] did in the motel? A. That when Ramiro was stabbing the people, that the knives broke off and he went inside the kitchen and got a bigger knife.” The identity of the “he” in question was not pursued in the questioning of Santana, and there is nothing inherently improper in Santana’s testimony or even any plain conflict. The prosecutor argued to the jury in defendant’s case, however, that defendant was the one who obtained the knife from the motel kitchen. “According to Miguel [Santana], [defendant] went into the hotel to rob it, according to defendant. The knife broke off and he went into the kitchen to get a larger knife. Same thing we heard from other witnesses, jail witnesses.” Santana’s testimony at the two trials thus seems to have differed in possibly significant respects, and the prosecutor may have argued inconsistent versions of the crimes to the two juries. Defendant raised no objections to the prosecutor’s questions or arguments thereon (see People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 34 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468]), however, and as review would require us to examine matters outside the present appellate record, these points are not properly before us on this appeal. (See People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426, fn. 17 [152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1].) B. Improper Direct Examination. Defendant objects that the prosecutor asked questions of two witnesses that assumed the existence of prejudicial facts not then or later placed in evidence. Except as to two points, defendant did not object to the lines of questioning and, as the alleged errors could have been cured by timely objection and prompt admonition, he may not now complain of them on appeal. (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 34.) During the questioning of Teresa, the prosecutor asked if she recalled telling a police investigator how many knives defendant told her that he and Ruiz had taken with them to the Imperial 400 Motel. She denied recalling having given the investigator a number, and no evidence was ever introduced of any statement by Teresa on this subject. Defendant did not object to these questions, however, and the jurors were specifically instructed under CALJIC No. 1.02 that they “must never assume to be true any insinuation suggested by a question asked a witness. . . .” Defendant also asserts misconduct in the prosecutor’s rebuttal questioning of Teresa, in the course of which Teresa, then nine months pregnant, was asked whether defendant was the father of her child. Defense counsel’s repeated objections to this line of questioning were sustained on relevancy grounds, and defendant now appears to assert misconduct in the prosecutor’s pursuit of the topic—by asking whether she had been pregnant previously and whether she had ever had sexual relations with defendant—despite the court’s rulings. Given that the defense objections were sustained and that defense counsel did not seek to have the jury admonished to disregard Teresa’s answers to the few questions that preceded the final objection, we fail to see a basis for claiming misconduct or prejudice. In any event, the testimony would seem to have been relevant, in light of the fact that other witnesses had testified to statements allegedly made by Teresa that defendant loved her, that she was pregnant by him and that he was taking responsibility for the killings to protect her. Defendant asserts similar misconduct in the prosecutor’s questioning of inmate witness Jones about a note sent to him allegedly promising him $5,000 if he kept quiet concerning defendant’s case and about alleged threats and attempts to poison his food. The prosecutor’s attempts to link defendant to these incidents were unsuccessful, but defendant asserts that the questions enabled the prosecutor to put before the jury unsubstantiated inferences of other criminal activity by defendant and that the prosecutor committed misconduct in arguing to the jury that defendant had threatened people in jail. (See People v. Perez (1962) 58 Cal.2d 229, 240-241 [23 Cal.Rptr. 569, 373 P.2d 617, 3 A.L.R.3d 946].) But, as before, defense counsel made no objection to the questions and, in light of other testimony by Jones that defendant had threatened him and testimony that defendant had attacked Teresa’s brother while both were in jail, the prosecutor’s argument was legitimate. C. Abusive Cross-examination. The prosecutor’s cross-examination of defendant was marked by multiple objections from defense counsel on the grounds that the questions were argumentative or based on prejudicial facts not in evidence. The trial court sustained defense objections to 28 questions, but denied counsel’s motion for a mistrial. Defendant now contends that it was prejudicial misconduct for the prosecutor to belittle and harass defendant, and complains that the prosecutor improperly injected into the guilt phase of the trial the subject of the death penalty by asking defendant whether “a snitch jacket in prison [for blaming the killings on others] is worse than going to the gas chamber on these murders?” We do not condone the prosecutor’s manner of cross-examining defendant in this case. (See Hawk v. Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 108, 125 [116 Cal.Rptr. 713].) But the fact remains that defense counsel’s objections were sustained. If counsel believed that a potential for prejudice remained, she should have requested a specific admonition to the jury. And the jurors were instructed under CALJIC No. 1.02: “As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must not guess what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the objection. . . . [¶] You must not consider for any purpose . . . any evidence that was stricken out by the court; such matter is to be treated as though you had never heard of it.” We cannot see prejudicial error in the prosecutor’s cross-examination, nor does the passing reference to the gas chamber require reversal. Defense counsel did not object to the question; defendant himself later testified that he had decided finally to tell the truth because he did not “think it is right for me to go to the gas chamber” for something he did not do; and the jury was specifically instructed under CALJIC No. 8.83.2 to disregard the subject of penalty or punishment in the course of its deliberations. D. Closing Argument. Defendant also contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by again asserting as proven facts on which no evidence had been introduced: (1) that defendant might have attempted to escape in order to confront and threaten witnesses; (2) that defendant made four separate admissions to four separate people that he and Ruiz killed the couple; (3) that the female victim “had her wrist cut off” during the attack; (4) that defendant threatened to stab Teresa’s brother and had “others beat up witnesses” to silence them; (5) that defendant’s concern with being seen as a “snitch” showed that he was part of a “gang” or had a “gang mentality”; (6) that the victims were tortured; (7) that the killings were premeditated; and (8) that defendant asked Santana, “Have you ever killed before?”—implying that he might previously have murdered someone. The People offer no substantive response to these contentions, and we agree the prosecutor may have stepped over the line of permissible argument. (People v. Kirkes (1952) 39 Cal.2d 719, 724 [249 P.2d 1]; see People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 213 [152 Cal.Rptr. 141, 589 P.2d 396].) There was no basis for a suggestion that defendant sought to escape in order to intimidate witnesses. He did not admit killing the couple in his statements to Teresa and Santana; both testified that defendant admitted to nothing more than cutting the female victim on the wrist. The female victim’s wrist was cut but not “cut off,” and no allegations of torture were made in the case. And Santana’s testimony was that defendant asked him “Do you have the guts to kill someone?”—not “Have you ever killed before?” These statements were not simple hyperbole or slight exaggerations in the heat of argument; they were misstatements of the record and potentially prejudicial to defendant’s case. As in so many other instances, however, defense counsel did not object— except as to the reference to “a torture situation” on which point the trial court sustained the objection on the ground that the prosecutor had gone beyond proper argument. The misstatements, although bearing a potential for prejudice, were not so extreme or so divorced from the record that they could not have been cured by prompt objections and admonitions. (People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 759, fn. 21 [175 Cal.Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446].) The record reveals no explanation for defense counsel’s failure to object, and the question would thus be cognizable only on habeas corpus as part of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 425-426.) The matter is not properly before us here. E. Trial Court Errors. Defendant also complains of trial court errors that permitted, exacerbated or failed to cure the impact of the above instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. He briefly asserts, with little supporting argument beyond a reference to section 1044 and quotations of general principles from past decisions, that the prosecutor’s misconduct was so pervasive that the court on its own motion should have either admonished the jury to disregard the questions and closing argument or granted a mistrial. We cannot agree. First, much of what defendant finds objectionable in the prosecutor’s conduct would not necessarily even have been apparent to the court. That the testimony of Santana was inconsistent with his testimony at Ruiz’s trial and that the prosecutor might have argued a different version of the facts in that proceeding could have been known only by one who had reviewed the transcript of the Ruiz trial. And, to the extent that a basis for objection might have been apparent, the court was not obligated to intervene sua sponte as defense counsel might well have had a tactical reason for not objecting. We will not fault a trial court for exercising appropriate caution. More to the point, a trial court has no sua sponte duty to control prosecutorial misconduct; the authority defendant relies on to urge such a duty is no longer valid. Defendant looks to People v. Perez, supra, 58 Cal. 2d at pages 249-250, to support his argument that his conviction cannot stand because the trial court failed on its own motion to correct the prosecutor’s misconduct or to grant a mistrial. But Perez relied on the “close case” exception of People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245, 261-262 [324 P.2d 556] to excuse the defendant’s failure to object at trial—an exception that Lyons drew from the inartful phrasing of People v. Berryman (1936) 6 Cal. 2d 331, 337 [57 P.2d 136]. In People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, we overruled Berryman and its progeny on this point and explained that the “close case” rule was not an exception to the requirement that a defendant object to preserve an issue for appeal but rather a statement of the test for prejudice if the issue had, by objection, been preserved. {Id. at pp. 27-34.) That is, the erroneous denial of an objection may, in a close case, warrant reversal, but that a case is close does not in and of itself excuse the failure to object or impose a duty on the trial court to intervene in the absence of objection. (See People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 335-336 [246 Cal.Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082].) Nor do defendant’s more specific claims of trial court error withstand scrutiny. Defendant objects that the court improperly limited the cross-examination of Santana. It was and remains the case that defendant failed to establish a basis for impeaching Santana with his testimony at the Ruiz trial; that is, defendant failed to apprise the court of any inconsistencies in Santana’s testimony that would have justified such a line of questioning. (See also ante, fn. 18.) And, in light of other testimony at trial (see post, pp. 322-323), we would be compelled to conclude that any error the trial court might have committed in this regard could not have prejudiced defendant. Defendant also objects to the trial court’s ruling permitting Santana’s younger brother to testify that three months prior to the killings Ruiz told him he had lost his job at the Imperial 400 Motel and allowing the prosecutor to bring out that the witness had told police that Ruiz had said he “would get even.” Even assuming that the statement should not have been allowed into evidence, the testimony was equivocal—as the witness testified he did not recall either that Ruiz had made that statement or that he had told police of it—and any error was harmless. F. Summary. Neither defendant’s complaints of prosecutorial misconduct—at least to the extent cognizable on appeal—nor his assertions of error by the trial court—either generally in failing to prevent prosecutorial misconduct or specifically in the challenged evidentiary rulings—call for reversal of his conviction. 7. Testimony of Rebuttal Witness. Defendant next claims that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to call inmate witness Hill at the rebuttal stage, asserting that he should have been called as part of the prosecution’s case-in-chief and that the trial court permitted the testimony to exceed the allowed scope of rebuttal. Only the latter point need concern us. Although the prosecution had evidently contemplated calling Hill as part of its case-in-chief, defendant has made no showing that the prosecution intentionally held back the testimony to the rebuttal stage and Hill was properly called at that time as his testimony on defendant’s statements to him that Teresa was not involved in the crimes countered the testimony of defendant and others in the defense case that Teresa was Ruiz’s partner in the killings. (People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1184 [240 Cal.Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301]; People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 331-332 [165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883].) The scope of Hill’s testimony presents something of a closer question, but on balance we are not persuaded that error is present or that error, to the extent present, was preserved for appeal. Defendant asserts that the testimony exceeded the proper scope of rebuttal because it “include[d] a material part of the case in the prosecution’s possession that tend[ed] to establish the defendant’s commission of the crime.” (People v. Carter (1957) 48 Cal.2d 737, 753 [312 P.2d 665].) But, as the prosecution notes, those portions of Hill’s testimony that went beyond a showing that Teresa was not involved in the crimes did not introduce anything new or significantly different to link defendant to the crimes; for the most part, the testimony merely reiterated and fortified the parts of the prosecution’s case-in-chief that had been attacked by the defense evidence. (See People v. Whitehorn (1963) 60 Cal.2d 256, 263 [32 Cal.Rptr. 199, 383 P.2d 783]; People v. Graham (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 736, 741 [149 Cal.Rptr. 6].) Hill’s testimony did introduce a few new points. He was the only witness testifying that defendant admitted participating in the killing of both victims, that defendant stabbed the female victim more than once, that he stabbed her in the eye (a wound not found by the pathologist or otherwise shown to exist), and that he planned the crimes. Contrary to the testimony of Santana and Teresa, and more explicit than the testimony of inmate witness Jones, Hill’s testimony painted defendant as an active participant in the brutal murders of both victims. The admission of rebuttal evidence rests largely within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of “palpable abuse.” (People v. Graham (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 736, 741 [149 Cal.Rptr. 6]; see § 1093, subd. (d).) The record in this case will not support a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the rebuttal testimony. Moreover, defense counsel’s failure to object on this ground precludes the challenge on appeal in any event. (Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 332.) 8. Admission of Jailhouse Tape Recordings. Defendant challenges, on three separate grounds, admission of the tape recordings of his jailhouse conversations with family members and friends the day before he was arraigned. Defendant first asserts that the tapes should have been suppressed because they were obtained only as a result of the delay of his arraignment beyond the time mandated by statute, and at a time he was allegedly without the assistance of counsel. Defendant also contends, independent of these two grounds, that suppression is required as a remedy for violation of his statutory right of privacy as a pretrial detainee, asserting that retroactive application of our decision in De Lancie v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 865 [183 Cal.Rptr. 866, 647 P.2d 142], which we rejected in Donaldson v. Superior Court (1985) 35 Cal.3d 24 [196 Cal.Rptr. 704, 672 P.2d 110], is now mandated by the rule in Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) 479 U.S. 314 [93 L.Ed.2d 649, 107 S.Ct. 708]. None of his challenges to the admissibility of the tape recordings is persuasive. A. Arraignment Delay. Defendant was arrested without a warrant shortly before noon on Monday, April 12, 1982. He was not arraigned until the morning of April 15, 1982. By constitutional provision (Cal. Const., art. I, § 14) and by statute (§ 849, subd. (a)), defendant was entitled to be brought before a magistrate “without unnecessary delay.” As even an accused arrested upon a warrant previously issued by a judicial officer must be arraigned within two days (§ 825), a fortiori, the three-day delay here violated defendant’s right to a prompt arraignment. (See People v. Pettingill (1980) 21 Cal.3d 231, 243 [145 Cal.Rptr. 861, 578 P.2d 108].) Defendant analogizes the recording of his jailhouse conversations during the period of this illegal detention without arraignment to the obtaining of a confession during such a period and, on that basis, argues that the tape recordings should have been suppressed. Recognizing that even an illegal detention does not automatically render a confession inadmissible and that a defendant must show the detention “produced the admissions” or there was “an essential connection” between the two events (Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 329-330), defendant contends the arraignment delay denied him the prompt appointment of counsel and thus deprived him of “the standard advisement not to expect any privacy on the jailhouse visitor phones.” Defendant has shown nothing more than a “but for” relationship between his prearraignment detention and the taping. His argument would, contrary to the rule in Thompson, supra, 27 Cal. 3d 303, render inadmissible virtually every statement obtained during the period of an illegal detention, for in each such case the defendant could argue that but for the delay, counsel would have been appointed and would have advised against the making of any statement. (See People v. Cook (1982