Full opinion text
Opinion BAXTER, J. Petitioner Kenneth Earl Gay was convicted by a jury of the June 1, 1983, first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 189) of Paul Verna, a Los Angeles police officer. The jury found that the murder was an intentional killing of a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties; that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(5)); that a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022); and that petitioner personally used a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 1203.06, subd. (a)(1)). The jury returned a penalty verdict of death. The jury also found petitioner guilty of two counts of attempted robbery (§§ 664/211), ten counts of robbery (§ 211), conspiracy to commit robbery (§ 182), and being an ex-felon in possession of a concealable firearm (§ 12021). He was found to have personally used a firearm in committing three of those offenses (§§ 12022.5, 1203.06, subd. (a)) and to have inflicted great bodily injury on two of the robbery victims (§ 12022.7). This court reversed the attempted robbery, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery convictions on the basis of prejudicial instructional error, but otherwise affirmed the judgment and sentence of death on April 29, 1993. (People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1].) While his appeal from the judgment was pending, petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petition challenges the validity of the judgment on several grounds. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is the principal focus of the petition for writ of habeas corpus. After review of the petition and accompanying exhibits, this court issued an order to show cause ordering respondent Director of Corrections to show cause why the penalty of death should not be set aside on the ground that petitioner had received constitutionally ineffective assistance by trial counsel, Daye at the penalty phase of the trial. After consideration of the record on appeal, the evidence presented at the habeas corpus evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the referee, we conclude that petitioner did not receive constitutionally adequate representation at the penalty phase of the trial. While we cannot say with certainty that the result would have been more favorable to petitioner had he been represented by competent counsel, neither can we have confidence in a penalty verdict rendered after a trial in which counsel for defendant defrauded both the court and his client and ill served his client in the manner demonstrated by this record. We shall, therefore, grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus and remand petitioner to the superior court for a new penalty trial. I Background Officer Verna was shot and killed by petitioner and his crime partner Raynard Paul Cummings when Verna stopped the car in which they were passengers, driven by Pamela Cummings, Raynard’s wife, as they drove through the Lakeview Terrace district of the San Fernando Valley. In the weeks before Verna stopped the car for a traffic violation, Cummings, allegedly with petitioner, had committed a series of robberies in Los Angeles County. Following his arrest petitioner was held in the Los Angeles County jail. Daye Shinn met with petitioner in the county jail and appeared as retained counsel for petitioner at the preliminary hearing, replacing a deputy public defender who had been appointed by the court. Petitioner had retained Shinn prior to the preliminary hearing on the fraudulent representation by Shinn and Marcus McBroom that Shinn’s fees would be paid by a group of Black businessmen. Shinn was later appointed to represent petitioner after Shinn first advised petitioner to tell the court that petitioner’s parents would pay Shinn’s fees and then advised petitioner to tell the court that his parents could not do so. As will be discussed in more detail below, Shinn’s fraudulent representations to petitioner and the court were part of a scheme in which Shinn brought Dr. Fred Weaver, a psychiatrist, and Marcus McBroom, who acted as Weaver’s assistant, into the case. A pretrial statement admitting petitioner’s complicity in the several robberies with which he was charged was admitted at trial. Shinn had advised petitioner to make the statement to an investigating officer, falsely assuring petitioner that the statement would not be admissible at trial. During the penalty phase of the trial, Shinn called Dr. Weaver to offer mitigating evidence. Dr. Weaver testified that petitioner was a sociopath with an antisocial personality, but did well in a structured custodial situation. The only other penalty phase witnesses were petitioner’s mother, wife, mother-in-law, cousin, and three acquaintances, none of whom had been interviewed by Shinn, who were called to offer evidence of petitioner’s good character traits. Although other potentially mitigating penalty phase evidence was readily available, Shinn himself did no investigation of penalty phase evidence and the investigation undertaken by Shinn’s investigator, who was given inadequate guidance, failed to discover that evidence. These aspects of Shinn’s representation are the principal focus of our inquiry. II Ineffective Counsel Allegations Although we have concluded that the petition fails to state a prima facie case for relief on ineffective counsel grounds with respect to guilt, prejudice not having been established as to that phase of the trial, we include in our summary those factual allegations of the petition related to the quality of counsel’s representation prior to the penalty phase which had an impact on the penalty determination. Petitioner alleges in substance that Shinn engineered his appointment in the case by lies, misrepresentations, and unethical conduct. Petitioner’s retention of Shinn occurred at a time when petitioner was represented by a deputy public defender. Shinn, accompanied by an African-American man in clerical garb, approached petitioner in the county jail. Shinn stated that he was an experienced criminal lawyer and that his companion was a minister who represented a group of African-American businessmen who were interested in paying for petitioner’s defense because they were sure he would not otherwise receive a fair trial. The pair urged petitioner to retain Shinn because he needed a “good lawyer,” and petitioner did so. When petitioner appeared for the preliminary hearing, Shinn told petitioner to falsely tell the court that petitioner’s parents had given Shinn a $5,000 retainer. Petitioner did so and Shinn was substituted as counsel. Petitioner’s mother declares that she did not provide funds to retain Shinn and he did not request a retainer. Neither Shinn nor his investigator ever interviewed petitioner’s parents. His mother did not meet with Shinn until the day she testified at the penalty phase of the trial. After the preliminary hearing Shinn told petitioner to tell the court that he was without funds to pay Shinn and that Shinn should be appointed under the authority of section 987.2. Prior to the penalty phase, Shinn arranged for petitioner to see Dr. Weaver, a psychiatrist. Weaver’s assistant, Dr. McBroom, was the minister who had accompanied Shinn to the jail when Shinn solicited employment. Petitioner alleges that Shinn’s performance at the penalty phase was deficient in numerous ways. Possibly the most damaging allegation was that, after falsely assuring petitioner the statement could not be used against him at trial, Shinn misled petitioner into making a statement to investigating officers in which petitioner admitted participating in the robberies with which he was charged. Shinn also failed to adequately investigate and discover available mitigating evidence, used an incompetent mental health expert, and had no coherent penalty phase strategy. Petitioner attributes Shinn’s selection of Dr. Weaver as his mental health expert to a conflict of interest arising out of an allegedly improper “capping” arrangement whereby Dr. McBroom solicited clients for Shinn who then retained Dr. Weaver, for whom McBroom was an assistant. Petitioner alleges that at the time Shinn represented him, Shinn labored under another clear, but undisclosed, conflict of interest arising out of complaints made against Shinn by a former client to the State Bar, various legislators, and the district attorney regarding Shinn’s misappropriation of client funds. The State Bar investigation threatened Shinn’s license and livelihood. At the time Shinn was acting on his own behalf in these investigations; he was unable to devote full time to the representation of or adequately defend petitioner. A. Prepenalty-phase Conduct. Petitioner alleges more specifically with regard to the robbery-related counts that Shinn advised him to confess to those charges in a pretrial interview with a police investigator, falsely telling petitioner that Shinn had an agreement that petitioner would confess to those counts and testify for the prosecution and his statement would not be used against him. Shinn did not have an agreement to that effect. At a hearing on the admissibility of the taped statement petitioner made during that interview, the police investigator testified in response to questioning by Shinn that there was no such agreement and that the investigator believed petitioner was truthful in his confession to the robbery-related offenses. In a deposition taken prior to the filing of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Shinn testified that he did not remember what reason, if any, he had for questioning the investigator in that fashion. Respondent denies that Shinn induced petitioner to confess to the robberies, and asserts that they would have been proven at the penalty phase in any event. Therefore, respondent asserts, Shinn’s conduct in this regard did not cause any prejudice at the penalty phase. Because this court reversed the robbery-related counts on appeal, we consider only whether Shinn’s conduct in these matters was incompetent and, if so, whether consideration of those robberies and attempted robberies, coupled with the impact of Shinn’s other failings, was so prejudicial with regard to the penalty verdict as to render the death penalty verdict unreliable. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674].) B. Murder Count—Guilt Phase. Petitioner alleges that Shinn inexplicably introduced into evidence exhibit C, a statement by Pamela Cummings accusing petitioner of being the person who fired the first shot at Officer Verna and who then left the car and fired the remaining shots into the officer’s body. She declared that he did this while codefendant Raynard Cummings was asking “what’s going on.” He also introduced exhibit D, a statement by Raynard Cummings, accusing petitioner of firing all of the shots. In a deposition Shinn could not recall any tactical reason for introducing these exhibits. Petitioner also alleges that Shinn failed to discover and call four witnesses to whom Cummings had admitted that he killed Officer Verna. One, Jack Flores, had been a jail inmate whose declaration states that he was in a cell adjacent to Raynard Cummings in June and July 1983. Cummings described the shooting to Flores, admitting that he had been the only person to shoot Verna. Flores gave a statement to two Los Angeles Police Department detectives on July 11, 1983. He states that he also gave them a letter by Cummings admitting that Cummings did all the shooting. Flores gave the letter to the police. Flores was called as a prosecution witness at the separate trial of the penalty phase for Cummings. He states that he was told that the prosecution did not intend to ask him to testify about Cummings’s admissions. Petitioner also alleges that Shinn did not call jail inmate James Edward Jennings who made a statement to the police about Cummings’s description of Cummings’s role in the killings. Jennings had ridden with Cummings on a bus going to court. In the statement, exhibit E to the petition, Jennings says that Cummings bragged about how he shot and killed Officer Verna and about a series of robberies and auto thefts. Cummings told Jennings that Cummings was in the backseat of the car stopped by Officer Verna. Gay was in the front seat. When the officer asked for I.D., Cummings said “I’ve got I.D.” He then pulled a gun from between his legs and shot Verna twice in the upper body, once in the neck or shoulder area and once in the upper body area. Verna then spun about, at which time Cummings shot Verna in the back. Allegedly Michael Gaxiola, another jail inmate who was not called as a witness, had been interviewed at the Los Angeles County Hall of Justice about a conversation with Cummings in which Cummings told Gaxiola that he shot Officer Verna because he was not going to go back to jail or allow Verna to jail his wife. Shinn also failed to call Robin Gay, who had waived her privilege against self-incrimination before the grand jury, although she had refused to testify at trial. In her grand jury testimony, she claimed that after the shootings, Raynard Cummings admitted he “downed” the officer and reenacted events in which Raynard fired the initial shots from the back seat of the car and then got out and shot Officer Verna to death. Petitioner argues that by failing to offer this evidence at the guilt phase, Shinn eliminated any basis for a “lingering doubt” argument during the penalty phase of the trial. C. Penalty Phase. 1. Acts and omissions during trial. Petitioner alleges that Shinn failed to investigate and rebut prosecution evidence of prior violent criminal activity and did not object to inadmissible aggravating evidence. He claims that the evidence Shinn presented through the testimony of Dr. Weaver, who testified that petitioner had an antisocial personality, was inaccurate, ill-informed, damaging, and actually corroborated prosecution evidence rather than offering mitigating factors for jury consideration. Petitioner also alleges that although Weaver’s testimony referred to petitioner’s troubled childhood, the testimony was ineffective and uncompelling because it lacked detail, and was incomplete, cursory, conclusory, and perfunctory; that it was not part of an integrated approach to the case; and that Shinn did not prepare Weaver to testify and Weaver was not a competent penalty phase expert. Weaver did not testify regarding psychological problems suffered by petitioner. Petitioner also complains that Shinn conceded that petitioner had committed the prior violent criminal acts and virtually conceded that death was the appropriate penalty. Among the items of evidence to which no objection was offered was evidence that while in jail awaiting trial, petitioner had made threats against a jail guard and his family, evidence that was inadmissible as direct evidence in aggravation. 2. Medical/social history. Petitioner claims Shinn should have discovered and presented as a mitigating factor evidence that petitioner was raised in a deprived, abusive, and chaotic home environment, suffered head injuries, and had medical problems which affected his behavior, his ability to reason, and his response to stressful situations. In support of his claim that relevant mitigating evidence ' was available, petitioner submitted the declaration of Joan Carroll Cartwright, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist who has interviewed petitioner and reviewed case materials regarding petitioner that have now been assembled. She states that she has reviewed the trial testimony of Dr. Weaver, whose competence and diagnosis she questions because he failed to obtain any of the background data required for a competent diagnosis. She declares that no competent professional would have administered the “Gestalt” test used by Dr. Weaver’s assistant in 1985 to detect brain injury. The assistant administered an intelligence test (WISC) that is appropriate only for children and could not adequately measure petitioner’s intelligence. Based on her own investigation, Dr. Cartwright concludes that petitioner is the victim of a dysfunctional and violent home in which he and his siblings experienced “extreme physical abuse” by an alcoholic father who had limited mental capacity and substantial mental impairments. Petitioner’s mother was emotionally neglectful of abuse toward petitioner and his siblings. Petitioner was beaten on the head by his father and also suffered head trauma in accidents while in institutions. He suffered headaches, blackouts, memory loss and attention/concentration problems as well as physical ailments. Petitioner’s father, Van Gay, who is Black, had an IQ of 65. He contracted syphilis and gonorrhea in 1956, and because these diseases were not cured, he deteriorated mentally and psychologically. He was an abusive alcoholic, and was diagnosed as having a “form of passive-aggressive personality of the passive dependent type with hysterical features and neurosis with depressive and conversion reactions.” In 1983, petitioner’s father was found to have a moderate to severe depressive disorder and was fearful of emotional closeness. He was diagnosed as having depression and paranoia. Dr. Cartwright’s declaration describes additional evidence of childhood and adolescent problems of petitioner and his siblings, none of which evidence was presented by Shinn and most of which would have been relevant, mitigating evidence. Respondent denies the allegations related to inadequate penalty phase investigation and preparation for lack of information and belief, and argues that, assuming Shinn failed to investigate and obtain background information and records, it made no difference. Based on a declaration by Shinn, respondent also asserts that Shinn was willing to call additional witnesses at the penalty phase but petitioner did not want them to testify. The witnesses who testified were those approved by petitioner. Petitioner admits that he approved the witnesses who testified, but denies the truth of the assertion that he instructed Shinn not to call other witnesses. He alleges that Shinn failed to investigate or contact the penalty phase witnesses who did testify until the day of their testimony. In his traverse he reasserts the claim that Shinn failed to obtain available and necessary records or interview available members of petitioner’s family regarding their social, medical, and psychiatric history. 3. Incompetent mental health professional. Petitioner contends that Dr. Weaver was incompetent. He supports this claim with Dr. Cartwright’s declaration. • Respondent denies the allegation that Shinn failed to consult with competent mental health experts regarding “mental state defenses,” denies that such defenses were available, asserts that the experts whom Shinn consulted were competent, and argues that permitting Dr. Weaver to testify that petitioner was a sociopath and had an antisocial personality was not unreasonable. In a declaration accompanying the return Shinn states that he had worked with psychologist McBroom in the past through Weaver and believed that he had the proper licenses to administer psychological testing on petitioner. Shinn had used Weaver as an expert witness before and used him after petitioner’s case. He did so because he did a “good job.” He was not obligated in any way to use the services of either McBroom or Weaver in petitioner’s case. 4. Conflict of interest. In related allegations petitioner asserts that Shinn misrepresented facts to him and failed to disclose material facts which effectively precluded his participation in his own defense. These acts included the failure to disclose Shinn’s allegedly “unlawful capping relationship” with Drs. Weaver and McBroom, failure to disclose that he intended to utilize their services as a result of that relationship, as well as failure to disclose that McBroom was unlicensed and Weaver incompetent. He alleges that Shinn was obligated to utilize the services of Weaver and, because he had to pay Weaver for those services, had an incentive to limit the time Weaver devoted to the case and thus keep Weaver’s charges to a minimum. Petitioner contends that Shinn’s alleged failure to obtain the assistance of a competent mental health professional to assist in developing and presenting mitigating evidence resulted from a conflict of interest. He alleges that the minister who told him that the defense would be funded by a group of Black businessmen and that he should retain Shinn was in fact Dr. Marcus McBroom, the psychologist who assisted Dr. Weaver. He alleges that Dr. McBroom, who administered psychological tests to petitioner, is not licensed in California. Relying on a declaration by Shinn, respondent denies that Shinn had a conflict of interest in retaining Weaver and McBroom that precluded his hiring competent mental health professionals. Respondent also denies that Shinn was accompanied by a man in clerical garb when he met petitioner, but concedes that the declarations of Shinn and McBroom differ regarding the first meeting with petitioner. Shinn declares that his first contact with petitioner was through McBroom who told him that a group of Black businessmen wanted Shinn to represent Gay. Shinn went to the jail with McBroom and petitioner agreed to representation by Shinn. McBroom told Shinn thereafter that the businessmen would not pay. Shinn met with petitioner and told him that he was no longer willing to represent petitioner. Petitioner suggested the possibility that Shinn’s fees would be paid by petitioner’s family. In interviews with respondent’s investigator, McBroom acknowledged that he met petitioner in the county jail and that he and Dr. Weaver have worked with Shinn on numerous occasions. He stated that when Shinn asked Weaver’s assistance, Weaver told Shinn that McBroom would be assisting. Shinn wanted McBroom to go to the county jail so that McBroom could meet petitioner and petitioner would know who McBroom was. Shinn and petitioner appeared to know one another when McBroom first met petitioner. He denied that he presented himself as a minister in order to get Shinn retained as counsel for petitioner, claiming that Shinn was already attorney of record when he met petitioner. He asserts that licensing is not required for the tests he administered. Weaver, who holds a valid California license, believes that McBroom was qualified to administer the tests under Weaver’s Ill Constitutionally Ineffective Counsel Well-established legal criteria govern the assessment of an ineffective counsel claim. Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant effective assistance of counsel. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 686, 691-692 [104 S.Ct. at pp. 2063-2064, 2066-2067]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215 [233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839].) The right of a criminal defendant to counsel “entitles the defendant not to some bare assistance but rather to effective assistance.” (In re Cordero (1988) 46 Cal.3d 161, 180 [249 Cal.Rptr. 342, 756 P.2d 1370].) “Specifically, he is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent and conscientious advocate. (In re Cordero, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 180.) This means that before counsel undertakes to act, or not to act, counsel must make a rational and informed decision on strategy and tactics founded upon adequate investigation and preparation.” (In re Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 584, 602 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 727, 822 P.2d 435] (Marquez)); see also People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 215.) While our scrutiny of an attorney’s conduct of the defense is deferential, that deference is limited. “[I]t must never be used to insulate counsel’s performance from meaningful scrutiny and thereby automatically validate challenged acts or omissions. Otherwise, the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel would be reduced to form without substance.” (People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 217.) A habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of proof of the facts on which an incompetent counsel challenge to the validity of the judgment under which the petitioner is restrained is predicated, by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Visciotti (1996) 14 Cal.4th 325, 351 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 801, 926 P.2d 987].) To do so on a theory that he received constitutionally inadequate representation by counsel at the penalty phase of his trial, he must establish that counsel’s performance did not meet an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and that he suffered prejudice thereby. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 [104 S.Ct. at p. 2068].) Prejudice is established when “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors [of counsel], the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.’ [Citations.] As in the guilt phase, reasonable probability is defined as one that undermines confidence in the verdict.” (Marquez, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 606.) Alternatively, the petitioner may establish that as a result of counsel’s inadequacy, the prosecution case was not subject to meaningful adversarial testing, thereby raising a presumption that the result is unreliable. (United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 658-659 [104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046-2047, 80 L.Ed.2d 657].) Before these criteria are applied, we address factual disputes which appear in the return and traverse where resolution is necessary to determine the merits of petitioner’s claim of constitutionally ineffective representation by counsel at the penalty phase of his trial. IV Reference of Disputed Factual Questions This court appointed the Honorable J. Stephen Czuleger, Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, to sit as a referee and resolve factual disputes. Judge Czuleger was asked to take evidence and make findings of fact on several questions. Those in which the findings are relevant to our conclusions are discussed below. In our review of the parties’ exceptions to the findings of the referee, we apply well-settled law. “The referee’s conclusions of law are subject to independent review, as is his resolution of mixed questions of law and fact. [Citations.] . . . The referee’s findings of fact, though not binding on the court, are given great weight when supported by substantial evidence. The deference accorded factual findings derives from the fact that the referee had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their manner of testifying.” (Marquez, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 603; see also In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 109 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 860 P.2d 466].) The findings of Judge Czuleger on the questions relevant to our proposed disposition, the parties’ exceptions thereto, and the findings of this court follow each question. Because the potential penalty phase prejudice from jury consideration of the robberies with which petitioner was charged is high, we first consider the referee’s findings on the question related to petitioner’s claim that Shinn incompetently induced him to confess to the several robberies which preceded the murder of Officer Verna. A. Did trial counsel induce petitioner to confess to the commission of the several robberies with which petitioner was charged and to the commission of the Valley Vacuum Cleaner robbery; was petitioner advised of the potential consequences of that confession; and did the prosecutor or the investigators give trial counsel any reason to believe that the statement given by petitioner in which he confessed would not be used against petitioner at trial? Findings-. “Shinn induced Petitioner to confess to the charged and uncharged robberies. Shinn advised Petitioner that it would be in his own best interest to cooperate with the prosecution and that he might be able to work out a favorable disposition of his case as a result. Petitioner was told by Shinn that the statement could not be used against him if the prosecutors decided not to use him as a witness. “At the time of the tape recorded interview, with the deputy district attorney, Petitioner was advised of his rights against self-incrimination and told that there were no promises or agreements between the defense and prosecution in advance of the interview. Petitioner and Shinn stated that they understood the admonition. “Neither the prosecutor nor the investigators specifically gave trial counsel any reason to believe that the statement would not be used against Petitioner at trial. Shinn, from past experiences with the District Attorney’s Office nonetheless believed that he had this understanding and so advised Petitioner.” Exceptions: Petitioner excepts to the findings to the extent that the referee’s statement that the prosecutor and his investigators did not “specifically” give Shinn reason to believe that petitioner’s statements would not be used might be read as a finding that they may have done so implicitly in their statements and conduct. Respondent does not except to these findings and argues that the evidence established that neither Shinn nor petitioner had any indication from the prosecutor or investigator that any agreement existed. The findings of the referee are fully supported by the evidence and are adopted by the court as its own. Respondent argues that Shinn’s incompetent performance in inducing petitioner to admit participation in the robberies was not prejudicial as defendant would have been convicted of the robberies even apart from those admissions. The evidence at trial suggests otherwise with respect to several of the robberies, however. Three of the robbery counts were based on an April 25, 1983, robbery of the operators of Kenn Cleaners. None of the victims identified petitioner as a participant. Only Pamela Cummings testified that petitioner was present. Pamela Cummings was an accomplice as a matter of law whose testimony identifying petitioner as one of the robbers had to be corroborated. (§ llll.) Apart from petitioner’s admissions, there was no direct evidence corroborating her identification of petitioner as one of the robbers. The same is true as to the two robbery counts based on the May 6, 1983, robbery of the operators of the Salads Plus salad bar. None of the three victims of the May 29, 1983, robbery of the operators of the Pizza Man delivery service identified petitioner. Respondent argues that evidence that Cummings’s accomplice was light skinned was sufficient corroboration. We are not persuaded. An inference might be drawn that because petitioner was light skinned and had been Cummings’s partner in some of the robberies, petitioner was his accomplice in all of the robberies. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, and slight evidence may be sufficient corroboration. (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1128 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1].) While a court might well recognize this evidence was sufficient if the question arose on appeal after conviction, here we cannot say with assurance that it is probable that a jury would necessarily find the evidence sufficient. If it did not, the jury would not convict petitioner of six of the robbery-related counts had his statement not been introduced. Even were we to assume that a jury would accept the circumstantial evidence that petitioner was Cummings’s accomplice during those robberies as corroboration of Pamela’s testimony, Shinn’s conduct harmed petitioner. The statement Shinn misled petitioner into making, a stipulation that petitioner was a serial robber, made it unnecessary for the jury to grapple with the question of corroboration. The statement Shinn incompetently elicited from petitioner made the prosecution’s case. There were problems with two of the other counts which might have affected those verdicts also. The victim of the May 20, 1983, Designer Florist robbery was unable to identify petitioner in court. She testified that “Kenneth Gay” had robbed her, but that was after seeing petitioner, whom she did not then recognize, on television. Moreover, the victim of the repair shop robbery on May 13, 1983, was deceased at the time of trial. His identification of petitioner came in the reading of his preliminary hearing testimony. There was no in-court visual identification of petitioner by either of these witnesses. It is possible, therefore, that but for Shinn’s incompetence in inducing petitioner to confess the robberies to the officers investigating the murder, he would not have been convicted of several of the robberies. Moreover, the question of petitioner’s guilt might not have been put to the jury at all, if, as did occur on one count, the trial court granted a motion for acquittal. (§ 1118.1.) The prejudicial impact at the penalty phase of the admission of petitioner’s statement confessing to the robberies cannot be understated. Shinn not only acted as a second prosecutor by creating the evidence that led to petitioner’s conviction of the robberies, his conduct permitted the prosecutor to portray petitioner as an admitted serial robber who killed a police officer to avoid arrest and prosecution for the robberies. That picture of defendant, absent any substantial mitigating evidence, would be devastating to any hope for a sentence less than death. As our opinion affirming the judgment on appeal reflects, little mitigating evidence was offered on petitioner’s behalf at the penalty trial, although evidence offered at the habeas corpus hearing suggests that much more potentially mitigating evidence was easily accessible. Some of that evidence related to petitioner’s “mental status.” Therefore, because Shinn engineered his appointment through his relationship with Marcus McBroom, an assistant of Dr. Weaver, the psychiatrist Shinn subsequently engaged to assist in this case, we next consider the questions related to the retention of Shinn to represent petitioner, Shinn’s selection of Dr. Weaver as his mental health expert, and the impact of Shinn’s conduct and instructions to Dr. Weaver on the investigation into mental health as a potentially mitigating factor. B. What contacts between trial counsel, Marcus McBroom, and/or other ' persons led to petitioner’s election to retain Daye Shinn; did McBroom represent himself to petitioner as a clergyman and encourage petitioner to retain Shinn; was petitioner told that a group of businessmen would pay the fees of private counsel and, if so, by whom was he told and was that statement true; did Shinn tell petitioner to tell the court that his parents had paid a retainer to Shinn, if so, was that statement true; and did Shinn at the time he was retained intend to seek appointment later, knowing that his fee would not be paid by petitioner’s parents? Findings: “While Petitioner was in county jail in late June, 1983, Shinn and Marcus McBroom introduced themselves to Petitioner. McBroom identified himself as a minister and told Petitioner that he represented a group of black businessmen that wished to hire a lawyer for Petitioner. McBroom was an ordained minister. Both Shinn and McBroom encouraged Petitioner to retain Shinn. Petitioner said he had no money to retain counsel and Petitioner was told not to worry that this group of black businessmen would take care of Shinn’s fee. “Shinn never quoted a fee, was paid a fee, or attempted to collect a fee from the alleged group of businessmen. “There is no evidence to cause this Court to believe that there ever was any group of ‘black businessmen’ to pay Shinn’s retainer. Shinn later told Petitioner to tell the court that his parents had paid a retainer to Shinn. This was not accurate. Shinn never had any reasonable belief that he would be paid by any group of businessmen or Petitioner’s family. Shinn’s intent from early on was to seek appointment by the Court.” Exceptions'. There are no exceptions to the findings, which are amply supported by the testimony of petitioner. We adopt them. Shinn engineered both his initial retention and subsequent appointment by fraudulent means. Petitioner argues that representation by an attorney whose retention and appointment is brought about by such a fraudulent and unethical scheme should be presumed to have been prejudicial, thus requiring reversal of his conviction. In concluding that the allegations of the petition failed to state a prima facie case with respect to the guilt phase, however, we impliedly rejected the argument that prejudice is presumed from such conduct. Shinn’s fraudulent schemes are clearly relevant, however, in assessing his credibility, his relationship with Dr. Weaver, and his commitment to act as a zealous advocate at the penalty phase of the trial. C. Is there any basis for concluding that Shinn had a conflict of interest, or a reason other than demonstrated competence which led him to use Fred Weaver, M.D. and/or Marcus McBroom as his mental health experts, and, if so, what are the facts which might support such a conclusion? Findings: “Marcus McBroom brought Shinn into Petitioner’s case. Shinn had worked with Dr. Weaver and McBroom in the past. McBroom contacted Dr. Weaver and asked him if he would be interested in working on the case. Dr. Weaver said he would if he was satisfied after talking to Shinn about the time commitment necessary. Dr. Weaver indicated that he was in the ‘waning’ years of his forensic work and did not want a long and complicated case. “After speaking to Shinn and McBroom together, Dr. Weaver learned that an extensive commitment of time would not be necessary and he agreed to take the case. Shinn knew that by retaining Dr. Weaver, McBroom would also be utilized to perform the diagnostic testing. Dr. Weaver had never worked on a death penalty case before. “There is no evidence of a direct conflict of interest. The evidence does show a prior relationship between the three individuals, that the three had previously worked together, and that McBroom had engineered Shinn’s entry onto the case. Simply because of this prior relationship, the three worked together on Petitioner’s case.” Exceptions: Petitioner does not except to these findings, but states that the evidence supports a conclusion that Weaver was selected solely because of the past relationship he and McBroom had with Shinn, and/or because Weaver was not interested in a complicated assignment. Respondent does not except to these findings. Petitioner argues on the basis of the findings and the evidence that the record demonstrates that Shinn did not want an extended mental health workup of petitioner at the penalty phase and limited the scope of the examination to be performed, and that Dr. Weaver was neither qualified nor interested in undertaking the quality of analysis necessary in this case. Respondent contends that the evidence establishes that neither Shinn’s apparent belief that the death penalty was inevitable nor the monetary limitations affected the adequacy of the examination performed by Dr. Weaver. Respondent relies on answers given by Dr. Weaver on cross-examination for an argument that Dr. Weaver himself concluded, after his independent evaluation, that the case was hopeless and since there was not too much that would make a difference, Dr. Weaver concluded that additional time was not necessary. Dr. Weaver’s conclusions did not affect his work, however, and he felt he spent the appropriate amount of time necessary for the examination and review and to form his opinion, and would not have rendered an inadequate opinion in a case in which a defendant faced execution. We adopt the referee’s factual findings. Although he concluded that there was no evidence of a direct conflict of interest, he did not find that there was no conflict of interest. His factual findings suggest that there was. It is apparent from the record that Shinn did not select Dr. Weaver because of his demonstrated competence. Instead, the record supports a conclusion that Shinn, McBroom, and Weaver had a capping relationship pursuant to which Weaver was retained in cases in which McBroom had arranged representation by Shinn. While the conflict may not have been “direct,” the only reasonable inference from the evidence is that in cases in which he had been introduced to the client by McBroom, Shinn did not consider retaining experts other than Weaver. The finding that Shinn retained Dr. Weaver with the understanding that Weaver was not willing to commit the time or undertake the work necessary for a complicated case is consistent with this conclusion and amply supported by the record. As the evidence relevant to the next questions reflects, the record also supports a conclusion that both Shinn and Weaver considered the death penalty a foregone conclusion and for that reason Shinn did not undertake, and did not instruct Weaver to undertake, the type of penalty phase investigation and preparation expected of competent professionals in a capital case. The evidence does not support respondent’s view of the adequacy of Dr. Weaver’s examination and opinion. Dr. Weaver had been used as an expert by Shinn in several prior criminal cases in which diminished capacity issues were raised. Petitioner’s trial was his only experience testifying at the penalty phase of a capital trial, although he had testified in two prior murder cases in the early 1970’s. He became involved only three weeks before his testimony, when Marcus McBroom telephoned him. At that time Dr. Weaver’s interest in forensic cases was “waning.” Forensic work took time from other areas in which he was interested. Additional training and experience in forensic psychiatry, which Weaver did not have, was now expected of experts in this field. Weaver therefore accepted the case only after McBroom told him it was “an open-and-shut case” which would not require much time and Shinn told him the same. Dr. Weaver’s own experience growing up in the South gave him a sense that when a Black man was charged with killing a policeman the case was hopeless. Shinn neither advised Dr. Weaver about the mitigating evidence he hoped to offer at the penalty trial, nor discussed how Dr. Weaver’s testimony would fit into the penalty phase presentation. Dr. Weaver gave his report to Shinn, who spent only about five minutes in the hall outside the courtroom with Dr. Weaver before Dr. Weaver testified. Dr. Weaver understood he was to see petitioner once or twice, make a short assessment, and report back to Shinn. Investigation of petitioner’s drug use or discussion with his family would have been considered an unnecessary “frill” in what was an open-and-shut case. Dr. Weaver had no school, medical, hospital, correctional, employment, military, or juvenile records for petitioner or any family members when he examined petitioner. He had no sources of information other than petitioner himself, McBroom’s reports, and material attached to or part of police reports. Ordinarily, he would have felt that additional material was needed, but he did not in this case. He would not have taken the case if it had required any extensive investigation. It was in this context that Dr. Weaver responded affirmatively to a suggestion made on cross-examination that “otherwise” he would not have rendered what he considered to be an inadequate opinion in a capital case. Although Dr. Weaver did see petitioner more often than he initially believed was required and more than he would have normally done given the amount of the fee, Weaver felt that he did not need to do his best. He was just to “go through the motions” and he did not do his best. The evidence amply supports a conclusion that Weaver’s selection as Shinn’s mental health expert was attributable to Shinn’s prior relationship with McBroom and Weaver, and McBroom’s involvement in Shinn’s retention. Shinn’s retention of Weaver notwithstanding the latter’s reluctance to accept a complex or time-consuming case, his failure to supply Weaver with relevant and easily available background material, and his instructions to Weaver which limited the extent of the assessment Weaver was to make constitute constitutionally inadequate representation. Shinn’s performance in this regard did not meet the standard to be expected of counsel engaged in the representation of a defendant in a capital case. These failures resulted in presentation of truncated, inadequate mental health evidence at the penalty phase. Our conclusion that Shinn provided constitutionally inadequate assistance in this aspect of penalty phase preparation and presentation is limited to an assessment of Shinn’s performance. If prejudicial, relief is available only on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, a denial of the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Since the state bore no responsibility for the selection of Dr. Weaver, or the limits placed on the extent of his investigation or his fee, petitioner may not claim entitlement to relief on the basis that he was denied a competent mental health expert. (Cf. Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68 [105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53].) It is not the role of this court to assess the competence of a licensed physician acting within his area of expertise. We decide only that a reasonably competent attorney representing a criminal defendant facing the death penalty would not impose similar limitations, both financial and otherwise, on an expert, and that Shinn’s selection of an expert who accepted the case only with the understanding that it was not complicated and would not take much time did not meet constitutional standards of competence. The following questions and findings support our conclusion that Shinn performed incompetently in his investigation and presentation of potentially mitigating mental health evidence. D. What is the nature of the evaluation that Shinn requested Weaver to perform and how was the evaluation related to penalty phase defenses? Findings: “Shinn has no recollection of the nature of the evaluation which he asked Dr. Weaver to perform. However, Dr. Weaver testified convincingly that Shinn told him that the penalty phase portion of the trial was ‘an open and shut case.’ Shinn told him the facts of the case, that it involved the murder of a police officer and that Dr. Weaver was to examine Petitioner to see if he had any psychopathology, that is, that he was psychotic or had anything that might be labeled a psychiatric disorder. Shinn told Dr. Weaver that the purpose of the penalty portion of the trial was to determine whether petitioner received a death sentence or life in prison. Shinn made clear to Dr. Weaver, however, that the decision was a foregone conclusion, that Petitioner would receive the death penalty and that Dr. Weaver need not spend a great deal of time on the case. “Dr. Weaver was to be paid $1,000 for his work. He received $800 from Shinn.” Exceptions: Neither petitioner nor respondent excepts to these findings which we adopt as our own. E. Did the records reviewed by Weaver, or did petitioner himself, reveal to Weaver any history of head injuries, medical problems, child abuse or other facts that might affect petitioner’s conduct, and, if so, of what information was Weaver aware? Findings'. “The only records reviewed by Dr. Weaver were the police reports, the test results obtained by Marcus McBroom, possibly Exhibit I (a prison psychological evaluation) and some trial transcripts. He neither requested nor was given any other records. “Either through direct interview with Petitioner or through comments passed on by McBroom, Dr. Weaver was aware of Petitioner’s mixed race heritage, some family history, the beatings he received as a child, his drug usage, some educational and prison history and his criminal background. There is no evidence that Dr. Weaver was aware of any head or other physical injuries or that Petitioner was the alleged victim of sexual abuse.” Exceptions: Respondent excepts to the finding that Dr. Weaver “possibly” reviewed respondent’s exhibit I, arguing that the evidence is clear that this is the report Dr. Weaver reviewed at the penalty phase of the trial. The evidence supports the findings of the referee, which we adopt as our own. The evidence does, as respondent contends, suggest that Dr. Weaver did review respondent’s exhibit I, a parole outpatient clinic psychiatric evaluation of petitioner. Weaver was not aware of past head injuries or sexual abuse suffered by petitioner, but did know that petitioner’s racial heritage had caused difficulty, that petitioner had suffered abuse at the hands of his father, and that petitioner had abused drugs. The parole outpatient clinic psychiatric report provided some information about childhood problems arising from petitioner’s mixed-race heritage, a back injury he suffered in 1977 in a work-related fall, abuse by his father, and petitioner’s use of LSD and marijuana. That Dr. Weaver had very limited information regarding petitioner’s background when he made his evaluation is clear from the record, however. The parole outpatient clinic psychiatric report recites only: “[Petitioner describes himself as being ‘half-white and half-black’ and had to fight both racial groups as a child. He recalls being suspended and expelled several times from school though he did eventually graduate from high school. He recalls that in his youth, his father would punish him by physical beatings, causing injuries, though he used only his hand to accomplish this. [1[] He reports that he got along well with his mother who was friendly and attempted to keep her husband from harming the patient. He did not get along well with his brother, though he reports that he continues to remain close with his sisters, [f] Employment history includes welding, a janitor, and a mechanic. His longest job was for 1-1/2 years as a welder, but he lost his job after the injury.” The mental status evaluation stated that petitioner was alert and oriented in all spheres and that his memory was intact. His speech had a normal flow and his mood was neutral. The psychiatrist concluded that petitioner had limited insight and judgment and opined that the prognosis for return to criminal activity was high and that petitioner was likely to react to small frustration in a violent and vengeful manner. No psychiatric diagnosis was made. Dr. Weaver testified that he did not meet with any family members; had no school, prison, jail, juvenile system, employment, or military records regarding petitioner or any members of his family; and had no medical or hospital records regarding petitioner. When he did his evaluation he made no effort to obtain any of these records. He had only the parole outpatient clinic report, McBroom’s test results, some police reports, and the information supplied by petitioner during his interviews with Weaver and McBroom. F. Did Weaver’s penalty phase testimony include all potentially mitigating information regarding petitioner of which Weaver was aware from his review of records related to petitioner and his interviews and assessment of petitioner? If not, of what additional information was he aware and why was it not related to the jury? Findings: “The only ‘potentially mitigating information’ which Dr. Weaver was aware of but that was not relayed to the jury concerned Petitioner’s drug usage, his stress and depression at the time of evaluation, and alleged concentration or attention deficits. “Dr. Weaver did not utilize the drug usage information because he felt that it did not [a]ffect the diagnosis of Petitioner which he described to the jury. Dr. Weaver stated that Petitioner minimized his drug use, in fact, Petitioner did not even describe that problem to him. Dr. Weaver only knew about it from what McBroom told him. In any case, he did not feel it was relevant to the evaluation which he performed. “As to the observation of depression by Dr. Weaver, there is no evidence as to why he chose not to mention it. However, the jury was aware from the guilt portion of the trial that Petitioner had attempted suicide following his arrest. Furthermore, they obviously knew that he had just been convicted of murder. “Concerning Petitioner’s alleged attention deficit, Dr. Weaver stated that he came to this conclusion from his interviews with Petitioner. However, nowhere else, including from McBroom’s testing, was that information confirmed. Moreover, it was neither explained by Dr. Weaver nor discussed further as to its relevance.” Exceptions'. Petitioner excepts to the referee’s failure to make findings regarding the potentially mitigating evidence of which Dr. Weaver should have been aware and to the failure to find that Weaver did not testify about drug use and other mitigating factors of which he was aware because he was instructed by Shinn not to undertake the work necessary to investigate such “frills.” Respondent excepts to the finding that Dr. Weaver had stated petitioner minimized his drug use and did not describe that problem, arguing that Dr. Weaver did not make that statement. Respondent concedes that the evidence supports an inference that petitioner minimized his drug use, but argues that there is no evidence that Dr. Weaver was aware of petitioner’s doing so. At the outset we note that while Dr. Gretchen White offered extensive evidence regarding petitioner’s background at the habeas corpus evidentiary hearing, the many problems in petitioner’s home, the impact they had on him, and drug and alcohol abuse that continued from the time petitioner was in his teens, she did not offer an opinion that he suffered from a mental disorder. She testified that she did not diagnose him and did not see the diagnostic tests that she would need to rely on. Dr. White could not rely on Dr. Weaver’s testimony for an opinion because it appeared that the only test both he and McBroom agreed was given to petitioner was the Bender Gestalt test, which would not assist in diagnosing anything about a person’s personality. The Halstead test which McBroom apparently gave is, in her opinion, “diagnostically extremely weak.” Dr. White also testified that when Dr. Weaver examined petitioner and offered his diagnosis, Dr. Weaver was not aware of the Gay family genetic vulnerability to alcoholism and schizophrenia; that three siblings were schizophrenic; petitioner’s attention deficit; the extent of the physical and psychological abuse suffered by petitioner; and did not know about the depressive, passive side of petitioner’s personality. David Foster, M.D., a psychiatrist and neurologist with extensive training and experience in forensic psychiatry which included examinations of 12 death row inmates, did offer a mental health evaluation. He testified on direct by declaration and was cross-examined by deposition. He had undertaken a 10-hour psychiatric evaluation of petitioner, including a mental status examination, a structured psychiatric diagnostic interview, and a lengthy open-ended interview designed to assist in eliciting contradictions and evidence of malingering and falsification. He had also reviewed extensive documents related to petitioner’s childhood and adolescence, the trial and habeas corpus evidentiary hearing testimony of Dr. Weaver, petitioner’s evidentiary hearing testimony, the testimony of the other witnesses at that hearing, and the social history testimony of Dr. White, the 1992 test results of neuropsychologist Dale Watson. Dr. Foster had been provided with the mitigating sentencing factors available at the 1985 penalty trial. Dr. Foster’s testimony is summarized below at some length because Shinn’s failure to investigate and present evidence of mental impairment and his decision to utilize Dr. Weaver as his expert notwithstanding Weaver’s unwillingness to expend significant time on the case are among Shinn’s penalty phase omissions. The failure to present this kind of mental disorder/ deficit evidence to the jury is a factor supporting our conclusion that Shinn’s incompetence was prejudicial to petitioner at the penalty phase. Dr. Foster had been asked if petitioner manifested psychiatric symptomatology or other evidence of mental disorders or impairments that prevented petitioner from functioning normally and if those disorders or impairments were present at the time of petitioner’s crimes and trial. He concluded that at the time of the offenses and the trial petitioner suffered “from dissociation, residual symptoms of PTSD (posttraumatic stress disorder), impairments due to organic brain dysfunction including, but not limited to, an attention-concentration deficit and learning difficulties, a mood disorder, and by history, psychoactive substance abuse disorder. He suffered from these impairments, the symptoms of which were heightened and converged with devastating impact on his behavior and functioning, at the time of the crime for which he was convicted. Conditions of his confinement and his impaired functioning during trial likely interfered with his competence to stand trial. The mental health evaluation provided at the trial level was grossly inadequate, because it failed to take into account Mr. Gay’s history and the importance of clinical symptoms, fail[ed] to incorporate appropriate testing, and failed to consider the importance of his impairments to issues relevant to the penalty determination.” Dr. Foster stated in his testimony that petitioner presented clinical signs consistent with learning disorders and showed signs and symptoms of brain dysfunction, trauma, dissociation, and mood disturbance. The symptoms had been present over time and continued to affect petitioner’s behavior and functioning. Petitioner’s unusual use of language suggested a language disorder that is possibly related to a learning disability. He also manifested the documented attentional and concentration deficit. Dr. Foster found extensive evidence that petitioner has long suffered from a dissociative disorder, an impression corroborated by information in his history. The dissociative experiences occurred not only when petitioner was beaten by his father, but when he witnessed similar frightening, traumatic events. The episodes are preceded by physical sensations including dizziness or lightheadedness, anxiety and weakness, tightness of the chest, shortness of breath, racing heart, nausea, and weakness of his limbs. The sensations are consistent with dissociation and anxiety. Some are also consistent with “aura,” a phenomenon that frequently precedes episodes of unstable electrical activity in the brain, such as seizures. Petitioner stated that he experienced the same sense of detachment and unreality during the murder as he felt during beatings by his father. He was almost in a dream state and did not want to be there. Dr. Foster also found corroboration that petitioner suffers from debilitating anxiety, grandiosity symptomatic of a mood disorder, hypomanic symptoms and entrenched depression. He also concluded that during the period before petitioner’s arrest, petitioner was affected by the use of drugs. In specific answer to the first question posed by petitioner’s counsel, Dr. Foster found: “A. That Kenneth Earl Gay does show psychiatric symptomatology, corroborated by other evidence of mental disorders and impairments which prevent him from functioning normally, and these disorders and impairments were present at the time of the crimes for which he was convicted and during his trial.” As a result of “extraordinary abuse” petitioner suffered during his development and experiences throughout his later life, he manifested symptoms associated with and diagnostic of posttraumatic stress disorder as identified in the DSM-III, which was in use at the time of petitioner’s off