Full opinion text
Opinion BAXTER, J. Defendant was convicted by a jury in the Orange County Superior Court of the November 8, 1982, first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 189, 187) of Timothy Dykstra (count I); attempted murder (§§ 664/187) of Michael Wolbert (count II); and robbery (§ 211) of those victims (count III). The jury also found that the murder was committed under the special circumstance of murder in the commission of robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)), and that defendant had personally used a firearm in the commission of tiie offenses (§ 12022.5). The same jury found that the killing of Dykstra was intentional and returned a penalty verdict of death. After denying defendant’s automatic application for modification of the penalty (§ 190.4), the judge imposed a sentence of death for the murder, a consecutive term of nine years with a two-year enhancement for the attempted murder, and a stayed (§ 654) term of one year with an eight-month enhancement for the robbery. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) Having concluded that no prejudicial error affected the determination of guilt or penalty, we shall affirm the judgment in its entirety. I A. The Prosecution Case. The evidence, based in major part on the testimony of Michael Wolbert, and on defendant’s confessions, established the following. Defendant and Brian Hefner, both of whom had been employed as burglar alarm salesmen by Global Wholesalers in Garden Grove, and who shared a motel room, were fired by their employer on November 8, 1982. Because their final paychecks were insufficient to cover future rent, they devised a plan to rob fellow employees who were also to be paid on that date. The pair waited in the company parking lot until another group of employees, among whom were Dykstra and Wolbert, returned from their shifts. They invited Dykstra and Wolbert to join them at a party which, they claimed, was to be held at the home of friends in the Anaheim Hills area. Dykstra and Wolbert agreed to go to the party. They did not know defendant and Hefner well, however, and were cautious. They insisted on driving in Wolbert’s car. They also removed most of their cash from their wallets and hid it behind the dashboard of their car. After leaving defendant’s car at an apartment complex, the four drove to a remote area on Santiago Canyon Road where defendant asked Wolbert to stop so that defendant could relieve himself. It was then between 7 and 9 p.m. All four men left the car, Dykstra getting out first to permit defendant to leave. After the other three men left the car, Wolbert saw a gun in defendant’s waistband. Wolbert then left the car and when he next looked at defendant saw that defendant and Dykstra were standing face-to-face about two feet apart, with defendant holding the gun pointed at Dykstra. Defendant demanded the victims’ wallets. Wolbert told him where the money was hidden. Dykstra and Wolbert then stayed on an embankment, several feet apart, while Hefner searched for the money. Defendant moved over to stand by Wolbert, who asked defendant to let them go, told him to take the car and the money, and assured him that he would not identify him. When Hefner left the car, defendant moved back toward Dykstra who was sitting down. Defendant then raised the gun in one hand and shot Dykstra from a distance of about three or four feet. The bullet passed through the pericardial sac, grazing Dykstra’s heart, and entered his right upper lung, causing death by exsanguination, i.e., blood loss. After defendant shot Dykstra, Wolbert stood up and stepped back. Defendant approached Wolbert, who was backing up, raised the gun in both hands, and shot Wolbert three times. Wolbert was struck first in the torso and fell down. Defendant came closer and from a distance of about three feet shot Wolbert in the left shoulder. As defendant began to walk away Wolbert got up and began to approach defendant. Defendant turned, held the gun close to Wolbert’s head and shot him in the left eye, at which point Wolbert fell down again. Wolbert saw defendant pull the hammer of the gun back before each shot. In spite of his life-threatening wounds, Wolbert did not lose consciousness. He heard defendant and Hefner get into the car and drive back down the road. He was later able to attract the attention of passersby who summoned aid. He identified his assailants as fellow employees at Global Wholesalers. Dykstra was dead when paramedics arrived. Wolbert was transported to the hospital where he underwent surgery. On the following morning, he identified both defendant and Hefner in a photographic lineup, identifying defendant as the person who had shot him and Dykstra. Defendant and Hefner were arrested as they left their motel room about 9 a.m. on the morning after the robbery and murder. The murder weapon, a .22-caliber single action revolver which still held six expended shell cases in the cylinder, was found hidden in a space behind the bathroom sink. Defendant confessed his involvement and, at the request of the investigating officers, participated in a videotaped reenactment of those events that had taken place in Santiago Canyon. Analysis of a sample of defendant’s blood, taken at approximately noon on November 9, 1982, revealed no alcohol, amphetamines, opiates, barbituates, or phencyclidine (PCP). Cocaine and benzoylecgonine, a metabolite of cocaine, were present, however. B. The Defense Case. Defendant attempted to establish that his actions on November 8, 1982, were the product of, or influenced by, his ingestion of drugs and that he did not intend to kill Timothy Dykstra. At the time of the offenses defendant was 25 years old. He testified that he had used drugs since the age of 12, among them marijuana, barbituates, amphetamines, cocaine, PCP, LSD, and heroin. He had first been arrested on a drug-related charge in 1975 when he sold “speed” to an undercover agent. In 1981 he was found guilty of vandalism after becoming involved in a fight while drinking. He had been committed to the Youth Authority after three escapes from county juvenile facilities. In 1978, he pleaded guilty to a charge of assault with a deadly weapon, and was sentenced to state prison. On the night of the stabbing incident that led to that conviction he had used marijuana and PCP. That incident occurred in the same motel at which he was living when arrested on November 9, 1982. It was, he testified, a hangout for drug addicts and prostitutes. Brian Hefner had owned both a .22-caliber rifle and the revolver, but defendant persuaded him to pawn the rifle to obtain money with which to buy cocaine. Hefner refused to pawn the revolver, but defendant was not aware that Hefner had the revolver with him on November 8, 1982, when the pair decided to find someone to rob. They had abandoned a plan to obtain money by selling sugar as cocaine, and Hefner had suggested that they find someone to go with them to buy cocaine, take the victims’ money under that pretense, and “just split.” They invited Dykstra and Wolbert to a party at which there would be girls and cocaine, but were unsuccessful in an attempt to get Dykstra and Wolbert to provide money with which to buy cocaine. Defendant and Hefner then decided to simply take them somewhere and take their money. Defendant alone decided where to take the victims and gave Wolbert directions to Santiago Canyon, which was an area to which he had been when committed to a county boys ranch. Hefner’s car was left at an apartment complex in the hope that Dykstra and Wolbert would believe that defendant and Hefner lived in that complex. They went to Santiago Canyon so that defendant and Hefner would have time to get away before their victims made it back to town to look for them at the apartment complex. Defendant’s intent was only to take the victims’ money, not to kill them. When Hefner told defendant at the Global Wholesalers warehouse that he had brought the gun to protect himself in case anything went wrong, defendant told him to leave it. Hefner put the gun behind the heater in his car. Defendant did not know that Hefner brought the gun with him when the pair transferred to Wolbert’s Camaro for the drive to Santiago Canyon. Defendant testified that he did have to relieve himself when he asked that the car stop. He had planned to take Dykstra and Wolbert farther back in the canyon so that it would take them a long time to come back out. When the car stopped, Hefner got out behind defendant, handed the gun to him, and said, “let’s take their money now.” Defendant took the gun, held it on the victims, but, he claimed, it was Hefner who demanded their money. After Hefner had gathered up the money, defendant began to back up to get into the car to leave. The victims had not resisted. Wolbert told him to go ahead and take the car, just leave. At that point, however, Hefner said: “Don’t let them go because they’ll tell,” and yelled at defendant to shoot them. Defendant testified that he did not know what happened then except that he started shooting. He shot until the gun was empty. He had not loaded the gun and did not know how many shells were in it. He did not know whether he used one hand or two. He had no idea where he was firing the gun. He did not intend to shoot anyone through the heart or in the side, and was not aiming there. Dykstra had not made any threatening move prior to being shot, but Wolbert stood up and came running toward him. Defendant did not know at that point that Wolbert had been hit by the prior shots. Earlier Wolbert had shown defendant a “weapon”—a glove with metal lining—that Wolbert said he carried in case there was “trouble.” Defendant did not know he shot Wolbert in the face, but admitted that he had pulled the trigger and was pointing the gun at Wolbert. At the time of these events defendant was “a little bit loaded.” Prior to the incident he had injected himself with cocaine, as he had been doing on a daily basis. He had not worked on November 8 because he was “loaded.” Because he had been injecting cocaine he had been up for two days before that. The cocaine made him more “wired” and “spaced out.” On his return to the motel after the robbery/murder, in which he and Hefner had obtained about $70, he paid the rent and bought a quarter-gram of cocaine from a friend who lived nearby. He and Hefner used that cocaine at the friend’s house, and during the evening purchased two more quarter-grams. Defendant insisted that although the robbery was planned he had not planned to kill anyone, had not thought it over, and had not considered the consequences of what might happen if he did kill someone. Defendant presented expert testimony of a forensic psychologist, Dr. Louis Broussard, that defendant had minimal brain injury of a type associated with impulse disorders and specific learning disorders. The learning disorder had caused achievement problems in school, problems that had not been remediated, and as a result his academic achievement was less than it might otherwise have been. Based on the expert’s examination and testing of defendant, his review of defendant’s confessions and the videotaped reenactment, interviews with family members, and the laboratory tests of defendant’s blood, Dr. Broussard believed that defendant was not completely aware of what he was doing during the robbery/murder and could not judge the nature and consequences of his acts at that time. Dr. Broussard also described the effects of prolonged use of cocaine, which resulted in some users becoming “ambulatory psychotics,” having persecutory delusions similar to those of a person getting over acute schizophrenia, and experiencing hallucinations. Dr. Broussard had concluded that defendant was in a drug-induced psychotic state at the time of the events, could not and did not premeditate and deliberate, and was not in control of his senses when he agreed after his arrest to title police interview without counsel. Dr. Broussard also believed that when defendant responded to Hefner’s command to shoot, he was behaving like a sleepwalker or person under hypnosis. His behavior was chaotic and drug controlled. C. Penalty Phase. 1. Aggravating Evidence. The only evidence presented by the People in the initial phase of the penalty trial was the testimony of William Scofield, the victim of the June 15, 1978, assault with a deadly weapon offense to which defendant had pleaded guilty and for which he had served a prison term. Scofield testified that five or six men, including defendant, broke into the hotel room he was sharing with his friend Kathy Cusack. The other men beat him with sticks and baseball bats, dragged him out of the room, and attempted to throw him from the balcony. Defendant came out of the room and stabbed Scofield in the lower back. The wound required stitches. The events occurred on the day after Scofield had an argument and fight with another tenant who, allegedly, had lost a cat belonging to Cusack. Other persons present during that exchange were armed with knives, but no one was stabbed then. The People sought to present the testimony of Cusack that during the June 15 incident defendant had also stabbed her. Defendant’s objection that the pretrial notice of aggravating factors given by the prosecution, which referred only to the assault on Scofield, was not broad enough to give notice that evidence of the assault on Cusack would be offered was sustained and she did not testify at this stage of the penalty trial. (See § 190.3.) The court rejected the People’s arguments that the assault on Cusack was so closely related to the assault on Scofield that it was among the circumstances of the latter, and that because defendant had been charged with both assaults notice that evidence of one would be offered was adequate. Cusack was permitted to testify in rebuttal to the mitigating evidence presented by defendant. She first met defendant on June 12, 1978, at a party in defendant’s apartment. She had not seen him again until the early morning hours of June 15 when he and several other men broke into the apartment she shared with Scofield. Defendant had a knife. When the other men, who were beating Scofield with bats and sticks, dragged Scofield out of the room, defendant remained in the room where Cusack was standing on the bed. He stabbed her through the right forearm, which she had raised to protect herself, stabbed her farther up that arm, and when she fell down onto the bed, slashed her leg. He then stabbed her in the ankle. When defendant attempted to stab Cusack in the abdomen she told him she was pregnant. He nonetheless tried again to stab her in the abdomen, but she rolled over and he stabbed her in the side. He then stabbed her in the chest, slashed her shoulder, stabbed her in the area of her breast. After stabbing Cusack eight or more times, defendant began to carve up the walls of the apartment, and to cut up the posters and pictures. When Cusack hit him over the head with a stick, defendant ran out of the apartment. She, too, had to be hospitalized for treatment of her wounds. 2. Mitigating Evidence. Defendant was one of nine children. His sisters Lisa, then 15 years old, Rose, 20, Antoinette, 31, and Ida, 33, his brother Louis, 24, and his parents all testified regarding defendant’s love and concern for family, his willingness to assist and counsel his siblings, his musical and artistic talent, and the change in his personality when under the influence of drugs. All agreed that drugs were defendant’s biggest problem, and testified that he was violent only when under the influence of drugs. Defendant’s father became aware of the drug problem several years before the trial. On the first occasion that defendant came home “loaded,” his father “punched him clear across the room.” Thereafter his father tried to bribe him and to find employment for him, in an effort to get him off drugs. Defendant had never been violent toward anyone in the family, and when not under the influence of drugs was “one of the nicest kids you can ever meet.” He attended all family gatherings, ran errands and did favors for his parents, and never refused their requests. The violent acts about which testimony had been offered were uncharacteristic of defendant Christine, defendant’s girlfriend for two and one-half years, described his manner with her children as “fantastic,” testified that he was very helpful both with household tasks and with car repairs, and characterized defendant as a very loving, caring, gentle, and considerate person who treated her and her children with respect. II Competency Relying on People v. Hale (1988) 44 Cal.3d 531 [244 Cal.Rptr. 114 [749 P.2d 769], and People v. Marks (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335 [248 Cal.Rptr. 874, 756 P.2d 260], defendant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial because the judge had expressed a doubt as to defendant’s competency and had initiated proceedings under section 1368 to determine competency, which proceedings were never held. We disagree with the initial premise that the court expressed doubt as to defendant’s competence and had ordered that proceedings be conducted pursuant to section 1368. Defendant relies solely on the court’s response to his motion for the appointment of experts “under [Evidence Code section] 730 with respect to an examination of Mr. Visciotti on the criteria of 1026 and 1368.” The court granted the motion, orally stating only that the experts would “be requested to conduct the examination based on 1026 and 1368.” The May 2, 1983, form order of appointment signed by Judge Franks in department 38 recited, however: “It Appearing to This Court that defendant’s status may fall within the definition set forth in the appropriate statute indicated below” and had check marks on the four lines adjacent to the statutory bases for appointment, sections 1026 and 1368, and Evidence Code sections 730 and 1017. The order set a hearing date of June 20,1983, in department 38, and ordered the reports of the experts delivered to that department. Counsel for defendant did not appear on June 20 and no hearing was held. The prosecutor represented that defendant’s attorney had advised him a week earlier of a conflicting commitment, and that the two had never agreed on what was to be heard on the day set for the hearing. The case was put over to June 23, at which time it was called in before another judge in a different department. Competence was never mentioned during defendant’s June 23 appearance or in any subsequent proceeding, and no psychiatric reports by the appointed experts are in the record. This record does not suggest that the judge intended to express a doubt as to defendant’s competence, or that he intended to initiate proceedings to determine competence. Section 1368 provides that if a doubt as to a defendant’s competence arises in the mind of the judge, the judge “shall state that doubt in the record and inquire of the attorney for the defendant whether, in the opinion of the attorney, the defendant is mentally competent.” If the attorney then informs the court that he or she believes the defendant is or may be incompetent to stand trial, the court is required to order a hearing to determine the question. It is apparent from this record that counsel’s request for appointment of experts for the dual purpose of assisting counsel in making a decision on whether to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and to render an opinion on defendant’s competence was preliminary to consideration by counsel, let alone the judge, of whether either had a doubt as to defendant’s competence. Neither counsel nor the judge expressed a doubt as to defendant’s competence and the judge did not order section 1368 proceedings. The typed recital in the form order to the effect that the defendant “may fall within the definition set forth in the appropriate statute indicated above” reflects nothing more than an explanation or justification for the appointment of the experts. It is not the statement contemplated by section 1368 that the court presently has a doubt as to the defendant’s competency. (Cf. People v. Westbrook (1964) 62 Cal.2d 197, 203 [41 Cal.Rptr. 809, 397 P.2d 545] [criminal proceedings suspended and cause transferred to “psychiatric department,” an order that could only be explained! by the court having a doubt as to the defendant’s sanity].) In Hale, by contrast, the court expressed a doubt as to the defendant’s competence based on the defendant’s conduct and demeanor in the courtroom, inquired of counsel, who agreed that in Ms opinion the defendant was not competent, and ordered a hearing “ ‘on the question of the defendant’s present mental competency.’ ” (People v. Hale, supra, 44 Cal.3d 531, 535-536.) Similarly, in People v. Marks, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1335, the trial court had stated a doubt as to the defendant’s mental competence and had ordered “ ‘the question of Ms mental competence to be determined in a special hearing wMch will be held pursuant to Sections 1368.1 and 1369 of the Penal Code.’ ” (Id., at p. 1338, italics omitted.) III Jury Selection Issues Defendant claims that the jury selection process denied Mm Ms rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article I, section 16 of the California Constitution, to a randomly selected, representative jury; that the use of case specific hypothetical voir dire questions to “indoctrinate” potential jurors was prejudicial misconduct that resulted in a biased jury; that Witherspoon-Witt error (Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770]; Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844]) occurred when prospective juror Rokes was excused; that three jurors who admitted bias in favor of the death penalty were improperly allowed to remain on the venire panel; and that the trial court erroneously permitted jury selection proceedings to be conducted in his absence. We address each claim in turn. A. Representative Jury—Random Selection. Appellant contends first that the procedure by which the judge, with the acquiescence of counsel, filled the jury box to initiate the general voir dire following the sequestered Hovey death-qualification voir dire (see Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80-81 [168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301]) denied him a randomly selected jury. Random selection, he contends, is mandated by statute and constitutional command, and may not be waived by counsel. Defendant analogizes jury selection to the status of jury trial itself prior to the 1928 amendment of the California Constitution which for the first time permitted waiver of the right to jury trial. Even under the present article I, section 16, trial by jury in criminal cases is not simply a right of the defendant. It may not be waived unless both the People and the defendant agree. Because random selection, too, is not simply a right of the defendant but is a state-mandated procedure, it may not be waived. This court rejected a similar argument in People v. Johnson (1894) 104 Cal. 418, 419 [38 P. 91], where we held that a claim of error based on an irregularity in the seating of jurors who had been selected from those regularly drawn had been waived by the defendant’s failure to object. Here, too, counsel acquiesced in the procedure of which defendant now complains. Since our decision in Johnson, however, the Legislature has made it clear that random selection is a firm policy of the State of California. Section 1046 directs that juries be formed for criminal trials “in the same manner as trial juries in civil actions.” Code of Civil Procedure section 197 provided at the time of this trial: “It is the policy of the State of California that all persons selected for jury service shall be selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of the area served by the court, and that all qualified persons have the opportunity, in accordance with this chapter to be considered for jury service in the state and an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose. This chapter applies to all trial juries in all civil and criminal proceedings in all courts.” Code of Civil Procedure section 191 now states the policy: “The Legislature recognizes that trial by jury is a cherished constitutional right, and that jury service is an obligation of citizenship. “It is the policy of the State of California that all persons selected for jury service shall be selected at random from the population of the area served by the court; that all qualified persons have an equal opportunity, in accordance with this chapter, to be considered for jury service in the state and an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose. . . .” People v. Johnson, supra, 104 Cal. 418, was decided prior to the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure sections 191 and 197. We have not had occasion since the enactment of those sections to consider whether the establishment of random selection as a policy of the state affects the rule applied in Johnson. We conclude that it does not. While the parties are not free to waive, and the court is not free to forego, compliance with the statutory procedures which are designed to further the policy of random selection, equally important policies mandate that criminal convictions not be overturned on the basis of irregularities in jury selection to which the defendant did not object or in which he has acquiesced. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 813 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436].) The failure to object will therefore continue to constitute a waiver of a claim of error on appeal. Because we had not reaffirmed the Johnson rule (supra, 104 Cal. 418) at the time of defendant’s trial, however, and the standard by which reversible error is to be determined presents an important question, we will address defendant’s claim. Notwithstanding the policy of random selection and equal opportunity for jury service by all qualified persons, not every departure from the statutory procedures constitutes reversible error. The Legislature also provided in former section 1059 that a challenge to the panel could be founded only on a material departure from those procedures. (See People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 394, 395 [276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221].) Clearly, therefore, the Legislature did not intend that minor deviations from the statutory procedure be grounds for reversal of a judgment of conviction. It follows that a defendant may not claim error on appeal if the procedure utilized in jury selection did not depart materially from the statutory procedures established to further the purpose of random selection. The method by which prospective jurors were seated for the purpose of general voir dire in this case was not a material departure from the procedures established by statute. The nonstatutory procedure to which defendant now objects was used only to select (from the prospective jurors who remained on the venire after death qualification) the first 12 persons to be seated for general voir dire. Instead of directing the courtroom clerk to draw the names of 12 venirepersons at random, the court sought a stipulation that defendant waive his right to random selection of the initial group of jurors. Instead, each attorney was to submit a list of 20 prospective jurors from which the court would select the first 12 to be seated, matching any who appeared on both lists. Counsel were assured that they would be permitted to excuse even persons they had nominated in this fashion, that neither would know if all or any of the initial 12 persons were on both lists, and that diligent voir dire would be permitted as in any other case. Before the procedure was undertaken, defendant was advised by the court that he, like every other defendant, had a right to random, secret, impartial seating of all prospective jurors. The judge then said: “The inquiry the court will make is as follows: Does the defendant waive his right and agree that the court may chose the first 12 jurors to be seated, thereafter returning to the usual selection process?” At that point, defendant responded, “Yes.” Counsel for defendant stated that he had advised defendant that he and the prosecutor had each selected 20 jurors from whom the court would make the selection. He stated that defendant had agreed to waive the rights described by the court and to permit selection in that manner. The People also indicated agreement. The court then advised counsel that their lists had “minimally matched up” and that it was probable that there would be some among the first 12 jurors who had been on both lists. The court did not indicate what, if any, criteria were to be applied in the choice of prospective jurors to fill the remaining seats. The court’s explanation of the process to be used, the waiver elicited from defendant, and defense counsel’s representation of his explanation to defendant reflect seemingly divergent views of the process to be utilized. The court did not promise that the first 12 jurors would all be selected from the lists submitted by counsel. The waiver simply permitted the court to choose the first 12 jurors to be seated. When defendant’s attorney said that he had told defendant that the jurors would be selected from the lists, the court said nothing to indicate a contrary intent. In fact, four were taken from the prosecution list, three from the defense list, and five were on neither list. Two of the prospective jurors had been included on both lists. Five of the jurors ultimately sworn to try the case had been chosen by the judge pursuant to this stipulation. Of those, two had not been on either list. The superior court minutes reflect still another interpretation of the stipulation. The minutes recite: “Counsel stipulate the Court may select twelve prospective jurors at random from lists of twenty prospective jurors submitted by each side.” Notwithstanding defendant’s present claim that he did not understand the procedure, he is not entitled to relief on appeal on grounds that the statutory jury selection procedures were not followed. We are not faced here with a complete abandonment of random selection. When the general voir dire commenced, the venires of prospective jurors had already been examined in the sequestered Hovey voir dire. There is no suggestion that these venires had not been selected at random, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 222. The prospective jurors in them had been seated for the initial voir dire in accordance with that random draw. The procedure here differs, therefore, from that at issue in People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d 367, 393-395, in which the initial seating for voir dire was not conducted in conformity with former section 222 of the Code of Civil Procednxe. In this case we are not concerned with the initial voir dire, or with a challenge to the panel. Only the general voir dire following the sequestered Hovey voir dire is in question. We agree with the assumption implicit in defendant’s argument that, in the absence of a statutory provision adapting the procedures for selection of capital jurors to the mandate of Hovey (supra, 28 Cal.3d 1), trial courts should follow the procedures established by Code of Civil Procedure section 222 to select prospective jurors for a general voir dire which follows a sequestered Hovey voir dire. Because the stipulation applied only to the first 12 prospective jurors to be seated and the statutory procedure was followed in the initial selection of the prospective jurors and was followed thereafter, we do not deem the procedure to be a material departure from that mandated by the Legislature. Defendant attempts to distinguish the procedure utilized in this case from that in People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d 367, on grounds that having presided over the sequestered voir dire the trial judge was aware of the biases of the jurors he selected. That distinction is insufficient to compel reversal since defendant acquiesced in this aspect of the selection process. Regardless of any possible misunderstanding as to the manner in which the trial court would select the first 12 jurors, it was apparent that the selection would be made from jurors whose views about capital punishment had been explored during the sequestered voir dire. Defendant also argues that random selection is necessary to ensure the constitutional right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the populace. To the extent that he claims the procedures utilized in selecting the jury before which he was tried denied him due process or rights under the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution and article I, section 16 of the California Constitution, the claim fails for similar reasons. Random selection does serve to ensure the jury trial rights granted by the Sixth Amendment and article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. Not every departure from the state statutory procedure, even if deemed material, necessarily denies a defendant the constitutional right to a jury selected from a representative cross-section of the populace, however. We reject defendant’s claim that actual harm need not be shown. To warrant reversal of a judgment of conviction, the defendant must demonstrate that the departure affected his ability to select a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the population. Defendant posits scenarios in which designation of acceptable jurors by the parties, or selection by the court, could result in exclusion by omission of categories of jurors in violation of People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748], or in a jury not drawn from a true cross-section of the population (see Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357 [58 L.Ed.2d 579, 99 S.Ct. 664]). He fails, however, to establish that the stipulation to seat the first 12 jurors for general voir dire, from prospective jurors already randomly selected for the sequestered voir dire, could or did have such an impact. To the contrary, the record confirms that during the general voir dire, 19 prospective jurors were randomly selected to replace those excused for cause or peremptorily challenged. Seven of the jurors seated to try the case were selected during this random draw. Five had been among the first twelve seated. This case differs markedly, therefore, from the jury selection process condemned in United States v. Kennedy (5th Cir. 1977) 548 F.2d 608, (hereafter Kennedy) on which defendant relies for his claim that relief is available without regard to a showing of actual harm. Far from supporting this proposition, Kennedy concludes that the federal statutory right may be waived by failure to challenge the jury, and that more than simply a departure from random selection for the seating of some jurors is necessary to establish a violation of the constitutional right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. (Kennedy, supra, 548 F.2d 608.) The issue in Kennedy was whether use of three volunteer jurors, who had just completed a term of jury service, to sit on a criminal jury constituted a substantial failure to comply with the random selection procedures of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968. (28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869.) The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that while there had been a substantial failure to comply with the act, the appellant was foreclosed from asserting the statutory violation by failure to challenge the jury on that ground, and that reversal on constitutional grounds was not warranted because the departure from statutory random selection procedures had not denied him the right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. The jurors in question had been randomly selected for the master jury list prepared for use at trials during the prior month. The court rejected that consideration as a basis for finding compliance with the statute, stating: “Nonrandom selection of a subgroup from a randomly selected group does not make for a randomly selected subgroup.” (Kennedy, supra, 548 F.2d at p. 612.) Nonetheless, the defendant’s “forfeiture of the statutory claim in no way affects the sanctity of a defendant’s due process right to be tried by a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. While a properly preserved claim of substantial noncompliance with the Act would of course require reversal if meritorious, the ftmdamental justice of a conviction remains intact if the jury selection procedure did not transgress that due process guarantee.” (Id., at pp. 613-614.) “The due process clause does not itself guarantee a defendant a randomly selected jury, but simply a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. A claim of denial of this due process right requires a showing that the jury selection process tended to exclude or underrepresent some discernible class of persons and consequently to defeat a fair possibility for obtaining a truly representative cross section.” (Kennedy, supra, 548 F.2d at p. 614.) United States v. Northside Rlty. Assoc. (N.D.Ga. 1981) 510 F.Supp. 668 (hereafter Northside Rlty. Assoc.) offers no more support. As defendant observes, insofar as it applies to petit juries the federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 reflects a policy similar, if not identical, to the policy of this state, providing: “It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes. It is further the policy of the United States that all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries in the district courts of the United States, and shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose.” (28 U.S.C. § 1861.) In Northside Rlty. Assoc., supra, 510 F.Supp. 668, the dispositive issue involved substantial noncompliance with the act in a manner not unlike that in the case before this court. In selecting prospective jurors for assignment to divisions within the district from master jury wheels of qualified prospective jurors by use of a newly developed computerized selection procedure, the clerk failed to designate by random process the “starting number” by which the computerized sequence of selection from the wheel was to commence. Instead the jury clerk picked the starting numbers with the result that six of more than five hundred numbers accounted for 32 percent of the choices. The court dismissed indictments handed down by a grand jury in which the members had been selected in a process initiated in that manner, after finding that the deviation from the act was substantial, and was not an infrequent or inadvertent departure. In so doing the district court accepted the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Kennedy, supra, 548 F.2d 608, that a showing of prejudice was not necessary to establish a substantial failure to comply with the act. (510 F.Supp. at pp. 692-693.) Unlike Kennedy (supra, 548 F.2d 608) and the instant case, however, the defendants in Northside Rlty. Assoc., supra, 510 F.Supp. 668, made a timely and procedurally proper challenge to the indictment, a challenge based on the departure from the statutory mandate of random selection. Thus, neither Kennedy nor Northside Rlty. Assoc, supports defendant’s claim that even an insubstantial deviation from a policy mandating random selection justifies reversal of a judgment of conviction where no proper pretrial challenge was made and no resultant denial of a jury drawn from a representative cross-section is demonstrated. Defendant’s protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, nothing in this record suggests that the statutory violation in this case so skewed the jury selection process that the procedure was so “inherently defective” as to be constitutionally invalid even without a showing that the jury actually chosen was not impartial. Nor is reversal required on grounds that the procedure threatened such a potential for abuse or appearance of partiality that reversal without a showing of actual prejudice is required to protect the integrity of the jury selection process. B. Impartial Jury—Witherspoon-Witt Error. Relying on language in Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510, 522, footnote 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 785], which this court once understood to state the constitutional rule (see People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425, 436 [162 Cal.Rptr. 306, 606 P.2d 341]), defendant claims that the trial court erroneously excluded prospective juror Dale Rokes, who expressed an abstract opposition to the death penalty, but did not make it “unmistakably clear . . . that [he] would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case . . . .” (Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510, 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 785], italics omitted.) Defendant recognizes that the United States Supreme Court has since clarified the governing principles, holding that a defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to an impartial jury is not compromised by the excusal of a prospective juror whose views about capital punishment give the “definite impression” that those views would “ ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” (Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-852].) We have adopted the reformulated standard in applying the California Constitution. (People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 645 [280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351]; People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1165 [259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730]; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 767 [239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) We find no error. When asked at the outset of the voir dire if he had a conscientious objection to imposition of the death penalty in an appropriate case, Rokes responded: “I don’t know if I could; no.” When pressed by the court to consider if “there’s any possibility, by any stretch of the imagination, that you might impose a death penalty for a very horrible crime, for a mass murder,” he again replied, “I don’t think I could, no.” Even as a juror deciding the fate of Adolf Hitler, Rokes believed, “No, I couldn’t do it.” When asked by defense counsel if his position was that the state did not have the right to take life, Rokes responded: “No, I don’t disagree with the law. I couldn’t see myself as passing that type of judgment.” And, when asked by the prosecutor if he could imagine any circumstance so offensive that he would vote for the death penalty, he replied: “No, I can’t.” Finally, the court explained its responsibility to determine if it was “unmistakably clear that under no circumstance [he] would ever vote for the death penalty” and asked: “That’s the position you’ve taken?” Rokes replied: “Yes.” Defendant claims that the questions posed to the prospective juror focused on the wrong question, and did not establish Rokes’s inability to follow the law. We see no possibility that Rokes was unaware that he was being asked if he could follow the law. Indeed, he stated that he did not disagree with the law. His answers made it unmistakably clear that he could not personally follow the law by voting to impose a sentence of death. C. Jury “Indoctrination.” Defendant next complains that the prosecutor improperly used the Hovey voir dire (Hovey, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1) to indoctrinate prospective jurors and preargue his theory of the case. In the process, defendant claims, the prosecutor was permitted to inquire, by detailed hypothetical, but case-specific, descriptions, into whether the prospective jurors might find death an appropriate penalty in the specific case. The conduct of the voir dire in this manner was, he argues, both error and misconduct because the prosecutor asked each juror to commit himself or herself in advance to a position. Defendant offers as examples the voir dire of two prospective jurors who were later sworn to try the case. The first was asked: “If we get to the penalty phase, if we get that far, then you’ve already found the man guilty of first degree murder. It’s a horrible crime. And you found he committed this murder while he was engaged in a robbery, based on facts that would be something like a man decides to commit a robbery, arms himself with a handgun to make sure he’s successful, robs his victim. During the course of the robbery it occurs to him that if the victim is not alive, there won’t be anybody going to the police and complain .... So, realizing that, the robber points his gun at the victim, pulls the trigger, shoots him once through the heart and kills him. “That’s the type of facts we’re going to be dealing with, something along those lines, perhaps. “Do you feel just, first of all, theoretically like it’s possible you could vote for the death penalty if you’re faced with facts such as those?” Another juror was asked: “So now you’re in a penalty phase with the defendant like this one, who has committed this kind of a crime and I want you to ask yourself, after looking inside yourself whether you could actually vote to put another human being to death for doing a crime like this: “Let’s assume you have a person who decides to commit a robbery because he wants to make some additional money. He goes out and gets himself a loaded handgun to make the odds more in his favor that he’ll be successful. And he finds a victim that he thinks has some money and sure enough, the victim has some money when the defendant sticks him up. Sometime about this point the defendant has the brilliant thought that if I let this guy go, he’s going to the police and I might get caught and whereas if I don’t let him go, don’t leave any witnesses, I won’t get caught, in other words I’d better kill him to make myself more certain of getting away. “That’s exactly what he does; he shoots the victim once through the heart and subsequently he’s caught and he’s been brought before us and you have found beyond any doubt that he’s guilty of first degree murder committed during the course of a robbery. “Do you think its possible that you could go in the jury room, look the other jurors in the eye and knowing you’ll have to come out and look the defendant in the eye also, say I think this crime is so horrendous and the other background facts we’ve heard are so horrendous, he should be put to death?” As we have observed before, “[t]he only question the court need resolve during this stage of the voir dire is whether any prospective juror has such conscientious or religious scruples about capital punishment, in the abstract, that his views would ‘ “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” ’ ” (People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 845 [268 Cal.Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983].) The Hovey “voir dire seeks only to determine if, because of his views on capital punishment, any prospective juror would vote against the death penalty without regard to the evidence produced at trial.” (Ibid.; People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 597 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127]. See also, Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 416 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 846-847].) It was not necessary, therefore, to permit extensive questioning of the prospective jurors during the Hovey voir dire regarding their willingness to impose the death penalty based on the anticipated facts of, or a hypothetical set of facts based on, the case to be tried. Defendant objected neither to these questions, nor to similar questions asked of other jurors during the Hovey voir dire, however. Although voir dire is not a platform from which counsel may educate prospective jurors about the case, or compel them to commit themselves to a particular disposition of the matter, to prejudice them for or against a party, or to “indoctrinate” them (see People v. Williams (1981) 29 Cal.3d 392, 408 [174 Cal.Rptr. 317, 628 P.2d 869]), the scope of the inquiry permitted during voir dire is committed to the discretion of the court. Absent a timely objection to questions that arguably exceed the proper scope, any claim of abuse of discretion is deemed to have been waived. D. Death Penalty Bias. Prospective juror Austin responded to an inquiry by the court whether he had “a leaning one way or the other? Are you more inclined to be pro death as opposed to pro life” with: “Yeah, pro death.” He stated that, “[I]t would have to be a lot” of mitigating evidence to convince him to return a verdict of life without possibility of parole. He denied that his views arose out of revenge, explaining simply that he was afraid that a person sentenced to life without parole might escape or be released, and did not think a person who premeditated before killing someone should be loose to kill again. He also preferred the death penalty to life imprisonment because he did not feel he could support such a person for the rest of his life. Defendant educes from this that Austin was committed to voting for death in any case involving an intentional murder, or at a minimum had a bias for death. The trial court denied a challenge for cause, however, concluding that Austin’s replies did not make it unmistakenly clear that he would impose the death penalty in all cases. We agree, but more importantly, as respondent notes, Austin was not selected as a juror or even seated during the general voir dire. Similarly, prospective juror Wheeler, who defendant claims was also biased toward death, was removed by the People’s exercise of a peremptory challenge, and prospective juror Worrell was excused for hardship by stipulation. E. Absence of Defendant. Notwithstanding his execution of a written waiver of his right to be present at some stages of jury selection, and a subsequent oral waiver of that right, defendant claims that the judgment must be reversed because he was not present throughout jury selection. He argues that the right to be present during a crucial part of the trial may not be waived, and that even if waiver is permissible, his waivers were invalid. Defendant concedes that the written waiver executed by him and his attorney on July 5, 1983, is in the language prescribed by subdivision (b) of section 977. That section expressly permits a defendant to waive his right to be present at all felony proceedings other than the arraignment, plea, preliminary hearing, taking of evidence, and imposition of sentence, i.e., proceedings at which the presence of the defendant “bears a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 825 [281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865]; People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1116 [269 Cal.Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327].) It provides, however, that the defendant must, “with leave of court, execute in open court, a written waiver of his right to be personally present.” Defendant asserts that “apparently” his written waiver was not executed in open court. The minute order for that date recites, however: “A Waiver of Defendant’s Personal Presence is received and ordered filed.” Defendant offers no support for his assertion that the waiver was not executed in open court other than the omission of a recital to that effect in the minute order. The minutes recite that defendant and his counsel were present at the time the waiver was received. In the absence of any indication to the contrary we presume, as we must, that a judicial duty is regularly performed. (Evid. Code, § 664. See Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913 [141 Cal.Rptr. 133, 569 P.2d 727].) Even absent such presumption, however, an irregularity in the procedure by which the waiver is executed is not grounds for reversal of the judgment in the absence of a showing both that the irregularity affected the voluntary and intelligent nature of the waiver, and that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of his absence from those aspects of jury selection from which he had absented himself. (People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 903 [274 Cal.Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282]; People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 782-783 [254 Cal.Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419].) One week after his written waiver was accepted by the court, defendant’s attorney advised the court that defendant did not want to be present during further voir dire proceedings. The court noted the prior written waiver and then agreed to acquiesce in defendant’s request upon receiving an oral waiver and a statement that defendant volitionally and personally made the request. Defendant’s waiver was then elicited and accepted by the court. We have repeatedly rejected the argument that presence at all stages of a capital case is indispensible and thus unwaivable. (People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1238 [283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163]; People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d 771, 825; People v. Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d 870, 903; People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 60-61 [255 Cal.Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109]; People v. Grant (1988) 45 Cal.3d 829, 845 [248 Cal.Rptr. 444, 755 P.2d 894]; People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d 386, 406-407 [247 Cal.Rptr. 137, 754 P.2d 184]; People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 585-586 [244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776].) We are not persuaded that this conclusion should be reconsidered. F. Exclusion of the Public and the Press. Defendant next claims that reversal of the judgment is required because the public and the press were excluded from the sequestered “death-qualification” voir dire conducted pursuant to Hovey v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1. He concedes that the issue was not raised in the trial court (People v. Thompson, supra, 50 Cal.3d 134, 156-157), but argues that the trial court did not give counsel “any real opportunity to do so” and suggests that defendant might not have been competent to waive the right. As discussed above, the record does not afford any basis for questioning defendant’s competence. The record is also devoid of any support for defendant’s claim that trial counsel had no opportunity to object to the sequestered voir dire. Nor will we infer such an inhibition, particularly since the right to a sequestered voir dire was recognized in response to concerns of capital defendants over the potentially prejudicial effect of an open voir dire on jurors’ views and willingness to reveal their views about capital punishment. (Hovey v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, 80.) As we observed in People v. Thompson, supra, 50 Cal.3d 134, 156-157, there was active litigation of the question of the right of the press to attend jury voir dire in 1983 when this trial occurred, and because the sequestered voir dire is for the benefit of the defendant “it is doubtful that any competent defense counsel would have objected to it.” We conclude, therefore, that no impropriety in the jury selection process warrants reversal of the judgment. IV Guilt Phase Issues A. Evidence and Argument Related to the Scofield Incident. 1. Cross-examination of Defendant. As our brief description of the evidence offered by defendant reflects, his defense strategy involved an effort to attribute his actions to substance abuse, and to convince the jury that his use of cocaine shortly before the offenses so affected his mind that the murder was not intentional, wilfull, deliberate, or premeditated. In support of this effort he admitted his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, but sought to minimize any implication that he was assaultive, and claimed that he was forced to plead guilty to that offense even though he had acted in self-defense. In response, the People sought to bring out not only the details of defendant’s 1978 assault on William Scofield, but other evidence about the incident, including evidence that defendant had stabbed Kathy Cusack. Defendant was asked if he had kicked the door to the room open, and denied it. He denied that there was a woman in bed, that he had ever seen Cusack, that he had seen a pregnant woman on the night of the stabbing, that Scofield had been in bed, that he had stabbed Cusack, that he had been close enough to her to stab her, or that anyone had cried or screamed that she was pregnant. Defendant now claims that the cross-examination during which the People elicited these answers was an improper inquiry into inadmissible evidence which implied that he had stabbed Cusack. The prosecutor’s questions, defendant claims, were testimony. He did not object on those grounds, however, or on grounds that the cross-examination exceeded the scope of direct. He made only a relevance objection to a question asking if he had decided to plead guilty and go to state prison, and objected, on grounds that the questions assumed facts not in evidence, to a question asking if he recalled that the initial argument had been over the loss of Cusack’s cat. Therefore, even were we to assume that questions were improper, the failure to object bars reversal on that ground. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) We make no such assumption, however, since the inquiry into all of the circumstances of the attack on Scofield was well within the scope of defendant’s testimony on direct examination, and sought to elicit evidence relevant to whether defendant had purposefully engaged in violent assaults in the past. Defendant having introduced evidence that his conviction of assault with a deadly weapon was based on conduct he took in self-defense, the People were not precluded by Evidence Code sections 761 and 787 from attempting to rebut that evidence by bringing out all of the circumstances of the incident in which Scofield was attacked. Defendant had placed his character in issue, attempting to show that he did not commit a premeditated murder, and in aid of that effort to cast a favorable light on the circumstances of his prior conviction. The People were, therefore, entitled to cross-examine him regarding all of the circumstances for purposes of impeachment. (Evid. Code, §§ 773, 780; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1017 [264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627]; People v. Wagner (1975) 13 Cal.3d 612, 617 [119 Cal.Rptr. 457, 532 P.2d 105]; People v. Schader (1969) 71 Cal.2d 761, 770-771 [80 Cal.Rptr. 1, 457 P.2d 841].) Defendant’s effort to convert the issue into one of prosecutorial misconduct fares no better. Defendant seeks to rely on the well-established rule that a prosecutor may not examine a witness solely to imply or insinuate the truth of the facts about which questions are posed. (See People v. Wagner, supra, 13 Cal.3d 612, 619; People v. Hamilton (1963) 60 Cal.2d 105, 116 [32 Cal.Rptr. 4, 383 P.2d 412], disapproved on another point in People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 649 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810].) That reliance is misplaced. Here the inquiry about the assault on Cusack was unquestionably predicated on evidence available to the prosecution. This is not a case in which the evidence would have been inadmissible but for the fact that defendant’s answers may have been untruthful. (See People v. Lavergne (1971) 4 Cal.3d 735, 744 [94 Cal.Rptr. 405, 484 P.2d 77].) The evidence would have been admissible. A prosecutor is not under compulsion to anticipate that a witness’s memory of additional details regarding events about which he has testified will suddenly fail on cross-examination. The questions were leading, but such questions are not improper when asked in good faith of a presumptively hostile witness on cross-examination. (Evid. Code, § 767, subd. (a)(2); People v. Williams (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 5, 8 [314 P.2d 161