Full opinion text
Opinion CHIN, J. A jury convicted defendant Raymond Anthony Lewis of the first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189) and robbery (§211) of Sandra Simms, and found true the allegation that he personally used a deadly weapon, i.e., a wooden object, to commit the crimes. (§ 12022, subd. (b).) The jury also found true the special circumstance allegation that defendant committed the murder in the course of a robbery. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).) Defendant admitted suffering three prior convictions. After the penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death, and the trial court imposed the sentence. The trial court denied his motion for a new trial or to modify the verdict (§ 1181, subds. 6 & 7), and his automatic application for modification of the verdict. (§ 190.4, subd. (e).) This appeal is automatic. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; § 1239, subd. (b).) For reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment in its entirety. I. Facts A. Guilt Phase 1. Prosecution Evidence The prosecution’s main witness, Paul Pridgon, testified that he saw defendant repeatedly beat Sandra Simms with a two-by-four wooden board, strangle her, and take money from her person. On June 6, 1988, the night of the murder, Simms, defendant, and his girlfriend, Michelle Boggs, smoked cocaine at defendant’s boardinghouse. Defendant had met Simms approximately a month before, through Boggs. Later that night, Simms gave defendant money to buy more drugs. On his way to buy the drugs, defendant met Paul Pridgon for the first time. Pridgon took him to a drug dealer. Afterwards, Pridgon took defendant to his apartment, which Pridgon shared with several individuals, where they smoked more drugs. Concerned that defendant may have run off with her money, Simms and Boggs went to look for him. When they found defendant and Pridgon, Simms repeatedly asked where her money was. Defendant said that he would get it, and left with Pridgon. When defendant and Pridgon later arrived at defendant’s boardinghouse where Simms and Boggs were waiting, defendant pulled Simms aside and told her that he could buy $100 worth of crack cocaine for $30. Defendant, Simms, and Pridgon went to buy the crack. Pridgon testified that earlier that evening, defendant had said he was going to knock down a prostitute who he knew had money. Defendant asked Pridgon if he was “down for taking the money.” Pridgon answered “yeah,” without understanding what defendant had said. When defendant repeated his plan, Pridgon stated, “No. I don’t do that kind of stuff.” Defendant replied, “Well, I[’ll] do it my damn self.” The trio walked down an alley toward Pridgon’s apartment. Defendant grabbed a two-by-four wooden board that he said he would use to hit dogs. As they got close to Pridgon’s apartment, defendant swung the two-by-four like a baseball bat at Simms’s head. Simms, who was looking in another direction, fell down after the first blow. Defendant struck Simms with the two-by-four approximately six more times. Getting on top of Simms, defendant straddled her waist with his legs, grabbed her throat with his hands, and strangled her. He then ripped her blouse and took money out of her bra. Defendant threatened Pridgon that he would kill him if he said anything. The two began walking. Defendant gave Pridgon a stainless steel butter knife, which Pridgon threw into a trash can nearby. As they walked onto a main street, defendant threw the two-by-four into a backyard. After the crime, defendant and Pridgon went back to Pridgon’s apartment to smoke drugs that they had just purchased. Pridgon did not tell anyone at his apartment about the murder. Defendant, Pridgon, and Betty Thomas, who lived with Pridgon, left together to get more drugs. As they passed the alley where Simms’s body lay, a man told them, “Don’t go through the alley because this Black guy done killed a woman.” When Pridgon came back to his apartment, he told Lorene Allen, who was Thomas’s mother and also lived with Pridgon,' that defendant killed Simms. Allen did not believe him and said he was lying. Although Pridgon wanted to tell the police about the murder, Allen told him, “Don’t do that, because you will get yourself in big trouble you can’t get out of.” A man driving in the alley first discovered Simms’s body. When a Fresno police officer arrived, he found Simms lying dead on her back. There was a pool of blood by her head, along with blood splatters spreading as far as 7 feet 10 inches away from her head. The left side of her face contained a large cut, and her neck had several razor-like cuts. A wood splinter was found in Simms’s hair and a small clump of her hair was found by her right side. Simms’s blouse was splattered with blood and partially open, with the two top buttons ripped off. Her lace bra contained a $20 bill. Simms’s purse contained a check stub from Carl’s Jr., a fast-food restaurant where Simms had worked. Employee and bank records showed Simms had cashed her $167.62 paycheck, which she had received the day she was killed. The morning after the murder, Pridgon told police that defendant had killed Simms. Pridgon led a detective to the following items: the butter knife; the 18- to 24-inch-long two-by-four; and the woodpile from which defendant had picked up the two-by-four. The recovered two-by-four, which was chipped on one end, contained traces of human blood. The wood splinter found in Simms’s hair fit the chipped end of the two-by-four. Criminologists, however, could not develop usable fingerprints from either the two-by-four or the butter knife, and could not assign a specific phosphoglucomutase (PGM) enzyme to the blood found on the two-by-four. Defendant was arrested at his boardinghouse. Before being taken to police headquarters, defendant, who was barefoot, asked to put on some shoes. Detective Sanchez, who arrested defendant, stated defendant pointed to a pair of size 10 ladies’ white Converse tennis shoes, which Detective Sanchez handed to defendant to put on. Defendant, who was wearing blue sweatpants, also asked for a green jacket hanging on his bed. Tests on the right tennis shoe revealed the shoe contained human blood with a PGM type of two-plus, two-minus, which matched Simms’s blood and that of approximately 2 percent of the population. However, the criminologist could not determine conclusively the source of the blood. Defendant’s sweatpants and jacket also had traces of blood, but criminologists could not determine if the blood was human blood. The pathologist confirmed that Simms’s injuries were consistent with her being struck by a wooden object, like a two-by-four. He testified that Simms’s head and face weré struck approximately four to six times. He found multiple injuries only on Simms’s face, head, and neck, which included injuries consistent with strangulation. He opined that Simms had been standing when she was first struck on the left side of her jawbone, fracturing her jawbone and rendering her unconscious. She sustained basal skull fractures when she fell to the ground and hit the right side of her head. Simms was alive but unconscious when she was strangled because there were no signs of resistance or struggle. The pathologist determined that strangulation was the main cause of death, with cerebral contusions from the basal skull fractures as a second or contributing cause. 2. Defense Evidence As his main defense, defendant attacked Pridgon’s credibility, and presented evidence suggesting that Pridgon was to some extent involved in the crimes. Defendant testified on his own behalf. He denied killing or hurting Simms, who was like a mother to him and even called him “son.” He further denied being “hooked on” cocaine the night of the killing or needing any money. He last saw Simms when she, defendant, and Pridgon left defendant’s boardinghouse for Pridgon’s apartment because defendant wanted to pursue a woman who lived with Pridgon. As the three reached Pridgon’s apartment, a Black man in a white Cadillac drove up and began talking to Simms. Simms got in the car and told defendant, “Mommy be right back,” and said that she would return in 20 to 25 minutes. Simms and the man drove down the alley. When defendant and Pridgon went inside Pridgon’s apartment, defendant noted the time was 11:50 p.m. Defendant attacked the credibility of Pridgon, who was 23 years old at the time of trial. Through expert witnesses, defendant presented evidence that Pridgon suffered from mental disorders, mild mental retardation, and substance abuse. Experts testified that Pridgon’s capacity to perceive and recollect Simms’s killing was impaired, and that he made up information to fill in gaps in his memory. Defendant claimed that Pridgon imagined that defendant strangled Simms after listening to the pathologist’s testimony. Defendant also argued Pridgon suffered from hallucinations, as evidenced from Pridgon’s testimony that he heard blood flow from Simms’s head, and heard defendant take money from Simms’s bra. To further impeach Pridgon’s credibility, defendant presented evidence of Pridgon’s felony conviction for burglary and his conviction for being under the influence of cocaine. Two investigators who had dealt with Pridgon before believed him to be dishonest and untrustworthy. Based on numerous inconsistencies between Pridgon’s testimony at trial and at the preliminary hearing, defendant moved to strike Pridgon’s entire testimony. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant also attacked the source and weight of the physical evidence. First, defendant testified that at the time of his arrest, Detective Sanchez— and not defendant—picked out the tennis shoes, green jacket, and blue sweatpants for defendant to wear. Defendant claims he was wearing other clothes and shoes at the time. At trial, defendant maintained the tennis shoes and green jacket did not fit him, and did not belong to him. Instead, defendant testified he saw Pridgon wearing the jacket and remembered Pridgon wearing the tennis shoes on the night of the murder. Defendant also presented testimony from a shoe store owner who opined the bloody tennis shoes fit Pridgon better than they fit defendant. Witnesses testified that Pridgon had a habit of carrying sticks, and was known as “Crazy Paul” in the neighborhood. Based on the foregoing, defendant argued that Pridgon was to some extent involved in the crimes, i.e., Pridgon either killed Simms himself, assisted in the particular crimes, or watched or was present as someone other than defendant killed Simms. B. Penalty Phase 1. Prosecution Evidence As factors in aggravation, the prosecution introduced evidence that defendant, when he was 13 years old, had participated in the 1975 murder of A. Z. Rogers. Defendant and his two friends poured gasoline into Rogers’s car, where he was sleeping, and then threw a lit match. Rogers died from smoke inhalation and second and third degree bums covering 95 percent of his body. The prosecution also introduced evidence that deféndant had been involved in the 1982 residential burglary and robbery of 81-year-old Mariana Cardoza, the 1986 residential burglary and attack upon Norman Logan, and the 1986 residential burglary and attack upon Steven Ohler. While in jail in 1986, defendant punched, kicked, and threatened a fellow inmate with a shank, a jail-made weapon. In 1989, defendant created a jail disturbance by starting a fire, and attempted to stab an officer with a shank. The prosecution also showed that defendant was involved in a number of purse snatchings in April 1986. The prosecution introduced evidence of defendant’s prior convictions for robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), receiving stolen property (id., § 496), and two counts of transporting, selling, and furnishing phencyclidine (PCP). (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.) 2. Defense Evidence As factors in mitigation, defendant presented expert testimony from Dr. Callahan, a psychiatrist, that, given defendant’s prior convictions and violent past, he suffered from an antisocial personality disorder. Based on his review of defendant’s prior medical records, Dr. Callahan concluded that previous doctors examining defendant in 1975 had diagnosed him with paranoid schizophrenia with episodic violent behavior, impaired judgment, and borderline intelligence. Those doctors concluded that defendant should be placed in a psychiatric facility where he would receive antipsychotic medication and other drugs; however, this did not occur. Although defendant took the major tranquilizer Mellaril while he was in the California Youth Authority (CYA), he had not taken any medication from January 1, 1990, through the time of the penalty phase. Dr. Callahan concluded that defendant lived in a very unstructured and unsupervised environment, which in part may have accounted for defendant’s criminal conduct. Dr. Callahan opined that a structured environment and medication would help prevent defendant from acting out violently. Dr. Callahan noted that antisocial personality disorder tends to diminish in adulthood. Defendant told Dr. Callahan that he wished to pursue an education in prison. An expert witness, psychologist Dr. Adams, interviewed defendant a week before defendant testified. Dr. Adams concluded that defendant met the criteria for antisocial personality disorder given his criminal history, his incarceration for most of his life since he was 14 years old, and his inability to establish long-term relationships. Dr. Adams opined defendant’s lack of a male role model adversely affected his character and personality development. Odell Rogers, the brother of A. Z. Rogers and the boyfriend of defendant’s mother, testified that he had warned Rogers about carrying gas in his car because he smoked and used matches. Odell Rogers was not afraid of defendant. Defendant also introduced character evidence, which included the following testimonies: Minnie Lewis, defendant’s mother, testified defendant wrote to her every week and told her if he was not executed he wanted to be a counselor to tell kids to stay off drugs and off the streets. She said she loved her son and would be extremely distraught if he were executed. Sandra McCullar, defendant’s sister, testified that she spoke to defendant every week in jail, and believed that defendant had changed; that he talked about God and quoted from the Bible, and told McCullar to stay in school and not use drugs, and his younger half brother to stay in school; and that she would miss defendant very much if he were executed. Cathy Jackson, defendant’s cousin, testified defendant offered advice to young people to stay off drugs and out of trouble. She said she would miss him if he were executed. Defendant also presented testimony regarding his behavior while incarcerated. Dana Crittenden, who worked for the Fresno County Sheriff’s Department, testified that defendant always treated her with respect and even intervened when another inmate at court gave her problems. Richard Caldie, a correctional officer for Fresno County, testified defendant never treated him with disrespect or tried to attack him. Marvis Williams, who worked for the Fresno County jail, testified that she knew defendant for a year, he never gave her any problems, that he always treated her with respect, and that she liked him. Finally, defendant presented the testimony of Richard Phillips, who then had been an inmate for over 20 years, and had spent more than the last nine and one-half years on death row. Phillips testified that there was much need for counselors for other inmates in prison, and that defendant could eventually become a counselor after a rigorous training and screening process. II. Discussion A. Guilt Phase 1. Jury Selection—Challenge for Cause Defendant argues that the trial court improperly excused Prospective Juror Lloyd G. based on his views against the death penalty. On his jury questionnaire and several times during voir dire, Lloyd G. specifically stated that he was “biased against” the death penalty, and that he saw no need for this type of punishment in society. However, defendant contends the prospective juror stated that he could apply the law according to the court’s instructions. Thus, defendant claims the trial court violated his right to a fair and impartial jury under both the state and federal Constitutions by excusing Lloyd G. For reasons that follow, we disagree. “ ‘ “[I]n a capital case, a prospective juror may be excluded if the juror’s views on capital punishment would ‘prevent or substantially impair’ the performance of the juror’s duties.” [Citations.] “A prospective juror is properly excluded if he or she is unable to conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 987 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044].) “If the prospective juror’s responses to voir dire questions are conflicting or equivocal, the trial court’s determination of the juror’s true state of mind is binding upon the reviewing court. [Citations.]” (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1319 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259].) We find no error. Lloyd G. stated that the prosecution would have to convince him of the need for capital punishment—not only under the particular facts of this case, but also as a general proposition—before he would vote to impose it. He thus possessed a bias against the death penalty which “ ‘ “ ‘prevented] or substantially impaired]’ ” ’ ” his ability to perform his duty as a juror. (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 987.) Defendant points out, however, that Lloyd G. said he was not totally opposed to the death penalty, and that he could possibly change his mind about voting for life imprisonment rather than death. Despite his bias against capital punishment, the juror stated he could apply the law according to the court’s instructions. At the very least, however, Lloyd G.’s responses were “conflicting or equivocal.” (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1319.) Accordingly, we are bound by the trial court’s determination of Lloyd G.’s state of mind. (Ibid.) 2. Claims Relating to the Testimony of Eyewitness Paul Pridgon Before Pridgon testified, defendant requested that a psychiatrist be present in court during Pridgon’s testimony to determine whether he had the capacity to perceive and recollect. Defendant later withdrew his request and agreed with the court that the issue whether Pridgon’s capacity to perceive and recollect was impaired was “a matter of impeachment” pursuant to Evidence Code section 780. Neither party requested a hearing outside the jury to determine whether Pridgon was qualified to testify. On cross-examination, Pridgon testified that when Simms was lying on the ground after defendant had struck her, Pridgon saw and “heard” blood flow from her head, which sounded “[l]ike somebody pouring water in a cup.” He also said that he knows how money “sounds.” Defendant impeached Pridgon with his preliminary hearing testimony, including the fact that Pridgon failed to mention previously that defendant strangled Simms. When Pridgon testified at trial that he told the investigator about the strangling, he told defense counsel to confirm the strangling with the pathologist. Defendant contends that Pridgon simply overheard the pathologist’s testimony and did not actually see defendant strangle Simms. Indeed, defendant points out that Pridgon failed to mention this fact to Lorene Allen, whom he told that defendant killed Simms. Defendant also maintains that Pridgon embellished his testimony with his statement that he purposely fell on his bad knee to allow Simms to run away, which Pridgon failed to mention at the preliminary hearing. Pridgon also purportedly described an “S,” which he saw scrawled on the two-by-four used to kill Simms. Pridgon later clarified that the scrawled “S” was actually ants crawling over the two-by-four. In response to the defense question whether Pridgon’s fingerprints were on the knife that defendant discarded, Pridgon testified: “No way my fingerprints. They took my clothes and my prints and my necklace. It was negative to me, is nothing. If it comes out positive me, yes, fingerprints on it. Because I could barely positive negative. Negative means no. There was no fingerprints.” At one point, Pridgon refused to answer a defense question regarding Simms’s strangulation. Based on the foregoing testimony, defendant stated, “I think I’m going to ask the Court to consider striking all of Mr. Pridgon’s testimony . . . [f] . . . [bjased on . . . the wholesale impeachment that’s been going on of him since he took the stand . . . .” The trial court impliedly denied the request. After Pridgon testified, defendant called several expert witnesses who testified regarding Pridgon’s mental disorders, including his psychosis, paranoia, and, “schizophreniform disorder.” Psychiatrist Dr. Kinsey testified that in June 1987, he “triple-diagnosed” then 15-year-old Pridgon with schizophreniform disorder, low IQ, and substance abuse. For Pridgon’s psychotic symptoms of anxiety and auditory hallucinations, Dr. Kinsey prescribed an antipsychotic major tranquilizer, which he recommended that Pridgon take for at least a year. His colleague, Dr. Moulder, a psychologist, made a similar diagnosis and added that Pridgon’s substance and alcohol use would exacerbate his psychotic symptoms. Psychologist Dr. Pickering testified that in September 1990, he diagnosed Pridgon with polysubstance abuse and borderline personality, involving characteristics of confusion, uncertainty, inadequacy, fear, and paranoia. He disagreed, however, with other defense experts’ diagnoses of schizophreniform disorder. Dr. Pickering believed that Pridgon suffered from confabulation, which he explained is a process where a person goes “from a detail which may or may not be relevant to anything, to almost a giant imaginative leap . . . [which] takes on credibility.” In addition, Dr. Pickering opined that Pridgon’s drug use impaired his ability to perceive and recollect. Dr. Deutsch, an addiction specialist, opined that smoking large quantities of cocaine over a long period could affect a person’s mental processes, which could eventually progress to a psychosis where the person has hallucinations, paranoia, delusions, and increased feelings of hostility. He further testified that an individual suffering from borderline personality, atypical psychosis, or schizophreniform disorder, and who uses cocaine or PCP, is in a much worse position than one who does not. In rebuttal, the prosecution offered the expert testimony of Dr. Terrell, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Thackrey, a clinical psychologist. Dr. Terrell, who met with Pridgon on several occasions and reviewed prior medical reports and records on Pridgon, testified that Pridgon had the intellect of a seven year old, with a similar ability to recollect and comprehend. He also diagnosed Pridgon with substance abuse consisting of cocaine, marijuana, and PCP (which abuse was in remission), and atypical psychosis due to substance abuse. However, because Pridgon’s account of the murder was “within the realms of human experience,” Dr. Terrell testified that his account did not seem to consist of a psychotic fantasy. He further testified that notwithstanding Pridgon’s diagnosed mental disorders and low intellect, “[tjhere is nothing that would lead me to believe that he would be incapable of reporting an account of an act of this nature,” though Pridgon’s degree of accuracy would be that of a seven year old. Dr. Thackrey’s findings were consistent with Dr. Terrell’s. He concluded that Pridgon did not meet the criteria to be considered schizophrenic, nor did he suffer from delusional symptoms or auditory hallucinations, but noted that Pridgon did suffer from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder resulting in his lack of concentration and increased fidgetiness. Dr. Thackrey found nothing in his review of the record or his assessment of Pridgon that “would necessarily preclude [Pridgon’s] ability to remember something that he saw happen or to tell us, at leást in general terms, what had happened.” Given Pridgon’s limited intellectual abilities, Dr. Thackrey opined that “it could be . . . relatively easy to inadvertently confuse Mr. Pridgon or elicit contradictory kinds of statements about details, and the like.” Based in part on defendant’s assertion that Pridgon’s testimony was “inherently unreliable,” defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, claiming insufficient evidence of guilt. The trial court denied the motion. The trial court also denied defendant’s subsequent motion for a new trial or to modify the jury’s verdict under section 1181, subdivisions 6 and 7, arguing that Pridgon’s unreliable testimony made the verdict “contrary to . . . evidence.” On appeal, defendant asserts a number of claims regarding Pridgon’s testimony, which we discuss in turn. a. Capacity to Perceive and Recollect Defendant argues that Pridgon did not have the necessary capacity to perceive and recollect in order to testify under Evidence Code section 702, subdivision (a). To testify, a witness must have personal knowledge of the subject of the testimony, i.e., “a present recollection of an impression derived from the exercise of the witness’ own senses.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West’s Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 702, p. 300; Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a).) In order to have personal knowledge, a witness must have the capacity to perceive and recollect. (See People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 525 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035].) The capacity to perceive and recollect is a condition for the admissibility of a witness’s testimony on a certain matter, rather than a prerequisite for the witness’s competency. (Ibid.) Upon a party’s objection, a witness’s personal knowledge must be shown before the witness may testify regarding the matter. (Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a); see also id., § 403, subd. (c)(1) [upon a party’s request, a court must instruct the jury as to whether a preliminary fact exists before it may consider the proffered evidence].) “ ‘[I]f there is evidence that the witness has those capacities, the determination whether [he] in fact perceived and does recollect is left to the trier of fact.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 526; 2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Witnesses, § 46, p. 297 [the capacity to perceive and recollect is “only preliminarily determined by the trial judge, and ultimately redetermined by the jury”].) A trial court should allow a witness’s testimony unless “no jury could reasonably find that he has such [personal] knowledge.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West’s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 701, p. 284.) “The fact that a witness has made inconsistent and exaggerated statements does not indicate an inability to perceive [or] recollect . . . .” (People v. Willard (1983) 155 Cal.App.3d 237, 240 [202 Cal.Rptr. 100].) Nor does a witness’s mental defect or insane delusions necessarily reflect that the witness lacks the capacity to perceive or recollect. (People v. McCaughan (1957) 49 Cal.2d 409, 420 [317 P.2d 974]; People v. La Rue (1923) 62 Cal.App. 276, 284 [216 P. 627] [“ ‘It is admissible ... in order to affect the credibility of the witness, to prove that he was or is subject to insane delusions; that his mind and memory are impaired by disease’ ”].) A witness’s uncertainty about his or her recollection of events does not preclude admitting his or her testimony. (People v. Avery (1950) 35 Cal.2d 487, 492 [218 P.2d 527] [uncertainty of recollection goes to the weight and not admissibility of a witness’s testimony].) Defendant did not timely object to Pridgon’s incapacity to perceive and recollect to limit the admissibility of Pridgon’s testimony before he testified. Thus, without an objection, the trial court was not required to determine whether Pridgon had personal knowledge before he testified. (Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a).) Although a party may move to strike a witness’s testimony when lack of personal knowledge is shown on cross-examination (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West’s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 702, p. 300), defendant did not challenge Pridgon’s testimony on this basis. Rather, defendant agreed that Pridgon’s capacity to perceive and recollect was “a matter of impeachment,” and proceeded to impeach his capacity through cross-examination and expert testimony. (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (c); see also People v. Cooks (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 224, 302 [190 Cal.Rptr. 211] [“A witness may be cross-examined about his mental condition or emotional stability to the extent it may affect his powers of perception, memory (recollection), or communication”].) Thus, defendant’s failure to object timely on the basis of Evidence Code section 702, subdivision (a), constitutes a waiver of this claim on appeal. (See People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 622 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635] [party must object to witness’s lack of testimonial competence to preserve this claim on appeal].) Even assuming, however, that defendant had timely and specifically objected on this ground (see Evid. Code, § 353), we find no substantial basis for the trial court to have excluded Pridgon’s testimony. Although Pridgon’s testimony may have consisted of inconsistencies, incoherent responses, and possible hallucinations, delusions and confabulations, Pridgon “presented a plausible account of the circumstances of [Simms’s] murder.” (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 574 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347] [witness who suffered from delusions was not incompetent to testify].) Pridgon testified to many details of the crime, which were unlikely to be known by anyone not present, and which were independently corroborated by the evidence. He also led police to the place where the two-by-four was discarded. Moreover, despite instances of Pridgon’s incomprehensible testimony (often on cross-examination), he also testified lucidly, albeit simply, throughout trial. For instance, after Pridgon testified he saw defendant get on top of Simms after striking her, the prosecution asked if defendant did anything to her. Pridgon replied, “Yeah, he. had his hand right here. (Indicating.) “Q[:] All right. Now you said he had his hand ‘right here’? “A[:] On her throat. “Q[:] ‘On the throat,’ okay. And you showed me something with your hand. What—what was it that you saw him doing with his hand? “A[:] He tore her blouse up, and stick his hand up there in her bosom.” In short, there was no substantial basis for the court to exclude Pridgon’s testimony; rather, it was up to the jury to determine whether Pridgon’s recollections were true. (People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 574; see also People v. McCaughan, supra, 49 Cal.2d at p. 420; People v. Avery, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 492; People v. Willard, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at p. 240.) Although defendant maintains that Pridgon’s intimate knowledge of the crimes indicated that Pridgon and not defendant committed the crimes, this is a separate issue from whether Pridgon had the capacity to perceive and recollect. Moreover, contrary to defendant’s contention, we cannot conclude that Pridgon’s testimony about hearing blood flow was improbable as a matter of law. (See, e.g., People v. Crowell (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1053, 1057 [244 Cal.Rptr. 296] [stabbing victim “ ‘could hear the air and the blood bubbling out my back’ ”]; People v. Fernandez (1950) 301 N.Y. 302, 316 [93 N.E.2d 859, 866] [defendant “ ‘could hear blood dripping’ ” from victim who was lying flat on the floor]; State v. Oslund (1985) 71 Or.App. 701, 704 [693 P.2d 1354, 1355] [defendant “heard [shooting victim’s] blood dripping on the floor”].) Nor can we conclude as a matter of law that Pridgon could not hear the sound of money. The rustling of paper money is an audible sound. (See, e.g., Rushing v. State (Ind. 1983) 449 N.E.2d 597, 598 [witness to robbery did not see defendant take money from the cash register but “heard the sound of money rustling and cash drawer clips flopping”].) Indeed, in ruling on defendant’s subsequent motion for a new trial, the trial court stated: “The Court sat approximately four to six feet from Pridgon during his entire trial testimony. The Court had an ample opportunity to observe the demeanor and manner in which Mr. Pridgon testified. In addition, the Court had an opportunity to observe the attitude of Mr. Pridgon toward this action and toward the giving of testimony in general. It is clear that Mr. Pridgon suffers from some type of mental problem. At the very least it can be said that he is a slow learner. ft[] However, the Court believed [Pridgon’s testimony regarding the murder].” The trial court rejected defendant’s contention that Pridgon hallucinated the death and the manner of killing. Although the court noted that Pridgon’s testimony included inconsistencies (and did not attempt to reconcile them), it stated that, “The Court can only reiterate that at no time has the Court questioned the credibility of Mr. Pridgon on the fact that the Defendant killed Sandra Simms and took money from her person at the time of the killing.” As noted, because defendant failed to object that Pridgon lacked the capacity to perceive and recollect in order to testify, the trial court had no occasion to consider this issue. However, based on the record before us, we conclude that the trial court’s statements regarding Pridgon’s credibility strongly suggest that the court would have overruled defendant’s objection and rejected his argument on this claim. To that end, we reject defendant’s contention that the trial court erroneously believed that Pridgon’s capacity to perceive and recollect was an issue relating only to impeachment. The trial court’s statements noted above reflect that it believed Pridgon had such capacity. Plainly, Pridgon fell well short of being an ideal witness. As the prosecution’s psychologist testified, it would be easy to inadvertently confuse Pridgon, given his limited intellectual abilities. Inevitably, his confusion mounted when someone motivated to make him look incredible—as defense counsel was—asked the questions. As a reviewing court, we confront a cold record without the trial court’s benefit of observing firsthand the appearance and demeanor of the witness. Here, both the jury and trial court found that Pridgon was a credible witness, and we must give proper deference to such findings. (People v. Jones (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 161, 165 [73 Cal.Rptr. 727].) Thus, we reject defendant’s constitutional challenges based on his right of confrontation protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, his rights to due process, to present a defense, to a trial by jury, and to a reliable conviction afforded under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and his right to a reliable, individualized capital sentencing determination guaranteed under the Eighth Amendment. For similar reasons, we reject defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to timely object to Pridgon’s capacity to perceive and recollect, or for otherwise conceding Pridgon’s capacity was a “matter of impeachment.” Where “there was no sound legal basis for objection, counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the evidence cannot establish ineffective assistance.” (People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 616.) b. Competency Defendant also contends that Pridgon was incompetent to testify under Evidence Code section 701, subdivision (a). A person is incompetent and disqualified to be a witness if he or she is “[ijncapable of expressing himself or herself concerning the matter so as to be understood, either directly or through interpretation by one who can understand him” (Evid. Code, § 701, subd. (a)(1)), or is “[ijncapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.” (Evid. Code, § 701, subd. (a)(2).) “[T]he burden of proof is on the party who objects to the proffered witness, and a trial court’s determination will be upheld in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. [Citations.]” (People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 573; see also People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 444 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388].) The challenging party must establish a witness’s incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Farley (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 851, 869 [153 Cal.Rptr. 695, 12 A.L.R.4th 301]; see also Evid. Code, § 405; 1 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook, supra, § 25.6, p. 400.) Unlike a witness’s personal knowledge, a witness’s competency to testify is determined exclusively by the court. (3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, supra, Presentation at Trial, § 61, p. 93; see Evid. Code, § 405, subd. (a).) Defendant failed to object at trial to Pridgon’s competency and in fact expressly stated that Pridgon was competent to testify. Accordingly, his claim is waived on appeal. (People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 622 [“[djefendant may not circumvent this objection requirement by claiming that the trial court should have inquired into the witness’s qualifications on its own”].) Defendant argues, however, that he effectively retracted his waiver by later moving to strike Pridgon’s entire testimony during trial. Assuming, however, that defendant timely and specifically objected to Pridgon’s competence through his motion to strike (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a)), we find no substantial basis for the trial court to determine that Pridgon was incompetent to testify. Although, Pridgon may have suffered from mental disorders and his testimony was difficult to comprehend at times, the record does not support the claim that he was incapable of communicating so as to be understood, pursuant to Evidence Code section 701, subdivision (a)(1). (See People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 574 [no substantial evidence that witness, who delusionally believed imaginary son was present during murder, lacked capabilities under Evid. Code, § 701, subd. (a)(1) & (2)]; People v. Jones, supra, 268 Cal.App.2d at pp. 165-166 [prosecution witness characterized as a “mental defective” by trial judge was not incompetent despite his conflicting and inconsistent testimony]; People v. Scaggs (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 339, 354 [314 P.2d 793] [record did not disclose that witness who was described as senile and of unsound mind was incompetent as a matter of law].) Consistent with Pridgon’s diagnosis of having the intellect of a seven year old, he expressed difficulty with complex questions and often responded in incomplete, sometimes nonsensical, sentences. Mere difficulty in understanding a witness, however, does not disqualify that witness under Evidence Code section 701, subdivision (a). To the extent defendant contends Pridgon’s responses were unbelievable—including his testimony that he “heard” blood and knew how money “sounds”—this was an issue of credibility for the jury and not relevant to the issue of Pridgon’s competency. (See Adamson v. Department of Social Services (1988) 207 Cal.App.3d 14, 20 [254 Cal.Rptr. 667].) “ ‘Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Jones, supra, 268 Cal.App.2d at p. 165.) Moreover, the fact that Pridgon initially refused to answer defendant’s question regarding Simms’s strangulation did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not understand the duty to tell the truth. (Evid. Code, § 701, subd. (a)(2).) After Pridgon’s refusals to answer, defense counsel asserted that “I think [Pridgon’s] lying right now.” This, however, is a question of credibility for the jury as trier of fact. (See Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (a) [witness’s “demeanor while testifying and the manner in which he testifies” may be relevant to credibility].) In sum, even assuming that defendant properly objected to Pridgon’s competency to testify, there was no substantial basis for the trial court to exclude Pridgon’s testimony on this ground. (Evid. Code, § 701, subd. (a).) Moreover, the record supports that the trial court would have rejected defendant’s challenges to Pridgon’s competency. Thus, we also reject defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to object to Pridgon’s lack of competency. Where “there was no sound legal basis for objection, counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the evidence cannot establish ineffective assistance.” (People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 616.) c. Instructional Errors Defendant did not request an instruction that Pridgon’s capacity to perceive and recollect was a preliminary fact that the jury must find before it may consider Pridgon’s testimony. (Evid. Code, § 403, subds. (a)(2), (c)(1).) However, defendant maintains that the trial court should have given this instruction sua sponte. In addition, defendant argues that the trial court should have “subsequently determine[d]” that Pridgon’s personal knowledge was not proven as a preliminary fact, and therefore should have instructed the jury to disregard his testimony. (Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (c)(2).) We discuss each issue in turn. Under Evidence Code section 403, subdivision (c)(1), if the court admits evidence subject to the existence of a preliminary fact, the court “[m]ay, and on request shall, instruct the jury to determine whether the prehminary fact exists and to disregard the proffered evidence unless the jury finds that the preliminary fact does exist.” On its own terms, this provision makes it discretionary for the trial court to give an instruction regarding a preliminary fact unless the party makes a request. Because defendant failed to do so, the trial court was not required to instruct the jury that Pridgon’s capacity to perceive and recollect was a preliminary fact that had to be found before the jury could consider his testimony. (Evid. Code § 403, subd. (c)(1).) Nor was the trial court required to instruct the jury sua sponte. Contrary to defendant’s contention, his challenge to Pridgon’s capacity to perceive and recollect was not a defense per se or a theory of his case, but an evidentiary issue serving to limit Pridgon’s testimony. Thus, the cases upon which defendant relies are inapposite. (See, e.g., People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 720 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913] [sua sponte duty to instruct on involuntary manslaughter upon evidence of diminished capacity]; People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 531 [83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390] [sua sponte duty to instruct on issue of provocation]; People v. Splawn (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 553, 559 [211 Cal.Rptr. 638] [sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser included offense of attempted disposal of insured property with intent to defraud].) Indeed, the foregoing distinction is underscored by the purpose for this Evidence Code section 403, subdivision (c)(1), instruction in this case. Defendant’s proposed sua sponte instruction would merely have told the jury the obvious: that if it found Pridgon could not perceive or recollect, i.e.,' that he hallucinated the murder and robbery, then the jury should disregard his testimony. Our faith in the common sense of jurors weighs against requiring a trial court to give such instruction sua sponte. We also reject defendant’s contention that the trial court should have subsequently instructed the jury to disregard Pridgon’s testimony because the “jury could not reasonably find that the preliminary fact [of Pridgon’s capacity to perceive and recollect] exists.” (Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (c)(2).) Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, we cannot conclude that “no reasonable person could find that [Pridgon] had personal knowledge of the circumstances,” such that the trial court should have excluded his testimony as a matter of law. (People v. Blagg (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1039 [89 Cal.Rptr. 446]; Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (c)(2).) Based on testimony of both prosecution and defense expert witnesses, the record reflects that Pridgon did not suffer from severe mental defects which substantially affected his testimony, or that Pridgon’s cocaine use substantially interfered with his ability to perceive and recollect. Further, there was no evidence as to exactly when Pridgon stopped taking the major tranquilizer Mellaril, or that he would otherwise experience hallucinations without taking the medication, from which to infer that Pridgon experienced hallucinations on the day of the murder, as defendant contends. Regarding defendant’s claim that Pridgon confabulated Simms’s strangulation after he overheard the pathologist testify, Pridgon made gestures at the preliminary hearing indicating that he saw defendant strangle Simms before the pathologist testified. Moreover, Pridgon’s failure to mention the strangling to Detective Sanchez or Lorene Allen may have been based on the detective’s failure to include this in his report, and on Allen’s statement that she did not want to know anything about the murder, which would cause Pridgon not to give her further details. Indeed, when the prosecution read the excerpt from the detective’s report, which did not contain details of the strangling, Pridgon interjected that he recalled that defendant bent over Simms, put both hands on her neck, and attempted to strangle her before taking her money. In addition, Pridgon’s statement that he was “tired of my people getting killed” was not a delusional belief Pridgon had that he was a protector of an unidentifiable group. Rather, it was a statement reasonably interpreted that Pridgon, who was a Black man, was tired of fellow Black people, like Simms, getting killed. Moreover, Pridgon’s statement that he was attempting to help Simms by falling on his bad knee was not inconsistent with his preliminary hearing testimony, and he eventually reaffirmed this statement during cross-examination. Finally, Pridgon’s inability to tell time, including the exact time of the murder, would be consistent with his having the intellect of a seven year old. In short, we conclude that the trial court did not err by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury regarding Pridgon’s capacity to perceive and recollect as a preliminary fact (see Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (c)(1)), or by failing to instruct the jury to disregard Pridgon’s testimony. (Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (c)(2).) Thus, we reject defendant’s constitutional claims in this regard. For similar reasons, we reject defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to request such instructions. Because there was no reasonable likelihood of prejudice in that the instructions would not have provided necessary guidance to the jurors, we need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient. (People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 656 [280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351] [two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel claim].) 3. Motion for New Trial After the jury returned its verdicts, defendant moved for a new trial claiming that Pridgon’s testimony was unreliable, and therefore, the verdict was “contrary to . . . evidence” under section 1181, subdivision 6. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, finding substantial evidence that supported the fact that defendant committed the murder. The court found that irrespective of Pridgon’s impeachment, the witnesses and evidence pointed to defendant as the killer; this included Pridgon as an eyewitness, defendant’s motive to kill Simms, Pridgon’s lack of a motive to kill Simms, and the tennis shoes containing blood consistent with Simms’s, which were linked to defendant. Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for a new trial because the evidence supporting the guilty verdict was insufficient given Pridgon’s incompetent testimony, which was not independently corroborated. Defendant points out that the tennis shoes did not implicate defendant, but rather Pridgon. He emphasizes that the prosecution’s criminologist could not determine the source of the bloodstains. Moreover, he claims he did not ask for the tennis shoes, but rather Detective Sanchez handed them to him when he was arrested. A shoe store owner testified that the tennis shoes, which were women’s shoes, fit Pridgon better than they fit defendant. Defendant argues that the trial court should have evaluated Pridgon’s testimony with “great caution,” because his testimony was crucial to the prosecution’s case, and in particular, because Pridgon suffered from mental defects. (See People v. McCaughan, supra, 42 Cal.2d at p. 421; People v. St. Andrew (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 450, 459 [161 Cal.Rptr. 634].) On a motion for a new trial, a trial court must review the evidence independently, considering the proper weight to be afforded to the evidence and then deciding whether there is sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict. (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 524 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119].) “A trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial is so completely within that court’s discretion that a reviewing court will not disturb the ruling absent a manifest and unmistakable abuse of that discretion. [Citation.]” (People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1260-1261 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645].) Based on our review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion. The record reflects that Pridgon had personal knowledge of the crime, which included his capacity to perceive and recollect. (See ante, at pp. 358-359.) Moreover, contrary to defendant’s contention, evidence corroborated Pridgon’s testimony. The pathologist confirmed Pridgon’s description of the murder and how it took place. Pridgon also led detectives to the murder weapon, which indicated that he witnessed the murder. Moreover, Detective Sanchez testified that when he asked defendant to get his shoes when he was arrested, defendant pointed to the tennis shoes in question. Boggs also recalled that defendant wore white tennis shoes, which were below the ankle, when he was arrested, and that he had no other shoes besides them. Also, blood tests on the shoes revealed that at least one spot was human blood, and consistent with Simms’s blood PGM type: two-plus, two-minus. The Attorney General also points out that defendant, unlike Pridgon, had a motive to kill and rob Simms because he had no money. He also had the motive to kill to avoid returning the money Simms gave him to purchase drugs, and to silence her nagging about his returning her money. Moreover, assuming the trial court had a duty to exercise great caution in viewing Pridgon’s testimony, there is nothing in the record to show that the court failed to do so. We also reject defendant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. For challenges relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, “the reviewing court must examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68].) Here, as explained, the evidence was sufficient. Thus, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a new trial did not result in an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Hayes, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1260-1261.) 4. Robbery Special Circumstance In his motion for a new trial, defendant alternatively requested that the trial court strike the robbery special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)), which the jury had found true. Defendant argued that based on the crucial but unreliable testimony of Pridgon, the special circumstance was unsupported by evidence. Denying his motion, the trial court declined to reconcile inconsistencies in Pridgon’s testimony, including the fact that money was found on Simms’s person. The court rejected defendant’s contention that Pridgon had hallucinated the death and manner of killing Simms. The court was “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt” under section 211 that defendant killed Simms while engaged in the commission of robbery. On appeal, defendant asserts that substantial evidence does not support the robbery special circumstance, and argues that the trial court otherwise implicitly concluded that defendant had not committed a robbery. We discuss each point in turn. Substantial evidence must support a special circumstance finding. (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1022.) “In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence for a special circumstance, the question we ask is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 678 [286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84].) We find the record contains substantial evidence that defendant murdered Simms while engaged in the commission of a robbery. After Pridgon testified that defendant had pressed on Simms’s throat and reached into her blouse after striking her, the following colloquy took place: “Q[uestion by the prosecution:] And what did you see when you say he went in the blouse? “A[nswer by Pridgon:] He came out with some money. “Q[:] Were you able to tell exactly how much money? “A[:] No, I can’t tell how much it was, but I knew it was a lot of money. “Q[:] And can you—were you able to tell if it was coins or paper? “A[:] It was paper. “Q[:] From what you could see, did it appear to be more than one piece of paper money or just one piece? “A[:] He came out with a lot of money. “Q[:] ‘He came out’— “A[:] With a handful of money. “Q[:] ‘A handful’? “A[:] Hum. “Q[:] Now, you’ve been gesturing with your hand to the—the breast area on your body. Is that where you saw him reach in and come out with the money? “A[:] Yes. “Q[:] What’s the next thing that happened after you saw him come out with the money? “A[:] He got off of her. “Q[:] And then what happened? “A[:] Then he grabbed me and said if I say something, he’s going to kill me.” In addition, when the prosecution asked whether defendant had ever mentioned wanting to hit Simms and take money from her, Pridgon answered, “Yes. He say he know where a prostitute at that got money. . . . He asked me if I’m down for taking the money. [H] I don’t quite understand what he was saying. And I told him, ‘Yeah.’ I didn’t understand what he said. But when he repeat over again, I told him, ‘No. I don’t do that kind of stuff.’ [H] . . . He said, ‘Well, I do it my damn self.’ ” There was also circumstantial evidence that defendant robbed Simms. Defendant admitted he had seen Simms keep money in her bra. Physical evidence also showed that the top of Simms’s blouse was ripped open, revealing her brassiere containing a folded $20 bill, and that buttons that had come from Simms’s blouse lay near her body. There was evidence that Simms had recently cashed a paycheck and that she normally set aside money for rent from the paycheck and used the rest to purchase crack. Based on these facts, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that defendant robbed Simms. As discussed previously, we reject defendant’s contention that the trial court should have disregarded Pridgon’s testimony as inherently unreliable. (See ante, at p. 362.) We also reject defendant’s claim that the trial court implicitly foreclosed the finding of robbery based on the court’s observation that “[ajlthough somewhat illogical, the apparent motive of the murder was to obviate the necessity of the defendant returning money to the victim which had been given to the defendant for the purpose of purchasing drugs.” In other words, defendant did not kill Simms intending to rob her, but killed her to avoid paying a debt. As further evidence that he did not rob Simms, defendant states he did not take money from her person, which is supported by the fact that $20 was found on Simms’s body. Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, the trial court’s observation that defendant may have had the motive to kill Simms to cancel a debt he owed her does not preclude the finding of the robbery special circumstance. (See People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1053 [“appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence”].) Although the record may have supported both theories, it was up to the trier of fact to determine whether or not defendant committed the robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 791 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 982 P.2d 485].) Indeed, the trial court, upon denying defendant’s motion for a new trial or alternatively to strike the robbery special circumstance, independently reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence and credited Pridgon’s testimony “on the fact that the Defendant killed Sandra Simms and took money from her person at the time of the killing,” and “that the Defendant Raymond Lewis told him that he intended to hit the victim and take her money.” “ ‘ “If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]” ’ ” (People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1054.) As noted, the record reveals substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that defendant robbed and murdered Simms. Thus, a reversal of the robbery special-circumstance finding was not warranted. (People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1054.) Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim that his sentence violates the federal constitutional prohibition against arbitrary and capricious action. 5. Claims Relating to Accomplice Liability Defendant claims the trial court prejudicially erred by refusing to instruct the jury on accomplice liability and testimony regarding prosecution witness Pridgon. (§ 1111; CALJIC Nos. 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.14, 3.16.) Because the testimony implicating defendant in the crimes was from an accomplice, the trial court should have instructed the jury that the testimony must be independently corroborated by evidence connecting defendant to the crimes. Based on the trial court’s failure to do so, defendant maintains his conviction rests on uncorroborated accomplice testimony proscribed by section 1111. Under section 1111, an accomplice is “one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given.” To be chargeable with an identical offense, a witness must be considered a principal under section 31. (People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1113-1114 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478]; but see id. at p. 1114 [a mere accessory is not an accomplice].) An accomplice must have ‘“guilty knowledge and intent with regard to the commission of the crime.’ ” (People v. Hoover (1974) 12 Cal.3d 875, 879 [117 Cal.Rptr. 672, 528 P.2d 760].) “If there is evidence from which the jury could find that a witness is an accomplice to the crime charged, the court must instruct the jury on accomplice testimony. [Citation.] But if the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding that a witness is an accomplice, the trial court may make that determination and, in that situation, need not instruct the jury on accomplice testimony. [Citation.]” (People v. Horton, supra, 1