Full opinion text
Opinion BAXTER, J. The Charter Schools Act (CSA; Ed. Code, § 47600 et seq.), as adopted by the Legislature in 1992 and since amended, represents a revolutionary change in the concept of public education. Under this statute, interested persons may obtain charters to operate schools that function within public school districts, accept all eligible students, charge no tuition, and are financed by state and local tax dollars, but nonetheless retain considerable academic independence from the mainstream public education system. Such schools may elect to operate as, or be operated by, corporations organized under the Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law. (Id., § 47604, subd. (a).) Here certain charter schools, their corporate operators, and the chartering school districts were sued on multiple grounds by some of the schools’ students and their parents or guardians. The gravamen of all the claims is that the schools—designed to provide and facilitate home instruction through use of the Internet (so-called distance learning)—failed to deliver instructional services, equipment, and supplies as promised, and as required by law. In effect, plaintiffs assert, the schools functioned only to collect “average daily attendance” (ADA) forms, on the basis of which the schools, and the districts, fraudulently claimed and received public education funds from the state. Plaintiffs also claim violations of specific statutory rules governing “independent study” programs offered by the public schools. This case concerns whether, and in what circumstances, public school districts, charter schools, and/or the operators of such schools may be exposed to civil liability based on allegations of this kind. Among other things, we must determine whether such entities, or any of them, are “persons” who may be sued (1) under the unfair competition law (UCL; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) and (2) in a qui tam action, brought by individuals on behalf of the state, under the California False Claims Act (CFCA; Gov. Code, § 12650 et seq.). We reach the following conclusions: (1) Public school districts are not “persons” who may be sued under the CFCA. (2) On the other hand, the charter schools in this case, and their operators, are “persons” subject to suit under both the CFCA and the UCL, and are not exempt from either law merely because such schools are deemed part of the public school system. (3) The CFCA cause of action is not a barred claim for “educational malfeasance” (see Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 814 [31 Cal.Rptr. 854] (Peter VK)) insofar as it asserts, not simply that One2One’s charter schools provided a substandard education, but that they submitted false claims for school funds while failing to furnish any significant educational services, materials, and supplies. (4) The CFCA cause of action is not barred insofar as it alleges that, before 2000, the charter schools violated “independent study” rules set forth in a 1993 statute, Education Code section 51747.3, because section 51747.3 applied to charter schools even before its amendment in 1999. (5) Finally, a qui tarn action under the CFCA against a charter school or its operator is not subject to the Tort Claims Act (TCA; Gov. Code, § 815 et seq.) requirement of prior presentment of a claim for payment (see id., §§ 905, 910 et seq.). These conclusions require that we affirm in part, and reverse in part, the judgment of the Court of Appeal. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On December 30, 1999, plaintiffs filed a complaint, which included a claim for qui tarn relief on behalf of the state, under the CFCA. (Gov. Code, § 12652, subd. (c)(1).) As provided by the CFCA in such cases, the complaint was filed under seal. (Gov. Code, § 12652, subd. (c)(2).) In July 2000, after the seal was lifted, the Attorney General noticed his election to intervene in, and proceed with, the CFCA action on behalf of the state. (Gov. Code, § 12652, subd. (c)(6).) On August 11, 2000, plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint (the complaint). As pertinent to the issues before us, the complaint alleged the following: At various times during 1997, 1998, and 1999, defendant One20ne Learning Foundation (0ne20ne), a Texas corporation, operated three charter schools in California through its California corporate alter ego, defendant Charter School Resource Alliance (CSRA). These schools included (1) defendant Sierra Summit Academy, Inc. (Sierra Summit Academy), operating as a California nonprofit corporation, and chartered by the Sierra Plumas Joint Unified School District (Sierra District) in Sierra County, (2) defendant Mattole Valley Charter School (Mattole Valley School), chartered by the Mattole Unified School District (Mattole District) in Humboldt County, and (3) defendant Camptonville Academy, Inc. (Camptonville Academy), operating as a California nonprofit corporation, and chartered by defendant Camptonville Union Elementary School District (Camptonville District) in Yuba County. Defendant Robert Carroll is One20ne’s president and chief executive officer. Defendant Jeff Bauer is Superintendent of the Sierra District. Defendant Carol Kennedy is the Director of Sierra Summit Academy. Defendant Richard Graey is Superintendent of the Mattole District and the Director of Mattole Valley School. Defendant Allen Wright is Superintendent and Principal of the Camptonville District. Defendant Janis Jablecky is the Director of Camptonville Academy. Each plaintiff was a minor student enrolled in one of defendant charter schools at some time during 1998 and/or 1999, or the parent and/or guardian of such a student. All plaintiffs were direct victims of One2Gne’s failure to provide promised instruction, testing, equipment, materials, and supplies. Like traditional public schools, charter schools are funded by the state based on ADA records. While charter schools have considerable freedom in their academic approach, they must meet statewide educational standards and use appropriately credentialed teachers. The chartering entity, usually a school district, has oversight responsibilities, and must revoke a school’s charter for fiscal mismanagement, material violation of the charter, failure to meet or pursue any of the educational outcomes set by the charter, failure to meet generally accepted accounting principles, or violation of law. Sierra Summit Academy, Mattole Valley School, and Camptonville Academy were operated as distance learning schools, in which students study at home, complete lessons on their computers, and transmit them via the Internet to the school. Students are also tested through the Internet. The charters and promotional literature for One20ne-operated schools promised to provide “ways and means” for students to achieve an education through distance learning, including the furnishing of computers, necessary software, and textbooks, and reimbursement of up to $100 per month for out-of-pocket educational expenses incurred by students or their parents or guardians. Each student was also to be assigned an “educational facilitator,” who was to devise a learning contract for the student, provide parents with a copy of the student’s curriculum goals, order necessary educational materials, and come to the student’s home a few hours per week for personal instruction, testing, and evaluation. Despite its promises, One20ne has failed to provide the enumerated equipment, supplies, and services, either to plaintiff students or to any of its enrollees. Its educational facilitators—who, on information and belief, are teaching outside their credentialed areas or are not credentialed at all—do not provide assessment, instruction, review, or curriculum, either online or in person. One20ne also fails to reimburse students, parents, and guardians for educational expenses. In some cases, parents actually pay One20ne for equipment and for educational materials and supplies, either because One20ne has failed to provide these items for free as promised, or because parents have exhausted their $100 per month expense allowance. Moreover, One20ne overbills for the educational materials and software it does provide. In particular, the educational software programs One20ne uses are available online for free, or for much less than One20ne charges. One2One aggressively recruits poor, rural districts to approve their charter schools, then enrolls students throughout the state for distance learning. In return for chartering its schools and allowing their operation, One20ne pays the districts administration fees in excess of those allowed by statute. Despite their oversight responsibilities, the districts enable One20ne to misuse public funds by turning a blind eye to the charter schools’ activities, and, for the most part, failing to take steps to monitor them. On the basis of allegations such as these, the complaint asserted causes of action against the charter school defendants for breach of contract (seventh cause of action) and intentional and negligent misrepresentation (fourth and fifth causes of action, respectively). Against the charter school and district defendants, it contained claims for mandamus and declaratory relief (third and 10th causes of action, respectively), and for violation of the free school, equal protection, and due process guarantees of the California Constitution (eighth and ninth causes of action, respectively). As to all defendants, it sought injunctive relief against misuse of taxpayer funds (second cause of action). Finally, the complaint included, (1) against the charter school and district defendants, a CFCA cause of action for qui tam relief, on behalf of the state, for the alleged submission of false and fraudulent claims for payment of state educational funds (first cause of action) and, (2) against the charter school defendants, an individual and representative claim under the UCL, alleging unfair and deceptive business practices in the operation of the schools (sixth cause of action). The CFCA cause of action asserted that the charter school defendants submitted false claims, within the meaning of this statute, by requesting funding from the districts and/or the state, “knowing that their ADA records did not accurately reflect the students enrolled in and receiving instruction, educational materials, or services from their schools.” (At another point, the complaint alleged more generally that 0ne20ne “fails to provide the education it promises but falsely collects State educational funds as if the education were provided”) The CFCA count also alleged that the charter school defendants falsely claimed ADA funds (1) for what was effectively independent study, though the schools were in violation of Education Code section 51747.3, subdivision (a), in that they provided money or other things of value to independent study pupils that were not provided to students attending regular classes, and (2) for independent study pupils who, in violation of subdivision (b) of the same section, resided outside the counties in which the respective schools were located, or adjacent counties. In the CFCA cause of action, the complaint alleged that the district defendants had submitted false claims on behalf of the charter schools, even though they “knew or deliberately or recklessly disregarded whether the public funds were being used for wrongful purposes.” Further, the complaint asserted, the district defendants wrongfully claimed funds for supervisory services beyond the limits set forth in the CSA. Aside from the injunctive and declaratory relief noted above, the complaint sought, among other things, (1) compensatory and punitive damages against the charter school defendants, and, (2) against the charter school and district defendants, restitution of funds falsely claimed and received, with treble damages and civil penalties as provided in the CFCA. Several defendants demurred. In November 2001, the trial court sustained, without leave to amend, the demurrers as to the first (CFCA), second (taxpayer injunctive relief), fourth (intentional misrepresentation), fifth (negligent misrepresentation), sixth (UCL), and seventh (breach of contract) causes of action. The court reasoned as follows: (1) All these counts are noncognizable private claims for “educational malfeasance.” (2) Because the charter school and district defendants are “public entities,” the CFCA, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation causes of action are subject to the TCA requirement of prior presentment of a claim for payment. (3) As “public entities,” the charter school defendants are not “persons” subject to suit under the UCL. (4) The taxpayer claim for injunctive relief is subject to the requirement of a prior claim for refund. (5) The CFCA claim for violation of the statutory restrictions on “independent study” programs fails, because those restrictions applied to charter schools only in and after 2000, and all the facts alleged in the complaint precede that date. All parties stipulated that (1) the trial court’s ruling on the demurrers was binding, as law of the case, on those defendants who had not demurred, (2) the remaining causes of action would be dismissed in order to facilitate appellate review, and (3) plaintiffs would dismiss the individual defendants. Judgment was entered accordingly. Plaintiffs appealed, urging that the CFCA, UCL, contract, and misrepresentation claims should not have been dismissed. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of dismissal. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the causes of action for breach of contract and misrepresentation are barred by the rule that private parties cannot sue public schools for “educational malfeasance.” The Court of Appeal also concurred that the charter school defendants, as part of the public school system, are “public entities,” and thus are not “persons” who may be sued under the UCL. On the other hand, the Court of Appeal held that the CFCA, unlike the UCL, does include public entities among the “persons” who may be sued. Hence, the Court of Appeal determined, charter schools and public school districts may be subject to private qui tarn actions under the CFCA. Moreover, the Court of Appeal reasoned, plaintiffs’ CFCA allegations—i.e., that the charter school and district defendants made or facilitated fraudulent claims to obtain state ADA funds for educational services that were not provided—are not a prohibited cause of action for “educational malfeasance.” Nor, the Court of Appeal concluded, must a qui tarn action under the CFCA be preceded by presentment of a claim for payment pursuant to the TCA. In this regard, the Court of Appeal noted that (1) the state is expressly exempt from the TCA’s “prior presentment” requirement (Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (z)), (2) a qui tarn plaintiff under the CFCA stands in the shoes of the state, and (3) application of a “prior presentment” requirement in this context would undermine the CFCA’s provision that qui tarn actions must initially be filed under seal, thus allowing the state to investigate, without prior warning to the alleged false claimant, before deciding whether to intervene in the action. Finally, however, the Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court that plaintiffs’ CFCA claim must fail insofar as it is based on allegations that the charter schools violated the “independent study” statute (Ed. Code, § 51747.3). Like the trial court, the Court of Appeal concluded that, while the complaint covered only acts done by the charter school defendants in the years 1998 and 1999, the “independent study” statute did not apply to charter schools until the year 2000. The Court of Appeal remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. We understand the effect of the Court of Appeal’s judgment to be that plaintiffs may proceed against both the district and charter school defendants on the CFCA cause of action—minus the allegations concerning violation of the statutory rules governing “independent study” programs—but may not proceed on the UCL, contract, or misrepresentation causes of action. Petitions for review were filed by defendants (1) One20ne, (2) CSRA, (3) the Mattole District and Graey, (4) Camptonville Academy and Jablecki, and (5) the Sierra District and Sierra Summit Academy. All challenged the Court of Appeal’s reinstatement of plaintiffs’ CFCA cause of action. The petitions variously argued that (1) the charter school and district defendants are “public entities,” and as such, are not “persons” subject to suit under the CFCA, (2) a qui tam action under the CFCA is subject to the “claim presentment” provisions of the TCA, and (3) the CFCA allegations are a disguised claim for “educational malfeasance.” Plaintiffs answered the petitions, urging, as additional issues, that (1) the restrictions on “independent study” programs imposed by Education Code section 51747.3 have applied to charter schools since that statute’s adoption in 1993 and (2) private nonprofit corporations operating charter schools are “persons” covered by the UCL. We granted review. As will appear, we agree with certain of the Court of Appeal’s holdings and disagree with others. We will therefore reverse in part the Court of Appeal’s judgment. DISCUSSION 1. The CSA. The CSA, as adopted in 1992 and since substantially amended, is intended to allow “teachers, parents, pupils, and community members to establish . . . schools that operate independently from the existing school district structure.” (Ed. Code, § 47601.) By this means, the CSA seeks to expand learning opportunities, encourage innovative teaching methods, provide expanded public educational choice, and promote educational competition and accountability within the public school system. (Ed. Code, § 47601, subds. (a)-(g).) If statutory requirements are met, public school authorities must grant the petition of interested persons for a charter to operate such a school within a public school district. (Ed. Code, § 47605.) For certain purposes, the school is “deemed to be a ‘school district’ ” (id., § 47612, subd. (c)), is “part of the Public School system” (id., § 47615, subd. (a)), falls under the “jurisdiction” of that system, and is subject to the “exclusive control” of public school officers (id., § 47615, subd. (a)(2); see § 47612, subd. (a)). (See Wilson v. State Bd. of Education (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1136-1142 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 745] (Wilson).) A charter school must operate under the terms of its charter, and must comply with the CSA and other specified laws, but is otherwise exempt from the laws governing school districts. (Ed. Code, § 47610.) A charter school may elect to operate as, or be operated by, a nonprofit corporation organized under the Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law. (Id., § 47604, subd. (a), as added by Stats. 1998, ch. 34, § 3.) A charter school is eligible for its share of state and local public education funds, which share is calculated primarily, as with all public schools, on the basis of its ADA. (Ed. Code, § 47612; see also id., § 47630 et seq.) Provisions added to the CSA since its original adoption enumerate certain oversight responsibilities of the chartering authority (Ed. Code, §§ 47612, 47604.32), and authorize that agency to charge the school supervisorial fees, within specified limits, for such services (id., § 47613). 2. The CFCA. The CFCA, which is patterned after a similar federal law, was adopted in 1987. (Stats. 1987, ch. 1420, § 1, p. 5237.) It provides that “[a]ny person” who, among other things, “[k]nowingly presents or causes to be presented to . . . the state or . . . any political subdivision thereof, a false claim for payment or approval,” or “[kjnowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used a false record or statement to get a false claim paid or approved by the state or by any political subdivision,” or “[cjonspires to defraud the state or any political subdivision by getting a false claim allowed or paid by the state or any political subdivision,” or “[i]s a beneficiary of an inadvertent submission of a false claim to the state or a political subdivision, subsequently discovers the falsity of the claim, and fails to disclose the false claim to the state or the political subdivision within a reasonable time after discovery [thereof],” “shall be liable to the state or to the political subdivision for three times the amount of damages” the state or political subdivision thereby sustained, as well as for the state’s or political subdivision’s costs of suit, and may also liable for a civil penalty of up to $10,000 for each false claim. (Gov. Code, § 12651, subd. (a)(l)-(3), (8).) The CFCA defines a “person” to “include[] any natural person, corporation, firm, association, organization, partnership, limited liability company, business, or trust.” (Gov. Code, § 12650, subd. (b)(5).) Where a “person” has submitted a false claim upon state funds, or upon both state and political subdivision funds, in violation of the CFCA, the Attorney General may sue that person to recover the damages and penalties provided by the statute. (Gov. Code, § 12652, subd. (a)(1).) Where the false claim was upon “political subdivision funds,” or upon both state and political subdivision funds, the “prosecuting authority” of the affected political subdivision may bring such an action. (Id., subd. (b)(1).) When either the Attorney General or the local prosecuting authority unilaterally initiates an action involving both state and political subdivision funds, the other affected official or officials must be notified. If the Attorney General initiates such an action, the local prosecuting authority may, upon receiving notice, intervene. If the local prosecuting attorney is the initiator, the Attorney General may, upon notice, elect to assume responsibility for the action, though the local prosecuting authority may continue as a party. (Gov. Code, § 12652, subds. (a)(2), (3), (b)(2), (3).) A CFCA action may also be initiated by a “person,” as a “qui tam” plaintiff, for and in the name of the state or the political subdivision whose funds are involved. (Gov. Code, § 12652, subd. (c)(1), (3).) The complaint in such an action shall be filed in camera, and may remain under seal for up to 60 days. While the complaint remains sealed, “[n]o service shall be made on the defendant.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) The qui tam plaintiff must immediately notify the Attorney General of the suit and disclose to him all material evidence and information the plaintiff possesses. If the qui tam complaint involves only state funds, the Attorney General may, within the 60-day period or extensions thereof, elect to intervene and proceed with the action. If political subdivision funds alone are involved, the Attorney General must forward the qui tam complaint to the local prosecuting authority, who may elect to intervene and proceed with the action. If both state and political subdivision funds are involved, the Attorney General and the local prosecuting authority are to coordinate their investigation and review. Either official, or both of them, may then elect to intervene and proceed with the action. If these officials decline to proceed, the qui tam plaintiff shall have the right to conduct the action. (Gov. Code, § 12652, subd. (c)(4)-(8).) If state or local officials intervene, they may assume control of the action, but the qui tam plaintiff may remain as a party. (Id., subd. (e)(1).) A substantial portion of the proceeds of any settlement or court award in a CFCA action—as much as 66 percent—does not revert to the general coffers of the state or the political subdivision against which the false claim was submitted. Instead, a significant “cut” of these proceeds goes to those who pursued the action on behalf of the defrauded entity. Thus, if the Attorney General or a local prosecuting authority initiated a CFCA action, that officer is entitled to a fixed 33 percent of the proceeds of the action, or settlement thereof. Where a local prosecuting authority intervened in an action initiated by the Attorney General, the court may award the local prosecuting authority a portion of the Attorney General’s 33 percent, as appropriate to the local authority’s role in conducting the action. If, in an action brought by a qui tam plaintiff, the Attorney General or the local prosecuting authority proceeds with the action, that official receives a fixed 33 percent of the proceeds, and the qui tam plaintiff receives from 15 to 33 percent, depending on his or her litigation role. Where both the Attorney General and a local prosecuting authority are involved in a qui tam action, the court may award the latter officer a portion of the Attorney General’s 33 percent, depending on the role played by the local prosecutor. If neither the Attorney General nor the local prosecuting authority elects to proceed with the action, the qui tam plaintiff may receive between 25 and 50 percent of the proceeds. (Gov. Code, § 12652, subd. (g).) The CFCA’s remedies are cumulative to any others provided by statute or common law. (Gov. Code, § 12655, subd. (a).) Further, its provisions “shall be liberally construed and applied to promote the public interest.” (Id., subd. (c).) 3. The UCL. As pertinent here, the UCL provides for relief by civil lawsuit against “[a]ny person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17203.) “Unfair competition” is defined to include “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising . . . .” (Id., § 17200.) An action for injunctive relief, which relief may include orders necessary “to restore to any person in interest any money or property . . . acquired by means of such unfair competition” (id., § 17203), may be brought (1) by the Attorney General or a specified local prosecuting officer “upon their own complaint or upon the complaint of any board, officer, person, corporation, or association,” or (2) “by any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of such unfair competition” (id., § 17204). For purposes of the UCL, “the term person shall mean and include natural persons, corporations, firms, partnerships, joint stock companies, associations and other organizations of persons.” (Id., § 17201.) Except as otherwise specifically provided, the UCL’s remedies are “cumulative to each other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.” (Id., § 17205.) 4. May a public school district be sued under the CFCA? The Court of Appeal held that both the district and charter school defendants are “persons” subject to suit under the CFCA. The district defendants insist that they are not “persons” for purposes of this statute. For reasons that will appear, we agree with the district defendants. We apply well-settled principles of statutory construction. Our task is to discern the Legislature’s intent. The statutory language itself is the most reliable indicator, so we start with the statute’s words, assigning them their usual and ordinary meanings, and construing them in context. If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute’s plain meaning governs. On the other hand, if the language allows more than one reasonable construction, we may look to such aids as the legislative history of the measure and maxims of statutory construction. In cases of uncertain meaning, we may also consider the consequences of a particular interpretation, including its impact on public policy. (E.g., MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412, 426 [30 Cal.Rptr.3d 755, 115 P.3d 41]; People v. Smith (2004) 32 Cal.4th 792, 797-798 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 290, 86 P.3d 348].) As noted, the CFCA defines covered “persons” to “include[] any natural person, corporation, firm, association, organization, partnership, limited liability company, business, or trust.” (Gov. Code, § 12650, subd. (b)(5).) We observe at the outset that while this list is not necessarily comprehensive, the only words and phrases it uses are those most commonly associated with private individuals and entities. While, in the broadest sense, a school district might be considered an “association” or an “organization,” the statutory list of “persons” contains no words or phrases most commonly used to signify public school districts, or, for that matter, any other public entities or governmental agencies. Yet the statute makes very specific reference to governmental entities in other contexts. Thus, it provides that any “person” who presents a false claim to the “state or [a] political subdivision” is liable to such entity for two or three times the damage thereby sustained. (Gov. Code, § 12651, subds. (a), (b).) A “political subdivision” is defined to include “any city, city and county, county, tax or assessment district, or other legally authorized local government entity with jurisdictional boundaries.” (Id., § 12650, subd. (b)(3).) The specific enumeration of state and local governmental entities in one context, but not in the other, weighs heavily against a conclusion that the Legislature intended to include public school districts as “persons” exposed to CFCA liability. In other contexts, the Legislature has demonstrated that similar definitions of “persons” do not include public entities, and that legislators know how to include such entities directly when they intend to do so. For example, under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.), a “person” is defined to “include[] one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, limited liability companies, legal representatives, trastees, trastees in bankruptcy, and receivers or other fiduciaries.” (Id., § 12925, subd. (d).) FEHA provides that an “ ‘[ejmployer’ includes any person regularly employing five or more persons, or any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, the state or any political or civil subdivision of the state, and cities,” except as otherwise specified. (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (d), italics added.) This conceptual separation of “persons” from governmental entities in FEHA is an additional indication that the CFCA’s definition of “person” does not include public entities. The legislative history of the CFCA contains no explicit discussion of the scope of the word “person.” Nonetheless, the limited evidence available suggests there was no intent to include school districts and other public and governmental agencies. As originally introduced on March 4, 1987, Assembly Bill No. 1441 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 1441), which in final form became the CFCA, explicitly included, as covered “persons,” “any person, firm, association, organization, partnership, business trust, corporation, company, district, county, city and county, city, the state, and any of the agencies and political subdivisions of these entities.” (Italics added.) A substantial subsequent amendment to the bill excised the references to governmental entities, and the definition of “person” was changed to the form finally adopted. (Assem. Bill No. 1441, as amended in Assem. (Apr. 29, 1987) § 1; see Stats. 1987, ch. 1420, § 1, pp. 5237, 5238.) Our past decisions note deletions from bills prior to their passage as significant indicia of legislative intent. (E.g., Sierra Club v. California Coastal Com. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 839, 852 [28 Cal.Rptr.3d 316, 111 P.3d 294]; People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 240-242 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 205, 980 P.2d 912]; but cf. American Financial Services Assn. v. City of Oakland (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1239, 1261-1262 [23 Cal.Rptr.3d 453, 104 P.3d 813].) A traditional rule of statutory construction is that, absent express words to the contrary, governmental agencies are not included within the general words of a statute. (E.g., Estate of Miller (1936) 5 Cal.2d 588, 597 [55 P.2d 491]; Balthasar v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. (1921) 187 Cal. 302, 305 [202 P. 37].) However, plaintiffs and their amici curiae invoke a more recent exception to this principle, i.e., that government agencies are excluded from the operation of general statutory provisions “only if their inclusion would result in an infringement upon sovereign governmental powers. . . . Pursuant to this principle, governmental agencies have been held subject to legislation which, by its terms, applies simply to any ‘person.’ [Citations.]” (City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199, 276-277 [123 Cal.Rptr. 1, 537 P.2d 1250]; see also, e.g., Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 933 [101 Cal.Rptr. 568, 496 P.2d 480] (Nestle); Flournoy v. State of California (1962) 57 Cal.2d 497, 498-499 [20 Cal.Rptr. 627, 370 P.2d 331]; Hoyt v. Board of Civil Service Commrs. (1942) 21 Cal.2d 399, 402 [132 P.2d 804].) In at least one instance, this premise was applied to a statutory definition of covered “persons” somewhat like that used in the CECA. (State of California v. Marin Mun. W. Dist. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 699, 704 [111 P.2d 651] [county held subject to statute allowing Department of Public Works to order “any person” to move his pipeline as necessary for public safety or highway improvement; statute defined “person” to include “ ‘any person, firm, partnership, association, corporation, organization, or business trust,’ ” and did not expressly name governmental entities].) In LeVine I, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 758, the Court of Appeal held that the defendant school district was a “person” within the scope of the CECA, and was thus subject to CECA provisions prohibiting retaliation against an employee for reporting a false claim or furthering a false claims action (Gov. Code, § 12653, subd. (b)). Invoking the “rule that governmental agencies are excluded from the general provisions of a statute only if their inclusion would result in an infringement upon sovereign powers,” the Court of Appeal declined to find that the CECA would cause such infringement. (LeVine I, supra, at p. 765.) The Court of Appeal reasoned that “no governmental agency has the power, sovereign or otherwise, knowingly to present a false claim.” (Ibid..) In the case before us, the instant Court of Appeal employed a similar analysis. We disagree with the ultimate conclusion of LeVine I. In the first place, the premise that public entities are statutory “persons” unless their sovereign powers would be infringed is simply a maxim of statutory construction. While the “sovereign powers” principle can help resolve an unclear legislative intent, it cannot override positive indicia of a contrary legislative intent. As we have explained, the language, structure, and history of the particular statute before us—the CFCA—strongly suggest that public entities, including public school districts, are not “persons” subject to suit under the law’s provisions. On that basis alone, we are persuaded that governmental agencies, including the district defendants in this case, may not be sued under California’s false claims statute. Moreover, we do not agree with LeVine 7’s analysis of the “sovereign power” question. Of course school districts have no “sovereign” power or right to submit false claims against the public treasury. Nonetheless, we cannot accept LeVine 7’s determination that application of the CFCA to public school districts would infringe no sovereign powers. As we will explain, in light of the stringent revenue, appropriations, and budget restraints under which all California governmental entities operate, exposing them to the draconian liabilities of the CFCA would significantly impede their fiscal ability to carry out their core public missions. In the particular case of public school districts, such exposure would interfere with the state’s plenary power and duty, exercised at the local level by the individual districts, to provide the free public education mandated by the Constitution. The People, by initiative, have put all agencies of government, including school districts, on a strict fiscal diet by adding provisions to the California Constitution that limit their power to tax and spend. Article XIII A, section 1, “places a general ceiling on the ad valorem property taxes which may be levied on behalf of local governments and school districts. [Citation].” (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 691, fn. 17 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 480, 842 P.2d 1240] (Butt).) Article XIII A also bans other new local taxes levied by, or for the specific benefit of, school and other special districts except as approved by a two-thirds majority of the voters. (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 4; see Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 13-15 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 490, 820 P.2d 1000]; Hoogasian Flowers, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1282-1284 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 686].) At the state level, article XIII A forbids the enactment of any new ad valorem real property tax, and prohibits all increases in state taxes except by a two-thirds vote of each house of the Legislature. (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, §3.) Article Xin B generally limits the annual appropriations of state and local governments to the prior years’ appropriations as adjusted for the cost of living. (Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 1.) Under this constitutional provision, these limits may be changed only by vote of the affected electorate. (Id., § 4.) Public school districts face an additional restriction on their ability to tax and spend for their educational mission. Because disparities in school funding levels based on the comparative wealth of local districts violate the equal protection clause of the California Constitution (see Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728 [135 Cal.Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929]; Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584 [96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241]), the Legislature has adopted a strict system of equalized funding (Ed. Code, § 42238 et seq.), under which, as noted above, “the amount of property tax revenues a district can raise, with other specific local revenues, [is] coupled with an equalization payment by the state, thus bringing each district into a rough [per student] equivalency of revenues.” (56 Cal.Jur.3d, supra, Schools, § 7, p. 198, fns. omitted.) “In obedience to Serrano principles, the current system of public school finance largely eliminates the ability of local districts, rich or poor, to increase local ad valorem property taxes to fund current operations at a level exceeding their [s]tate-equalized revenue per average daily attendance. [Citation.]” (Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th 668, 691, fn. 17.) School districts must use the limited funds at their disposal to carry out the state’s constitutionally mandated duty to provide a system of public education. The Constitution requires, and makes the Legislature responsible for providing, “a system of common schools by which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each district . . . .” (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 5.) The Legislature has chosen to implement this “fundamental” guarantee through local school districts with a considerable degree of local autonomy, but it is well settled that the state retains plenary power over public education. (Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th 668, 680-681.) Hence, there can be no doubt that public education is among the state’s most basic sovereign powers. Laws that divert limited educational funds from this core function are an obvious interference with the effective exercise of that power. Were the CFCA applied to public school districts, it would constitute such a law. If found hable under the CFCA, school districts, like other CFCA defendants, could face judgments—payable from their limited funds—of at least two, and usually three, times the damage caused by each false submission, plus civil penalties of up to $10,000 for each false claim, plus costs of suit. Such exposure, disproportionate to the harm caused to the treasury, could jeopardize a district financially for years to come. It would injure the districts’ blameless students far more than it would benefit the public fisc, or even the hard-pressed taxpayers who finance public education. The Legislature is aware of the stringent revenue, budget, and appropriations limitations affecting all agencies of government—and public school districts in particular. Given these conditions, we cannot lightly presume an intent to force such entities not only to make whole the fellow agencies they defrauded, but also to pay huge additional amounts, often into the pockets of outside parties. Such a diversion of limited taxpayer funds would interfere significantly with government agencies’ fiscal ability to carry out their public missions. We note that “ ‘[t]he ultimate puipose of the [CFCA] is to protect the public fisc.’ ” (State of California v. Altus Finance (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1284, 1297 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 498, 116 P.3d 1175].) Given that school district finances are largely dependent on and intertwined with state financial aid (see Belanger v. Madera Unified School Dist. (9th Cir. 1992) 963 F.2d 248, 251-252 (Belanger)), the assessment of double and treble damages, as well as other penalties, to school districts would not advance that purpose. Of course, where liability otherwise exists, public entities must pay legal judgments from their limited revenues and appropriations, even if they cannot exceed their tax or appropriations ceilings to do so and must therefore cut spending in other areas. (See Gov. Code, § 970 et seq.; Ventura Group Ventures, Inc. v. Ventura Port Dist. (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1089, 1098-1100 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 53, 16 P.3d 717].) This obligation, in and of itself, does not infringe their “sovereign powers.” But we may consider the effect on sovereign powers when we are determining whether the Legislature intended, by mere implication, to expose a public entity to a particular statutory liability. For the reasons we have detailed, we conclude the Legislature did not intend to subject financially constrained school districts—or any agency of state or local government—to the treble-damages-plus-penalties provisions of the CFCA. We conclude that such entities are not “persons” subject to suit under that statute. We disapprove LeVine v. Weis, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 758, and LeVine v. Weis, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 201, to the extent they hold otherwise. Our analysis is not affected by two United States Supreme Court decisions construing the federal false claims statute (FFCA; 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq.)—the model for California's law. In Stevens, supra, 529 U.S. 765, the high court majority held that the several states (including agencies of state governments) are not “persons” subject to qui tam actions under the FFCA. On the other hand, a different majority later concluded in Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler (2003) 538 U.S. 119 [155 L.Ed.2d 247, 123 S.Ct. 1239] (Chandler) that certain local governmental entities, including cities and counties, are “persons” subject to such suits. The parties hotly dispute whether California school districts are “state” agencies, as to which Stevens might be persuasive, or local governmental entities that should fall, by analogy, under the rule of Chandler. However, we find little in either case of direct relevance to the issue before us. Both decisions construe a federal statute which, in respects material here, is distinct from its California counterpart. Moreover, both cases apply federal principles of statutory construction that differ from those used in this state. The FFCA was originally adopted in 1863 to confront massive contractor fraud during the Civil War. (Stevens, supra, 529 U.S. 765, 781.) As enacted and since amended, the federal statute, like California’s, makes “persons” liable for submitting false claims to the government (31 U.S.C. § 3729), but, unlike the California statute, the federal version includes no definition of covered “persons.” In Stevens, the majority noted that the statute had never indicated it applied to states. Thus, the majority applied a “longstanding interpretive presumption,” for purposes of federal law, “that ‘person’ does not include the sovereign. [Citations.]” (Stevens, supra, at p. 780.) Further, the Stevens majority pointed to a separate section of the FFCA— one also with no California parallel—allowing the Attorney General to serve civil investigative demands upon “persons.” (31 U.S.C. § 3733(a)(1).) As the majority observed, “persons” were defined, for purposes of that section, to include the state (id., § 3733(Z)(4)), thus suggesting states were excluded for other purposes. (Stevens, supra, 529 U.S. 765, 783-784.) The majority also cited a similar federal law, the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1986 (PFCRA), which was adopted just prior to the substantial 1986 amendments to the federal false claims act, and carried lesser penalties. As the majority noted, the PFCRA contains a definition of “persons” that does not include states. It would be anomalous, the majority concluded, for Congress to subject states—generally considered immune from “punitive” damages—to the greater false-claims penalties but not the lesser ones provided by the PFCRA. (Stevens, supra, at pp. 786-787.) In Chandler, a qui tam plaintiff brought a federal false claims action against the county owner-operator of a hospital, alleging that the hospital submitted falsified compliance documents to obtain federal research funds. The county moved to dismiss, asserting it was not a “person” covered by the FFCA. On authority of Stevens, the district court agreed and dismissed the action. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Stevens did not apply to the county. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. In distinguishing Stevens, as had the court of appeals, the Chandler majority applied a different presumption of federal statutory construction— one also in effect since the Civil War inception of the FFCA. This presumption, the majority explained, is that, where not specifically defined, the word “person” encompasses “artificial persons” such as “corporations” (Chandler, supra, 538 U.S. 119, 125-126), including both “full-fledged municipal corporations,” such as towns and cities, that were incorporated at the request of their inhabitants, and “quasi-corporations,” such as counties, that were created unilaterally by the state (id., at p. 127, fn. 7). The Chandler majority acknowledged that the 1986 amendments had added treble-damage and penalty provisions to the Civil War-era statute, and also conceded the presumption against subjecting government entities to “punitive” damages. However, the Chandler majority observed, there were remedial, nonpunitive aspects to the 1986 damages and penalty provisions. In any event, the majority concluded, given the strong presumption against repeal by implication, the modem addition of arguably “punitive” damages to the FFCA could not be considered a silent reversal of the historical assumption that this statute includes municipalities. (Chandler, supra, 538 U.S. 119, 129-134.) As noted above, when the issue is whether government entities are “persons” covered by a particular statutory scheme, California courts apply interpretive principles somewhat different from those detailed in Stevens and Chandler. Under California law, absent contrary indicia of legislative intent, statutory “persons” are deemed to include governmental entities, both state and local, unless such inclusion would infringe the entities’ exercise of their sovereign powers and duties. California’s false claims statute, unlike the federal version, defines covered “persons,” and does so in a way that suggests an intent not to include government entities. Other indicia of legislative purpose also support this conclusion. And for reasons we have detailed, application of the CFCA’s treble-damages-plus-penalties requirement to public school districts would place severe and disproportionate financial constraints on their ability to provide the free education mandated by the Constitution—a result the Legislature cannot have intended. Nothing in Stevens or Chandler changes our conclusions in this regard. Equally beside the point are federal and California decisions holding that California school districts are “arms of the state,” and thus enjoy the state’s sovereign immunity, under the Eleventh Amendment, from suits in federal court. (E.g., Belanger, supra, 963 F.2d 248, 250-251 [civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983]; Kirchmann v. Lake Elsinore Unified School Dist. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1100-1102, 1105-1115 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 289] [entity with 11th Amend, immunity also enjoys immunity from state court suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983]; also cf. U.S. ex rel. Ali v. Daniel, Mann, Johnson (9th Cir. 2004) 355 F.3d 1140, 1147 [five-pronged “arm of the state” test is appropriate for determining whether government entity enjoys immunity from federal false claims liability under Stevens].) When we decide whether the California Legislature intended a California statute to include or exclude California government entities, we are not concerned with issues of federalism, constitutional or statutory. Nothing in decisions addressing such issues precludes us from holding, for the reasons we have explained, that there was no legislative intent to apply the CFCA to public school districts. We conclude that neither such districts, nor any other agencies of state and local government, are “persons” subject to suit under the CFCA. 5. May charter schools and their operators be sued under the CFCA? Though we have disagreed with the Court of Appeal about whether the district defendants are “persons” subject to CFCA actions, we have little difficulty upholding the Court of Appeal’s determination that the charter school defendants are “persons” who may be liable under the CFCA. The CFCA expressly defines “persons” to include “corporations” and “limited liability companies,” as well as, among other things, “organizations” and “associations.” (Gov. Code, § 12650, subd. (b)(5).) The statute includes no exemption, either in the definitional section or elsewhere, for “corporations” organized under the Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law (Corp. Code, § 5110), or for “corporations,” “limited liability companies,” “organizations,” or “associations” that operate charter schools under the CSA. The instant complaint alleges, and apparently there is no dispute, that defendants One2Gne, CSRA, Sierra Summit Academy, and Camptonville Academy are corporations. Moreover, Mattole Valley School, though apparently not itself a corporation, is alleged to be operated by corporations, and is certainly an “organization” within the meaning of the statutory definition. Nonetheless, the charter school defendants insist that, by virtue of the CSA, they are entitled to any “public entity” immunity enjoyed by their chartering districts. The charter school defendants point to various declarations in the CSA that charter schools are “part of the Public School System, as defined in [ajrticle IX of the California Constitution” (Ed. Code, § 47615, subd. (a)(1)), are “under the jurisdiction of the Public School System and the exclusive control of the officers of the public schools” (id., subd. (a)(2)), and, for specified purposes of funding, are “deemed to be . . . ‘school district[s]’ ” (id., § 47612, subd. (c); see also id., § 47650). We are not persuaded. Though charter schools are deemed part of the system of public schools for purposes of academics and state fiinding eligibility, and are subject to some oversight by public school officials (see Wilson, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1136-1142), the charter schools here are operated, not by the public school system, but by distinct outside entities— which the parties characterize as nonprofit corporations—that are given substantial freedom to achieve academic results free of interference by the public educational bureaucracy. The sole relationship between the charter school operators and the chartering districts in this case is through the charters governing the schools’ operation. Except in specified respects, charter schools and their operators are “exempt from the laws governing school districts.” (Ed. Code, § 47610.) The autonomy, and independent responsibility, of charter school operators extend, in considerable degree, to financial matters. Thus, where a charter school is operated by a nonprofit public benefit corporation, the chartering authority is not liable for the school’s debts and obligations. (Ed. Code, § 47604, subd. (c).) A 2003 amendment to the CSA makes clear that the chartering authority’s immunity from financial liability for a charter school extends to “claims arising from the performance of acts, errors, or omissions by the . . . school, if the authority has complied with all oversight responsibilities required by law.” (Ed. Code, § 47604, subd. (c).) The CECA was designed to help the government recover public funds of which it was defrauded by outside entities with which it deals. There can be little doubt the CECA applies generally to nongovernmental entities that contract with state and local governments to provide services on their behalf. The statutory purpose is equally served by applying the CECA to the independent corporations that receive public monies under the CSA to operate the schools at issue here on behalf of the public education system. On the other hand, we conclude, the sovereign power over public education is not infringed by application of the CECA, including its treble-damages-plus-penalties provisions, to the charter school operators in this case. As we have seen, public school districts are the entities fundamentally responsible for operating the system of free public education required by the Constitution. The districts’ continuing financial ability to carry out this mission at basic levels of adequacy is thus critical to satisfying the state’s free public school obligation. (See Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th 668, 678-692.) Accordingly, we have concluded that the Legislature did not intend to undermine this sovereign obligation by exposing public school districts to the harsh monetary sanctions of the CECA. But the CSA assigns no similar sovereign significance to charter schools or their operators. Under that statute, the term of a charter cannot exceed five years, subject to renewal. (Ed. Code, § 47607, subd. (a)(1).) The grant and renewal of charters are dependent upon satisfaction of statutory requirements, including attainment of specific educational goals. (Id., subds. (b), (c); see also id., § 47605.) A charter may be revoked for material violations of the law or charter, failure to meet pupil achievement goals, or fiscal mismanagement. (Id., § 47607, subd. (d).) If a charter school ceases to exist, its pupils are reabsorbed into the district’s mainstream public schools, and the ADA revenues previously allotted to the charter school for those pupils revert to the district. The CSA was adopted to widen the range of educational choices available within the public school system. That is a salutary policy. Yet application of the CFCA’s monetary remedies, however harsh, to the charter school defendants presents no fundamental threat to maintenance, within the affected districts, of basically adequate free public educational services. Thus, application of the CFCA to the charter school operators in this case cannot be said to infringe the exercise of the sovereign power over public education. This being so, there is no reason to conclude that the charter school defendants are not “persons” within the definition expressly set forth in the CFCA. In our view, they are such “persons,” and they may be held liable under the terms of that statute if they submit false claims for state or district educational funds. 6. May charter schools and their operators be sued under the UCL? The Court of Appeal determined that the charter school defendants are not “persons” subject to suit under the UCL. But reasons similar to those applicable under the CFCA persuade us the Court of Appeal erred in this respect. In language similar to the CFCA’s, the UCL defines “persons” subject to that law to “mean and include natural persons, corporations, firms, partnerships, joint stock companies, associations and other organizations of persons.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17201.) The charter school defendants either are, or are operated by, corporations, and they also constitute “associations” or “organizations.” They are within the plain meaning of the statute. Noting that several cases have held government entities are not “persons” who may be sued under the UCL (e.g., Community Memorial Hospital v. County of Ventura (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 199, 209 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 732] (Community Memorial)', see also People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. California Milk Producers Advisory Bd. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 871, 877-883 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 900]; California Medical Assn. v. Regents of University of California (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 542, 551 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 194]; Trinkle v. California State Lottery (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1203-1204 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 496]; Janis v. California State Lottery Com. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 824, 831 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 549]; Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. v. Bluvshtein (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 308, 318 [281 Cal.Rptr. 298]; but see Notrica v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 911, 939-945 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 89]), the charter school defendants insist they are entitled, as part of the public school system, to this “public entity” exemption. The Court of Appeal agreed. We do not. As we have indicated, the charter schools here are operated, pursuant to the CSA, by corporations that, for purposes of the CFCA, do not qualify as public entities. Though, by statutory mandate, these institutions are an alternative form of public schools financed by public education funds, they and their operators are largely free and independent of management and oversight by the public education bureaucracy. Indeed, the charter schools compete with traditional public schools for students, and they receive funding based on the number of students they recruit and retain at the expense of the traditional system. Insofar as their operators use deceptive business practices to further these efforts, the purposes of the UCL are served by subjecting them to the provisions of that statute. Nor is the state’s sovereign educational function thereby undermined. Even if governmental entities, in the exercise of their sovereign functions, are exempt from the UCL’s restrictions on their competitive practices (see Community Memorial, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 199, 209-211 [county was not “person” for purposes of UCL, such that county hospital’s treatment of paying patients in competition with private hospitals would be subject to statute]), no reason appears to apply that principle to the charter school defendants, which are covered by the plain terms of the statute and which compete with the traditional public schools for students and funding. We conclude that the charter school defendants are “persons” covered by the UCL. 7. Did statutory restrictions on independent study programs apply to charter schools before Education Code section 51747.3 was amended in 1999? The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that plaintiffs may not pursue, as part of their CECA cause of action, allegations that the charter school defendants claimed ADA funding in violation of the “independent study” requirements of Education Code section 51747.3. The appellate court reasoned that section 51747.3 applied to charter schools only after a 1999 amendment, effective in 2000, and that all the