Full opinion text
Opinion PANELLI, J. This case arises out of a request by the Joint Apprenticeship Committee of the Southern California Chapter of Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. (hereafter ABC-JAC), a nonunion group of contractors, for state approval of an apprenticeship program to be operated in certain areas of the state where programs affiliated with unions, the Riverside and San Bernardino Electrical Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committees and the Orange County Electrical Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee (hereafter existing programs), are already operating. The existing programs objected to approval of the ABC-JAC program. The request for approval was ultimately denied by the state administrative authorities on the ground that the operation of the new program would violate title 8, California Code of Regulations, section 212.2, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 212.2(a)), which prohibits the approval of new programs that adversely affect existing programs. During writ proceedings in the superior court, the question of preemption by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.) (hereafter ERISA) of certain state laws and regulations relating to the approval process for apprenticeship programs was raised. We granted review in this case and limited the issues to be considered in order to address the question of “the effect of [ERISA] on the power of the California Apprenticeship Council and the Chief of the Division of Apprenticeship Standards of the Department of Industrial Relations to approve or disapprove apprenticeship programs.” We subsequently requested briefing on the following related issue: “Assuming that the question of whether the California Apprenticeship Council and the Chief of the Division of Apprenticeship Standards of the Department of Industrial Relations retain all or some of their powers to approve or disapprove apprenticeship programs is answered in the affirmative, is [title] 8[,] California Code of Regulations, section 212.2, subdivision (a) preempted by [ERISA]?” Thus, we must consider the relationship between ERISA preemption and the federal and state laws and regulations that govern apprenticeship training programs. We conclude that the state’s general authority to approve apprenticeship programs falls within the scope of ERISA’s preemption clause, but that this authority is saved from preemption by virtue of the general savings clause of that statute and the fact that it is explicitly provided for in the federal laws and regulations governing apprenticeship programs. We also conclude that section 212.2(a) falls within the scope of ERISA’s preemption clause. Moreover, this subdivision, to the extent that it sets forth a requirement for approval of apprenticeship programs that is completely independent of those set forth by federal laws and regulations, does not fall within the scope of ERISA’s general savings clause and, thus, cannot be relied upon by the state to deny Fitzgerald Act (29 U.S.C. § 50) approval to the ABC-JAC program or any other apprenticeship program. I. Background A. The Request for Approval and the Proceedings Below The Southern California Chapter of the Association of Building Contractors, Inc. (hereafter ABC) is an association of nonunion contractors. The ABC decided to sponsor an apprenticeship program for the training of construction electricians. As is customary, the ABC established a joint apprenticeship training committee (hereafter JAC) to administer the program and created a trust to provide funding for the program through contributions from participating ABC employers. In April 1988, the ABC-JAC sought state approval of its new program, which was to be operated in three counties of the state where existing, union-affiliated programs were already operating. While neither federal nor state approval is required for a sponsor to operate an apprenticeship program, strong financial incentives exist at both the state and federal levels for sponsors to obtain approval. For example, only apprentices participating in an approved apprenticeship program may be paid wages lower than the applicable journeyman wage on federal and state public works projects. (29 C.F.R. § 29.2(k) (1992); Lab. Code, § 1777.5.) As the Ninth Circuit has observed: “In order for such an apprenticeship program to work, it is essential that the employer be able to pay lesser wages to the apprentices while they are in training.” (Electrical Joint Apprenticeship Com. v. MacDonald (9th Cir. 1991) 949 F.2d 270, 274 [hereafter MacDonald], cert. denied _ U.S. _ [120 L.Ed.2d 869, 112 S.Ct. 2991].) In California, additional financial incentives exist in the form of direct financial subsidies for training provided by approved programs. (Lab. Code, §§ 3074, 3074.7; Ed. Code, § 8152.) Finally, an apprentice who completes an approved training program obtains a certificate of completion naming him or her a skilled journeyman in the chosen trade, and hence increases his or her marketability as well as the marketability of his or her employer contractor. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 224.) After reviewing the proposed standards for the ABC-JAC program, the Chief of the Division found that the proposed program met all relevant requirements and approved the ABC-JAC program. The existing programs objected to approval of the ABC-JAC program primarily on the grounds that there was no need for the program (Lab. Code, § 3075) and that the operation of the new program would adversely affect the existing prevailing conditions in the area in violation of section 212.2(a). As provided for under California law, the existing programs appealed the decision of the Chief of the Division to the California Apprenticeship Council (hereafter Council). (See, post, at p. 434.) The Council reversed the decision on the ground that the difference in wages and fringe benefits between the ABC-JAC program and the existing programs would adversely impact the existing programs, especially with respect to their ability to compete for private projects. In December 1988, the ABC-JAC sought a writ of mandate in the superior court to direct the Council to vacate its decision. In April 1989, the superior court granted the first petition for writ of mandate, ruling that the Council did not have before it substantial evidence of any threat to the existing programs posed by competition from the ABC-JAC program. The superior court also rejected the argument that sections 208, 212, and 212.2 of title 8 of the California Code of Regulations, which set forth requirements for program approval and for compensation of apprentices, were preempted under ERISA, finding that to rule otherwise would impair the enforcement of the federal apprenticeship laws and regulations. The Council conducted further proceedings in light of the superior court’s writ. In July 1989, without taking any further evidence, the Council ruled again—this time upholding the decision approving the ABC-JAC program. The existing programs then sought a writ of mandate from the superior court, contending the Council had misinterpreted the court’s instructions. In October 1989, the superior court agreed with the existing programs and remanded the matter yet again to the Council, directing it to prepare a written report stating the basis for its most recent decision in favor of the ABC-JAC program. In January 1990, the Council issued a written decision, in which it returned to its original position and reversed the decision approving the ABC-JAC program. In February 1990, the ABC-JAC sought a third writ of mandate from the superior court. In March 1990, the superior court granted the petition for the third writ of mandate, reversing the Council yet again. The existing programs and the Council timely appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the superior court and ruled in the alternative in pertinent part that: 1) the Council’s decision, reversing approval of the ABC-JAC program on the basis of section 212.2(a), was preempted by ERISA and 2) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. In deciding the ERISA issue, the Court of Appeal wrote: “We cannot reconcile the Council’s position, that it retains the power under state law to prevent employee benefit plans from providing benefits except pursuant to the Council’s regulatory dictates, with decisions by the Ninth Circuit in Hydro-storage [v. Northern Cal. Boilermakers (9th Cir. 1989) 891 F.2d 719, cert. denied (1990) 498 U.S. 822 (112 L.Ed 2d 46, 111 S.Ct. 72)], the Third District in [Operating Engineers & Participating Employees Etc. Fund v.] Weiss [Bros. Construction Co. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 867 [270 Cal.Rptr. 786], cert. denied (1991) _ U.S. _ (113 L.Ed. 2d 268, 111 S.Ct. 1337)], and the Eighth Circuit in Boise Cascade [Corp. v. Peterson (8th Cir. 1991) 939 F.2d 632, cert. denied (1992) _ U.S. _ (120 L.Ed.2d 887, 112 S.Ct. 3014)], which squarely reject those arguments. Those decisions held that state laws on apprenticeship, and the Council’s authority pursuant thereto to prevent apprenticeship programs from varying from its directives, ‘relate to’ employee benefit plans and are not saved from preemption by any relevant exception.” The existing programs, the Council and the Chief of the Division petitioned this court for review of the decision of the Court of Appeal on the ERISA preemption issue claiming that the decision of the Court of Appeal conflicted with recent federal decisions, including MacDonald, supra, 949 F.2d 270, and Dillingham Const. N.A., Inc. v. County of Sonoma (N.D.Cal. 1991) 778 F.Supp. 1522, appeal pending Ninth Circuit (Dock. No. 92-15247), and, as a result, left the Council and the Chief of the Division unable to ascertain the scope of their authority to continue to approve and disapprove apprenticeship programs. We granted review limited to the issues previously specified. B. Apprenticeship Law A brief review of the federal and state statutes and regulations governing the approval process for apprenticeship programs is necessary in order to understand the present dispute regarding ERISA preemption and the procedural posture of the case. 1. Federal Law In 1937, Congress first enacted legislation, known formally as the National Apprenticeship Act and commonly as the Fitzgerald Act, to encourage the establishment of modern apprenticeship programs to be administered by the federal Department of Labor. (29 U.S.C. § 50 [hereafter sometimes Fitzgerald Act].) The Fitzgerald Act provides in relevant part: “The Secretary of Labor is hereby authorized and directed to formulate and promote the furtherance of labor standards necessary to safeguard the welfare of apprentices, to extend the application of such standards by encouraging the inclusion thereof in contracts of apprenticeship, to bring together employers and labor for the formulation of programs of apprenticeship, to cooperate with State agencies engaged in the formulation and promotion of standards of apprenticeship . . . .” The Fitzgerald Act is implemented through a detailed set of regulations found at title 29, Code of Federal Regulations, sections 29.1-29.13 (1992). The scheme embodied in these regulations provides for registration or approval of apprenticeship programs for various “federal purposes” by the Department of Labor, Bureau of Apprenticeship Training (hereafter Bureau). (29 C.F.R. § 29.3 (1992).) The Bureau may choose to delegate its approval power to states that have enacted their own apprenticeship laws by “recognizing” a “State Apprenticeship Agency or Council” (hereafter SAC) for this purpose. (29 C.F.R. § 29.12(a) (1992).) Through recognition, the Secretary of Labor (hereafter Secretary) “gives the SAC the authority to determine whether an apprenticeship program conforms with the Secretary’s published standards and the program is, therefore, eligible for those Federal purposes which require such a determination by the Secretary.” (29 C.F.R. § 29.12(a) (1992).) A program is considered to be in conformity with federal standards only if it is registered with, or approved by, either a SAC or the Bureau. (29 C.F.R. § 29.3(a) (1992).) To be approved as a SAC, a state must submit proof of acceptable apprenticeship laws and regulations (29 C.F.R. § 29.12(a)(1) (1992)); acceptable composition of the SAC (29 C.F.R. § 29.12(a)(2) (1992)); an acceptable State Plan for Equal Employment Opportunity in Apprenticeship that conforms with 29 Code of Federal Regulations, part 30 (29 C.F.R. § 29.12(a)(3) (1992)); a description of the standards, criteria, and requirements for program registration and/or approval (29 C.F.R. § 29.12(a)(4) (1992)); and a description of the policies and operating procedures which depart from or impose requirements in addition to those in the federal regulations (29 C.F.R. § 29.12(a)(5) (1992)). If a state does not continue to meet the federal requirements, it may be “derecognized.” (29 C.F.R. § 29.13 (1992).) According to the record in this case, the Secretary, at regular intervals, reviews a SAC state’s statutes and regulations for conformity to the Fitzgerald Act and its implementing regulations. California has been certified by the Bureau as a SAC state since 1978. It is undisputed that California has maintained its SAC certification at all times relevant to this case. 2. California Law In California, apprenticeship training is governed by the Shelley-Maloney Apprenticeship Labor Standards Act of 1939 (hereafter Shelley-Maloney Act), which is codified as California Labor Code section 3070 et seq. Pursuant to the Shelley-Maloney Act, apprenticeship training is administered by the Division, which is under the auspices of the Department of Industrial Relations (hereafter Department). (Lab. Code, § 3073.) The Chief of the Division, pursuant to Labor Code section 3073, administers the apprenticeship law, acts as secretary of the Council, and is empowered to investigate and either approve or disapprove written standards for apprenticeship programs. (Lab. Code, §§ 3073, 3075, 3090; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 212, 212.1, and 212.2.) The Council is established within the Division pursuant to Labor Code section 3070. The Council meets at the direction of the Director of the Department (hereafter Director) and aids the Director in formulating policies for the effective administration of the apprenticeship laws. (Lab. Code, § 3071.) The Council meets at least quarterly and is empowered to issue rules and regulations which establish apprenticeship standards, equal opportunity and affirmative action requirements for apprenticeship programs, and criteria for selection procedures for apprentices. (Ibid.) The approval process for apprenticeship programs begins when the program sponsor, such as the ABC-JAC, submits written program standards to the Chief of the Division for approval. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 212.) A detailed list of subjects and specifications that must be met in a program’s standards in order for the program to be approved is set forth at title 8, California Code of Regulations, section 212. Generally, the federal requirements for an apprenticeship program set forth at 29 Code of Federal Regulations, section 29.5 are substantively similar to the requirements of California apprenticeship law. The federal laws and regulations, however, do not address whether approval can be denied to a program if it will adversely impact an existing program. Under the California regulations, the Chief of the Division must refuse to approve a program that has such an impact. (§ 212.2(a).) In furtherance of this duty and as part of the administrative review of the proposed program, the Chief of the Division is required to consult with the sponsors of any existing programs that could be affected by approval of the new program. (Ibid.) Decisions of the Chief of the Division can be appealed to a three-member panel of the Council. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 212.2, subd. (c), 203.) The decision of the appeal board is submitted to the full Council for final consideration. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 203, subd. (a)(5).) It is in light of this scheme of federal and state regulation of apprenticeship programs that we consider the ERISA preemption questions presented by this case. II. Analysis A. ERISA Preemption ERISA is a comprehensive federal statute designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee pension and benefit plans. (Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1983) 463 U.S. 85, 90 [77 L.Ed.2d 490, 496-497, 103 S.Ct. 2890] [hereafter Shaw]; Marshall v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1045, 1050-1051 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 832 P.2d 573], cert. denied _ U.S. _ [121 L.Ed.2d 537, 113 S.Ct. 601] [hereafter Marshall].) ERISA contains safeguards to preclude abuse and frustration of the comprehensive system of federal regulation it establishes. (Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon (1990) 498 U.S. 133, 137-138 [112 L.Ed.2d 474, 482-483, 111 S.Ct. 478] [hereafter Ingersoll-Rand]', accord Marshall, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1051.) “Prominent among these safeguards is an expansive preemption provision, found at section 514 of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1144[(a)] [Citations].)” (Marshall, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1051.) ERISA’s preemption clause is to be applied expansively. (Ingersoll-Rand, supra, 498 U.S. at p. 138 [112 L.Ed.2d at p. 483].) As we have previously recognized: “ERISA’s preemption clause is conspicuous for its breadth, establishing as an area of exclusive federal concern the subject of every State law that ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA.” (Marshall, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1051, citing FMC Corp. v. Holliday (1990) 498 U.S. 52, 58 [112 L.Ed.2d 356, 364, 111 S.Ct. 403].) Despite its broad scope, ERISA’s preemption clause has several exceptions. The only exception arguably relevant in this case is ERISA’s so-called general “savings clause.” Section 514(d) of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1144(d)) provides that “[n]othing in this title shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States ... or any rule or regulation issued under any such law.” In light of the governing statutes, we must determine: (1) whether this case involves an employee welfare benefit plan within the scope of ERISA’s preemption clause and, (2) if so, whether ERISA’s savings clause saves from preemption (a) the authority of the Council and Division to approve or disapprove apprenticeship programs for registration under the Fitzgerald Act and/or (b) the state regulation, § 212.2(a), which requires disapproval of new programs that would adversely affect existing prqgrams. (See Hydrostorage v. Northern Cal. Boilermakers (9th Cir. 1989) 891 F.2d 719, 726-727 [hereafter Hydrostorage], cert. denied (1990) 498 U.S. 822 [112 L.Ed.2d 46, 111 S.Ct. 72]; accord, Operating Engineers & Participating Employees etc. Fund v. Weiss Bros. Construction Co. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 867, 873-879 [270 Cal.Rptr. 786] [hereafter Operating Engineers], cert. denied (1991)_U.S. _ [113 L.Ed.2d 268, 111 S.Ct. 1337].) B. An Employee Welfare Benefit Plan The parties dispute whether this case involves an employee welfare benefit plan governed by ERISA. All parties concede that the financial aspects of the program—in other words, the trust established to receive and manage employer contributions to fund the apprenticeship program—is an ERISA plan. The Department, the Council, the existing programs, and several amici curiae, however, contend that ERISA does not govern the written standards under which apprenticeship programs operate. We conclude that both the trust and the standards form “integral part[s] of a larger ‘program’ established for the purpose of providing ‘apprenticeship . . . training’ ” and that this program is an employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA. (Hydrostorage, supra, 891 F.2d at p. 728.) Our starting point in this analysis is the statutory language. An employee welfare benefit plan is defined as a “plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, . . . for the purpose of providing for its participants . . . apprenticeship or other training programs. . . .” (29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), italics added.) Neither the statute, nor its implementing regulations, nor its legislative history shed light upon the meaning of the operative terms that we must define, i.e., “plan,” “fund,” “program,” or “apprenticeship program.” (Hydrostorage, supra, 891 F.2d at p. 727; accord, Massachusetts v. Morash (1989) 490 U.S. 107, 114 [104 L.Ed.2d 98, 108, 109 S.Ct. 1668] [hereafter Morash].) Finding limited guidance in the statutory language, we turn to case law. Several courts recently have addressed the question of whether apprenticeship or other training programs constitute employee welfare benefit plans for purposes of ERISA. (Hydrostorage, supra, 891 F.2d at pp. 727-729; MacDonald, supra, 949 F.2d at p. 274; Operating Engineers, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at pp. 876-877; Boise Cascade Corp. v. Peterson (8th Cir. 1991) 939 F.2d 632, 637 [hereafter Boise Cascade], cert. denied (1992) U.S._ [120 L.Ed.2d 887, 112 S.Ct. 3014]; National Elevator Industry, Inc. v. Calhoon (10th Cir. 1992) 957 F.2d 1555, 1558 [hereafter National Elevator], cert. denied_U.S.__[121 L.Ed.2d 331, 113 S.Ct. 406.) The courts in each of these cases answered this question in the affirmative. The seminal case in this area is the Ninth Circuit opinion in Hydrostorage, supra, 891 F.2d 719. Among the issues presented in that case was whether an administrative order interpreting Labor Code section 1777.5, which requires the hiring of apprentices and the contribution of funds to approved apprenticeship programs by any employer working on a state public works project, was preempted by ERISA. After an extensive analysis, the Hydro-storage court held that section 1777.5 as applied was preempted. (Hydrostorage, supra, 891 F.2d at p. 732.) In addressing the threshold question of whether the statute related to an employee welfare benefit plan, the Hydrostorage court looked to the “plain language” of the ERISA statute to determine its meaning. (Hydrostorage, supra, 891 F.2d at pp. 727, 728.) Based upon prior authority and a stipulation of the parties, the Hydro storage court had little difficulty determining that the trust fund established to finance the apprenticeship program was an ERISA plan. (Ibid.; cf. Carpenters So. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. El Capitan Development Co. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1041, 1045 [282 Cal.Rptr. 277, 811 P.2d 296] [hereafter Carpenters], cert. denied_U.S._(116 L.Ed.2d 450, 112 S.Ct. 430)].) The Hydrostorage court then considered whether the apprenticeship program standards constituted an ERISA plan. The analysis of the Hydrostorage court is instructive: “A more difficult question is whether the Standards constitute an ‘employee welfare benefit plan,’ . . . We conclude that the Standards satisfy [the] definition [found at 29 United States Code section 1002(1)(A)]. The Standards consist of a detailed, 16-page document which specifies the duties and procedure of the Committee [established to administer the program for the trust], the minimum qualifications of apprentices, the maximum ratio of apprentices to journeymen on job locations, the terms and conditions of apprenticeships, and the hours and wages of apprentices. The Standards also provide for supplemental instruction as well as periodic examination of apprentices. The Standards clearly embody ‘a method of design or action, procedure, or arrangement for accomplishment of a particular . . . object,’ in this case the training of apprentices. Black’s Law Dictionary 1036 (5th ed.1979). In addition, there is no question that the Standards were established ‘for the purpose of providing for its participants . . . apprenticeship or other training programs.’ 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). The Standards’s stated purpose is ‘the training of Boilermakers, skilled in all phases of the erection and repair industry, who will be a credit to the industry.’ Finally, the Standards were established by the Committee, an entity created by the collective bargaining agreement and composed of equal numbers of representatives of labor and management. As such, the Committee qualifies as ‘an employer or employee organization, or . . . both.’ Id.” (Hydrostorage, supra, 891 F.2d at p. 728.) The Hydrostorage court concluded: “The Standards are an integral part of a larger ‘program’ established for the purpose of providing ‘apprenticeship . . . training.’ [29 United States Code section 1002(1).] Thus, both the Fund and the Standards fall within the definition of an ‘employee welfare benefit plan’ under ERISA. . . . [¶] .... Since the Standards and Fund constitute an ERISA plan, this case clearly falls within the coverage of ERISA.” (Ibid.) In this case, we are presented with an apprenticeship program similar in all relevant respects to the one analyzed in Hydrostorage. We find no relevant factual distinctions between these cases with respect to this issue. Although we are not bound by the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the applicable law, we find it persuasive and, therefore, hold that the ABC-JAC apprenticeship program, including the governing standards, is an ERISA employee welfare benefit plan. Notwithstanding the persuasive analysis in Hydrostorage, supra, 891 F.2d 719, the Department strenuously argues that, although the fund in this case may be an ERISA plan, the standards are not. Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Morash, supra, 490 U.S. 107, the Department argues that the literal interpretation of 29 United States Code section 1002(1) undertaken by the Hydrostorage court is in error. In Morash, the Supreme Court held that a company’s policy of paying its discharged employees for their unused vacation time did not constitute an “employee welfare benefit plan” for purposes of ERISA. (Morash, supra, 490 U.S. at p. 120 [104 L.Ed.2d at p. 112].) The Department contends that the high court’s analysis embodies a tripartite test that must be applied in order to determine whether a benefit plan is an “employee welfare benefit plan” subject to ERISA and that, when applied to the facts of this case, the Morash analysis compels the conclusion that apprenticeship standards are not employee welfare benefit plans. Although the suggested “test” finds some support in the language of the Morash decision, the court in fact did not enunciate or apply such a test. Even if the court had done so, we conclude that Morash is readily distinguishable from the present case and that its teachings in fact buttress our conclusion that the standards are an integral part of the apprenticeship program. First, we observe that the Department’s entire argument is premised upon the assumption that the standards may be isolated from the trust in analyzing whether an apprenticeship program is an employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA. Such a distinction, however, receives no support from the language of the statute or any decision brought to our attention, including Morash, supra, 490 U.S. 107. Critical to the Morash decision was the fact that the vacation benefits in question were payable from the company’s general funds. No separate trust or other accumulation of funds was in any way involved. The high court specifically stated: “In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that the case before us . . . concern [s] payments by a single employer out of its general assets. An entirely different situation would be presented if a separate fund had been created by a group of employers to guarantee the payment of vacation benefits . . . .” (Morash, supra, 490 U.S. at p. 120 [104 L.Ed.2d at p. 112].) In this case, however, a separate fund does exist to finance the training of the apprentices, and the parties do not dispute that the fund is governed by ERISA. Thus, contrary to the Department’s argument, the plan in question in this case clearly presents “risks that ERISA . . . intended to address.” (Id. at p. 115 [104 L.Ed. at pp. 108-109].) Furthermore, while it is true that in Morash the high court did not end its analysis with a literal interpretation of 29 United States Code section 1002(1) (Morash, supra, 490 U.S. at pp. 114-116 [104 L.Ed.2d at pp. 108-110]), it is also true that the high court specifically contrasted the vacation benefits at issue in that case with other benefits listed in section 1002(1), including “training programs,” which the high court indicated would be subject to ERISA. (Morash, supra, 490 U.S. at pp. 115-116 [104 L.Ed.2d at p. 108-110].) The Department attempts to limit the import of the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court by pointing to the use of the language “training programs,” rather than “apprenticeship programs.” We believe, however, that the better interpretation is that the court used the phrase as an inclusive shorthand reference to the longer statutory phrase “apprenticeship or other training programs.” Moreover, the language of Morash, supra, 490 U.S. 107, supports our conclusion. It states: “Section 3(1) [29 United States Code section 1002(1)] subjects to ERISA regulation plans to provide medical, sickness, accident, disability, and death benefits, training programs, day care centers, scholarship funds, and legal services. The distinguishing feature of most of these benefits is that they accumulate over a period of time and are payable only upon the occurrence of a contingency outside of the control of the employee. [Citation.] . . . The reference to vacation payments in § 3(1) should be understood to include within the scope of ERISA those vacation benefit funds analogous to other welfare benefits, in which either the employee’s right to a benefit is contingent upon some future occurrence or the employee bears a risk different from his ordinary employment risk.” (Id. at pp. 115-116 [104 L.Ed.2d at pp. 108-110].) We believe that it is obvious that an apprentice incurs a risk different from the risk of ordinary employment. The apprentice agrees to accept lower pay and to complete certain educational requirements in order to learn skills which will eventually lead to recognition as a journeyman. If the apprenticeship program goes out of business or if the apprentice is expelled from the program, his investment in the training may be for naught. Finally, Morash relies upon the existence of regulations stating that the “payment of vacation benefits ‘out of [an] employer’s general assets’ rather than from a trust fund, are not employee welfare benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA.” (Morash, supra, 490 U.S. at pp. 117-118 [104 L.Ed.2d at pp. 110-111], fn. omitted.) In the present case, there is no similar explicit administrative interpretation upon which to rely. For these reasons, we are not persuaded that Morash, supra, 490 U.S. 107, calls into question the holding of Hydrostorage, supra, 891 F.2d 719, that standards for apprenticeship training programs must be considered part of ERISA employee welfare benefit plans. Although the Department may wish, from a policy perspective, for only the financial aspects of an apprenticeship program to be governed by ERISA, we are not free to rewrite a federal statute in order to achieve that result. C. Preemption of State Laws Having determined that the standards are an integral part of an employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA, we now must determine whether state laws and regulations authorizing the Council and the Division to approve or disapprove registration of apprenticeship training programs, and setting standards for these programs, are preempted by ERISA. We conclude that these laws fall within the scope of ERISA’s preemption clause. We note, however, that reaching this conclusion does not end our analysis. As previously explained, ERISA contains a general savings clause, codified at 29 United States Code section 1144(d), and we ultimately must determine whether the laws challenged in this case are “saved” from preemption (and are therefore enforceable by the state) under this clause. Prior to reaching the determinative issue, we set forth the reasoning supporting our conclusion that the challenged laws fall within the scope of ERISA’s preemption clause. The preemption clause provides that ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .” (29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), italics added.) “The key to § 514(a) is found in the words ‘relate to.’ ” (Ingersoll-Rand, supra, 498 U.S. at p. 138 [112 L.Ed.2d at p. 483].) “A law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan . . . if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” (Shaw, supra, 463 U.S. at pp. 96-97 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 500-501]; accord, Carpenters, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1048, quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux (1987) 481 U.S. 41, 47 [95 L.Ed.2d 39, 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549],) It is clear that state laws governing approval of apprenticeship programs have a “connection with” those programs. (Cf. Boise Cascade, supra, 939 F.2d at p. 637; Hydrostorage, supra, 891 F.2d at pp. 729-730; Operating Engineers, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at pp. 879-880.) The laws in question prescribe minimum terms and conditions for apprenticeship training that programs must meet in order to be eligible for approval and thus for certain financial benefits. (See ante, at pp. 428-429.) Moreover, the state laws in question expressly refer to apprenticeship programs, including their standards. As we have previously demonstrated, these programs are ERISA plans. (See ante, at pp. 436-440.) The Supreme Court has recognized, a “state statute’s express reference to ERISA plans suffices to bring it within the federal law’s preemptive reach.” (Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv. (1988) 486 U.S. 825, 830 [100 L.Ed.2d 836, 840, 108 S.Ct. 2182]; accord Ingersoll-Rand, supra, 498 U.S. at pp. 139-140 [112 L.Ed.2d at pp. 484-485].) Reading the statutory language in its “broad sense” as we must (Shaw, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 98 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 501-502]), we find that the state laws in question are within the scope of ERISA’s preemption clause. Our finding is consistent with our previous observation that “[because of the breadth of the preemption clause and the broad remedial purpose of ERISA, state laws found to be beyond the scope of [. . . ERISA] are few. [Citation.]” (Carpenters, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1048-1049, internal quotation marks omitted.) Without analyzing the issue in the context of the statutory language, various parties contend through complementary arguments that ERISA’s preemption clause does not apply. These arguments all fit beneath the umbrella of a general contention that Congress did not intend to preempt state regulation of the substantive aspects of apprenticeship programs. In light of the ERISA’s statutory language and legislative history as interpreted by the high court, we reject these arguments. The first argument advanced by the parties opposing preemption derives from their previously discussed attempt to divorce the substantive elements from the financial elements of apprenticeship programs. These parties contend that the substantive requirements for apprenticeship programs are beyond the scope of ERISA regulation and that Congress therefore could not have intended the preemption clause to apply to state laws regulating these aspects of apprenticeship programs. This argument is flatly contradicted by opinions of the Supreme Court. As the Supreme Court has explained: “We also emphasized that to interpret the pre-emption clause to apply only to state laws dealing with the subject matters covered by ERISA, such as reporting, disclosure and fiduciary duties, would be incompatible with the provision’s legislative history because the House and the Senate versions of the bill that became ERISA contained limited pre-emption clauses, applicable only to state laws relating to specific subjects covered by ERISA. These were rejected in favor of the present language in the Act, ‘indicating] that the section’s pre-emptive scope was as broad as its language.’ Shaw [, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 98 (77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 501-502)].” (FMC Corp. v. Holliday, supra, 498 U.S. at pp. 58-59 [112 L.Ed.2d at pp. 364-365, fn. omitted]. See also Ingersoll-Rand, supra, 498 U.S. at p. 139 [112 L.Ed.2d at p. 485]; Carpenters, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1047.) A persuasive example of the application of this rule is found in one of the first decisions of the Ninth Circuit to address ERISA’s preemptive effect. (Standard Oil Co. of California v. Agsalud (9th Cir. 1980) 633 F.2d 760, affd. mem. (1981) 454 U.S. 801 [70 L.Ed.2d 71, 102 S.Ct. 79].) In considering whether Hawaii’s Comprehensive Prepaid Health Care Act was preempted by ERISA, the court wrote: “Appellants in the district court argued that since ERISA was concerned primarily with the administration of benefit plans, its provisions were not intended to prevent the operation of laws like the Hawaii Act pertaining principally to benefits rather than administration. There is, however, nothing in the statute to support such a distinction between the state laws relating to benefits as opposed to administration. As the district court pointed out, the language of the statute provides that ERISA shall supersede ‘any and all State laws’ and that does not mean ‘some but not til State laws.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 765.) The distinction between state laws relating to “financial” as opposed to “substantive” requirements for apprenticeship programs similarly is not supported. The parties also urge that Congress could not have intended to preempt the state laws challenged in this case, because to do so would not advance any of the goals of ERISA and would result in less protection for apprentices. In the several variations of this argument presented to us, not one party addresses the applicability to this case of the policy reasons underlying Congress’s decision to promulgate the expansive preemption clause contained in ERISA. The legislative history of ERISA makes it abundantly clear that this clause was intended to “ ‘round out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation.’ ” (Shaw, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 99 [77 L.Ed.2d at p. 502], quoting Remarks of Representative Dent, 120 Cong. Rec. 29197 (1974).) Preemption of state laws relating to employee welfare benefit plans that do not fall into an explicit exception in the statute is consistent with the policy choice made by Congress to prefer national consistency of regulation over other competing considerations. Given the language of the preemption clause and its legislative history, we must conclude that Congress intended for the state laws in question here to be within the scope of ERISA’s preemption clause. The parties next contend, in an argument closely related to the argument that the standards are not an employee welfare benefit plan, that the standards under which apprentices are trained and wages and welfare of employees generally are areas of compelling state interest that have been traditionally regulated by the states. Therefore, the parties argue that a rebuttable presumption arises that Congress did not intend to preempt state laws relating to the standards under which apprentices are trained. This facet of the argument against preemption is premised primarily upon the following language in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts (1985) 471 U.S. 724, 740 [85 L.Ed.2d 728, 740-741, 105 S.Ct. 2380] (hereafter Metropolitan Life): “We must also presume that Congress did not intend to pre-empt areas of traditional state regulation. [Citation.]” This argument, however, also fails in light of federal Supreme Court precedent. Initially, we observe that the presumption stated by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life, supra, 471 U.S. at page 740 [85 L.Ed.2d at pages 740-741], was not sufficient standing alone to prevent the preemption of the state law under review in that case. The high court held in pertinent part in Metropolitan Life that, although a Massachusetts statute mandating the provision of minimum mental health care benefits under certain types of insurance policies fell within the scope of ERISA’s broad preemption clause, the statute was saved from preemption as a law which “ ‘regulates insurance’ ” by the “insurance saving clause” of the statute, codified as 29 United States Code section 1144(b)(2). (Metropolitan Life, supra, 471 U.S. at pp. 739-740 [85 L.Ed.2d at pp. 739-741], See also FMC Corp. v. Holliday, supra, 498 U.S. at pp. 60-65 [112 L.Ed.2d at pp. 366-369].) The presumption relied upon by the parties opposing preemption was only relevant in the context of determining an apparent inconsistency between the scope of the preemption clause and the scope of the savings clause potentially relevant to the state law at issue in Metropolitan Life. The potential conflict at issue in that case is not found in the present case. As the court specifically recognized: “Unlike the exemption from ERISA coverage at issue in Shaw [the general savings clause codified at 29 United States Code section 1144(d)], the exception in § 514(b) is phrased very broadly.” (Id. at p. 737 [85 L.Ed.2d at pp. 738-739].) Despite the valiant efforts of some parties to manufacture uncertainty, there is none as to whether the challenged state laws in this case fall within the scope of the ERISA preemption clause. The prerequisites for employing the presumption set forth in Metropolitan Life, supra, 471 U.S. 724, have not been met. (Carpenters, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1055-1056.) Moreover, our decision is supported by federal case law specifically rejecting the contention that ERISA preemption of state laws relating to apprenticeship and other training programs is forestalled by the bare fact that wages and employee welfare is an area of traditional state regulation. (Boise Cascade, supra, 939 F.2d at pp. 637-638; cf. National Elevator, supra, 957 F.2d at p. 1561.) Finally, the parties opposing preemption assert that to hold that the state laws in question are within the scope of the ERISA preemption clause (even if they are ultimately saved from preemption under the general savings clause) could have untoward consequences in future cases. For example, the parties argue that state laws relating to day care or prevailing wages will be the next targets of ERISA preemptions suits. We express no opinion regarding the merits of such challenges. We can only state that we recognize both the potential breadth of the ERISA preemption clause as well as the fact that the federal government has promulgated few substantive regulations governing certain employee welfare benefit plans. Nevertheless, Congress chose to enact the expansive preemption clause contained in ERISA, and the legislative history reveals that the conferees who chose this language “were aware that such broad preemption might create regulatory lacunae or lead to other, unforeseen problems." (Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (1978) 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. 23, 41.) To the extent that ERISA’s broad preemption provision results in the types of regulatory vacuums envisioned by various parties, it will be “the result of congressional choice and should be addressed by congressional action.” (Shaw, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 106 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 506-507].) D. The Savings Clause As explained previously, our analysis does not end with the conclusion that the challenged state laws fall within the scope of ERISA’s preemption clause. We must also decide whether these laws are “saved” from preemption under one of the exceptions set forth in ERISA. The only exception that could apply in this case is the general “savings clause,” section 514(d) of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1144(d)), which provides that “[n]othing in this title shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States ... or any rule or regulation issued under any such law.” This clause specifies that ERISA does not implicitly preempt other federal laws and regulations. The savings clause is, thus, consistent with Congress’s intent in enacting ERISA’s preemption clause “ ‘to foreclose any non-Federal regulation of employee benefit plans.’ ” (Shaw, supra, 463 U.S. at 104 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 505-506], quoting Remarks of Representative Dent, 120 Cong. Red. 29197 (1974).) Although the savings clause does not specifically mention state laws and regulations, courts have recognized that state laws and regulations may be saved from preemption under the savings clause to the extent that their preemption would “impair or modify” a federal law. (See, e.g., Shaw, supra, 463 U.S. at pp. 102-105 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 504-506].) Our task, therefore, is to determine whether preemption of either (1) the state’s general authority to approve or disapprove apprenticeship programs or (2) the requirement found in section 212.2(a) that a new apprenticeship program not “adversely affect” existing prevailing conditions would impair the Fitzgerald Act or the federal regulations issued under it. The state laws in question are saved from preemption only if we answer these questions in the affirmative. 1. The Savings Clause and the State’s General Authority to Approve or Disapprove Apprenticeship Programs The next step in our analysis, therefore, is to determine whether state laws and regulations authorizing the Council and the Chief of the Division to approve or disapprove registration of apprenticeship programs fall within ERISA’s savings clause by virtue of the Fitzgerald Act and the regulations issued thereunder. Although the case is not directly analogous to the case at hand, we begin with the seminal decision of the Supreme Court in Shaw, supra, 463 U.S. 85. The Supreme Court in that case considered in pertinent part whether ERISA preempted all or portions of New York’s Human Rights Law or whether the law was saved from preemption under the general savings clause by virtue of its relationship to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Very briefly stated, the pertinent dispute centered around a provision found in the state law, prior to the time that such a requirement was added to title VII, that required employers to treat pregnancy in the same way other nonoccupational injuries or illnesses were treated under their disability benefits plans. The Supreme Court determined that New York’s Human Rights Law was saved in part and preempted in part. First, the court noted that title VII specifically requires recourse to available state remedies prior to invoking federal remedies. For this reason, the court found portions of the Human Rights Law were saved from ERISA preemption. The court explained: “Given the importance of state fair employment laws to the federal enforcement scheme, pre-emption of the Human Rights Law would impair Title VII to the extent that the Human Rights Law provides a means of enforcing Title VII’s commands. . . . Such a disruption of the enforcement scheme contemplated by Title VII would, in the words of § 514(d) [29 United States Code section 1144(d)], ‘modify’ and ‘impair’ federal law.” (Shaw, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 102 [77 L.Ed.2d at p. 504], fn. omitted.) The court found that the challenged requirement of equivalent pregnancy-related disability benefits, however, was not saved from preemption by ERISA, because title VII contained no equivalent requirement. The court explained: “Insofar as state laws prohibit employment practices that are lawful under Title VII, however, pre-emption would not impair Title VII within the meaning of § 514(d) [29 United States Code section 1144(d)].” (Shaw, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 103 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 504-505].) The court further explained: “Although Title VII does not itself prevent States from extending their nondiscrimination laws to areas not covered by Title VII, [citations], it in no way depends on such extensions for its enforcement. Title VII would prohibit precisely the same employment practices, and be enforced in precisely the same manner, even if no State made additional employment practices unlawful. ... We fail to see how federal law would be impaired by pre-emption of a state law prohibiting conduct that federal law permitted.” (Id. at pp. 103-104, fn. omitted [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 504-505], italics added.) Shaw, thus, teaches that it is not sufficient for purposes of invoking the protection of the savings clause that a state law is consistent with, or supplements, a federal law. Rather, preemption of the state law must have a negative effect on the functioning of, or standards set forth in, the federal law before the general savings clause will extend its protection to the state law. The federal courts have applied the teachings of Shaw, supra, 463 U.S. 85, to the relationship between ERISA’s savings clause and the Fitzgerald Act. One of the first cases to address this issue was Hydrostorage, supra, 891 F.2d 719. As previously noted, the Hydrostorage court held that an administrative order interpreting Labor Code section 1777.5, which requires the hiring of apprentices and the contribution of funds to state-approved apprenticeship programs by any employer working on a state public works project, was preempted by ERISA. (See, ante, at pp. 436-437.) The Hydrostorage court rejected the argument that the order was saved from preemption under ERISA’s savings clause by virtue of the fact that the section promoted and encouraged the spread of approved apprenticeship programs established under the auspices of the Fitzgerald Act and its regulations. In so doing, the Hydrostorage court interpreted Shaw and the savings clause narrowly: “The [Supreme] Court’s conclusion clearly rested upon the fact that the New York law functioned as an enforcement mechanism for Title VII. That is simply not the case here. The Fitzgerald Act does not articulate a ‘goal of encouraging joint state/federal enforcement.’ Nor does the Fitzgerald Act contain any clause which preserves state laws. [Citation.] [¶] We reject Boilermakers’ argument that the Fitzgerald Act embodies a project in ‘cooperative federalism’ which will be ‘impaired’ or ‘modified’ within the meaning of section 514(d) if the administrative order against Hydrostorage were preempted by ERISA.” (Hydrostorage, supra, 891 F.2d at p. 732. Accord, Operating Engineers, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at pp. 878, 880; National Elevator, supra, 957 F.2d at pp. 1561-1562.) The Ninth Circuit’s most recent interpretation of the relationship between the preemption clause and the Fitzgerald Act is found in MacDonald, supra, 949 F.2d 270. In that case, the court held that a Nevada statute, which was interpreted by the state labor commissioner to provide an exemption from the state’s prevailing wage laws for apprenticeship programs approved by the state, but not for apprenticeship programs approved directly by the Bureau, was preempted under ERISA as applied. In so holding, the MacDonald court explained the relationship between the preemption clause and the Fitzgerald Act as follows: “There is no exemption from the broad preemption provision of section 514(a) of ERISA except for the federal Fitzgerald Act and the regulations issued thereunder. [Citation.] Thus, any state regulation of apprenticeship programs that is separate and apart from the authorization given by the Fitzgerald Act and its accompanying regulations is preempted by section 514(a) of ERISA. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 274, italics added.) We believe that this is an accurate summary of the complex relationship between ERISA’s preemption clause, ERISA’s savings clause, and the federal and state apprenticeship laws. Furthermore, we find it noteworthy that the MacDonald court also implicitly recognized that states may continue to exercise general approval authority under the Fitzgerald Act and its regulations: “29 C.F.R. § 29.3 provides for a dual system of approval and recognition so that either the [Bureau] or the State Apprenticeship Council can approve an apprenticeship program for federal purposes. However, either agency is constrained in its approval to apply the requirements and standards of the federal regulations.” (Id. at p. 273, fn. omitted.) We are convinced that preemption of state approval functions would impair, within the meaning of the savings clause, the federal laws governing apprenticeship training. The Fitzgerald Act is “written in very broad terms. It contains a wide grant of authority to the Secretary of Labor to develop and promote standards of training for apprentices, and to give such standards the widest possible application.” (Gregory Electric Co. v. United States Dept, of Labor (D.S.C. 1967) 268 F.Supp. 987, 991.) In furtherance of this mandate, the Secretary has enacted regulations, which one court has described as “a detailed regulatory scheme defining apprenticeship programs and their requirements, and establishing] a review, approval, and registration process for proposed apprenticeship programs administered by State Apprenticeship Councils under the aegis of the United States Department of Labor. . . .” (Siuslaw Concrete Const. v. Wash., Dept. of Transp. (9th Cir. 1986) 784 F.2d 952, 956.) The Secretary has specifically stated in these regulations: “The purpose of this part is to set forth labor standards to safeguard the welfare of apprentices, and to extend the application of such standards by prescribing policies and procedures concerning the registration, for certain Federal purposes, or [sic] acceptable apprenticeship programs with the U.S. Department of Labor. . . . These labor standards, policies and procedures cover the registration, cancellation and deregistration or [sic] apprenticeship programs and of apprenticeship agreements; the recognition of a State agency as the appropriate agency for registering local apprenticeship programs for certain Federal purposes-, and matters relating thereto.” (29 C.F.R. § 29.1(b), italics added.) In furtherance of these goals, the regulatory scheme specifically includes provisions for federally approved state agencies, such as California’s Division and Council, to “determine whether an apprenticeship program conforms with the Secretary’s published standards and the program is, therefore, eligible for those Federal purposes which require such a determination by the Secretary.” (29 C.F.R. § 29.12(a) (1992), italics added.) In light of this regulatory scheme, we find that the preemption of the state’s general authority to approve or disapprove apprenticeship programs would “impair” the purposes and functioning of the Fitzgerald Act and its implementing regulations. Therefore, we find the state laws and regulations providing for the exercise of this general authority to be saved from ERISA preemption under section 514(d) of that statute (29 U.S.C. § 1144(d)). 2. The Savings Clause and Section 212.2(a) Since the Chief of the Division and the Council exercise nonpreempted approval functions, we must determine whether these nonpreempted functions extend by virtue of ERISA’s savings clause to denying approval to the ABC-JAC program on the ground that the program fails to comply with section 212.2(a). This regulation provides in challenged part that a program may be denied approval when existing prevailing conditions (including training standards) in the area and industry in which the new program plans to operate would be lowered or adversely affected. (§ 212.2(a).) Neither the Fitzgerald Act nor the regulations promulgated under it contain a similar requirement. (See, ante, at pp. 433-434, and post, at pp. 456-461.) Nevertheless, the Department claims that section 212.2(a) is saved from preemption by virtue of section 29.12(a)(5) and (e)(1) of the federal regulations. (29 C.F.R. § 29.12(a)(5) & (e)(1) (1992).) Code of Federal Regulations section 29.12(a)(5) (1992) provides for recognition of a SAC upon submission and approval of, among other requirements, “[a] description of policies and operating procedures which depart from or impose requirements in addition to those described in this part.” Code of Federal Regulations section 29.12(e)(1) (1992) states: “An apprenticeship program submitted for registration with a State Apprenticeship Agency recognized by the Bureau shall, for Federal purposes, be in conformity with the State apprenticeship law, regulations, and [Equal Employment Opportunity requirements].” We do not agree with the Department’s argument. Neither the fact that federal law envisions additional state regulation nor the fact that the state regulation is consistent with the purpose of the federal law resolves the question of ERISA preemption. (Shaw, supra, 463 U.S. at pp. 103-105 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 504-506]; cf. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra,_ U.S._ [119 L.Ed.2d at p. 169]; Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., supra, 486 U.S. at pp. 829-830 [100 L.Ed.2d at pp. 843-844].) Under ERISA’s savings clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the pertinent question remains whether the preemption of the state law would modify, impair or hinder the federal law. (Shaw, supra, 463 U.S. at pp. 103-105 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 504-506].) Preemption of this additional state requirement for approval of apprenticeship programs in California would affect neither the purpose nor operation of the Fitzgerald Act and its regulations. (Cf. Shaw, supra, 463 U.S. at pp. 103-104 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 504-506].) We first observe that the Bureau recognizes a SAC for the purpose of vesting the SAC with the responsibility of determining “whether an apprenticeship program conforms with the Secretary’s published standards and the program is, therefore, eligible for those Federal purposes which require such a determination by the Secretary.” (29 C.F.R. § 29.12(a) (1992), italics added.) Although the Secretary does review and consider state “policies and operating procedures which depart from or impose requirements in addition to those prescribed” by the federal regulations (29 C.F.R. § 29.12(a)(5) (1992)), the federal apprenticeship scheme is not modified, impaired or hindered if state laws embodying such policies or procedures are preempted. Even if no independent state policies or procedures existed, a SAC would be able to fulfill the purpose for which it was recognized by the Secretary. Second, we observe that the only apparent purpose of the challenged requirement in section 212.2(a) is to restrict competition among apprenticeship programs, as it was interpreted by the Council to do in this case. The legislative history of the Fitzgerald Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder, however, do not demonstrate a Congressional intent to restrict competition in this area or to prefer existing training programs over new programs. Moreover, although one of the purposes of the Fitzgerald Act was unquestionably to provide “a cloak of protection to put around boys and girls and encourage them to go back into the skilled trades” (Comments of Representative Fitzgerald, 81 Cong. Rec. 6632 (1937)), the standards to protect the apprentices were to be national standards formulated by the Secretary. (See H.R. Rep. No. 945, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2 (1937); To Safeguard the Welfare of Apprentices, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Com. on Labor, House of Representatives on H.R. 6205, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 22, 23 & 26, 1937) pp. 6 (Statement of C.R. Dooley), 28 (Statement of Arthur Rosenthal).) An apprenticeship program is not compelled to comply with the national standards in order to operate. Rather, the law relies upon federal and state financial incentives to motivate the program to voluntarily seek approval and therefore adopt the standards. To the extent an independent