Full opinion text
Opinion GEORGE, C. J. Plaintiff in this action, Nicole Taus, was the unnamed subject of a “case study” set forth in a prominent scholarly article describing her apparent recovery of a long-repressed memory of childhood abuse. (The article referred to plaintiff as “Jane Doe.”) Defendants are the authors and publishers of two subsequent articles that, in questioning the basic premise advanced by the initial article, disclosed various aspects of plaintiff’s family background and personal life but did not disclose her identity. (Like the initial article, defendants’ articles referred to plaintiff as “Jane Doe.”) Shortly after the later articles were published, plaintiff filed the present action against defendants, challenging defendants’ activities in investigating, publishing, and thereafter publicly discussing their articles and investigation. The complaint asserted that defendants improperly had invaded plaintiff’s privacy and committed other tortious conduct by investigating plaintiff’s background and discovering and disclosing information concerning her private life without her consent. Defendants responded by filing special motions to strike the complaint pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16), asserting that the complaint sought to impose liability upon them for actions that were undertaken in furtherance of their constitutional right of free speech. The trial court denied the motions in large part, concluding that the bulk of plaintiff’s claims should be permitted to go forward. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that most of the claims set forth in the complaint should be dismissed under the anti-SLAPP statute, but also concluded that the suit could proceed with regard to four aspects of defendants’ conduct that were challenged in the complaint. Following the Court of Appeal’s decision, only defendants sought review in this court. The petition for review contended that although the Court of Appeal was correct in dismissing the bulk of plaintiff’s claims, the appellate court had erred in permitting any aspect of the action to go forward. We granted review to consider whether the Court of Appeal correctly determined that plaintiff’s suit could proceed as to the four points challenged by defendants. As explained hereafter, we conclude that the Court of Appeal erred with respect to three of those claims, but that it correctly determined that dismissal is not warranted at this juncture with regard to one of the claims advanced by plaintiff. Accordingly, we shall reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal. I The relevant facts in this case are set forth in some detail in the Court of Appeal’s opinion in this matter, and because neither party has taken issue with that court’s statement of facts, we shall adopt that portion of the Court of Appeal’s opinion, with minor supplementation and stylistic changes. A. Background—Published Articles The dispute between these parties arises out of the publication of three articles that appeared in two scientific journals between May 1997 and August 2002. 1. The 1997 Child Maltreatment Article The May 1997 issue of Child Maltreatment, a scientific journal published by the American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, contains an essay, authored by David Corwin and Erna Olafson, entitled Videotaped Discovery of a Reportedly Unrecallable Memory of Child Sexual Abuse: Comparison With a Childhood Interview Videotaped 11 Years Before (2 Child Maltreatment 91 [hereafter the Child Maltreatment article]). The Child Maltreatment article contains the following summary of its contents: “This article presents the history, verbatim transcripts, and behavioral observations of a child’s disclosure of sexual abuse to Dr. David Corwin in 1984 and the spontaneous return of that reportedly unrecallable memory during an interview between the same individual, now a young adult, and Dr. Corwin 11 years later. Both interviews were videotape recorded. The significance, limitations, and clinical implications of this unique case study are discussed. Five commentaries by researchers from differing empirical perspectives who have reviewed these videotape-recorded interviews follow this article.” (Child Maltreatment article, supra, at p. 91.) The young woman who is the subject of the Child Maltreatment article was referred to throughout the article as “Jane Doe” (hereafter sometimes just “Jane”), and all the names of persons and places relating to her story were changed with the exception of the identity of Corwin, who conducted the interviews. According to the article, Corwin became involved in Jane’s case in 1984 after Jane’s father accused her mother of physically and sexually abusing her. The allegations were made in the context of a custody dispute, and Corwin was appointed by the court to conduct an evaluation. The Child Maltreatment article contains excerpts from three interviews conducted by Corwin in 1984 when Jane was six years of age. During each interview, Jane told Corwin that her mother had rubbed her finger inside Jane’s vagina while giving her a bath. The specific excerpts that are repeated in the article include Jane reporting that her mother first had done this to her when she was three, that these actions hurt, and that her mother had warned she would do “something” to Jane if Jane told her father what her mother had done. During the third interview, Jane consistently maintained that nobody told her to say these things about her mother and that she was not lying. At one point, Corwin inquired whether Jane’s mother had said anything when she placed her finger there. Jane reported that her mother asked: “That feel good?,” and that Jane had replied no. Jane also said that this had happened on more than 20 occasions and closer to 99 during the time she lived with her mother. (Child Maltreatment article, supra, at pp. 94, 100-101.) The excerpts from the 1984 interviews are interspersed with analysis and with Corwin’s conclusions, first drawn and testified to in 1984, that: (1) Jane was physically and sexually abused by her mother, and (2) Jane’s mother falsely accused Jane’s father of abusing Jane and attempted to coerce Jane into verifying the false accusation. The authors of the Child Maltreatment article reported that their article relied upon background sources in addition to the 1984 interviews, including reports by child protective services and the police, court files and decisions pertaining to the parents’ divorce and contentious custody battle, and reports by other evaluators and therapists. According to the article, Jane’s statements to Corwin were consistent with statements she previously made to other evaluators. Jane’s prior reports of inappropriate behavior by her mother included “ ‘striking her on several parts of her body, burning her feet on a hot stove, and invading and hurting her genitals and anus with her hands.’ ” (Child Maltreatment article, supra, at p. 95.) The Child Maltreatment article also contains a transcript of an interview of Jane conducted by Corwin on October 15, 1995, when Jane was 17 years of age. According to the article, the 1995 interview was arranged after Corwin contacted Jane and her father to obtain their consent to continue to use the 1984 videotaped interviews for “professional education,” and learned that Jane could not remember the events that were the subject of those earlier interviews and wanted to view the 1984 videotapes. (Child Maltreatment article, supra, at p. 98.) Jane’s foster mother accompanied her to the interview with Corwin, who agreed to show the two of them the videotapes of the 1984 interviews. (A local therapist also was present during the interview.) At the outset of the 1995 interview and before viewing the 1984 videotapes, Jane stated that she did remember statements and allegations she had made during those interviews but that “[ijt’s the memory of if what I said was true that I’m having a problem with.” (Child Maltreatment article, supra, at p. 104.) Corwin asked Jane to share what she could recall about that period of time concerning the 1984 interviews and the things she may have said then. Jane described the room where she was interviewed in 1984 and a sweatshirt she may have worn, and began to recount some of the allegations she had made. She recalled accusing her mother of abusing her by burning her feet on a stove but stated she could not remember whether that was in fact how her feet were burned. Jane told Corwin that she recently had been in contact with her mother, who denied all the allegations of abuse. When Corwin focused the discussion on sexual abuse, the following occurred: “DC[] Okay. Do you remember anything about the concerns about possible sexual abuse? “JD: No. (Eye closure) I mean, I remember that was part of the accusation, but I don’t remember anything—(inhales audibly and closes eyes) wait a minute, yeah, I do. “DC: What do you remember? “JD: (Pauses) Oh my gosh, that’s really, (. . . Close[s] eyes and holds eyes) really weird. (Looks at foster mother) I accused her of taking pictures (starts to cry and foster mother puts hand on Jane’s shoulder) of me and my brother and selling them and I accused her of—when she was bathing me or whatever, hurting me, and that’s— “DC: As you’re saying that to me, you remember having said those things or you remember having experienced those things? “JD: I remember saying about the pictures, I remember it happening, that she hurt me. “DC: Hurt you, where? How? “JD: She hurt me. She— “Therapist: There’s tissues to your right. “JD: You see. I don’t know if it was an intentional hurt—she was bathing me, and I only remember one instance, and she hurt me, she put her fingers too far where she shouldn’t have, and she hurt me. But I don’t know if it was intentional, or if it was just accidental. “DC: Can you be more specific because I—? “JD: I know what was said on the tape. On the tape it was said that she put her fingers in my vagina. And she hurt me. “DC: Okay. Is that what you recall or— “JD: That’s what I recall. I recall saying it, and I recall it happening. “DC: You recall it happening? “JD: I recall. I didn’t—that’s the first time I’ve remembered that since saying that when I was 6 years old, but I remember.” (Child Maltreatment article, supra, at pp. 105-106.) According to the Child Maltreatment article, Corwin thereafter showed Jane the videotapes of the 1984 interviews, took a two and one-half hour break, and then recommenced the 1995 videotaped interview. During that part of the interview, Corwin asked Jane to describe her feelings about viewing the videotapes. Jane responded that the tapes reinforced her belief that her mother had abused her. In her view, the girl she saw on the tapes would not have made up the accusations. Jane also expressed relief that she no longer had to entertain the possibility that her father, who recently had died, had lied to her about her mother. At the end of the 1995 interview, Jane agreed that Corwin could use her interviews for educational purposes. She stated: “Yeah, I think it’s—I mean, I’m prepared to give my life, devote my life, to helping other kids who have gone through what I’ve gone through, well not necessarily what I’ve gone through, that have gone through traumatic . . . experiences, by becoming a psychologist or psychiatrist, whichever I decide but, and I by no means want to stand in your way.” (Child Maltreatment article, supra, at p. 109.) In the final pages of the Child Maltreatment article, the authors reconciled possible inconsistencies between Jane’s recalled memory in 1995 and the accusations she made in 1984, and concluded that “[t]he core recollection, then, is true to her earlier disclosures.” (Child Maltreatment article, supra, at p. 110.) The authors also suggested that, assuming Jane’s memory of abuse actually had been unavailable to her prior to the 1995 interview, Corwin’s presence may have helped trigger her recall. Finally, the authors posed questions and issues to explore and address in the future. In addition to the article by Corwin and Olafson, the May 1997 issue of Child Maltreatment contained five separate shorter articles by prominent professionals in the mental health field who had reviewed the Corwin and Olafson article and the videotaped interviews described in that article. Each of these case commentaries uniformly praised the manner in which Corwin had conducted his interviews with Jane Doe and generally described the case study as “unique,” “extraordinarily important,” and providing “important insights” into the nature of missing memories. (E.g., Putnam, Commentary, supra, 2 Child Maltreatment 117.) Further, a number of the commentators, in discussing additional questions they believed should be explored, stated that it would be useful to know “what has happened to Jane subsequently. Has she recalled other previously unavailable traumatic memories (e.g., how her feet were burned)? How has this affected her relationship with her mother? ... It would be interesting to see whether this experience has produced substantial changes in her life, for better or worse.” (Putnam, Commentary, supra, 2 Child Maltreatment at p. 120; see also Ekman, Expressive Behavior and the Recovery of a Traumatic Memory: Comments on the Videotapes of Jane Doe, supra, 2 Child Maltreatment at p. 116 [“Many questions remain unanswered and will only be revealed over time as we can learn how her adult personality takes shape”].) 2. The 2002 Skeptical Inquirer Article The May/June 2002 and July/August 2002 issues of the Skeptical Inquirer, a magazine published by the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (CSICOP), included a two-part article, written by defendants Elizabeth Loftus and Melvin Guyer, entitled Who Abused Jane Doe? The Hazards of the Single Case History (26 Skeptical Inquirer 24, 37 [hereafter, the Skeptical Inquirer article].) The stated premise of the Skeptical Inquirer article is that case studies, although useful to scientists, are “bounded by the perceptions and interpretations of the storyteller” and should be used “to generate hypotheses to be tested, not as answers to questions.” (Id. at pp. 25, 26.) To illustrate their point, Loftus and Guyer provide “a case study of a case study—a cautionary tale.” (Id. at p. 26.) The case study they scrutinize is Corwin and Olafson’s Child Maltreatment article. According to the Skeptical Inquirer article, psychological researchers and clinicians disagree as to whether the human mind represses memories of traumatic experiences in such a way that these memories accurately can be recovered years later through tools such as therapy and hypnosis. The article also states that the Child Maltreatment article has been offered and accepted as proof that traumatic memories eventually can be reliably recovered. The Skeptical Inquirer article summarizes the content of the Child Maltreatment article and offers the following summary of the reactions of professionals who had read about the Jane Doe case: “Corwin’s case study was vivid and compelling. Leading scientists were persuaded by it; indeed, emotionally moved by it. Few considered any other possible explanations of Jane’s behavior at six or at seventeen. Few were skeptical that Jane really had been abused by her mother before age six, that her retrieved memories were accurate, or that ‘repression’ accounted for her forgetting what her mother supposedly had done to her. [][] But we were.” (Skeptical Inquirer article, supra, at p. 28, italics added by Court of Appeal.) The Skeptical Inquirer article related that the allegations against Jane’s mother in 1984 grew out of a contentious five-year custody battle and were made at a time when many experts were unaware that interviewers looking for evidence of sexual abuse easily could manipulate children and taint their memories. Further, the article states that Corwin had a “vested interest” in persuading others that his initial finding of sexual abuse was accurate and that “some repression-like process” had prevented Jane from recalling that abuse during the period before Corwin re-interviewed her. (Skeptical Inquirer article, supra, at p. 29.) Therefore, as Loftus and Guyer explained, “we set out on an odyssey to learn more about the case. Our investigation produced much valuable information that should assist scholars in making their own decisions about whether Jane was abused, and if so, by whom.” (Ibid.) The Skeptical Inquirer article describes how Loftus and Guyer found clues to fuel their investigation notwithstanding the fact that Corwin had disguised the case. (Skeptical Inquirer article, supra, at p. 29.) For one thing, Corwin showed videotapes of his interviews with Jane Doe at a number of professional meetings and, at some point during the interviews, Corwin used Jane’s real first name and a city where she spent some of her childhood. Using this information and other clues from the Child Maltreatment article, the authors of the Skeptical Inquirer article searched legal databases and found a published appellate court case relating to allegations that Jane’s father had failed to comply with visitation orders. (See In re William T. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 790 [218 Cal.Rptr. 420].) That case provided additional factual details about Jane Doe’s family. Further, the disclosure of the father’s first name and last initial led to a successful search for the father’s identity and, according to the authors, “from there we uncovered the full history of the custody dispute and the abuse allegations.” (Skeptical Inquirer article, supra, at p. 29.) The Skeptical Inquirer article includes its authors’ version of an accurate summary of the facts relevant to Jane Doe’s allegations of abuse. This article does not disclose Jane’s identity or the real names of persons connected to her case. It does, however, provide details about Jane’s history that were not disclosed in the Child Maltreatment article, including unfavorable information about Jane’s father and stepmother. Many of the details concerning Jane’s history that are disclosed in the Skeptical Inquirer article were obtained through interviews conducted by or on behalf of the authors of the latter article. Jane’s biological mother was interviewed. She continued to deny the allegations of abuse and, according to defendant authors, was “eager for us to visit” and “told us a few things, of course from her perspective, that never appeared in any of Corwin’s accounts of this case.” (Skeptical Inquirer article, supra, at p. 30.) The Skeptical Inquirer article summarizes the mother’s story and also reports that the maternal grandmother’s best friend and Jane’s older brother concur that Jane never was abused by her mother. The article also discloses that, after Corwin reviewed with 17-year-old Jane the allegations of abuse, Jane severed all contact with her mother. Jane’s foster mother, also interviewed for the Skeptical Inquirer article, allegedly described how Jane was “extremely distressed” when she came to live with her. (Skeptical Inquirer article, supra, at p. 31.) Jane’s father had had a heart attack and could not care for her; Jane’s stepmother (who had divorced Jane’s father long ago) was out of the picture, and Jane wanted to “put the ‘puzzle pieces’ of her past together.” (Ibid.) Jane’s foster mother helped Jane contact her biological mother but reported that the renewed relationship was destroyed after Corwin “entered the picture.” (Ibid.) Jane’s foster mother opined that viewing the tapes convinced Jane the abuse had occurred, and that the interview with Corwin dramatically changed Jane: “She went into herself. She became depressed. She started behaving in self-destructive ways, and soon left FosterMom’s home.” (Ibid.) According to this article, Jane’s foster mother wondered whether Jane had rejected her because “of the older woman’s strict rules against staying out late and misbehavior, or because she was trying to run away from her own misery.” (Id. at p. 32.) Jane’s foster mother also wondered whether viewing the tapes was a mistake. Jane’s stepmother, who also was interviewed for the article, allegedly “volunteered that the way they [that is, Jane’s father and stepmother] got Jane away from Mom was ‘the sexual angle.’ ” (Skeptical Inquirer article, supra, at p. 32.) During the interview, the stepmother displayed continuing and serious animosity toward Jane’s mother, accusing her of such things as being a “prostitute” and a “ ‘leech’ ” who “always had her hand out.” (Ibid.) According to the article, Jane’s stepmother described how she and Jane’s father “ ‘documented’ ” their case against Jane’s mother by, for example, bringing Jane to two hospitals to have her feet examined to support the foot burning allegation. (Ibid.) The stepmother also reported that, when Jane was between the ages of four and nine years, Jane spoke to her about the sexual abuse she had endured. The Skeptical Inquirer article includes personal information concerning Jane’s stepmother’s marital history and legal problems. The authors of the article maintained this information was relevant because Corwin used comparable information regarding Jane’s mother to discredit her credibility. In this article, defendants Loftus and Guyer offer several reasons why they doubt that Jane Doe was physically or sexually abused by her mother, including: (1) six-year-old Jane’s reports of abuse were inconsistent; (2) the credibility of Jane’s father was not superior to that of Jane’s mother in terms of marital stability, criminal history, and other behavior; and (3) at least one expert who conducted a thorough contemporaneous investigation doubted that any abuse had occurred. The Skeptical Inquirer article also questions whether 17-year-old Jane’s memory of an alleged prior event was, in fact, a recovered memory. The authors note, for example, that the evidence indicating that Jane had spoken about the allegations with her stepmother and others during the years between the 1984 interviews and the 1995 interview “undermin[es] claims of massive repression or dissociation.” (Skeptical Inquirer article, supra, at p. 32.) Further, according to this article, “[t]o the extent that Jane’s memory can be regarded as an instance of a recovered, accurate memory, there must be some objective and independent corroboration of the events she purports to remember.” (Skeptical Inquirer article, supra, at pp. 37, 38.) The authors suggest for several reasons that the required corroboration does not exist: (1) Corwin’s original clinical evaluation was neither objective nor reliable; (2) there is no evidence to support the allegation that Jane’s mother burned Jane’s feet; indeed, the authors’ own research supported the conclusion that, if Jane’s feet had been burned, the injury would have been documented by the hospitals where Jane was taken or by child protective services, and no such documentation existed; (3) there is no evidence, prior allegation, or even reference in the reports or the evidence to support Jane’s supposed recollection that she previously had accused her mother of taking pornographic pictures of her and her brother; and (4) the emotion and personal details captured on the videotapes of the 1984 interviews could persuade not just knowledgeable scientists but Jane herself that the abuse had occurred even if it never had. The Skeptical Inquirer article contains a postscript in which defendants Loftus and Guyer describe “unexpected” resistance to their efforts to “critically evaluate” Corwin’s claim that Jane Doe recovered a repressed memory. (Skeptical Inquirer article, supra, at pp. 37, 40.) Defendants contend that critics of their inquiry impeded the publication of their work and that even their respective universities warned them not to publish any of the material they had gathered, “even that which is in the public domain and readily found by anyone with access to a modem and Google search engine.” (Ibid.) The authors stated: “We are alarmed on behalf of all members of the academic community that our universities, institutions that above all others should be championing the right to free speech and academic debate, so implacably opposed it in this instance.” (Ibid.) 3. The 2002 Tavris Article In addition to the second part of the Loftus and Guyer article, the July/August 2002 issue of the Skeptical Inquirer contained an accompanying article entitled The High Cost of Skepticism by Carol Tavris (26 Skeptical Inquirer 41; hereafter the Tavris article). In this article, Tavris .posits that the power wielded by university institutional review boards (IRB’s) stifles scientific inquiry and progress, and threatens the very foundation of the “skeptical movement.” (Tavris article, supra, at p. 42.) To illustrate her point, Tavris focuses on the authors of the Skeptical Inquirer article summarized above: “The story of what happened to Elizabeth Loftus and Mel Guyer when they set out to investigate the case of Jane Doe is itself,” Tavris contends, “a case study of the high cost of skepticism.” (Ibid.) According to the Tavris article, the authors of the Skeptical Inquirer article decided to examine the Jane Doe case and Corwin’s “alleged evidence of a recovered memory of sexual abuse,” because the “stakes were high for their work as scholars, teachers, and expert witnesses, because the case was already being used in court as evidence that recovered memories of sexual abuse in childhood are reliable.” (Tavris article, supra, at p. 42.) According to this article, Loftus and Guyer were encouraged to pursue their story after finding that documents in the public record were inconsistent with the Child Maltreatment article. The Tavris article describes how Loftus and Guyer were treated by the IRB’s at the universities where they were employed. The IRB at the University of Michigan, where Guyer was employed, allegedly took the position initially that its approval for this project was unnecessary, because Guyer would not be doing “human subjects research,” but then reversed its position a month later, when it “disapproved” the project and recommended that Guyer be reprimanded. (Tavris article, supra, at p. 42.) Then, several months later, a new chair of the IRB determined that this project was exempt from IRB consideration because it did not involve human subjects research, and found there was no basis for recommending a reprimand. According to the Tavris article, Loftus and Guyer were encouraged by the “green light given to Guyer at Michigan” and continued their investigation until the University of Washington, where Loftus was employed, received an e-mail from Jane Doe complaining that her privacy was being violated. (Tavris article, supra, at p. 42.) Tavris’s article offered the following explanation as to why the University of Washington should have rejected Jane Doe’s complaint out of hand: “Considering that David Corwin had published his account of her life and was traveling around the country showing videotapes of Jane at six and seventeen, and considering that no one was making her story public (and hence violating her ‘privacy’) except Jane herself and Corwin, this complaint should have been recognized as a cry from a troubled and vulnerable young woman, and set aside.” (Id. at pp. 42-43.) Instead, Tavris reports, the “investigation” conducted by the University of Washington lasted more than 21 months, consisted of a series of shifting charges against Loftus, often kept secret from her, and was fueled by improper outside influences. These influences included a scathing memorandum drafted by a member of the University of Michigan’s IRB who was critical of Guyer, as well as the litigation strategies of opposing counsel in an out-of-state court case in which Loftus was a defense expert and Corwin was a plaintiff’s expert. Ultimately, Tavris reports, Loftus was exonerated of charges of “scholarly misconduct,” and the University of Washington concluded that her investigation of the Jane Doe case did not constitute human subjects research. Even then, however, Loftus’s employer, the University of Washington, instructed her not to contact Jane Doe’s mother again, or to interview anyone else in the case without advance approval. The Tavris article describes Jane Doe as “an unhappy young woman whose life has been filled with conflict and loss.” (Tavris article, supra, at p. 43.) It characterizes Corwin as a man “who has publicly promoted his case study as a personal vindication and a prototype of how recovered memories should be studied” (ibid.) while presenting Loftus and Guyer as heroes whose “courage, persistence, and integrity” made them “willing to ‘offend’ in the pursuit of truth and justice.” (Ibid.) [End of adopted excerpt Court of Appeal opinion.] B. First Amended Complaint On February 13, 2003, a few months after the publication of the Skeptical Inquirer and Tavris articles, plaintiff filed the initial complaint in this proceeding against Loftus, Guyer, Tavris, the Skeptical Inquirer, the University of Washington, and Shapiro Investigations, a private investigation company that had performed some investigation services for Loftus. In the initial paragraph of the complaint, plaintiff identified herself as “Lieutenant Junior Grade Nicole S. Taus, also known as ‘Jane Doe’ in publications referred to herein.” As far as the record reveals, the filing of the complaint was the first occasion on which “Jane Doe’s” true identity was publicly disclosed. The complaint also disclosed other personal information about plaintiff, including the names of her parents, the year she was bom, and the city where she was raised. On March 6, 2003, prior to any response by defendants, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, adding CSICOP (the publisher of Skeptical Inquirer) and the Center for Inquiry West (an affiliate of CSICOP) as defendants. The first amended complaint, which is the operative complaint for purposes of the present proceeding, sets forth four causes of action. The first cause of action alleged that all defendants were liable to plaintiff for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The complaint asserted that defendants had “misused their knowledge and skills as psychologists, researchers [,] and writers and exploited plaintiff when they knew or should have known that plaintiff had a background and personal history of abuse so as to make her extremely susceptible to emotional abuse, slander, libel and exploitation.” The second cause of action, also directed at all defendants, sought recovery for invasion of privacy. The complaint maintained that plaintiff is not a public figure and has a constitutional and statutory right to privacy, particularly with respect to her medical history and juvenile court records. The complaint asserted that defendants obtained private information about plaintiff both legally and by false representations and published that information, including statements about plaintiff that are not truthful. In particular, the complaint alleged that defendants employed fraudulent means to obtain private information from plaintiff’s relatives, including misrepresenting their identity and befriending plaintiff’s biological mother. The third cause of action, directed at Loftus and the University of Washington, sought recovery for fraud. The fraud claim against Loftus was based on allegations that Loftus made misrepresentations to plaintiff’s relatives and friends in order to obtain private information about her, and the claim against the University of Washington apparently rested on allegations that the university falsely had represented to plaintiff that the process under which she filed an ethics complaint against Loftus with the university would be confidential. Finally, the fourth cause of action, directed against Loftus and Tavris, sought recovery for defamation. The complaint alleged that Loftus and Tavris made oral and written statements about plaintiff “designed to suggest that she was unhappy, vulnerable, and of questionable fitness for her duty as an officer in the military.” The claim against Tavris related solely to statements in the Tavris article. The claim against Loftus was based both on statements in the Skeptical Inquirer article and on “public and disparaging statements about plaintiff” allegedly made by Loftus after the publication of the Skeptical Inquirer, including Loftus’s alleged remark at a professional conference that “Jane Doe engaged in destructive behavior that I cannot reveal on advice of my attorney. Jane is in the Navy representing our country.” C. The Motion to Strike On May 13, 2003, defendants Loftus, Guyer, Tavris, the Skeptical Inquirer, CSICOP, and the Center for Inquiry West filed a motion pursuant to the anti-SLAPP provisions of section 425.16 to strike the first amended complaint; Shapiro Investigations subsequently joined in the motion. The motion to strike was accompanied by a variety of exhibits and declarations. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to strike, maintaining that section 425.16 is inapplicable because statements about her are not matters of legitimate public concern and that, in any event, the declarations and other materials accompanying the opposition demonstrate a probability that she would prevail on the merits of each of her claims. Defendants filed a reply to the opposition, attaching additional declarations and exhibits. After consideration of the motion, opposition, and reply, and the accompanying declarations and exhibits, the trial court denied the motion to strike the causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy. The trial court granted the motion to strike the cause of action for fraud against Loftus but denied the motion as to that cause of action against the University of Washington, and granted the motion to strike the cause of action for defamation against Tavris, but denied the motion as to that claim against Loftus. All defendants that had filed the motion to strike appealed from those portions of the trial court’s ruling permitting the majority of plaintiff’s claims to proceed. Plaintiff did not appeal from the portions of the trial court’s ruling striking the fraud cause of action against Loftus and the defamation cause of action against Tavris, and accordingly those portions of the trial court’s ruling were not before the Court of Appeal and are not before us. D. The Court of Appeal’s Decision In analyzing the validity of the trial court’s ruling on the motion to strike, the Court of Appeal turned initially to the terms of the anti-SLAPP statute, section 425.16, and in particular to subdivision (b)(1) of that provision, which provides: “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” As the Court of Appeal recognized, past cases establish that in ruling on a section 425.16 motion to strike, a court generally should engage in a two-step process: “First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. ... If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.4th 53, 67 (Equilon).) In undertaking the first step of the analysis—namely, determining whether the conduct or activity of defendants that gave rise to plaintiff’s claims was activity in furtherance of defendants’ right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue—the Court of Appeal noted that section 425.16, subdivision (e) defines such activity as including “any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest” as well as “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3) & (4), italics added.) The Court of Appeal then pointed out that “the statements and conduct which gave rise to [plaintiff’s] causes of action relate specifically to the validity of the Jane Doe case study which was the subject of the Child Maltreatment article and, more generally, to the question whether childhood memories of traumatic sexual abuse can be repressed and later recovered (the repressed memory theory).” The appellate court further observed that the record before the trial court “contains considerable evidence of both (1) an ongoing controversy in academic and clinical circles within the field of psychology as to the validity of the repressed memory theory, and (2) that the publications at the root of this litigation are part of this ongoing debate.” In light of these circumstances, the Court of Appeal concluded that the activities of defendants that gave rise to plaintiff’s action—that is, investigating, publishing, and speaking about the subjects of their magazine articles—were acts in furtherance of defendants’ right of free speech for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. The Court of Appeal then turned to the second step of the section 425.16 analysis—namely, whether plaintiff had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on each of the claims that the trial court had declined to dismiss. Because the remaining claims that are now before this court can best be understood in light of the Court of Appeal’s discussion and disposition of all of plaintiff’s claims, we shall summarize that court’s analysis of the potential merit of each of the claims that the trial court declined to dismiss. 1. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress With respect to the first cause of action—for negligent infliction of emotional distress—the Court of Appeal concluded that the complaint failed to “articulate any theory of negligence that might apply in this case.” The appellate court noted that although plaintiffs appellate brief contained “an extremely vague argument that [defendants] breached their ethical obligations by violating applicable professional standards,” plaintiff had failed to “identify a single ethical obligation or professional standard that was allegedly breached. Instead, she contends that [defendants] have essentially conceded that publishing the Skeptical Inquirer article constituted a violation of the ethical obligations of a psychologist. Not surprisingly, [defendants] concede no such thing.” Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a probability that she would prevail on her negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress theory, and held that this claim must be stricken. 2. Invasion of Privacy With regard to the second cause of action—for invasion of privacy—the Court of Appeal determined that the allegations in the first amended complaint potentially implicated two distinct invasion-of-privacy torts—(1) the tort of improper public disclosure of private facts, and (2) the tort of improper intrusion into private matters (see generally Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 200, 214-242 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469] (Shulman))—and it separately discussed the viability of these two distinct tort theories. a. Public-disclosure-of-private-facts Tort As to the public-disclosure-of-private-facts tort, the Court of Appeal indicated that the complaint identified three allegedly improper disclosures: (1) the Skeptical Inquirer article, (2) the Tavris article, and (3) statements that Loftus made in other contexts. Noting that past cases had established that “lack of newsworthiness is an element of the ‘private facts’ tort, making newsworthiness a complete bar to common law liability” for this tort (Shulman, supra, 18 Ca.4th 200, 215), the Court of Appeal initially determined that neither the complaint nor the material submitted in conjunction with the motion to strike “identified any private fact that was revealed in the Skeptical Inquirer or Tavris articles which is not newsworthy.” The court found in this regard that “[t]o the extent these articles disclosed private information about [plaintiff’s] past that was not already disclosed in the Child Maltreatment article, these facts related to the validity of Corwin’s conclusions that [plaintiff] was abused by her mother, repressed the memory of sexual abuse and then recovered that memory 11 years later,” and that “the role of the Jane Doe case study in the repressed memory debate made the validity of that case study a matter of legitimate public interest.” Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held that plaintiff had not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the private-facts tort with regard to any of the disclosures made in either the Skeptical Inquirer or Tavris articles. At the same time, however, the Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiff had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on a private-facts tort theory with regard to statements that Loftus had made in other contexts. The Court of Appeal noted in this regard that “there is evidence in the record that Loftus made the following statement at an October 2002 professional conference: ‘Jane Doe engaged in destructive behavior that I cannot reveal on advice of my attorney. Jane is in the Navy representing our country,’ ” and that “[t]here is also evidence that Loftus revealed the first and last initial of [plaintiff’s] real name during a deposition in an unrelated court action.” The Court of Appeal concluded that “[t]hese comments publicly disclose private information about Taus which is not newsworthy. They do not relate in any way to the validity of the Jane Doe study, the repressed memory debate or to any other matter of legitimate public interest. They are clues to the true identity of Jane Doe and, under the circumstances, a reasonable jury could find that disclosing this information was both offensive and objectionable.” Accordingly, although the Court of Appeal concluded that the private-facts tort could not proceed with regard to any disclosures in the Skeptical Inquirer or Tavris articles themselves, the appellate court held that plaintiff had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on a private-facts tort theory against Loftus on the basis of statements relating to plaintiff that Loftus allegedly made at a professional conference and during a deposition in an unrelated court action. b. Intrusion-into-private-matters Tort With regard to the intrusion-into-private-matters tort, under which liability may be imposed for an intrusion into a “private place, conversation, or matter ... in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person” (Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 231), the Court of Appeal found that plaintiff “has identified three alleged intrusions into her zone of privacy: (1) establishing a friendship with [plaintiff’s] biological mother in order to obtain personal information about [plaintiff]; (2) securing interviews with friends and family through fraudulent means; and (3) collecting and disseminating confidential information about [plaintiff] from various court files.” The Court of Appeal separately analyzed each of these alleged intrusions. With regard to the initial alleged intrusion, the appellate court held that “[t]he friendship between Loftus and [plaintiff’s] mother is not an intrusion into [plaintiff’s] private life.” The court explained that “[t]he subjects that [plaintiff’s] mother discussed with Loftus were not private to [plaintiff] because they also obviously involved [plaintiff’s] mother,” and that “[plaintiff’s] mother has as much right to share her story with Loftus as [plaintiff] has to share the details of her life with Corwin.” Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded that Loftus’s conduct in befriending plaintiff’s mother did not support a cause of action for improper intrusion. With regard to plaintiffs’ claim that defendants could be held liable for improper intrusion into private matters by conducting interviews with plaintiff’s relatives or friends by fraudulent means, however, the Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence presented by defendant was sufficient to support the imposition of liability on this theory. The appellate court relied on a declaration of plaintiff’s foster mother, Margie Cantrell, that alleged: “Loftus contacted [Cantrell] in late 1997, told her she [Loftus] was working with Corwin to help [plaintiff], and requested that Cantrell come to an office to answer some questions. Cantrell stated that she accepted the invitation because she knew Corwin and she knew that [plaintiff] trusted him and because she wanted to help [plaintiff]. Cantrell further stated that when she met Loftus, Loftus welcomed her, ‘saying again that she was working with Dr. Corwin and was actually his supervisor in connection with his study of [plaintiff].’ ” The Court of Appeal stated that “Cantrell’s declaration is undisputed evidence that [defendants] penetrated a zone of privacy which included Cantrell, who was not only a close friend and confidant of [plaintiff’s] but also a mother figure to her, by misrepresenting their identity and true purpose. Appellants contend that only Cantrell has standing to pursue a claim based on these alleged misrepresentations. We agree that [plaintiff] cannot use this evidence to support her fraud claim. On the other hand, this evidence is relevant to show that [defendants] intruded into a private area of [plaintiff’s] life. Indeed, this evidence actually suggests that [defendants] were aware that the information they sought was private and that it would not have been shared with them had they been truthful about the nature and purpose of their investigation.” Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiff had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on an intrusion-into-private-matters tort on the basis of Lotus’s alleged misrepresentations to Cantrell. With respect to plaintiff’s claim that defendants had engaged in an improper intrusion into private matters by obtaining private information from court records, the Court of Appeal explained that plaintiff actually had advanced two distinct arguments in this regard. First, plaintiff argued that defendants had engaged in improper intrusion in gathering information about her “from documents, such as medical and [child protective services] reports, which, although contained in files open to the public, were of a confidential nature.” The Court of Appeal found that this portion of plaintiff’s claim lacked merit, relying on our holding in Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 231, that there can be “ ‘no liability for the examination of a public record concerning the plaintiff.’ ” Second, the Court of Appeal noted that plaintiff also argued that defendants had obtained private information about her from documents contained within her juvenile dependency file. Because such files are not open to the public, but rather are confidential, the Court of Appeal concluded that defendants could be held liable for improper intrusion if they improperly had obtained access to plaintiff’s confidential juvenile court records. Although defendants vigorously maintained that “any medical or psychological reports they obtained came from the Stanislaus County divorce proceeding”—a public record—and pointed out that plaintiff had failed to adduce any evidence that defendants had accessed plaintiff’s confidential juvenile court records in Solano County, the Court of Appeal, relying upon a statement in a declaration from the owner of Shapiro Investigations that one of his employees had copied “voluminous public records” at the Solano County courthouse that may have been relevant to the Jane Doe case, concluded that the record contained sufficient evidence from which “a jury could reasonably infer that some form of trickery or misconduct was employed” to obtain confidential files in Solano County. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiff’s improper-intrusion-into-private-matters claim could go forward insofar as it was based on defendants’ conduct in gaining improper access to, and using information derived from, plaintiff’s confidential juvenile court files. 3. Defamation Finally, the Court of Appeal examined whether plaintiff had established a probability of prevailing on her defamation claim against defendant Loftus. In addressing this issue, the appellate court noted that the defamation claim was based on five distinct statements—three that appeared in the Skeptical Inquirer article, and two that Loftus allegedly had made in other contexts. The Court of Appeal found that none of the first four challenged statements properly could support a defamation claim, but concluded that the defamation action could proceed with regard to the final statement challenged by plaintiff. In analyzing the defamation claim, the Court of Appeal turned first to the three statements in the Skeptical Inquirer article that plaintiff asserted provided a proper basis for a defamation action. The statements in question, as set forth by the Court of Appeal, are as follows: “(1) After Jane met with Corwin and viewed the tapes, ‘she started behaving in self-destructive ways, and soon left FosterMom’s home.’ [f] (2) ‘Jane terminated her newly emerging relationship with her mother after Corwin came back into her life and replayed her childhood tape. Her mother lost her once, long ago in 1984, and lost her again in 1995. At this writing they are not in contact with one another.’ [][] (3) ‘If the abuse never happened in the first place, the adult-child may be mistakenly led to believe that it did because she does not understand that there are reasons why a child might make an abuse report even when no abuse had occurred. She may be led to act on the basis of this “new information” in ways that she would not have otherwise acted, with results devastating for her and others. In this case, for example, Jane terminated her newly re-forming relationship with her mother after seeing her childhood tapes.’ ” The Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate either that any express factual assertion in any of these three statements is false or that the statements reasonably could be construed as implying one or more falsehoods about her. With respect to the first statement, the court rejected plaintiff’s assertion that the statement reasonably could be construed as stating that plaintiff had physically injured herself and had run away from home, observing instead that “the statement relates to Jane’s foster mother’s recollection about Jane’s change in behavior after she viewed the tapes, which included such things as expressing anger toward the foster mother and refusing to follow ‘strict rules against staying out late and misbehavior’ ”— conduct that, as the appellate court noted, plaintiff “has not denied engaging in.” With respect to the second and third statements from the Skeptical Inquirer article, the Court of Appeal concluded that the false implication to which plaintiff suggested the statements gave rise—that viewing the videotapes had caused plaintiff to terminate her relationship with her biological mother when, plaintiff asserts, it was “Loftus’s own interference” that caused the subsequent rift between her and her biological mother—was actually a subjective “expressionQ of opinion . . . that could be drawn from facts presented in both the Child Maltreatment and the Skeptical Inquirer articles,” and, as such, could not support a defamation action against Loftus. The Court of Appeal then turned to the first statement not contained in the Skeptical Inquirer article that plaintiff claimed was defamatory. On June 14, 2001, prior to the publication of that article and while the University of Washington’s investigation of plaintiff’s ethics complaint against Loftus’s investigatory activities was ongoing, Loftus made the following statement during a speech to the annual meeting of the American Psychological Society in Toronto: “I continue to be the target of efforts to censor my ideas. I am gagged at the moment and may not give you the details. . . . Who after all benefits from my silence? Who benefits from such investigations in the dark? The only people who operate in the dark are thieves, assassins and cowards.” The Court of Appeal found that “[u]nder the circumstances, no reasonable person who heard this statement on June 14, 2001, could have interpreted it as a statement of actual fact concerning [plaintiff]. Because this statement was made before the Skeptical Inquirer article was published, it is unlikely anyone even connected it to Jane Doe.” Moreover, the Court of Appeal found that even after the publication of the Skeptical Inquirer article, “any reasonable person would understand Loftus’s colorful statement as the rhetoric of an agitated advocate whose efforts to promote a professional theory were thwarted by those who disagreed with her. As used in this way, the terms ‘thieves, assassins and cowards’ are nothing more than ‘ “subjective expressions of disapproval, devoid of factual content.” ’ ” Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded that the June 14, 2001 statement would not support a defamation claim. With respect to the last statement of Loftus on which plaintiff’s defamation claim was based, however, the Court of Appeal concluded that the defamation claim should be permitted to go forward. The statement in question was the same statement allegedly made by Loftus at the October 2002 professional conference that the Court of Appeal previously had found could support an action for improper public disclosure of private facts. As noted above, Loftus allegedly stated at the conference that “Jane Doe engaged in destructive behavior that I cannot reveal on advice of my attorney. Jane is in the Navy representing our country.” In the Court of Appeal’s view, these remarks were not “an expression of opinion or a subjective professional judgment drawn from fully disclosed facts” but rather “could reasonably be interpreted as implying that [plaintiff’s] ongoing destructive behavior or the effects of past behavior make her unfit for military service”—a defamatory implication. Moreover, the Court of Appeal concluded that “in contrast to the statements made in the Skeptical Inquirer article, this statement does not relate to a matter of public interest. It has no bearing on the validity of the Jane Doe case study or on any aspect of the controversy relating to the repressed memory theory.” In light of its determination that “the public has no legitimate interest in that matter,” the Court of Appeal concluded that “the truth of the alleged statement is a defense with respect to which Loftus has the burden of proof,” and because Loftus had not presented any evidence that plaintiff had engaged in behavior that made her unfit for military service, the appellate court held that the record demonstrated a probability that plaintiff would prevail on her claim for defamation based on Loftus’s October 2002 statement. 4. Court of Appeal’s Conclusion- In sum, although the Court of Appeal concluded that the majority of plaintiff’s claims against defendants should have been dismissed, it held that the action could go forward with respect to (1) a cause of action for improper public disclosure of private facts based upon Loftus’s alleged statement at the October 2002 professional conference and Loftus’s disclosure of plaintiff’s initials during a deposition in an unrelated case, (2) a cause of action for improper intrusion into private matters based upon Loftus’s alleged misrepresentations to plaintiff’s foster mother and upon defendants’ alleged intrusion into confidential juvenile court files, and (3) a cause of action for defamation based upon Loftus’s alleged statement at the October 2002 professional conference. E. Petition for Review and Issues Before This Court After the Court of Appeal issued its opinion, only defendants petitioned for review in this court, raising contentions relating solely to those claims as to which the Court of Appeal had found that defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion properly was denied. Because plaintiff did not petition for review or file an answer contesting any issue on which the Court of Appeal ruled against her, we have no occasion to address any such issue here. Accordingly, the only issues before us are whether the Court of Appeal properly concluded that dismissal under the anti-SLAPP statute was improper with regard to plaintiff’s claims relating to the following four incidents or conduct allegedly engaged in by one or more of the defendants: 1. Loftus’s statement at the October 2002 professional seminar (relating to Jane Doe’s position in the military), which the Court of Appeal concluded could support either (a) a cause of action for public disclosure of private facts, or (b) a cause of action for defamation. 2. Loftus’s disclosure of plaintiff’s initials during a deposition in March 2003, a disclosure that the Court of Appeal concluded would support, along with Loftus’s statements at the October 2002 seminar, a cause of action for public disclosure of private facts. 3. Defendants’ collection of information from court records, which the Court of Appeal concluded would support a cause of action for improper intrusion into private matters. 4. Loftus’s alleged misrepresentation of her relationship with Corwin in obtaining information about plaintiff from plaintiff’s foster mother, which the Court of Appeal concluded would support a cause of action for improper intrusion into private matters. We begin by discussing the standard that governs the determination of a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute, and then turn to the application of that standard to each of the four incidents in question. II As explained above, this appeal is from a trial court ruling on a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) provides in relevant part: “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” As the Court of Appeal recognized, in applying the statute a court generally is required to engage in a two-step process: “First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. ... If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) Here, we believe there can be no question but that defendants’ general course of conduct from which plaintiff’s cause of action arose was clearly activity “in furtherance of [defendants’] exercise of . . . free speech ... in connection with a public issue” within the meaning of section 425.16. As the initial Child Maltreatment article itself makes abundantly clear, at the time of defendants’ actions there was a substantial controversy in the mental health field regarding whether, and under what circumstances, a victim of c