Full opinion text
Opinion GEORGE, C. J. Following the guilt phase of defendant’s murder trial, a Fresno County jury found defendant Dexter Winfred Williams guilty of the first degree murder of Miguel Gonzalez (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189) and determined that in the commission of the offense, he used a deadly weapon. (§ 12022, subd. (b).) The jury found true the special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery and in the course of a kidnapping. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (B).) The jury also found defendant guilty of the robbery and kidnapping for the purpose of robbery of Miguel Gonzalez and David Bush (§§ 209, subd. (b), 211), and further found that in the commission of these offenses, defendant used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)) and inflicted great bodily injury. (§ 12022.7.) The jury also found defendant guilty of the false imprisonment of Michael and Rosanna Beckham (§ 236) and not guilty of the rape of Rosanna Beckham (§ 261). At the conclusion of the guilt phase, the court determined that defendant had served two prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) Following the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for new trial and motion to reduce the penalty pursuant to section 190.4, subdivision (e), and imposed a judgment of death as well as sentence on the noncapital offenses. This appeal is automatic. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; § 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the judgment in its entirety. I. FACTS A. GUILT PHASE EVIDENCE 1. The Prosecution’s Case a. The events of February 16 to 18, 1991 On February 16, 1991, defendant, then 29 years of age, and his cousin, Jerry Franklin, arrived in Fresno by Greyhound bus from Northern California. Defendant telephoned the residence of his former wife, Cora Drake, to request transportation to her residence. Cora shared her home, located on North Roosevelt Street in the City of Fresno, with her sons David, then 18 years of age, and James, then 4 years of age. David Drake answered defendant’s telephone call and agreed to give defendant a ride from the bus station to the Drakes’ residence. David invited a friend, Michael Beckham, then 21 years of age (who, together with his 19-year-old wife, Rosanna Beckham, was staying at the Drakes’ residence), to join him. David Drake and Michael Beckham took a cab to the bus station, where they met defendant and Franklin and returned with them to the Drakes’ residence. On the afternoon of February 17, 1991, defendant and Franklin began shaping pieces of wax to resemble cocaine rocks so they could sell them as counterfeit drugs. Franklin thereafter suggested that defendant, Michael Beckham, David Drake, and another houseguest, Steve Elias, lure victims into an alley behind the Drakes’ residence for the purpose of robbing them. Michael Beckham offered to pose as a hitchhiker in order to lure homosexual men to drive into the alley, where the others could rob them. Michael Beckham lured one victim as planned and defendant, Franklin, David Drake, and Elias beat him into unconsciousness. Defendant took the victim’s wallet, then retrieved various articles from the man’s vehicle, including spiked bracelets, two sets of handcuffs, and a hydraulic jack for a vehicle. Defendant distributed the cash from the victim’s wallet and gave Michael Beckham $10. Another victim was approached in the same way but drove off when defendant emerged from the bushes and displayed his genitals. A third incident occurred at approximately 11:00 p.m. on February 17, 1991, when Michael Beckham lured David Bush into the alley in his vehicle and convinced him to remain there for several minutes. Michael left the vehicle and returned with defendant, who opened the door of Bush’s vehicle and began striking Bush on the head with a crescent wrench. Entering the vehicle, defendant pushed Bush onto the passenger seat and continued to strike him with the wrench. Defendant demanded Bush’s wallet but was angered to see it contained less than $10. While continuing to strike Bush with the wrench and threatening to shoot him if he tried to escape, defendant backed the vehicle toward the entrance of the alley, a distance Bush estimated to be approximately 100 feet. Bush escaped from the vehicle and waved down a passing automobile, which initially gave chase to defendant, then turned away. Eventually a neighborhood resident telephoned for emergency assistance for Bush. Bush suffered a broken nose and facial lacerations. At trial, he identified Michael Beckham as the hitchhiker who initially flagged him down, but in police photo lineups and at trial Bush was unable to identify defendant as his assailant. He testified that the assault on him had dislodged his glasses, leaving him unable to see clearly. That same evening, David Drake spoke on the telephone with an acquaintance, Kenny Dustin, 18 years of age. David Drake asked Dustin to come to the Drakes’ residence because defendant had “[taken] over [the] house.” David said he and his younger brother, James, were afraid of defendant. At Dustin’s request, Sara Lowmiller drove Dustin to the Drakes’ residence. As she subsequently departed from the residence, Lowmiller saw an African-American man and a White man “scuffling” in the street. The White man, his face bloodied, came to Lowmiller’s car window and asked for help. Remaining in her vehicle, Lowmiller followed the African-American man into the alley, thought better of continuing her pursuit, then drove away, returning to the Drakes’ residence. There, she summoned Dustin from the residence with her automobile horn. As she waited for Dustin, she observed the African-American man, whom she previously had seen face her, enter the Drakes’ residence. Lowmiller told Dustin that a person who appeared to be bleeding was being chased in the alley, and asked Dustin to explain what had occurred. Dustin responded that he would explain later, directing her to depart. Lowmiller did not identify defendant as the African-American man she observed that evening. Dustin, however, testified that the African-American man seen by Lowmiller was defendant. Michael Beckham testified that defendant entered the Drakes’ residence late on the evening of February 17, 1991, and .gave Michael $10 with instructions to go to a store to purchase alcohol. Angry because defendant had not given him a larger share of the robbery proceeds, Michael—accompanied by Dustin and David Drake—instead used the $10 to purchase rock cocaine, which Michael Beckham and Dustin smoked. In the early morning hours of February 18, 1991, while Michael Beckham, Dustin, and David Drake were away from the residence, defendant “corner [ed]” Michael’s wife, Rosanna Beckham, in the kitchen and attempted to touch and kiss her, then backed her into an empty bedroom, where he removed their clothes. Rosanna, a slight, short young woman, was fearful of defendant, who was much larger and who she knew had served a prison term. She testified that he initiated sexual intercourse with her over her tearful objections, but was interrupted by the ringing of the telephone. Franklin entered the room and told defendant the call was for him. Defendant left the bedroom, and Rosanna ran to the bathroom and dressed. When Rosanna heard that Michael Beckham, Dustin, and David Drake had returned to the residence, she emerged from the bathroom, entered the bedroom where the others were watching television, and sat down on the bed near defendant. Michael Beckham testified: “I could see [defendant] laying back and my old lady was sitting nervous like this . . . and [defendant’s] hands were rubbing on her, and I asked him, I said, ‘what are you doing rubbing on my wife?’ And my old lady got up and he says, T ain’t rubbing on your wife.’ ” Defendant told Michael, “Go fuck yourself.” Rosanna, with tears in her eyes, walked into the dining room, followed by Michael; she informed him that she wanted to leave. Michael asked, “what’s wrong, what’s going on? . . . [W]hat did he do, rape you? And she says—she didn’t say nothing.” A few moments later, defendant, accompanied by Franklin, began yelling at Michael Beckham, demanding the $10 Michael had received earlier in the evening. Defendant thereafter struck Michael to the ground and started kicking him. Defendant continued hitting Michael while Rosanna screamed. Defendant told Franklin to silence Rosanna, and each time Rosanna screamed Franklin struck her. Defendant produced a set of handcuffs (procured during the first robbery), handcuffed Michael Beckham’s hands behind his back, and dragged him to the back of the residence. There, in Rosanna Beckham’s presence, the beating continued; demanding money, defendant broke one of Michael’s ribs and caused other injuries. Defendant thereafter handcuffed Rosanna’s wrists behind her back, and at defendant’s request, Franklin tore off her clothes. Defendant grabbed her by the throat and lifted her from the floor. Defendant placed a knife to Michael Beckham’s neck and directed him to call his (Michael’s) mother for the purpose of obtaining $100. Crying, and bleeding from his mouth and nose, Michael telephoned his parents, begging them for the money. At one point, defendant grabbed the telephone and said Michael owed him $100 for drugs and that he wanted his money. Michael did not know why defendant had increased the debt from $10 to $100. Michael’s parents refused the request. When Franklin suggested that defendant desist, defendant replied: “Shut up. I’m in charge of this.” Betty Hills, who also was residing with her son in the Drakes’ home at the time, heard Rosanna screaming, initially believing the screams to have emanated from a television horror film. Hills asked defendant why he was hitting Rosanna, to which he replied that she had stolen $40. Hills asked, “if I give you $40, will you stop hitting her and he said yep. So he quit hitting her.... I told him I would go prostitute and get him his $40. It would take 20 minutes to get it. I would be right back. ... He told me that I hadn’t stole from him, let that bitch go make the money, she’s the one that stole. Talking about [Rosanna].. . . That I hadn’t done nothing to him. So he said [Rosanna] could go make the money.” Rosanna eventually was freed from her handcuffs and directed to dress. Defendant informed her that she would be required to “stand out on the street and pick up guys” in order to obtain money for him, and that if she refused, her husband would be killed. Although she had never engaged in prostitution, Rosanna agreed. Defendant informed Rosanna that she was to stand in the street, attract customers, and direct them to an alley where she would prostitute herself and thereafter give defendant the money. According to Dustin, Rosanna silently mouthed the words “help me” to him. Still in the early morning hours of February 18, 1991, defendant, accompanied by Dustin, took Rosanna to Belmont Street, an area known for prostitution. As the two men watched, an automobile pulled over and Rosanna entered it. The driver gave her $5, shortly after which defendant appeared and attempted to kick out the driver’s side window. The driver sped away, stopping briefly to release Rosanna. Rosanna gave defendant the $5, and in response defendant informed her that she “only had 95 more to go.” Defendant and Dustin thereafter walked Rosanna back to Belmont Street, whereupon a driver picked her up, took her to his apartment, gave her “a handful of change,” and then returned her to Belmont Street a short time later. Returning to the Drakes’ residence, Rosanna saw Michael sitting on the floor, his hands still in handcuffs behind his back. At defendant’s command, Rosanna thereafter returned to Belmont Street, where a white Chevrolet Monte Carlo driven by Miguel Gonzalez stopped, and she agreed to perform oral sex for $4. Rosanna directed Gonzalez to the alley, where he parked the automobile. Rosanna exited the vehicle and spoke briefly with defendant. At his direction, she returned to the vehicle to “take care of’ Gonzalez. As she began to remove her jacket, defendant threw a hydraulic jack—stolen during the first robbery—through the driver’s side window, shattering it and hitting Rosanna in the head. Her head bleeding profusely, Rosanna exited from the vehicle and returned to the Drakes’ residence. Gonzalez emerged from his vehicle and attempted to flee, but defendant tackled him and, according to Dustin’s preliminary hearing testimony, defendant then “stomped on the guy’s head.” Franklin joined in and “[s]tomped on him a couple more times.” Gonzalez pleaded for his assailants simply to take his money and leave him alone, and then lapsed into unconsciousness. Defendant took Gonzalez’s wallet (eventually giving Dustin $5) and dragged the victim to the trunk of the car, which Dustin opened with a screwdriver. Defendant and Franklin placed the victim inside the trunk and closed it. Defendant drove the vehicle back to the Drakes’ residence, which Dustin and Franklin entered through a back window. Because Rosanna was bleeding profusely from a cut above her eye, Franklin, Dustin, and David Drake suggested she be taken to a hospital. Defendant initially indicated such a trip was unnecessary, but changed his mind, telling Franklin and Dustin to accompany him and Rosanna to the hospital. While they were driving, Gonzalez began banging the inside of the trunk, pleading to be released. Defendant told Gonzalez to “shut up,” then asked the others where they could take him. Dustin testified that, believing defendant simply intended to leave Gonzalez somewhere and not kill him, he (Dustin) suggested they drive to a walnut orchard located behind a residence where Dustin once had resided. Defendant drove outside of town to the orchard and exited the vehicle with Dustin and Franklin. Rosanna remained in the car. Defendant opened the trunk, hit Gonzalez on the head repeatedly with the hydraulic jack, and then told Dustin to help lift the victim out of the trunk. Dustin did so, dropping Gonzalez to the ground. Defendant resumed beating Gonzalez’s head with the hydraulic jack, hitting him at least five or six times. Gonzalez attempted to crawl away, but moved only a few feet before defendant beat his head repeatedly, with a tire rim. Rosanna heard one of the men say, “I think he’s dead,” and then another voice say, “well, make sure.” Dustin watched defendant roll the body over the edge of a five-foot slope. The three men rejoined Rosanna in the automobile. Dustin asked defendant whether Gonzalez was dead. Defendant replied: “No. He’s going to wake up in the morning with a bad headache.” Defendant thereafter unsuccessfully attempted to start the car, prompting Dustin to request assistance from a friend who lived nearby. The friend helped start the vehicle, but apparently did not notice Gonzalez’s body lying nearby. Franklin suggested they take Rosanna to the hospital, but defendant refused, instead asking Dustin whether he knew where there was a party. Eventually the group drove back to the Drakes’ residence, arriving there at approximately dawn on February 18, 1991. Once inside the house, defendant told Rosanna that the police would arrive soon, so the two of them “had to go back to the bedroom and finish,” a comment that Rosanna understood to refer to the sexual assault defendant had commenced earlier. Defendant took Rosanna to a bedroom, removed their clothes, and had sexual intercourse while Rosanna cried and told him that it hurt. After speaking by telephone with her son, David, Cora Drake met David and Michael Beckham and called 911 from a nearby convenience store, meeting the responding police officers there. The police arrived at the residence shortly thereafter. Defendant directed Dustin to stall the police while he climbed out of the back bedroom window. The police had surrounded the residence, however, and defendant immediately was detained. Asked by the police to provide his name, defendant replied it was Ramon Williams. In the ensuing pat-down search, the police recovered from defendant’s pants pocket a wallet containing a California identification card bearing the name Miguel Gonzalez. The white Chevrolet Monte Carlo parked in front of the Drakes’ residence was registered to Gonzalez; the driver’s door window was shattered, and both the outside and the inside of the trunk were stained with blood. Michael Beckham testified that during a break in the testimony he gave at trial, he made eye contact with defendant, and that defendant mouthed the words, “You’re dead, fool,” a warning defendant repeated in a subsequent courtroom encounter, informing Michael, “You’re dead.” b. The police investigation Fresno Police Department Sergeant Gary Snow testified he encountered Kenny Dustin handcuffed inside a police vehicle parked near the Drakes’ residence on February 18, 1991, the morning of defendant’s arrest. After advising Dustin of his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602]), Snow informed him that a person may have been transported in the bloodstained Monte Carlo automobile, and mentioned that the individual possibly still was alive. Dustin initially informed the officer that he knew nothing about a body inside the trunk of the Monte Carlo. After receiving assurances from Snow that his statement would not be repeated to defendant and Franklin, however, Dustin implicated them. He offered to show Snow where the deceased victim was located, and thereafter accompanied Snow to the walnut orchard. There, Snow found the body of Miguel Gonzalez. Snow testified that Gonzalez’s head “was very distorted because of massive . . . injuries. . . . [I]t was difficult making out facial features because of the extent of the injuries. . . . There were blood spatters. . . . [H]e had brain matter on the ground a short distance from his head. I noticed other blood in the near vicinity of where the victim’s body was lying. The victim . . . appeared to have been either rolled or [dragged] down an embankment . . . [and] it looked like a trail of blood where he had either been rolled or [dragged]. ... I didn’t do a detailed crime scene sketch or take detailed notes but I do remember that there was a tire jack near the victim’s head and there was a tire rim, chrome rim that was lying a few feet away from the victim’s body.” Snow requested that homicide investigators be dispatched to the crime scene. Defendant, Franklin, and Dustin were arrested that morning in connection with the killing of Gonzalez, although Dustin was released shortly thereafter. Defendant had incurred recent injuries to both hands, and dried Flood was visiFle on the palm of his left hand. His shoes appeared to have dried blood on them, as well as dirt embedded in the soles. c. Forensic evidence Stephen O’Clair, a senior criminalist employed by the California Department of Justice, testified that blood of a type consistent with that of Miguel Gonzalez (and inconsistent with that of defendant, Jerry Franklin, David Bush, Michael Beckham, and Rosanna Beckham) was found on the tire jack and tire rim discovered at the crime scene, on the rear bumper of the Monte Carlo, on a cardboard carton inscribed “Miller Highlife” recovered from the trunk of the Monte Carlo, in the alley behind the Drakes’ residence, at the orchard where Gonzalez’s body was found, and on defendant’s gloves, pants, and shoes. The blood spatter found on defendant’s pants was consistent with having been caused by blows inflicted on the victim with the tire jack. Dr. Jerry Nelson performed an autopsy on the body of Miguel Gonzalez. Nelson testified that as a result of “multiple blows applied to the face and head,” the victim experienced “multiple skull fractures with the bones being pushed into the cranial cast inflicting the lacerations on the brain,” and the cause of death was “multiple lacerations or tears of his brain.” The victim’s face “had a very crushed, inward, flattened appearance. The nose was very flat, as the nasal bones and cartilage were extensively fractured.” The victim also suffered “multiple fractures in each of the cheek bones,” and at least eight lacerations to the face and head area. Asked to opine whether Gonzalez had experienced a painful death, Nelson testified, “before he lost consciousness, I’m sure that it was very painful.” Nelson equated the injuries suffered by Gonzalez to those suffered by an individual involved in a head-on automobile collision. He further testified that the injuries suffered by Gonzalez caused him to bleed so profusely “that he bled almost all of his blood out of his body.” Nelson added that the victim’s injuries were not inconsistent with those that would result from a hydraulic tire jack “forcefully applied,” or a tire rim “dropped on somebody.” d. Defendant’s interviews with the police After reading defendant his Miranda rights (.Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436), Fresno Police Department Detective Tom Sanchez conducted a taped interview of defendant shortly after the latter’s arrest on February 18, 1991, and, at defendant’s request, conducted a second taped interview on the following day. The prosecution played the audiotape recordings of these interviews for the jury, which also was provided with transcripts of the interviews. Copies of these transcripts are included in the record before us. During the first interview, Sanchez informed defendant that he was under arrest for murder and that other individuals had placed defendant at the scene of the murder. Although defendant initially declined to provide a statement, and Sanchez terminated the interview, defendant volunteered to speak a few moments later. He thereafter acknowledged having “slapped the shit out of’ Michael Beckham and having had consensual sex with Michael’s wife, Rosanna, but denied coercing her into prostitution or robbing, beating, or murdering anyone. He claimed the other witnesses falsely had accused him and Franklin, attempting to make scapegoats of them, and characterized their allegations concerning his involvement in the robberies as a “fucking lie.” Defendant asserted the injuries to his hands were “old injuries” incurred at a party in Vallejo when “some fool pull[ed] out his knife and I grabbed it.” Defendant acknowledged knowing that Miguel Gonzalez was in the trunk of the Monte Carlo, but denied knowledge of what had happened to Gonzalez thereafter, stating: “I don’t know what the fuck happened. . . . I’m going to tell you [the] straight up truth. I don’t remember dumping nobody off period.” He characterized the interrogating officer’s version of the events as “some crazy shit,” adding that “I know damn well I didn’t do a goddamn thing.” Defendant asserted: “I didn’t harm anybody. I didn’t dump anybody off neither. . . . Me and Jerry are being used for scapegoats, fuck that.” Defendant denied touching the hydraulic jack, knowing anything about the tire rim, or driving the vehicle to the orchard. He subsequently recanted the latter denial, stating that when he did exit the vehicle at the orchard, it was only to urinate. He claimed “the only fucking thing I ought to be charged with is joy riding, cause that’s the only fucking crime I’ve committed.” Asked to explain how the victim’s wallet came to be located in the pants defendant was wearing when apprehended by the police, defendant denied the pants were his own. He claimed to have been shocked when the police discovered the wallet, adding: “Because, I don’t really know if the bitch gave it to me after she got her money from it or not, okay, and see, ... I am foggy on that right now. . . .” Defendant asserted that the bloodstains on the pants he wore were “[f]rom getting the . . . battery cables.” During the second interview, conducted at defendant’s request on February 19, 1991, defendant again generally attempted to deny or minimize his involvement in the crimes. For example, he denied speaking with Michael Beckham’s mother on the telephone in an effort to obtain money, denied knowing how Rosanna Beckham received the wound to her forehead, denied wearing gloves on the night the crimes occurred, and again denied knowing how Miguel Gonzalez’s wallet appeared in the pants defendant was wearing when the police arrested him. Defendant portrayed Dustin as a key actor in the crimes: “I don’t know if Kenny [Dustin] is trying to turn State’s evidence or whatever, you know, I really don’t give a fuck because he’s implicated worse than anybody else . . . .” Defendant asserted that Dustin took the tire rim from Gonzalez’s vehicle, and added that Dustin “was beating the shit out of the guy” with “that fucking mag wheel, you know. And that’s where I was saying, man, you know, that’s unnecessary.” Defendant asserted that he had been content to leave Gonzalez alive in the orchard and let the victim “walk back to Sacramento,” but that Dustin “wanted to knock the man unconscious again and I didn’t think all that was necessary. You know, I mean, the man’s out there. He’s already bleeding. Leave him alone.” Defendant described scuffling with Dustin, because the latter was “fucking with the dude [Gonzalez]. I didn’t think it was warranted. . . .” Defendant added, “I didn’t commit no motherfucking murder, you know, I may have been there.” He called Dustin a liar who was seeking to exonerate himself by blaming defendant, describing him as “a goddamned liar, you know. He wants to keep it off himself, fine. . . . Really can’t blame the motherfucker [Dustin] but I know damn well I’m not getting ready to let him just send me down the drain for something I didn’t do.” Contradicting the statement he gave during the previous day’s interview, defendant acknowledged participating in the robbery of Gonzalez. When Sanchez stated, “what you’re telling me is that you’re guilty of everything that’s gone on, except for murder,” defendant agreed, saying, “I didn’t do anything harmful to that man [Gonzalez] other than pulling him out of the car.” Defendant added, “okay, yes. I was there. Fuck it. I’m accessory to every one of those fucking robberies.” e. Defendant’s admissions in his letter to Franklin Over defendant’s objection, the prosecution read into evidence a letter defendant wrote to Jerry Franklin, seized from the latter’s Fresno County jail cell on September 23, 1993. The letter read as follows: “Young Jay, “I just got your letter and your words and thoughts made me immediately get back to you. Listen to what I am saying because I’m coming at you with the real. Do not think that you won’t see daylight because you will and reassure your woman of this fact. “From the beginning I was never going to let you go down on this case. I know what needs to be done and the both of us don’t need to get stretched out. On my end I’m praying for life without parole. If I get the death penalty I’m hoping that the appeal will give me action. I am not faking myself out, that way I know how to deal with this. “Jay, you have to testify in order to free yourself. This is how it goes. In the long run you cop to the robbery, I’ll take the kidnap, robbery, rape, and murder. Now listen. You really won’t be copping to the actual robbery. All you be admitting to is helping Kenny [Dustin] in the alley because he couldn’t handle [the] dude. Your testimony pins Kenny for the robbery. I helped and knocked [the] dude out because he was fighting both of you. We helped Kenny put him in the trunk and at first Kenny was going to take us to go party but you and I was scared because the dude was beating on the trunk. Kenny took us out to the field and when me and him was pulling [the] dude out the trunk he got mad, because I dropped [the] dude and he started beating [the] dude with the rim because [the] dude made him look bad in the alley and we had to help him. “That bitch went with us cause she wanted to. The robberies before David [Drake], Mike [Beckham], and Elias did, we just watched. . . . [T]hat bitch remember that she was at me from the moment we got there and then the next night when her husband was gone and it was me, you, her and David, she told you that she liked me but she had never been with a Black man before. But later on you saw us kissing in the kitchen and the bedroom and then when David [Drake] put the handcuffs on you, you walked in the room and saw us and when her husband called, David knocked on the door to warn us that he was coming. There is a whole lot more but as we are going to court, I’ll tell you. “So you see to show that you wasn’t involved, you have to testify. Robbery carries three, six, and eight, and you would probably get the six but you’ll have almost three in and you won’t do no more than a year. “It is good, that Mary Lou found out the real. Jay, go ahead and marry her now that she knows what time it is[.] [I]f she still wants to be down for you give her what she wants. Tell her to come visit me. I want to let her know that it ain’t going to be easy and that she is going to have to be strong during trial and I want to let her know what it will be like being married to someone in the pen. I want to tell her to her face that I ain’t going to let you go down on this. I also want to tell her a little about the case so she can understand a little better, plus if she is going to be my cousin, I want to meet her, explain to her why I want her to come up. I need her full name too. “Jay, I haven’t told the lawyers none of the plans and . . . you must remember it’s me and you and I know you want to help but I need you out there on the streets. Russ and Cecil aren’t looking out for moms and them the way they should so you can’t be here with me. If I tell you to roll over on me, don’t question what I say, just do it. We won’t have time to do a lot of talking. “Tell Mary Lou to come visit and rush me her name back so I can put her on the list. Stay up. Dex.” 2. The Defense Case The gravamen of the defense case was to discredit Kenny Dustin’s testimony naming defendant as the actual killer of Miguel Gonzalez. Toward this end, the defense presented the testimony of several witnesses who provided evidence that Dustin was dishonest, a White supremacist, a thief, an alcohol and drug abuser, physically and emotionally abusive to his former girlfriend (who testified that she observed Dustin smoke rock cocaine one evening at the time the preliminary hearing was ongoing), and had made out-of-court statements implicating himself in the Gonzalez murder. With regard to the latter point, Dustin’s former girlfriend, Kristi Daffron (who, later in 1991, gave birth to their son when she was 17 years of age), testified that Dustin admitted to her that he kicked Gonzalez “a couple of times, then . . . smashed his head in because the guy kept spitting on his foot.” Daffron testified Dustin told her on at least two dozen occasions that he smashed Gonzalez’s head and had used “a tire jack and a tire rim” to accomplish the beating. Daffron further testified Dustin “told me when he threw me through a wall that he got away with two murders, he can get away with a third one.” Daffron recounted various instances of violent assaults and threats Dustin had inflicted on her, including when she was three months pregnant and residing with him in a hotel room paid for by the Fresno County District Attorney’s Office. Daffron recounted two occasions on which she was present when Dustin met with Fresno County Prosecutor Polacek, then assigned to prosecute defendant in the present case, and received money from him. She testified that subsequent to the preliminary hearing, Polacek gave Dustin a bus ticket to the Sacramento area, but Dustin secured a refund for the value of the ticket. Another incident of abuse occurred when Daffron was seven months pregnant. “He threatened to tie me up in the closet and leave me for dead. He said nobody would ever find me in there.” Dustin thereafter was admitted to a hospital psychiatric ward. Daffron’s father, Allen Smith, testified that after Dustin “accepted the Lord, Jesus Christ, as his savior,” Dustin admitted to Smith that he “had struck the victim several times himself . . . [on] or about the head. And he was bleeding all over and Kenny didn’t know if he was dying or dead or what, when he was beating him.” Smith recalled that Dustin had used “[a] real heavy hubcap or a tire rim or something ... he always talked about a heavy hubcap because he couldn’t find anything else or they couldn’t find anything else or something like that.” Smith also recalled Dustin informing him on four or five occasions that “I’ve already killed twice and I can take you out just as easy.” Polacek testified that he had interviewed Dustin, but considered him “strictly a witness” who had “committed no crime as far [as] I was concerned.” Polacek acknowledged he had received 30 to 40 telephone calls from Dustin, including some lengthy calls two or three weeks prior to Polacek’s trial testimony in which Dustin mentioned he had been arrested. Polacek denied that Dustin had asked for help in pending prosecutions and denied Dustin had received any deal in return for his testimony. Polacek added: “The only thing I ever told him . . . [was] ... if the statements you’ve given previously are all the truth, you won’t be charged.” “In my view,” Polacek testified, “from 1991 to the present, Mr. Dustin has no criminal culpability. And there is no point in giving somebody a deal when no deal is needed.” He acknowledged that Daffron and her parents had met with him and accused Dustin of having had a “more active role” in the homicide than previous evidence had suggested. Polacek was uncertain but believed he had not discussed with Dustin the allegations against him. Polacek did not take steps to investigate the allegations, believing them to have been motivated by animus against Dustin. At trial, the defense also presented evidence indicating that approximately three weeks prior to the preliminary hearing, Dustin had obtained financial assistance from the Fresno County District Attorney’s Office following an incident in which Dustin was robbed, his stomach slashed with a knife, and his assailants allegedly declared, “let’s see if you testify now.” Fearful, Dustin thereafter sought protection from the Fresno County District Attorney’s Office, which in response provided him with modest sums of money for groceries, lodging, and relocation expenses including a one-way bus ticket to Paradise, California. A defense investigator testified that the prosecution had not provided Daffron’s name to the defense in the early phases of discovery; rather, the investigator discovered her identity when he searched court records disclosing restraining orders that had been entered against Dustin. The investigator added that the prosecution did not provide records of payments made to Dustin by the district attorney’s office prior to his being served with a subpoena duces tecum. The defense further presented evidence indicating that a few weeks prior to the commencement of trial, Dustin was in custody on a matter unrelated to defendant’s case and so informed the Fresno County District Attorney’s Office. The defense attempted to establish that the prosecution offered Dustin a deal in order to reduce his period of incarceration for crimes unrelated to those charged in the present case, in exchange for his testimony implicating defendant in the present case. The defense established that the prosecution struck such a bargain with the witness Michael Beckham. Sergeant Snow testified for the defense that Dustin had stated during interrogation that he had gone along with defendant’s plan to rob Gonzalez and that Dustin told Snow that “the game plan was to beat the victim and rob him.” Dustin acknowledged that he knew the plan in advance and was working with defendant. The defense presented the testimony of private investigator Sanford Glickman, who, in connection with the defense of Jerry Franklin, interviewed prosecution witness Michael Beckham. Glickman recalled that Beckham had used several derogatory racial epithets when referring to defendant. Defendant did not testify. 3. The Prosecution’s Case in Rebuttal In rebuttal, the prosecution called several witnesses, primarily to demonstrate that Dustin had not been offered a deal in exchange for his testimony, and that the expenses Dustin received from the Fresno County District Attorney’s Office were not significant or unusual. The prosecution presented evidence indicating that Daffron herself was an abuser of illegal substances. Several prosecutors recounted their prosecution of Dustin for various offenses during the period preceding defendant’s trial and asserted they had handled the cases in the usual manner and had no contact with Polacek concerning these prosecutions. Polacek directed the deputy prosecutor to handle the prosecution of Dustin as he would any other case. Over defense objection, the prosecution read into the record Rosanna Beckham’s preliminary hearing testimony, in which she recalled that while sitting in the automobile at the orchard on the night of the murder, “[somebody had said that he [Gonzalez] was dead and somebody else said, well, make sure,” and that she did not believe either one of the voices was that of Kenny Dustin. On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony that Dustin had bragged about his involvement in a murder, had a history of suffering from paranoid schizophrenic depression, and had been hospitalized for “irrational behavior.” B. PENALTY PHASE EVIDENCE 1. The Prosecution’s Case The prosecution presented evidence indicating that in 1987, when defendant’s former girlfriend informed him she was returning a videocassette recorder (VCR) to a co worker from whom she had borrowed the device, defendant responded by punching her in the ribs. The prosecution also presented evidence establishing that in 1989, defendant had approached a high school student, Jennifer Wimberly, on the sidewalk in front of a delicatessen, and committed a battery with serious bodily injury upon her. The attack caused Wimberly to suffer three chipped teeth in addition to a laceration under her left eye that required six sutures to close. Wimberly testified she had never seen her assailant prior to the incident. Finally, the parties stipulated that defendant had been convicted of and served prison terms for assault with a deadly weapon in 1981 (§ 245, subd. (a)), auto theft in 1989 (Veh. Code, § 10851), and the above referenced battery with serious bodily injury upon Wimberly in 1989. (§ 243, subd. (d).) 2. The Defense Case The defense presented the testimony of several Fresno County Sheriff’s Department officers,, who described defendant as having been a good prisoner who did not present discipline or security problems. One officer described defendant as “a fairly nice fellow,” another described him as “very courteous” and “quick to respond when asked or told to do something,” and a third described defendant as “[vjery respectful. . . . He’s different—there’s some bad inmates and good inmates. He was a good one. He never gave me any problems at all.” The defense also presented the testimony of defendant’s mother, stepfather, and several other family members, who described the severe emotional impact they would suffer if defendant were executed. Finally, the defense presented the testimony of Ted Dunlap who, at the time of trial, was serving a nine-year state prison sentence for burglary. Dunlap was the victim of defendant’s assault with a deadly weapon—one of the charges to which the parties had stipulated at the close of the prosecution’s case in aggravation. Dunlap explained that he and defendant “started fighting and a gun went off and everybody ran in different ways.” Shortly after the firearm discharged, Dunlap discovered that he had been shot, although he did not know who had shot him. On cross-examination, Dunlap acknowledged that on the date of the incident, October 26, 1980, defendant was angry at him for having taken an unduly large share of the proceeds from a prior robbery they had committed together. In response to a question how the execution of defendant would impact him, Dunlap replied, “I would feel sad and hurt.” 3. The Prosecution’s Case in Rebuttal The prosecution in rebuttal presented the testimony of two Fresno County Sheriff’s Department deputies, each of whom described an incident in which defendant’s cellmate during the time of trial refused to return his dinner trays, prompting officers to shut off the water to that cell, an act that angered defendant. The two cellmates ultimately were removed from the cell, separated, and placed in other cells. One officer described defendant as initially being “a little uncooperative with the move,” but added that defendant ultimately “complied with the officers’ instructions.” The other officer testified that defendant declared, “as of Monday, anybody entering my cell, it’s on.” The latter officer interpreted defendant’s statement as a threat to correctional staff. The prosecution also read into the record the testimony of Ted Dunlap, given at the preliminary hearing in the proceedings that ultimately concluded with defendant’s conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. During that hearing, Dunlap testified that defendant “had the gun. That’s the only gun I seen. . . . Yes, I seen him with the gun.” 4. The Defense Case in Surrebuttal The defense read into the record additional testimony given by Ted Dunlap at the preliminary hearing noted immediately above. This testimony more fully described the shooting incident, including Dunlap’s subsequent trip to a hospital while accompanied by defendant until he let Dunlap out at a location near the facility. n. DISCUSSION A. GUILT PHASE ISSUES 1. Whether the Trial Court Properly Admitted the Preliminary Hearing Testimony of Kenny Dustin Defendant contends the trial court erred in determining that prosecution witness Kenny Dustin was entitled to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15), thereby rendering Dustin unavailable as a witness at the trial and leading to the introduction of Dustin’s preliminary hearing testimony into evidence. Defendant contends the alleged error constituted a violation of his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to a fair trial, and also undermined the reliability of the jury’s penalty determination. He claims violations of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and parallel provisions of the California Constitution. Two statutory provisions are particularly significant to defendant’s claim, Evidence Code sections 1291 and 240. Pursuant to Evidence Code section 1291, under various circumstances prior testimony by an unavailable witness is admissible despite the general rule excluding hearsay evidence. Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a) defines the circumstances under which a witness may be considered unavailable for the purpose of admitting the witness’s prior testimony in evidence. One such circumstance occurs when the witness properly invokes the privilege against self-incrimination at trial. (Evid. Code, § 240, subd. (a)(1).) Defendant claims first that Dustin’s preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible pursuant to Evidence Code sections 240 and 1291, because Dustin was not entitled to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination. Specifically, defendant claims, Dustin waived the privilege against self-incrimination as to all the circumstances surrounding the charged crimes. Defendant rests this claim upon the circumstance that during the in limine hearing on the admissibility of Dustin’s preliminary hearing testimony and the propriety of his invocation of the privilege, Dustin, without asserting the privilege, answered questions inquiring whether his preliminary hearing testimony was true. Second, defendant contends that the prosecution should have afforded Dustin immunity from prosecution at trial, thereby permitting Dustin to testify and forcing him to submit to defendant’s cross-examination in the presence of the jury. Defendant argues that the prosecution procured Dustin’s unavailability at trial by withholding immunity, and that for this reason, Dustin was not unavailable within the terms of Evidence Code sections 240, subdivision (a), and 1291. Defendant also contends the trial court on its own motion should have afforded Dustin immunity from prosecution. a. Factual background Dustin testified for the prosecution at the preliminary hearing without consulting an attorney concerning potential self-incrimination. The People were represented by Fresno County Deputy District Attorney Steven Polacek. At trial, represented by another deputy district attorney, the prosecution intended to call Dustin to testify during its case-in-chief. The trial court, however, appointed counsel to advise Dustin, because in its view Dustin could be viewed as a potential suspect in the murder of Miguel Gonzalez and in other crimes committed on February 17 to 18, 1991. After conferring with counsel, Dustin decided to assert his privilege against self-incrimination and to refuse to answer any questions relating to the crimes. The prosecution then announced its intention to offer into evidence the testimony given by Dustin at the preliminary hearing, under the former-testimony exception to the hearsay rule. (See Evid. Code, §§ 1200, 1291.) The court conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury in order to determine whether Dustin properly could invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, rendering him unavailable as a witness under the pertinent Evidence Code provisions. After Dustin was sworn, the prosecutor asked him several questions, including whether Dustin recalled the events of February 17 to 18, 1991, whether Dustin recalled seeing defendant at the Drakes’ residence during that period, whether Dustin recalled seeing the white Chevrolet Monte Carlo parked near the residence, whether Dustin recalled defendant beating Miguel Gonzalez with a tire jack, and whether Dustin recalled traveling to the area where the victim’s body was dumped. Dustin refused to answer each question, expressly grounding his refusal on the privilege against self-incrimination. In response to the prosecutor’s inquiry whether he had testified truthfully at the preliminary hearing, Dustin responded affirmatively. On cross-examination, when defense counsel inquired of Dustin whether he intended to respond to any questions regarding the period February 17 to 18, 1991, Dustin replied, “No. I plead the Fifth.” Defense counsel asked Dustin whether he intended to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege “with respect to any questions that are asked of you about. . . those dates.” Dustin responded, “Yes.” In response to additional questions posed by defense counsel to Dustin regarding specific crimes committed against Miguel Gonzalez, Dustin repeatedly invoked the privilege. In response to defense counsel’s question, Dustin again asserted that the testimony he gave at the preliminary hearing had been complete and truthful. The defense objected to the admission of Dustin’s preliminary hearing testimony, claiming that defendant’s right to representation by counsel free of conflict of interest had been violated at the preliminary hearing. Specifically, defendant alleged that his own counsel at the preliminary hearing had a conflict of interest, because she was a member of the public defender’s office and another deputy from the same office had represented Dustin on a prior occasion when Dustin had been charged with a battery in violation of section 242. Initially, defendant contended that because of the conflict, he did not have an appropriate opportunity to cross-examine Dustin at the preliminary hearing. The defense also contended that, when Dustin testified at the in limine hearing at trial that he had testified truthfully at the preliminary hearing, he thereby waived his privilege against self-incrimination, and that as a consequence he was available as a witness and his prior testimony was inadmissible. At a hearing held in response to the claim of conflict, the deputy public defender who had represented defendant at the preliminary hearing testified that she had been unaware at the time of the hearing that her office ever had represented Dustin and that her representation of defendant had been as vigorous as it would have been had her office never represented Dustin. Defendant’s trial counsel conceded that any conflict of interest on the part of defendant’s preliminary hearing counsel had not caused defendant prejudice. Trial counsel acknowledged that prior counsel’s cross-examination of Dustin at the preliminary hearing had been “excellent,” “robust and uninhibited,” and that “there was the same motive and incentive to cross-examine [Dustin] at [the] preliminary hearing as there is at. . . trial.” The trial court found that Dustin was unavailable as a witness within the meaning of Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(1), and, pursuant to the former-testimony exception to the hearsay rule codified in Evidence Code section 1291, permitted the prosecution to introduce the testimony given by Dustin at the preliminary hearing. The trial court concluded that the conflict of interest claimed by defendant did not adversely affect the cross-examination of Dustin at the preliminary hearing. The transcript of Dustin’s preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury. In his testimony, Dustin recounted his observation of the events of February 17 to 18, 1991. Dustin’s testimony implicated defendant in the robbery, kidnapping, and fatal beating of Miguel Gonzalez. b. Dustin’s asserted waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination Defendant claims the prosecution failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that Dustin was unavailable within the meaning of Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(1). But if the trial court properly determined Dustin was entitled to assert his privilege against self-incrimination, the prosecution necessarily carried its burden, because a witness is unavailable if he or she is entitled to invoke the privilege. (Evid. Code, §§ 240, subd. (a)(1), 1291.) In substance, defendant’s claim is that the trial court erred in concluding Dustin properly asserted rather than waived his privilege. It is a fundamental principle of our law that witnesses may not be compelled to incriminate themselves, and the scope of a witness’s privilege is liberally construed. (Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 [95 L.Ed. 1118, 71 S.Ct. 814]; People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 [30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742]; see Evid. Code, § 940.) “To invoke the privilege, a witness need not be guilty of any offense; rather, the privilege is properly invoked whenever the witness’s answers ‘would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute’ the witness for a criminal offense.” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 617 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635], quoting Hoffman v. United States, supra, 341 U.S. at p. 486; see also People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 304.) “A witness may assert the privilege who has ‘reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.’ ” (People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 304.) Moreover, “ ‘[t]o sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.’ [Citation.] To deny an assertion of the privilege, ‘the judge must be “ ‘perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency’ to incriminate.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 304-305; see Evid. Code, § 404 [such evidence “is inadmissible unless it clearly appears to the court that the proffered evidence cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate the person claiming the privilege”].) Given the broad protective scope of the privilege, waiver of a nonparty witness’s privilege “is not to be lightly inferred.” (Klein v. Harris (2d Cir. 1981) 667 F.2d 274, 287; see also United States v. Seifert (9th Cir. 1980) 648 F.2d 557, 561.) Under the circumstances of the present case, we independently review the question whether the court properly permitted Dustin to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. (People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 304.) Defendant does not dispute that Dustin had reasonable cause to apprehend danger from answering questions concerning his activities and observations on the night of the murder, or that he properly invoked his privilege as to the bulk of the questions posed to him at the in limine hearing. Indeed, defendant claims the police and the prosecution should have treated Dustin as a suspect from the outset of their investigation and prosecution. Defendant claims, nonetheless, that, for the purpose of the trial, Dustin waived his privilege against self-incrimination as to the entire subject matter of his activities and observations during the period related to the murder. According to defendant, the waiver occurred during the in limine hearing when Dustin, after repeatedly invoking the privilege, failed to invoke it when he testified that his testimony at the preliminary hearing was truthful. Defendant reasons that Dustin’s claim that he testified truthfully at the earlier hearing constituted a ratification of his preliminary hearing testimony, and that it essentially repeated his testimony at that hearing concerning his activities during the period surrounding the crimes. Defendant claims Dustin waived or failed to assert the privilege as to the entire subject matter of his preliminary hearing testimony and that as a consequence, he was not unavailable within the meaning of Evidence Code sections 240, subdivision (a)(1) and 1291. A nonparty witness may elect to waive his or her privilege against self-incrimination. In addition, in some instances a waiver may be implied when a witness has made a partial disclosure of incriminating facts. “It is well established that a witness, in a single proceeding, may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about the details. [Citation.] The privilege is waived for the matters to which the witness testifies, and the scope of the ‘waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. ’ [Citation.]” (Mitchell v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 314, 321 [143 L.Ed.2d 424, 119 S.Ct. 1307] (Mitchell); see Rogers v. United States (1951) 340 U.S. 367, 374 [95 L.Ed. 344, 71 S.Ct. 438] (Rogers) [a witness may not invoke the privilege as to details after voluntarily disclosing incriminating facts].) On the other hand, a witness’s failure to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination during one hearing within a proceeding does not necessarily constitute a waiver for the purpose of subsequent hearings. Thus the failure of a witness to claim the privilege at a preliminary hearing does not prevent the witness from refusing to testify regarding the same incriminating material at the trial. (People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 303; People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 23 [252 Cal.Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249], citing Overend v. Superior Court (1900) 131 Cal. 280, 284 [63 P. 372]; People v. Maxwell (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 562, 570-571 [156 Cal.Rptr. 630].) Similarly, a witness’s incriminating admission at an in limine hearing concerning the admissibility of evidence ordinarily does not prevent the witness from invoking the privilege against being compelled to give testimony regarding the matter at the trial. (People v. Lawrence (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 510, 517 [336 P.2d 189]; see also 2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Witnesses, § 500, p. 808; 31A Cal.Jur.3d (2002) Evidence, § 574, p. 122.) Applying these principles, we observe that any waiver of the privilege that occurred by virtue of Dustin’s statement that he had told the truth at the preliminary hearing ordinarily would be binding upon Dustin only within the context of the in limine hearing. Even if we assume without deciding that Dustin essentially ratified his preliminary hearing testimony when he asserted he had been truthful at that hearing, he did so only after he clearly and justifiably had asserted his privilege as to his conduct and observations during the period related to the crimes. And even if his asserted ratification could have opened him to further questioning during the in limine hearing despite his assertion of the privilege, it does not follow that the asserted ratification constituted a waiver of his privilege for the purpose of trial. Dustin’s statement did not occur at trial, nor did it occur when the trial court was acting in a factfinding capacity. As noted, waiver of the privilege is not lightly inferred (Klein v. Harris, supra, 667 F.2d at p. 287), and there can be little justification for compelling a witness to incriminate himself concerning a whole series of events as to which he has invoked the privilege, when there is no need to do so to ensure the integrity of the factfinding process. Significantly, application of the waiver doctrine depends upon the purpose of the hearing at which the statements are made and the impact upon the integrity of the factfinding process if assertion of the privilege is permitted. “The justifications for the rule of waiver in the testimonial context are evident: A witness may not pick and choose what aspects of a particular subject to discuss without casting doubt on the trustworthiness of the statements and diminishing the integrity of the factual inquiry. As noted in Rogers, [supra, 340 U.S. 367] a contrary rule ‘would open the way to distortion of facts by permitting a witness to select any stopping place in the testimony,’ [citation] . . . [and] ‘make of the Fifth Amendment not only a humane safeguard against judicially coerced self-disclosure but a positive invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to tell.’ [Citation.]” (Mitchell, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 322; see also 1 McCormick on Evidence (6th ed. 2006) § 133, p. 562 [the waiver rule “rests primarily ... on the need to avoid leaving triers of fact with the limited version of relevant information that would be before them if a witness was permitted to at will pick a point at which to invoke the privilege”].) In the context of a claim that a statement made by a defendant at a proceeding in which a guilty plea was entered constituted a waiver of the privilege at the ensuing sentencing hearing, the United States Supreme Court in Mitchell, supra, 526 U.S. 314, examined the nature of the two proceedings and determined that the defendant’s guilty plea and concession that she did “some of it,” during discussion of the factual basis for her plea, did not constitute a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination for the purpose of the sentencing hearing. (Id. at p. 322.) The high court in Mitchell explained that had the petitioner testified at a trial that she did “some of it,” she would have subjected herself to cross-examination at sentencing on related subject matter. (Mitchell, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 322.) On the other hand, “[t]he concerns which justify the cross-examination when the defendant testifies are absent at a plea colloquy”—a hearing the high court characterized as one protecting the defendant from an involuntary or unintelligent plea. (Ibid.) “There is no convincing reason why the narrow inquiry at the plea colloquy should entail such an extensive waiver of the privilege. Unlike the def