Full opinion text
Opinion MORENO, J. A jury convicted defendant Richard Lonnie Booker of the first degree murders of Tricia Powalka, Amanda Elliot, and Corina Candara. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) It also convicted him of arson (§451, subd. (b)) and the attempted murder of Eric S. (§§ 187, 664). It found true special circumstance allegations of multiple murder as to each count of murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and that Corina was murdered during the commission or attempted commission of a rape (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(iii), now (a)(17)(C)) and a lewd act by force on a child under 14 (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(v), now (a)(17)(E)) The jury further found that defendant had personally used a handgun and a knife in the commission of these offenses. (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), (23), 12022, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a).) The jury returned a verdict of death as to each of the victims. The trial court denied the automatic application to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and sentenced defendant to death for the three murders and to life with the possibility of parole and determinate prison terms for the remaining counts and allegations. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the judgment. I. Facts A. Guilt Phase 1. Prosecution evidence On August 9, 1995, 19-year-old Tricia Powalka lived in an apartment in the City of Riverside with her six-month-old son, Eric S. Eric’s cousins, 15-year-old Amanda Elliot and 12-year-old Corina Candara, sometimes visited them and babysat Eric. Amanda’s close friend, 21-year-old Deverick Maddox, twice previously had visited the apartment to socialize with the young women. Although Maddox had spent the night at Powalka’s apartment on a previous occasion, he denied having a sexual interest in any of the young women. During the evening of August 9, Maddox visited Powalka’s apartment while she was at work; Amanda, Corina, and Erie were there. Amanda suggested Maddox invite a friend over, so he telephoned defendant and invited him over. Maddox left the apartment to meet defendant, who had turned 18 a month before; on the way back, they stopped at a nearby liquor store, purchased two bottles of fortified wine, and returned to the apartment. Powalka arrived at the apartment, and then she, Maddox, and defendant went to a store and bought some more liquor. The two men and three young women spent the evening drinking, talking, dancing, playing dominos, listening to music, and watching a movie; a neighbor was also present for part of the evening. At one point, Powalka retrieved a gun from the bedroom, showed it to the others, and let defendant handle it. Neighbors heard talking, laughter, and music until as late as 3:00 a.m. At some point, Powalka went to her bedroom to go to sleep. Maddox and defendant fell asleep on the couch in the living room, and Amanda and Corina slept on the floor. Maddox awoke during the night and noticed Amanda was now on the couch and defendant was on the floor. In the early morning, Maddox was awakened by Amanda screaming. Defendant was standing looking towards the hallway. Amanda entered from the hallway holding her neck, then dropped to her knees. The other females were not in the living room. Defendant was holding a knife and a gun in his hands, which were covered with blood; he was not wearing shoes and his socks also were covered in blood. Amanda told Maddox she had been heading towards the bathroom when defendant “sliced” her. Maddox asked defendant if there had been an accident, and he responded he did it “on purpose,” repeatedly apologized, and said he “killed them.” When Maddox told defendant they had to call the police, defendant said he was not going to go to jail. Maddox walked down the hallway and saw Gorina’s body in a puddle of blood in the bathroom. Powalka’s bloodstained legs were visible in the bedroom. Maddox started to leave the apartment, but defendant thrust the gun at him and said, “Shoot me. I rather you kill me than to go to jail, if you tell them.” Maddox went home. About 6:00 a.m. on August 10, 1995, a coworker of Maddox’s father arrived at the Maddox household to drive Maddox’s father to work. While there, the coworker saw Maddox enter the house; there was no blood on him. Later that day, Maddox washed his clothes. At some point in the morning, defendant telephoned Maddox. Defendant told Maddox that while talking to Corina he dropped his knife near her and she accused him of trying to cut her. Defendant said Corina went to tell Powalka, so he followed her. About 7:30 a.m., the maintenance supervisor for Powalka’s apartment complex received a telephonic page indicating there was a fire in her unit. Receiving no response to his knocks on Powalka’s door, the supervisor opened the door with his master key and discovered Amanda’s body in the living room and Powalka’s body in the bedroom of the smoke-filled apartment. Powalka was wearing no clothes except a pair of shorts, and her panties were rolled around her left knee. On the stove was a large deposit of ashes. Firefighters arrived and rescued Eric from his playpen in the bedroom. A firefighter started to drag Powalka’s body from the apartment, but stopped after realizing that she already was dead. A chest of drawers was blocking the bathroom door. Firefighters moved the chest, looked into the bathroom, and saw Gorina’s body. Gorina’s shorts and panties, like Powalka’s, had been rolled down around her left knee. Gorina’s legs were open and there were bloodstains on her thighs consistent with the shape of handprints. Fire investigator Timothy Rise determined the fire had been deliberately started by placing a nylon bag full of clothes on the stove’s hot burners. There was charring on the kitchen cabinets, the overhead light fixtures, and the stove’s exhaust vent. In Rise’s opinion, the amount of smoke in the apartment would have been lethal. Powalka’s neighbors told law enforcement personnel that Maddox was one of the male visitors from the night before. Detectives located Maddox, transported him to the police station, and interviewed him there. After initially denying any involvement, Maddox identified defendant as the other visitor. After locating defendant and transporting him to the police station that night, Riverside Police Detective Ron Sanfilippo advised him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602] to remain silent and have counsel present during questioning. Defendant, who had a cut on one of his hands, initially denied involvement in the killings. Defendant told the officers his memory of the events was incomplete and confusing because he had been drinking heavily that night. Defendant acknowledged Maddox had introduced him to the young women and they were “kicking back” and having a party at the apartment. Defendant initially claimed he had left about 3:00 a.m., but revised his story after Sanfilippo told him that they had already spoken to Maddox. Defendant then claimed he was absentmindedly playing with his knife when Gorina accidentally bumped into it. Gorina asked defendant why he was trying to stab her and tried to grab the knife, so he “hit” (that is, stabbed) her. Defendant inconsistently claimed he threw Gorina into the bathroom and that she ran in on her own accord. Defendant said he locked the bathroom door, but denied blocking it with the chest of drawers. Defendant provided various explanations for how he killed Powalka. Defendant initially claimed Powalka threatened to shoot him, so he struck her in the neck. Defendant then claimed that when he exited the bathroom Powalka put the gun to his head, so he stabbed her at least twice. Defendant also claimed Powalka tried to shoot him when he threw Corina into the bathroom, so he struck Powalka. At some point, defendant knocked the gun out of Powalka’s hand and picked it up. As Powalka was lying on the ground, defendant removed her shorts. Defendant admitted that he returned to the bathroom and told Corina to take her shorts off, and that he “kind of helped” her while she was lying on the floor. Defendant admitted he was drunk and did not intend to “make it” with Corina; he alternatively admitted he “might of touched” her “down there,” but also said he only “looked” at her “there.” Defendant recalled striking Corina, perhaps more than once, as she lay on the bathroom floor. With respect to Amanda, defendant claimed she charged him, so he stabbed her two or three times in the neck and then shot her as she lay on the ground. Defendant denied deliberately trying to set the apartment on fire, but admitted he may have put a laundry bag on top of the stove and turned on the burner before he left. Defendant denied knowing that Eric was in the apartment that evening, but recalled hearing a baby cry at some point. Defendant claimed that, before he left the apartment, he picked up the telephone to call the police, but then changed his mind and went home and slept. Defendant described the weapons as being a .22-caliber Beretta handgun and a knife that was actually two steak knives that he had taped together. Defendant showed Sanfilippo where he had hidden the handgun near Powalka’s apartment. Later, ballistic tests indicated that an ammunition casing recovered from the apartment was “probably” fired by the recovered handgun. Defendant claimed he threw the knife into a garbage can, and it was never recovered. Maddox testified he regularly saw defendant carrying a knife, and one of defendant’s friends also testified he had seen defendant with a knife similar to the one used in the killings. Police officers later searched defendant’s room and found two steak knives similarly taped together. While in jail, defendant told deputies that he should get the death penalty and be executed “for what he had done,” expressed concerned for his own safety in custody, and said he wanted to talk to a priest or a pastor because he wanted to die or kill himself. Defendant was placed in a safety cell because he told a doctor he wanted to kill himself. In August 1995, Robert DiTraglia, M.D., a forensic pathologist, performed autopsies on the victims and concluded all of them had bled to death. Neither fire nor smoke contributed to their deaths. Corina suffered multiple “sharp force injuries” (that is, stab and cut wounds) to the neck and bled to death because her right carotid artery and jugular vein were severed. Corina bore no signs of genital trauma. Two criminologists compared hairs obtained by combing Gorina’s pubic region with samples provided by defendant and Maddox; the criminologists concluded the recovered hairs were inconsistent with defendant’s samples but consistent with Maddox’s and her own. An analysis of vaginal swabs and Gorina’s clothing did not reveal the presence of semen. Powalka was stabbed 54 times and had at least 52 cut wounds. Powalka’s right carotid artery was severed in one location and almost severed in another; the right jugular vein also had multiple sharp-force injuries. Powalka bore no signs of genital trauma. A vaginal smear slide collected from Powalka indicated the presence of spermatozoa, but there was insufficient material to perform further analysis. Amanda was stabbed six times and had multiple cut wounds. Her right carotid artery was partially severed. Amanda also was shot: the bullet entered behind her left ear, pierced her lungs, and lodged there. The gunshot wound would have been independently fatal. Amanda also had multiple stab and cut wounds, consistent with being defensive wounds, that were caused by a serrated knife blade. 2. Defense evidence Defendant presented no evidence, but impeached Maddox with convictions for receiving stolen property and discharging a firearm from a car. B. Penalty Phase 1. Prosecution evidence a. Defendant’s uncharged violent criminal conduct On March 22, 1994, defendant stabbed his uncle, Robin Stewart. Stewart, who was much larger than defendant, had been bullying him for months. On that day, Stewart shoved defendant against a wall and then threw him out the front door. Stewart insulted defendant and dared him to come back. Defendant came back, stabbed Stewart in the stomach, and ran away. Stewart went to the hospital for treatment. Although Stewart testified defendant was justified in stabbing him, he had told the police defendant stabbed him for no reason. During the summer of 1994, defendant’s former neighbor, Maricely Ascencio, her husband, and her brother were arguing with one of defendant’s relatives. Defendant joined in the argument and threatened to kill Ascencio and her family if they were “messing with his brother,” so she reported the incident to the police. Although defendant was unarmed during the argument, Ascencio twice saw defendant with two taped-together knives that he repeatedly threw against the ground. Ascencio’s brother recalled another incident where he saw defendant chasing an individual down the street while trying to hit him with a stick. A few months before the murders, defendant and four other men were arguing near a high school. The four other men started fighting. Defendant pulled out a knife, but did not engage anyone in combat. b. Victim impact evidence Powalka had, in addition to her son Eric, a daughter, Brianna, who was two years old when Powalka was murdered. Powalka’s mother, Frankie Sanderson, described Powalka as “[fjeisty, a lot of fun, very outspoken, [and] just a good person.” Despite her extensive injuries, Powalka had an open-casket funeral. Powalka was cremated because her mother believed she “didn’t like bugs” and would not have wanted to be in the ground. It was very difficult for Sanderson to view the autopsy photographs, sort through Powalka’s belongings, make the funeral arrangements, apply to be the guardian for her two children, and endure the holidays, her birthday, and the anniversary of her death. Since Powalka’s death, Eric and Brianna had not lived together. Sanderson believed Powalka’s death had a negative effect on her health, and accelerated her own mother’s death. Sanderson missed Powalka terribly. Linda Baker, Powalka’s sister, described her as a happy, fun, outgoing person who was a great mother. Baker started raising Brianna. Esther Elliot-Martin, Amanda’s mother and Gorina’s aunt, described her daughter as beautiful, intelligent, thoughtful, caring, helpful; good at writing, music, video games, and making people laugh; and as someone who loved children, especially Eric. Amanda had written a poem about her brother, which Elliot-Martin read to the jury. Elliot-Martin missed Amanda, especially on birthdays, Mother’s Day, and Christmas; whenever she heard the song “Mandy,” which was Amanda’s nickname, Elliot-Martin cried. Gorina was the only child of Nora Candara, who described her daughter as her best friend and a warm and caring person. Richard Candara, Nora’s husband and Gorina’s stepfather, described Gorina as easy to raise, and as a “straight-A” student who loved school, played clarinet, composed music, drew, and wrote stories. Gorina also loved Eric. Nora and Richard stayed involved with Gorina’s school because her murder was so hard on her friends. Because of Gorina’s death, Nora attempted to commit suicide and had been in a mental institution twice; due to her condition, Richard had to take care of her. Nora had not been able to find work, Richard was unable to concentrate at work and had changed jobs three times, and they were struggling to keep their marriage together. Ricardo Candara, Amanda and Gorina’s grandfather, described their family as extremely close, and said it was “hell on earth” having to deal with his daughters’ loss of their children. The holidays were the worst. The jury viewed videotapes depicting photographs of each of the young women. 2. Defense evidence Defendant’s mother, Natalie Booker, was bom with brain damage due to complications during her birth. Defendant’s grandmother, Mary Booker-Johnson, was Natalie’s caretaker, as she was unable to live independently, handle money, make rational decisions, or exercise good judgment. Natalie could write her name but could not read. Natalie, who was 19 years old when she gave birth to defendant, did not know how to take care of her son or even how to clean a house. Defendant and Natalie lived with Booker-Johnson for almost all of his childhood. In school, defendant had problems with reading comprehension and mathematics and was placed in a special education program in the second or third grade. In 1991, Natalie was hit by a car and had been comatose in a convalescent home ever since. Defendant, who was 12 or 13 at the time of the accident, was devastated, struggled in school, and was not quite the same since the accident. Booker-Johnson described defendant as a good grandson who had been “a right hand” to her. Booker-Johnson provided examples of defendant’s helpfulness, and testified that she had always known him to be kind and caring. She loved defendant very much. Defendant had one son, who was bom in 1995 shortly after the murders. II. Discussion A. Pretrial Issues 1. Failure to initially swear in grand jurors The trial court did not swear in the grand jury until midway through its proceedings, and defendant contends this omission constituted a “fundamental jurisdictional error” that compels reversal. These are the relevant facts: Defendant’s case was initiated by way of an indictment rather than a complaint. (See § 682.) On February 28, 1996, the trial court selected the jurors for a criminal grand jury, including a foreperson, from a pool of potential petit jurors. The person selected as the grand jury foreperson admonished the rest of the potential grand jurors to step down if they could not act impartially. The prosecutor made his opening statement. SanfiHppo then testified and played a portion of the audiotape recording of defendant’s confession. At this point, the trial court realized that the assembled jurors had not been sworn in, so it administered the oath for grand jurors. The grand jury then finished listening to the audiotape. SanfiHppo continued to testify. Sanfilippo’s partner also testified; during his testimony several photographs were introduced into evidence. The prosecutor then made his closing argument and instructed the grand jury. The grand jury returned the indictment at issue. On April 26, 1996, defendant moved pursuant to section 995 to set aside the indictment on the ground, among others, that some evidence was presented to the grand jury before it was sworn in. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Defendant filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal, which denied it without comment. {Booker v. Superior Court (Sept. 10, 1996, E018917) [nonpub. order].) The Attorney General concedes the trial court administered the oath to the grand jurors after they had heard some testimony, but contends defendant suffered no prejudice from this belated swearing-in of the grand jurors and thus is not entitled to relief. The Attorney General is correct. Under federal and state law, irregularities in grand jury proceedings generally are reviewed for prejudice. (See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States (1988) 487 U.S. 250, 254-257 [101 L.Ed.2d 228, 108 S.Ct. 2369] [citing Fed. Rules Crim.Proc., rule 52(a), 18 U.S.C.]; People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 800 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 126 P.3d 938] [citing Bank of Nova Scotia] (Jablonski).) Isolated exceptions to this general rule, not applicable to defendant’s case, have included cases involving discrimination in the composition of the grand jury based on the grand jurors’ race (Vasquez v. Hillery (1986) 474 U.S. 254 [88 L.Ed.2d 598, 106 S.Ct. 617]) or gender (see Ballard v. United States (1946) 329 U.S. 187 [91 L.Ed. 181, 67 S.Ct. 261]). Citing People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519 [165 Cal.Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941] (Pompa-Ortiz), defendant contends the challenge to the indictment that he filed prior to the start of his trial now relieves him of the burden of demonstrating on appeal the prejudice he suffered. Not so. In Pompa-Ortiz, we affirmed the defendant’s conviction despite irregularities in his preliminary examination and ruled that, as to pretrial challenges to irregularities during the preliminary examination, a defendant need not demonstrate prejudice to obtain relief, but must as to posttrial challenges. (Id. at p. 529.) We have since extended the rule articulated in Pompa-Ortiz to include irregularities during grand jury proceedings. (See, e.g., Jablonski, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 800-801.) - Defendant is correct that Pompa-Ortiz did not require a showing of prejudice during a pretrial challenge to irregularities in the preliminary examination, but nothing in Pompa-Ortiz suggests that standard of review applies to a posttrial challenge if the defendant asserted the challenge pretrial. In Jablonski, notwithstanding the defendant’s having challenged alleged irregularities during the grand jury proceedings in a section 995 motion, we rejected the claim as presented on appeal because he failed to demonstrate prejudice. (Jablonski, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 800-801.) As Pompa-Ortiz and Jablonski demonstrate, the need for a showing of prejudice depends on the stage of the proceedings at which a defendant raises the claim in a reviewing court, and not simply on whether he or she had raised the claim prior to trial. That defendant here, unlike the defendant in Jablonski, filed a pretrial writ petition does not alter the analysis as to why no showing of prejudice is required for pretrial challenges to grand jury proceedings but is required for posttrial challenges. Defendant also cites Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239 [219 Cal.Rptr. 420, 707 P.2d 793] in support of the contention that pretrial exhaustion obviates the need for a posttrial showing of prejudice. In Serna, we granted a pretrial petition for writ of mandate directing the superior court to dismiss a case on speedy trial grounds. We did so without requiring a showing of prejudice. In the course of our analysis, we observed, “it is not unreasonable to require a felony defendant who does not seek or obtain pretrial relief to demonstrate actual prejudice when reversal of a judgment is sought on this ground on appeal.” (Id. at p. 263, italics added; see also People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 461 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271] (Stewart).) Seizing on the italicized language, defendant emphasizes that he did in fact seek relief prior to this appeal, and contends he ought therefore to be excused from the requirement to demonstrate prejudice. We are not persuaded. Serna and Stewart are consistent with Pompa-Ortiz's rule that whether a showing of prejudice is required depends on the stage of the proceedings at which the claim is raised in the reviewing court. To the extent defendant reads Serna or Stewart as implying a different showing of prejudice is required for posttrial challenges based on whether there was also a pretrial challenge, he is mistaken. Thus, because this is a posttrial challenge to the grand jury proceedings, any irregularity in the proceedings requires reversal only if defendant has been prejudiced. Assuming for the sake of argument that the irregularity violated the federal Constitution, defendant is entitled to relief unless the prosecution can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the irregularity did not affect the outcome of trial. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824] (Chapman).) Under state law, defendant bears the burden of demonstrating any error deprived him of a fair trial. (See Jablonski, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 800.) Here, defendant is not entitled to relief under either standard. As the trial court noted, the evidence presented to the grand jury after the trial court administered the oath was sufficient to support an indictment against defendant. The belated swearing-in of the grand jurors did not have a structural impact on those proceedings, as the grand jury, once properly sworn, received sufficient evidence to support the indictment. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the error is susceptible to review for actual prejudice because we can review—and, indeed, have reviewed—the evidence that was presented to the grand jury after it was sworn. Unlike in Vasquez v. Hillery, supra, 474 U.S. 254, where racial animus of the grand jurors may have affected their decision of whether and how to charge the defendant, our review of these grand jury proceedings does not require us to speculate as to the jurors’ motives. Consequently, we reject his claim that it is impossible to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support his indictment, and we need not consider his claim that the indictment was based at least partly on evidence received prior to the jury being sworn. 2. Asserted Witt/Witherspoon error (2) Defendant contends the trial court improperly excused five prospective jurors who expressed doubts about their willingness to impose the death penalty. Under state and federal law, prospective jurors may be excused for cause if their views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors, even where the prospective jurors have not made it “ ‘unmistakably clear’ that [they] would ‘automatically vote a certain way.” (People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1286 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 190 P.3d 616], quoting Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844] and Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770].) Unless a juror makes it clear that he or she is unwilling to set aside his or her beliefs and follow the law, a trial court may not dismiss a juror under Witt/Witherspoon based only on answers provided on a juror questionnaire. (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 785-787 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 211, 187 P.3d 1041]; Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 451.) Errors under Witt/Witherspoon mandate reversal of the penalty verdict without regard to prejudice. (People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 264 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 451]; see People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 666-667 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156, 234 P.3d 428] [Witt/Witherspoon error does not compel reversal of guilt phase verdict].) Jury selection in this case started with a large group of prospective jurors, some of whom were dismissed immediately due to hardship caused by jury service. Approximately 130 prospective jurors remained, and they were given questionnaires prepared jointly by the parties. The questionnaire inquired about, among other topics, the prospective jurors’ opinions concerning the death penalty. The trial court noted on the record that, for efficiency’s sake, the parties had reviewed the completed questionnaires and, based solely on the responses, defendant agreed to stipulate to the excusal of some jurors who appeared to oppose the death penalty while the prosecutor agreed to do likewise for some jurors who appeared to support it. At one point, the trial court explicitly recited it was not excusing any prospective jurors for cause; rather, the parties were stipulating to the excusáis. In total, the parties stipulated to the excusal of 33 prospective jurors, five of whom are the basis for this claim of error. If either party objected to the excusal of a prospective juror through this process, that person was not excused but was summoned later for voir dire. The trial court did not excuse any prospective juror over defendant’s objection during this process. At the end of the stipulated excusáis, defense counsel stated: “Your Honor, for the record, [the prosecutor] and I have both reviewed all of the questionnaires . . . . [f] And as a matter of trial tactics, we had agreed to enter into stipulations regarding excusing by my count, 33 of the venire members, as we believe it’s to the benefit of our client to do that.” The trial court then began its voir dire of the remaining prospective jurors, and eventually the jurors and alternate jurors were seated. The Attorney General contends defendant has forfeited this claim on appeal, and we agree. We previously have barred belated challenges to stipulated excusáis of prospective jurors. (See People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 87-89 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 507, 105 R3d 1099] (Benavides)-, People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 72-74 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506].) Defendant nonetheless contends the logic of these decisions was undermined by other cases, such as Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th 425, People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946 [4 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 75 P.3d 53], and People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332], Not so. Stewart involved the dismissal by the trial court of prospective jurors based on the questionnaire responses; in Heard, the trial court improperly dismissed a prospective juror when during voir dire he clarified his questionnaire responses and indicated he could follow the trial court’s instructions; and Cash was concerned with the trial court’s refusal to permit questioning on whether specific acts of aggravation would cause a potential juror to automatically vote in favor of the death penalty. In contrast, in this case, as in Benavides and Ervin, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the prospective jurors. Our more recent case, People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 157 P.3d 950] (Cook), also is in accord with Benavides and Ervin. In Cook, prospective jurors completed a questionnaire that inquired about their views on the death penalty. The trial court permitted both the prosecution and the defense to move to exclude for cause various prospective jurors based solely on their questionnaires. (Cook, at p. 1341.) The trial court stated it would dismiss a prospective juror if both parties agreed to the excusal. (Id. at p. 1342.) The trial court also asked if there were “ ‘others that there’s going to be a challenge for cause that you’re willing to submit on the questionnaires?’ ” (Ibid.) The parties agreed to “ ‘submit on the questionnaires’ ” with respect to some prospective jurors, and the trial court clarified that they would be “ ‘thereby waiving [their] right to any further questioning.’ ” (Ibid.) If the trial court denied such a challenge, the parties could later question the prospective juror during voir dire. (Ibid.) One prospective juror, Maria R., provided answers that cast doubt on her ability to vote for the death penalty. (Cook, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1341.) The defendant “submit[ted]” as to the prosecutor’s challenge for cause to Maria R.; the trial court granted the challenge, and the defendant did not comment. (Id. at p. 1342.) On appeal, we ruled the defendant had forfeited his right to complain about the trial court’s failure to question Maria R. on voir dire because he repeatedly agreed to let the trial court decide such challenges for cause based solely on the questionnaire responses. (Ibid.) In so ruling, we noted that Stewart, upon which defendant here relies and the defendant in Cook similarly relied, presented a different situation; there, the trial court granted several challenges for cause based solely on questionnaire responses over the defendant’s repeated objections and without the defendant’s agreeing to the procedure. (Cook, at p. 1342; see also Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 15-20 [167 L.Ed.2d 1014, 127 S.Ct. 2218] [rejecting federal habeas corpus challenge in which defense counsel’s acquiescence during an otherwise extensive voir dire supported the trial court’s excusal of a potential juror for cause].) Defendant here, like the defendant in Cook, agreed to the procedure whereby a prospective juror would be dismissed without voir dire if both parties stipulated to the dismissal. Of the five prospective jurors about whose dismissal he now complains, defendant stipulated to the dismissal of all of them; unlike the defendant in Cook, defendant here did not object to the dismissal of any of the prospective jurors now challenged on appeal. In addition, defendant declined to stipulate to the dismissal of several other prospective jurors, and they were later summoned to voir dire. If defendant had wanted to retain any of the five dismissed prospective jurors for further questioning, he should not have stipulated to their dismissal. Moreover, unlike the prospective jurors in Cook and Stewart, the trial court here did not excuse any prospective juror for cause—the parties stipulated to the excusáis, as was the case in Benavides and Ervin. Although the discussion between the trial court and the parties focused on the prospective jurors’ opinions about the death penalty, and those expressed opinions formed the basis for the parties’ decisions regarding whether to stipulate to the dismissal, no prospective juror during this stage of the proceedings actually was dismissed for cause. Defendant contends he stipulated to this prescreening procedure only at its conclusion, and thus could not have forfeited his right to challenge any purported errors that occurred during it, but this is simply not so: the record indicates the parties agreed to the procedure at its outset and then entered the stipulation into the record at its conclusion. As defendant agreed to and participated in the process whereby some prospective jurors were excused through stipulations, he has forfeited his right to complain about this procedure. And as none of the five challenged prospective jurors actually were dismissed for cause, the trial court made no findings on whether their views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors, and we therefore have no basis on which to exercise our review. 3. Asserted Batson/Wheeler error Defendant, who is African-American, contends the prosecutor improperly excused four African-Americans (M.L.W., J.M., M.D.W., and D.J.) from the venire. (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748], overruled in part by Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162 [162 L.Ed.2d 129, 125 S.Ct. 2410]; Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 S.Ct. 1712].) “It is well settled that ‘[a] prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis of group bias—that is, bias against “members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds”—violates the right of a criminal defendant to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. [Citations.] Such a practice also violates the defendant’s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] “The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the procedure and standard to be used by trial courts when Batson motions challenging peremptory strikes are made. ' “ ‘First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race[; s]econd, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question^ and t]hird, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.’ ” [Citation.]’ (Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 476-477 [170 L.Ed.2d 175, 128 S.Ct. 1203].)” (People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 898 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 286, 200 P.3d 898].) As explained below, we reject defendant’s challenge to each of the excusáis. a. Factual background As noted, after hardship excusáis approximately 130 potential jurors completed the juror questionnaire. Defense counsel noted that, according to the completed questionnaires, 64 percent of these prospective jurors identified themselves as Caucasian, 14 percent as Hispanic, 8 percent (10 out of 132) as African-American, 2 percent as Asian, 2 percent as other, and 10 percent did not specify. From this group, the parties stipulated to the excusal of at least 33 potential jurors. The trial court first questioned the prospective jurors, followed by counsel for each party. From the panel of the first 20 prospective jurors, the prosecutor challenged a Hispanic prospective juror without objection. (1) Prospective Juror M.L.W. When the prosecutor exercised his second peremptory challenge, against M.L.W., defendant made a motion under Batson/Wheeler. Answers to the juror questionnaire indicated that M.L.W. was a religious person who opposed the death penalty and believed it was generally unnecessary, as murderers “will always have to answer to God and that’s much worse than facing death.” M.L.W. nonetheless expressed a willingness to set aside her personal beliefs. M.L.W.’s brother had been arrested for selling drugs, but M.L.W. felt he was fairly treated by the criminal justice system. On voir dire, M.L.W. reiterated a willingness to set aside her personal beliefs regarding the death penalty. M.L.W. also was a crime victim: While driving on the freeway, someone pointed a gun at M.L.W., but she believed this experience would not affect her ability to serve as a juror. In response to defendant’s Batson/Wheeler motion, the trial court ruled defendant had failed to make a prima facie case of racial discrimination, although it did note that the first prospective juror peremptorily excused by the prosecutor was Hispanic. The trial court also noted M.L.W.’s religious reservations about the death penalty. Because the trial court ruled defendant had not made a prima facie case, the prosecutor did not explain why he peremptorily challenged M.L.W. The prosecutor later expressed concerns about M.L.W.’s religious beliefs and about jurors who felt they might be sinning or “going to hell” if they voted in favor of a death verdict. The prosecutor then excused three more jurors, including an African-American (G.N.), without objection. (2) Prospective Juror J.M. The prosecutor exercised his sixth peremptory challenge against J.M., and defendant made another Batson/Wheeler motion. The juror questionnaire asked prospective jurors to indicate whether any relatives or close friends had been accused of a crime, and J.M. left this question blank. J.M.’s other responses indicated a generally favorable opinion of the death penalty. On voir dire, the trial court asked J.M. if any family member had been accused of a crime, and J.M. said that none had. The prosecutor then pointed out that J.M.’s son had been prosecuted as a juvenile; J.M. responded by expressing confusion over whether the question applied to juvenile proceedings. In denying defendant’s Batson/Wheeler motion, the trial court ruled defendant failed to make a prima facie showing, as J.M. was “obviously hiding something.” The prosecutor also accused J.M. of lying under oath and said there was no way J.M. would be kept on the panel. (3) Prospective Juror M.D. W. The prosecutor exercised his seventh peremptory challenge against M.D.W., and defendant made a Batson/Wheeler motion. Like M.L.W., M.D.W.’s juror questionnaire indicated she was a religious person but could set aside those beliefs for jury duty. M.D.W. indicated the death penalty was appropriate for a person who “deliberately and maliciously causes severe harm to others,” but “the death penalty should only be used in instances where there can be no rehabilitating” and other people are at risk. The questionnaire also indicated M.D.W.’s aunt was charged with a crime and her children were taken away from her when the aunt’s boyfriend killed one of the children in his care. Despite the emotional nature of that situation, M.D.W. felt “justice was served.” On voir dire, M.D.W. acknowledged that rehabilitation was just one possible factor in determining the appropriate penalty. The trial court again ruled there was no prima facie showing of discrimination, citing M.D.W.’s concerns about rehabilitation; the trial court also noted her own awareness of being a “highly opinionated” person. The prosecutor acknowledged M.D.W. had given “correct verbal answers” but he felt she actually would be unable to vote for death. The prosecutor then exercised three more peremptory challenges without objection. (4) Prospective Juror D.J. When the prosecutor exercised his 11th peremptory challenge, against D.J., defendant again made a Batson/Wheeler motion. DJ.’s juror questionnaire indicated he worked as a loss prevention officer for a department store and had family members who worked in law enforcement. DJ.’s younger brother had tossed his infant son (D.J.’s nephew) into the air and failed to catch him, and the child died. Although the brother was convicted of manslaughter, D.J. felt the outcome was fair. DJ.’s church was opposed to the death penalty, but he expressed a willingness to vote for the death penalty if it was appropriate. The trial court denied defendant’s Batson/Wheeler motion, finding no prima facie showing based on DJ.’s religious beliefs and some inconsistencies in answers about his incarcerated brother. The prosecutor also noted DJ.’s body language was “angry and/or at least very uncomfortable,” and noted D.J.’s concern about his brother’s conviction. But the prosecutor was most concerned with D.J.’s religious beliefs and purported willingness to ignore those beliefs; the prosecutor suspected DJ. may have had a hidden agenda to spare defendant from the death penalty. After the prosecutor had used his 13th (of 20 total) peremptory challenges, and defendant had used seven of his 20, the parties accepted the jury. During the selection process for the alternate jurors, the prosecutor used all four of his peremptory challenges, including one against an African-American (M.R.), without objection. b. Legal contentions In denying defendant’s Batson/Wheeler motions, the trial court first found no prima facie showing of discrimination, and then explained its reasons for doing so; the.court, however, then invited the prosecutor to make additional remarks. The prosecutor each time concurred in the trial court’s remarks and made additional observations. Thus, similar to People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 173-174 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 153, 226 P.3d 276] (Mills), this case is a first stage/third stage Batson hybrid, as the record contains both the prosecutor’s reasons and the trial court’s evaluation (albeit implicit) of those reasons. Thus, as we did in Mills, we will express no opinion on whether defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination and skip to Batson’s third stage and evaluate the prosecutor’s reasons for challenging these prospective jurors. “ ‘Review of a trial court’s denial of a [Batson/Wheeler] motion is deferential, examining only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions. [Citation.] “. . . We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court’s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal. [Citation.]” ’ ” (People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 886 [102 Cal.Rptr.3d 852, 220 P.3d 872] (Taylor).) “As part of our analysis, we consider as ‘bearing on the trial court’s factual finding regarding discriminatory intent’ [citation] the comparisons of prospective jurors challenged and unchallenged that defendant expounds in his briefs, though few if any of these comparisons were made in the trial court. At the same time, ‘we are mindful that comparative juror analysis on a cold appellate record has inherent limitations.’ [Citation.] In addition to the difficulty of assessing tone, expression and gesture from the written transcript of voir dire, we attempt to keep in mind the fluid character of the jury selection process and the complexity of the balance involved. ‘Two panelists might give a similar answer on a given point. Yet the risk posed by one panelist might be offset by other answers, behavior, attitudes or experiences that make one juror, on balance, more or less desirable. These realities, and the complexity of human nature, make a formulaic comparison of isolated responses an exceptionally poor medium to overturn a trial court’s factual finding.’ [Citation.]” (Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 887.) As noted, with respect to each of the challenged prospective jurors, the trial court ruled defendant failed to demonstrate an inference of racial bias. Defendant contends the trial court erred in so ruling, as the prosecutor used six of his 13 peremptory challenges (including four of his first seven) to excuse African-Americans. Only 10 of the prospective jurors in the venire, defendant observes, were African-American. Defendant contends we cannot rely on the trial court’s “speculations” about the prosecutor’s possible reasons for challenging these prospective jurors. We disagree. The prosecutor expressly adopted the trial court’s reasons, and his additional observations supplemented those of the trial court. Although defendant contends we “can have no confidence that the prosecutor’s stated race-neutral reasons were really his own,” there is nothing in the record to indicate they were not. Notably, the prosecutor explicitly adopted the trial court’s reasons; there is no need for us to engage in speculation as to the prosecutor’s reasons for the challenges, as the prosecutor actually offered reasons. Moreover, the record supports the inference that the prosecutor’s offered reasons were genuine, as his questioning of each of these prospective jurors focused on the exact bases that the trial court cited in its rulings. The trial court correctly denied defendant’s Batson/Wheeler motion with respect to J.M. because of his less than forthcoming responses on the juror questionnaire and during voir dire regarding whether any family members were ever accused of committing a crime. Although defendant on appeal repeats J.M.’s stated confusion regarding whether the inquiry applied to juvenile adjudications, and contends there is “no reason to believe [J.M.] deliberately concealed this information” or “had some hidden agenda or would be biased against the prosecutor,” the trial court and the prosecutor, who had the opportunity to observe J.M.’s demeanor, concluded J.M. had been untruthful. On the record before us, J.M.’s reluctance to discuss these matters sufficiently demonstrates that the proffered reasons for dismissing J.M. were not pretextual. M.L.W., M.D.W., and D.J., the subject of defendant’s first, third, and fourth Batson/Wheeler motions, were primarily excused due to their expressed reservations about the death penalty, reservations that were rooted in their religious beliefs. In denying defendant’s motions, the trial court noted that the prosecutor also had challenged prospective jurors of other races who expressed religious objections or concerns about the death penalty. The trial court then related its experience that African-Americans, as a group, are less supportive of the death penalty. Defendant contends the trial court’s comment about the effect of African-Americans’ beliefs, as a group, on their ability to serve as capital jurors demonstrated impermissible racial bias. Not so. The prosecutor excluded these specific three prospective jurors not because of their race but rather because of their expressed doubts about the death penalty. And, as defendant concedes, a juror’s reservations about the death penalty constitute a valid race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge. (E.g., People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 140-141 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 54, 186 P.3d 437] (Salcido).) To the extent defendant contends these religious reservations acted as a proxy for racial discrimination, as the trial court noted and defendant concedes, the prosecutor also challenged jurors of other races based on these same reservations. (See People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 190-191 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710] [reliance on a reason asserted to be a proxy for race is permissible if there is a specific link between the stated reason and the basis for the challenge].) Consequently, defendant fails to demonstrate that the prosecutor’s concerns over the prospective jurors’ religious reservations were pretextual. Defendant nonetheless contends the excusal of these prospective jurors functioned as impermissible religious discrimination. As defendant did not articulate this basis for his objection in the trial court, he has forfeited the claim on appeal. (See People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 462 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 461, 161 P.3d 3].) In any event, the claim lacks merit, as there is no evidence in the record the prosecutor discriminated against any particular religious denomination. Nor is there any evidence the prosecutor excluded prospective jurors who expressed some sort of religious belief, or a religious belief that might theoretically interfere with the ability to return a death verdict. Rather, the prosecutor challenged only those who actually expressed a possible conflict between their religious beliefs and duties as a juror, which, as we have noted, is permissible. 4. Asserted failure to determine racial bias of jurors Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to determine whether any of the prospective jurors might be biased against him due to his race. As noted, defendant is African-American, his victims were not, and at the time of his trial, Riverside County was populated primarily by Caucasians. The juror questionnaire did not expressly ask the jurors about any potential racial biases they might have, although one question did ask if there was anything about defendant’s “appearance” that might cause a prospective juror to be biased. No prospective juror answered in the affirmative. During voir dire, defense counsel did ask the first group of prospective jurors whether any of them would be affected by the differences in race between defendant and the victims, and, again, no prospective juror responded in the affirmative. As we have held repeatedly and as defendant implicitly acknowledges, he cannot complain on appeal about the trial court’s failure to question the venire on racial prejudice unless he has requested specifically such an inquiry. (People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1152-1153 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 652, 209 P.3d 977].) Defendant participated in drafting the juror questionnaire, questioned potential jurors but asked only one question during voir dire about differences between his race and the race of the victims, and does not justify his failure to request or conduct a more thorough inquiry. Defendant’s reliance on People v. Taylor (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1299 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 676] is thus unavailing because in that case, unlike here, the trial court controlled the voir dire and did not permit the attorneys to ask questions directly. Consequently, this claim is forfeited. Citing People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213] (Holt), defendant nonetheless contends the trial court was required to propound specific questions designed to reveal racial prejudice. Not so. In Holt, we ruled a trial court could not prevent counsel from asking such questions (see id. at pp. 660-661), but Holt in no way obligates a trial court to undertake such an inquiry. Similarly, in Ristaino v. Ross (1976) 424 U.S. 589, 597, footnote 9 [47 L.Ed.2d 258, 96 S.Ct. 1017], another case on which defendant relies, the high court ruled that “voir dire questioning directed to racial prejudice was not constitutionally required . . . .” When race is “inextricably bound up” with the issues to be tried, however, a trial court might be required to make such an inquiry on its own initiative. (Id. at p. 597.) But other than the bare fact of the difference between the races of defendant and the victims, nothing about the circumstances of this crime suggests race played any role. (See ibid.; cf. Ham v. South Carolina (1973) 409 U.S. 524 [35 L.Ed.2d 46, 93 S.Ct. 848] [inquiry into racial prejudice was relevant, as the defendant was a civil rights activist who claimed he had been framed by law enforcement personnel].) Even were we to agree that the interracial nature of this crime required further voir dire, we would find no reversible error. “Unless the voir dire by a court is so inadequate that the reviewing court can say that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair, the manner in which voir dire is conducted is not a basis for reversal. [Citation.]” (Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 661; see People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 620-623 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 760, 124 P.3d 363].) Defendant had the opportunity to further examine potential jurors about possible racial bias, either directly or indirectly through the juror questionnaire, but defense counsel apparently found no need to do so; moreover, defense counsel did not exhaust his allotment of peremptory challenges. (See People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 607-610 [108 Cal.Rptr.3d 87, 229 P.3d 12] (Taylor).) Consequently, defendant’s trial was not fundamentally unfair. B. Guilt Phase Issues 1. Admission of crime scene photographs Petitioner contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting inflammatory, gruesome, cumulative, and irrelevant photographs of the victims’ bodies and the surrounding crime scene. Prior to the start of trial, defendant sought to exclude some photographs of the victims (taken at the crime scene or during their autopsies), arguing the nature of their wounds and the fact that the young women had once been alive was not in dispute. After conducting a hearing, the trial court excluded six photographs of Powalka (and not 12 others), one photograph of Amanda (and not 21 others), and five photographs of Corma (and not 15 others). In lieu of the autopsy photographs, defendant offered to stipulate to the cause of death for each of the victims, but the prosecutor refused the stipulation. Of the 48 photographs not excluded during this hearing, 39 ultimately were admitted into evidence at trial. Defendant objected at trial to the admission of four photographs of the crime scene on the grounds of relevance and being unduly prejudicial; the trial court overruled the objections. In total, the trial court admitted more than 100 photographs into evidence during the guilt phase. We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s admission of evidence. (People v. D’Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 298 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 459, 226 P.3d 949] (D’Arcy).) Having reviewed the photographs, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them. At the outset, we note defendant did not object to many of the photographs admitted at trial; he also does not specify on appeal which photographs are the basis for this claim. As the failure to raise a timely objection forfeits the claim for appeal (see Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Carey (2007) 41 Cal.4th 109, 126 [59 Cal.Rptr.3d 172, 158 P.3d 743]), he cannot now complain about the majority of the photographs that were admitted. Regardless, even if defendant’s claim could be applied to every photograph admitted at trial, his argument would still lack merit. Defendant cites a variety of cases, some more than 50 years old, for the proposition that a trial court can abuse its discretion by admitting particularly gruesome photographs. As general rule this may be true, but cases of more recent vintage have recognized that photographs of murder victims are relevant to help prove how the charged crime occurred, and that in presenting the case a prosecutor is not limited to details provided by the testimony of live witnesses. (E.g., D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 299; see Evid. Code, § 350 [only relevant evidence is admissible].) The trial court, in applying this principle, properly reviewed the challenged photographs. It did not abuse its discretion in excluding some and ruling that others were relevant in proving the prosecutor’s theory of the case, and that their probative value was not substantially outweighed by their prejudicial impact. (E.g., Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 191-192; see Evid. Code, § 352 [evidence that is relevant still may be excluded if it creates a substantial danger of prejudicing, confusing, or misleading the jury, or would consume an undue amount of time].) Citing People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 322-323 [246 Cal.Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082] (Poggi) and People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 577-578 [180 Cal.Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908], defendant contends the prosecutor was obligated to accept his offer to stipulate to the cause of death of each of the murder victims. Defendant’s reliance on these cases is misplaced, as both involved photographs of the victims while alive, which were used to demonstrate they were killed by the attacks in question. The prosecutor here did not introduce the photographs from the crime scene and autopsies solely to establish the fact of their deaths, but rather to demonstrate that defendant committed murder. As defendant’s plea of not guilty put all elements of each offense at issue (e.g., People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1243 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225]), defendant’s mental state during the commission of the crimes was relevant, and his proposed stipulation would not have relieved the prosecutor from proving this element. Despite the graphic nature of some of these photographs, the prosecution may present a persuasive and forceful case and, except as limited by Evidence Code section 352, it is not required to sanitize its evidence. (See, e.g., Salcido, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 147.) Defendant nonetheless argues none of the photographs “had any tendency in reason to prove that these offenses were premeditated as opposed to being impulsive, rash, unconsidered acts.” But as the trial court noted, many of the photographs highlighted the attacks on the victims’ throats, which tended to prove an intent to kill. Malice aforethought is an element of murder. (§ 187, subd. (a).) The photographs also supported the prosecutor's argument that the same person committed all of these crimes. Moreover, the prosecutor alleged Powalka and Corina were murdered during the commission or attempted commission of rape (and that Corina was murdered during the commission or attempted commission of a lewd act). Some of the photographs depicted their nearly identical states of undress, which could have helped prove the necessary mental state required for these allegations. Defendant further contends the photographs should have been excluded as cumulative to the testimony provided by live witnesses, but we have often rejected that argument (e.g., D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 299), and do so again here. Defendant also contends the photographs were cumulative, but the trial court did exercise its discretion and excluded some photographs as cumulative. To the extent that objection has not been forfeited with respect to the remaining photographs, defendant does not specify on appeal which photographs were cumulative to the others (see People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 185 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988]), and as more than 100 photographs were admitted into evidence at trial, we decline to hazard a guess on his behalf. 2. Sufficiency of the evidence Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions of first degree murder, attempted murder, and arson, as well as the special circumstances of murder during the commission or attempted commission of rape or a lewd act, or multiple murders. During closing argument for the guilt phase, defense counsel argued there was a possibility that Maddox committed some—or all—of these act