Full opinion text
THE COURT. Appellants William Griffin, Wiley H. Caddel, and James Mulligan, together with defendants Fred Grange, Paul McCarty and Robert Gray, were jointly indicted in Mendocino County on five counts of felony. The first count charged conspiracy to violate sections 67 and 68 of the Penal Code, in that from about November 1, 1947, to and including June 13, 1948, all six defendants conspired to give and offer bribes to executive officers of this state, with intent to influence said officers in respect to their action and decision as such officers, and also charged that they conspired to ask for and agreed to receive bribes as executive officers and employees of the state upon the understanding that their action in matters then pending before the said executive officers and employees on matters which might be brought before them in their official capacities would be influenced thereby. Three alleged overt acts were pleaded as having been committed pursuant to this conspiracy. The second count charged all six defendants with conspiring to violate section 330a of the Penal Code, in that during the same period they conspired to have under their control, either as owners, agents, employees, or otherwise, slot machines upon the result of the action of which money was then and thereafter to be hazarded. Ten overt acts were alleged to have been committed pursuant to this conspiracy. The defendants were then charged by the indictment with having violated section 67 of the Penal Code, as follows: Count Three charged all six defendants with having given a bribe to Sheriff B. G. Broaddus on April 30, 1948; Count Four charged all six defendants with having given a bribe to Sheriff Broaddus on June 3, 1948; and Count Five charged all six defendants with having given a bribe to Sheriff Broaddus’ deputy, William White, on June 3, 1948. Before the trial began, defendant Grange entered a plea of guilty to the first count of the indictment, and on motion of the district attorney Counts Two, Three, Four and Five were dismissed as against him. The trial of the case commenced on November 8, 1948. During its course, and before the People had rested their ease, the court granted motions of the district attorney to discharge defendants Gray and McCarty in order that each might be made a witness for the People, pursuant to the provisions of section 1099 of the Penal Code. On December 3, 1948, the jury returned its verdict finding each of the appellants guilty on each of the five counts of the indictment. After denial of probation, judgment was rendered as follows: Bach of the three appellants was sentenced to prison for the term prescribed by law on each of the five counts of the indictment; in the case of appellant Griffin, the term of imprisonment on each of the said five counts was ordered to run concurrently; appellant Mulligan’s sentence provided that .the terms of imprisonment imposed as to Counts One, Three, Four and Five should run concurrently, and that the imprisonment under Count Two should run consecutively to that imposed under the other four counts; appellant Caddel’s sentence provided that the terms of imprisonment imposed under Counts One and Five should run concurrently, that the terms imposed under Counts Three and Four should also run concurrently, but should commence at the termination of- the term of imprisonment imposed under Counts One and Five, and that the term imposed under Count Two should commence upon the termination of the term imposed under Counts Three and Four. . The three defendants moved for new trials, which motions were denied, and they have now separately appealed from the judgments of conviction, and from the orders denying their motions for new trials. Prior to the trial appellant Caddel filed in this court a .petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the- Mendocino County Superior Court from trying the cause. Said petition was- denied. . The appellants contend in this appeal that the evidence was. insufficient as a matter of law to justify the convictions ; that-.testimony of accomplices was not corroborated as required by law; that the court committed error in .denying motions for mistrial, for advisory verdicts and to strike evidence, and also in instructing the jury; that the court committed error in overruling demurrer to Count One of the indictment; and that the district attorney was guilty of prejudicial misconduct. The record on appeal is voluminous, the Reporter’s Transcript alone containing 4,127 pages. Fifty-three witnesses were called and examined, and over 100 exhibits admitted into evidence. Stating the facts in the light most favorable to respondent, as we are required to do (People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678 [104 P.2d 778]; People v. Hannon, 44 Cal.App.2d 484 [112 P.2d 719]), they showed that defendant Fred Grange, who had been associated over a period of years in gambling enterprises, was, in the latter part of 1947 and in 1948, a part owner of Lane’s Flat, a resort in Mendocino County. Appellant Griffin was an employee at Lane’s Flat. Defendant Robert Gray was an owner and operator of slot machines and had lately been in partnership in the machines with one Gobels. This partnership having been split up, Gray, being in financial difficulty, contacted Fred Grange for assistance. After some conversations an agreement was reached whereby Grange would become a partner in the ownership and operation of the slot machines. Grange, in turn, agreed to co-sign a contract for Gray evidencing certain indebtedness on the machines to the Morris Plan, and to underwrite the monthly payments under said contract of $546.64, until such time as the revenue from the machines was sufficient to take care of the installments. Appellant Griffin took part in these discussions, and it was agreed that he would participate in the new arrangement, and in particular that he would act as mechanic for the slot machines. Pursuant to this agreement, and on the 5th day of January, 1948, the contract with the Morris Plan was signed by Grange on behalf of Gray. Shortly afterward Gray’s slot machines, which had been stored at Andy’s Place in Willits, were moved in a truck by Griffin and Gray to Lane’s Flat. The machines being in poor condition, it was necessary to have them repaired, and they were taken to San Francisco to the M. S. Wolf Distributing Company. Appellant Griffin went along so that he might become familiar with the mechanism of the machines. A system of bookkeeping was then set up in which the expenditures of the new business were entered, and, later on, the revenue. When the machines had been repaired they Were returned to Mendocino County where the owners of various resorts were contacted and the machines placed on location and in operation. In the preceding late summer, Grange had become acquainted with appellant Mulligan, a retired police officer of Los Angeles. In November of that year Mulligan had come to Lane's Plat and was there at a time when Grange, Griffin and Gray were also present. After that occasion in November Grange had seen Mulligan either at Lane’s Plat or in San Francisco and they had talked about slot machine operations. Mulligan claimed to have a connection with the attorney general’s office through appellant Caddel, who was employed by that office as an undercover operative. Mulligan and Caddel were friends of many years’ standing, and Mulligan informed Grange that Caddel and he were partners. He also informed Grange that unless “arrangements” were made in Mendocino County slot machines would not be allowed to operate. He instructed Grange to get a list of the slot machine operators and their locations, and to find out what kind of fellows the sheriff and district attorney were, and who knew them. Both Grange and Griffin undertook to do this. On two occasions Grange contacted different deputy sheriffs in Mendocino County and sought information as to what the “deal” was on slot machines. Both of these officers assured Grange there was none. In these conversations the policy of the attorney general’s office on slot machines was mentioned, and Grange declared, “Well, I have that fixed.” In his talk with Deputy Sheriff William White, Grange elaborated on the subject further by describing a method whereby the local officers might know that “everything was all right” with the attorney general’s office. This consisted of the giving of a certain confirmatory sign or signal whereby a representative of the attorney general’s office, at a prearranged time, would call on the sheriff for no ostensible reason, and then having merely passed the time of day would depart. Information as to the use of this signal had been given to Grange by Mulligan. Griffin’s efforts to-obtain the desired information were along a different line. He introduced himself to Paul McCarty, originally indicted as one of the conspirators, and who was reputed to be the largest operator of slot machines in Mendocino County. He informed McCarty that he (Griffin) was going to be a mechanic for Bob Gray’s machines, and that Grange had acquired an interest in them. Griffin then asked McCarty “what the score was in the county,” how they ran slot machines there, and asked “who the person was to talk to.” McCarty replied that his brother, Pete, handled the matter. Grange followed this up by also interviewing McCarty. He told McCarty of the partnership which he (Grange) now had with Gray, and since he was interested in the slot machine business he wanted to know what the deal was in Mendocino County. McCarty replied that there was no deal, but that he imposed upon the sheriff and the district attorney on the basis of long acquaintance with them, and that it was a friendship proposition. Not being successful in these efforts to obtain the desired information, and meanwhile having been introduced to Sheriff Broaddus, Grange decided to go to headquarters and talk directly to the sheriff. This he did about the middle of February, 1948. In this conversation the operation of slot machines in Mendocino County was discussed. Grange touched upon the importance of such operations to the resorts, and that if they were permitted by the sheriff to operate machines there would be reciprocity in the form of substantial donations to the sheriff’s campaign funds, or in any way he wanted to handle it. Grange assured the sheriff that the attorney general’s office was “all right,” and that nothing would be done by that office to embarrass the sheriff, or without previous notification. Grange then repeated to the sheriff the signal which he had previously related to White, that at an appointed time a man from the attorney general’s office would call on the sheriff and say, “Good morning, I come from the attorney general’s office, and how’s everything, goodbye.” Grange further alluded to another proof to show that he had a connection with the attorney general’s office, to wit, that if the sheriff had some place which might be embarrassing to him to raid, that the attorney general’s office would send the sheriff a complaint concerning the place, suggesting that the sheriff raid it, or the attorney general’s office itself would raid the place. Sheriff Broaddus at first told Grange that he would not consent to anyone operating slot machines or violating the law, but at the conclusion of the conversation when Grange asked him if he (Grange) should see McCarty, the sheriff said that it was all right with him if he did. Grange took this as an intimation from the sheriff that the latter might go along with the proposition. Grange’s first meeting with Caddel occurred on February 16th. On that day Mulligan had made an appointment to meet Grange at the San Francisco airport. Grange drove to San Francisco and met Mulligan as per appointment, and they went into the bar at the airport and ordered a drink. Shortly thereafter a man appeared and Mulligan said “That is Caddel. ’ ’ Caddel ordered a drink and then asked Mulligan, ‘ ‘ Can I see you a moment?” The two stepped back from the bar. Later, when Mulligan left, Caddel walked up to Grange and said, “Whatever Mulligan tells you is all right with me; we are partners.” In this same month Gray became ill and was compelled to return from Lane’s Flat to his home in San Francisco. A meeting was then arranged between Mulligan, Grange and Griffin to discuss the purchase of Gray’s interest in the slot machines. On February 29th Grange and Griffin proceeded by plane to San Francisco, arriving there about 6 or 7 p. m., and registered at the Palace Hotel. They were assigned to a room on the eighth floor.. Appellants Mulligan and Caddel, with their respective wives, had registered at the Palace on the preceding evening, and also had rooms on the eighth floor.' After arriving at the hotel, Grange and Griffin went to Appellant Mulligan’s room, where they saw Mulligan and his wife. On the table were four glasses, and appellant Mulligan remarked that “Buck” Caddel had just been there and gone down the hall. The three, Grange, Griffin and Mulligan, then discussed the purchase of Gray’s slot machines, and Mulligan suggested they call Gray to make an appointment to see him. The hotel records show a call to Montrose 49657, the residence of Robert Gray, charged to Mulligan’s room on February 29, 1948. On the following day Gray came to the Palace Hotel and met with Grange, Griffin and Mulligan. There was a variance in the testimony of Gray and Grange as to the time of the meeting, Gray fixing it in the afternoon, and Grange in the morning. In any event, a conversation was held about the sale and purchase of Gray’s interest in the slot machines. It developed, however, that there was a difference of opinion about values. Gray wanted four or five thousand dollars for his interest, whereas it had been planned to offer him only one thousand dollars. Gray was requested to step out of the room for a few minutes, and the remaining three discussed the matter. Grange suggested that they offer Gray two thousand dollars. Appellant Mulligan thought for a moment and then said, “Well, I will have to go over and ask Buck.” Mulligan left and was gone ten or fifteen minutes, then he came back and said it was OK for two thousand dollars, that Buck would OK it for two thousand dollars. Gray testified that Mulligan was gone from the room about ten minutes, and after his return they continued to talk - about the sale of the machines, but that Mulligan said he wanted no part in the transaction. The conference concluded by Gray’s reserving his decision on the matter to a later date. Grange testified that when he started to leave the eighth floor of the hotel on this occasion, on going towards the elevator, he met appellant Caddel coming up another corridor, and that Caddel approached him and said, “Whatever deal Mulligan makes is OK, as we are partners.” This meeting was denied by Caddel, and also it was stipulated to as a fact in the trial that Caddel checked out of the hotel at 10:30 a. m. of that day. As noted above, Gray’s testimony was that the meeting occurred in the afternoon, and he was corroborated as to the time of his coming to the hotel by other witnesses. A few days later Gray announced his decision of not selling his interest in the slot machines and of staying in the business. It was then suggested by Grange to Mulligan that the latter procure additional slot machines in order to equal the number of Gray’s, and that a partnership be established which would consist of one-third interest for Gray, one-third for Mulligan, and one-third for Caddel. Mulligan said it would be a good idea, and he would tell Caddel about it. Under this arrangement Grange was to take over from Gray the two slot machines operated at Lane’s Plat in consideration of three monthly payments on the Morris Plan contract, two of which had already been made by Grange. Later in March there was a further modification, whereby appellant Mulligan agreed to reimburse Grange for these payments, and to relieve Grange from responsibility under the contract, in consideration of which the two slot machines at Lane’s Plat would be operated for the benefit of Mulligan and Caddel. Grange agreed to this arrangement, and informed Mulligan that $1,500 would take care of the three Morris Plan payments. Mulligan then told Grange that machines would be sent up to Lane’s Plat accordingly, and that appellant Griffin would represent Mulligan and Caddel, and that they would make their own deal with Griffin. On March 13th Griffin departed in Grange’s truck for Los Angeles, having received word from Mulligan that there were some slot machines available there. In Los Angeles Griffin went to the California Games Company, a retail slot machine sales company, purchased four slot machines and ordered two more. During his stay in Los Angeles Griffin also brought to the California Games Company three or four slot machines for renovation. On one occasion appellant Mulligan was with Griffin at the slot machine company and was talking with Griffin. Delivery of the machines purchased and of those renovated was taken by Griffin in the truck, and the two additional machines which he had ordered were shipped to Robert Gray at Sutton’s Place, Mendocino County. Thomas Wall, who operated the California Games Company, had known Mulligan for sixteen years and Caddel for nine. After Griffin had arrived back at Lane’s Flat with the additional slot machines, resort owners in Mendocino County were further solicited for locations, and a number of them accepted the machines. Some who were approached by Griffin and Gray did not. Meanwhile Grange had been to see McCarty again and had given him $100 for Sheriff Broaddus. The system of deducting a certain amount from the weekly receipts of each slot machine for “protection” began around the 1st of April. The amount so deducted each week was $10 per machine, $4.00 of which was to be for the state, and the other $6.00 to take care of the local authorities. These deductions were to be called “Repairs and Insurance” and Griffin was delegated to explain this to the location owners. This was done, and the practice of taking $10 off the top from each slot machine was begun. Collections from the machines were made by Griffin or Gray and were entered upon a printed form entitled “Collection Report” which showed the amount of money taken from the machine, and the division of it. On April 5th appellant Mulligan came to Ukiah and registered at the Palace Hotel under the name of “Miller.” After arriving there he conferred with Grange about the April pay-off. Grange then went in search of McCarty, and locating him, said, “The man is here for the money,” and “wants a list of your locations.” In this interview between Grange and McCarty a question came up as to whether or not there should be a payment required on machines operating merely as “free play” or solely on the automatic pay-off machines. McCarty objected to paying on the former, and inasmuch as Grange didn’t know the answer, Grange went back to the hotel to consult Mulligan. Mulligan instructed Grange that no payment was required for the free play machines, and so to inform McCarty. However, Mulligan added that McCarty would only get protection on the machines he paid for and that “if something happens to some of the machines he isn’t paying for then not to come crying round about it.” Grange conveyed this message to McCarty. A computation was then made of McCarty’s machines, to wit: 16 machines at $8 for a two-week period begining April 1st, or a total of $128. Grange remarked it was a small amount for a man coming clear from Los Angeles to Mendocino County. After some discussion the amount was increased to $150. McCarty gave this sum to Grange in cash, together with a list of his machines. McCarty testified that the money he had given Grange was actually paid out of his own pocket, that he had not made any collection from any slot machine operators in the county, nor had he solicited any money from them. His purpose in giving Grange the money was to bait a trap for Grange on behalf of the sheriff. He said he wanted Grange to give him some proof of a connection with the attorney general’s office, and that he wanted to get a look at the fellows Grange was supposed to be with. The money obtained from McCarty, together with the list, was delivered by Grange to Mulligan in Mulligan’s room at the Palace Hotel at Ukiah. Appellant Griffin was present at the time and made a copy of McCarty’s list on the stationery of the Palace Hotel. It had two columns, showing both the places having free play and those having automatic pay-off machines .When Grange gave the envelope and the list to Mulligan, Mulligan said, “I have to call Buck and tell him that everything is all right, because he is very interested to know. ’ ’ Mulligan then made a long distance call and Grange heard him speak to the party on the other end of the line and say, “Everything has gone here as planned. Everything is all right.” Mulligan’s next trip to Mendocino County was on April 29th. He proceeded to Lane’s Flat and met Grange about 2 o’clock that afternoon. He told Grange that he (Mulligan) and Caddel had driven from San Francisco in separate cars, and that Caddel was stopping off to see the sheriff. Mulligan then suggested that Grange go back and see the sheriff, and ask him if he had a visitor, and if everything was all right. Grange replied that it was a bit late, and they agreed that Grange would see the sheriff the next morning. On the same day, about 11:15 in the morning, appellant Oaddel appeared in. the sheriff’s office in Mendocino County, introduced himself to Sheriff Broaddus and showed his credentials, stating that he wanted to be sure that the sheriff knew who he was. He inquired if the sheriff had any “beef” with the attorney general’s office. The sheriff, replied he had none and that Oaddel was the first man from that office .to call on him. A short conversation was had between the two, lasting about five minutes, and appellant Oaddel then left. On the following morning Grange and Mulligan proceeded from Lane’s Plat to Ukiah in Mulligan’s car and drove up in front of the Palace Hotel. Mulligan gave Grange $200 in currency, which was placed in a white envelope. About 9:15 of that morning Grange called at Sheriff Broaddus’ home and asked the sheriff if he had had a visitor on the day before. The sheriff replied in the affirmative. Grange then explained that he did not know that Oaddel was ..going to call on the sheriff until early in the preceding afternoon, and consequently did not have a chance to notify the sheriff in advance of Caddel’s visit. Near the end of this conversation Grange left a sealed envelope on the chesterfield in the sheriff’s house, saying, “Here’s something that will take care of you.” The envelope was not picked up by Sheriff Broaddus until after Grange left, at which time the sheriff found that it contained $250 in currency. The sheriff later showed this money to Deputy Sheriff Bartolomie, and it, together with the original envelope, was introduced in evidence as People’s Exhibit 3. After leaving the money with the sheriff, Grange returned to the Palace Hotel in Ukiah and picked up Mulligan. Mulligan’s visit to Lane’s Plat continued from April 29th to May 4th. Meanwhile, Griffin had been looking for McCarty, and Mulligan remarked that McCarty was “a hell of a guy to do business with, you can never find him when you need him or want him.” He added, “Well, you ought to forget about Mr. McCarty,” However, Grange located McCarty and informed him that he (Grange) had now produced proof to the sheriff of his connection with the attorney general’s office, by Caddel’s visit. Grange also told McCarty that he (Grange) had given some money to the sheriff. Grange complained because McCarty had not made his payment, to which McCarty replied that he did not have the money, but that he would bring it to Lane’s Plat the next day and see the fellow from the attorney general’s office. On the next day McCarty started for Lane’s Flat with the money. On the road there he was intercepted by appellant Griffin in a pickup truck. The two stopped and stepped off the road, and Griffin handed McCarty an envelope from Grange in which was a list and a $100 bill. This $100 bill was intended for Sheriff Broaddus and was to be given to him by McCarty. The latter refused to accept the $100. He told Griffin, however, that he (McCarty) had some money and a list for payment. Appellant Griffin told him that if he had anything for Grange to put it in an envelope and he would give it to him! In doing so McCarty dropped the money and the wind blew it around. The two picked up the currency and it, together with the $100 bill, was placed in the envelope and taken by Griffin. When Griffin came back to Lane’s Flat he handed Mulligan the envelope in the presence of Grange, and related what had transpired in the interview with McCarty. Mulligan’s visit at Lane’s Flat was concluded on May 4th and he departed on that day for San Francisco. In the accounts kept by Gray of slot machine business for the month of April, a statement dated April 30th showed total receipts for the month of $1,064.50. In the list of expenditures was an entry of April 30th entitled “Podok” in the sum of $250. “Podok” was a word used to indicate pay-off to the state and county, according to Gray. In the latter part of April Grange received the $1,500 which Mulligan had agreed to pay him for Grange’s interest in Gray’s slot machines. It was paid in the form of a cashier’s cheek drawn on the Security First National Bank of Los Angeles. Thomas Wall, the operator of the California Games Company, testified that in April of 1948, appellant Griffin .requested Wall’s secretary, Melba Wesson, to go across the street to the bank and purchase the cheek. Griffin gave her the money, and the check was made payable to and endorsed by Grange. Two more slot machines were purchased in May and shipped C.O.D. to Willits, California. Appellant Griffin gave Gray the money for them, a cashier’s check in the sum of $500, which Gray endorsed and took delivery of the machines, as evidenced by the tag of the Railway Express Agency. The $500 check was purchased by the same M. Wesson of the California Games Company, from the Security First National Bank of Los Angeles, and was "made payable to W. A. Griffin. At one time Griffin had told Gray that Wall was the partner in Los Angeles. However, in referring to the $500 check in a discussion with Gray, Griffin said, “Well, if this thing wasn’t safe then Mr. Mulligan wouldn’t have sent a check up for $500.00.” Wall testified he had retained no interest in the slot machines sold to Griffin, that he had never received any revenue from them or from Griffin, and never was told anything about their operations. On May 20th Sheriff Broaddus accidentally encountered Grange, and the latter invited the sheriff to Lane’s Plat for a talk. The sheriff agreed to come in a few days. On May 22d there was a long distance call from Mulligan’s number in Los Angeles to Lane’s Plat. On the following day, May 23d, Sheriff Broaddus and his deputy, William White, went to Lane’s Plat, where the sheriff met Grange and had a private talk with him in one of the cottages. Grange asked if the sheriff had any “beef” about slot machines and inquired about the operators along the coast. Then Grange told Sheriff Broaddus that a letter would be received inviting the sheriff to a meeting to be called by the attorney general in Los Angeles right after the first of June. Grange then gave the sheriff a list of operators of slot machines, and suggested a “token” raid prior to the meeting in Los Angeles so that the sheriff could report the same there. The sheriff informed Grange he was taking a prisoner east, and that meanwhile Grange should take care of Deputy White, who was suspicious. This Grange agreed to do, and at the conclusion of the conference, which lasted some thirty-five minutes, Grange, when they had returned from the cabin, shook hands with White and said, “I will see you later.” On the 3d of June, Mulligan appeared on the scene again and registered at the Palace Hotel in Ukiah, room 237, under the fictitious name of Wilson. Grange met him there, and Mulligan coached the former on what Sheriff Broaddus was to report at the Los Angeles meeting, namely, that the sheriff was not to say that there were no machines in Mendocino County, but that there were a few and he was making raids, and that he had been pretty busy, and that there would always be a few machines. On that same day Grange contacted McCarty for the June pay-off, but with negative results. McCarty reported that he had not been able to get the operators to pay him. Grange then asked McCarty to arrange a meeting for him with the sheriff right away. On this occasion McCarty returned the $100 which Grange had previously given him for the sheriff, with the comment that if Grange wanted to pay the sheriff to do it himself. The meeting so arranged by McCarty took place on the river road. Both the sheriff and Grange drove there, left their cars and then stood talking. In this conversation Grange reported to the sheriff, among other things, that there were about 158 slot machines in the county. He handed the sheriff a paper containing two lists prepared by Griffin, one of “our” machines and the other of Les Gobel’s. This list was admitted in evidence as People’s Exhibit 5. Grange also told the sheriff it would be a good idea to make a token raid before the meeting in Los Angeles on June 7th. Grange suggested that the sheriff pick up one of “our” machines at Sutton’s which was breaking down and causing trouble. Grange also told the sheriff there was not enough in the business for everbody, that he thought the state was going to pull out, but that the sheriff did not have to worry because he would not be interfered with by the attorney general’s office. Just prior to leaving, Grange opened the left-hand door of the sheriff’s car and put an envelope on the seat and said, “Here’s something more for you.” The envelope was sealed and contained $300 in currency. This sum included the $100 returned by McCarty. Grange told the sheriff he had given $100 to McCarty for the sheriff but that McCarty had returned it. The $300 was all in currency, $20 bills, and was offered in evidence as People’s Exhibit 7. Grange then went back to the Palace Hotel and talked to Mulligan and Griffin. He told them about the $100 which was to be paid to Deputy Sheriff White, and then got the money and went to White’s home on the same day and paid the $100 to White. This money was also in an envelope and consisted of five $20 bills, introduced in evidence as People’s Exhibit 8. White took the money to the sheriff’s office and showed the bills to Deputy Sheriff Bartolomie. After giving this money to White, Grange returned to the Palace Hotel and reported to Mulligan what had happened. In the financial statement of slot machine operations for the first part of June there was an entry of expenditures entitled “Podok” in the sum of $300. On June 5th, pursuant to Grange’s suggestion, a machine was seized by the sheriff’s office in each of the following locations: Sutton’s, Tanoak, Jeff’s Bancho, and Booneville. Gray testified that they had replaced the machine at Sutton’s with an old, worn-out one in anticipation of the proposed raid. This was also verified by John Sutton, the operator, and by Deputy Sheriff Bartolomie, who seized an old battered machine at.Sutton’s. A week later a new machine, to wit, a big console job, was moved into Sutton’s in place of the old one that had been, seized. .On June ,7th Gray purchased a cashier’s check in the sum of $150. which he either sent to appellant Mulligan or gave to appellant Griffin to mail. This money was also taken out of the business by Gray at the direction of Griffin and corresponded with an item of 1 ‘Podolc” in the records of the business. . On June 7th Sheriff Broaddus attended the meeting in Los Angeles and made a short report on slot machines in his county, in accordance with Grange’s instructions. Upon, returning from the attorney general’s meeting, Sheriff Broaddus organized raids and seized slot machines in various parts of the county. Grange was arrested and the slot machines at Lane’s Plat were seized. Appellant Griffin was also arrested, and on being questioned said, first, that he had no connection with slot machines and that he was only a mechanic. The following morning he admitted to Deputy Sheriffs White and Bartolomie that he was a partner in the slot machine business, and that he was a part owner of the machines, and that he and Gray owned the machines together. On June 13th, at San Diego, appellant Caddel was present at a meeting of the Crime Commission. He was asked if he knew a man by the name of Mulligan, to which he replied in the affirmative. When asked in regard to what Mulligan was doing, he stated that he would prefer not to tell that before the commission, but would be perfectly willing to tell it to Admiral Standley, President of the Commission, in private. After the meeting was adjourned Caddel informed Admiral Standley that Mr. Mulligan was employed as a “bag man,” that is, a pay-off man, one who carries funds and makes the pay-off. It is insisted with much earnestness by all the appellants that the evidence above set forth was insufficient to warrant the convictions or to support the verdicts, the principal contention being that it was based mainly upon the testimony of accomplices. It is urged by appellants that the evidence was either not corroborated at all by independent evidence, or at least was insufficiently corroborated. The heaviest attack is made upon the testimony of Grange and Gray who were accomplices as a matter of law and who, in the words of appellants, “bartered their testimony for their freedom.” It is also urged that the witness, Paul McCarty, and even Sheriff Broaddus himself, were accomplices and that their testimony required corroboration. Inasmuch as this latter point has an important bearing on the main proposition of the insufficiency of the evidence and of corroboration of accomplices, it seems proper to consider it first. As was noted above, McCarty was indicted along with the other defendants, but during the course of the trial, upon application of the district attorney, the trial court directed that McCarty be discharged in order to make him a witness for the People. In doing so, the trial judge remarked that he had grave doubts as to whether any case had been proven against McCarty and that it was his belief that if the prosecution were to rest at that time an advised verdict probably would be in order. When McCarty was sworn as a witness he testified unequivocally that he was baiting a trap for Grange on behalf of the sheriff. There is evidence in the record that supports this declaration. When McCarty was first contacted by Grange, and the illegal scheme unfolded, McCarty refused to believe the sheriff would be a party to it. He went to see the sheriff and had a conversation with him and received certain instructions. The conversation between the sheriff and McCarty was, after the action had been dismissed as to McCarty, stricken from the record. However, in the light of subsequent events, the jury might properly have inferred that the sheriff had concurred in a course of action to be pursued by McCarty for the purpose of detection and prosecution of the perpetrators. (People v. Squires, 99 Cal. 327 [33 P. 1092].) This is borne out by the following facts: that McCarty and the sheriff kept in touch with each other during the course of the conspiracy, and on one occasion met in San Francisco to discuss it; that McCarty made no effort to bring any slot machine operators into the scheme as proposed by Grange nor collected any money from them for pay-off; that he refused to pay the $100 given to him by Grange to be paid to the sheriff as a bribe, stating to Grange, “If you want to pay the sheriff, pay him yourself”; that it was his intention at the request of the sheriff to find out whether or not Grange was trying to use a pay:off to him and start some organized vice of some kind at Lane’s Flat, and whether or-not the attorney general was mixed up in this pay-off; that he wanted Grange to give him some proof that Grange had connections with the attorney general’s office which had not been furnished, and that he was baiting a trap; that on the occasion that he paid the money to Griffin, MeCarty was on Ms way to Lane’s Plat in order that he might see the man represented to be from the attorney general’s office. The rule is well established that one who, under the direction of an officer of the law, feigns complicity in the commission of a crime merely for the purpose of detecting or prosecuting the perpetrator is not an accomplice and his testimony is not subject to the limitations contained in section 1111 of the Penal Code relating to corroboration. (People v. Bolanger, 71 Cal. 17 [11 P. 799]; People v. Keseling, 35 Cal.App. 501 [170 P. 627] ; People v. Heusers, 58 Cal.App. 103 [207 P. 908]; People v. Lanzit, 70 Cal.App. 498 [233 P. 816]; People v. Calvert, 93 Cal.App. 568 [269 P. 969]; People v. Lombard, 131 Cal.App. 525 [21 P.2d 955]; People v. Fitzgerald, 14 Cal.App.2d 180 [58 P.2d 718] ; People v. Buyle, 20 Cal.App.2d 650 [68 P.2d 268] ; People v. Grijalva, 48 Cal.App.2d 690 [121 P.2d 32]; People v. Hicks, 62 Cal.App.2d 859 [145 P.2d 689].) This is predicated upon the theory that those who originate and propose a criminal design may not escape conviction merely by reason of the fact that a trap was laid for them or that they were facilitated in the execution of their unlawful enterprises by an officer» of the law who acted for the purpose of detecting them. (People v. Caiazza, 61 Cal.App. 505 [215 P. 80]; People v. Lanzit, supra.) It is settled law that if there is a disputed question of fact as to whether a witness was or was not an accomplice, the jury must decide. (People v. Kraker, 72 Cal. 459 [14 P. 196, 1 Am.St.Rep. 65] ; People v. Sansome, 98 Cal. 235 [33 P. 202]; People v. Demera, 64 Cal.App. 121 [220 P. 673] ; People v. Rous, 118 Cal.App. 534 [5 P.2d 470] ; People v. Featherstone, 67 Cal.App.2d 793 [155 P.2d 685].) Likewise, it is for the jury to determine, when the evidence is conflicting, whether a witness was an actual or a feigned accomplice. (People v. Bolanger, supra; People v. Spaulding, 81 Cal.App. 615 [254 P. 614].) As pointed out in People v. Gibbs, 87 Cal.App. 177 [261 P. 1057], an accomplice usually comes upon the stand admitting his complicity in the commission of the offense. But where complicity is denied it becomes a question for the jury when the facts are disputed or susceptible of different inferences. In view of these rules it is our conclusion that the question of whether or not McCarty or Sheriff Broaddus were merely feigning complicity in the offenses charged in order to detect and prosecute the perpetrators thereof was properly left to the jury for determination. The jury was given the definition of an accomplice and was instructed upon the rules in relation to the testimony of accomplices. It was further instructed as a matter of law that witnesses Gray and Grange were accomplices. On the subject of feigned complicity the trial court gave the jury the following instruction: “One who under the direction of an officer of the law or of any other person or upon his own initiative and without criminal intent feigns complicity in the commission of crime merely for the purpose of determining the perpetrator thereof with a view of prosecution for the offense is not an accomplice in law, and his testimony need not be corroborated.” Appellants contend that the effect of this instruction was to take the question away from the jury and inform them that McCarty was not an accomplice. We do not so construe it. The trial court specifically instructed the jury that as to any witness in the case, other than Gray or Grange, it was for them to determine from all of the testimony and circumstances as shown by the evidence whether or not such witness was an accomplice. The determination was thus left to the jury, and no error was committed by the trial court in giving to the jury a definition of feigned accomplices. Under the evidence of the case it was proper for the trial court so to instruct. Consequently, any inference of the complicity of McCarty and Broaddus deducible from their acts and conduct having been resolved adversely by the jury, it must be held that such a finding is conclusive on appeal, and that therefore their testimony need not have been corroborated pursuant to the provisions of section 1111 of the Penal Code. (People v. Gibbs, supra; People v. Spaulding, supra.) We will now proceed to the main issue of appellants’ contentions, namely, that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Particular emphasis is placed by them upon a method adopted by some of the decisions in testing the sufficiency of evidence corroborative of the testimony of an accomplice. This method was first announced in People v. Morton, 139 Cal. 719, 724 [73 P. 609] ; wherein the following language from Welden v. State, 10 Tex.App. 400, was quoted: “We suggest this mode as a proper test: eliminate from the ease the evidence of the accomplice, and then examine the evidence of the other witness or witnesses with the view to ascertain if there be inculpatory evidence—evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense. If there is, the accomplice is corroborated; if there is no inculpatory evidence, there is no corroboration, though the accomplice may be corroborated in regard to any number of facts sworn to by him.” Appellants rely strongly upon the case of People v. Reingold, 87 Cal.App.2d 382 [197 P.2d 175], wherein the test above quoted was employed. In applying it to the evidence the court said, on page 393: “. . . the corroboration is not sufficient if it requires interpretation and direction to be furnished by the accomplice’s testimony to give it value; second, that the corroborative evidence to be sufficient and of the required substantial value must tend directly and immediately, to connect the defendant with the offense charged against him; and, third, that the corroborative evidence is insufficient when it merely casts a grave suspicion upon the accused.” The statutory law on the subject is embraced by section 1111 of the Penal Code. This section was enacted in the year 1872 and amended only twice subsequently. In its original form it read: “A-conviction can not be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other evidence which in itself, and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient, if it merely shows the commission of the offense, or the circumstances thereof.” In 1911 the section was amended to read as follows: “A conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless he be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.” By this amendment the Legislature saw fit to delete from the section the words “by other evidence which in itself, and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice.” In 1915 another paragraph was added, as follows: “An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in-the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given. ’ ’ The statutory law has thus remained relatively constant throughout a considerable period of time. In applying it to the facts of particular cases and in evaluating the degree of corroboration required, the courts have announced certain rules as follows: It is not necessary that the corroborative evidence prove independently either that the defendant is guilty of the offense or that he is guilty heyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Ames, 39 Cal. 403; People v. Rose, 42 Cal.App. 540 [183 P. 874]; People v. Blunkall, 31 Cal.App. 778 [161 P. 997]; People v. Thompson, 16 Cal.App. 748 [117 P. 1033]; People v. Leavens, 12 Cal.App. 178 [106 P. 1103] ; People v. Melone, 71 Cal.App.2d 291 [162 P.2d 505]; People v. Baskins, 72 Cal.App.2d 728 [165 P.2d 510].) If this were not true and if it were required that a complete case for the prosecution be established without reference to the testimony of the accomplice, there would then be no occasion to offer the accomplice as a witness. ' Sufficient corroboration may be furnished by the defendant’s own testimony (People v. Sullivan, 144 Cal. 471 [77 P. 1000]; People v. Watson, 21 Cal.App. 692 [132 P. 836]; People v. Bunkers, 2 Cal.App. 197 [84 P. 364, 370]; People v. Baba, 101 Cal.App. 723 [282 P. 403]; People v. King, 30 Cal.App.2d 185 [85 P.2d 928]; People v. White, 48 Cal.App.2d 90 [119 P.2d 383]; People v. Wilson, 25 Cal.2d 341 [153 P.2d 720]), or by admissions or confessions made by him (People v. Richardson, 161 Cal. 552 [120 P. 20]; People v. Davis, 135 Cal. 162 [67 P. 59] ; People v. Zimmerman, 65 Cal. 307 [4 P. 20]; People v. Cleveland, 49 Cal. 577), or by silence in the face of an accusatory statement (People v. Collins, 4 Cal.App.2d 86 [40 P.2d 542]). The entire conduct of the parties, their relationship, acts, and conduct during and after the crime, may be taken into consideration by the jury in determining the sufficiency of the corroboration. (People v. King, 33 Cal.App.2d 538 [92 P.2d 510]; People v. Ross, 46 Cal.App.2d 385 [116 P.2d 81] ; People v. Willmurth, 77 Cal.App.2d 605 [176 P.2d 102] ; People v. Mazzola, 99 Cal.App. 682 [279 P. 211]; People v. Wiley, 33 Cal.App.2d 424 [91 P.2d 907]; People v. Rice, 29 Cal.App.2d 614 [85 P.2d 215]; People v. Payton, 36 Cal.App.2d 41 [96 P.2d 991]; People v. Garrison, 80 Cal.App.2d 458 [181 P.2d 738].) If the corroboration is inculpatory it is not essential that it extend to all of the elements of the offense, nor to every fact and detail included in the testimony of the accomplices. (People v. Black, 45 Cal.App.2d 87 [113 P.2d 746] ; People v. Andrew, 43 Cal.App.2d 126 [110 P.2d 459]; People v. King, 30 Cal.App.2d 185 [85 P.2d 928]; People v. Martinez, 19 Cal.App.2d 599 [66 P.2d 161]; People v. Whittaker, 18 Cal.App.2d 396 [63 P.2d 1202]; People v. Briley, 9 Cal.App.2d 84 [48 P.2d 734]; People v. Tinnin, 136 Cal.App. 301 [28 P.2d 951]; People v. Baillie, 133 Cal.App. 508 [24 P.2d 528]; People v. Collier, 111 Cal.App. 215 [295 P. 898]; People v. Baba, 101 Cal.App. 723 [282 P. 403]; People v. Negra, 208 Cal. 64 [280 P. 354]; People v. Frazer, 80 Cal.App. 464 [252 P. 633]; People v. Taylor, 70 Cal.App. 239 [232 P. 998]; People v. Kelly, 69 Cal.App. 558 [231 P. 767]; People v. Yeager, 194 Cal. 452 [229 P. 40]; People v. Wilson, 25 Cal.2d 341 [153 P.2d 720]; People v. Harper, 25 Cal.2d 862 [156 P.2d 249]; People v. Malone, 82 Cal.App.2d 54 [185 P.2d 870].) Conversely, such evidence is sufficient if it tends in some slight degree, at least, to implicate the defendant. It need not be strong. (People v. Kelly, supra; People v. Follette, 74 Cal.App. 178 [240 P. 502]; People v. McNett, 80 Cal.App. 81 [251 P. 688]; People v. Negra, supra; People v. Linde, 131 Cal.App. 12 [20 P.2d 704]; People v. Tinnin, supra; People v. Andrew, supra; People v. Wilson, supra.) The testimony of an accomplice need not be corroborated by direct evidence, or, stated in another way: Circumstantial evidence suffices for the purpose of corroboration. (People v. McNett, supra; People v. Frazer, supra; People v. Blunkall, supra; People v. Nikolich, 93 Cal.App. 356 [269 P. 721]; People v. Allen, 95 Cal.App. 60 [272 P. 349]; People v. Negra, supra; People v. Entriken, 106 Cal.App. 29 [288 P. 788]; People v. Knoth, 111 Cal.App. 250 [295 P. 577]; People v. Bonner, 5 Cal.App.2d 314 [42 P.2d 694]; People v. Ross, supra.) It is sufficient, even though circumstantial and slight, if the connection of the defendant with the alleged crime may be reasonably inferred from the corroborative evidence. (People v. Whittaker, supra; People v. Rice, supra; People v. Payton, supra; People v. Suter, 43 Cal.App.2d 444 [111 P.2d 23]; People v. Wilson, supra.) The corroborating evidence is sufficient if it connects the defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as reasonably to satisfy the fact-finding body that the accomplice is telling the truth. (People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal.2d 105 [194 P.2d 681]; People v. Henderson, 34 Cal.2d 340 [209 P.2d 785].) In the Trujillo case, supra, our Supreme Court said, at page 110: “Such corroboration must create more than a suspicion of guilt, but is sufficient even though it ‘be slight and, when standing by itself, entitled to but little consideration. ’ (People v. Negra, 208 Cal. 64, 69 [280 P. 354]; People v. Wilson, 25 Cal.2d 341, 347 [153 P.2d 720]; People v. Shaw, 17 Cal.2d 778, 803 [112 P.2d 241]; People v. Yeager, 194 Cal. 452, 473 [229 P. 40].) It is sufficient when the evidence offered as corroborative tends to connect a defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as reasonably may satisfy a jury that the accomplice is telling the truth. It is not necessary that the accomplice be corroborated as to every fact to which he testifies. If his testimony could be completely proven by other evidence, there would be no occasion to offer him as a witness. (People v. Negra, supra; People v. Yeager, supra.) For the same reason, it is not necessary that the independent evidence be sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt. The prosecution is not required to single out an isolated fact which in itself, unrelated to other proven facts, is considered to be sufficient corroboration. It is the combined and cumulative weight of the evidence furnished by non-accomplice witnesses which supplies the test.” In People v. Henderson, supra, at page 343, the following language is used: “The evidence of inculpatory participation need not be direct nor extend to every fact and detail. It may be circumstantial and is sufficient, even though slight, if it tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. (People v. Negra, 208 Cal. 64, 69-70 [280 P. 354]; People v. Yeager, 194 Cal. 452, 473 [229 P.40].)” In the vast majority of the decisions on the subject no indication is given that the test suggested by People v. Morton, supra, was used. And this is true of a number of the decisions on the subject, which have been decided by our district courts of appeal subsequent to the People v. Reingold case, namely, People v. Holt, 88 Cal.App.2d 42 [198 P.2d 58]; People v. Mastrantuono, 88 Cal.App.2d 178 [198 P.2d 574] ; People v. Baker, 89 Cal.App.2d 503 [201 P.2d 42] ; People v. Anderson, 90 Cal.App.2d 326 [202 P.2d 1044]; People v. Fountain, 91 Cal.App.2d 158 [204 P.2d 639] ; People v. Colton, 92 Cal.App.2d 704 [207 P.2d 890]; People v. Duarte, 96 Cal.App.2d 661 [216 P.2d 81]. The word “corroboration” in its etymological sense denotes “a strengthening or confirming.” (Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition.) It is essentially a relative term and refers to some antecedent which it is said to strengthen or fortify. The jury in determining the question of corroboration must obviously compare the residue of the other evidence with the accomplice’s testimony, in order to ascertain the truthfulness, of the latter, and in this regard the corroborative evidence must do more than merely raise a suspicion of guilt, even a grave suspicion, in the jury’s mind.It must reasonably. satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth. (People v. Trujillo, supra; People v. Henderson, supra.) In view of these more recent decisions of the Supreme Court we conclude that the test suggested in People v. Morton, supra, and followed by People v. Reingold, supra, is not an exclusive method of analyzing the sufficiency of evidence corroborative of the testimony of an accomplice. We conclude further that such evidence may be held sufficient if it connect the defendant with the crime in such a way as reasonably to satisfy the fact-finding body that the accomplice is telling the truth.. Under our system of jurisprudence it is the peculiar, and exclusive province of the trier of facts, either jury or judge, to decide upon the credibility of the witness, and the weight and effect of his testimony. This elementary rule is equally true when an accomplice is offered as a witness (People v. Curlee, 53 Cal. 604; People v. Gibson, 53 Cal. 601; People v. Hoosier, 24 Cal.App. 746 [142 P. 514]), with the restriction, however, that the jury’s discretion is not arbitrary and that it may not accept the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. However, the law does not forbid the jury to believe the accomplice,but does require that there be other evidence which measures up to the requirement tending to connect the defendant with the crime charged. If there be such evidence, then the testimony of the accomplice is to be considered by the jurors as any other testimony, and given such weight as they may conclude that it is entitled to. (8 Cal.Jur., § 340, p. 281; People v. Flood, 41 Cal.App. 373 [182 P. 766] ; People v. Hoosier, supra; People v. Negra, supra; People v. Hanks, 35 Cal.App.2d 290 [95 P.2d 478].) The weight to be given to the testimony of an accomplice as well as the sufficiency and weight of the corroboration is for the jury’s determination. (People v. Trujillo, supra; People v. Pruitt, 55 Cal.App.2d 272 [130 P.2d 767]; People v. Lindley, 26 Cal.2d 780 [161 P.2d 227]; People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678 [104 P.2d 778].) Before a verdict of a jury can be set aside upon appeal upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to support it, it must be made clearly to appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there substantial evidence sufficient to support the conclusion of the trial court. (People v. King, 40 Cal.App.2d 137 [104 P.2d 521]; People v. Tedesco, 1 Cal.2d 211 [34 P.2d 467]; People v. Ramsey, 83 Cal.App.2d 707 [189 P.2d 802]; People v. Parker, 80 Cal.App.2d 128 [181 P.2d 16].) As said in People v. Henderson, 34 Cal.2d 340, at page 346 [209 P.2d 785] : “When as in the present record it is discovered that there is testimony aside from that of the accomplice which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, the function of the appellate court is performed. Questions of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are for the trial court, and since the circumstances reasonably justify the finding of guilt, an opposing view that they also may be reconciled with innocence will not warrant interference with the judgment on appeal. (People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678, 681 [104 P.2d 778], and cases cited.) ” We are satisfied, after reading the entire transcript of testimony, that, measured by the rules last above stated, there is sufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of the accomplices. The case was tried upon the theory of conspiracy, and in support thereof the testimony of a number of witnesses who were clearly not accomplices was introduced, as well as a large number of documentary exhibits. We have already in the statement of facts summarized some of the circumstances corroborating the testimony of the accomplices. Inasmuch as the sufficiency of this other evidence is so severely challenged we will again, at the risk of repetition, allude to it. The evidence from nonaccomplice sources so far as appellant Griffin is concerned consists of, first, his own admission that he was a partner in the slot machine business, that he was a part owner of the machines, and that he and Gray owned them together. Testimony from witnesses who were not accomplices disclosed the following: that on one occasion appellant Griffin and Gray were transporting slot machines in a truck and were intercepted on the highway by two deputy sheriffs; that appellant and Gray unsuccessfully solicited Edward E. Lane to put slot machines in the latter’s resort at Riverdale; that appellant came to the resort of Austin I. Stinson three or four different times, and once approached Stinson about putting in slot machines; that one Charles Strait saw slot machines at Sutton’s resort and heard them pay off, and on two occasions saw Griffin and Gray repairing slot machines there; that in 1948, sometime before June, he saw both men carrying out machines which they said would not work; that one Evelyn McMahon saw Griffin come to a resort known as Peggy’s Place on several occasions, and saw Griffin working on the slot machines with tools; that one Joe Whalen, an employee in the bar at Grundy’s, saw Griffin repairing slot machines in that place and saw him remove the money from them. Evidence of Griffin’s trip to Los Angeles and the purchase of slot machines from the California Games Company was developed by nonaccomplice testimony. As has already been stated, Griffin took delivery of the four machines purchased, and the three or four machines which had been renovated, in a truck and departed with them. Gasoline purchases on the trip were charged to a credit card belonging to Lane’s Flat. Two additional slot machines purchased by Griffin were ordered to be shipped to Robert Gray in Mendocino County. On May 5, 1948, as testified by witness McCarty, when the latter was on his way to Lane’s Flat to meet the man represented to be from the attorney general’s office for the May pay-off, he was stopped on the road by Griffin. Griffin handed him an envelope from Grange in which was a list and a $100 bill intended as a bribe for Sheriff Broaddus. As was related above, McCarty refused to accept this bill, but in turn stated that he had some money and a list for payment. Griffin took these and told McCarty he would give them to Grange. Documentary evidence admitted in evidence in corroboration of testimony of the accomplices Gray and Grange was the following: a $500 cashier’s check purchased by Melba Wesson of the California Games Company from the Security First National Bank of Los Angeles and payable to W. A. Griffin; this check was endorsed “W. A. Griffin” and “R. A. Gray”; Gray testified that this money was used to take delivery of slot machines which were shipped C.O.D. American Railway Express; the express tag evidencing the shipment was also admitted into evidence; a second cashier’s check in the sum of $1,500, purchased by Melba Wesson of the California Games Company with money furnished by appellant Griffin, which cheek was made payable to Fred Grange, and bears the endorsement “Fred S. Grange”; Grange testified that he was paid this sum in reimbursement for payments made to the Morris Plan on Gray’s contract for slot machines. This evidence amply corroborates the testimony of accomplices Gray and Grange that an agreement was made and carried into execution to operate slot machines in Mendocino County and to obtain protection therefor by a system of bribery. It further directly inculpates appellant Griffin as a member and active participant in the conspiracies. It also corroborates the testimony of numerous other resort owners that Gray or Griffin or both of them together had solicited the resort owners to put in slot machines, that the machines were placed on location in their respective resorts and put in operation, and that Griffin or Gray or both collected the proceeds thereof and paid to the location owners a percentage thereof. The evidence