Citations
- 147 Cal. App. 3d 353
Full opinion text
Opinion
POCHÉ, J.
In announcing a rule of comparative negligence in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 [119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 78 A.L.R.3d 393], the California Supreme Court candidly recognized that this innovation raised numerous collateral issues “[t]he most serious [of which] are those attendant upon the administration of a rule of comparative negligence in cases involving multiple parties.” (Id., at p. 823.) Later in American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578 [146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899], a multiparty case, the high court held that although the doctrine of joint and several liability continued in full vigor (id., at p. 590), there remains an avenue of relief for the joint tortfeasor who has paid more than his proportionate share of liability: he may pursue an indemnity action against his fellow tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis (id., at pp. 591-598). The court emphasized, however, an important exception: a good faith settlement with the plaintiff releases a tortfeasor from any other tortfeasor’s claim for indemnification. (At p. 604.)
This is the backdrop for the problem before us: how to divvy up in dollars the percentage of responsibility attributable to joint tortfeasors who have settled and thus are judgment proof. We hold that the sharing must be proportional to the remaining tortfeasors’ degree of comparative fault.
Review
In the early morning hours of January 27, 1978, David Forsyth, driving his own car, and Lawrence Lucier, his passenger, were returning from a meeting they had attended at the Santa Rosa Golf and Country Club (Country Club) on behalf of their employer, Anker-Lucier Mortuary. Both were seriously injured when Forsyth’s car ran into the rear of a disabled tractor/ trailer rig in the slow northbound lane on Highway 101 outside of Ukiah. The rig was owned by Lyly & Sons Trucking Company (Lyly & Sons) and was operated by its employee, Donald Gohl.
Separate personal injury actions were commenced by Forsyth and Lucier against Lyly & Sons, Gohl, and Country Club. Lucier also named Forsyth as a defendant in his action. A complaint in intervention for subrogation in each action was filed by California Compensation and Fire Company (California Compensation), the workers’ compensation carrier for the employer of Lucier and Forsyth. In each action Lyly & Sons and Gohl filed a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity against the State of California (state), which was not a party to either of the complaints. The indemnity cross-complaint alleged that the state had negligently maintained, designed and controlled the portion of Highway 101 so as to provide inadequate visibility to northbound travelers, and that the state’s negligence had created a dangerous and defective condition of public property which had proximately caused plaintiffs’ and intervener’s injuries. Lyly & Sons asserted that in the event it was held liable for plaintiffs’ and intervener’s injuries, it was entitled to recover at least a portion of such damages from the state under the equitable indemnity principles enunciated in American Motorcycle.
The actions were consolidated in Sonoma County Superior Court. Prior to trial the personal injury actions were settled in good faith and releases were executed dismissing all the defendants named in the two complaints. The terms of the settlement were: Lucier received $835,000 ($800,000 from Lyly & Sons, $25,000 from Forsyth, and $10,000 from Country Club); Forsyth received $35,000 ($25,000 from Lyly & Sons and $10,000 from Country Club); and Lyly