Citations
- 214 Cal. App. 3d 259
Full opinion text
Opinion
CHANNELL, J.
In this proceeding, we consider whether parties to an add-on petition in a coordination action are entitled to file a peremptory challenge to the coordination judge. We conclude that the Judicial Council rules governing coordination proceedings do not provide for such a right, that the Judicial Council had the authority to exclude parties to an add-on petition from the exercise of peremptory challenges, and that the exclusion is reasonable.
The coordination proceeding underlying the instant petition is In re Technical Equities Litigation which involves multiple actions by investors who lost money they invested with Technical Equities Corporation. In August 1986, the Honorable Conrad L. Rushing was assigned to sit as coordination trial judge. This court has been assigned as the reviewing court having appellate jurisdiction. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 404.2.)
During November and December 1988, after several of the complaints in the coordination proceeding had gone to judgment, individual plaintiffs in the coordination proceeding (real parties in interest herein) filed eight separate actions in Santa Clara County Superior Court as judgment creditors. The defendants in these eight actions, petitioners herein, are insurance companies. The actions allege that the judgments were rendered against individuals who are insureds under policies issued by petitioners. Each complaint seeks (1) a declaration that real parties, as judgment creditors, are entitled to maintain “direct” actions against petitioners pursuant to Insurance Code section 11580 and (2) a declaration as to the applicability of the policies.
On December 23, 1988, real parties filed a petition with Judge Rushing to add on the actions against petitioners to the coordination proceeding. Each petitioner filed a peremptory challenge to Judge Rushing pursuant to section 170.6. Judge Rushing ordered the peremptory challenge motions stricken as untimely under rule 1515.
Upon a challenge to this ruling, we issued our alternative writ. Returns to the alternative writ have been filed by respondent court and by real parties in interest.
In 1972, the Legislature added chapter 2 entitled “Coordination” to title 4 of part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, commencing with section 404. (Stats. 1972, ch. 1162, § 2, p. 2287.) The standards for coordination are set forth in section 404.1 and include the requirement of common questions of fact or law and the efficient utilization of judicial resources.
Pursuant to section 404.7, the Legislature authorized the Judicial Council to provide by rule the practice and procedure for coordination of civil actions. In 1974, pursuant to this authorization, the Judicial Council adopted Rules for Coordination of Civil Actions. (Rule 1501 et seq.) The Judicial Council provided in rule 1544 for a procedure to add on cases to an ongoing coordination proceeding after a coordination trial judge has been assigned. The add-on case must meet the same standards for coordination as apply to the original coordination. (Rule 1544(a).)
The request to add on a case is made directly to the coordination trial judge assigned to the proceeding, in this case Judge Rushing. (Rule 1544(a).) Rule 1515 provides that “[a]ny motion or affidavit of prejudice regarding an assigned judge shall be submitted in writing to the assigned judge within 20 days after service of the order assigning that judge to the coordination proceeding.” (Italics added.) There is no provision in rule 1544 for a peremptory challenge by a party to an add-on case. Thus, unless section 170.6 itself applies to add-on parties, any peremptory challenge by such parties will be untimely. The effect of the rules governing coordination cases is to exclude add-on parties from the right to peremptorily challenge the coordination trial judge.
We conclude that the authority given to the Judicial Council over coordinated actions is broad enough to empower the Judicial Council to exclude parties from the right to exercise a section 170.6 challenge. Section 404.7 empowers the council to provide “by rule the practice and procedure for coordination of civil actions . . .” “[