Sisemore v. Master Financial, Inc. (151 Cal. App. 4th 1386, 2007)

Opinion

DUFFY, J.

We address here whether a licensed family daycare home operator who allegedly suffered discrimination in applying for a home loan may state a legally cognizable claim for discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Government Code section 12955 et seq. The daycare home operator claims, inter alia, that the lender’s action violated FEHA because it (1) constituted intentional discrimination on the basis of the borrower’s source of income, and (2) had the effect of discriminating against women and families with children.

Plaintiff and appellant Kim Sisemore (Sisemore), the mother of a young child, is a licensed operator of a family daycare home. She sought a mortgage loan from defendant and respondent Master Financial, Inc. (Master Financial), to facilitate her purchase of a San Jose home. She was turned down; Master Financial stated in writing that it “does not lend on day care homes.” Shortly thereafter, plaintiff and appellant Project Sentinel, Inc., a nonprofit fair housing organization (Project Sentinel), obtained written confirmation from Master Financial that it “will NOT make loans with home day care if the home day care income is required to qualify.”

Sisemore brought suit against Master Financial and two of its employees; Project Sentinel later joined in the suit as a plaintiff. They contended, among other things, that Master Financial’s policies were in violation of FEHA. More specifically, plaintiffs asserted that Master Financial (1) had intentionally discriminated on the basis of the source of income of the loan applicant in violation of section 12955, subdivision (e); and (2) was liable under FEHA because its lending policy had a disparate impact on Sisemore and other family daycare home operators in that it disproportionately excluded women and families with children, thereby violating sections 12955, subdivision (e), and 12955.8, subdivision (b). The demurrer to the second amended complaint (Complaint) was sustained without leave to amend by the court below, and plaintiffs appeal from a judgment that we deem to have been entered on that order. (See Discussion, pt. II., post.)

We consider on appeal whether a source-of-income discrimination claim under FEHA applies only in the landlord-tenant context (as the court concluded below). We also consider whether plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim is viable, or, as Master Financial urges, is not maintainable because family daycare home operators are not among a class of persons protected under FEHA. Further, we evaluate the viability of Sisemore’s claims of discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq.), of unlawful or unfair business practice under the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), and of violating Health and Safety Code section 1597.40. We also consider whether Project Sentinel had standing to allege a FEHA claim.

We conclude after de novo review that the lower court properly sustained without leave to amend the demurrer to the first cause of action for violation of Health and Safety Code section 1597.40. The court, however, erred when it sustained the demurrer to the fourth cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Further, the court should have overruled the demurrer to the (FEHA) third cause of action. Plaintiffs have stated a claim for intentional source-of-income discrimination under FEHA; section 12955, subdivision (e) cannot be read so narrowly as to make it applicable only to tenants or potential tenants seeking rental housing. Plaintiffs have further stated a FEHA claim for disparate impact discrimination. Moreover, we hold that Project Sentinel alleged sufficient facts for standing to assert a FEHA claim. Finally, we conclude that Sisemore has stated a viable claim under the UCL (second cause of action). Accordingly, we will reverse.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following material facts—which this court accepts as true for purposes of evaluating the trial court’s ruling on demurrer (Searle v. Wyndham Internat., Inc. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1330, fn. 1 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 231])—are alleged in the Complaint: Sisemore is a licensed operator of a family daycare home for 14 or fewer children. The principal source of her income is from her operation of the family daycare home. Sisemore has custody and care of her three-year-old daughter.

In June 2003, Sisemore—while she was renting the home out of which she operated her daycare business—contacted Nikki Caster, a loan processor, to assist in obtaining a loan to purchase a home. Caster in turn contacted Colleen Brehm, a representative of Master Financial; she explained Sisemore’s financial circumstances to Brehm, including the fact that Sisemore was then renting a home and that the principal source of her income was the operation of a daycare home. Brehm informed Caster that Sisemore could qualify for a particular loan product that Master Financial offered. That product consisted of a loan secured by a first deed of trust at an interest rate starting at 5.24 percent, and a loan secured by a second deed of trust at an interest rate starting at 9.99 percent. Brehm did not tell Caster or Sisemore that a term of the home loan prohibited Sisemore from using her intended home as a family daycare operation.

In August 2003, Sisemore located a home in San Jose that she wanted to purchase; she intended to reside in it with her daughter, and to operate a daycare business. Caster informed Brehm about the property. Brehm told Caster that the interest rate on the first loan had increased to 5.74 percent but that the terms were otherwise the same as previously discussed. Based upon this understanding, Sisemore submitted an offer to purchase the home that was accepted. During the escrow process, Master Financial sent a letter denying Sisemore’s loan application, stating that it “does not lend on day cafe homes.” As a result of this denial, Sisemore was required to seek and obtain an alternative home loan with less attractive rates and terms than the loans she had anticipated receiving from Master Financial.

In July 2004, a female Project Sentinel employee, who posed as a licensed home daycare operator (a “tester”), contacted Master Financial to inquire about qualifying fór a home loan. Andy Vargas, an area sales manager of Master Financial, advised her by e-mail that Master Financial “will NOT make loans with home day care if the home day care income is reqüired to qualify.”

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Sisemore filed her original complaint on August 20, 2004, against Master Financial, Vargas, and Brehm. Thereafter, Sisemore, along with Project Sentinel, filed a first amended complaint. Master Financial filed a demurrer and motion to strike relative to the first amended complaint. The court in large part sustained the demurrer with leave to amend.

Sisemore and Project Sentinel filed the Complaint on or about March 24, 2005. Master Financial filed a demurrer and motion to strike. The court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer to the first through fourth causes of action of the Complaint. Sisemore and Project Sentinel filed separate timely appeals from the order.

DISCUSSION

I. Issues on Appeal

The following issues are presented in this appeal:

1. Whether Master Financial’s alleged policies constituted a prohibition or restriction on the use or occupancy of property as a family daycare home, such that Sisemore stated a claim for a violation of Health and Safety Code section 1597.40.

2. Whether Sisemore stated a cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51).

3. Whether plaintiffs stated a claim for intentional discrimination based upon source of income under FEHA (§ 12955 et seq.).

4. Whether plaintiffs stated a claim for disparate impact discrimination under FEHA, because Master Financial’s policies had a disproportionate effect on women or families with children.

5. Whether Project Sentinel alleged sufficient facts for standing to assert a FEHA claim.

6. Whether Sisemore stated a cause of action under the UCL (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200).

II. Appealability

We are confronted initially with whether the matter from which the appeals have been taken is properly appealable. Although Master Financial here does not argue that plaintiffs’ separate appeals are defective because they challenge a nonappealable order, we cannot overlook this potential procedural infirmity: “The existence of an appealable judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal. A reviewing court must raise the issue on its own initiative whenever a doubt exists as to whether the trial court has entered a final judgment or other order or judgment made appealable by Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1. [Citations.]” (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126-127 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 876 P.2d 1074].) Since this issue is central to our jurisdiction, we address it on our own motion. (Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 398 [197 Cal.Rptr. 843, 673 P.2d 720]; Nguyen v. Calhoun (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 436 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 436].)

The purported appeals taken by plaintiffs were from the order sustaining the demurrer. The record does not reflect the entry of a judgment or a dismissal on the demurrer order. An order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is not appealable, and an appeal is proper only after entry of a dismissal on such an order. (Berri v. Superior Court (1955) 43 Cal.2d 856, 860 [279 P.2d 8]; Hill v. City of Long Beach (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1684, 1695 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 125].) On occasion, however, appellate courts have reviewed such orders, based upon justifications such as the avoidance of delay, the interests of justice, and the apparent intent of the trial court to have a formal judgment filed. (Reyna v. City and County of San Francisco (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 876, 879 [138 Cal.Rptr. 504].) And when the trial court has sustained a demurrer to all of the complaint’s causes of action, appellate courts may deem the order to incorporate a judgment of dismissal, since all that is left to make the order appealable is the formality of the entry of a dismissal order or judgment. (Thaler v. Household Finance Corp. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1098 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 779]; see also Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 516, 520 [213 Cal.Rptr. 410] [appeal from order sustaining demurrer without leave to amend deemed proper to avoid delay and in furtherance of justice].)

Here, the order sustaining the demurrer to each of the four causes of action of the Complaint without leave to amend effectively ended plaintiffs’ ability to proceed fiirther with their case below. The only step left to make the order appealable was the formal entry of a dismissal order or judgment. We will accordingly deem the order on the demurrer to incorporate a judgment of dismissal and will review the order. (Thaler v. Household Finance Corp., supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1098.)

III. Standard of Review

The standard of review is de novo. (Cryolife, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1152 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 396].) “In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules. ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.]” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58]; see also Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1066, 1075 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 263, 929 P.2d 582].)

“It is not the ordinary function of a demurrer to test the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations or the accuracy with which he describes the defendant’s conduct. A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading.” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213 [197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660].) Thus, as noted, in considering the merits of a demurrer, “the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be. [Citation.]” (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [176 Cal.Rptr. 824]; see also Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216] [court reviewing propriety of ruling on demurrer is not concerned with the “plaintiff’s ability to prove . . . allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof’].)

On appeal, we will affirm a “trial court’s decision to sustain the demurrer [if it] was correct on any theory. [Citation.]” (Kennedy v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 799, 808 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 736], fn. omitted.) Thus, “we do not review the validity of the trial court’s reasoning but only the propriety of the ruling itself. [Citations.]” (Orange Unified School Dist. v. Rancho Santiago Community College Dist. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 750, 757 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 778].)

When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, the reviewing court must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the complaint could have been amended to cure the defect; if so, it will conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiff leave to amend. (Williams v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 708, 719 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 374].) The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that it could have amended the complaint to cure the defect. (Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 320 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 320, 106 P.3d 976].)

IV. Claim Under Health and Safety Code Section 1597.40

A. Contentions of the Parties

Sisemore alleges in the first cause of action of her Complaint that Master Financial’s conduct in rejecting her loan application constituted a practice of discrimination against family daycare home providers in violation of Health and Safety Code section 1597.40. Specifically, Master Financial violated that statute when it (1) refused to lend to her if she operated her family daycare business in the home she was acquiring through the anticipated loan; (2) issued “a written instrument . . . publishing [Master Financial’s] stated policy of refusing to make home loans secured by a dwelling in which a licensed home day care is operated”; and (3) discriminated against other loan applicants who were home daycare operators.

Sisemore urges that Master Financial’s conduct was a violation of subdivision (b) of Health and Safety Code section 1597.40 because Master Financial’s letter refusing to make a loan to a family daycare home constituted a “written instrument . . . forbid[ding] or restricting] the . . . mortgaging of [] real property for use or occupancy as a family day care home.” She contends that the trial court erroneously held that no such claim was alleged because Master Financial’s written denial “[did] not purport to restrict any real property from being used or occupied as a family day care home.” (Boldface omitted.)

Sisemore argues further that she stated a cause of action for a violation of Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (c). She urges that Master Financial’s denial of a loan was a “restriction or prohibition . . . [on] the acquisition, use, or occupancy of [] property for a family day care home for children,” proscribed by Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (c). Sisemore argues that the court below erred by concluding that Master Financial’s alleged conduct “[did] not violate subdivision (c) because it [did] not impose restrictions on the purchase and use of real property.” She argues further that the court erred when it found that “[s]ubdivision[s] [(b) and] (c) do[] not require mortgage lenders to engage in the business of lending on day care homes.”

Master Financial responds that the statute does hot apply to the matters alleged by Sisemore. Specifically, Health and Safety Code section 1597.40 concerns the invalidity of written instruments or restrictive covenants impairing the use of real property for the operation of family daycare homes. Since Sisemore—Master Financial argues—did not allege the existence of such a written instrument or restrictive covenant, she failed to state a cause of action under the statute.

B. Viability of First Cause of Action

L. Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (b)

Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (b) provides: “Every provision in a written instrument entered into relating to real property which purports to forbid or restrict the conveyance, encumbrance, leasing, or mortgaging of the real property for use or occupancy as a family day care home for children, is void and every restriction or prohibition in any such written instrument as to the use or occupancy of the property as a family day care home for children is void.” As noted, Sisemore contends that Master Financial’s letter denying Sisemore’s loan application constituted a “written instrument” restricting or prohibiting the mortgaging of Sisemore’s -property for use or occupancy as home daycare, in violation of subdivision (b) of the statute. Reduced to its most basic form, Sisemore’s contention is that a rejection letter in which a mortgage lender refuses to make a loan where the security is intended to be used as a family daycare home constitutes a “written instrument.” We reject that assertion.

In construing subdivision (b) of Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, we begin “with the actual language of the statute, and if the text is clear as applied to a given case, and it does not fall into any of the exceptions, stop there. [Citations.]” (J.A. Jones Construction Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1575 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 206].) We thus commence by considering whether Master Financial’s rejection letter constituted a “written instrument” under the statute. Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (b) does not define the term, and there have been no reported decisions discussing the meaning of “written instrument” in subdivision (b). But in context, the type of “written instrument” addressed in subdivision (b) of the statute is one “entered into relating to real property” and which contains certain restrictions or prohibitions concerning the use of the property.

We are guided by the manner in which “instrument” is defined under the Government Code with reference to the recordation of documents: “ ‘Instrument,’ as used in this chapter, means a written paper signed by a person or persons transferring the title to, or giving a lien on real property, or giving a right to a debt or duty.” (§ 27279, subd. (a).) And we note that a leading authority, in identifying a nonexclusive list of 116 types of written instruments subject to recordation under section 27280, subdivision (a), does not include a mortgage lender rejection letter as being a recordable instrument. (5 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2000) § 11:6, pp. 19-35.)

As defined in legal dictionaries, the term is not susceptible of the meaning ascribed to it by Sisemore. (See, e.g., Black’s Law Dict. (8th ed. 2004) p. 813, col. 2: “instrument. 1. A written legal document that defines rights, duties, entitlements, or liabilities, such as a contract, will, promissory note, or share certificate.”) Nor are common definitions of “instrument” supportive of Sisemore’s position. (See, e.g., Webster’s Third New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 1172, cols. 1-2: “instrument... a legal document (as a deed, will, bond, lease, agreement, mortgage, note, power of attorney, ticket on carrier, bill of lading, insurance policy, warrant, writ) evidencing legal rights or duties esp. of one party to,another . . .”; Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (10th ed. 2001) p. 605, col. 2: “instrument ... a formal legal document (as a deed, bond, or agreement) . . . .”)

Sisemore asserts that Barrett v. Dawson (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1048 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 899] (Barrett) supports a broad construction of the statute and the conclusion that Master Financial’s rejection letter constituted a “written instrument.” The chief issue in Barrett was whether a 1983 amendment to Health and Safety Code section 1597.40 (formerly codified as § 1597.501) was intended to make restrictive covenants that limited family daycare homes in residential areas void irrespective of whether the covenants predated the original enactment of the statute in 1981. Significantly, Barrett—unlike the case here—clearly concerned a written instrument; namely, a restrictive covenant contained in a document recorded when the neighborhood was developed in 1968. (Barrett, supra, at p. 1052.) Barrett simply does not support the conclusion that a mortgage lender’s letter rejecting a borrower based upon the anticipated use of the security as a family daycare home constitutes a “written instrument” under Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (b).

“Words used in a statute or constitutional provision should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.]” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299].) In this instance, we cannot reasonably construe Master Financial’s letter rejecting a mortgage loan based upon the nature of Sisemore’s anticipated use of the security to be a “written instrument” under subdivision (b) of Health and Safety Code section 1597.40.

2. Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (c)

Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (c) provides: “Except as provided in subdivision (d) [concerning family home daycare operated in rented or leased property], every restriction or prohibition entered into, whether by way of covenant, condition upon use or occupancy, or upon transfer of title to real property, which restricts or prohibits directly, or indirectly limits, the acquisition, use, or occupancy of such property for a family day care home for children is void.” Sisemore contends—independent of her claim under Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (b)—that Master Financial violated subdivision (c) because it restricted or prohibited Sisemore from using the property she intended to acquire as a family daycare home. She argues that subdivision (c) affords broad protection against practices that directly or indirectly limit, inter alia-, the use of property for family daycare, including Master Financial’s practice here.

We first reject Master Financial’s argument that no claim under subdivision (c) was stated because its rejection letter did not constitute a “written instrument.” While, as we have observed, this contention has merit under subdivision (b) of Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, nowhere is the term “written instrument” found in subdivision (c). There is no reason to import the requirement of a “written instrument” specified in subdivision (b) into the practices proscribed under subdivision (c).

Sisemore posits correctly that the scope of Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (c) is broader than subdivision (b), in that the former subdivision does not require a “written instrument” as its subject. By its terms, subdivision (c) embraces “every restriction or prohibition entered into,” irrespective of whether it is part of a “written instrument.” Were we to interpret subdivision (c)—as suggested by Master Financial—to apply only to restrictions or prohibitions found in a “written instrument,” the proscriptions in subdivision (b) would be rendered unnecessary and surplusage. (Bowland v. Municipal Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 479, 489 [134 Cal.Rptr. 630, 556 P.2d 1081] [rejecting interpretation of statute that would render other existing provisions unnecessary].)

But we do not believe that Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (c) encompasses the type of conduct here, i.e., a mortgage lender’s rejection letter. The statute addresses restrictions or prohibitions “entered into,” thereby implying an arrangement more formal and binding than simply a lender’s stated policy regarding mortgage loans. (See Black’s Law Dict., supra, p. 572, col. 2: “enter. ... 3. To become a party to cthey entered into an agreementx”) The express intent of the Legislature in enacting Health and Safety Code section 1597.40 was that “family day care homes for children should be situated in normal residential surroundings so as to give children the home environment which is conducive to healthy and safe development.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1597.40, subd. (a).) The Legislature declared “this policy to be of statewide concern with the purpose of occupying the field to the exclusion of municipal zoning, building and fire codes and regulations governing the use or occupancy of family day care homes for children, . . . and to prohibit any restrictions relating to the use of single-family residences for family day care homes for children except as provided by this chapter.” (Id., 2d par.) And the court in Barrett, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pages 1050-1051, identified the scope of the statute as declaring void any restrictive covenants that limited family daycare homes in residential neighborhoods. (See also Note, Family Day-Care Homes: Local Barriers Demonstrate Needed Change (1985) 25 Santa Clara L.Rev. 481, 501 [“Only recently have a few progressive states, such as California [citing Health & Saf. Code, § 1597.40], specifically prohibited the application of deed restrictions or other written instruments respecting real property, to day-care homes.” (Fn. omitted.)].)

We reject Sisemore’s construction of Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, subdivision (c), namely, that the statute applies because Master Financial “entered into” a rejection letter that restricted or prohibited the, use to which security for a proposed loan could be made. The mortgage lending policy contained in that letter did not constitute a “restriction or prohibition entered into, whether by way of covenant, condition upon use or occupancy, or upon transfer of title to real property, which restricts or prohibits directly, or indirectly limits, the acquisition, use, or occupancy of such property for a family day care home . . . . ” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1597.40, subd. (c).)

The first cause of action, therefore, failed to state a claim for relief. As there is no reasonable probability that the Complaint could have been amended to state a claim under Health and Safety Code section 1597.40, the trial court' properly sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as to that claim. (Williams v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles, supra, Í21 Cal.App.4th at p. 719.)

V. Unruh Civil Rights Act Claim

A. Background and Contentions of the Parties

Sisemore alleges in the fourth cause of action of the Complaint that Master Financial’s conduct was in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq.) (Act). After incorporating by reference all factual allegations in the Complaint, she alleges that Master Financial discriminated against her “based on [her] source of income, occupation, and an arbitrary characteristic, the running of a family day care . . . .”

The court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer to the Act cause of action. It reasoned that “[a] mortgage lender may impose occupational or professional qualifications that exclude certain prospective borrowers. Such restrictions do not constitute arbitrary discrimination unless the mortgage lender uses them as a pretext to exclude persons having the types of personal characteristics protected by the [Act]. The election to become a- licensed home day care provider represents a professional and, probably, economic choice rather than a personal characteristic of the type enumerated in the Act. . . . See Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 537 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 706].” Since Sisemore did not allege that the loan rejection was pretextual in order to discriminate on the basis of a protected personal characteristic, but merely alleged that Master Financial “categorically refuse to approve mortgages for licensed home day care providers,” the court concluded that the fourth cause of action failed to state a claim under the Act.

Sisemore asserts that the Act has been construed to afford broad protection against arbitrary discrimination. Discrimination on the basis of one’s occupational status is not expressly proscribed by the statute. But our Supreme Court (Sisemore argues) has reiterated that section 51 of the Civil Code does not present an exhaustive list of the bases upon which discrimination is proscribed, and that courts have occasionally recognized other classifications (e.g., children, families with children) that are subject to protection under the Act. Sisemore asserts that occupational-status discrimination, although not expressly mentioned in the statute, is conduct that courts have acknowledged to be prohibited under the Act.

Master Financial responds that subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 51 prohibits only discrimination based upon certain personal characteristics, such as gender, race, color, or religion. It argues that Sisemore is attempting to improperly expand the Act to include protection against discrimination on the basis of an economic, rather than a personal, characteristic. Master Financial, citing Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142 [278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873] (Harris), contends that economic/financial distinctions, such as the operation of a family daycare home claimed here to be the basis of the discriminatory conduct, are not afforded protection under the Act.

B. Whether Unruh Civil Rights Act Claim Was Alleged

Civil Code section 51, subdivision (b) provides; “All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” As our Supreme Court has very recently emphasized: “The Act expresses a state and national policy against discrimination on arbitrary grounds. [Citation.] Its provisions were intended as an active measure that would create and preserve a nondiscriminatory environment in California business establishments by ‘banishing’ or ‘eradicating’ arbitrary, invidious discrimination by such establishments. [Citations.]” (Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 167 [59 Cal.Rptr.3d 142, 158 P.3d 718].)

And the Supreme Court has previously made clear that the listing of the particular bases for discrimination in Civil Code section 51 “is illustrative rather than restrictive. [Citation.]” (In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 216 [90 Cal.Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992] (Cox).) Thus, in Cox, the high court concluded that the Act prohibited a business’s arbitrary exclusion of a customer on the ground that he associated with a male with long hair and unconventional dress. (Cox, at p. 216.) Similarly, in Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 740 [180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115] (Marina Point), the court held that a blanket policy of excluding children or families with children from rental housing constituted discrimination under the Act, notwithstanding the fact that those groups were not specifically enumerated in the statute. (See also O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790 [191 Cal.Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427] (O’Connor) [holding that a condominium development restricting residency to persons over 18 violated Act].)

In Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1142, the Supreme Court revisited whether discrimination based upon characteristics not specifically enumerated in Civil Code section 51 was potentially proscribed under the Act. After extensive discussion (see Harris, supra, at pp. 1154-1156), the court rejected the defendants’ position that only classes specifically identified in the statute were protected. The Harris court acknowledged that “[beginning with Cox in 1970, the Unruh Act has been construed to apply to several classifications not expressed in the statute. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1155.) It therefore rejected the defendants’ contention that the Legislature had repudiated the holdings in “Cox, Marina Point, O’Connor, and similar appellate decisions extending the Unruh Act beyond its specified categories of discrimination . . . .” (Id. at p. 1156.)

The Supreme Court, in Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 840 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 565, 115 P.3d 1212] (Koebke), reiterated that in Harris it had “affirmed the principle articulated in [its] earlier decisions that the Act’s enumerated categories are illustrative, rather than restrictive.” It explained that Harris had established a “a three-part analytic framework for determining whether a future claim of discrimination, involving a category not enumerated in the statute or added by prior judicial construction, should be cognizable under the Act.” {Ibid..)

Although the case was not mentioned by the Supreme Court, slightly over a year before Harris was decided, the Fourth District Court of Appeal (Division Three) held that a police officer had stated a claim for discrimination under the Act on the basis of his occupational status. In Long v. Valentino (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1287 [265 Cal.Rptr. 96] (Long), the plaintiff, a police officer, attended a public meeting sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) that concerned police practices. (Id. at p. 1291.) After being ejected by an ACLU attorney, the plaintiff brought suit for damages, alleging, inter alia, a claim for unlawful discrimination under the Act. (Long, at p. 1293.) The appellate court concluded that the plaintiff had stated a claim under the Act based upon arbitrary occupational-status discrimination, and it rejected the defendants’ assertion that speech alone (i.e., words uttered ejecting the plaintiff) was not actionable. The court stated: “[A]n announcement such as ‘You can’t eat at my diner because you are a lawyer, bricklayer, female, or Indian chief’ would be actionable under the Unruh Act, although words alone were the means employed to effect the unlawful discrimination.” (Long, at p. 1297; see also McCalden v. California Library Ass’n (9th Cir. 1990) 955 F.2d 1214, 1221 [noting that protected classes under the Act have been broadly defined to include, intér alia, “students, families with children, welfare recipients, and occupational groups”].) Moreover, the court disposed of the defendants’ argument that police officers were not entitled to protection under the Act, holding that “they are as much entitled to the protections of the Unruh Act as any other citizen. They may not be refused service in a restaurant, denied an apartment, or ejected from a public meeting merely because of their occupation* whether working a shift or on vacation.” (Long, supra, at p. 1298; see also id. at p. 1300 [citing other hypothetical examples of prohibited occupational-status discrimination by car rental agency, restaurateur, and transportation company].)

Sisemore urges that Long established a judicially recognized category (occupational status) that is protected from arbitrary discrimination under the Act. She argues that since the Supreme Court in Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1142 did not disturb prior case authority identifying certain protected classifications not specified in Civil Code section 51, she stated a viable cause of action under Long for occupational-status discrimination.

We conclude that Sisemore has alleged a cognizable Unruh Civil Rights Act claim. At its most basic form, the fourth cause of action alleges that Master Financial arbitrarily discriminated against Sisemore solely on the basis of her occupational status. Liberally construed, the claim is that she was refused a mortgage loan simply because she is a family daycare home operator. Long, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d 1287 supports the conclusion that arbitrary occupational discrimination is prohibited under the Act. (See also 8 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Constitutional Law, § 905, pp. 388-389 [identifying occupational discrimination as being protected under Act, citing Long].) The Supreme Court has not. overruled or even questioned Long’s holding. In addition, we note that seven years before Long was decided, the Supreme Court in dictum mentioned that discrimination on the basis of employment status was a cognizable claim under the Act. (Marina Point, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 736; see also 58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 608 (1975) [concluding that arbitrary occupational discrimination was prohibited by Act].) The high court has never repudiated that dictum. Therefore, Sisemore has stated a discrimination claim under the Act.

Master Financial urges that it simply made a business decision that it would make no loans to a prospective borrower who intended to use the security for the loan (his or her residence) to operate, a family daycare business. It alternatively characterizes its conduct as a refusal to make a business loan. While these are potential explanations for its actions, the fact remains that the Complaint alleges that Master Financial refused to provide a mortgage loan to Sisemore—who was otherwise qualified for the , loan under Master Financial’s criteria—because she intended to engage in her chosen occupation as a family daycare home operator. She is required by statute to use her residence to operate a family home daycare facility. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 1596.78 [defining facility as home regularly providing child care to 14 or fewer children “in the provider’s own home”].) Sisemore therefore must use the security for her mortgage loan (her home) to engage in her chosen occupation. Regardless of the label used to describe Master Financial’s alleged conduct, it can fairly be considered as a refusal to deal with Sisemore solely on the basis of her occupation.

Master Financial, citing Harris, also argues that the type of discrimination alleged by Sisemore is “entirely economic,” rather than discrimination based upon a “personal” characteristic protected under the Act. This position is without merit for two reasons. First, we do not read Harris as establishing a bright-line test in which discriminatory conduct is proscribed under the Act only if it involves a “personal” characteristic. Rather, the court held that the Act provides protection against discriminatory conduct based upon categories identified in the statute as well as others that have been identified in appellate decisions. (Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1155.) The Harris court further held that, in evaluating the viability of an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim based upon a category not enumerated in the statute or identified in a prior appellate decision, one of the questions in the three-part test is whether the new claim “is based on a classification that involves personal.characteristics.” (Koebke, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 841.) Since Long, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d 1287, held that the Act prohibited arbitrary discrimination on the basis of one’s occupation, we need not engage in the three-part Harris test that would require a qualitative analysis of whether a person’s occupation is a “personal” characteristic, or a purely “economic” one.

Second, even were such an analysis required, we would disagree with Master Financial that one’s occupational status is a purely economic characteristic. This case differs significantly from the circumstances in Harris, where the claim was that a business could not discriminate under the Act by establishing a particular economic criterion for the rental of an apartment unit. Here, Sisemore contends that she was discriminated against because of her choice of occupations, not that she was denied a mortgage loan because that choice resulted in her earning insufficient income to meet the lender’s underwriting criteria. Moreover, an individual’s choice of an occupation— while it may, of course, be motivated at least in part by economic consideratiqns—is often a very personal one.

Master Financial relies on Roth v. Rhodes, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th 530, in support of its position that Sisemore did not allege a viable Act claim. In Roth, the plaintiff, a podiatrist, alleged that operators of medical buildings had, inter alia, violated the Act by limiting its commercial tenants to medical doctors. (25 Cal.App.4th at pp. 535-536.) The trial court granted summary adjudication in favor of the defendants on the Act claim. (25 Cal.4th at p. 536.) The Roth court posited that the question of whether a commercial landlord could “refuse to lease space to podiatrists [was] analytically no different from the question of whether the law requires a department store which caters to the high end of the market to purchase shoes from a manufacturer who makes less expensive, lower quality shoes. Or we could ask, does the law prohibit a landlord from limiting his tenancies to lawyers, merchants, or any specific trade or profession?” (Id. at pp. 536-537.) The court concluded that restrictions by a commercial landlord limiting tenants to certain occupations do not run afoul of the Act as long as the restrictions are not used as a pretext to exclude persons having personal characteristics protected under the Act. (25 Cal.App.4th at p. 537.) In so holding, the court noted that the choice of a profession is “a professional and, frequently, an economic choice, rather than a personal characteristic of the type enumerated in the [A]ct.” (Id. at p. 539.)

While a cursory reading of Roth might suggest that Sisemore’s occupational status is not protected under the Act against arbitrary discrimination of the kind alleged here, we conclude that Roth dictates no such conclusion. Roth concerned a commercial landlord’s decision to tailor its tenant base to a particular occupation to the exclusion of all others. This business decision provided a uniform tenancy for the commercial building, rather than an arbitrary exclusion of one particular occupational group.

Further, the procedural posture in Roth differs greatly from the status of our case. The trial court in Roth granted summary adjudication after receiving evidence concerning the defendants’ business justification for the allegedly discriminatory practice. Here, the court rejected the claim at the demurrer stage, without any evidence of Master Financial’s justification for refusing to make a mortgage loan to Sisemore because of her occupation. On the face of the pleadings, Master Financial arbitrarily rejected Sisemore as a borrower solely because of her occupation even though she otherwise met the lender’s qualifications. At this stage, it was improper for the court to have found that Sisemore had not stated a viable claim under the Act.

Moreover, Roth did not repudiate the holding in Long, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d 1287, that the Act prohibits arbitrary occupational discrimination. Indeed, the Roth court neither cited Long nor held categorically that the Act does not protect against any form of occupational-status discrimination. (See Elisa B. v. Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 108, 118 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 46, 117 P.3d 660] [“ ‘Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered’ ”].) We therefore conclude that Roth is distinguishable from the circumstances before us and does not compel the conclusion that Sisemore has failed to state a claim under the Act.

“ ‘The purpose [of the Act] is to compel a recognition of the equality of citizens in the right to the peculiar service offered . . .’ ” by an organization or entity covered by the Act. (Marina Point, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 738; see also Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 712, 733 [195 Cal.Rptr. 325].) As the Supreme Court has held, “[t]he Act is to be given a liberal construction with a view to effectuating its purposes. [Citations.]” (Koire v. Metro Car Wash (1985) 40 Cal.3d 24, 28 [219 Cal.Rptr. 133, 707 P.2d 195]; see also Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 167.) We conclude that a finding here that Sisemore stated a viable Unruh Civil Rights Act claim for occupational discrimination is consistent both with the holding in Long and the statute’s policy of prohibiting arbitrary denial of access to public accommodations.

VI. FEHA Claims

A. Background

In the third cause of action, plaintiffs allege that Master Financial committed unlawful housing practices in violation of FEHA. They assert that Master Financial, as a “. . . mortgage company or other financial institution that provides financial assistance for the purchase, organization, or construction of any housing accommodation[,] . . . discriminate[d] against [a] person or group of persons because of the ... sex,. . . familial status,. .. [or] source of income ... in the terms, conditions, or privileges relating to the obtaining or use of that financial assistance.” (§ 12955, subd. (e).)

There are two essential components to plaintiffs’ position. First, they assert that they properly alleged a claim for intentional discrimination against a group specifically protected under FEHA—namely, persons discriminated against based on the source of their income in violation of subdivision (e) of section 12955. Second, plaintiffs contend that they alleged a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination in violation of subdivision (e) of section 12955 because Master Financial’s policy of not lending to home daycare operators disproportionately affected two protected classes, namely, women and families with children. Since a FEHA violation may be shown (as provided in section 12955.8, subdivision (b)) by establishing that an act prohibited by FEHA “has the effect, regardless of intent, of unlawfully discriminating on the basis of . . . sex . . . [or] familial status . . . ,” plaintiffs contend that they stated a viable disparate impact claim.

The court below concluded that neither plaintiff had alleged a viable FEHA claim. It concluded that the “source of income” category in section 12955, when the statute is “viewed as a whole and in conjunction with its legislative history, . . . [applies only to] prohibit[] discrimination on the basis of a person’s source of income in assessing his or her eligibility for rental housing. It does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of a person’s source of income in assessing his or her eligibility for a mortgage loan.” The court held further that plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim failed because the allegations did not “establish that the alleged discriminatory practices affect women as a group or families with children as a group. Instead, they establish that the discriminatory practices affect licensed home day care providers as a group. The FEHA does not protect this group.”

We address separately below plaintiffs’ intentional discrimination and disparate impact theories. We also address Master Financial’s assertion that the order sustaining the demurrer was proper (as to the entity plaintiff) on the additional ground that Project Sentinel lacks standing to assert a FEHA claim.

B. Plaintiffs’ Intentional Discrimination Claims under FEHA

Section 12955 makes a variety of discriminatory housing practices unlawful. Subdivision (e) of the statute—upon which plaintiffs’ intentional discrimination claims are based—makes it unlawful “[f]or any person, bank, mortgage company or other financial institution that provides financial assistance for, the purchase, organization, or construction of any housing accommodation to discriminate against any person or group of persons because of the race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, ancestry, familial status, source of income, or disability in the terms, conditions, or privileges relating to the obtaining or use of that financial assistance.” (Italics added.) Based upon Master Financial’s statements—(to Sisemore) that it “does not lend on day care homes,” and (to Project Sentinel) that it “will NOT make loans with home day care if the home day care income is required to qualify”—plaintiffs contend that they were denied a mortgage loan on the basis of source of income as proscribed by section 12955, subdivision (e).

Master Financial’s primary response is that the terms of section 12955 make it clear that the source-of-income discrimination provisions apply only in the context of discrimination by a landlord against an actual or potential tenant seeking rental housing. In support of this position, it cites subdivision (p)(l) of the statute, which ¡provides: “For the purposes of this section, ‘source of income’ means lawful, verifiable income paid directly to a tenant or paid to a representative of a tenant. For the purposes of this section, a landlord is not considered a representative of a tenant.” Master Financial argues further that the legislative history of the 1999 amendment to section 12955 compels the conclusion that the source-of-income provisions protect only tenants or prospective tenants against discrimination by landlords.

The interpretation and application of a statute involve questions of law subject to de novo review. (Amdahl Corp. v. County of Santa Clara (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 604, 611 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 486].) We take a three-step sequential approach to interpreting statutory language. (See Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1238-1239 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298] (Halbert’s Lumber).) First, we will examine the language at issue, giving “the words of the statute their ordinary, everyday meaning.” (Id. at p. 1238; see also Lungren v. Deukmejian, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 735.) If we conclude that the statutory meaning is free of doubt, uncertainty, or ambiguity, the language of the statute controls, and our task is completed. (Halbert’s Lumber, supra, at p. 1239; see also Security Pacific National Bank v. Wozab (1990) 51 Cal.3d 991, 998 [275 Cal.Rptr. 201, 800 P.2d 557].) Second, if we determine that the language is unclear, we will attempt to determine the Legislature’s intent as an aid to statutory construction. (Halbert’s Lumber, supra, at p. 1239.) In attempting to ascertain that intent, “we must examine the legislative history and statutory context of the act under scrutiny. [Citations.]” (Sand v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 567, 570 [194 Cal.Rptr. 480, 668 P.2d 787].) Third, if the clear meaning of the statutory language is not evident after attempting to ascertain its ordinary meaning or its meaning as derived from legislative intent, we will “apply reason, practicality, and common sense to the language at hand. If possible, the words should be interpreted to make them workable and reasonable [citations], . . . practical [citations], in accord with common sense and justice, and to avoid an absurd result [citations].” (Halbert’s Lumber, supra, at pp. 1239-1240.)

We will conform to this three-step procedure in our interpretation of the statutory language at issue here.

1. Whether language is clear on its face

On its face, the language of subdivision (e) of section 12955—prohibiting discrimination against “any person or group of persons” on the basis of source of income—appears clear on its face. “Person” is not limited in any way; in its ordinary sense, the language would suggest universal application to any man, woman, or child who is subjected to discrimination on the basis of his or her source of income in connection with the financing of the purchase, construction, or organization of housing.

But subdivision (p)(l) of section 12955 undermines the supposedly clear meaning of “any person or group of persons” in subdivision (e). While the definition of “source of income” found in subdivision (p)(l) does not compel the conclusion that subdivision (e) prohibits source-of-income discrimination only in the context of persons seeking rental housing, the collision of these two subdivisions creates an ambiguity unresolved by the first step of statutory construction.

Accordingly, we will attempt to ascertain the meaning of the statute by examining legislative intent.

2. Legislative intent

Master Financial in its demurrer contended that the Legislature’s clear intent was to make the provisions concerning source of income discrimination applicable only in the landlord-tenant context. It cited certain language purportedly describing the purpose of the bill ultimately enacted in 1999 to amend section 12955. The language, describing a version of Senate Bill No. 1098 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1098), reads: “This bill would make it unlawful for a landlord to use specified financial or income standards for the rental of housing. The standard^] would be unlawful if it: a) fails to account for the aggregate income of persons residing together or proposing to reside together, or the aggregate income of the tenants and their co-signers, on the same basis as the aggregate income of married persons residing together or proposing to reside together; or b) uses a minimum income standard based on a multiple or percentage of the rent that, in case where there is a government rent subsidy, fails to calculate the minimum income based solely on the part of the rent to be paid by the tenant.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1098 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 7, 1999, p. 3.)

Sisemore correctly notes that the above quoted language related to an early version of Senate Bill 1098; at the time, the proposed legislation did not have “source of income” language as part of an amendment to section 12955. Instead, it proposed the inclusion (as subds. (m) and (n) of § 12955) of language prohibiting the failure to account for certain income of actual or prospective tenants as. outlined in the language quoted in the preceding paragraph. The proposed legislation was amended in July 1999, at which time appeared the “source of income” language that ultimately became part of the 1999 amendment to section 12955. Therefore, we conclude that the language cited by Master Financial in its demurrer does not support the conclusion that the legislative intent was to limit the class of persons protected against source-of-income discrimination to actual or prospective tenants seeking rental housing.

Master Financial also asserts that a heading to and introductory language concerning Senate Bill 1098 support its position regarding legislative intent. Specifically, it cites the following heading and preamble to a committee report for the proposed legislation: “SUBJECT [f] Landlord and Tenant Law—Rights of Parties upon Termination of Section 8 Contracts—Rental Information and Criteria—[][] DESCRIPTION [][] This bill would amend the landlord/tenant laws as follows: . . .” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1098 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 7, 1999, p. 1.) But as we have noted, this description concerned an early iteration of Senate Bill 1098 that preceded its amendment in which source-of-income language appeared. Further, we find such descriptions in headings to analyses of proposed legislation to have little or no value in ascertaining legislative intent.

Of some significance here in evaluating legislative intent is a portion of the legislative counsel’s digest of the final version of Senate Bill 1098: “This bill would, until January 1, 2005, prohibit discrimination under [FEHA] on the basis of a person’s source of income, the failure to account for the aggregate income of coresidents, or the failure to exclude a government rent subsidy from that portion of the rent to be paid by the tenant in assessing his or her eligibility for rental housing.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1098 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 1999, ch. 590, italics added.) The legislative counsel’s use of the term “person” in the first clause to describe the class of individuals who would be protected under the bill against source-of-income discrimination—particularly when juxtaposed against the term “tenant” in the second clause-supports plaintiffs’ assertion that subdivision (e) of section 12955 was intended to protect all persons, not just tenants or prospective tenants, against source-of-income discrimination. (See Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1157, fn. 6 [courts may “ascribe[] to the Legislature the intentions expressed in the Legislative’s Counsel’s Digest of a statutory amendment”].)

In our effort to ascertain the intent of the Legislature here, we are mindful of the observation of Justice Sills that “reading the tea leaves of legislative history is often no easy matter. Even assuming there is such a thing as meaningful collective intent, courts can get it wrong when what they have before them is a motley collection of authors’ statements, committee reports, internal memoranda and lobbyist letters. ... In light of these factors, the wisest course is to rely on legislative history only when that history itself is unambiguous.” (J.A. Jones Construction Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 1578.) After consideration of the matter, we believe that it would be imprudent to render a conclusive interpretation of the 1999 amendment to section 12955 on the basis of legislative intent.

3. Application of reason and common sense

The court below interpreted the “source of income” protections of section 12955 as “prohibiting] discrimination on the basis of a person’s source of income in assessing his or her eligibility for rental housing” only. It thus restricted the statute to affording protection only to tenants or prospective tenants, and then, only in the context of source-of-income discrimination by a landlord in a lease transaction. In effect, the court held that section 12955, subdivision (p)(l)’s “source of income” definition trumped other subdivisions of the statute that facially provide protection against source-of-income discrimination to all persons. We conclude that this was an erroneous interpretation of the statute for several reasons.

First, this narrow interpretation ascribes little significance to the fact that section 12955 appears on its face to provide broad protection against source-of-income discrimination in a variety of housing contexts, and not simply to landlord-tenant situations. It is not only subdivision (e) of section 12955—the subdivision at issue here—that appears to afford broad protection to all persons against source-of-income discrimination. Subdivision (a) of section 12955 makes it unlawful “[f]or the owner of any housing accommodation to discriminate against or harass any person because of [the person’s] . . . source of income . .. . ” Subdivision (c) of section 12955 ¡prohibits the printing or publication of “any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a housing accommodation that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on . . . source of income .. . .” Further, subdivision (i) prohibits one “whose business involves real estate-related transactions [from] discriminating] against any person in making available a transaction, or in the terms and conditions of a transaction, because of. . . source of income . . . .” And subdivision (j) makes it unlawful “[t]o deny a person access to, or membership or participation in, a multiple listing service, real estate brokerage organization, or other service because of . . . source of income ...” Moreover, appar