California School Boards Ass'n v. State Board of Education (191 Cal. App. 4th 530, 2010)

Opinion

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.

In 2000, the voters of this state approved Proposition 39, which, among other things, amended Education Code section 47614 to require public school facilities to be shared fairly among all public school pupils, including those in charter schools. (Prop. 39, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2000); § 47614, subd. (a).) This case considers the validity of various regulations adopted by the State Board of Education (State Board) pertaining to a public school district’s sharing of its facilities with charter schools. We conclude the challenged regulations are valid. We shall affirm the portion of the trial court’s judgment that upheld the majority of the challenged regulations and reverse the portion of the judgment that set aside several of the regulations.

BACKGROUND

The Legislature adopted the Charter Schools Act of 1992 (§ 47600 et seq.; hereafter Charter Schools Act) to “provide opportunities for teachers, parents, pupils, and community members to establish and maintain schools that operate independently from the existing school district structure . . . .” (§ 47601.) The Legislature intended charter schools to be a means of (1) improving student learning; (2) increasing learning opportunities, especially for low-achieving students; (3) encouraging the use of different and innovative teaching methods; (4) creating new professional opportunities for teachers; (5) offering parents and students more choices within the public school system; and (6) giving schools a way to change from a rule-based to a performance-based accountability system. (Id., subds. (a)-(f); Wilson v. State Bd. of Education (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1130-1131 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 745].) In 1998, the Legislature added a seventh goal to this list: to “[p]rovide vigorous competition within the public school system to stimulate continual improvements in all public schools.” (§ 47601, subd. (g), added by Stats. 1998, ch. 34, § 1, p. 193.)

A charter school may be created a number of different ways under the Charter Schools Act. A petition to establish a charter school may be granted by a school district’s governing board after the petition has been circulated and signed either by a number of parents or legal guardians of students that is equivalent to at least 50 percent of the number of students that is estimated will be enrolled in the charter school in the first year or a number of teachers that is equivalent to at least 50 percent of the number of teachers the charter school estimates will be employed at the school in the first year. (§ 47605, subds. (a)(1) & (b).) A petition to convert certain existing public schools to charter schools may be granted by a school district’s governing board after the petition has been circulated and signed by not less than 50 percent of the permanent status teachers currently employed at the public school to be converted. (Id., subds. (a)(2) & (b).) If the governing board of a school district denies a petition for a charter school, the petition may be submitted to and granted by the applicable county board of education or the State Board. (Id., subd. (j).) A petition may also be submitted directly to a county board of education or the State Board. (§§ 47605.5, 47605.6, 47605.8.)

In addition to charter schools formed under the Charter Schools Act, parents of pupils in certain underachieving schools may apply directly to the State Board to allow them to establish a charter school “at the existing schoolsite.” (§§ 52055.5, subd. (b)(3)(B), 52055.55, subd. (b)(3), 52055.650, subd. (h)(2)(B).)

Prior to the adoption of Proposition 39, former section 47614 provided: “A school district in which a charter school operates shall permit a charter school to use, at no charge, facilities not currently being used by the school district for instructional or administrative purposes, or that have not been historically used for rental purposes provided the charter school shall be responsible for reasonable maintenance of those facilities.” (Stats. 1998, ch. 34, § 15, p. 202.)

Proposition 39 changed this limited obligation of a school district to provide facilities to a charter school. The voters of California expressed the intent “that public school facilities should be shared, fairly among all public school pupils, including those in charter schools.” (§ 47614, subd. (a), italics added.) Post-Proposition 39, section 47614, subdivision (b), now provides: “Each school district shall make available, to each charter school operating in the school district, facilities sufficient for the charter school to accommodate all of the charter school’s in-district students in conditions reasonably equivalent to those in which the students would be accommodated if they were attending other public schools of the district. Facilities provided shall be contiguous, furnished, and equipped, and shall remain the property of the school district. The school district shall make reasonable efforts to provide the charter school with facilities near to where the charter school wishes to locate, and shall not move the charter school unnecessarily.” (Italics added.)

Section 47614 sets forth certain parameters for the school district and the responsibilities of the charter schools. Section 47614 allows a school district providing facilities to a charter school to “charge the charter school a pro rata share (based on the ratio of space allocated by the school district to the charter school divided by the total space of the district) of those school district facilities costs which the school district pays for with unrestricted general fund revenues. The charter school shall not be otherwise charged for use of the facilities. No school district shall be required to use unrestricted general fund revenues to rent, buy, or lease facilities for charter school students.” (§ 47614, subd. (b)(1).)

Section 47614 requires each charter school desiring facilities from a school district to each year “provide the school district with a reasonable projection of the charter school’s average daily classroom attendance by in-district students for the following year. The district shall allocate facilities to the charter school for that following year based upon this projection. If the charter school, during that following year, generates less average daily classroom attendance by in-district students than it projected, the charter school shall reimburse the district for the over-allocated space at rates to be set by the State Board of Education.” (§ 47614, subd. (b)(2).) A school district may deny facilities requests based upon projections of fewer than 80 units of average daily classroom attendance for the year. (Id., subd. (b)(4).)

Critical to this case, section 47614 also provides: “The State Department of Education shall propose, and the State Board of Education may adopt, regulations implementing this subdivision, including but not limited to defining the terms ‘average daily classroom attendance,’ ‘conditions reasonably equivalent,’ ‘in-district students,’ ‘facilities costs,’ as well as defining the procedures and establishing timelines for the request for, reimbursement for, and provision of, facilities.” (§ 47614, subd. (b)(6), italics added.)

The State Board’s rulemaking authority in section 47614 complements its general authority in section 33031 to “adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with the laws of this state ...(c) for the government of the day and evening elementary schools, the day and evening secondary schools, and the technical and vocational schools of the state, and (d) for the government of other schools, excepting the University of California, the California State University, and the California Community Colleges, as may receive in whole or in part financial support from the state.”

In 2002, the State Board adopted regulations to implement the provisions of section 47614. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 11969.1 et seq.) Several years later, the State Department of Education was directed to review the existing regulations with the assistance of a workgroup broadly representative of the educational community, including charter schools, school administrators, school boards, and teachers. The objective was to identify amendments that would update, clarify, or enhance the existing regulations based on experience, as well as several published appellate court decisions. Using workgroup input and other sources of information, regulatory amendments were proposed by the State Department of Education to the State Board. In 2008, the State Board adopted the new regulations.

The California School Boards Association, the Education Legal Alliance, the Association of California School Administrators, and the California Association of School Business Officials (together the School District Associations) filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief against the State Board, Jack O’Connell in his capacity as the California State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the State Department of Education (together the State defendants) seeking to vacate and set aside 15 of the provisions of the regulations. The trial court granted the California Charter Schools Association (the Charter Association) leave to intervene.

The trial court issued a ruling after hearing in which it upheld 10 of the challenged regulations, but found five of the challenged regulations contained invalid provisions. The trial court issued a judgment directing the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus compelling the State defendants to vacate the regulations contained in Regulations, section 11969.3, subdivision (d)(1), (2)(A), (B), (C), and (D).

The Charter Association filed an appeal from the portion of the judgment and peremptory writ that required the State defendants to vacate the five specified regulations as invalid. The Charter Association claims all the regulations are valid.

The School District Associations appeal the portion of the judgment and decision that upheld the challenged regulations. The School District Associations claim the trial court erred in upholding six of the 10 regulations they challenged at the trial court level. They assert the regulations are invalid.

DISCUSSION

I.

Standard of Review

There are two categories of administrative rules: quasi-legislative rules and interpretive rules. (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 10 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031] (Yamaha).) The regulations adopted by the State Board here are quasi-legislative rules to which we apply a narrow scope of review.

As stated by the California Supreme Court: “It is a ‘black letter’ proposition that there are two categories of administrative rules and that the distinction between them derives from their different sources and ultimately from the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers. One kind— quasi-legislative rules—represents an authentic form of substantive lawmaking: Within its jurisdiction, the agency has been delegated the Legislature’s lawmaking power. [Citations.] Because agencies granted such substantive rulemaking power are truly ‘making law,’ their quasi-legislative rules have the dignity of statutes. When a court assesses the validity of such rules, the scope of its review is narrow. If satisfied that the rule in question lay within the lawmaking authority delegated by the Legislature, and that it is reasonably necessary to implement the purpose of the statute, judicial review is at an end.” (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) A court’s function is to inquire into the regulation’s legality, not its wisdom. (State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1029, 1040 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 343, 88 R3d 71] (State Farm).)

“[T]he absence of any specific [statutory] provisions regarding the regulation of [an issue] does not mean that such a regulation exceeds statutory authority . . ..” [Citations.] The [agency] is authorized to “fill up the details” of the statutory scheme. [Citation.]’ ” (Marshall v. McMahon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1841, 1848 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 220], quoting Ford Dealers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1982) 32 Cal.3d 347, 362 [185 Cal.Rptr. 453, 650 P.2d 328]; accord, Mineral Associations Coalition v. State Mining & Geology Bd. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 574, 589 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 544] (Mineral Associations); Physicians & Surgeons Laboratories, Inc. v. Department of Health Services (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 968, 981 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 565].)

However, an agency does not have discretion to promulgate regulations that are inconsistent with the governing statute, alter or amend the statute, or enlarge its scope. (Slocum v. State Bd. of Equalization (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 969, 974 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 627]; People ex rel. Dept, of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Miller Brewing Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1189, 1198-1199 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 861]; Terhune v. Superior Court (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 864, 872-873 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 841]; accord, Gov. Code, §§ 11342.1, 11342.2.)

Where regulations are void because of inconsistency or conflict with the governing statute, a court has a duty to strike them down. (Littoral Development Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation etc. Com. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1058 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 518].) “In the end, ‘[t]he court, not the agency, has “final responsibility for the interpretation of the law” under which the regulation was issued.’ ” (Communities for a Better Environment v. California Resources Agency (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 98, 110 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 441], fn. omitted.) We must conduct an independent examination to determine whether the agency “ ‘reasonably interpreted the legislative mandate’ ” in enacting the regulation. (State Farm, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1040.) “[T]he standard governing our resolution of the issue is one of ‘respectful nondeference.” (Mineral Associations, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 583; accord, Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 11, fn. 4.)

We keep in mind that “the burden is on the party challenging a regulation to show its invalidity.” (Mineral Associations, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 589; accord, Geftakys v. State Personnel Board (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 844, 867 [188 Cal.Rptr. 305].)

II.

The School District Associations’ Challenge on Appeal to the 2008 Regulations

The School District Associations argue the trial court erred in upholding the validity of six of the State Board’s regulations: (1) Regulations, section 11969.2, subdivision (d); (2) id.., section 11969.3, subdivision (a)(1); (3) id., section 11969.2, subdivision (e); (4) id., section 11969.7, subdivision (f); (5) id., section 11969.9, subdivision (c)(1)(C); and (6) id., section 11969.9, subdivision (k)(3). We consider each of the regulations in turn.

1. Regulations, Section 11969.2, Subdivision (d) “Contiguous” (Regulations, section 11969.2(d))

Regulations, section 11969.2(d) was amended in 2008 to read as follows (new language is underscored): “(d) Contiguous. As used in Education Code section 47614(b), facilities are ‘contiguous’ if they are contained on the school site or immediately adjacent to the school site. If the in-district average daily classroom attendance of the charter school cannot be accommodated on any single school district school site, contiguous facilities also includes facilities located at more than one site, provided that the school district shall minimize the number of sites assigned and shall consider student safety. In evaluating and accommodating a charter school’s request for facilities- pursuant to Education Code section 47614, the charter school’s in-district students must be given the same consideration as students in the district-run schools, subject to the requirement that the facilities provided to the charter school must be contiguous. If a school district’s preliminary proposal or final notification presented pursuant to subdivisions (f) or (h) of section 11969.9 does not accommodate a charter school at a single school site, the district’s governing board must first make a finding that the charter school could not be accommodated at a single site and adopt a written statement of reasons explaining the finding.”

At the trial court level, the School District Associations attacked the new portion of this regulatory language as (1) inconsistent with section 47614 and Ridgecrest Charter School v. Sierra Sands Unified School Dist. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 986 [30 Cal.Rptr.3d 648] (Ridgecrest), (2) as lacking evidence of necessity in the record, and (3) as being vague. The trial court rejected the School District Associations’ claims.

Changing tack, the School District Associations no longer pursue these claims on appeal. The School District Associations now challenge the original language of the regulation adopted in 2002, complaining the regulation (1) defines the term “contiguous” to mean a single or same school site contrary to the plain meaning of the term and (2) requires charter school students to be accommodated on the same site without regard to grade level, which they allege is inconsistent with the requirement of section 47614, subdivision (b) that facilities be provided in “conditions reasonably equivalent.” The School District Associations argue, apparently as part of this last claim, the sole exception recognized by the regulation for not providing a single site—that there are too many charter school students (in-district average daily classroom attendance) to be accommodated at a single site—is insufficient to allow consideration of grade level factors relevant to providing reasonably equivalent facilities. The School District Associations also argue the regulation makes the “contiguous” provision dominant over the “conditions reasonably equivalent” provision of section 47614. In their reply brief, the School District Associations propose “contiguous” as used in section 47614 means “attendance areas defining the neighborhoods served by the schools” “touch, are adjacent to, next to, and share some portion of a common boundary.” We find no merit in these claims.

To begin with, the State Board has clear authority to define the term “contiguous,” which is used without statutory definition in section 47614. Section 47614, subdivision (b)(6), expressly authorizes the State Board to adopt “regulations implementing this subdivision, including but not limited to defining the terms . . . .”

The State Board adopted a definition of “contiguous” in Regulations, section 11969.2(d) that “facilities are ‘contiguous’ if they are contained on the school site or immediately adjacent to the school site.” In addition, “[i]f the in-district average daily classroom attendance of the charter school cannot be accommodated on any single school district school site, contiguous facilities also includes facilities located at more than one site . . . .” (Ibid.) Patently, the State Board has not adopted a regulation that defines “contiguous” as solely a single site as the School District Associations claim.

The State Board has adopted a definition of “contiguous” that is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term as recognized by the court in Ridgecrest, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th 986. “ ‘Contiguous’ means ‘touching along all or most of one side’ or, more generally, ‘near, next, or adjacent [to].’ (Webster’s New World Diet. (2d college ed. 1982) p. 307.) The requirement that charter schools be provided with ‘contiguous’ facilities presumably means the facilities must be contiguous to one another, i.e., located at or near the same site; otherwise, there would not appear to be any reason for including the term in the statute.” (Id. at p. 1001.)

The definition of “contiguous” in Regulations, section 11969.2(d) tracks this common understanding of the term. Facilities are contiguous “if they are contained on the school site or immediately adjacent to the school site.” (Regs., § 11969.2(d).) Indeed, the regulatory definition goes beyond this common understanding to also include multiple sites as contiguous where “the in-district average daily classroom attendance of the charter school cannot be accommodated on any single school district school site.” (Regs., § 11969.2(d).)

Nevertheless, the School District Associations argue the definition of “contiguous” in Regulations, section 11969.2(d), which they assert requires a school district to accommodate charter school students on the same site without regard to grade level, prevents them from complying with the requirement of section 47614, subdivision (b) that facilities be provided in “conditions reasonably equivalent.” The School District Associations argue the sole exception recognized by the regulation for not providing a single site—that there are too many charter school students to be accommodated at a single site—is insufficient to allow consideration of grade level factors relevant to providing reasonably equivalent facilities.

In explanation of these points, the School District Associations point out that traditional schools are typically organized into elementary schools (with grades K through 5 or K through 6), middle schools (with grades 6 through 8, 7 through 8, or 7 through 9), and high schools (with grades 9 through 12 or 10 through 12). Elementary schools have smaller desks, bathrooms and other furnishings. Middle schools and high schools have not only larger furnishings, they have additional classroom space for age-appropriate educational programs such as science, music, and vocational training. Playgrounds and athletic facilities differ in size and type between the school campuses. For charter schools offering K through 8 or K through 12 programs, the School District Associations claim the regulation forces school districts to make “a Hobson’s choice.” The choice being locating the charter students at an elementary school, depriving the middle and high school charter students of their age-appropriate specialized classrooms and athletic facilities, as well as exposing the district’s traditional elementary school students to the safety concerns presented by the presence of the charter school’s older students, or locating the charter students at a middle school or high school to the disadvantage of the charter’s elementary students. We are unpersuaded.

Again, the definition of “contiguous” in Regulations, section 11969.2(d) does not absolutely require a single site. Thus, a school district may be able to eliminate or reduce some of these identified difficulties by providing “adjacent” facilities. And where there are too many charter students to be accommodated at a single site, a district may offer multiple sites based on grade level and still meet the contiguity requirement. Nevertheless, to the extent the number of charter school students does not exceed what can be accommodated at a single district facility and where there are no adjacent facilities available, a difficult situation may indeed be presented. However, the difficulty is not a result of the regulation, but of the statute. Section 47614 requires each school district to “share[d] fairly” (§ 47614, subd. (a)) public school facilities with charter schools by making facilities available to each charter school that are sufficient to accommodate all the charter school students “in conditions reasonably equivalent” to those they would be in if they attended the district’s traditional schools (id., subd. (b), italics added) and that such facilities are “contiguous.” (Ibid.) Regulations, section 11969.2(d) does not make the “contiguous” provision dominant over the “conditions reasonably equivalent” provision of section 47614. It recognizes the statute requires both.

We agree with the court in Ridgecrest, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th 986, that “[t]here is, plainly, some tension between the ‘shared fairly’ and ‘reasonably equivalent’ requirements in section 47614 on the one hand, and the ‘contiguous’ requirement on the other. The first two suppose a balancing of all the factors—educational, logistical, financial, legal, and practical-—that ordinarily go into deciding how to assign students among the various schools within a district (giving equal consideration to the ‘district’ and charter school students). The third requirement, contiguity, supposes that all charter school students must first be assigned to the same site (assuming one exists large enough to house them all) before any consideration may be given to the other factors. These two extremes correspond roughly to the positions staked out by the parties in this case. We believe the answer lies somewhere in between, albeit toward the contiguity end of the scale. That is, at the risk of seeming to oversimplify a difficult and complex process, we think it must at least begin with the assumption that all charter school students will be assigned to a single site, and attempt from there to adjust the other factors to accommodate this goal.” (Id. at p. 1002.)

Contrary to the assertion of the School District Associations, the definition of “contiguous” in Regulations, section 11969.2(d) does not prevent the consideration of grade level factors relevant to providing reasonably equivalent facilities and there is no reason to conclude on this facial challenge to the regulation that it is impossible or illogical for a district to provide “reasonably equivalent” (§ 47614, subd. (b), italics added) facilities at a single site for a charter school with a broader range of grade levels than the traditional schools in the district.

The term “reasonably equivalent” is broad enough to encompass many situations. For example, if the number of students in a charter school with a K through 8 or K through 12 educational program can be accommodated on an elementary school site within the school district, the district may bring appropriate furniture and other middle school and/or high school appropriate equipment onto the elementary school site for the older charter students’ use. A decision may be made that such students can reasonably put up with the smaller restroom or other fixed elementary school facilities. School schedules could be staggered to minimize any safety concerns posed by the presence of the older students on the elementary campus. The accommodation options are many; thus, the regulation does not preclude a district from considering grade level factors in providing “reasonably equivalent” and “contiguous” facilities at a single site.

Finally, Regulations, section 11969.2(d) recognizes there may be circumstances where a district concludes it simply cannot provide reasonably equivalent facilities to the charter school at a single site. Regulations, section 11969.2(d) provides that, “[i]f a school district’s preliminary proposal or final notification presented pursuant to subdivisions (f) or (h) of Regulations, section 11969.9 does not accommodate a charter school at a single school site, the district’s governing board must first make a finding that the charter school could not be accommodated at a single site and adopt a written statement of reasons explaining the finding.” The State defendants reasonably suggest this regulatory language, expressly adopted to incorporate the holding and reasoning of the Ridgecrest decision, allows a school district to accommodate students of the charter school at more than one site provided the school district makes a finding to that effect and adopts a written statement of reasons explaining the finding.

We conclude the State Board “ ‘reasonably interpreted the legislative mandate’ ” in enacting the definition of contiguous in section 11969.2(d). (iState Farm, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1040.)

2. Regulations, Section 11969.3, Subdivision (a)(1) “Conditions Reasonably Equivalent” (Regulations, section 11969.3(a)(1))

Section 47614 expressly authorizes the State Board to adopt regulations “defining the term[] . . . ‘conditions reasonably equivalent.’ ” (§ 47614, subd. (b)(6).) The State Board did so in Regulations, section 11969.3.

Regulations, section 11969.3, subdivision (a) was amended in 2008 to read, as pertinent to the School District Associations’ challenge to the regulation, as follows (new language is underscored; deleted language is struck out):

“The following provisions shall be used to determine whether facilities provided to a charter school are sufficient to accommodate charter school students in conditions reasonably equivalent to those in which the students would be accommodated if they were attending public schools of the school district providing facilities, as required by Education Code section 47614(b).

“(a) Comparison Group.

“(1) The standard for determining whether facilities are sufficient to accommodate charter school students in conditions reasonably equivalent to those in which the students would be accommodated if they were attending public schools of the school district providing facilities shall be a comparison group of school district-operated schools with similar grade levels. If none of the district-operated schools has grade levels similar to the charter school, then a contiguous facility within the meaning of subdivision (d) of section 11969.2 shall be an existing facility that is most consistent with the needs of students in the grade levels served at the charter school. The district is not obligated to pay for the modification of an existing school site to accommodate the charter school’s grade level configuration.”

The School District Associations object to the new sentence: “If none of the district-operated schools has grade levels similar to the charter school, then a contiguous facility within the meaning of subdivision (d) of section 11969.2 shall be an existing facility that is most consistent with the needs of students in the grade levels served at the charter school.” The School District Associations claim the sentence again seeks to compel school districts to accommodate all of the charter school students at a single site, “an existing facility,” thereby requiring the districts to ignore the grade level configuration of their schools. The School District Associations contend the regulation “seeks to describe what is ‘reasonably equivalent’ by specifically telling school districts to ignore what is reasonably equivalent.” The School District Associations complain the challenged sentence is not a definition of the comparison group for purposes of determining reasonable equivalency as the subdivision purports to be, but is an additional definition of contiguous that is inconsistent with section 47614 for the reasons previously argued.

Largely for the reasons already expressed, we reject the School District Associations’ claims.

The question before us is not whether the State Board appropriately placed the challenged sentence in Regulations, section 11969.3 dealing with the determination of conditions of reasonable equivalency. Nor are we called upon to offer an opinion on whether the challenged sentence in Regulations, section 11969.3(a)(1) could perhaps have been drafted with additional clarity. The question before us is only whether the provision is inconsistent with section 47614, alters or amends section 47614, or enlarges its scope. (Slocum v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 974; People ex rel. Dept, of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Miller Brewing Co., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1198-1199; Terhune v. Superior Court, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 872-873; Gov. Code, §§ 11342.1, 11342.2.) We must determine whether the agency “ ‘reasonably interpreted the legislative mandate’ ” in enacting the regulation. (State Farm, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1040.) We find the regulation valid by these standards.

It is clear from its language that the challenged amendment is intended to recognize there may be no existing district school serving all the same grade levels as the charter school for purposes of comparison. This is confirmed by a review of the State Board’s explanation for the amendment to the regulation.

In its initial statement of reasons for the amendment to Regulations, section 11969.3(a)(1), the State Board explained the regulation as follows: “Subdivision (a) describes the creation of a comparison group of schools. Following consideration of input received through the workgroup process, two sentences have been added to paragraph (1). These added sentences address the situation in which a comparison group as envisioned in the existing regulations cannot be assembled. In such a situation, the comparison group includes all of the district-operated schools serving any of the grade levels served by the charter school. A contiguous facility in such a situation is a facility that is most consistent with the needs of students in the grade levels served at the charter school, [f] An example of a situation in which this might be applicable is a charter school that serves kindergarten through grade eight in a school district that is configured solely of sites that are either for elementary grades (kindergarten through grade five) or for middle grades (grades six through eight). In such a situation, the issue of a ‘contiguous’ ' facility as required by law is to be determined based on consistency with the needs of students in the grade levels served at the charter school, recognizing that modification of a site may be necessary to serve the charter school’s students.”

The State Board’s final statement of reasons for the amendment summarizes the amendment as follows: “Section 11969.3(a) (Definition of Comparison Group). Amend to clarify that if the district’s grade level configuration is different from the charter school’s, the district is to provide the charter school an existing facility that is most consistent with the charter school’s grade level configuration, but that the school district is not obligated to modify an existing facility to accommodate the charter school’s grade level configuration.”

Thus, the amended language of Regulations, section 11969.3(a)(1) is intended to offer a practical solution to the situation where there is no directly applicable comparison district school for the grade level configuration of the charter school. In such a situation, it directs a school district to provide facilities to the charter school on an existing district school site that is most consistent with the needs of students in the grade levels served at the charter school. (§ 11969.3(a)(1).)

The provision does not require school districts to ignore the grade level configuration of their schools or tell “school districts to ignore what is reasonably equivalent,” as the School District Associations claim. The facilities provided must still meet the requirements of reasonable equivalency based on a comparison with the district’s schools that have grade levels similar to the charter school as stated in the sentence before the challenged provision in Regulations, section 11969.3(a)(1). The facilities must still meet the requirements of reasonable equivalency specified by Regulations, section 11969.3, subdivisions (b), regarding capacity, and (c), regarding condition, unless the charter is a conversion charter school, in which case “the condition of the facility previously used by the school district at the site shall be considered to be reasonably equivalent to the condition of school district facilities for the first year the charter school uses the facility” (Regs., § 11969.3, subd. (c)(2)).

In directing the district to provide the charter school facilities at an existing district facility, the regulation does no more than recognize the contiguity requirement of section 47614, as previously discussed. It does not eliminate the ability of a school district to propose accommodation to the charter school at more than one school site upon “a finding that the charter school could not be accommodated at a single site” with “a written statement of reasons explaining the finding.” (Regs., § 11969.2(d).)

The School District Associations have not shown the regulation to be invalid. (Mineral Associations, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 589.)

3. Regulations, Section 11969.2, Subdivision (e) “Furnished and Equipped” (Regulations, section 11969.2(e))

Section 47614 requires the facilities made available to charter schools by each school district to be “furnished . . . and equipped.” (§ 47614, subd. (b).) The third regulation the School District Associations challenge is Regulations, section 11969.2(e), which defines “furnished and equipped” for purposes of section 47614.

Regulations, section 11969.2(e) was amended in 2008 to read as follows (new language is underscored; deleted language is struck out): “(e) Furnished and Equipped. As used in Education Code section 47614(b), a facility is ‘furnished and equipped’ if it includes all the reasonably equivalent furnishings and equipment necessary to conduct classroom-based instruction (i.e.-,-at a minimum, desks, chairs, and blackboards) and to provide for student services that directly support classroom instruction as found in the comparison group schools established under section 11969.3(a), and if it has equipment that is reasonably equivalent to that in the comparison group schools. ‘Equipment’ means property that does not lose its identity when removed from its location and is not changed materially or consumed immediately (e.g., within one year) by use. Equipment has relatively permanent value, and its purchase increases the total value of a Local Educational Agency’s (LEA’s) physical properties. Examples include furniture, vehicles, machinery, motion picture film, videotape, furnishings that are not an integral part of the building or building system, and certain intangible assets, such as major software programs. Furnishings and equipment acquired for a school site with non-district resources are excluded when determining reasonable equivalence.”

The School District Associations contend amended Regulations, section 11969.2(e) is invalid because it defines equipment in a way that is inconsistent with Proposition 39 and a related statute and because it forces school districts to use unrestricted general fund revenues to provide facilities to charter schools in violation of section 47614, subdivision (b)(1). We reject each claim.

A. Consistency of the Regulatory Definition With Proposition 39 and Statutory Law

In adopting Proposition 39, the voters of California expressed the intent “that public school facilities should be shared fairly among all public school pupils, including those in charter schools.” (§ 47614, subd. (a), italics added.) Proposition 39 amended section 47614 to provide, in relevant part, that “[e]ach school district shall make available, to each charter school operating in the school district, facilities sufficient for the charter school to accommodate all of the charter school’s in-district students in conditions reasonably equivalent to those in which the students would be accommodated if they were attending other public schools of the district. Facilities provided shall be contiguous, furnished, and equipped, and shall remain the property of the school district.” (§ 47614, subd. (b).)

The terms “furnished” and “equipped” are not defined by section 47614. Section 47614, subdivision (b)(6), expressly authorizes the State Board to adopt “regulations implementing this subdivision, including but not limited to defining the terms . . . .”

The School District Associations claim the definition of “furnished” and “equipped” adopted by the State Board in Regulations, section 11969.2(e) is inconsistent with Proposition 39. Relying on the principle of statutory construction that terms within a statute or within the same act possess a consistent meaning (People v. Standish (2006) 38 Cal.4th 858, 870 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 785, 135 P.3d 32]; People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 987 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 861, 62 P.3d 97]; People v. Contreras (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 760, 764 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 233]), the School District Associations argue equipment must be defined as property of a permanent nature, which they argue the Legislature has defined in another Education Code statute as property with a useful life of at least 20 years (§ 15100, subds. (e) & (i)), not as property with a life of a year and a day as defined by Regulations, section 11969.2(e) (equipment is property that is not “consumed immediately (e.g., within one year) by use”).

We begin with the claim that section 11969.2(e) is inconsistent with Proposition 39.

In addition to amending section 47614, Proposition 39 amended article XIIIA of the California Constitution to add a new exception to its 1 percent limitation of ad valorem tax on real property. (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 1, subd. (b)(3); Prop. 39, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2000).) The new provision allows a school district, community college district, or county office of education to incur bonded indebtedness “for the construction, reconstruction, rehabilitation, or replacement of school facilities, including the furnishing and equipping of school facilities, or the acquisition or lease of real property for school facilities, approved by 55 percent of the voters of the district or county, as appropriate.” (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 1, subd. (b)(3), italics added.) The use of the proceeds of such bonds is restricted to “the purposes specified in Article XIII A, Section 1(b)(3), and not for any other purpose, including teacher and administrator salaries and other school operating expenses.” (Id., subd. (b)(3)(A), italics added.)

That is, article XIII A of the California Constitution allows school bond funds to be used for furnishing and equipping school facilities, but prohibits school bond funds from being used to pay school operating expenses. Applying this distinction between equipment and operating expenses to section 47614, also adopted by Proposition 39, the School District Associations argue the voters did not intend operating expenses to be included in a definition of furniture and equipment under section 47614.

However, even accepting this point for purposes of argument, we do not read Regulations, section 11969.2(e) as incorporating operating expenses within its definition of equipment. Section 11969.2(e) defines equipment as “property that does not lose its identity when removed from its location and is not changed materially or consumed immediately (e.g., within one year) by use. Equipment has relatively permanent value, and its purchase increases the total value of a Local Educational Agency’s (LEA’s) physical properties.” An operating expense is not property that falls within this definition. Section 11969.2(e) is not inconsistent with Proposition 39 as alleged by the School District Associations.

The School District Associations assert, however, the definition of “equipment” in Regulations, section 11969.2(e) is invalid because it is inconsistent with section 15100, which specifies the allowable purposes for a bond election as including “[t]he supplying of school buildings and grounds with furniture, equipment, or necessary apparatus of a permanent nature” (§ 15100, subd. (e)) and “[t]he purchase of schoolbuses the useful life of which is at least 20 years” (§ 15100, subd. (i)). The School District Associations argue section 47614 should be construed consistently with section 15100 to include a definition of equipment as property with a permanent nature and a useful life of at least 20 years. The School District Associations contend we should look to section 15100 because “[t]he Legislature enacted section 15264-15276, the Strict Accountability in Local School Construction Bond Act of 2000 contingent on the passage of Proposition 39” and “[t]hat act authorized governing boards of school districts to issue bonds pursuant to Chapter 1 (commencing with section 15100).”

We disagree that section 47614 should be interpreted to incorporate subdivisions (e) and (i) of section 15100. Nothing in section 47614 references either the strict accountability in the Local School Construction Bond Act (§ 15264 et seq.) or section 15100. These statutes were not enacted by Proposition 39 and they deal with the use of school bond funds, not the sharing of facilities, which is the subject of section 47614. Section 47614 requires school districts to “share[] fairly” property the districts already have with charter schools by making available to the charter schools facilities that are furnished and equipped. (§ 47614, subds. (a) & (b).) Nothing suggests that the property shared is limited to what the district could purchase using bond funds.

The definition of equipment in Regulations, section 11969.2(e) is consistent with Proposition 39, including section 47614.

B. The Definition of Furnish and Equip Does Not Require School Districts to Use Unrestricted General Funds

The School District Associations also contend that the definition of “equipment” adopted by the State Board in Regulations, section 11969.2(e) is so expansive that it results in an inconsistency with the portion of section 47614 that states: “No school district shall be required to use unrestricted general fund revenues to rent, buy or lease facilities for charter school students.” (§ 47614, subd. (b)(1).) Providing an elaborate discussion of the three general sources for school funding (average daily attendance or “ADA” funding; categorical funding; and capital facilities funding), the School District Associations contend section 11969.2(e) ignores the clear limitations imposed by the funding statutes on the uses of school funds and requires school districts to furnish, equip, and even provide supplies for the facilities they make available to the charter schools.

The School District Associations claim the problem posed by the regulation is illustrated by the following example they used before the trial court. “[We] described a typical situation where a charter school is sharing space within a traditional school operated by the school district. It is impossible for two school entities to share the administrative office, occupying desks, using telephones, computers, and so on at the same time. Therefore, the charter school needs its separate administrative office. The school district converts a classroom for those purposes. That classroom to be used by the charter school as an administrative office now needs to be furnished and equipped with office desks, chairs, telephones, copiers, computers, internet access, etc. The regulation defining furnish and equip would impose on the school district the burden of purchasing duplicate office furniture and equipment for the charter school. The only funds available for the school districts to do that is their unrestricted general fund revenues.”

The fundamental flaw in the School District Associations argument and example is the assumption that section 47614 requires school districts to purchase anything for the charter schools. Section 47614 requires school districts to share facilities, including furniture and equipment. Nothing in section 47614 or the definition of equipment in Regulations, section 11969.2(e) requires a school district to purchase or obtain more facilities, furniture or equipment to share with the charter school. As recognized by the trial court, a school district’s only obligation under the statute and the regulations “is to share its furnished and equipped facilities with charter schools.” (See Regs., § 11969.3, subd. (b)(2) & (3).) As noted by the State Board in its response to comments received about section 11969.2(e) during the initial public comment period, “[t]he charter school is entitled to the use [of] (access to) equipment, but there is no requirement for a school district to purchase separate equipment for the charter school. The proposed regulations create no funding obligation that exceeds the statute itself.”

Thus, in the hypothetical example provided by the School District Associations, it may be necessary for the two school entities—the district school and the charter school, to share administrative offices. We see no reason to believe it will be impossible for them to do so in all cases. But, in cases where administrative offices cannot be shared and the school district converts a classroom into an administrative office for the charter school, section 47614 requires the school district to review the furnishings and equipment it provides to its school administrative offices and either determine a method of sharing the use of such property or divide that property in such a way as to fairly share it with the charter school. (§ 47614, subd. (a).) True—this may mean in some cases both the district schools and the charter school will be inconvenienced to some extent and must make do with less.

We conclude the definition of the equipment to be shared in Regulations, section 11969.2(e) is consistent with the provision in subdivision (b)(1) of section 47614 that specifies “[n]o school district shall be required to use unrestricted general fund revenues to rent, buy, or lease facilities for charter school students.”

The School District Associations have not shown the regulation to be invalid. (Mineral Associations, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 589.)

4. Regulations, Section 11969.7, Subdivision (f) (Regulations, section 11969.7(f))

This regulation harmonizes two statutes as follows: Section 47614, subdivision (b)(1) provides in full: “The school district may charge the charter school a pro rata share (based on the ratio of space allocated by the school district to the charter school divided by the total space of the district) of those school district facilities costs which the school district pays for with unrestricted general fund revenues. The charter school shall not be otherwise charged for use of the facilities. No school district shall be required to use unrestricted general fund revenues to rent, buy, or lease facilities for charter school students.” (Italics added.)

Section 47613 provides that a chartering authority may charge a charter school for costs of required supervisorial oversight as follows: “(a) Except as set forth in subdivision (b), a chartering authority may charge for the actual costs of supervisorial oversight of a charter school not to exceed 1 percent of the revenue of the charter school. [|] (b) A chartering authority may charge for the actual costs of supervisorial oversight of a charter school not to exceed 3 percent of the revenue of the charter school if the charter school is able to obtain substantially rent free facilities from the chartering authority.” (Italics added.)

Seeking to coordinate the provisions of these two statutes, the State Board adopted Regulations, section 11969.7(f) in 2008. Section 11969.7(f) states: “If a school district charges a charter school for facilities costs pursuant to this article, and if the district is the charter school’s authorizing entity, the facilities are not substantially rent free within the meaning of Education Code section 47613, and the district may only charge for the actual costs of supervisorial oversight of the charter school not to exceed one percent of the school’s revenue.”

The School District Associations contend Regulations, section 11969.7(f) is inconsistent with both sections 47613 and 47614 because it equates “facilities cost” to “rent,” forcing a school district into a “catch-22 situation” where it must choose between recovering a share of its facilities cost or its supervisorial oversight cost, but cannot collect both. We conclude the State Board “ ‘reasonably interpreted the legislative mandate’ ” in enacting section 11969.7(f). (State Farm, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1040.)

As the trial court recognized, the Charter Schools Act (§ 47600 et seq.) does not define the term “rent.” The State Board has authority to “fill up the details” by defining the meaning of the phrase “substantially rent free” in section 47613. (Marshall v. McMahon, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 1848; Mineral Associations, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 589.) Regulations, section 11969.7(f) provides a reasonable definition that comports with the usual meaning of the term rent and is consistent with the plain language of section 47614.

Section 47614 authorizes a school district to charge a charter school a pro rata share of those school district facilities costs the district pays for with unrestricted general funds. (§ 47614, subd. (b)(1).) Section 47614 prohibits the charter school from “otherwise” being “charged for the use of the facilities.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).) The inclusion of the word “otherwise” in section 47614, subdivision (b)(1) indicates the pro rata facilities cost charge being authorized is considered a charge for the charter school’s “use” of the school district’s facilities. “ ‘Rent’ is generally defined as payment made for the use of property.” (Davies Machinery Co. v. Pine Mountain Club, Inc. (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 18, 27 [113 Cal.Rptr. 784]; accord, 7 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2004) Landlord and Tenant, § 19:77, p. 217.) Thus, the State Board properly equated the facilities cost charge with rent.

Section 47613 limits the amount of supervisorial costs a chartering agency may recoup from a charter school to 1 percent if the facilities it provides to the charter school are not “substantially rent free.” (Id., subds. (a) & (b).)

Regulations, section 11969.7(f) simply applies the limitation of section 47613 to a school district that is the chartering authority for a charter school when the school district chooses to charge the charter school the section 47614, subdivision (b)(1) pro rata facilities cost. It is reasonable for the regulation to apply only to a school district that is the chartering agency for the charter school and not other chartering authorities because only chartering school districts both share facilities with a charter school and incur supervisorial costs.

The School District Associations argue against this conclusion on a number of grounds.

First, the School District Associations claim a different conclusion is required when the interrelationship between section 47613 and the prior version of section 47614 is considered. We disagree.

In 1998, section 47613.7 and section 47614 were added to the Charter Schools Act. (Stats. 1998, ch. 34, §§ 14 & 15, p. 202.) Section 47613.7 for the first time allowed a chartering agency to charge supervisorial costs of up to 3 percent of the revenue of the charter school “if the charter school is able to obtain substantially rent free facilities from the chartering agency.” (Stats. 1998, ch. 34, § 14, p. 202.) Otherwise, the chartering agency was limited to charging up to 1 percent of the revenue of the charter school for supervisorial costs. {Ibid.) Section 47613.7 was renumbered section 47613 in 1999. (Stats. 1999, ch. 78, § 32.6, p. 1197.) Former section 47614 provided that “[a] school district in which a charter school operates shall permit a charter school to use, at no charge, facilities not currently being used by the school district for instructional or administrative purposes, or that have not been historically used for rental purposes provided the charter school shall be responsible for reasonable maintenance of those facilities.” (Stats. 1998, ch. 34, § 15, p. 202.) Read together, we read the 1998 statutes to have required a school district to provide facilities it was not currently using for teaching or administrative purposes or that it had not historically used for rental purposes to charter schools rent free and to have authorized such a school district to charge the higher 3 percent supervisorial cost if it was the charter school’s chartering agency. If, however, the chartering school district chose to rent facilities it historically rented out to others to the charter school, it could do so, but was limited to the 1 percent formula for supervisorial costs.

In 2000, Proposition 39 amended section 47614 to require school districts to share fairly their facilities with charter schools. Subdivision (b)(1) of section 47614 allows a school district sharing its facilities with a charter school the option of charging the charter school a pro rata share of the district’s unrestricted general funded facilities costs. (§ 47614, subd. (b)(1) [“The school district may charge the charter school a pro rata share . . . .” (italics added)].) Proposition 39 did not amend section 47613. So, read together, the statutes still allow a school district to provide facilities to a charter school without charge and if the school district is the charter school’s chartering agency, it is then entitled to the higher 3 percent formula for its supervisorial costs. Just as with the prior statutes, however, a chartering school district that charges the charter school for the use of its facilities will be limited to the 1 percent formula for supervisorial costs. Consistent with this statutory construction, Regulations, section 11969.7(f) recognizes a chartering school district that chooses to charge the charter school for the pro rata share of its facilities costs is not providing the facilities substantially rent free.

To support their argument that facilities cost is not rent, the School District Associations next claim the facilities cost referred to in section 47614 is principally maintenance and operations costs, allowed in place of the previous requirement that the charter school be responsible for the reasonable maintenance of the facilities provided by the school district. (Stats. 1998, ch. 34, § 15, p. 202.) As a substitute for the charter school’s obligation to maintain and operate the facilities, the School District Associations argue the facilities costs cannot be construed as “rent.”

We disagree. The facilities costs that may be charged against the charter school in section 47614 do not supplant the charter school’s responsibility for its ongoing maintenance and operations costs. As the Charter Association points out, a charter school still has the responsibility for the ongoing operations and maintenance of the facilities, furnishings, and equipment provided by the school district. (Regs., § 11969.4, subd. (b).) And although certain subdivisions of section Regulations, 11969.7 include “costs associated with plant maintenance and operations” and school district contributions from unrestricted general fund revenues to various specified district maintenance accounts, in the facilities costs used for the calculation of the pro rata share charge to the charter school (§ 11969.7, subd. (a), (a)(1) & (2); see also Regs., § 11969.2, subd. (h)), another provision of section 11969.7 expressly excludes “any costs that are paid by the charter school, including, but not limited to, costs associated with ongoing operations and maintenance . . . .” (§ 11969.7, subd. (a).) Thus, charter schools retain the responsibility for ongoing operations and maintenance and the facilities costs charge is not a substitute for such obligation. Nothing in the other regulations adopted by the State Board precludes the facilities costs charge from being considered a form of rent for purposes of section 47613.

The School District Associations argue the Legislature recognized that charter schools receiving equivalent facilities under section 47614 were receiving those facilities “rent-free” when it enacted section 47614.5, the Charter School Facility Grant Program. We find no such recognition in section 47614.5.

The Charter School Facility Grant Program does not speak expressly or impliedly to the issue of whether the facilities costs charge in section 47614 is reasonably construed as rent for purposes of section 47613. Section 47614.5 states the grant program “is intended to provide assistance with facilities rent and lease costs for pupils in charter schools.” (§ 47614.5, subd. (a).) But a charter school “receiving reasonably equivalent f