Citations

Full opinion text

Opinion

STONE (W. A.), Acting P. J.

Does “Three Strikes—The Legislation,”

Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), apply to California convictions predating its March 7, 1994, effective date? Four recent cases have held the law applies: People v. Anderson (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 587 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 474] (Anderson); People v. Reed (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1608 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 47] (Reed); People v. Sipe (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 468 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 266] (Sipe); and People v. Green (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 280 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 249] (Green). We do likewise.

An information charged petitioner Danny Gonzales with assault with intent to commit rape (count I, § 220) and assault with a deadly weapon (count II, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), both crimes occurring March 8, 1994. Appended to count I were special allegations that Gonzales had suffered prior convictions in 1980 and 1981, respectively, for robbery (§ 211) and residential burglary (§ 459), each crime being a serious felony within the meaning of sections 1192.7 and 667, subdivision (d). Appended to each count were four prior prison term enhancement allegations. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)

Gonzales filed a motion to strike the prior felony conviction allegations pursuant to section 667, subdivision (d). Respondent granted the motion to strike. Real party in interest unsuccessfully sought writ relief in this court. Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted real party in interest’s petition for review and transferred the matter to us with directions to issue an alternative writ. We issued an alternative writ of mandate directing respondent to vacate its strike order or show cause. Respondent vacated its order and we discharged the alternative writ.

Gonzales then filed the instant petition seeking an order directing respondent court again to grant his motion to strike. We issued an order to show cause.

Overview

The Three Strikes legislation “was adopted as an urgency measure, effective March 7, 1994. It makes major changes to Penal Code section 667, adding subdivisions (b) through (i) relating to increased punishment for recidivists who suffered one or more previous convictions for a serious or violent felony. A ‘serious felony’ is one that is so defined in section 1192.7, subdivision (c); a ‘violent felony’ is a crime defined as such in section 667.5, subdivision (c). (See § 667, subd. (d)(1).)” (People v. Martin, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 660, fns. omitted.)

“. . . The 1994 legislation contains a stated purpose: ‘It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses.’ (§ 667, subd. (b).)” (People v. Ramirez (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 559, 564 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 374].)

Section 667, subdivision (c), provides in part: “Notwithstanding any other law, if a defendant has been convicted of a felony and it has been pled and proved that the defendant has one or more prior felony convictions as defined in subdivision (d),” certain sentencing results follow.

A defendant enters this labyrinth through section 667, subdivision (d), by virtue of California adult serious or violent felony priors, foreign equivalents, or qualifying California juvenile adjudications. Subdivision (d)(1) provides, in part: “Notwithstanding any other law and for the purposes of subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, a prior conviction of a felony shall be defined as: [