People v. Superior Court (50 Cal. App. 4th 1202, 1996)

Opinion

McGUINESS, J.

In Baldwin v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1630 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 422] (Baldwin), we held that the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) did not violate principles of double jeopardy when it revoked Mr. Baldwin’s driver’s license after it received notice of his third conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. We analyzed the United States Supreme Court’s opinions in Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch (1994) 511 U.S. 767 [128 L.Ed.2d 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937] (Kurth Ranch), and United States v. Halper (1989) 490 U.S. 435 [104 L.Ed.2d 487, 109 S.Ct. 1892] (Halper), and concluded that they did not compel us to apply double jeopardy principles to driver’s license revocations. (Baldwin, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1638-1642.)

The Napa County Superior Court has barred prosecution of drunk driving charges against 15 defendants who previously lost temporarily their licenses in DMV administrative per se suspension proceedings. We disagree and reaffirm the principles stated in Baldwin. We direct issuance of a writ of mandate to vacate the superior court’s order.

Facts and Procedures

Between April 10 and August 31, 1995, the Napa County District Attorney filed complaints in the Napa County Municipal Court charging 15 defendants, real parties in interest in this proceeding, with driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with a blood-alcohol level of .08 or more, in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivisions (a) and (b). The DMV also suspended each defendant’s driver’s license for the same conduct under the administrative per se procedures described in section 13353.2, subdivision (a).

Under the administrative per se procedures, if a person is arrested for driving under the influence or with a blood-alcohol level of .08 or more, the arresting officer confiscates the driver’s license, sends it to the DMV, and issues a 30-day license. During those 30 days, the driver may apply to the DMV for a hearing to contest loss of the license. Typically, the arresting officer does not appear at the administrative hearing and the hearing officer considers the arresting officer’s sworn statement, the chemical test results, and the driver’s record. The arrestee is given an opportunity to present testimony. (See generally, Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 846-847 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500, 863 P.2d 745] (Gikas).) The DMV suspends the driver’s license for four months on a first offense and for one year if the driver has had another violation within the past seven years. (§ 13353.3, subd. (b)(1) & (2).)

The DMV administratively suspended the licenses of all 15 defendants, only 1 of whom requested a hearing. Simultaneously, the Napa County District Attorney was proceeding in the municipal court on a criminal complaint against each defendant. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaints based upon the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and California Constitutions. The motions to dismiss were denied.

Defendants then petitioned the superior court for writs of prohibition. After hearing, the court granted relief, ordering the municipal court to dismiss the charges against all 15 defendants. This petition by the People of the State of California followed.

Double Jeopardy

In People v. Prince (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1177-1179 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 138] (Prince), Division One of this court brought double jeopardy case law up to date: “The double jeopardy clause is one of the ‘least understood and, in recent years, one of the most frequently litigated provisions of the Bill of Rights.’ [Citation.] The United States Supreme Court has stated that ‘. . . the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction [hereinafter “successive prosecution”] and multiple punishments for the same offense [hereinafter “multiple punishments”].’ [Citation.]

“ ‘A decade ago, the law was clear that civil forfeitures did not constitute “punishment” for double jeopardy purposes. In United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 [79 L.Ed.2d 361, 104 S.Ct. 1099] (1984), the Supreme Court held that the claimant’s prior acquittal on criminal charges did not bar a subsequent action for forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 924(d). Applying the test set forth in United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 [65 L.Ed.2d 742, 749, 100 S.Ct. 2636] (1980), the Court concluded that Congress intended forfeiture to be “a remedial civil sanction.” 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at p. 363 [79 L.Ed.2d at pp. 368-369]. Accordingly, it held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply.’ [Citation.]

“The decisions of the Supreme Court in United States v. Halper, supra, 490 U.S. 435, and Austin v. United States (1993) 509 U.S. [602] [125 L.Ed.2d 488, 113 S.Ct. 2801] have, however, raised questions concerning the application of the double jeopardy clause when the government first obtains a criminal conviction and later seeks forfeiture of proceeds of illegal transactions that also gave rise to the criminal convictions, or conversely, attempts to criminally prosecute a defendant, after obtaining a judgment of civil forfeiture. The issue is now pending before the United States Supreme Court in U.S. v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency [(9th Cir. 1994)] 33 F.3d 1210 (holding that civil forfeiture proceeding violated double jeopardy clause because defendants had already been convicted of same offenses), and U.S. v. Ursery (6th Cir. 1995) 59 F.3d 568, certiorari granted January 12, 1996, _ U.S. _ [133 L.Ed.2d 707, 116 S.Ct. 762] (vacating criminal conviction and sentence following entry of consent judgment in civil forfeiture of property used to facilitate offenses.)” (Fn. omitted.)

Prince held that prosecution for the manufacture and sale of methamphetamine was not barred by the double jeopardy clause where the district attorney first obtained four default judgments, none final yet, forfeiting personal property seized from the defendant’s residence. (Prince, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1176-1179.) Prince criticized the Ninth Circuit decision in U.S. v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency (9th Cir. 1994) 33 F.3d 1210, but Prince reversed dismissal of criminal charges because the forfeiture was not yet final and the defendant had defaulted in the forfeiture proceeding. (43 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1181-1186.)

In Halper, the defendant was first convicted of 65 counts of Medicare fraud, fined $5,000, and sentenced to 2 years’ imprisonment. Each violation had lost the United States government $9, for a total loss of $585. The government then sought civil penalties of $2,000 for each violation. Halper considered whether subjecting Mr. Halper to $130,000 in civil damages for false claims amounting to $585, constituted a second punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis. (Halper, supra, 490 U.S. at pp. 437-441 [104 L.Ed.2d at pp. 494-497].)

Halper concluded that “the labels ‘criminal’ and ‘civil’ are not of paramount importance. It is commonly understood that civil proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial goals, and, conversely, that both punitive and remedial goals may be served by criminal penalties. . . . [T]he determination whether a given civil sanction constitutes punishment in the relevant sense requires a particularized assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to serve. Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment. [