Fernandez v. United States (2026)

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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus FERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 24–556. Argued November 12, 2025—Decided May 28, 2026 Joe Fernandez was indicted in 2013 for his role in the assassination of two gang members. The prosecution’s theory was that members of a drug ring had paid Fernandez to act as the backup shooter, and when the primary shooter’s gun jammed, Fernandez fired 14 rounds and killed both victims. Fernandez’s alleged co-conspirator, Patrick Darge, testified against Fernandez at trial. The jury convicted Fernandez of murder for hire and a firearms offense, and the District Court imposed two consecutive life sentences. Fernandez pursued multiple avenues of relief. He first asked the District Court to reconsider, alleging Brady violations related to the Government’s failure to disclose that another alleged co-conspirator, Luis Rivera, had denied driving the getaway car. The District Court reviewed the Government’s notes from interviewing Rivera and con- cluded that they did not contain relevant information, though the judge noted he was “troubled” by the Government’s lenient treatment of Rivera. The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting both the Brady claim and Fernandez’s insufficiency-of-evi- dence argument. It held that a reasonable jury could credit Darge’s testimony and that the evidence was sufficient to support conviction. Fernandez then twice moved for postconviction relief under 28 U. S. C. §2255. The first motion, arguing actual innocence based on witness credibility, was described by the Second Circuit as “plainly meritless.” The second succeeded only in vacating his firearms conviction based on United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445, thus leaving in place Fernan- dez’s murder-for-hire conviction. In the order vacating the firearms conviction, the District Judge speculated that the Government had of- fered Rivera a lenient plea deal because it “kn[ew] something” incon- sistent with Darge’s testimony, and pointedly noted that if 2 FERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES Syllabus Fernandez’s life sentence on the murder-for-hire charge “were to be commuted, or held unlawful, [Fernandez] would be released immedi- ately.” 569 F. Supp. 3d 169, 174, n. 4, 179. Fernandez finally filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that extraordinary and compelling reasons—above all, that he was innocent—warranted a sentencing re- duction. The District Court granted the motion, citing unease about whether Darge’s testimony had been truthful, concerns about the Gov- ernment’s charging decisions, and doubts about the correctness of the jury’s verdict. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that challenges to the validity of a conviction are not cognizable as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under §3582(c)(1)(A). Seven circuits agree with the Second Circuit on that legal issue, while two circuits take the other side. Held: A prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U. S. C. §2255, not 18 U. S. C. §3582; the sup- posed invalidity of a conviction is not among the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that justify compassionate release. Pp. 5–17. (a) Section 2255 governs collateral attacks on federal convictions and imposes tight procedural constraints, including: a 1-year statute of limitations, §2255(f); a general rule that prisoners get only one shot at collateral relief with narrow exceptions, §§2255(h)(1)–(2); a bar on relitigating claims already raised and rejected on direct review, see Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 227, n. 8; and procedural de- fault rules requiring demonstration of “ ‘cause’ ” and “ ‘prejudice’ ” or ac- tual innocence for claims not raised on direct review, Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614, 622. This case arises because after Fernandez lost a challenge to his conviction under §2255, he filed a motion pre- senting similar arguments under 18 U. S. C. §3582, which permits prisoners to seek compassionate release from prison by showing “ex- traordinary and compelling reasons” warrant early release. Unlike the procedural constraints on §2255 claims, the sole procedural require- ment imposed by §3582 is that the prisoner must first present his re- quest to the Bureau of Prisons. The Court’s precedents establish that claims “close to the core of ha- beas corpus” must be brought under “the specific federal habeas corpus statute” prescribed for relief, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 489, and other statutes “must be read in harmony” with the habeas frame- work, District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U. S. 52, 66. In Preiser, the Court held that even though prisoners’ claims “came within the literal terms” of 42 U. S. C. §1983, Congress’s determination “that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confine- ment” “must override the general terms of §1983.” 411 U. S., at 490. Cite as: 608 U. S. ___ (2026) 3 Syllabus A contrary result would allow prisoners to evade the rigorous require- ments of postconviction relief and “wholly frustrate explicit congres- sional intent.” Id., at 489. In Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, the Court held that prisoners may not use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to argue that a denial of habeas relief was wrong on the merits, because allowing such motions would permit movants to “circumvent” the strict statutory habeas standards. Applying these principles, challenging the validity of a conviction through a compassionate release motion circumvents the exacting re- quirements of §2255. Fernandez candidly admits that avoiding §2255’s procedural and substantive requirements is the benefit of his approach. His strategy would enable prisoners to bypass §2255 by challenging convictions repeatedly, for years after they became final, and regardless whether the issues had already been raised or decided in prior proceedings. The text and structure of §3582 confirm that the invalidity of a con- viction is not among the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justi- fying compassionate release. “Extraordinary” means “most unusual,” “far from common,” and “having little or no precedent,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 807, while “compelling” means “tending to convince or convert by or as if by forcefulness of evidence,” id., at 463. An argument that is compelling in one context is not nec- essarily so in another, and a reason is not “compelling” if Congress has channeled it through the postconviction statutes. The name for §3582(c)(1)(A)—“Compassionate Release”—highlights its focus on granting mercy rather than righting legal wrongs. Congress gives spe- cial protection to defendants with “terminal illness,” §3582(d); ex- pressly identifies that relief is available for elderly prisoners who have served lengthy sentences and are not dangerous, §3582(c)(1)(A)(ii); and has permitted the Sentencing Commission to treat rehabilitation as a relevant consideration, 28 U. S. C. §994(t). The role of the Bureau of Prisons reflects the statute’s focus on a defendant’s personal circum- stances such as advanced age, safety risk, illness, and rehabilitation. The Bureau’s institutional expertise lies in the daily lives of prisoners, so it makes little sense to have the Bureau evaluate legal arguments and comb trial records to determine whether a prisoner has a “compel- ling” argument that his conviction was wrongful. Regulatory history points the same way. For decades, the Sentencing Commission has tied the availability of compassionate release to a defendant’s personal circumstances and has never said that the invalidity of a conviction can be an “extraordinary and compelling reaso[n] warrant[ing]” compas- sionate release. Pp. 5–13. (b) Fernandez’s argument that §2255 and §3582 offer different forms of relief does not help him. The difference in relief highlights the 4 FERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES Syllabus mismatch between the error he alleges and the remedy he seeks. When a prisoner persuades a court that his conviction is invalid, the remedy of a little less prison time does not redress the wrong. If a conviction is invalid, the fitting remedy is to vacate it, as §2255 allows. Whether a prisoner’s request for relief serves as a challenge to a con- viction often turns on the nature of the arguments presented. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 545 U. S., at 531, 533. If a prisoner moves for relief because of alleged problems with the underlying criminal investigation or trial, his motion suggests that his conviction is flawed. This case demon- strates as much: The District Court found there was reason to question the verdict, meaning that it harbored doubts about the soundness of the conviction. Fernandez’s backup argument—that actual innocence claims must be cognizable under §3582 because such claims have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent con- stitutional violation—fails. No court has concluded Fernandez was ac- tually innocent. In any event, a prisoner asserting actual innocence “challenge[s] the validity of his conviction,” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 406, and that lies “close to the core of habeas corpus,” Preiser, 411 U. S., at 489. Section 3582 does not provide a shortcut around the postconviction statutes. Pp. 13–17. 104 F. 4th 420, affirmed. BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which KAGAN, J., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 24–556 _________________ JOE FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT [May 28, 2026] JUSTICE BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court. A federal statute authorizes district courts to shorten prison sentences for “extraordinary and compelling rea- sons”—most commonly, conditions like the prisoner’s age and infirmity. 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A). Petitioner Joe Fernandez argues that doubts about a conviction’s validity also qualify as “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for relief under the statute. We disagree. A prisoner who col- laterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U. S. C. §2255, not 18 U. S. C. §3582. I Fernandez was indicted in 2013 for his role in the assas- sination of two gang members. The prosecution’s theory was that members of a drug ring had paid Fernandez $40,000 to act as the backup shooter. When the primary shooter’s gun jammed, Fernandez stepped in. He fired 14 rounds, killing both victims. Fernandez’s cousin and alleged co-conspirator, Patrick Darge, testified against him at trial. To discredit Darge, Fernandez’s counsel argued that Darge was framing Fer- nandez to protect the real second shooter, Darge’s brother. Unconvinced, the jury convicted Fernandez of murder for 2 FERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court hire and a firearms offense. See 18 U. S. C. §§924(j), 1958. The District Court then imposed two consecutive life sen- tences. Fernandez asked the District Court to reconsider, alleg- ing that the prosecution had violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963). He pressed that argument several times, first in a motion to vacate the verdict, then in a mo- tion for new trial, and again in a motion for rehearing. Ac- cording to Fernandez, the Government should have dis- closed that another alleged co-conspirator, Luis Rivera, had denied driving the getaway car. To determine whether Ri- vera had in fact denied his involvement, the District Court reviewed the Government’s notes from Rivera’s interview; it concluded that they “d[id] not contain any relevant infor- mation.” United States v. Fernandez, 2014 WL 7180225, *1 (SDNY, Nov. 25, 2014). There was no evidence that Rivera had ever made such a statement, and it was not clear that it would have mattered to the jury if he had. Even so, the judge noted that he was “troubled” that prosecutors had “al- low[ed] Rivera to plead to a lesser narcotics offense and [had] dismiss[ed] the murder and gun charges against him.” Id., at *3. In the judge’s view, the prosecutors could have used the evidence in Fernandez’s case to show that Rivera had engaged in similar wrongdoing. Ibid. Fernandez appealed, and the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence. See United States v. Fernandez, 648 Fed. Appx. 56 (2016). Although Fernandez argued that the Government had failed to turn over its notes before trial, those notes “d[id] not reflect Rivera’s unequivocal de- nial of a getaway driver role.” Id., at 61. “[I]n any event,” the court said, “Fernandez fails to show how the notes could have been ‘useful’” for impeaching any witness. Ibid. Fer- nandez also argued that insufficient evidence supported his conviction: He insisted that Darge’s testimony was not cred- ible and highlighted the Government’s choice not to charge Rivera as a co-conspirator in the murder-for-hire plot, Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 Opinion of the Court which he considered indicative of the weakness of the Gov- ernment’s case. But the court rejected the insufficiency claim too. It held that a reasonable jury could credit Darge’s testimony, that it was corroborated by other evi- dence in the record, and that the evidence was sufficient to support Fernandez’s conviction. Fernandez persisted. He twice moved for postconviction relief under 28 U. S. C. §2255. The first time, Fernandez argued (among other things) that he was actually innocent because the testimony against him was not credible. He said that “[e]ven the Government did not fully believe Pat- rick Darge,” as shown by the Government’s decision not to charge Rivera with murder for hire. Reply Brief in No. 18– 06 (CA2), pp. 8–9, n. 2. The Second Circuit described this argument as “plainly meritless,” concluding that “[t]he jury was entitled to credit the witnesses who testified that Fer- nandez committed the crimes with which he was charged.” Fernandez v. United States, 757 Fed. Appx. 52, 55–56 (2018). The second collateral challenge succeeded. The Dis- trict Court set aside Fernandez’s conviction for a firearms offense after United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445 (2019), held that 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(3)’s residual clause is uncon- stitutionally vague. See Fernandez v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 3d 169 (SDNY 2021). Still, the District Judge remained troubled about Fernan- dez’s murder-for-hire conviction. No new evidence had sur- faced. But the judge continued to focus on Rivera—the get- away driver who had pleaded guilty to a less serious charge. In his order vacating the firearms conviction, the judge speculated that the Government had offered Rivera such a lenient plea deal because it “kn[ew] something” incon- sistent with Darge’s testimony. Id., at 174, n. 4. And if Darge was lying, the judge wondered, “perhaps there is something to Petitioner’s argument, that not he, but Pat- rick Darge’s brother . . . was the second shooter, and that Patrick Darge testified to cover that up.” Ibid. Notably, the 4 FERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Second Circuit had already rejected this argument twice, and Fernandez had not briefed it again before the District Court. But the judge brought it up anyway, pointedly not- ing that if Fernandez’s life sentence on the murder-for-hire charge “were to be commuted, or held unlawful, [Fernan- dez] would be released immediately.” Id., at 179. Fernandez took the hint. Within two weeks, he filed a motion for compassionate release under §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). See No. 1:10–cr–00863 (SDNY), ECF Doc. 248. He argued that extraordinary and compelling reasons—above all, that he was innocent—warranted a sentencing reduction. Ac- cording to Fernandez, Darge’s testimony was biased and uncorroborated by forensic evidence; moreover, his identifi- cation of Rivera as the getaway driver was inconsistent with a later statement made by Rivera himself. The Gov- ernment had not turned over its notes on that statement, Fernandez asserted, and had allowed Rivera to plead guilty to a lesser charge. The District Court granted the motion. Nearly a decade after presiding over the trial and sentencing, the judge felt “a certain disquiet” about whether Darge’s testimony had been truthful and whether the cross-examination had been effective. 2022 WL 17039059, *4 (SDNY, Nov. 17, 2022). He had “strong concerns” about the Government’s decision to charge the getaway driver with a lesser offense and “doubt[ed] that the jury’s verdict was correct.” Ibid. Darge might have “sacrifice[d]” Fernandez “to save his brother,” and Fernandez might not have been the shooter or even “a member of the conspiracy.” Ibid. That “disquiet” formed the “basis of [the District Court’s] finding that Petitioner Joe Fernandez has shown extraordinary and compelling circumstances for his release.” Ibid.1 —————— 1 The District Court also granted compassionate release based on the sentencing “disparity between Fernandez’[s] life sentence and the Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 5 Opinion of the Court The Second Circuit reversed, holding that “challenges to the validity of a conviction are not cognizable as ‘extraordi- nary and compelling reasons’ under section 3582(c)(1)(A).” 104 F. 4th 420, 431 (2024). Congress has channeled such claims into federal postconviction proceedings under 28 U. S. C. §2255, and by design, compassionate release and §2255 do not overlap. “Challenging the validity of a convic- tion under the extraordinary-and-compelling-reasons prong of section 3582,” the court explained, “would permit a defendant to ‘evade the collateral review structure’ of sec- tion 2255.” 104 F. 4th, at 430 (alteration omitted). While seven other Circuits have reached the same con- clusion, two have taken the other side.2 We granted certio- rari to resolve the split. 605 U. S. 931 (2025). II Collateral attacks on federal convictions are governed by 28 U. S. C. §2255, which imposes tight procedural con- straints. It carries a one-year statute of limitations. §2255(f ). With very narrow exceptions, a prisoner gets only one shot at collateral relief. §§2255(h)(1)–(2). Claims that have already been raised and rejected on direct review typ- ically cannot be relitigated in §2255 motions. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 227, n. 8 (1969); Reed v. Far- ley, 512 U. S. 339, 358 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). And claims not raised on —————— sentences of the co-defendants.” 2022 WL 17039059, *4. The Second Circuit concluded that this was an error, 104 F. 4th 420, 429 (2024), and the issue is not before us. 2 Compare United States v. Ferguson, 55 F. 4th 262, 270–272 (CA4 2022); United States v. Escajeda, 58 F. 4th 184, 186–187 (CA5 2023); United States v. West, 70 F. 4th 341, 346–348 (CA6 2023); United States v. Von Vader, 58 F. 4th 369, 371 (CA7 2023); United States v. Crandall, 25 F. 4th 582, 586 (CA8 2022); United States v. Wesley, 60 F. 4th 1277, 1284–1286 (CA10 2023); United States v. Jenkins, 50 F. 4th 1185, 1202– 1204 (CADC 2022), with United States v. Trenkler, 47 F. 4th 42, 48 (CA1 2022); United States v. Roper, 72 F. 4th 1097, 1102–1103 (CA9 2023). 6 FERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court direct review are procedurally defaulted unless the prisoner can demonstrate “ ‘cause’ ” and “ ‘prejudice,’ ” or else actual innocence. Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614, 622 (1998). If the prisoner clears these procedural hurdles, he must demonstrate that the applicable substantive law enti- tles him to relief. Section 2255’s companion statute, 28 U. S. C. §2254, imposes similar constraints on state prison- ers. Recall that Fernandez brought—and lost—a challenge to his conviction under §2255. This case arises from his mo- tion presenting similar arguments under a different stat- ute, 18 U. S. C. §3582, which permits prisoners to seek com- passionate release from prison. In contrast to §2255’s reticulated scheme, §3582 imposes a single procedural re- quirement: A prisoner must first present his request for re- lease to the Bureau of Prisons. §3582(c)(1)(A). A motion may then be filed in district court, where the prisoner (or the Bureau, acting on his behalf ) must show that “extraor- dinary and compelling reasons” warrant his early release from confinement. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). This is not the first time we have addressed the relation- ship between the habeas statutes and other kinds of pris- oner litigation. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, prisoners brought claims under 42 U. S. C. §1983 challenging the forfeiture of their good-time credits, and their claims “plainly came within the literal terms of that statute.” 411 U. S. 475, 488 (1973). Even so, we held that “[t]he broad language of §1983” did not afford the prisoners a cause of action. Id., at 489. “Congress has determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for state prisoners attacking the valid- ity of the fact or length of their confinement, and that spe- cific determination must override the general terms of §1983.” Id., at 490. Challenges “close to the core of habeas corpus” must be brought, if at all, under “the specific federal habeas corpus statute”—in that case §2254—which was “explicitly and historically designed to provide the means Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 7 Opinion of the Court for a state prisoner to attack the validity of his confine- ment.” Id., at 489. A contrary result would allow prisoners to evade §2254’s requirements, and so would “wholly frus- trate explicit congressional intent.” Ibid. That is why “§1983 must be read in harmony with the habeas statute.” District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Os- borne, 557 U. S. 52, 66 (2009). Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524 (2005), flows in the same vein. There, we held that prisoners may not use Fed- eral Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to argue that a denial of habeas relief was wrong on the merits and warrants reo- pening. The language of Rule 60(b) is expansive, permit- ting courts to reopen a final judgment whenever a movant shows “any . . . reason that justifies relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(6) (emphasis added). And the text of §2254 “did not expressly circumscribe the operation of Rule 60(b).” Gonzalez, 545 U. S., at 529. Yet allowing movants to use a Rule 60(b) motion to make merits arguments would still col- lide with §2254. It would permit movants to “circumvent” the strict statutory habeas standards, including “that a suc- cessive habeas petition be precertified by the court of ap- peals.” Id., at 531–532 (citing 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(3)). And the Rule could not be applied to habeas proceedings in a manner “ ‘inconsistent with’ ” §2254. 545 U. S., at 529 (quot- ing 28 U. S. C. §2254 Rule 11 (2000 ed., Supp. IV)). Thus, Rule 60(b)’s allowance of reopening for “any . . . reason” was narrowed to account for §2254. Much like the prisoners in Preiser and Gonzalez, Fernan- dez has pursued a collateral attack outside the rigorous ha- beas framework. And as in those cases, the workaround is impermissible. Challenging the validity of a conviction 8 FERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court through a compassionate release motion circumvents the exacting requirements of §2255.3 Indeed, Fernandez candidly admits that avoiding §2255’s procedural and substantive requirements is the benefit of his approach. As for procedure: Fernandez asserted at oral argument that “there are harsh limitations associated with [§]2255, and Congress has stated . . . that those limitations are appropriate, but it doesn’t mean that in every case, as applied to every defendant, that those limitations are fair.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 18–19. According to Fernandez, the ability to bring a merits-based challenge under §3582 mitigates “[t]he error and the unfairness of [the prisoner’s] not having been able to bring it under [§]2255.” Id., at 19. His take on substance is similar. He offers the example of a prisoner who claims that prosecutors withheld mitigating evidence and that his lawyer was constitutionally ineffective for fail- ing to pursue that evidence. Fernandez posits that these arguments would fail to satisfy “the legal intricacies of the doctrines related to Brady v. Maryland and Strickland v. Washington.” Brief for Petitioner 41 (citation omitted). Still, Fernandez asserts, these half-baked legal challenges could count as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that justify a reduced sentence. Ibid. The dissent, too, pro- claims that the “core mission” of compassionate release is —————— 3 The dissent dismisses Preiser and Gonzalez on the ground that §1983 and Rule 60(b) are “general” provisions, whereas 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A) is “specific.” Post, at 14–16 (opinion of JACKSON, J.). But Preiser and Gonzalez do not lay the relevant statutes side-by-side to de- termine which is more “general” than the other. (If that were the metric, §3582(c)(1)(A) is certainly “more general” than 28 U. S. C. §2255.) In- stead, both cases apply an anticircumvention principle: They ask whether it would “impermissibly circumvent” the specific design of the habeas statute to permit prisoners to challenge the legality of their con- finement through a statute whose literal language might otherwise ap- ply. Gonzalez, 545 U. S., at 532; see also Preiser, 411 U. S., at 489. We undertake the same inquiry here. Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 9 Opinion of the Court to offer deserving prisoners relief from the rigors of §2255. Post, at 21 (opinion of JACKSON, J.). It is easy to see why Fernandez would prefer this con- struction. Section 3582—in sharp contrast to §2255—im- poses no time limit or numerical cap on motions. Nor is there any bar to raising issues waived or already decided on direct appeal. So a prisoner proceeding under §3582 could challenge the validity of his conviction repeatedly, for years after it became final, even if the issue had already been raised or decided in prior proceedings. This system would enable prisoners not only to bypass §2255, but also to over- ride it. Consider this very case: Fernandez lost an argu- ment on direct review and under §2255, but then repack- aged it in a motion under §3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and obtained release from prison on those twice-rejected grounds. We will not set §3582 and §2255 at cross-purposes when we can construe them “in harmony.” District Attorney’s Of- fice, 557 U. S., at 66. Congress made compassionate release available only when “extraordinary and compelling rea- sons” justify it. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). That is a demanding standard. And as we did with §1983 in Preiser and Rule 60(b) in Gonzalez, we interpret §3582 against the backdrop of the detailed process that Congress “explicitly and historically designed” for “attack[ing] the validity of [a prisoner’s] confinement.” Preiser, 411 U. S., at 489; see also Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U. S. 465, 473 (2023). Seen in that light, the supposed invalidity of a conviction is not among the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that justify compassionate release. While Congress has not defined the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that may warrant a reduced sentence, these criteria are not empty vessels. “Extraordinary” means “most unusual,” “far from common,” and “having lit- tle or no precedent.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 807 (1976); see 5 Oxford English Dictionary 614 (2d ed. 1989) (“[o]ut of the usual or regular course or order”). 10 FERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court “Compelling” means “tending to convince or convert by or as if by forcefulness of evidence.” Webster’s Third New In- ternational Dictionary, at 463; see 3 Oxford English Dic- tionary, at 600 (“irresistible; demanding attention, re- spect”). We will focus on the latter requirement. An argument that is compelling in one context is not nec- essarily so in another; the force of an argument depends on what it seeks to justify. For instance, a 25th wedding anni- versary is a convincing reason to shorten a business trip, but it is not a convincing reason to shorten a prison sen- tence. So here, we do not ask in the abstract whether a challenge to the validity of a conviction is “compelling.” We ask whether it is an especially convincing reason to grant the relief sought: compassionate release from prison.4 Section 2255’s reticulated scheme bears on this inquiry. A reason is not “compelling” if Congress has channeled it through the postconviction statutes. Even Fernandez rec- ognizes that an argument may be less compelling if it could have been—and was not—asserted through §2255. He ad- mits that courts may consider “as part of the extraordinary and compelling analysis” whether a “defendant sat on his rights or whether he’s taken all opportunities to enforce his rights.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 15–16. Yet the same is true for §2255’s other substantive and procedural requirements: That Congress has chosen to make §2255 a high bar is not a compelling reason to reduce the sentences of prisoners who fall short. —————— 4 The dissent acknowledges that it is “obviously true” that context in- forms which reasons count as “compelling.” Post, at 4. The concurrence agrees, for it proposes another context-based limit: that only “changed circumstances” qualify as reasons warranting sentencing reduction. Post, at 1–2 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment). Given that the concurrence embraces a limit that appears nowhere in the text, it is hard to see how the concurrence can resist our interpretation on the ground that it is “atextual.” Post, at 1. Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 11 Opinion of the Court Other features of the statute point in the same direction. The name for §3582(c)(1)(A)—“Compassionate Release”— highlights its focus on granting mercy rather than righting legal wrongs. First Step Act of 2018, §603(b), 132 Stat. 5239 (heading). In keeping with the theme of “compassion,” Con- gress in §3582 gives special protection to defendants with a “terminal illness.” §3582(d). For instance, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons must notify terminally ill prisoners of their right to seek compassionate release, §§3582(d)(2)(A)(i), (B)(i); must sometimes assist in prepar- ing those compassionate release requests, §§3582(d)(2)(A)(iii), (B)(iii); and must report to Congress “the number of prisoners who died while their request was pending,” §3582(d)(3)(H). In addition, the statute expressly identifies one situation in which a sentencing reduction is warranted: when “the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years” of a certain type of mandatory life sentence, and the Director of the Bureau of Prisons de- termines “that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community.” §3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). And in another statute that references §3582(c)(1)(A), Con- gress has permitted the Sentencing Commission to treat a defendant’s rehabilitation as a relevant consideration in granting compassionate release. 28 U. S. C. §994(t). The role of the Bureau of Prisons reflects the statute’s fo- cus on a defendant’s personal circumstances—his advanced age, safety risk, illness, rehabilitation, and the like. The Bureau evaluates compassionate release motions in the first instance. Until 2018, a district court could reduce a sentence only “ ‘upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.’ ” Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1998– 1999. After the First Step Act, prisoners may file their own compassionate release motions, but only if the Bureau de- clines or fails to respond to a prisoner’s request that the Di- rector file on his behalf. 132 Stat. 5239. Fernandez agrees that this procedural shift in the Bureau’s role—from 12 FERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court exclusive filer to initial evaluator—did not change the sub- stantive standard applicable to compassionate release mo- tions. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 9–12. If compassionate release were a vehicle for attacking the validity of a conviction, it is hard to see why the Bureau of Prisons would run the process. The Bureau’s institutional expertise lies in the daily lives of prisoners: matters relat- ing to their “safekeeping,” “care,” “subsistence,” “protec- tion,” “instruction,” and “discipline.” 18 U. S. C. §4042(a). So it makes sense for the statute to instruct the Bureau to help terminally ill prisoners seek compassionate release. §3582(d). By contrast, it makes little sense to have the Bu- reau evaluate legal arguments and comb trial records to de- termine whether a prisoner has a “compelling” argument that his conviction was wrongful. Even Fernandez concedes that analyzing potential trial errors is outside the Bureau’s bailiwick. Tr. of Oral Arg. 10. Take Fernandez’s own situ- ation: How would the Bureau determine whether the testi- mony at his trial was credible? Or take Fernandez’s hypo- thetical: How would the Bureau evaluate arguments raised under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984)? Supra, at 8. Congress’s decision to route compassionate release motions through the Bureau strongly suggests that the “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant[ing]” compassionate release must be reasons that the Director is competent to assess. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Regulatory history points the same way. Congress has authorized the Sentencing Commission to issue policy statements about when compassionate release is war- ranted, 28 U. S. C. §994(t), and these policy statements shape whether courts may grant compassionate release mo- tions, 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A). For decades, the Sentenc- ing Commission has tied the availability of compassionate release to a defendant’s personal circumstances. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 13 Opinion of the Court App. C, Amdt. 698 (Nov. 2007) (USSG) (listing “ ‘extraordi- nary and compelling reasons’ ” to include “ ‘terminal ill- ness,’ ” “ ‘a permanent physical or medical condition,’ ” “ ‘[t]he death or incapacitation of the defendant’s only fam- ily members capable of caring for the defendant’s minor child,’ ” or “ ‘other’ ” reasons as determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons). While the Sentencing Commis- sion has issued more detailed policy statements over the years, it has maintained the same basic categories.5 See USSG §1B1.13(1), comment., n. 1 (Nov. 2021). It has never said that the invalidity of a conviction qualifies as an “ex- traordinary and compelling reaso[n] warrant[ing]” compas- sionate release. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). In short, the structural inference of Preiser and Gonzalez is borne out in §3582 itself. The heartland “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that might warrant an early re- lease from prison—age, illness, a child left with no guard- ian—bear no resemblance to the grounds for relief under §2255. Fernandez cannot deploy §3582 to blunt what he perceives to be the sharp edges of §2255. III Fernandez insists that because §2255 and §3582 offer dif- ferent forms of relief, the structural inference from Preiser and Gonzalez does not apply. Under §2255, a court could set aside Fernandez’s conviction as if it never happened. But Fernandez is not going for that—at least not in this round. Now, he seeks the more modest relief permitted by §3582: a reduced sentence. If he succeeds, he would leave prison early, but his murder-for-hire conviction—along with its collateral effects—would remain in place. That —————— 5 In 2023, the Sentencing Commission added a new category to the list of “extraordinary and compelling” reasons: “ ‘Unusually Long Sen- tence[s].’ ” USSG Supp. to App. C, Amdt. 814 (Nov.). That amendment, while not relevant here, exceeds the Commission’s authority. Rutherford v. United States, ___ U. S. ___, ___–___ (2026) (slip op., at 15–16). 14 FERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court distinction, he says, means that he is not circumventing §2255, but rather proceeding on an entirely different track. See also post, at 11 (JACKSON, J., dissenting). Instead of helping him, this argument highlights the mis- match between the error Fernandez alleges and the remedy he seeks. When an elderly or infirm prisoner is discharged early, the reasons for release have nothing to do with the lawfulness of the conviction—so it makes sense to leave it in place. But when a prisoner persuades a court that his conviction is invalid, the remedy of a little less prison time does not redress the wrong. If a conviction is invalid, the fitting remedy is to vacate it, as §2255 allows. That §3582 does not offer this remedy is evidence that it is not a suita- ble vehicle for the claim. In any event, the difference in relief does not render Preiser irrelevant. The remedies were not identical in Preiser either: The prisoner sought an injunction under §1983 for the restoration of good-time credits, rather than habeas relief. This formal distinction did not change our analysis; what mattered was that Preiser brought a claim “close to the core of habeas corpus.” 411 U. S., at 489. When, as here, a prisoner “attack[s] the validity of his con- finement” and “seeks either immediate release from that confinement or the shortening of its duration,” his claim be- longs under the umbrella of the postconviction statutes. Ibid. And to be clear: Fernandez is challenging the validity of his conviction, even though he is not asking to have it va- cated or set aside. Whether a prisoner’s request for relief challenges a conviction turns on the nature of the argu- ments presented. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 545 U. S., at 531, 533 (holding that only some arguments presented in a Rule 60(b) motion would improperly infringe on §2254). When a prisoner moves for compassionate release based on a termi- nal illness, his motion does not suggest that his conviction is invalid. But if a prisoner moves for relief because of Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 15 Opinion of the Court alleged problems with the underlying criminal investiga- tion or trial, his motion suggests that his conviction is flawed. That is true here: Fernandez’s motion said he “would never commit” murder for hire; questioned whether the District Judge would have reached the same verdict as the jury; urged the court not to credit Darge’s testimony; alleged that the Government failed to turn over or present to the jury “highly exculpatory” notes from interviewing Ri- vera; and even argued that Fernandez could sufficiently show his actual innocence to satisfy Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298 (1995), which governs certain procedurally de- faulted habeas claims. See ECF Doc. 248, pp. 7–9, 14. The District Court then impermissibly treated Fernandez’s challenge to his conviction as an “extraordinary and com- pelling reaso[n]” for sentencing reduction. 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). It expressed “[r]eason to [q]uestion the [v]erdict,” “doubt that the jury’s verdict was correct,” and the belief that the prosecution distrusted the testimony of its star witness. 2022 WL 17039059, *4. In other words, the District Court harbored doubts about the soundness of the conviction.6 —————— 6 Perplexingly, the dissent accuses us of failing to define “what it means for a prisoner to ‘collaterally attac[k] the validity of his conviction,’ ” post, at 17 (alteration in original), and characterizes this limit as unworkable, post, at 9, 16–19; see also post, at 1 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judg- ment). But we explain our holding in detail, and its application is straightforward: There is an obvious distinction between a prisoner who asserts that he should not have been convicted in the first place and one who asserts that his present circumstances warrant an exercise of com- passion. Cf. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 532 (2005) (requiring dis- trict courts to distinguish between Rule 60(b) motions that attack “the substance of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits” and those that raise “some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas pro- ceedings”). Indeed, we routinely require courts to draw much finer dis- tinctions than this. See, e.g., Esteras v. United States, 606 U. S. 185, 200, and n. 9 (2025) (requiring sentencing courts to consider “the nature and 16 FERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Fernandez offers a backup position: Even if §3582(c)(1)(A)(i) does not ordinarily allow district courts to grant compassionate release for reasons that would support a §2255 motion, he asserts that actual innocence claims are an exception. He points out that “a factual showing of ac- tual innocence ‘ha[s] never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation.’ ” Brief for Petitioner 41–42 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 400 (1993)). Thus, he says, such a claim must be cognizable under §3582; otherwise, a pris- oner might have nowhere to go. See also post, at 9–10, 17– 18 (JACKSON, J., dissenting). It bears emphasis that this argument is only marginally relevant to Fernandez himself. No court—not even the Dis- trict Court that reduced his sentence—concluded that Fer- nandez was actually innocent. His evidentiary challenges were repeatedly rejected, and the District Court reduced his sentence because of “disquiet” about the conviction, not con- fidence in Fernandez’s innocence. 2022 WL 17039059, *4. So even if an actual innocence claim were cognizable under §3582, Fernandez would not benefit from it. In any event, this case gives us no occasion to decide the antecedent question whether a prisoner may assert a —————— circumstances of the offense” but not the “ ‘need for the sentence imposed’ ‘to reflect the seriousness of the offense’ ”). Betraying the weakness of its criticism, the dissent leans on a source that offers no support. According to the dissent, our approach implicates the “notoriously difficult” exercise of deciding “when, under the Preiser line of cases, a successful §1983 action necessarily implies ‘the invalidity of the plaintiff ’s conviction.’ ” Post, at 17 (citing W. Baude, J. Goldsmith, J. Manning, J. Pfander, & A. Tyler, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1687 (8th ed. 2025)). But this source describes the difficulty of determining when relief other than a release from custody (for example, a damages award) would “necessarily imply the invalidity of [the plaintiff ’s] conviction” within the meaning of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 487 (1994). That issue has no bearing on today’s case. Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 17 Opinion of the Court freestanding actual innocence claim under §2255. We have never ruled that possibility out and do not do so now. See Herrera, 506 U. S., at 417. Instead, we hold simply that a compassionate release motion is not a vehicle for raising such a claim. A prisoner asserting actual innocence “chal- lenge[s] the validity of his conviction,” id., at 406, whether factually or legally, and that lies “close to the core of habeas corpus,” Preiser, 411 U. S., at 489. If it is “not in substance a ‘habeas corpus application,’ ” it is “at least similar enough that failing to subject it to the same requirements would” forge a path for bypassing the postconviction statutes. Gon- zalez, 545 U. S., at 531. And for the reasons we have al- ready stated, §3582 does not provide that kind of shortcut. Fernandez’s remaining arguments echo those presented in another case, which we also decide today. See Rutherford v. United States, ___ U. S. ___ (2026). Petitioners in both cases contend that the phrase “extraordinary and compel- ling reasons” vests courts with broad discretion to grant a prisoner compassionate release for virtually any reason whatsoever. We reject these arguments here for the same reasons we reject them in Rutherford. Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 11–15). “While the terms ‘extraordinary’ and ‘com- pelling’ leave room for judgment, they are not so flexible as to encompass any consideration.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11). * * * The compassionate release provision is not a vehicle for attacking the validity of a conviction. Accordingly, the judg- ment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is af- firmed. It is so ordered. Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 24–556 _________________ JOE FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT [May 28, 2026] JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN joins, concurring in the judgment. The First Step Act of 2018 expanded district courts’ au- thority to “reduce [a] term of imprisonment” upon a finding that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and that the reduced sentence is consistent with traditional sentencing factors. 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A). For many of the reasons explained in JUSTICE JACKSON’s dissenting opinion, the Court’s decision interpreting that provision today is wrong. The majority improperly narrows the scope of §3582(c)(1)(A) based on tenuous inferences drawn from the federal habeas statutes. Its habeas-based rule distorts and expands the Court’s habeas-channeling cases, creating an atextual limitation found nowhere in §3582(c)(1)(A). In doing so, it superimposes a technical, and likely unworkable, habeas analysis on top of a sentence- reduction framework that broadly calls for holistic review. Moreover, the rule adopted today risks shutting out meri- torious claims for a sentence reduction simply because they might resemble, in some amorphous way, a claim that might call into question a sentence or conviction. Even so, the judgment below should be affirmed on a dif- ferent, far simpler ground, which follows much more natu- rally from the statute before the Court: A motion for com- passionate release cannot justify a reduced sentence if it relies solely on facts a court already considered in imposing 2 FERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment the initial sentence, rather than any changed circum- stances that developed after sentencing. In general, a “court may not modify a term of imprison- ment once it has been imposed.” §3582(c). Section 3582(c)(1)(A) authorizes a limited departure from that rule of finality when “extraordinary and compelling reasons” arise so as to “warrant . . . a reduction” of the sentence im- posed. For a reason to “warrant” a change of a sentence, however, it cannot have been a consideration that was part of the initial sentencing determination to begin with. At the very least, changing a sentence already imposed under §3582(c)(1)(A) requires something to have changed, after sentencing, in a way that alters the sentencing calculus. See, e.g., Setser v. United States, 566 U. S. 231, 242–243 (2012) (explaining that §3582(c)(1)(A) provides for relief when “ ‘developments that take place after the first sentenc- ing’ produc[e] unfairness to the defendant” (citation omit- ted)). Otherwise, district courts would have indefinite au- thority to revise sentences already imposed based on information and arguments that were previously consid- ered and rejected. Such authority would seriously diminish the finality of sentences required by §3582(c). The District Court’s grant of relief here ran afoul of this principle. Petitioner Joe Fernandez has been litigating the issues at the core of his §3582(c)(1)(A) motion since his trial. From the start, Fernandez has contended that the evidence against him was weak and that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he (and not someone else) committed the murders for which he was convicted. He raised these issues at his trial, see ante, at 1–2, at his sentencing, see App. 57–62, in a motion to reconsider his sentence, see ante, at 2–3, and in a postconviction motion under 28 U. S. C. §2255, even though “[n]o new evidence had surfaced,” ante, at 3–4. Each effort failed in the trial court and on appeal. Yet these same arguments finally found success under §3582(c)(1)(A) based on the District Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment Court’s renewed feelings of “ ‘doub[t]’ ” and “ ‘disquiet’ ” about the original trial evidence supporting Fernandez’s jury verdict. Ante, at 4.* This grant of relief was inappropriate given the absence of any postsentencing developments, and the Court needed to go no further to affirm the decision below. Unfortu- nately, bad facts often make bad law, and so they did today. Correctly perceiving a problem with the District Court’s grant of relief, the majority responds with a rule that goes far beyond both what is needed to resolve this case and, worse, what the text and relevant precedents can bear. Be- cause I do not agree with the majority’s reasoning in sup- port of its decision to affirm the decision below, I concur only in the judgment of the Court. —————— *As the majority notes, ante, at 4, n. 1, the District Court also relied on a sentencing disparity between Fernandez and some of his codefend- ants in granting relief, but the Second Circuit rejected that separate ba- sis for relief on grounds unrelated to the question that this Court granted certiorari to review, 104 F. 4th 420, 428–429 (2024). Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 JACKSON, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 24–556 _________________ JOE FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT [May 28, 2026] JUSTICE JACKSON, dissenting. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) of Title 18 of the U. S. Code—known as the compassionate-release statute—authorizes district courts to reduce federal prison sentences under specified circumstances. This case is about the scope of that author- ity. By its terms, the compassionate-release statute is flex- ible, permitting sentence reductions for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The breadth of this language is no accident: It reflects Con- gress’s intent to preserve some of the traditional discretion afforded to district courts to ensure just treatment of de- fendants in criminal cases. Today, the Court arbitrarily restricts that discretion by grafting an atextual rule onto §3582(c)(1)(A). It holds that a district court may not base its “extraordinary and compel- ling” findings on any reason that “collaterally attacks the validity” of the prisoner’s conviction. Ante, at 1. Such “at- tacks,” the majority says, must be brought through motions for habeas relief under 28 U. S. C. §2255. Ibid. But this restriction comes of out nowhere—it finds no support in the statute’s text or history, nor can it be justified by our prec- edents. What, then, explains the new categorical rule that the Court adopts today? The answer appears to be the major- ity’s intuition that the District Court’s grant of petitioner Joe Fernandez’s compassionate-release motion qualifies as 2 FERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES JACKSON, J., dissenting an abuse of discretion under the circumstances presented here. That may well be true—but not because of an im- plicit, habeas-based limitation on the reach of §3582(c)(1)(A). Because the Court of Appeals erroneously relied on such a habeas-based rule in reversing the District Court’s grant of compassionate release, and the majority now endorses that approach, I respectfully dissent. I would vacate, rather than affirm, the decision of the Court of Appeals. I The majority holds that the District Court erred in grant- ing Fernandez’s compassionate-release motion because §3582(c)(1)(A) contains an implicit habeas-based limitation: Sentence reductions that derive from purported “[c]ollat- eral attacks on federal convictions” are not authorized. Ante, at 5. It is not clear whether the majority believes, on the one hand, that conviction-related concerns can never be sufficiently “extraordinary and compelling” or, on the other, that even if there are “extraordinary and compelling” rea- sons to doubt the defendant’s conviction, a sentence reduc- tion is nevertheless unavailable. What is evident is that, in devising this new rule, the ma- jority devotes most of its analysis to describing the contours of habeas relief under §2255 and gives short shrift to the text and history of §3582(c)(1)(A). Had the majority focused instead on the statute actually before it, it would have seen that the compassionate-release provision operates as an in- dependent stop-gap measure, designed to preserve a dis- trict court’s discretion to reduce a criminal sentence when “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances warrant that result. And when §3582(c)(1)(A) is thus properly un- derstood, it is clear that the existence of habeas review has no bearing whatsoever on whether a defendant can seek or obtain compassionate release. Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 JACKSON, J., dissenting A Start with the words Congress used in §3582(c)(1)(A)— they provide the most obvious strike against the majority’s newfound rule. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s text, while authoriz- ing a sentence reduction, does not refer to §2255 or habeas review—in any way, shape, or form. Of course, if Congress had intended §2255 to limit the availability of the compas- sionate-release remedy, it could easily have said so. This Court has often taken the lack of a cross-reference to mean that two distinct statutory provisions bear no relation to one another. See, e.g., Pugin v. Garland, 599 U. S. 600, 608 (2023); Azar v. Allina Health Services, 587 U. S. 566, 576– 577 (2019). Not only is there no explicit basis for the majority’s habeas-based rule, there is also no implicit one. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) is a straightforward grant of discretion: It vests district courts with authority to reduce a prisoner’s sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” The terms “extraordinary” and “compelling” are commonly un- derstood to relate to a narrow and specific set of circum- stances defined by degree, not type. See Rutherford v. United States, ___ U. S. ___, ___ (2026) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dis- senting) (slip op., at 7–8). As the majority acknowledges, “ ‘[e]xtraordinary’ means ‘most unusual,’ ‘far from common,’ and ‘having little or no precedent,’ ” while “ ‘compelling’ means ‘tending to convince or convert by or as if by forceful- ness of evidence.’ ” Ante, at 9–10 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 463, 807 (1976)). Neither definition implies the exclusion of any kind of consideration from a district court’s sentence-reduction analysis. Rather, they suggest that any factor can be the basis for compas- sionate release, so long as it is both sufficiently unusual and sufficiently forceful. See Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Group, Inc., 590 U. S. 212, 215 (2020) (observing that this Court does not “usually read into statutes words that aren’t there”). 4 FERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES JACKSON, J., dissenting The statutory context confirms the absence of any type- based restriction on the sentence-modification authority §3582(c)(1)(A) conveys, much less the majority’s preferred habeas limit. With full awareness of §2255, Congress placed only two textual limitations on what constitutes an “extraordinary and compelling reason” to modify a defend- ant’s sentence. First, the resulting sentence reduction must be “consistent” with the Sentencing Commission’s pol- icy statements. 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A). Second, “[r]eha- bilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason” for a sentence reduc- tion. 28 U. S. C. §994(t). Far from connoting an additional habeas-based constraint, Congress’s express inclusion of these two restrictions on a district court’s “extraordinary and compelling” findings “ ‘implies the exclusion of othe[r]’ ” such limitations. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. 281, 300 (2018) (quoting A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 107 (2012)). The majority offers little by way of a text-based come- back. Focusing on the word “compelling,” the majority ob- serves that what “is compelling in one context is not neces- sarily so in another”; for example, a 25th wedding anniversary may be a “compelling” reason to shorten a busi- ness trip but not a prison sentence. Ante, at 10. While ob- viously true, that observation tells us nothing relevant. All agree that personal considerations (e.g., illness and family hardship) might warrant a sentence reduction under §3582(c)(1)(A), see ante, at 10–12, yet those considerations, too, are more or less “compelling” under various circum- stances. Moreover, as explained in Part II–A, infra, Fer- nandez’s claim of actual innocence, if meritorious, would be a compelling reason to reduce his sentence. At the time the District Court considered his §3582(c)(1)(A) motion, Fer- nandez had already served 11 years in federal prison for a crime he says he did not commit. On the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” scale, his innocence claim is Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 5 JACKSON, J., dissenting lightyears away from reducing a sentence to facilitate cele- bration of a wedding anniversary. B The text alone suffices to dispel the habeas-related limi- tation myth the majority adopts today. But, as is often true of statutes, it is not possible to fully understand the com- passionate-release provision without appreciating its stat- utory and legislative history. See R. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 31 (2014) (“The task of the judge is to make sense of legislation in a way that is faithful to Congress’s pur- poses”). The historical context under which §3582(c)(1)(A) emerged and developed is “the water in which [the text] swim[s].” United States v. Hansen, 599 U. S. 762, 775 (2023). Notably absent from this history is any indication that Congress understood §2255 to implicitly limit the scope of compassionate release, either when it first enacted §3582(c)(1)(A) in 1984 or when it amended the provision in 2018. 1 Before 1984, “the Federal Government employed in crim- inal cases a system of indeterminate sentencing.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 363 (1989). Though “[s]tat- utes specified the penalties for crimes,” they “nearly always gave the sentencing judge wide discretion to decide whether the offender should be incarcerated and for how long” or “whether restraint, such as probation, should be imposed instead of imprisonment or fine.” Ibid. The result: “great variation among sentences imposed by different judges upon similarly situated offenders” and “uncertainty as to the time the offender would spend in prison.” Id., at 366. Congress set out to alleviate those problems with the Sen- tencing Reform Act of 1984. See 98 Stat. 1987; see also S. Rep. No. 98–225, p. 65 (1983) (“The shameful disparity in criminal sentences is a major flaw in the existing 6 FERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES JACKSON, J., dissenting criminal justice system