Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM NIXON, Chief Judge. Pending before the Court in the above-styled matter is Defendant Vanderbilt University’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 35), to which Plaintiff Idit Dobbs-Weinstein filed a Response (Doc. No. 43). For the reasons outlined below, the Court grants the Motion and dismisses Plaintiffs state law claims. I. Background Plaintiff Dobbs-Weinstein alleges discrimination in employment on the basis of her gender and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-21-101 et seq. Plaintiff also brings state claims for breach of contract and breach of covenant of good faith. Plaintiff is an Israeli national, and also holds Canadian citizenship. In the Fall of 1987, she was appointed to the position of Assistant Professor of Philosophy, a tenure-track position. Plaintiffs claims arise out of Vanderbilt University’s decision to deny her tenure in the Spring of 1994. After joining the faculty in 1987, Plaintiffs performance and her potential to qualify for tenure were reviewed at various intervals, in accordance with the Rules and Procedures for Appointments, Renewals, Promotions and Tenure in the College of Arts and Science (“College Rules,” Mem.Supp.Mot.Summ.J., App. B). In order to be reappointed at each interval, the College Rules require approval by a majority of the tenured members of Plaintiffs department, in this case the Philosophy Department. At the end of her second year, in the spring of 1989, Plaintiff was reviewed and she was reappointed for an additional two years. At the end of Plaintiffs fourth year, in the spring of 1991, Plaintiff was again considered for reappointment, and again was approved, this time for a three-year extension. At the end of that three-year term, in the spring of 1994— Plaintiffs seventh year of appointment — the Department considered whether to grant Plaintiff the tenured position of Associate Professor. The University’s Faculty Manual (“Manual,” Mem.Supp.Mot.Summ.J., App. A) outlines the criteria by which each renewal and reappointment decision are to be made. The Manual provides for three general areas of excellence which must be fulfilled: For the award of tenure, Vanderbilt requires (1) excellence in research, scholarship, or creative expression in one’s discipline and (2) a high level of effectiveness in teaching. From discipline to discipline, the form taken by a candidate’s contribution will vary. But, in each case, Vanderbilt expects the level and quality of achievement in research, scholarship, or creative expression and teaching equivalent to that required for tenure in leading departments or schools of other major research universities. In addition, Vanderbilt expects satisfactory performance in the area of (3) service. (Manual, Chapter 1, Section E.) The standard for assessing factor (1), “research, scholarship, and creative expression,” is included in the Manual: Successful candidates for tenure at Vanderbilt must be active scientists, scholars, critics, or artists. By the time of tenure review, they must have completed and made available research, scholarship, criticism, or artistic production of such high quality as to gain favorable recognition within their discipline and at a national level. The works may be available through the publication of books and articles, the circulation of manuscripts intended for publication, lectures and presentations, exhibits or performances. Both past achievements and future promise, both the quantity and quality of completed work, determine one’s eligibility for tenure. (Manual, Chapter 1, Section E, Subsection 1.) The evaluation of a candidate’s work includes a consideration of “at least three letters solicited by the Chair [of the department] from a list suggested by the candidate of at least six qualified reviewers outside the University, and at least three letters from colleagues chosen by the Chair in consultation with those department members whose fields are closest to those of the candidate.” (College Rules, Section V, A, 4.) The Manual also defines the standard for assessing factor (2), effectiveness in teaching: Candidates for tenure must accept as career obligations the dissemination of knowledge and the nurturing of a spirit of inquiry. To meet tenure standards in teaching, candidates must demonstrate a high level of effectiveness in any of the numerous forms that teaching takes and in any of the settings in which it occurs. Command of the subject, clarity in communication, and sensitivity to the needs of students are indispensable assets of effective teachers. Candidates for tenure must possess both the skills required to transmit the contents of their disciplines and the capacity to motivate an active pursuit of new knowledge or insight. Such skills and capacities spring from the same qualities that lead to successful scholarly inquiry. (Manual, Chapter 1, Section E, Subsection 2.) Under the College Rules, conclusions regarding teaching effectiveness are based on “[ejvaluations of teaching by members of the department and by graduate and undergraduate students (see Section V, F), or evidence concerning the candidate’s teaching in other institutions, along with comments by Vanderbilt students who have met and heard the candidate; .... ” (College Rules, Section V, A, 4.) Section V, F of the College Rules provides that each department “shall develop a standard procedure for obtaining student evaluations of candidates for renewal and promotion” and those evaluations should “normally include course evaluations made in accordance with faculty legislation and evaluations prepared by graduate and undergraduate majors in the department.” (College Rules, V, F.) As noted above, the tenured members of the Philosophy Department voted to reappoint Plaintiff at both her two- and four-year reviews. However, at Plaintiffs four-year review, the voting members expressed some concern with Plaintiffs performance as to factors (1) and (2) — scholarly contribution and teaching performance. For example, “varying evaluations of her scholarship” were given: “Some find her written work to be not clearly focused, to be a bit scattered, to be in need of editorial assistance. Others do not dispute these observations, but nevertheless find her ideas interesting and important.... On the other hand, others suggested that her work is good only if judged by the standards appropriate to book reports.” (Venable Aff., Ex. 1 at 4.) Although the Department reported that Plaintiff was considered by all to be an extremely effective teacher of and role model to graduate students, “[i]t was also universally acknowledged that Dobbs-Wein-stein’s teaching at the undergraduate level is below par; in fact, that it has been quite unacceptable and must improve if she is to be considered tenurable down the road.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiffs reappointment at her four-year review was ultimately approved by a six to three margin, with two abstentions. (Id. at 1.) A positive vote for tenure, as provided by the College Rules, indicated that the voter believed the candidate “may in due time qualify for tenure,” while a negative vote denoted the opinion that the candidate “[was] very unlikely to qualify for tenure.” (College Rules, Section IV, 5 & 6.) The author of the Department’s report on this vote noted that “[he] would judge that one reasonable understanding of an abstention would be something like, ‘possible, but unlikely’ (as distinguished from ‘very unlikely’).” (Venable Aff., Ex. 1, at 2.) Three years later, in the spring of 1994, the tenured members of the Department convened to decide whether to promote Plaintiff to the tenured position of Associate Professor. By a vote of five to four, tenure was approved. However, the concerns that were voiced at Plaintiffs four-year evaluation were again raised. For example, while it was noted that Plaintiffs book manuscript had recently been accepted by an academic press for publication, the departmental report on the vote reiterated that scholarship concerns persisted: There is general agreement that by generally accepted standards Dobbs-Weinstein does not write as well as she might, though there is also general agreement that her recent writing ... is better than her earlier writing.... It is [also] clear that some of her faculty colleagues have found conversations with her mystifying while other colleagues ... have found conversations with her to be insightful and helpful. Those who oppose tenure add the charge that, apart from the clarity issue, they do not find her presentation of materials always accurate.... (Venable Aff., Ex. 2 at 4-5.) Discussed “at even greater length” by the voting members of the Department was Plaintiffs success at teaching. The voting members struggled with the “range” of the teaching requirement, disagreeing as to whether quality of teaching should be equivalent in both graduate and undergraduate contexts, or whether one category of instruction was mox’e important than the other; indeed, the faculty noted that “[o]ur criteria refer to teaching, not to the teaching of undergraduates.” (Venable Aff., Ex. 2 at 7.) While it was concluded that Plaintiffs teaching of graduate students was exceptional, “[a]t the undergraduate level the data [were] complex.” (Id.) The panel went on: Evaluation numbers vary. Her performance in freshman seminars has clearly improved ... and ... her Medieval Philosophy course is on an upswing. But the undergraduate reaction is mixed and complex. Is the clear success of her teaching at the graduate level plus evidence of some improvement at the undergraduate level enough to satisfy the tenure requirement for excellence in teaching? All of us wish the undergraduate record were better but some of us feel that the graduate record plus the bright parts of the undergraduate record are adequate, while others do not. (Id.) Under the University’s Faculty Manual and the College Rules, a recommendation for tenure by the Department is forwarded to the Dean of the College. The Dean then assesses the recommendation in light of the principles laid out in the Manual and the Rules. He or she has the authority to either concur in the recommendation, or to decline to concur. If a Dean refuses to concur, the Department, by a two-thirds vote, may appeal the decision to the University’s Promotion and Tenure Review Committee (“PTRC”). Irrespective of the Dean’s decision, the PTRC reviews the tenure file. If the PTRC accepts the Department’s recommendation, it recommends tenure to the Provost (even if the Dean has declined to concur). The Provost, in turn, reviews the recommendation and the tenure file, and makes the decision whether to recommend tenure to the Chancellor. The Chancellor then makes a recommendation to the Board of Trust, which makes the final tenure determination. (See Manual, Chapter 1, Section E, Subsection 5.) In this case, the 5-4 -recommendation of the tenured members of the Philosophy Department was forwarded in January, 1994 to then-Acting Dean John Venable. Dean Venable decided that he was unable to concur with the recommendation. In his letter to Dr. Donald Sherburne, Chair of the Department, dated May 26, 1994, Dean Vena-ble explained the various grounds for his refusal to concur: (1) Research quality. Dean Venable found that the evidence in this area was “mixed,” but that ultimately “the case for excellence [was] not made.” (Venable Aff., Ex. 3 at 2.) Venable cited three concerns. First, he noted that the input from outside reviewers was far from unanimous. Of nine outside scholars, he found that two reviews were clearly negative and the remaining seven recommended tenure; of those seven, however, he found the content of the letters, on the whole, only “moderately favorable.” (Id.) One positive letter he described as “rather superficial” and ultimately “not persuasive.” (Id.) Another reviewer who recommended tenure also “offer[ed] the reservation that the candidate has not produced a ‘clear synthesis’ of her various subjects.” (Id.) A third positive review “presented] a well-argued case, though one with reservations.” (Id.) On the whole, Dean Venable found only three of the seven positive recommendations to be “quite favorable,” “glowing,” and “strongly supportive.” (Id.) Dean Venable also cited the departmental report on the vote which indicated that “some of [the tenured professors] ... express serious doubts about the quality of the candidate’s scholarship,” and that even “[s]ome supporters of tenure ... acknowledge problems.” (Id.) In this vein, Venable went on to articulate his specific concern with the weight to be given to the recent acceptance of Plaintiffs manuscript for publication by SUNY Press. “Although a publishable book is a virtual necessity for tenure in Philosophy ... mere publication is not enough.” (Id.) Venable noted that the readers for the SUNY Press were “supportive [of publication] but with reservations,” and that the department was “apparently united in its perceptions of a lack of clarity.” (Id. at 3.) Finally, Venable questioned the acceptance process at SUNY Press, suggesting that the process was unduly influenced by relationships between Vanderbilt faculty and the press. (Id.) Dean Venable also indicated his concern that some of the scholarly papers included on Plaintiffs curriculum vitae did not undergo peer review, and that overall “[o]ne is left with the sense that this is not a body of work that can establish a strong scholarly reputation.” (Id.) (2) Teaching. In this area, Dean Venable disagreed with the Philosophy Department report, which had noted that the voting members felt there was some ambiguity as to whether the College considered the teaching of undergraduates to be as significant as other teaching by tenure candidates. Vena-ble wrote, “There is ... no ambiguity in the application of the [teaching effectiveness] criterion in the College of Arts and Science: to earn tenure, faculty members must teach undergraduates well.” (Id. at 3.) In this regard, Venable was troubled by the fact that even though just eight of the twenty-four courses Plaintiff had taught during her Vanderbilt career had been graduate-level, she had taught approximately the same number of undergraduate as graduate students. Consequently, “[Plaintiff] escaped undergraduate teaching to an extent that would seem impossible, particularly so in the period during which she had been advised to demonstrate improvement in undergraduate teaching.” (Id. at 4.) The disproportionate teaching of graduate students was due to the typically low undergraduate enrollment in Plaintiffs less advanced courses. Venable found this enrollment indicative of teaching quality, since “[t]he College’s general experience is that medieval courses with good teachers (e.g., in English and History) draw well.” (Id.) He felt that such inferences were borne out by the assessment given in the Department’s report, and by student evaluations Plaintiff received for her undergraduate teaching, which Venable found “do not support a conclusion of high effectiveness.” (Id. at 5.) While the Dean gave Plaintiff high marks for willingness to spend time with students outside of class, he concluded that while her undergraduate students “appreciate her efforts on their behalf, [they] do not understand her in class,” and that “[t]he overall result is, in my judgment, mediocre undergraduate teaching.” (Id.) Finally, while Venable concurred in the Department’s assessment of Plaintiff as an exceptional teacher of graduate students, he expressed concern that not all graduate students who had experiences to contribute about working with Plaintiff were free to do so; he suggested that some were “coerced” into not voicing opposition to Plaintiffs candidacy for tenure. (Id.) Upon return to school for the new academic year in August 1994, the tenured members of the Philosophy Department met, in accordance with the Manual and the College Rules, to vote on the question of whether to appeal Dean Venable’s decision to the PTRC. The Department’s vote was the same as the original tenure vote, 5-4, and thus failed to yield the two-thirds margin necessary for such an appeal. Consequently, Plaintiff was informed that her contract with the College would end in May 1995. In response to Dean Venable’s action, and the subsequent Departmental vote, Plaintiff filed a grievance in October 1995 with the University’s Senate Committee on Professional Ethics and Academic Freedom (“PEAF Committee”). Plaintiffs complaint alleged various improprieties in the process by which her tenure candidacy was reviewed by Dean Venable, and by which the Department subsequently considered an appeal. (Venable Aff., Ex. 4.) She also contended that both Dean Venable’s decisionmaking, and the premises upon which such decisionmaking was based (such as student evaluations), were tainted by discriminatory animus on the basis of gender and national origin. (Id.) In April 1995, the PEAF Committee issued its findings. While the Committee rejected Plaintiffs allegations that the denial of tenure was motivated by discrimination, it did conclude that there were “several areas of concern” (Venable Aff., Ex. 5 at 8) which warranted — in accordance with the Manual and College Rules — the PTRC’s review of Plaintiffs file. In particular, the PEAF Committee referenced Dean Venable’s letter to the Department and concluded, “[T]he committee is troubled at how simple ‘considerations’ [about Plaintiffs scholarship and especially her book’s publication] have acquired the status of ‘reasons’ to support a conclusion regarding the merits of her scholarship, when there is so little substantial discussion [in the letter] about the quality of her work.” (Venable Aff., Ex. 5 at 10.) The Committee also found that Dean Venable had placed undue emphasis upon Plaintiffs teaching of undergraduates, since her area of study was uniquely specialized, and would more naturally place her in greater contact with graduate students. (Id. at 13-14.) Consequently, the PTRC reviewed the tenure file, and, in August 1995, issued its conclusions. In its brief report, the PTRC concluded that although Dean Venable’s concerns were “legitimate, reasonable and weighty,” a recommendation should be made to the Provost to promote Plaintiff to the position of Associate Professor with tenure. The Provost, Dr. Thomas G. Burish, accepted the PTRC’s recommendation, which he in turn conveyed to Chancellor Joe B. Wyatt. Chancellor Wyatt concurred in the recommendation; consequently, on November 3, 1995, the University’s Board of Trust voted to promote Plaintiff to Associate Professor with tenure. The appointment was made retroactive to the end of the 1993-94 academic year, the time at which Plaintiff would have been promoted but for Dean Venable’s refusal to concur in the Philosophy Department’s recommendation. Consequently, Plaintiff received back pay for the 1994-95 academic year that reflected the difference between her Assistant Professor salary level and that which she would have earned as an Associate Professor, as well as the full Associate Professor salary she would have received during the elapsed portion' of the 1995-96 academic year had her contract not concluded in August 31,1995. Plaintiff filed this action in May 1995. She charges that Defendant’s initial denial of tenure was illegally tainted by sex and national origin discrimination, in violation of Title VII and the Tennessee Human Rights Act, and that her subsequent instatement at the tenured level does not account for the lost interest which would have accrued on her salary or compensate her for the emotional and professional damages she suffered over the year following her denial of tenure. Plaintiff also brings state breach of contract and covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims stemming from alleged irregularities in the way the University’s tenure procedures were implemented in her case. Finally, Plaintiff has added a claim that the University discriminates on the basis of sex in faculty salaries, for which she seeks both retroactive and prospective relief. II. Legal standards Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits ... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In order to grant summary judgment, the Court must determine that a reasonable jury would be unable to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of proof that no genuine issues of material fact are present. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Moreover, the facts, and reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must come forward with “more than just some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989). Where the record in its entirety would not lead a jury to find for the non-movant, a genuine issue of material fact does not exist. Id. at 1478. Material facts are those which, under the substantive law governing the issue, might affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. Mere allegations of a factual dispute are not sufficient to meet this standard. Id. Title VII prohibits discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment on the basis of an individual’s sex and national origin, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act imports Title VIIs protections. To state a claim under Title VII, a plaintiff may provide direct evidence of discrimination (although such “smoking gun” evidence is rarely available), indirect evidence, or circumstantial evidence. Woythal v. Tex-Tenn. Corp., 112 F.3d 243, 246 (6th Cir.1997) (quoting Gagne v. Northwestern Nat’l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 314-15 (6th Cir.1989) (citation omitted)). If a plaintiff lacks direct evidence, a jury may still infer discriminatory intent under the burden-shifting framework adopted under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and its progeny. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Texas Dep’t of Comm. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). According to this approach, a plaintiff may state a prima facie case of sex and national origin discrimination by presenting evidence that (1) she is a member of the protected class(es); (2) she is qualified to do the job; (3) despite these qualifications, she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that “after [the adverse employment action], the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Once these four elements are proven, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Id. If the defendant carries this burden, the plaintiff must then produce “sufficient evidence to allow a jury to reasonably reject [the employer’s] explanation” as a pretext for discrimination, id. at 804, and to instead conclude that the plaintiffs gender and/or national origin, played a determinative role(s) in the adverse employment decision. Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1023 (6th Cir.1993). The Supreme Court in St. Mary’s Honor Center made clear that “the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” 509 U.S. at 518. Moreover, the Court held that “[i]t is not enough ... to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiffs explanation of intentional discrimination.” Id. at 519. III. Discussion A. Sex and national origin discrimination — tenure denial The Court rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs discrimination claim is mooted by her subsequent receipt of tenure. If evidence of discrimination exists in this case, Plaintiff clearly still has an action for damages — for both emotional harm and damage to her professional reputation — and possibly for interest on the backpay she ultimately received. Thus, the Court will examine Plaintiffs discrimination claims. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of sex and national origin discrimination. Defendant’s stated non-discriminatory reason for denial of tenure is Dean Venable’s disagreement with the voting members of the Philosophy Department — based on legitimate academic considerations — that Plaintiff met University criteria for tenure in the areas of teaching and scholarship. Therefore, the Court turns to the evidence Plaintiff has put forth in support of her claims of pretext. 1. Plaintiff’s evidence Plaintiff has amassed a range of evidence which she alleges supports the conclusion that the decision to deny her tenure was discriminatorily tainted. The evidence may be divided into the following categories: (1) Workforce data as evidence of gender discrimination. Plaintiff notes that at the time she was hired in 1987, she was the first woman employed in a tenure track position in the Philosophy Department at Vanderbilt, and, at all times relevant to this suit, she was the only woman in a department of eleven men. She also states in her deposition that during her employment at Vanderbilt, approximately 48 men received fellowships, while only 3 women did, (Dobbs-Weinstein Dep. at 93-95), although no documentation is provided for this assertion. Plaintiff notes that as of October 1, 1993, there were 138 male professors and 14 female professors at any level, including both tenure and tenure track positions, in the College of Arts and Science at Vanderbilt. At the same time, there were 69 male Associate Professors and 12 female Associate Professors (the tenured rank to which Plaintiff sought promotion) at the College. (Pl.’s Resp.Opp.Mot.Summ.J. at 29.) Finally, Plaintiff notes that “[o]ver 160 female faculty members in the College of Arts and Science between September 1,1986 and August 1, 1995 are no longer employed by Vanderbilt University.” (Id.) (2) Personal bias among Department members as evidence of gender and national origin discrimination. In addition to noting that opponents of her tenure were also opponents of the philosophical theories she espoused, Plaintiff claims that three of the four opponents also “made inappropriate comments of a sexual nature to either [Plaintiff] or students.” (Pl.’s Resp. Opp.Summ. J. at 8.) Plaintiff does not provide any further support for these allegations. Plaintiff also asserts that members of the Philosophy Department were unwilling to accommodate absences of faculty members due to Jewish holidays. (3) Male professor tenured “in place of’ Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that the incoming Dean of the College of Arts and Science, Madeline Goodman, conditioned her acceptance of Vanderbilt’s job offer on the provision of a tenured Philosophy Department position for her husband, Lenn Goodman. This argument appears to be conjecture, based on the fact that Lenn Goodman’s specialty is the same as Plaintiffs (medieval philosophy), and that he asked to take over her eourseload after Plaintiffs denial of tenure. No further facts are provided to transform this correlation into a causal factor for denial of Plaintiffs tenure. (4) Evidence of national origin discrimination at Vanderbilt generally. Plaintiff also argues that there is “substantial other evidence of bias at Vanderbilt based on national origin.” (Pl.’s Resp.Opp.Mot.Summ.J. at 28.) Plaintiff cites unspecified damage to Jewish religious symbols across campus, which included anti-Semitic graffiti on Plaintiffs office door. Plaintiff also submits the affidavit of Pascal Massie, a foreign-born teaching assistant pursuing her Ph.D. in the Philosophy Department. Massie contends that during her mandatory training at the Teaching Center— a supplemental training that all teaching assistants were required to fulfill — she, and other foreign students, were not “given the same depth of evaluation that foreign-born teaching assistants were given.” (Massie Aff. at 1.) Moreover, she alleges that “[ajmong the advice given by the Teaching Center was advice to foreign students to bathe frequently, leaving the impression that those giving the advice did not understand that it was the practice of foreign-born students to bathe frequently.” (Id. at 2.) (5) Evidence of national origin discrimination in student evaluations. Plaintiffs primary evidence of national origin diserimi-nation is Vanderbilt’s reliance upon student evaluations in making tenure decisions, evaluations which she claims are inherently biased against accented speakers such as herself. Plaintiff presents the report of Dr. Donald L. Rubin, a professor of Speech Communication and Language Education at the University of Georgia. Dr. Rubin’s area of expertise is the interaction between language and attitude, and specifically, “the impact of speakers’ language variety on listeners’ perceptions and comprehension of those speakers on listeners’ perceptions and comprehension of those speakers.” (Rubin Report at 1.) Dr. Rubin states that “[i]n general, my study of undergraduates’ responses to international instructors leads me to the overall conclusion that college students tend to negatively judge the teaching proficiency of international instructors, and even to comprehend their classroom lectures poorly.” (Id.) Dr. Rubin also suggests that negative student reactions and lowered comprehension rates occur in studies even when an instructor is merely identified as a non-U.S. native, but where the instructor’s speech is unaccented. (Id.) These results, Dr. Rubin surmises, are the result of prejudices which lead students to “hear what they expect to hear,” in other words, sub-standard teaching from non-native English speakers. (Id. at 2.) Interestingly, however, Dr. Rubin’s research has not led him to recommend the elimination of student evaluations as a basis for employment decisions. Indeed, he notes that his research ultimately “indicates that such evaluation is in general a reasonably accurate measure of teaching effectiveness,” (id.), though use of such evaluations should be tempered by an understanding of their shortcomings and potential biases. Dr. Rubin’s observations about the applicability of these findings to Plaintiffs case are based upon his viewing of a videotape of Plaintiff delivering a simulated lecture. (Id.) He categorizes Plaintiffs speech as “extremely intelligible,” though certain pronunciations make it clear that she “is not a native speaker of mainstream North American English” and “is an international.” (Id. at 3.) Most notably, Dr. Rubin found that while “it is plausible that these identifications could result in students activating stereotyped expectations of this speaker,” he concludes: To more adequately assess whether this speaker is indeed subject to negative student expectancies based on language and national origin, one would need to conduct an experiment in which this particular speaker contributes one set of stimulus materials. Under controlled conditions, a simulated lecture delivered by this instructor would be judged by a sample of undergraduate students. A similar sample of students would under the same controlled conditions respond to a lecture delivered by a person of similar physical attractiveness who would be identified as mainstream North American. For further comparison, vocal tracks could be switched between the two speakers. (Id. at 3-4.) (Emphasis added.) No such study was conducted by Dr. Rubin or by any other expert. (6) Suggestion of bias by Dean Venable. The bulk of the evidence presented by Plaintiff comprises statements and actions attributed to Dean Venable which allegedly illustrate his bias against women and foreign-born persons. Each incident shall be explained in turn: (a) Plaintiff submits the affidavit of English Professor Margaret Doody, who approached Venable in the Fall of 1993 regarding the hiring of a temporary visiting professor to teach comparative literature. Professor Doody’s affidavit states that Venable, in granting such permission, told Doody, “Whatever you do, don’t hire a foreigner. All our troubles come from foreigners.” (Doody Aff. at 1.) (b) Plaintiff also submits the affidavit of Assistant Professor Denise Kirschner of the Mathematics Department. In the spring of 1994, Professor Kirschner complained to Dean Venable about a comment made to her by a male Mathematics professor: Kirschner says that this professor told her that “in order to hire a woman in the Department of Mathematics at Vanderbilt, the woman must be better than any of the male candidates.” (Kirschner Aff. at 1.) Kirschner contends that when she told Dean Venable about this comment, Venable “was patronizing to me and simply advised me that I must have misunderstood the Department Chair,” (id.), as did Pat Pierce, a woman whose position at Vanderbilt is not identified by either Kir-schner or Plaintiff. (Id. at 2.) The male professor’s alleged remarks were not investigated, to Kirsehner’s knowledge, nor was he disciplined. (Id.) Kirschner also describes the “agitat[ion]” of the aforementioned math professor at a seminar held in the spring of 1994 regarding gender discrimination in the physical sciences. (c) The only other woman in whose tenure recommendation Venable failed to concur during his tenure as Acting Dean was Dr. Phyllis Frus, an Assistant Professor in the English Department. Plaintiff notes that when Frus appealed her denial, the PEAF Committee found evidence that two male professors in the Department, during the departmental meeting at which Frus’ tenure was considered, spoke of Frus’ gender and age in a derogatory manner. This discussion was included in the minutes of the meeting, which Dean Venable saw when he deliberated on whether to concur in the Department’s tenure recommendation. Dean Venable “failed to discipline, counsel or investigate the inappropriate statements relating to age and gender.” (Pi’s Resp.Opp.Mot.Summ.J. at 27.) (d) Dr. Sabine Cramer, an Assistant Professor in the German and Slavic Department from 1991 through 1996, submitted an affidavit about her experience with Dean Venable. Dr. Cramer was asked to testify before a committee investigating charges of sexual harassment brought against the male Chair of the Department. Dr. Cramer states in her affidavit that she was reluctant to testify because she feared endangering her future chances for contract renewal and for tenure, and that she conveyed these concerns to Dean Venable. (Cramer Aff. at 2.) Dean Venable, she says, assured her that the professor against whom Dr. Cramer was scheduled to testify would not be permitted to participate in Dr. Cramer’s renewal evaluation. (Id.) Contrary to these assurances, the professor was permitted to participate in the vote regarding Dr. Cramer, and he (along with the other two male professors in the Department) voted against her. (Id.) Dr. Cramer’s contract was not renewed. 2. Assessment of Plaintiff’s evidence The Court undertakes its examination in light of the fact that tenure decisions are unlike virtually any other kind of employment decision, and consequently, they warrant a slightly different kind of scrutiny from the courts. See Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 92-93 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that the tenure decision gives rise to a lifetime personal service contract, is often non-competitive and thus scrutiny of other candidates for comparisons is of limited value, is made through a decentralized procedure, considers multiple subjective criteria, and sparks unusually high levels of disagreement). While the tenure decision’s unique context certainly does not insulate universities from the reach of anti-discrimination statutes, the Court must also be cognizant of the well-established principle that a court considering a tenure decision must refrain from substituting its subjective judgment about a teacher’s qualifications for those of professional scholars. See, e.g., Brousard-Norcross v. Augustana College Ass’n, 935 F.2d 974, 975-76 (8th Cir.1991) (courts must not “sit as a ‘super personnel council’ to review tenure decisions”); Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 93 (“triers of fact cannot hope to master the academic field sufficiently to review the merits of such views and resolve the differences of scholarly opinion”); Smith v. University of North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 345 & n. 26 (4th Cir.1980) (noting the “anti-interventionist policy” of courts regarding tenure decisions); Kunda v. Muhlenberg Coll., 621 F.2d 532, 548 (3d Cir.1980) (“[djeterminations about such matters as teaching ability, research scholarship, and professional stature are subjective, and unless they can be shown to have been used as a mechanism to obscure discrimination, they must be left for evaluation by the professionals”). Rather, a court’s inquiry must focus on what actual evidence directly or indirectly implicates discrimination as the motive behind an institution’s stated academic reasons for denying tenure. Smith, 632 F.2d at 345-46. The Court finds that the evidence before it fails to create a genuine question of whether the decision to deny Plaintiff tenure was motivated by sex and/or national origin bias. Although Plaintiffs denial of tenure was ultimately found to be improper, this finding, and the other evidence presented by Plaintiff, do not sufficiently erode the substantial evidence supporting the legitimacy of Defendant’s stated academic reasons for that denial. Regardless of whether Plaintiff believes the criticisms of her teaching and scholarship to be fair or warranted, they are criticisms which were raised throughout her employment at Vanderbilt by a number of different parties who had varying degrees of investment in her future. These concerns emerged as early as 1991, the time of Plaintiffs fourth-year reappointment vote: as discussed su/pra,. “varying evaluations of her scholarship” were given at that time by her colleagues within the Department, and “[i]t was also universally acknowledged that Dobbs-Weinstein’s teaching at the undergraduate level is below par; in fact, that it has been quite unacceptable and must improve if she is to be considered tenurable down the road.” (Venable Aff., Ex. 1, at 3-4.) Ultimately, Plaintiffs reappointment was approved by a six to three margin, with two abstentions. {Id. at 1.) Similarly, the later 5-4 tenure vote within the Department indicates that Dean Venable’s objections — while ultimately overruled by the PEAF committee and the PTRC — were rooted in academic concerns over which reasonable scholarly minds could differ. Additionally, the Department’s denial of tenure and Venable’s failure to concur were in part based on evaluations received from scholars at SUNY Press and at other institutions, who gave a range of assessments of Plaintiffs qualifications. Moreover, the negative student evaluations which were received echoed the concerns over intellectual clarity cited by Plaintiffs colleagues themselves, indicating to this Court that the criticism from Plaintiffs peers and the Dean was rooted more in substance than in pretext: It is clear from the letters of students that classes taught by Dobbs-Weinstein often begin by generating a certain amount of confusion and puzzlement — some of the graduate students, and undergraduates, who ended up feeling enormously indebted to her teaching remark that their initial exposure to her in classes left them confused. (Venable Aff., Ex. 2 at 4-5.) Commenting on this phenomenon, Professor Sherburne, one of Plaintiffs ultimate supporters, wrote, “I fully understand the experience from which [Plaintiffs] critics are speaking; I have sometimes been mystified [by her comments and questions] and yet sometimes have felt that indeed there is something there she is trying to get at, even if I can’t quite put my finger on it any more than she can.” (Id. at 5.) Indeed, the degree to which Plaintiffs supporters agree with her detractors is striking in this case. Professor Sherburne summarized the Department’s narrow tenure vote in this way: [I]t is not a simple, straightforward matter to determine whether [Plaintiff makes philosophical sense and contributes to the field]. Five of us, all of whom freely acknowledge that there are problems with clarity and connecting links ..., feel that the scholarly accomplishment ... merits tenure, especially when one focuses on the work done in medieval philosophy. Four of us did not.... The four who voted against tenure agreed that in their conversations with the candidate and in their reading of her manuscripts, they did not encounter the qualify of mind that they feel a candidate has to exhibit to be worthy of tenure. The five who voted for tenure were, at least some of them, quite willing to agree that the candidate does not have the kind of mind and style that is viewed as standard in some traditions, but they concluded that in its way it gets the philosophical job done and that therefore the candidate merits tenure. {Id. at 6.) (Emphasis added.) Finally, the Vanderbilt academicians charged with review of Plaintiffs appeal also found significant room for debate about tenuring her. The PEAF Committee indicated in its report that “all members of our Committee considered this a close and unusual case” and that “[t]he concerns raised by Dean Venable were legitimate, reasonable and weighty.” {Id., Ex. 6 at 1.) The PTRC noted that its own' members who dissented from the tenure recommendation considered Plaintiffs case “a close one.” {Id. at 3.) Of particular note in this regard is the PEAF committee’s conclusion that while it ultimately found Dean Venable’s reasoning conclusory rather than supported by the realities of Plaintiffs scholarly record, it did not find that his failure to concur was a “product of discrimination.” (Id., Ex. 5 at 10.) In fact, both the PEAF committee and the PTRC indicated that if any improper motivation was to be attributed to the Dean, it was his unwillingness to take into account the fact that a vigorous ideological debate had divided the Philosophy Department and the discipline generally: As noted in the Department’s tenure vote report, opponents to Plaintiffs tenure fell within the “Anglo-American empirical tradition” (otherwise known as the “analytic” tradition) which “wants to get perfectly clear on all the details of the parts and thinks that with that done the overall picture will fall into place.” {Id., Ex. 2 at 5.) Plaintiff, on the other hand, fell into the “continental tradition” of philosophy, which “thinks that one proceeds from the whole down to the parts because only in the light of the overall picture does the meaning and significance of the parts come into view. Work produced from within this latter tradition ... often looks fuzzy and disjointed to those working within the assumptions of the former tradition....” (Id.) Both committees found that this pedagogic division may have accounted for much of the contentiousness of Plaintiffs candidacy: the PEAF committee criticized the Dean for overestimating the importance of the close departmental vote on Plaintiffs candidacy because “the split vote may not be an accurate reflection of her merit” but rather of “the deep division currently represented in the department,” (id., Ex. 5 at 15), while the PTRC noted that poor reviews of Plaintiffs scholarship were difficult to evaluate “in part because of disagreements within [Plaintiffs] own department, and in part because of an apparent division within the discipline of philosophy generally about what constitutes quality research.” (Id., Ex. 6 at 2.) Indeed, Plaintiff herself also suggests that this ideological rift fueled the opposition to her candidacy, given her observation that “[t]he four professors who voted against recommending tenure for [Plaintiff] were all analytic professors.” (Pl.’s Resp.Opp.Mot.Summ.J. at 7.) However, while it is unfortunate and even unfair that such disputes may have clouded the tenure decision here, “academic and intellectual bias is not evidence of sex discrimination.” Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 541 (3d Cir.1992) (reviewing denial of law firm partnership). In sum, such vigorous debate among Plaintiffs peers about her merits strongly indicates that Defendant’s initial denial of tenure was motivated by a truly legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for denial of tenure. The strength of the evidence supporting this contention places the responsibility for creating a material question of pretext squarely at Plaintiffs feet. Ultimately, this is a burden that Plaintiff fails to carry. As a threshold matter, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that evidence of skewed gender ratios can provide important context to allegations of sex discrimination and may help establish pretext in individual disparate treatment cases. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05. Thus, the Court assesses Plaintiffs other evidence of discrimination with cognizance of the fact that she was the first woman hired into a tenure-track position within the Department, that there were no women graduate students in the Department at that time, and that she remained the only woman in the Department through the time of her tenure vote. Plaintiffs other data, however, about the number of tenured and non-tenured women in the entire College of Arts and Sciences and about the number of women who left the College from 1986 to 1995, however, are less helpful. Such “raw numerical comparisons,” when not accompanied by any particularized discussion of qualified application pools or comparisons to the number of men who left, are of minimal probative value and do not allow definitive conclusions regarding bias at the College. Ezold, 983 F.2d at 543 (and cases cited therein); see also Shaw v. Monroe County, No. 95-70107, 1996 WL 426483, at *8 (E.D.Mich. Apr. 18, 1996) (plaintiffs citation of low rates of minority employment at defendant employer not probative because “statistics without correlation are indicative of no meaningful inference or conclusion”) (quoting Long v. City of Saginaw, 911 F.2d 1192, 1201 (6th Cir.1990)); Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 95. This is especially true in the academic setting, where departmental needs for adding faculty may vary dramatically, both from department to department and from year to year, and where decisions about hiring faculty — as noted supra — are highly subjective. See Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 95. Without contextual analysis of the statistics themselves, the statistics’ value in creating context in individual eases is substantially undermined. Moreover, Plaintiff ignores the Supreme Court’s important caveat to the principle that statistical data may aid an individual’s case: “We caution that such general determinations, while helpful, may not be in and of themselves controlling as to an individualized hiring decision, particularly in the presence of an otherwise justifiable reason for refusing to rehire.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805 n. 19 (quoted in Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 69 (2d Cir.1980)). As discussed supra, the Court believes that such a reason — albeit later overturned — has been articulated by Defendant. As to Plaintiffs allegation that incoming Dean Madeline Goodman required the Philosophy Department to hire her husband, whose specialty placed him in competition with Plaintiff, Defendant has denied that Lenn Goodman either shared Plaintiffs specialty or that he was hired instead of her; rather, Defendant states that it hired Lenn Goodman as an additional member of the faculty, irrespective of the tenure decision regarding Plaintiff. (Def.’s Resp. Addt’l Facts at 24-25, ¶ 65.) The PEAF Committee also concluded: “Although the appointment of Professor [Lenn] Goodman overlapped with the time in which the [Plaintiffs] tenure decision occurred, we accept Mr. Venable’s assurances that there was no connection between the two decisions and recognize that the University’s practice of offering positions to spouses of appointed persons occasionally results in additional persons within departments.” (Venable Aff., Ex. 5 at 7.) The Court finds no reason to question the Committee’s assessment of Professor Goodman’s hiring. The Court is thus left to consider the anecdotal evidence that Plaintiff claims is suggestive of gender and national origin bias on the part of her colleagues and Dean Vena-ble, and her contention that the evaluations by her students were biased and should not have been the basis for her tenure denial. It is certainly relevant to this Court’s inquiry to know how women and Jews were treated within the Philosophy Department, and by Dean Venable. Any statements or behavior by any of the decisionmakers that were derogatory on the basis of any protected characteristic may provide evidence of discrimination. Wilson v. Wells Aluminum Corp., No. 95-2003, 1997 WL 52921, *5 (6th Cir. Feb.7, 1997) (citing Cooley v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 25 F.3d 1325 (6th Cir.1994)); Ezold, 983 F.2d at 546 (“[P]roof of a discriminatory atmosphere may be relevant in proving pretext since such evidence ‘does tend to add “color” to the employer’s decisionmaking processes and to the influences behind the actions taken with respect to the individual plaintiff.’ ”) (quoting Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 597 (1st Cir.1987)); Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.1990) (comments indicating bias are “clearly relevant” to a disparate treatment claim). There is more to this principle, however: without evidence that illegal animus affected the contested employment decision itself, such “atmospheric” evidence is not enough to withstand summary judgment. See, e.g., Gartman v. Gencorp, Inc., 120 F.3d 127, 131 (8th Cir.1997) (“Not all comments that reflect a discriminatory attitude will support an inference that an illegitimate criterion was a motivating factor in an employment decision.”) (citations omitted); Ezold, 983 F.2d at 547 (gender-based comments by single person not sufficient to show “such a pervasive hostility to women at [law firm] ... was more likely the result of discriminatory bias than [law firm’s] perception of [plaintiffs] legal ability”). This is not a hostile environment sexual or national origin harassment case. To prove that her colleagues and the Dean denied her tenure because of her gender and national origin, she must prove not only how she (and other women) perceived the climate for women and Jews in the Department — and at the College generally — but how that climate actually infected the tenure process in her case, and played a determinative role in denying her tenure. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277-78, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[Statements by ... decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself [cannot] suffice to satisfy the plaintiffs burden [of persuasion].”); see also Wilson, 1997 WL 52921 at *5 (“[Workplace remarks furnished as evidence of discrimination [must be] clear, pertinent, and directly related to decision-making personnel or processes in order to prove discriminatory intent.”); Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 973 (7th Cir.1997) (“Evidence of discriminatory motives must ... have some relationship with the employment decision in question; inappropriate but isolated comments that amount to no more than ‘stray remarks’ in the workplace will not do.”) (citation omitted); Cooley v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 25 F.3d 1325, 1333 (6th Cir.1994) (anecdotal evidence of discriminatory comments must “goL ] beyond ... vague, ambiguous, and isolated comments”). No such nexus is established by the anecdotal evidence presented here by Plaintiff. She has not compared the criticisms levied at her qualifications to those levied at male tenure candidates, in order to expose them as illegitimate. She has failed to provide a single comment or incident, contemporaneous or otherwise, which would link alleged gender or ethnic animus on the part of the Department and/or Dean Venable to the tenure decisionmaking process in her case. Rather, her evidence is too removed, either temporally or in substance, to indicate that Plaintiffs gender and/or national origin played a determinative role in her tenure denial. The Court notes that the evidence regarding Dean Venable’s alleged insensitivity to the concerns of women faculty and to the hiring of foreign instructors, and the alleged irregularities in the tenure review process, are together the only portions of Plaintiffs case which come close to suggesting improper motive. Dean Venable’s alleged behavior toward Doody, Kirschner, Frus, and Cramer, if true, could be perceived as evidence of the kind of “deep-rooted, ongoing pattern [of discriminatory attitude] that is anything but isolated.” Cooley, 25 F.3d at 1331. Moreover, Plaintiff is correct in arguing that an institution’s deviation from its established policies can “discredit the legitimacy of the [institution’s] articulated reason for ... the denial of tenure.” Kunda, 621 F.2d at 545; see also Brousard-Norcross, 935 F.2d at 977 (quoting Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 93). Plaintiffs evidence is insufficient, however, to create a genuine issue of pretext here. First, Dean Venable’s alleged insensitivity to the concerns of women faculty has not been shown to have any link to his tenure decisions, either in general or in relation to Plaintiff. During his appointment as Acting Dean, Venable acted on fifteen tenure recommendations. (Venable Aff. at 1-2, ¶ 2.) In the case of male candidates, Venable concurred in eight of nine departmental recommendations; in the case of female candidates, Venable concurred in four of six departmental recommendations. The two recommendations of women in which Venable did not concur were Plaintiff and Phyllis Frus, discussed supra. Such statistics are drawn from too small a sample to suggest a pattern of bias in Venable’s tenure decisions. See Langland, 589 F.Supp. at 1005 (where dean had concurred in 29 of 37 male tenure recommendations, and 1 of 3 female tenure recommendations, statistical sampling insufficient). Furthermore, Plaintiffs complaint that Dean Venable required an excellence in undergraduate teaching that he did not ask of male tenure candidates is flawed for two reasons: first, as discussed extensively supra, there appears to be genuine contention among all academicians involved in Plaintiffs case as to how much weight undergraduate teaching should have been accorded, and to what extent Plaintiffs undergraduate teaching should be balanced with other criteria. This contention undermines a conclusion that Venable’s focus on the undergraduate teaching was motivated by bias. Second, Plaintiff does not provide evidence regarding the tenure decisions involving male candidates; consequently, the Court is unable to assess for itself whether the undergraduate teaching criterion was imposed selectively or in an otherwise biased manner. The alleged procedural deviations by Dean Venable also are insufficient, standing alone, to support an inference of sex and/or national origin discrimination. As to Dean Venable’s meeting with or accepting ex parte letters from faculty members after his receipt of the Philosophy Department’s report, but before he issued his decision on Plaintiffs file, Vena-ble notes that the rules outlined in the Faculty Manual do not preclude such meetings. He also told the PEAF Committee that in his one meeting with an opponent of Plaintiffs tenure, he “suggest[ed] to this person that he would not consider any matters he might raise in conversation; he then invited the person to submit a letter, which he also did with other members of the department.” (Venable Aff., Ex. 5 at 16.) These letters were then submitted to Plaintiffs tenure file. The PEAF Committee, while noting that the propriety of accepting such communications is an ongoing matter of dispute within the university, did not find that their acceptance in Plaintiffs case tainted her tenure decision. (Id. at 16-17.) Particularly in light of the vagueness of Plaintiffs description of the content of such communications, this Court is in no position to disagree. The PEAF Committee also found that it was fair for Professor Race, the new Chair of the Philosophy Department who oversaw the vote on whether to override Dean Venable’s failure to concur, to prohibit two new senior members of the depártment from participating in the vote. One of these faculty members did not have tenure in the department, and the other had not taken part in the original tenure discussion and vote. Finally, the Court does not find that Plaintiffs allegations regarding the temporal delay in the transmission of Dean Venable’s decision to her (through the new Chair, Professor Race) and in the tenure appeal process raise the specter of unlawful discrimination. While neither the PEAF Committee nor the PTRC addressed these issues, the Court notes that the Faculty Manual only provides that “written notices of renewal or non-renewal normally will be made by June 1 of the year preceding their final year.” (Manual, Chapter 1, Section D.) (Emphasis added.) Given the fact that Professor Sherburne resigned as Chair of the Department the day before Dean Venable authored his letter regarding his failure to concur — prompting Dean Venable to begin a search for a new Chair — the Court is inclined to find that the 'delay in informing Plaintiff of the Dean’s decision until after Professor Race was named Chair is not probative of discrimination. The Court now turns to Plaintiffs allegations regarding national origin bias in the student evaluations, and finds that no material question of fact exists on this question. It is well-established that “student reaction is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory factor on which to evaluate tenure candidates.” Brousard-Norcross, 935 F.2d at 976. Such an assumption is apparently not questioned by the Plaintiff; indeed, Plaintiffs own expert, Dr. Rubin, endorses the use of student evaluations in the aggregate, although he recommends that each case be studied individually to prevent hidden bias from infecting the tenure process. Plaintiff has failed to show that any such bias was present in the evaluations. No question has been raised as to the framing of the evaluation form’s questions. No evidence of biased student comments on the forms has been presented. Plaintiffs only evidence of bias is the report of Dr. Rubin, which merely outlines the phenomenon by which accented instructors may be penalized by their students. However, Dr. Rubin specifically notes that he would have to conduct further study to conclude whether Plaintiff herself was penalized in this way. Plaintiff does not even provide the Court with the actual evaluations she received; rather, the Court must rely on the summaries of the evaluations offered in the Department’s and Dean Venable’s reports, and on the expert report of Dr. William E. Cashin submitted on behalf of Defendant. Dr. Cash-in’s report indicates a significant fact: first, Plaintiff “in general did not receive low ratings.” (Cashin Aff., Ex. 2 at 2.) In comparison with other members of the Philosophy