Full opinion text
ORDER SPIEGEL, Senior District Judge. This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (doc. 94), Respondent’s Supplemental Return of Writ (doc. 95), and Petitioner’s Amended Traverse (doc. 96.) I. INTRODUCTION This is a capital case. Petitioner, Derrick Jamison, has been sentenced to death by the State of Ohio. Petitioner was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death by the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas for the murder of Gary Mitchell at the Central Bar in Cincinnati, Ohio on August 1, 1984. Petitioner was represented by attorneys Calvin Prem and William Flax at trial. (Return of Writ, Ex. C.) Petitioner pursued direct appeal in the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court; both courts affirmed his conviction and sentence. (Id., Exs. E & H.) Petitioner was represented by attorneys Albert Ro-denberg and William Flax in the Court of Appeals. (Id., Ex. D.) He was represented by attorneys Peter Pandilidis and William Flax in the Ohio Supreme Court. (Id., Ex. F.) The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and death sentence on March 7, 1990. State v. Jamison, 49 Ohio St.3d 182, 552 N.E.2d 180 (1990); (Id., Ex. H.) The Ohio Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration on April 11, 1990. (Id., Ex. I.) The United States Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari on October 9,1990. (Id., Ex. K.) Petitioner pursued postconviction relief in the Ohio courts. He filed his postcon-viction petition on June 25, 1991. (Return of Writ, Ex. L.) Postconviction relief was denied at all stages. (Id., Exs. N, Q, T & U.) On August 28, 1992, Petitioner filed his Application for Delayed Reconsideration of his Direct Appeal with the Hamilton County Court of Appeals pursuant to App.R. 14(B), App.R. 26 and State v. Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204 (1992), alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel before the Hamilton County Court of Appeals. (Return of Writ, Ex. V.) The Hamilton County Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s Application for Delayed Reconsideration as untimely. (Id., Ex. X.) Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from the decision denying his Application for Delayed Reconsideration. (State Court Appendix, Vol. X, Tab A.) The Ohio Supreme Court entered a decision on this appeal on April 14, 1993, dismissing the appeal sua sponte for the reason that no substantial constitutional question existed therein. (Id. at Tab F.) Petitioner also filed a Motion for Delayed Reinstatement of Direct Appeal as of Right in the Ohio Supreme Court. (State Court Appendix, Vol. XI, Tab A.) On October 27, 1993, the Ohio Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s motion without an opinion. (State Court Appendix, Vol. IX, Tab G.) On November 8, 1993, Petitioner filed a Motion for Rehearing. (State Court Appendix, Vol. XI, Tab E.) On December 15, 1993, the Ohio Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s motion without an opinion. (State Court Appendix, Vol. IX, Tab F.) On March 10, 1994, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (doc. 3.) Respondent filed his Return of Writ on April 2, 1994. (doc. 9.) On January 30, 1996, the Court granted Petitioner leave to conduct discovery to be completed within ninety days. (doc. 66.) Thereafter, on January 31, 1997, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition, which is the Petition currently before the Court, (doc. 94.) Respondent filed a Supplemental Return of Writ on March 3, 1997, arguing that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) applies to Petitioner’s claims, that Petitioner’s claims are not entitled to a merits review because of various procedural defaults, that Petitioner’s claims lack merit, and that the Court is bound by the state courts’ findings of fact. (doc. 95.) Petitioner filed his Amended Traverse on May 2, 1997 in which he disputes all of Respondent’s arguments, (doc. 96.) The Court held oral argument on the procedural default questions and the merits of the Amended Petition on December 22 and 23, 1997. Transcripts of that hearing were filed on March 23, 1998. (docs. 121 & 122.) Thereafter, the Parties submitted pre-hearing and post-hearing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and numerous notices of additional authority. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The charges against Petitioner arose from the events that occurred on August 1, 1984. The following factual background comes directly from the Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion in this case, in which the court affirmed the conviction and sentence of Petitioner. On August 1, 1984, Gary Mitchell was alone, tending bar at the Central Bar. The Central Bar, located near downtown Cincinnati, had been owned by Mitchell’s family for forty years. When two patrons came into the bar, around 2:00 p.m., they found the bar empty and Mitchell unconscious, lying face down behind the bar. The cash register was open and empty. One patron called the police and an ambulance. Soon thereafter the police and an ambulance arrived. When the ambulance crew carried Mitchell out, he had a large bruise on the side of his head. Upon arrival at the hospital, Mitchell was found nearly brain dead by treating physicians. Eight days later, Mitchell died from multiple brain bruises and bleeding caused by a traumatic blunt injury. Cincinnati police found few clues to solve this crime. They did find a gym shoe print on the top of the bar. After photographing the print, they lifted an impression of it, discovering it was made by a Pony gym shoe. One bystander described two males that he saw running from the area of the bar at approximately the time of the crime as being in their mid-twenties, one, 6'2" to 6'4", weighing approximately two hundred pounds, and the other, shorter, 5'3" to 5'9". Police investigated other robberies similar in pattern to the Central Bar homicide. Two earlier robbery victims had suffered severe head injuries, requiring extensive hospitalization. After the Central Bar homicide, other similar robberies continued to occur. On October 12, 1984, the police, after being alerted by an automatic alarm, arrested appellant, Derrick Jamison, shortly after he had robbed a Gold Star Chili restaurant. A hidden automatic camera photographed appellant when he robbed Gold Star Chili. Appellant was arrested and taken into custody. Police found on his person marked money from Gold Star Chili, jewelry from another robbery, and a gun taken from a third robbery. In addition, appellant was wearing Pony gym shoes, the soles of which were similar to the shoe print found at the Central Bar two and one-half months earlier. Appellant, 6'3" tall, twenty-three years old, and weighing one hundred seventy pounds, fit the earlier general description of one of the suspects running from the Central Bar on August 1, 1984. Appellant, while being a suspect, was not charged with the Central Bar incident at that time since he could not be positively identified. Police continued their investigation. In January 1985, police apprehended Charles Howell, appellant’s accomplice in the Central Bar homicide. Police discovered Howell through a Crime Stopper tip. Howell told police he and appellant were playing basketball at about noon on August 1st and on the spur of the moment, they decided to rob the Central Bar. Howell acted as the lookout. It was appellant who attacked the bartender. Appellant took the cash from the register, later giving Howell $80. Howell agreed to testify against appellant and pled guilty to aggravated robbery. Howell testified before a grand jury, which indicted appellant for aggravated robbery and the felony murder of Gary Mitchell. Jamison, 49 Ohio St.3d at 182-183, 552 N.E.2d 180. The specific claims raised in the state court proceedings can be found in the Appendix to this Order. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW Petitioner has sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Section 2254, Title 28 of the United States Code, provides that “a district court shall entertain an application of a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994). APPLICABILITY OF THE AEDPA The Parties dispute what effect, if any, the recent amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 set forth in section 104 of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA” or the “Act”), Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified, inter alia, at 28 U.S.C. § 2244 et seq.), have on this case. President Clinton signed the AEDPA into law on April 24, 1996. Because the law does not contain an effective date, it became effective on the date of enactment. Zuern v. Tate, 938 F.Supp. 468, 470 (S.D.Ohio 1996). The Act amends certain provisions of the preexisting habeas corpus statute that are codified in Chapter 153 of the Judicial Code and the Act creates a new Chapter 154 of the Judicial Code containing a set of “Special Habeas Corpus Procedures in Capital Cases.” The Act also adds a new § 2254(d), but this section does not apply to cases under Chapter 153 of the AEDPA pending on the date the Act became effective. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2068, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161, 1164 (6th Cir.1997); Powell v. Collins, No. 94-656 (S.D.Ohio June 15, 1998) (unpublished opinion). Therefore, the amended sections of the AEDPA under Chapter 153 do not apply in this case because Jamison’s Petition was filed prior to the enactment of the Act. However, Chapter 154 specifically states that it shall apply to cases pending on or after the date of enactment of the Act. The special procedures in Chapter 154 provide a system of expedited review to states that qualify under the opt-in procedures, which are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2261 (1996) and pertain to requirements for appointment of counsel for petitioners seeking postconviction review of their capital sentences in the state court system. Respondent argues that Chapter 154 applies to this Petition because Ohio meets the requirements set forth in § 2261 during the relevant times. Accordingly, Chapter 154 will only apply to Petitioner’s case if Ohio has “opted-in” to the special provisions it sets forth. Because the issue of whether Ohio has opted-in has been addressed numerous times by other district courts, the Court does not find it necessary to undergo an extensive analysis on the issue. The Court adopts the reasoning of our sister courts finding that Ohio has not “opted-in,” and therefore holds Chapter 154 does not apply to this case. See Scott v. Anderson, 958 F.Supp. 330, 332 (S.D.Ohio 1997); Mills v. Anderson, 961 F.Supp. 198, 203 (S.D.Ohio 1997); Zuern, 938 F.Supp. at 471-72; Hamblin v. Anderson, 947 F.Supp. 1179, 1182 (N.D.Ohio 1996); Landrum v. Anderson, No. 96-641 (S.D.Ohio Dec. 9, 1996) (unpublished opinion). Accordingly, we conclude that pre-AEDPA law applies to Petitioner’s petition. IV. ANALYSIS The objective of this Order is to address the claims Respondent asserts are waived and thus cannot be reviewed on the merits. The Court notes that, in regards to certain claims, it cannot determine conclusively whether those claims are waived because they depend upon the outcome of a merits review of the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, and they depend on further argument regarding “cause” and prejudice. Thus, where the Court explains for each of the claims below that Petitioner is entitled to raise an argument as to “cause” and prejudice, the Court will hold an evidentiary hearing on those issues at 10:00 a.m. on March 2, 1999. See Ratliff v. United States, 999 F.2d 1023, 1026 (6th Cir.1993) (noting that a hearing on the issue of cause and prejudice would have been appropriate to determine whether a sufficient showing of ineffective assistance of counsel has been made); Alcorn v. Smith, 781 F.2d 58, 59-60 (6th Cir.1986) (stating if “there are factual issues in dispute and an insufficient record upon which to resolve ... [a] legitimate claim[ ] [of ineffective assistance of counsel] advanced by the petitioner,” an evidentiary hearing on the issue of cause and prejudice is required). Once it is determined conclusively which other claims can be addressed on the merits, the Court will review those claims to determine whether the claims are entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the merits. The Court will schedule this hearing at a later date. The Court notes that the Parties agreed that the Petition is not subject to dismissal on exhaustion grounds because all claims raised by Petitioner have either been raised properly in the Ohio courts or are excused from the exhaustion requirement on the ground of futility in light of the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Steffen, 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 639 N.E.2d 67 (1994). (doc. 33.) Accordingly, the Court will proceed directly to the procedural default analysis. A. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT IN GENERAL Under the doctrine of procedural default, if a state court previously dismisses a state prisoner’s federal claim on the grounds that the prisoner failed to comply with a state procedural rule, then a federal district court ordinarily cannot consider the merits of that federal claim. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-730, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). This procedural default doctrine bars federal habeas review of a state court ruling only if the following requirements have been satisfied: (1) the petitioner actually violated an applicable state procedural rule; (2) the procedural violation provides an “adequate and independent state ground” for denying the petitioner’s federal constitutional claim; and (3) the state court actually enforced the procedural violation; that is, the highest state court to rule on the claim clearly and unambiguously relied upon the procedural violation as the reason for rejecting the claim. See generally, Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546. However, the petitioner can excuse the procedural default by demonstrating either: (a) that there was “cause” for the procedural default and actual prejudice by the alleged constitutional error; or (b) that the case falls within the category of cases considered “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See id. (emphasis added); Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir.1986); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-62, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991). For the cause and prejudice standard, the petitioner must provide a “substantial” reason that is “external” to the petitioner as the “cause” for the procedural default. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 161 (6th Cir.1994). In addition, the petitioner must show that the alleged trial errors “not merely ... created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982). To demonstrate a “fundamental miscarriage of justice,” a petitioner must show that the alleged constitutional violation probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Murray, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639. This exception applies only in “extraordinary cases.” Id. This standard requires a petitioner to show that he is “actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). To establish a probability of innocence, “a petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. We will discuss these requirements in greater detail as they apply to the various claims. B. REVIEW OF THE CLAIMS THAT RESPONDENT ARGUES ARE WAIVED BY PROCEDURAL DEFAULT As a preliminary matter, we note that Respondent concedes that the shoe-print issue found in the following claims has not been waived in its entirety: Claim Nine, Claim Ten, Claim Thirteen, Claim Fifteen, and Claim Twenty-One. Therefore, we need not address those claims in this section. CLAIM ONE The State of Ohio failed to provide Jamison with all relevant, material and exculpatory evidence during pretrial discovery proceedings. This failure violated Jamison’s rights as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Respondent argues that this claim is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to raise this claim in the state court at any stage. Thus, Respondent contends, the state courts have been totally deprived of any opportunity to hear this claim. Reviewing the record, we find that this claim was not raised on direct appeal or in post-conviction in the Ohio courts; rather, Petitioner raised the claim for the first time in his Amended Habeas Petition. According to the Sixth Circuit, a petitioner’s failure to raise a claim on direct appeal in the Ohio Court of Appeals or in the Ohio Supreme Court constitutes procedural default. Leroy v. Marshall, 757 F.2d 94, 97 (6th Cir.1985). Where, as here, Petitioner can no longer present the federal claim in state court, he has waived the claim for purposes of federal habeas review unless he can demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional error. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546; Murray, 477 U.S. at 485, 106 S.Ct. 2639; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977); Leroy, 757 F.2d at 97. Although the Supreme Court has not established conclusively the contours of the “cause” standard in the context of procedural default, Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 221, 108 S.Ct. 1771, 100 L.Ed.2d 249 (1988), generally speaking, a petitioner demonstrates “cause” where he presents a substantial reason to excuse the procedural default. Rust, 17 F.3d at 161. The Supreme Court has explained that ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute cause. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639. However, the mere fact that counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise the claim despite recognizing it, does not constitute cause for procedural default.... So long as a defendant is represented by counsel whose performance under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984) ], we discern no inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of attorney error that results in a procedural default. Instead, we think that the existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule. Id., at 486-89, 106 S.Ct. 2639. In addition to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court has found the following constitute “cause:” (1) interference by officials that makes compliance with the procedural rule impracticable, and (2) a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel. Id. at 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639. The court’s analysis does not end at a determination of cause, however. Once a petitioner demonstrates “cause” for the procedural default, he still must show that he was actually prejudiced by the claimed constitutional error. Frady, 456 U.S. at 168, 102 S.Ct. 1584 (concluding that a petitioner has “the burden of showing, not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”); see also, Rust, 17 F.3d at 161 (same). The prejudice prong is not satisfied “if there is strong evidence of a petitioner’s guilt and a lack of evidence to support his claim.” Rust, 17 F.3d at 161-62. As stated above, Petitioner alleges for the first time in his Amended Petition that the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office did not disclose all the exculpatory and favorable information in its and the Cincinnati Police Department’s (“C.P.D.”) possession to Petitioner’s trial counsel before the Central Bar trial began. Specifically, in his affidavit, William Flax, one of Petitioner’s trial attorneys, attests that there are 35 documents that he did not receive from the prosecution. This fact is undisputed by Respondent. In general, the alleged undisclosed evidence falls within the following groups: (1) Evidence relating to eyewitness James Suggs who provided identification information about the perpetrators of the Central Bar robbery/homicide to the C.P.D. (2) Evidence relating to Charles Howell, Petitioner’s codefendant who plead guilty to aggravated robbery in connection with the Central Bar robbery/homicide and who testified in the Central Bar robbery/homicide against Petitioner. (3) Evidence relating to the other eyewitnesses to the Central Bar robbery/homicide who provided descriptions of the two assailants. (4) Evidence relating to other suspects for the Central Bar robbery/homicide identified by the C.P.D. (5) Evidence relating to the cause of death of Gary Mitchell. (6) Evidence relating to Petitioner’s waiver of his Miranda rights during police questioning. (7) Evidence relating to pre-trial statements of eyewitnesses of the so-called similar robberies who testified at the Central Bar robbery/homicide trial. (8) Evidence relating to other robberies investigated by the C.P.D. that occurred in the same geographical area of Cincinnati during the time Petitioner allegedly committed the so-called similar robberies that were introduced at trial. The substance of the First Claim is based on the rule announced in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). These cases held that the suppression by the prosecution of favorable evidence to the accused in a criminal prosecution violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where the evidence is material either to the guilt or to the sentencing and regardless of the good or bad faith of the prosecutor. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 432, 115 S.Ct. 1555. The trial prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence extends to information in the possession of the prosecutor’s office or in the possession of the law enforcement agency responsible for investigating the offense. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (indicating that the individual prosecutor “has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf ... including the police”). In making a decision whether the exculpatory evidence is material, the reviewing court must assess the cumulative effect of all such suppressed evidence. Id. at 436-37, 115 S.Ct. 1555. The favorable evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 434-35, 115 S.Ct. 1555. The question is not whether the defense would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence. Id. Rather, reasonable probability of a different result means that the net effect of the suppressed evidence would undermine the confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555. Petitioner argues that he was prevented from discovering the factual basis of this Claim because of the State’s withholding of evidence and the state court’s refusal to allow him an opportunity to conduct discovery. These facts, he argues, demonstrate “cause” for the procedural default. Certainly, the withholding of evidence by the state that precludes an individual from discovering the factual basis of a claim constitutes “cause” for the procedural default. Amadeo, 486 U.S. at 222, 108 S.Ct. 1771. In Amadeo, the petitioner raised on direct appeal in state court a challenge to the composition of the juries that had indicted, convicted and sentenced him. Amadeo, 486 U.S. at 218, 108 S.Ct. 1771. The state supreme court affirmed the convictions and sentences, rejecting his challenge on the ground that it should have been objected to before the indictment or voir dire. Id. at 219, 108 S.Ct. 1771. The basis of the challenge was a District Attorney’s memorandum discovered nine months after the petitioner’s state court trial that composed the figures for the number of African-Americans and women to be placed on the master jury list in order to ensure their under-representation on juries. Id. at 217-18, 108 S.Ct. 1771. The petitioner in Amadeo argued that his claim was not waived because he did not have an opportunity to discover the purposeful discrimination before the time he discovered the memo. Id. at 218, 108 S.Ct. 1771. The federal district court, after holding an evidentiary hearing, found “cause” for the procedural default and granted the writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 220, 108 S.Ct. 1771. The district court found that the petitioner’s claim was reasonably unknown to the petitioner’s attorneys because it was concealed by the county officials and that the concealment, rather than a tactical consideration, was the reason for the failure to raise the challenge in state court. Id. at 220-21, 108 S.Ct. 1771. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court, reasoning that neither of the two factual predicates from the district court’s legal conclusion was adequately supported by the record. However, the United States Supreme Court stated that the facts found by the district court did constitute “cause” for the procedural default. Id. at 222, 108 S.Ct. 1771. The Court reversed the appellate court, holding that the factual findings of the district court were not clearly erroneous. Id. at 224, 228, 108 S.Ct. 1771. Respondent asserts that the alleged undisclosed Brady information was actually known and used by Petitioner’s trial counsel during the trial. For the most part, Respondent relies solely on citations to the trial transcript to attempt to prove that trial counsel did in fact have the information. Respondent did not respond directly to Petitioner’s argument regarding “cause” for the procedural default; rather, Respondent argues that Petitioner cannot use ineffective assistance of counsel (“LAC”) as the basis for cause even though Petitioner does not argue this. The peculiar aspect about the Brady claim is that the procedural “cause” for failing to raise it before in state court (i.e. the procedural default) is intertwined with, if not the same as, the substantive basis for the claim. The framing of the issue of “cause” relates to the Respondent’s analysis in this way: Respondent looks to see what defense counsel knew via the citations in the transcript, and if he did know of the same information contained in the documents that undisputedly were not disclosed to defense counsel, then Petitioner cannot say the State prevented him from knowing the facts upon which to base the Brady claim. To put it simply, Respondent’s argument is circular — there is no “cause” for failing to bring the Brady claim before because there is no Brady claim. Rather than collapse the issue of “cause” for failure to raise the Brady claim into the merits of the Brady claim, we approach the “cause” inquiry by focusing first on whether Petitioner’s trial counsel knew or reasonably could have known of the alleged undisclosed evidence. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 498, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (stating the issue of “cause” as “whether petitioner possessed, or by reasonable means could have obtained, a sufficient basis to allege a claim” at the first opportunity) (discussed more fully infra in Claim Two); Fairchild v. Lockhart, 979 F.2d 636, 640 (8th Cir.1992) (finding “cause” for failure to bring Brady claim by analyzing what prosecution disclosed, what defense counsel knew, and whether anything disclosed to defense counsel would have alerted him to the new evidence). As far as determining what defense counsel knew, the Court is unaware of the contents of the prosecutor’s file. We do know, however, that before the trial began, the Prosecution gave the defense counsel a pleading entitled “Discovery by State of Ohio.” (doc. 103, vol.1, Attach.2) As is discussed below, for the evidence that defense counsel was either aware of, or could reasonably have been aware of, there is no “cause” for failing to raise the Brady claim with respect to that issue. See, infra, Section (1). For the evidence that Mr. Flax attests that he did not receive or know about, Mr. Flax’s affidavit is sufficient to establish “cause” for failing to raise the Brady claim on those issues, and an evidentiary hearing will be held on those issues for both “prejudice” and the merits. See, infra, Section (2). Finally, there is a conflict between the documents Mr. Flax attests in his affidavit that he did not receive from the prosecution and the evidence asserted by Petitioner that Mr. Flax did not receive. We find, therefore, a question of fact as to whether Mr. Flax either knew of the evidence or documents or could have reasonably been aware of them, and the Court will hold a hearing on the issue of “cause” for that category. See, infra, Section (3). (1) For the following pieces of evidence that Petitioner alleges he did not receive prior to trial, we find that Petitioner’s trial counsel either did know or could have reasonably known of the evidence, and therefore there is no “cause” for failing to raise the Brady claim with respect to these issues. (a) Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was not informed that “Howell had previously been convicted of a theft offense involving a robbery in which the victim was struck in the head.” (doc. 100 at 4.) The affidavit of Mr. Flax states that “[i]n 1981, Charles Howell was convicted of receiving stolen property and co-defendant Johnny O. Howell was convicted of robbery. Johnny O. Howell struck one of the victims in the head during the commission of the robbery.” (doc. 103 at 6.) Petitioner is incorrect. The documentation provided by Petitioner for this point indicates that on June 24, 1980 Charles Howell was arrested for receiving stolen property. Charles Howell plead guilty to this offense on September 9, 1980. Mr. Flax has his date wrong in his affidavit; the crime that he describes in his affidavit is the same as that one to which Charles Howell plead guilty in 1980. Further, the prosecution informed the defense counsel that Charles Howell was convicted of receiving stolen property (“R.S.P.”) in 1980, as indicated in the document entitled “Discovery by the State of Ohio,” which Mr. Flax admits to having received. Accordingly, this evidence was not withheld by the State to satisfy “cause” because it could have been discovered through the State’s discovery. (b) Petitioner alleges that the prosecution failed to disclose reports indicating that the cause of Gary Mitchell’s death was by some other manner than stomping of a foot to his head as described by Charles Howell in his trial testimony, (doc. 100 at 7.) These reports are: A. The Homicide Report dated August 10, 1984 which indicated that “the decedent was struck in the head several times with unknown object.” B. The Investigative Summary of Officer Davis dated August 2, 1984, which stated “victim struck several times with blunt instrument perhaps a pistol or whatever.” C. The Offense Report dated August 1, 1984 which states that “unknown suspects entered bar, apparently confronted bartender, struck him in the head and removed cash drawer from register.” Mr. Flax attests that the defense counsel did not receive any of the above three reports. Respondent argues that the defense counsel were aware of the information that indicated possible alternative causes of Gary Mitchell’s death. The transcript indicates that defense counsel asked Charles Howell how was it that Petitioner could have stomped on the decedent’s head if there were no shoe marks on the head. (Tr. at 1347-49.) Also, one of the questions asked of Charles Howell by defense counsel alluded to a scientist’s statement that the victim died from some kind of blow from a blunt instrument. (Id.) Finally, Mr. Flax states, in a conversation with the court, that the coroner testified that the murder weapon was a blunt object. (Tr. at 2194.) Iri addition, the coroner testified that Gary Mitchell died as a result of a blow to the head. (Tr. at 956-66.) The immediate cause of death was the injury to the head, the contusions, and the skull and brain complications that ensued. (Id.) When defense counsel asked whether the coroner had any way of knowing what or how the head injury occurred, the coroner answered negatively, testifying only that “[i]t was a blunt injury, and precisely what caused it, I cannot say.” (Id.) Defense counsel knew of the coroner’s testimony before trial as the coroner was listed as a witness on the document provided to defense counsel by the prosecution. Therefore, defense counsel did know that the alleged cause of death was a blunt object, and it would appear that the above reports, which bolster the opinion testimony of the coroner, would not have added anything new or possibly favorable to the defense. Accordingly, we conclude that this evidence was not withheld by the State to satisfy “cause” because it could have been discovered through the State’s discovery. (c) Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel did not receive information that “Howell had been arrested for a prior robbery offense at Pat’s Carryout in the same geographical location as the robbery/homicide at the Central Bar where the victim sustained head injuries.” (doc. 100 at 4.) The document purportedly supporting this fact is a C.P.D. arrest record for Charles Howell that states, on November 12, 1981, Charles Howell was arrested for aggravated robbery of Pat’s Carryout, which is located on 1611 Central Ave. (doc. 100, Tab 1 at 23.) The arrest record is a part of a document Mr. Flax alleges he did not receive, (doc. 103, vol. 1 at 44.) Respondent argues that Petitioner knew about the same information contained in the arrest record at trial. A review of the record shows that Respondent’s argument appears to be correct. At the trial, defense counsel questioned Charles Howell regarding whether he had ever been arrested for a robbery at Pat’s Carryout. (Tr. at 1297.) Before Charles Howell answered, the prosecution objected, causing the court to call a sidebar. At sidebar, Mr. Prem, one of Petitioner’s counsel, told the Court that he had recently found a copy of a complaint against Charles Howell signed by Officer Donald Campbell charging him with aggravated robbery on November 10, 1981 at Pat’s Carryout. (Tr. at 1300-1301.) Mr. Prem explained to the court his theory of relevance of the arrest: [t]he relevance is this, a place less than a block away. It’s just past the corner on the next block. There was a robbery in which this witness was charged with aggravated robbery where the owner of this pony keg, delicatessen, whatever suffered a head injury during the course of the robbery. (Tr. at 1299.) When the sidebar concluded, Mr. Preña did not ask Charles Howell to answer the question about his arrest, previously put to him. Rather, defense counsel asked whether Charles Howell was the same “Charles Howell” as in the document (presumably the copy of the complaint), and Charles Howell answered, “No.” (Tr. at 1373-74.) With the exception of the date of the arrest, Petitioner’s trial counsel had the same information as that contained in the C.P.D. arrest record, which he claims was not disclosed to him. There is no substantial difference between the complaint and the arrest record. Accordingly, this evidence would only be cumulative to that information defense counsel had access to at trial, and therefore cannot establish “cause.” (d) Petitioner also argues that the prosecution failed to disclose that, “[a]t the time he was sought for questioning as a suspect in the Mitchell homicide, Howell was arrested on January 22, 1985 for an outstanding rape charge and for questioning on the Central Bar homicide. Howell gave a fictitious name when arrested. (At Jamison’s trial, C.P.D. testified Howell was arrested on a traffic capias, and denied he was arrested on rape.... C.P.D. now acknowledged that Mr. Howell had in fact been arrested for rape when he provided his statements linking Jamison to the Mitchell homicide.)” (doc. 100 at 4.) A Uniform Felony Arrest Report for Charles Howell, dated January 22, 1985, states that Charles Howell was arrested that day, that the “means of arrest” was “capias,” that the charges were “I.D. (rape,)” that the facts of the arrest were “traffic capias ... Hold for P.O. Wm. Davis Homicide Squad, for Investigation.” (Hoffman Dep.Ex. 28, doc. 85, vol. 3.) At trial, the defense counsel had this report and used it in his questioning of Officer Davis. (Tr. at 1074). Officer Davis testified that the rape charge was “incorrectly” put there, and that he knew “for a fact that at the time he was not wanted for that particular offense.” (Tr. at 1086.) Howell testified that he did not remember being told about the traffic capi-as or rape when he was arrested. (Tr. at 1352-53,1355.) During habeas discovery, Officer Hoffman at his deposition explained the January 22, 1985 Felony Arrest Report by stating, “actually, he was held for apparently an investigative detention arrest for rape but there was also an open traffic capias on him.” (Hoffman Dep. at 85.) Officer Kohus stated during his deposition that in regards to that arrest report, he remembered Officer Krabbe was looking for Charles Howell for a rape offense. (Kohus Dep. at 46, doc. 103 at 181.) Petitioner does not allege that the prosecution failed to disclose a specific document, and therefore cannot argue that the “cause” for the procedural default was the State’s withholding of the factual basis of the claim. In fact, it appears that defense counsel had the document that indicates the rape charge. The only dispute is whether Officer Davis lied during the trial and whether the prosecution knew of the lie at the time of trial. Respondent does not refute the Officer’s current testimony or attempt to show that Officer Davis was mistaken at time he testified at trial. Nonetheless, Petitioner has not demonstrated conclusively that Officer Davis committed perjury and that the Prosecution suborned the perjury. Therefore, Petitioner has not demonstrated “cause” for failing to raise this as a basis of the Brady claim. Furthermore, Petitioner has not shown that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result of the Court refuses to hear this claim. (2) We find that with respect to the evidence below, alleged to have been undisclosed to Petitioner’s trial counsel, the fact that Mr. Flax attests that he did not receive the documents from the Prosecution constitutes “cause” for failing to raise the Brady claim on those issues. Again, Respondent does not argue that Petitioner did in fact receive these documents. Respondent’s arguments relate to the merits of the claim, and we briefly describe below why there are factual issues disputed as to the merits of the claims and why it appears that the evidence would have been favorable to Petitioner. Respondent does not offer any other argument as to why there is no “cause” other than the fact that the claim is not meritorious. Therefore, for the following pieces of evidence, the Court will also need to determine after argument and a hearing whether there is actual prejudice to excuse the procedural default. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584; Rust, 17 F.3d at 161. (a) Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel did not receive this information: “Mr. Suggs selected from a police photo array photos of individuals whom he identified as the taller and shorter of the perpetrators whom he had seen flee the Central Bar homicide. Neither of the photos he selected depicted Mr. Jamison.” (doc. 100 at 3-4.) Respondent argues that Mr. Suggs never identified another suspect and was fully cross-examined with the same information that Petitioner is now suggesting is exculpatory. (doc. 124 at 12, ¶ 5.) Mr. Suggs testified on direct examination that “I seen a lot of pictures, but I was unable to identify.” (Tr. at 2054.) He restated on cross examination that he could not identify the individuals he saw the day of the robbery/homicide. (Tr. at 2058.) Also, Officer Davis testified that Mr. Suggs was shown photos, but he could not identify any of them. (Tr. at 1026,1144.) The undisclosed documents to which Petitioner refers are photos, which are distorted because they are copies, and the individuals that the photos depict are unrecognizable. However, on the bottom of one of the photos is written, “picked by Mr. Suggs as a look-a-like for the taller suspect.” (doc. 100, Tab 1 at 16.) The other document, which is preceded in the record by a number of copies of photos that are completely distorted, appears to be the criminal record of Eugene Vassar. (Id. at 19-20) Handwritten on the record next to the name Eugene Vassar is “alias Charles Howell.” (Id.) On the following page, which appears to be a continuation of the criminal record for Eugene Vassar, is the statement, “James Suggs picked this photo out of 7 photos and said he thinks it was the shorter of the 2 suspects in the Central Cafe Robbery — Just passed over picture of Greg Ivory.” (Id.) Mr. Flax attached these documents to this affidavit and stated that they were among those not disclosed to him by the prosecution, (doc. 103, vol. 1, Aff. Flax 1HI8(A), 10(A).) At the hearing, Respondent argued that a look alike is not an identification because it is not a positive identification. (b) Petitioner also alleges that the prosecution failed to disclose to Petitioner’s trial counsel other eyewitness statements about the Central Bar homicide that conflicted with the State’s theory that Charles Howell (6'1") and Petitioner (6'3"), both above average in height, were the assailants. “These eyewitness statements also contradicted Howell’s testimony at trial. These eyewitnesses saw and described two suspects who were seen ‘casing’ the Central Bar shortly before the homicide and fleeing from the Central Bar at the time of the murder. The suppressed statements make clear that one of the perpetrators was quite tall, and the other was significantly shorter.” (doc. 100 at 5.) Respondent failed to respond to the following points in his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (i) Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel did not receive this information: “Ellen Hall, the cook at the Central Bar, told the C.P.D. that two African-Americans twice entered the bar just prior to robbery. One of the individuals was stocky and approximately 6'2" wearing a summer hat and the other individual was 5'5" and weighed between one hundred forty to one hundred fifty pounds.” (doc. 100 at 5.) This information comes from the CJP.D.’s Investigative Summary, dated August 12, 1984. (doc. 103, vol.l, Attach.15.) Petitioner’s above statement is a correct summary of the information contained in that report, with the exception that the second individual was identified as 5'6". Mr. Flax attests that he did not receive this report. Howell testified that he and the other accomplice had not entered the bar prior the robbery. (Tr. at 1251-57.) (ii) Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel did not receive this information: “Gene Martin, who was in the Central Bar just prior the robbery, described two African Americans who entered the bar — the taller individual as a ‘good size, 6' or over’ and the shorter individual as 5'7". He also stated that two African Americans ‘checked out’ the Central Bar twice prior to the robbery also contradicting Howell’s trial testimony.” (doc. 100 at 6.) This information comes from the C.P.D.’s Investigative Summary dated August 12, 1984. (doc. 103, vol.l, Attach.15.) Mr. Flax attests that he did not receive this report. Petitioner’s above statement is a correct summary of the information contained in that report, with one exception: the report does not state that Mr. Martin said the two individuals “checked out the Central Bar twice.” Mr. Martin said that the taller one came in the Bar to use the phone. One can infer from the report that Ellen Hall saw them twice in the Bar. (iii) Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel did not receive this information: “George Richardson, who lived across the street from the Central Bar, provided a ‘description of the suspects’ that ‘matches the description given by the other witnesses’ one suspect 6'2" and the other suspect much shorter in medium 5' range.” (doc. 100 at 6.) This information comes from an Investigative Summary Report of Officer Davis dated August 2, 1984 and Officer Davis’ deposition testimony, (doc. 103, vol. 1, Attach. 9; doc. 100, Tab 1 at 58-59.) Mr. Flax attests that he did not receive this report. (iv)Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel did not receive this information: “Greg Mapp informed Officer Davis that he saw an individual flee the bar at the time of the homicide who was 5'7" to 5'9" and was carrying a brass pipe approximately one foot in length.” (doc. 100 at 6.) This information comes from the Investigative Summary, dated August 5, 1984 of Officer Davis. Petitioner’s summary of the report is correct. Mr. Flax attests that he did not receive this report. Howell testified that there was no weapon. (Tr. at 1251-57.) (c) Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel did not receive this information: “David Anthony, who was found in possession of one of the wallets from one of the victims of the Sav-All Drug Store, one of the so-called similar offenses, immediately after the robbery in the area behind the store. He was wearing a straw hat. Two eyewitnesses (Suggs and Richardson) stated that one of the Central Bar assailants was wearing a straw hat.” (doc. 100 at 7.) This information comes from an arrest report on August 7, 1984 charging David Anthony with (“I.D. (trafficking in marijuana) (RSP over)).” (doc. 103, vol.l, Attach.24.) The arresting officer observed Anthony “rooting thru wallet taken in Agg. Robbery Offense at 120 W. Elder Street.” (Id.) Also, the arresting officer observed Anthony wearing a straw hat. Additionally, there are photographs that state underneath them, “David Anthony; Suspect: Central Bar; 8-8-84.” (doc. 103, vol. 1 Attach. 21 at 49.) There is also a photo/sketch of a person wearing a straw hat with “Suspect # 1” written on top of it. The person depicted in the photo is unidentifiable. (doc. 103, vol.l, Attach.25.) There are handwritten notes, dated August 2, 1984, that have George Richardson’s name and address on the top of the sheet, and the description of the two individuals he saw run from the Central Bar, including that the second person was 5'11" and was wearing a tan straw hat. (doc. 103, vol. 1 Attach. 26.) Mr. Flax attests that he did not receive the arrest report, photos or notes. (d) Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel did not receive this information: “Robert Jordan and Percy Tait who had previously lived in the neighborhood of the Central Bar and matched the eye witness descriptions.” (doc. 100 at 7.) There are photographs in the record, which Mr. Flax attests he did not receive, that show a black male wearing a straw hat, an unidentifiable photo with “Robt. Jordan, 2-12-64; Q'2%" 165; 8-17-84; Davis” written under it, and another unidentifiable photo which reads “Percy Tait, 5'5 148 lbs, 8-12-84; lived across from_ with Robt. Jordan.” (doc. 103, vol. 1, At-tachs., 27 & 28.) (e) Petitioner alleges that the prosecution failed to disclose to trial counsel that Petitioner after his arrest refused to waive his Miranda rights. Specifically, Petitioner alleges the prosecution failed to disclose the Notification of Rights/Waiver Form that indicated Petitioner’s refusal to waive his rights in writing. Mr. Flax attests that he did not receive this document. Although there is a dispute as to the effect of the document, that argument relates to the merits of the Brady claim. Respondent has not made any other argument as to why the non-disclosure does not constitute “cause.” (3) Finally, for the following evidence, alleged to have been undisclosed by the Prosecution, we find there is a question of fact as to whether Mr. Flax either knew of the evidence or documents or could have reasonably been aware of them, and the Court will hold a hearing on the issue of “cause” and prejudice, and if need be, on the merits, for that category. (a) Petitioner alleges that the prosecution did not disclose the following information: James Suggs saw two individuals flee the Central Bar. The taller individual was ’23-25, 6'2" - 6'4" 200 lbs., brown pants, brown skin, and wearing a large brown hat (straw) and the shorter subject was “23-25, 5'9" 160 lbs., dark complexion, mustache, short Afro.” (doc. 100 at 3.) Most of the above description allegedly undisclosed to the defense was included in the August 1, 1984 Investigative Summary prepared by Officer Hoffman. (doc. 100, Tab 1 at 10.) Mr. Flax does not attest that the prosecution failed to disclose this document. For instance, the description of the two individuals that Mr. Suggs gave prior to the trial appears to be information about which the defense knew. At trial, Officer Davis testified that James Suggs told the officers that he observed two black males in their twenties run from the area of the bar, that one was 6'2" to 6'4" and 200 pounds and the other was shorter, 5'3" to 5'9". (Tr. at 1123.) Mr. Flax also elicited a similar description of the relative heights of the two individuals from Mr. Suggs at trial. (Tr. at 2052.) Although the reference to the straw hat worn by the taller individual, which was not mentioned at trial, may have been important to defense counsel because it is mentioned by another witness in reference to one of the so-called similar robberies, Mr. Flax did not state in his affidavit that he did not receive this document. Consequently, we do not know whether he should have known of this information. (b) Petitioner also alleges that his trial counsel did not receive this information: “On August 9, 1984, Officers Hoffman and Davis took James Suggs to several hat shops where he picked out the straw hat similar to that which Suggs saw the taller perpetrator wearing as he fled the Central Bar homicide.” (doc. 100 at 4.) This information was included in the Investigative Summary of Officers Davis and Hoffman dated August 4, 1984. (doc. 100, Tab 1 at 14.) Again, according to his affidavit, Mr. Flax does not allege that the prosecution failed to disclose this document. And again, Respondent does not affirmatively state that it provided Petitioner’s trial counsel with this document. (c) Petitioner alleges that the defense counsel were not informed that “Howell made two statements to the C.P.D. after his initial statement, both of which contradicted his initial statement. Initially, Howell stated that the robbery was unplanned, that he never jumped over the bar and that he never saw the victim lying on the floor. In his later statements, Howell stated that ‘this was a planned robbery’ and that ‘they went there with the intention of doing the robbery.’ He also stated that he jumped over the bar and saw a leg or shoe belonging to the victim.” (doc. 100 at 5.) When any of the above statements were made is unclear. Also, the Parties have not specifically identified by date or content the statements to which they refer in their briefs. Consequently, the Court finds that there is a question of fact as to this part of the Brady claim and that there should be an evidentiary hearing as to “cause” and prejudice, and possibly on the merits, with respect to this issue. The Court has been able to discern that, according to Mr. Flax’s affidavit and the documents that were attached to Petitioner’s brief, there were apparently three statements made prior to the testimony Howell gave at the grand jury hearing. (1)Officer Davis wrote the following on his Investigative Summary dated January 28, 1985: Howell “states that himself and this DERRICK JAMISON went into the Central Bar. He said it was not a planned thing. He states he went to the back of the bar into th'e bathroom and that DERRICK went up to the bar where the victim was standing and when he came out of the restroom, out of the men’s room, the victim was lying on the floor and JAMISON was going through the cash register.... At this point it seems like we’re going to charge this CHARLES HOWELL with Aggravated Robbery, with the agreement that he testify before the Grand Jury and at Common Pleas against DERRICK JAMISON.” (doc. 103 at 19-20.) (2) A handwritten document dated January 24, 1985, reads, “States he has a tape statement from his client. States his client went into the Bar to use the bathroom along with Jamison. States he came out of the bathroom, Jamison was going through cash register. His client jumped over the bar, saw a shoe or leg belonging to the victim. Left the bar and received some of the money from Jamison while running on the street.” (doc. 103 at 22.) (3) Officer Davis wrote the following on his Investigative Summary dated January 29, 1985: “[pjrior to him [Howell] going into the Grand Jury, he gave us another statement as to what occurred, this was in the presence of his attorney, TOM MILLER. He stated that this was a planned robbery. That they went in there with the intentions of doing the robbing and he still insists that he went to the bathroom and when he came out DERRICK JAMISON was at the register getting the money. He says already jumped over the bar and he jumped back over and DERRICK JAMISON went over and started stomping on the deceased’s head.... TOM MILLER in his plan is agreed to plead guilty to Aggravated Robbery charges so as it appears now, we’re in real good shape.” (doc. 103 at 23.) It is unclear whether all three of these statements are the ones that defense counsel did not receive or if the first one on January 23, 1985 is the “initial statement” to which Petitioner refers. Respondent says that the defense cross-examined Howell on inconsistencies in his grand jury testimony at trial and that defense counsel was provided with a copy of Howell’s taped statement to the police at trial. Respondent also argues that defense counsel was aware that Howell had spoken to the police after Howell had spoken to Prosecutor R. Daniel Reif at the grand jury, and defense counsel knew that Howell made a second statement to the police after testifying. Finally, Respondent argues that Howell was cross-examined by defense counsel on inconsistencies in his version of the events that took place at the Central Bar. (doc. 124 at 12.) Although the prosecution stated that it gave defense counsel a transcript of the taped statement made by Howell at trial (Tr. at 1399.), the defense counsel implied there may have been more than one taped statement because Howell testified on redirect that every time he gave a statement to the police it was taped. (Id.) In answering the defense’s questions, Howell testified that he spoke to the investigating officers after the time he spoke to the prosecution following his grand jury testimony. (Tr. at 1420-21.) However, Howell’s testimony as to this point is unclear because he later states that did not speak to the prosecution after testifying to the grand jury. (Id.) Mr. Flax did mention at trial the inconsistencies of Howell’s statements, comparing the statements originally made to the officers, the statements made at the grand jury, and the statements at trial. (See Tr. at 1320, 1340-50 & 1380-84.) In two questions, Mr. Flax identified those inconsistencies as relating to the time of day of the robbery/homicide, whether Howell went behind the bar in the Central Bar, whether Howell saw the attack on Gary Mitchell, and the number of times Petitioner allegedly “stomped” on the victim’s head. (Id.) Howell admitted to changing his story as between the time the officers first interviewed him and the testimony he gave at the grand jury. (Id.) Respondent’s citations to the transcript do not clearly support his position that Petitioner’s trial counsel knew of all the statements Howell made before trial. The transcript is unclear as to which statements the counsel are referring and the specific inconsistencies of Howell’s statements. The only time defense counsel attempt to detail the inconsistencies of Howell’s statements, they did so in the form of a statement or question that went unanswered. Further, if the statements Petitioner alleges were undisclosed occurred before the grand jury as it appears by the dates and the comments within the police reports, then the inconsistencies referred to at trial were not the ones that Petitioner is speaking about here. Rather, Petitioner would be referring to the inconsistencies among the three statements given prior to the grand jury testimony; if that is the case, then Respondent’s argument is incorrect. It thus appears that Petitioner’s trial counsel did not receive at least one of the three above pretrial statements of Howell. However, because the transcript and the Parties are unclear, we will hold an eviden-tiary hearing on this issue for purposes of determining “cause” and prejudice and possibly the merits. (d) Petitioner alleges that the Prosecution did not disclose the teletype from the C.P.D. officers who initially responded to the Mitchell homicide scene indicating that two individuals were involved in the offense — the first individual was 6'4" and weighed two hundred pounds and was wearing a large brown straw hat. The second individual was 5'3". (doc. 100 at 5.) Mr. Flax does not attest in his affidavit that he did not receive this teletype. Thus, there is a question of fact whether Mr. Flax did not receive this document. (e) Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel did not receive the following information: Based upon the descriptions provided by the above witnesses, the Crime Stoppers Program at the direction of C.P.D. issued the following release for the week of August 14, 1984 concerning the description of the two assailants at the Central Bar: “The suspects are described as # 1 — a male/black, 25 years of age, 6'2" - 4" tall, 200 lbs., wearing brown pants and a brown straw hat # 2 — a male/black, 25 years of age, 5'3" tall, 160 lbs., wearing blue press pants and a mustache.” Mr. Flax does not attest that he did not receive this report. Thus, there is a question of fact whether Mr. Flax received this document. (f) Petitioner alleges that the prosecution did not disclose evidence relating to pre-trial statements of eyewitnesses of the so-called similar robberies who testified at the Central Bar trial. Respondent did not respond at all to any of these alleged undisclosed facts. Mr. Flax attests that he did not receive any of the following evidence. (i) Petitioner alleges that his counsel did not know that Jack West, the victim of the Metropolitan Gallery robbery, provided a physical description of the assailant as 5'10", 150 lbs. with a stocky build. Derrick Jamison’s physical appearance did not match the description. Derrick Jamison is 6'3" and very thin. (doc. 100 at 8.) This description came from the August 4, 1984 Offense Report, which Mr. Flax attests he did not receive, (doc. 103, vol.l, Attach.34.) Petitioner’s statement that Mr. West described the assailant as stocky was incorrect; Mr. West described the assailant as thin. (ii) Petitioner alleges that according to the same Supplementa