Full opinion text
ORDER SPIEGEL, Senior District Judge. This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 456); the Government’s and Relator’s Response (doc. 484); Defendant’s Reply (doc. 491); the Government’s and Relator’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in Regards to the Liability of Helicopters Sold with Defective Gears (doc. 457); Defendant’s Response (doc. 481); the Government’s and Relator’s Reply (doc. 495); the Government’s and Relator’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Defendant’s Third Affirmative Defense in Regards to the High-Value Items Clause and Insurance Coverage (doc. 458); Defendant’s Response (doc. 482); the Government’s and Relator’s Reply (doc. 493); the Government’s and Relator’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in Regards to Defendant’s Fourth, Eighth, and Twelfth Affirmative Defenses (doc. 459); Defendant’s Response (doc. 483); and the Government’s and Relator’s Reply (doc. 492). In addition, the Parties have also filed the following supplements or amendments to their original motions for summary judgment: (1) the Government’s and Relator’s Brief of Supplemental Authority in Regards to its Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 514); (2) the Government’s and Relator’s Addenda/Amended Exhibits/Indexes/Amendments to their Joint Motions for Partial Summary Judgment (docs. 462, 476, 498, 513 & 514); and (3) Defendant’s Motion to file a sur-reply to the Government’s and Relator’s Reply Brief (doc. 500). Furthermore, this Court held a hearing in this matter on August 12, 1999 (doc. 521). BACKGROUND On May 22, 1995, qui tam relator, Brett Roby (hereinafter, “Relator”), filed this action under seal pursuant to Title 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) on behalf of himself and the United States Government (hereinafter, “the Government” or “the United States”) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio (doc. 2). Relator alleges that The Boeing Company (hereinafter, “Boeing” or “Defendant”) and its supplier, The Speco Corporation (hereinafter, “Speco”), violated the False Claims Act, Title 31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq., by manufacturing and selling defective transmission gears to the United States via Boeing’s CH-47(D) Chinook Army helicopters (hereinafter, “CH-47(D) helicopters”) (Id.). Speco manufactured the allegedly defective gears at its Springfield, Ohio facility before the gears were then installed by Boeing into the CH-47(D) helicopters. Those helicopters were then provided to the Government by Boeing (Id.). On April 30,1997, the Government intervened and filed an Amended Complaint against Boeing (doc. 34). The Amended Complaint was unsealed on May 1, 1997. In the Amended Complaint, the Government alleges that Speco manufactured defective, transmission gears at its Springfield, Ohio facility before Boeing installed the gears into the CH-47(D) helicopters, and, thereafter, supplied the defective gears and helicopters to the United States Army (Id.). According to the allegations contained in the Amended Complaint, in 1985, Defendant contracted with the Government to “re-manufacture” or “re-convert” its medium-lift helicopter fleet, consisting of appropriately 400 helicopters, into what is now known as the CH-47(D) helicopter (doc. 34). Over a period of time, Defendant entered into two multi-year contracts for the modification or conversion of the Army’s Chinook helicopter fleet, at a total project cost of approximately $2 billion dollars (Id.). Among the modifications made during the re-manufacturing of the helicopters were the use of Defendant’s proprietary steel alloy, BMS 7-223, known as “Vasco,” which was to be used as the engine and combining transmission gears for the modified helicopters (Id.). The Government and Relator allege in Count I of the Amended Complaint that Defendant submitted false claims in violation of the False Claims Amendments Act as prescribed under Title 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3133, as amended by Pub.L. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986) (doc. 34). Specifically, the Government contends that in 1991, one of the Speco-made gears failed in flight, while in service in Saudi Arabia, leading to the total loss of a CH-47(D) helicopter and all of its contents at an estimated loss of approximately $10 Million (Id.). In addition, the Government alleges that in 1993, another Speco-made gear failed in another helicopter incident resulting in a hard landing near Ft. Meade, Maryland, causing approximately $1 million in damage to that helicopter (M). Relator alleges that at a total cost to the United States of about two billion dollars ($2,100,000,000), Boeing re-manufactured the Army’s fleet of Chinook CH-47 A/B/C model helicopters into Chinook CH-47(D) and MH47D/E helicopters, and the contracted work to those helicopters was performed in an “incompetent and dangerous manner” by Defendant (see docs. 34 & 367). Moreover, Relator asserts that each of these “unsuitably, re-manufactured helicopters” were delivered by Boeing to the Government by operation of a claim for payment in the form of a “Standard Form DD250” that falsely represented that the contracted helicopters conformed to all of the specified contract requirements (Id.). Relator avers that it has evidence that Defendant acted in a reckless manner by installing the defective gears without adequate inspection (Id.). For example, Relator alleges that, Boeing for at least ten years prior to the Saudi crash had prior knowledge that the transmission helicopter gears were prone to certain grinding cracks and breakage (Id.). Relator further alleges that the material from which the gears were made are especially susceptible to exactly the kind and type of burning and cracking that resulted in the crash of Aircraft 89-0165 (Id.). Moreover, the Government and Relator aver in the Amended Complaint that, “[b]y virtue of the acts described above, Boeing, by and through its officers, agents, and employees, knowingly submitted, and caused to be submitted, false or fraudulent claims for payment or approval to [its] officers, employees, or agents of the United States Government” (doc. 34). The Government concludes Count I with the contention that “[b]y reason of these payments made upon these false claims, the United States Government has been damaged as a result of Defendant’s violations of the False Claims Act (hereinafter, the “FCA” or the “Act”), arising under 31 U.S.C. §§ 8729(a)(1), (2), (3) & (7), for damages to be determined at trial” (Id). The Amended Complaint further asserts claims against Defendant for: (1) payment by mistake; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) breach of contract; and (4) common law fraud (Id.). The Government seeks to recover treble damages based on the value of the first CH-47(D) helicopter and its contents, for the cost of repairing the second aircraft, and to treble those damages under the False Claims Act of 1986 (Id). In addition, the Government asserts that it is entitled to treble damages for the delivery of other U.S. Army Chinook helicopters with allegedly non-conforming engine transmission gears that were manufactured by Speco from 1987 to 1995, and statutory penalties of $5,0000 to $10,000 for the submission of each purportedly false claim for the helicopters in question (Id). In its Answer, Defendant submits a general denial of the Government’s allegations of false claims, violations of the False Claims Act, and the resulting compensatory and statutory damages (doc. 161). Specifically, Defendant counters the allegations contained in the Amended Complaint by asserting a total of twelve (12) affirmative defenses that would individually or collectively relieve Defendant of all liability from the Government’s claims (Id). For example, Defendant’s Third Affirmative Defense originally stated that, the “damages sought by the [government are barred by its inclusion of the High Value Items Clause in the prime contract with Boeing” (Id). Furthermore, Defendant’s Fifth Affirmative Defense originally stated that, the “United States cannot recover damages under the False Claims Act for the two helicopters, or their contents, which the [Government alleges were lost or damaged as a consequence of defective parts.... ” due to the fact that consequential damages are not recoverable under the FCA (doc. 340). Defendant asserts that, the False Claims Act precludes recovery for product defects, consequential damages , or any other recovery not found in the statute itself {Id.). The Court will now address the Parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment in the order of their filing (see docs. 456, 457, 458 & 459) and we will make our determination as to the appropriateness of each motion in Sections I-IV of the Discussion. STANDARD OF REVIEW The narrow question that we must decide on a motion for summary judgment is whether there exists a “genuine issue as to any material fact and [whether] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Supreme Court elaborated upon the appropriate standard in deciding a motion for summary judgment as follows: [T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of the non-movant’s case. Id. at 321, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 405 (6th Cir.1992); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989). If the moving party meets this burden, then the non-moving party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405. As the Supreme Court stated in Celotex, the non-moving party must “designate” specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405. Although the burden might not require the non-moving party to “designate” facts by citing page numbers, “ ‘the designated portions of the record must be presented with enough specificity that the district court can readily identify the facts upon which the non-moving party relies.’ ” Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405 (quoting InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091, 110 S.Ct. 1839, 108 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990)). Summary judgment is not appropriate if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Conclusory allegations, however, are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 1162 (6th Cir.1990). DISCUSSION I. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 456). On June 15, 1999, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 456) and moves this Court for summary judgment against all of the claims that were asserted in the Amended Complaint (see doc. 34). For the reasons more fully stated in the following subsections, Defendant asserts that judgment should be entered in Defendant’s favor on Count One, arising under the False Claims Act, 81 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3732. Defendant further asserts that, the Government and Relator (hereinafter, “Plaintiffs”) have failed to put forth sufficient evidence that Defendant acted with the requisite intent or that the claims in question was false. In particular, Defendant alleges the following reasons as to why there are no genuine issue of material fact in relation to Count One: (1) There is no evidence that Defendant actually knew or recklessly disregarded information showing that any defective gear was installed in any helicopter delivered to the Army; (2) There is no evidence that any gear currently in the Army’s inventory is defective or unsafe; and (3) The record establishes that Defendant’s oversight of the subcontractor, Speco, was not, as a matter of law, reckless. (doc. 456). Defendant also contends that, it is entitled to summary judgment as to the four remaining counts of the Amended Complaint, all of which sound in common law. A. Count One: The False Claims Act The FCA imposes liability on any person who “knowingly presents” to the government a “false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval,” or who “knowingly makes ... a false record or statement” in order to have “a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the [government.” 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)-(2) (West 1999). A person “knowingly” submits a false claim if, with respect to information in the claim, the person: (1) has actual knowledge of the information; (2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(b)(1)-(3) (West 1999). Specifically, to sustain a claim under the FCA, Plaintiffs must prove each of the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that Defendant made a claim, or made a statement in order to get the Government to pay money on a claim; (2) that the claim or statement was false or fraudulent; and (3) that Defendant knew that the claim or statement was false or fraudulent. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (West 1999); see also United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir.1999). At a minimum, the FCA requires proof of an objective falsehood. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 81 F.3d 1465, 1477-78 (9th Cir.1996). Expressions of opinion, scientific judgments, or statements as to conclusions about which reasonable minds may differ cannot be false. See Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1420-21 (9th Cir.1992) (“Bad math is no fraud, proof of mistake is not evidence that one is a cheat, and the common failings of engineers and other scientists are not culpable under the Act.”); see also Tyger Constr. Co. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 35, 57 (1993) (noting that FCA liability will not attach for a statement relating to a contract term that is incapable of a precise definition, and fraud cannot be predicated on the mere expression of an opinion); Boisjoly v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 706 F.Supp. 795, 808 (D.Utah 1988) (finding that the FCA requires a statement of fact that can be said to be either true or false). Similarly, the Seventh Circuit held that: errors based simply on faulty calculations or flawed reasoning are not false under the FCA. And imprecise statements or differences in interpretation growing out of a disputed legal question are similarly not false under the FCA. Lamers, 168 F.3d at 1018 (citations omitted). An untrue statement, however, is not sufficient by itself to warrant liability under the FCA, the Act also “requires a showing of knowing fraud.” Hagood, 81 F.3d at 1478. What is prohibited is “cheating” the government. See Wang, 975 F.2d at 1420; see also McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987). Thus, “statements of claims which are false within the meaning of the FCA must be more than objectively untrue, they must betray or suggest intentional deceit.” Lamers, 998 F.Supp. at 986-71. Courts therefore consistently recognize that “[ijnnocent mistakes or negligence are not actionable under” the FCA. Hindo v. Univ. of Health Sciences/The Chicago Med. Sch., 65 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir.1995); see also Hagood, 929 F.2d at 1420. Nor does the mere presence of a defect create liability under the Act. United States ex rel. Anderson v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 816-17 (9th Cir.1995); see also Wang, 975 F.2d at 1421 (“The Act is concerned about ferreting out wrongdoing, not scientific errors. What is false as a matter of science is not, by that very fact, wrong as a matter of morals.”); Hindo, 65 F.3d at 613 (“In short, the claim must be a lie.”). Based on these principles, several federal courts have recognized that summary judgment is properly granted to a defendant in a FCA case when a plaintiff fails to adduce enough evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the claim at issue was objectively false, or that the defendant acted with the requisite intent. See, e.g., Lamers, 168 F.3d at 1019-20; Hagood, 81 F.3d at 1477-78; Northern Telecom, 52 F.3d at 815-16; Wang, 975 F.2d at 1420-21; Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 2 F.Supp.2d 1034, 1049 (N.D.Ill.1998); United States ex rel. Windsor v. DynCorp., Inc., 895 F.Supp. 844, 850 (E.D.Va.1995); United States ex rel. Butler v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 71 F.3d 321, 329 (9th Cir.1995) (affirming a directed verdict for defendant where the evidence presented by the plaintiff could not support a finding of the requisite knowledge under the FCA). 1. Defendant’s Position Defendant initially asserts that, it is entitled to summary judgment on Count One because the Government cannot show that Defendant knowingly submitted any false claim in violation of the FCA. See Hagood, 81 F.3d at 1478 (“The False Claims Act ... requires a showing of knowing fraud.”); see also Northern Telecom, 52 F.3d at 816-17 (finding that liability does not arise under the Act for the mere delivery of defective products, absent evidence that the defendant knew that the product was defective). Defendant also asserts that, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment on the FCA claim, Plaintiffs must be able to point to sufficient evidence in the record in order to show that: (1) Defendant submitted an objectively false claim to the Government for payment; and (2) Defendant’s [non-specific] personnel actually knew that the claim was false, or acted in reckless disregard or deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the claim. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2); see also Lamers, 168 F.3d at 1018. Defendants sets forth a number of legal theories in order to show that the Government cannot meet its burden as to Count One (see doc. 456). First, Defendant contends that, the record is devoid of evidence that Defendant ever had “actual knowledge” that the gears in question were defective before they were installed in the aircraft that were subsequently delivered to the Government. Moreover, Defendant avers that, there is no evidence that, before the 1991 incident in Saudi Arabia, any of Defendant’s [non-specific] personnel knew or had reason to know that certain individuals at Speco were negligent in executing the inspections of the gears in question. Indeed, Defendant maintains that the evidence is to the contrary. For instance, Defendant alleges that, Speco previously had been successful in identifying anomalies in the dampening ring grooves through inspection before the gears were delivered to Defendant in the past. Accordingly, Defendant contends that, it had no reason to believe that Speco’s inspection techniques were ineffective at the time in question. Second, Defendant submits that, any FCA claim based on the 1993 Ft. Meade incident that is associated with the failure of a Speco-made gear must also fail because there is no evidence that Defendant had any reason to know that a defect existed at the time the helicopter was delivered. According to Defendant, the undisputed facts show that, one of the contributing causes of the 1993 incident was a unique anomaly created when a Speco employee attempted to remove a sharp edge from the gear’s surface during production of the gear. Defendant argues that, the Speco employee failed to make the required notation that he had performed this extra procedure, and, thus, Defendant had no reason to question whether the post-procedure inspections had actually occurred. Defendant asserts that, the anomaly was not discovered during the scheduled 1991 re-inspection because it was not located in any dampening ring groove — the location of the gear that the Army had designated for re-inspection in 1991. Third, Defendant submits that, the allegations about the 1991 and 1993 re-inspections cannot support a FCA claim. Defendant contends that, the Government’s alleged FCA claims are nothing more than a claim of negligence which is not cognizable under the FCA. See Hindo, 65 F.3d at 613 (“Innocent mistakes are not actionable under this section.”). Moreover, Defendant alleges the fact that the Army was fully aware of and participated in both the planning and execution of the re-inspection precludes, as a matter of law, any findings that Defendant acted with wrongful intent under the FCA. See Hughes Helicopters, 71 F.3d at 326-27 (“That a defendant has disclosed all of the underlying facts to the government may ... show that the defendant had no intent to deceive.”) Furthermore, Defendant alleges that, there are no witnesses or documents that supports Plaintiffs’ unsubstantiated theory that Defendant chose not to perform “nital etch” inspections in order somehow to deceive or cheat the Army. Rather defendant maintains that the decision not to conduct such inspections was a scientific judgment that is not actionable under the FCA. See Northern Telecom, 52 F.3d at 815-16; see also Hagood, 81 F.3d at 1477-78 (“The statutory phrase ‘known to be false’ does not mean ‘scientifically untrue,’ it means a lie.”); Hughes Helicopters, 71 F.3d at 327; Baxter Healthcare, 2 F.Supp.2d at 1047. Fourth, Plaintiffs, Defendant submits, have no evidence that any gear currently in service is unsafe or defective in any way. Moreover, the only evidence that Plaintiffs are prepared to proffer is that the Speco-made gears are allegedly unsafe. According to Defendant, this amounts to nothing more than mere speculation that some gears could have a potential defect. Defendant asserts that, the mere speculations of Plaintiffs are patently insufficient to meet their burden of defense on a motion for summary judgment. Fifth, Defendant also alleges that, it was not reckless in continuing to procure Spe-co-made gears through 1995, since Defendant did not act with a wrongful intent and the Government is unable to prove the existence of an actual defect due to a lack of quality. See United States ex rel. Compton v. Midwest Specialties, Inc., 142 F.3d 296, 302 (6th Cir.1998). Indeed, Defendant further alleges that, the Government, during the same time frame, contracted with Speco for the purchase of the same or similar aerospace parts at the same time it had many government-qualified assurance personnel in place to monitor the Speco-made parts throughout the period of the ten years at issue. See Hughes Helicopters, 71 F.3d at 362-27 (“The evidence established that all information upon which [relator] bases his case was not only available to the Army, but was in the Army’s possession”); see also Lamers, 998 F.Supp. at 988; X Corp. v. Doe, 816 F.Supp. 1086, 1094 n. 12 (E.D.Va.1993). Next, Defendant denies Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendant’s supervision of Speco and its personnel was reckless under FCA law. Rather, the record, Defendant argues, overwhelmingly establishes that Defendant’s oversight of Speco was unrelenting and conscientious in regards to Speco’s processes and procedures. Moreover, Defendant alleges that, among the many quality controls regularly employed by Defendant were the destructive testing of gears, the annual and special quality audits, the coordination committee meetings to address any production issues, and the use of rejection reports to document any parts with potential anomalies that were discovered during the manufacturing process. Seventh, Defendant maintains that, the Amended Complaint accuses it of failing “to conduct a thorough re-inspection of the suspect Speco gears in both its 1991 and 1993 inspections” (see docs. 34 & 456). Defendant alleges that, this is not a cognizable .theory of liability under the FCA because it is simply an allegation of negligence, and not one of recklessness of the truth or falsity of the information. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)-(2); see also Wang, 975 F.2d at 1420. Accordingly, Defendant argues that, the real issue to decide on its Motion is whether Defendant submitted a claim that was knowingly false in regard to the re-inspections, and not whether Defendant was “thorough” in how it conducted the re-inspections. Since there were no knowingly false statements made to the Government concerning the re-inspections, Defendant defends that this claim must therefore fail. Moreover, Defendant contends the fact that the planned scope of the re-inspections and its parameters were made with the full knowledge and approval of the Army, precludes the requisite intent required by the FCA. See Lamers, 998 F.Supp. at 988 (finding that “no violation exists where the government has not been deceived”); see also Hughes Helicopters, 71 F.3d at 326 (finding that a continuing dialogue and “pattern of cooperation between the Army and [the contractor]” was sufficient evidence showing that the contractor lacked the requisite intent under the FCA). Lastly, Defendant points out that the Amended Complaint alleges that, Defendant knowingly delivered gears to the Army that contained “rejectable CICN,” and that Defendant failed to inform the Government of this fact (see doc. 1). Defendant asserts that, this allegation fails in the first instance because Plaintiffs have not and cannot identify any gears that had “rejectable CICN” that were actually installed in helicopters. Defendant concludes its arguments as to Count One by stating that: there is simply no testimony, empirical data, or any other evidence to prove that any gear in service is defective or unsafe. All that the DOJ offers in order to support its claim that the gears are unsafe is a hypothesis that potential defects might possibly exist in some unspecified gear. This kind of metaphysical doubt is insufficient to create a factual dispute on summary judgment, or to meet the [Government’s burden under the FCA. (doc. 456); see also Wang, 975 F.2d at 1420-21. 2. Plaintiffs’Position In its Response filed July 6, 1999 (doc. 484), Plaintiffs initially begin their arguments by flatly denying all of Defendant’s assertions that are set forth above, and further summarizes that Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist. In addition, Plaintiffs assert in the alternative that, they are the party that is rightfully entitled to summary judgment based on their motions that have already been submitted for this Court’s review. Plaintiffs also set forth several legal theories countering as to why Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment should not be granted (see doc. 484). First, Plaintiffs allege that, Defendant misinterprets the definition of “knowingly” under the FCA. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that, under the FCA, “no specific intent to defraud is required”, and, therefore, Defendant is plain wrong when it argues that “actual knowledge” is required for an FCA violation. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b); see also Wilkins ex rel. United States v. Ohio, 885 F.Supp. 1055, 1059-60 (S.D.Ohio 1995) (finding that the knowledge requirement is “something less than the elements of fraud [found] at common law”). For example, Plaintiffs submit that, the FCA was intended to reach “the ostrich” defendant, “who ignores or fails to inquire about readily discoverable facts which would alert him that fraudulent claims are being submitted,” and who “insulate themselves by design from knowledge about the truth or falsity of a claim.” 132 Cong. Rec. § 11238-04 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1986) (remarks of Sen. Grassley). In addition, Plaintiffs accuse Defendant of proposing a very high standard for recklessness, which is substantially higher that the formulation used by Congress in enacting the 1986 Amendments to the FCA. See United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 941-42 (D.C.Cir.1997) (affirming the district court’s determination that “reckless disregard under the FCA is properly equated with aggravated gross negligence, or gross negligence-plus”); see also UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 776, 792 n. 15 (1999) (noting that reckless disregard under the FCA is the equivalent of an “aggravated form of negligence or gross negligence-plus”). Thus, Plaintiffs assert that, Defendant’s attempted use of the First Amendment standard (i.e., “reckless disregard for the truth”) or the recklessness standard used in securities fraud cases is misguided. Second, Plaintiffs allege that, with all of the obvious “red flags” concerning Speco’s difficulties in detecting cracks and burns in the gears places Defendant in the same position as the psychiatrist who failed to properly supervise his wife and office staff, who was found liable under the FCA for preparing bills that grossly over-billed Medicare for mental health services. See Krizek, 111 F.3d at 942-43. Plaintiffs assert that in the Krizek case, the psychiatrist-doctor was found to be reckless although he had no “actual knowledge” that his office staff had prepared incorrect bills in the past, nor had he had previous problems with Medicare. Id. at 942. Rather, it was later determined that the psychiatrist failed to review the bills that were sent to Medicare. Id. Plaintiffs submit that, like the psychiatrist in Krizek, Defendant had ample knowledge of problems with the Speco-made gears and also had the opportunity to correct the problem or provide notice to the Government, thus making its conduct more culpable than the psychiatrist in Krizek. Therefore, Plaintiffs argue that, the high knowledge standard sought by Defendant is not supported by the law. Third, Plaintiffs allege that the undisputed cause of the 1991 Saudi incident was the in-flight failure of a Speco-manufactured Vasco gear due to grinding cracks in the dampening ring grove. Plaintiffs aver that, Defendant has admitted the gear in question was cracked at the time of its delivery to Defendant by Speco, and, thus, contained the crack when the helicopter in question was subsequently delivered to the Army by Defendant. Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant knew that cracks in the gears of a helicopter could lead to a catastrophic gear failure. Thus, while allegedly turning a blind eye to its previous failed experience with the Litton-manufactured gears, Defendant allowed Speco to continue grinding the dampening ring grooves of in its helicopter gears. See BMY-Combat Sys. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 109, 125 (1997); see also Daff, 78 F.3d at 1574 (holding that the defendant defrauded the government by covering up test failures). Plaintiffs argue that, the evidence demonstrates that Defendant acted at least recklessly with respect to the gear that failed in Saudi Arabia, as well as the other gears with similar defects. Fourth, Plaintiffs further allege that, the evidence is also clear that Defendant submitted false claims in connection with the cracked gears, including the gear that caused the Saudi crash and the 1993 Ft. Meade failure. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that, in June of 1993, a second CH-47(D) helicopter failed in flight near Ft. Meade, Maryland due to the failure of a Speco-made Vasco gear. Plaintiffs assert that, Defendant admitted the gear had a manufacturing defect, rendering it “nonconforming to contract requirements.” Plaintiffs further assert that, Defendant further admitted that this gear was cracked at the time of delivery to Defendant and when it was subsequently delivered to the Army. Plaintiffs submit that, the Ft. Meade gears failed because Defendant accepted the Speco-made gear during “a nearly three-year hiatus” in Defendant’s contractually-required, destructive testing program. Plaintiffs allege that, a government contractor’s failure to conduct the contractually required product inspections is sufficient proof of reckless conduct, and, thus, satisfies the “knowing” standard under the FCA. See Compton, 142 F.3d at 303; see also Daff, 78 F.3d at 1574; United States ex rel. Fallon v. Accudyne Corp., 921 F.Supp. 611, 621 (W.D.Wis.1995). Fifth, Plaintiffs concede that, Defendant did conduct limited re-inspections of some of the Speco-made gears in question, however, Plaintiffs counter that, Defendant also failed to remove and replace all of the Speco-made gears with fully compliant gears, as well as the failure by Defendant to test for grinding burn on the gears. Plaintiffs argue that, Defendant’s conduct with respect to its limited and flawed re-inspection of the Speco gears supports Plaintiffs’ FCA claims. In addition, Plaintiffs submit that the Army approved of Defendant’s re-inspection procedures without having the benefit of Defendant’s full knowledge about Speco’s major problems in regards to creating and failing to detect grinding burns. See United States v. National Wholesalers, 236 F.2d 944, 950 (9th Cir.1956) (holding that contracting officer’s modification of the contract in order to allow a lesser performance was “void as against public policy,” as contracting officers do not have power to vitiate the FCA); see also United States ex rel. Mayman v. Martin Marietta Corp., 894 F.Supp. 218, 223 (D.Md.1995) (“[A] contractor who tells a government contracting officer that a claim is false still violates the statute when the false claim is submitted.”). Thus, Plaintiffs argue that, Defendant’s contentions about the re-inspections issue does not support its Motion for Summary Judgment. Next, Plaintiffs assert that, it is beyond dispute that a contractor violates the FCA if he acts with the requisite state of mind, and submits a claim for payment as if the product did conform to the contract. See United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1008 (5th Cir.1972). Plaintiffs submit that they have identified approximately 125 gears for which no representative destructive testing was ever performed. Plaintiffs allege that, according to Sixth Circuit precedent, the parts sold to the Government without the contractually required testing are per se non-conforming, and, therefore, the knowing submission of claims for payment is in violation the FCA. See Compton, 142 F.3d at 304-05 (finding that the Army did not bargain only for brake-shoe kits that could pass the required testing, but also “for the confidence that comes with a product that has been subjected to production testing”); accord BMY-Combat, 38 Fed. Cl. at 125 (finding that the prime contractor violated the FCA by submitting items made by the subcontractor with the prior knowledge that the contracted parts had not been inspected as required). Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that, Defendant’s continued use of Speco gears after knowing of the gears’ lack of quality assurance constitutes undeniable evidence demonstrating Defendant’s prior knowledge, and, therefore, supports Plaintiffs’ FCA claim. See United States v. Advance Tool Co., 902 F.Supp. 1011, 1016 (W.D.Mo.1995) (“If the government failed to inspect, that fact would not insulate [defendant] from liability for a false or fraudulent claim.”); see also Commercial Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 154 F.3d 1357, 1375 (Fed.Cir.1998) (holding that the quality control violations amounted to a violation of the FCA, even though it had no significant effect on the channel’s structural integrity). Seventh, Plaintiffs maintain that Defendant’s quality control efforts at Speco do not preclude a finding of FCA liability. Rather, Plaintiffs assert that, Defendant was obligated to do more than simply impose a system of quality controls at Speco that looked good on paper or was more demanding than the requirements of Spe-co’s other customers. Rather, Defendant was obligated, according to Plaintiffs, to make sure that the gears it accepted from Speco and later placed in the CH-47D helicopters did not have dampening ring grove' cracks, burns, or other non-conform-ities. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that, Defendant knew Speco had no meaningful corrective action program and took no action other than to complain about it to Speco. In addition, Plaintiffs maintain that, Defendant failed to make any significant disclosures of these problems to the Government. Lastly, Plaintiffs assert that, Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of CICN in the Vasco-made gears because Defendants took no action to address the abnormal continuous carbide network findings, and never bothered to inform the Government of the allegedly abnormal findings. Plaintiffs further assert that, Defendant handled the resulting report, in a manner different from every other rejection report in the history of its relationship with Speco, by failing to route it through the appropriate Government channels. Plaintiffs allege that, there are many more examples of genuine issues of material fact relating to the issue of CICN and the FCA that make it much more than a scientific dispute, and would preclude this Court from granting summary judgment in Defendants favor. For example, Plaintiffs assert that: (1) Defendant’s claim that CICN is prohibited only in test slugs is a litigation theory belied by years of company practice; (2) Defendant has always known that Vasco gears — and especially their dampening ring groves — contained CICN, but failed to tell the Government that it was making gears which carried this unacceptable micro-structural condition; (3) Senior Army engineers and scientists believe that the gears sold to the Government were non-conforming due to the existence of CICN; and (4) Defendant’s conduct when it was confronted with Speco’s findings of CICN in dampening ring grooves demonstrates that it attempted to conceal the issue from cognizant Government officials. (doc. 484). In short, Plaintiffs argue that, Defendant has attempted to escape responsibility for violations of the specifications by engaging in a semantic debate about “scientific disputes.” B. Count Five: The Common Law Fraud Claim To prevail on a claim of common law fraud, Plaintiffs must prove the following: (1) that a false representation, (2) that is material, (3) is made with knowledge of the falsity and with an intent to defraud, (4) with a reasonable reliance upon the false representation, and (5) that results in damages. Wittekamp v. Gulf & Western, Inc., 991 F.2d 1137, 1142 (3d Cir.1993) (noting the elements of common-law fraud under Pennsylvania law); see also Domo v. Stouffer, 64 Ohio App.3d 43, 51, 580 N.E.2d 788, 793 (1989) (noting the elements of common-law fraud under Ohio law). 1. Defendant’s Position Defendant submits that, in order to sustain a claim at common-law for fraud, Plaintiffs must adduce evidence showing that not only did Defendant make a. knowing misrepresentation, but also that it did so with the intent to defraud the Government. See Wang, 975 F.2d at 1420. Defendant submits that, Plaintiffs have not proved that Defendant has made any false statements concerning the gear involved in the 1991 incident, the gears currently in service, or any other gears. Defendant also submits that, Plaintiffs cannot show that Defendant knew that any such claim for gears were false or that it acted with the requisite intent to defraud. Moreover, Defendant contends that, the Army’s involvement at every stage of both of the gear’s re-inspections precludes any claim that the Government justifiably relied on any representations made by Defendant. In addition, Defendant asserts that, because the Government knew or reasonably could have learned the facts essential to this fraud claim by no later than December 21, 1992, any fraud claim that accrued prior to that date is barred by the three-year statute of limitations. See Title 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b) (prescribing the statute of limitations for common law fraud as three years after the right of action accrues); see also United States ex rel. Zissler v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 992 F.Supp. 1097, 1105 (D.Minn.1998) (noting that the limitations period begins to run once the facts making up “the very essence of the right of action” are known to the responsible government officials). Specifically, Defendant alleges that, since it entered into a tolling agreement with the Government that began on December 21, 1995, any common law fraud claims that accrued prior to that date must be dismissed with prejudice. Defendant also alleges that, discovery in this action has established that with respect to the Saudi incident, Army officials with oversight for the CH-47D helicopter program knew all of the essential facts relating to any purported fraud in 1991, when the Army undertook a full investigation of the causes of the Saudi incident. Therefore, any fraud claims alleged by the Government after December 21, 1995, are time barred. 2. Plaintiffs ’ Position Plaintiffs assert that, the elements of federal common law fraud are very simple and are certainly met under the facts as now known. See United States v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 841 F.2d 592, 595 (5th Cir.1988) (finding that federal law governs any suits by the United States in order to recover overpayment, especially in cases where the action would have an immediate impact upon the federal treasury); see also Stone v. United States, 286 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir.1961) (holding that federal law controls actions to recover erroneous payment); United States v. Krietemeyer, 506 F.Supp. 289, 293 (S.D.Ill.1980) (finding that federal common law governs punitive damages in fraud action). Plaintiffs allege that the Government suffered actual damage with respect to the Speco-manufac-tured gears that were placed in the CH-47D helicopters due to a justifiable reliance on a pattern of affirmative misrepresentations by Defendant. See RMED Int’l, Inc. v. Sloan’s Supermarkets, Inc., 878 F.Supp. 16, 20 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (finding that plaintiffs securities fraud complaint satisfied the pleading requirement that fraud be pled with particularity where it alleges “a continuous and prolonged pattern of misrepresentations and omissions”). In addition, Plaintiffs contend that, the three-year statute of limitations for tort actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b) is subject to the tolling provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2416(c), which excludes all periods during which the material facts “are not known, and reasonably could not be known by an official of the United States charged with the responsibility to act in the circumstances.” Moreover, Plaintiffs submit that, this Court has already determined that 28 U.S.C. § 2416(c) tolled the statute of limitations in this case until the Relator filed his qui tam Complaint in May of 1995 (see does. 2 & 152). Therefore, Plaintiffs argue that, because the DOJ is the only entity “charged with responsibility to act” in fraud cases, the statute of limitations was tolled until May 22, 1995, when the Relator filed his qui tam Complaint and the material facts became known to the Civil Division of the DOJ. See Martin J. Simko Constr., Inc. v. United States, 852 F.2d 540, 547 (Fed.Cir.1988) (finding that fraud matters are exclusively within the DOJ’s authority and therefore are beyond the contracting officer’s authority). C. Count Four: The Breach of Contract Claim To establish a breach of contract, Plaintiffs must prove: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) performance by the Government; (3) a breach by Defendant; and (4) injury to the Government. BMY-Combat, 38 Fed. Cl. at 127; Cleland v. Stadt, 670 F.Supp. 814, 817 (N.D.Ill.1987). 1. Defendant’s Position Defendant argues that, if the common-law fraud and FCA claims are eliminated, any breach of contract claims should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (hereinafter, the “CDA”), Title 41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (“[A]ll claims by the government against a contractor relating to a contract shall be the subject of a decision by the contracting officer.”); see also United States v. Unified Indus., Inc., 929 F.Supp. 947, 949-51 (E.D.Va.1996); United States v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 795 F.Supp. 1131, 1134 (N.D.Ga.1992) (holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear government claims that are subject to the CDA); United States v. Hydraire, Inc., No. 94-C-4414, 1995 WL 86733, at **5-6 (N.D.Ill. Feb.27, 1995) (permitting the district court to retain jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim only where the allegations of fraud were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss). Defendant alleges that, because Plaintiffs cannot prove that it engaged in any fraudulent conduct, Plaintiffs’ contract claim must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Unified Indus., 929 F.Supp. at 951 n. 6 (finding that where fraud allegations are unfounded, common-law contract claims may be dismissed and submitted to the contracting officer). Defendant sets forth an alternative argument contending that, the Government has failed to take the preliminary steps required to assert any contract claims because it has neither revoked acceptance of the helicopters nor invoked its rights under the warranty provisions of the contract, except as to the gears removed from service in 1991 and 1993. See East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872-73, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986); see also United States v. HydroAire, Inc., No. 94-C-4414, 1997 WL 160761, at **12-13 (N.D.Ill. Apr.3, 1997); Spandome Corp. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 626, 630 (1995). Furthermore, Defendant alleges that, it has met its obligations under the contract and to the Government for the gears removed from service in 1991 and 1993 by replacing them, and, thus, Plaintiffs’ contract claims have no merit. In addition, Defendant submits that, the Government cannot maintain an action for breach of warranty because it failed to comply with the “written 90 day notification requirement” that is allegedly contained in its prime procurement contract with Defendant. Defendant asserts that, the Government has not provided such notice to Defendant and the Government has never returned any allegedly defective gear to Defendant. Thus, Defendant argues that, the Government’s failure to comply with these warranty provisions bars any claim for breach of warranty. 2. Plaintiffs ’ Position Plaintiffs maintain that, there is no basis for the granting of summary judgment for Defendant on the FCA or common law claims, therefore, this Court should also retain jurisdiction over the contract claims as well. Moreover, Plaintiffs assert that, this Court has already decided that we have jurisdiction over the Government’s contract claim in this action as well (see doc. 152). Plaintiffs concede that, it is true that when a district court dismisses all claims over which the court had original jurisdiction, the court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over the remaining claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(c)(3) (West 1999). However, Plaintiffs allege that, the district court, in its discretion, may instead continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. See Stevenson v. Severs, 158 F.3d 1332, 1334 (D.C.Cir.1998). Therefore, Plaintiffs argue that, to the extent this Court may have the occasion to exercise this discretion, it should continue to assert jurisdiction over the contract claim, because to do otherwise would waste the judicial resources that this Court has already expended. D. Claims Two & Three: Payment by Mistake & Unjust Enrichment: 1. Defendant’s Position Defendants contend that it is black-letter that where the existence of a contract is proved, quasi-contractual claims such as unjust enrichment and payment by mistake cannot be brought. See United States v. EER Sys. Corp., 950 F.Supp. 130, 133 (D.Md.1996) (“[Cjommon law claims are quasi-contractual or tort-based that are inappropriate claims when there is an express contract.”); see also Trauma Serv. Group, Ltd. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 426, 432 (1995) (“[Tjhere can be no implied contract between the parties when an express contract covers the same subject”). Since discovery has established the existence of express contracts for the helicopter, Defendant argues that these same claims must be dismissed. Defendant submits that, although the alternative pleading rules may allow for pleading both breach of contract and quasi-contractual remedies, once an express contract is proven on summary judgment, the qausi-con-tractual claims must be dismissed. See Nematollahi v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 224, 235 (1997) (“Moreover, there can be no implied-in-law contract and, thus, no claim for unjust enrichment, when an express contract covering the same subject exists.”) 2. Plaintiffs’Positions Plaintiffs allege that, the “existence of an express contract does not necessarily preclude recovery under the theories of unjust enrichment, restitution of payment, or payment under a mistake of fact.” U.S. ex rel. O’Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 918 F.Supp. 1338, 1344 (E.D.Mo.1996). Plaintiffs argue that, they should be permitted to pursue its theories of alternative contract, payment by mistake and unjust enrichment claims, and that the granting of summary judgment is inappropriate at this time. On July 19, 1999, Defendant filed a very detailed, comprehensive, and lengthy Reply brief in which Defendant counters that Plaintiffs’ legal theories defending this Motion are either without merit, without legal relevance, or are without sufficient evidence to meet their prima facie burden (see doc. 491). In addition, Defendant re-argues many of the points it asserted in its original Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 456). For the sake of brevity and not wanting to re-review all of Defendant’s arguments that were asserted in its Reply brief, the Court will take Defendant’s Reply into our consideration on this matter, but will not repeat those arguments here. D. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied To survive a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs must establish evidence on which a reasonable jury could find for Plaintiffs. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A reviewing court must view the evidence in a light that is most favorable to the non-moving party. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Having reviewed the affidavits, deposition testimony, briefs, exhibits, and all other materials furnished in support and in opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 456), and after hearing the Parties arguments and representations of counsel at the August 12th hearing, the Court hereby DECLARES that there are genuine issues of material facts as to the claims set forth above. Consequently, the Court must DENY Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 456). II Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (doc. 457) On June 15, 1999, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in Regards to Liability as to Helicopters Sold with Defective Gears (doc. 457). Thereafter, Defendant filed its Response (doc. 481), followed by Plaintiffs’ Reply (doc. 495). In their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs initially assert numerous alleged facts that tend to prove that Defendants were fully aware of the gear defects, and, nonetheless, submitted false claims to the Government for payment in violation of the FCA. Plaintiffs offer .a memorandum, dated October, 1982, written by Mr. Richard Fatland, the Director of Quality Assurance at The Boeing Helicopter Company, concerning the susceptibility of Vasco gears to burning and cracking during the grinding process (doc. 457, Ex. I). Plaintiffs conclude their Motion by moving this Court to grant their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment due to Defendant’s knowing delivery of non-conforming helicopters, transmissions and gears due to their allegedly cracked and untested condition. See Compton, 142 F.3d at 304-305 (affirming the lower court’s conclusion that the defendant had submitted false claims by submitting invoices for payment of untested shoe kits). A. Plaintiffs’Position Plaintiffs allege that, Defendant was aware of the grinding cracks in the dampening ring grooves that were manufactured initially by the Litton Corporation. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that, Defendant subsequently accepted gears with ground dampening ring grooves from Spe-co despite knowing that the same gears produced by Litton had grinding cracks in their dampening ring grooves as well. Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that, Defendant was aware of the related problems of grinding burns and the failure to detect such burns at Speco. Plaintiffs argue that, the 1991 Saudi Arabia incident was caused by a crack in the dampening ring groove of a Speco-manufactured gear. Furthermore, Plaintiffs submit that, the 1993 Ft. Meade incident was caused by a crack in a Speco-manufactured gear as well. Plaintiffs also submit that, despite deteriorating conditions at Speco, Defendant continued to place Speco gears in the helicopters. Furthermore, Defendant failed to conduct, Plaintiffs allege, the contractually required destructive testing on the gears in question. Plaintiffs further allege that, Defendant knew that the annual destructive testing was not being done as contractually required. Therefore, Plaintiffs argue that, partial summary judgment is appropriate against Defendant for several reasons. First, Plaintiffs allege that, Defendant violated the FCA by certifying contract compliance for helicopters that Defendant knew contained cracked gears and for helicopters that Defendant knew contained Speco gears for which destructive testing was required, but was not actually done. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that, Defendant knowingly submitted false claims for payment to the Government for helicopters with cracked and untested gears. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1) & (2); see also United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232, 88 S.Ct. 959, 19 L.Ed.2d 1061 (1968) (finding that the FCA statute was “intended to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in a financial loss to the [government”); Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592, 78 S.Ct. 946, 2 L.Ed.2d 996 (1958) (noting that the purpose of the FCA is defined broadly in order “to protect the funds and property of the [government from fraudulent claims, regardless of the particular form, or function, [or] the government instrumentality upon which such claims were made”). Second, Plaintiffs contend that, Defendant knew that the helicopters were nonconforming because they contained cracked untested gears. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant knew of, recklessly disregarded, or was deliberately ignorant to the falsity of the submitted claims. See Hagood, 929 F.2d at 1421 (finding that the FCA specifically states that, “no proof of specific intent to defraud is required” to establish a violation of the Act). Moreover, Plaintiffs submit that, Defendant knew there was no representative annual destructive testing’ that were being performed on the Speco transmission gears, as required by the contract. See Compton, 142 F.3d at 305 n. 8 (affirming the lower court’s findings of FCA liability against Midwest Specialties and concluding that “the government did not bargain only for plug-welded brake shoes that could withstand a certain amount of force, [but that the government] also bargained for the confidence that comes with a product that has been subjected to product testing”). Thus, Plaintiffs argue that, summary judgment is appropriate under the facts of this case. Third, Plaintiffs assert that, Defendant breached its contracts with the Government by delivering helicopters which contained cracked gears for which no representative destructive testing had been performed. Plaintiffs also assert that, the defects in the gears within these helicopters are clearly latent defects which could not have been discovered by the Government through reasonable observation or inspection made at the time of acceptance. See F.A.R. § 452.246-2(k). Therefore, Plaintiffs argue that, the Government’s so-called “acceptance” of the helicopters containing these gears does not preclude the Government from asserting a breach of contract claim against Defendant. B. Defendant’s Position In its Response (doc. 481), Defendant asserts that, it had no knowledge that the Speco-manufactured spiral bevel gears that were delivered to the Army contained microscopic grinding cracks. Defendant also asserts that, it complied with its contractual requirements regarding destructive testing of the gears. Therefore, Defendant argues that, Plaintiffs’ Partial Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied as to the FCA and the breach of contract claims. Defendant sets forth several specific reasons why it believes summary judgment on behalf of Plaintiffs is inappropriate. First, Defendant asserts that, there is no evidence that establishes Defendant disregarded any information relative to the quality or integrity of the Speco gears. Defendant submits that, one reason, for this assertion is that dampening ring groove can be properly manufactured either through grinding or turning. In addition, Defendant maintains that, its magnetic particle specification is more than adequate enough to detect cracks in the dampening ring groves. Defendant further maintains the it had no knowledge, prior to the 1991 incident, that Speco’s magnetic particle inspections had ever failed to detect microscopic cracks. Second, Defendant alleges that, it diligently pursued corrective action when it learned, after the 1991 incident, that Spe-co’s inspection problems were mostly due to human error. As a result of this determination, Defendant further alleges that, all of Speco inspectors were retrained and re-certified in the areas of non-destructive testing. In addition, Defendant contends that, it pursued corrective action when it learned of Speco’s “nital etch” problems as well. Third, Defendant asserts that, Plaintiffs have not and cannot establish a claim for violation of the FCA due to the fact that Plaintiffs cannot establish the requisite intent element. Furthermore, Defendant asserts that, the conduct alleged by Plaintiffs does not constitute “knowing” conduct within the meaning of the FCA. For example, Defendant argues that, there is no evidence that it was aware of deficiencies in Speco’s inspection capabilities prior to the 1991 incident, nor was there any deliberate ignorance of such information. Fourth, Defendant alleges that, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that Defendant recklessly disregarded any information relative to the gear which failed at Ft. Meade or the gears that were removed from service thereafter. Moreover, Defendant maintains that, not only was there no contractual obligation to perform annual destructive testing on the spiral bevel gears, but also those instructions are not incorporated in Defendant’s contracts with the Army. Rather, Defendant asserts that, the applicable quality assurance operating instruction does not require annual destructive testing. Fifth, Defendant avers that, it did conduct periodic destructive testing at Speco in a rational and prudent manner, consistent with the terms of the contract and its quality assurance plan. Since Plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence of knowing conduct by Defendant relative to the destructive testing requirement, Defendant alleges that, Plaintiffs’ Motion in regards to its FCA claims should be denied. Lastly, Defendant avers that, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the breach of contract claims because it does not involve fraud, and, thus, exclusive jurisdiction over the action is governed by the CDA. Therefore, Defendant argues that, Plaintiffs remedies are limited to those available under the warranty provisions of the contract and Defendant further argues that, it has satisfied its warranty obligations under the contract. On July 19, 1999, Plaintif