Full opinion text
ORDER NANGLE, District Judge. Before the Court is the pro se petition of Clevon Jamel Jenkins for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 asking the Court to vacate; set aside or correct sentence. For the reasons set forth below, petitioner’s petition is denied. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On December 13,1993, petitioner Clevon Jamel Jenkins was jointly indicted with Shawn Brown, Cedric Brown, and Maurice Fleming by the Liberty County Grand Jury for the murder and armed robbery of Robert Franklin Hodges. Br.Supp. Answer-Resp. at 1 (Doc. 13). The state gave notice of its intent to seek the death penalty against petitioner. Id. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35.1, several pretrial rulings, including the admissibility of petitioner’s statements to police, were affirmed on interim appeal. Id.; Jenkins v. State, 265 Ga. 539, 458 S.E.2d 477 (1995) (“Jenkins I”). Following a week-long jury trial beginning August 28, 1995, petitioner was found guilty of malice murder and armed robbery. Br.Supp. Answer-Resp. at 1; Resp’t’s Ex. 16 at 2018-19. At the sentencing phase on September 2, 1995, the jury found the existence of one statutory aggravating circumstance, that petitioner committed the murder while engaged in the commission of armed robbery, and imposed a sentence of life without parole. Resp’t’s Ex. 16 at 2130-32. The trial court imposed a second life sentence for the crime of armed robbery to be served consecutively to the life sentence for murder. Id. at 2132-33. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial on September 6, 1995. Resp’t’s Ex. 8, Clerk’s Index, at 2. This motion for new trial was amended to include claims for ineffective assistance of counsel on March 6, 1997. Resp’t’s Ex. 8, Clerk’s Record, at 349. On March 14, 1997, an evidentiary hearing was held on the motion for new trial. Id. at 413. The trial court denied the motion for new trial on May 6, 1997. Id. at 426. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on June 2, 1997. Id. at 2. Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court on October 6, 1997. Jenkins v. State, 268 Ga. 468, 491 S.E.2d 54 (1997) (“Jenkins II ”). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on March 23, 1998. Jenkins v. Georgia, 523 U.S. 1029, 118 S.Ct. 1318, 140 L.Ed.2d 481 (1998). Petitioner filed this petition on July 16, 1998, challenging his Liberty County conviction on constitutional grounds. II. BACKGROUND At petitioner’s jury trial, witnesses testified that Terry Roberts drove petitioner, Cedric and Shawn Brown, and Maurice Fleming to Hodges Grocery Store in Rice-boro, Georgia on October 8,1993. Roberts remained in the car and Shawn Brown kept lookout while petitioner, Cedric Brown, and Maurice Fleming robbed the store. Roberts testified that Cedric Brown and petitioner were armed with .25 caliber pistols. During the course of the robbery, grocer Bobby Hodges was shot five times in his face, neck and shoulder. One shot, fired by Cedric Brown, inflicted a potentially fatal wound to Hodges’s sinus cavity. The fatal shot passed through soft tissue nicking Hodges’s jaw bone before severing his carotid artery, causing him to quickly bleed to death. A damaged bullet fired from the weapon carried by petitioner was found at the scene. This bullet’s damage was consistent with the damage the fatal bullet would have sustained. Petitioner, Cedric Brown, and Maurice Fleming then left the store with money, food stamps, and perfume stolen from the store. All five men hurriedly left the scene in Terry Roberts’s car. While in the car, petitioner and Cedric Brown allegedly stated that they shot Hodges and joked about the items stolen from the store. Minutes after the crime, Hodges was discovered by customers to the store; help was summoned, but Hodges died shortly thereafter. After the robbery proceeds were divided, petitioner, Cedric Brown, and Maurice Fleming fled to Florida on a Greyhound bus. Miami authorities arrested the men at a local motel and discovered a food stamp in their hotel room which was traced back to a Riceboro citizen who shopped at Hodges Grocery. While being transported to a Miami jail, petitioner allegedly told a Florida police officer, James Smith, that he only shot Hodges once. Petitioner allegedly later told Kenneth McCall, a Georgia cellmate, that he shot the victim twice and was the first to shoot him. Petitioner alleges that his conviction should be set aside for nineteen reasons: (1) that the trial court erred by allowing improper comments by the prosecutor regarding petitioner’s failure to testify; (2) that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay testimony from “silent witnesses”; (3) that the trial court erred by delivering improper instructions to the jury; (4) that the trial court erred by failing to submit the sufficiency of corroboration evidence to the jury; (5) that there was insufficient evidence to convict petitioner of malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt; (6) that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of petitioner’s co-defendants’ guilty pleas during the guilt phase of the trial; (7) that the prosecutor allowed testimony known to be false and misleading to stand uncorrected in the record; (8) that the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory Brady material; (9) that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence during the testimony of Investigator Gray; (10) that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay statements made by petitioner’s co-conspirators; (11) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the testimony of a co-conspirator regarding the existence of a conspiracy must be corroborated; (12) that the trial court erred by admitting a coerced confession; (13) that petitioner’s trial counsel were ineffective; (14) that the trial court erred in denying petitioner’s motion for change of venue due to pretrial publicity; (15) that the trial court erred by refusing to answer the jury’s question concerning when petitioner would be eligible for parole; (16) that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of petitioner’s co-defendants’ guilty pleas at the penalty phase of the trial; (17) that the Georgia life without possibility of parole statute, O.C.G.A. § 17-10-31.1, is unconstitutional; (18) that the Georgia courts erred in refusing to consider the cumulative effect of multiple errors committed at trial; and (19) that the amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is unconstitutional insofar as it limits the federal courts’ ability to apply federal law. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, (“AEDPA”), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, created a standard of review for federal courts to use when reviewing the decisions of state courts under the habeas corpus statute. The Act became effective on the date it was signed into law, April 24, 1996. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996); Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1568 (11th Cir.1996) (en banc). The recently amended § 2254(d) provides in relevant part: (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. (e)(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994 & West Supp.1997). The Supreme Court has recently determined how it will apply this new standard of review in Williams v. Taylor, — U.S. -, -, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). In Williams, the Supreme Court held that “ § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court.” Id. First, the federal court evaluating a habeas petition under § 2254(d)(1) must determine the applicable “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This law can be found in “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1523. Further, any precedent or legal rule that would qualify as an old rule under the analysis of Teague v. Lane also constitutes clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1). Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1523. However, the source of clearly established law is restricted to the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. Id. Next, the court must determine whether one of the two conditions set forth in § 2254(d) applies. A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court arrived at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the United States Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decided a case differently than the Supreme Court has decided on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Id. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Id. The determination of unreasonableness is an objective one, and the federal court may not issue a writ of habeas corpus simply because it concludes in its independent judgment that the state court was erroneous or incorrect. Id. at 1521-22. Therefore, two principal standards control this Court’s review of Jenkins’s habeas petition: first, under § 2254(e), the state court’s determinations of factual issues are presumed correct unless the petitioner presents clear and convincing evidence that the state court determinations were erroneous. Secondly, under § 2254(d), claims decided on the merits in a state court cannot be the basis for habeas relief unless the state court ruling fails to pass muster under a Williams analysis. IY. ANALYSIS A. Prosecutorial Comments in Summation on Failure to Testify (Ground One) Petitioner asserts that he was denied his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as a result of the prosecutor’s allegedly improper comments regarding petitioner’s failure to testify or present evidence. Petitioner specifically objects to four comments by the prosecutor in this case: Each witness has testified. The defense, on each witness, has had the opportunity to present evidence and under cross-examination to refute the State’s evidence. Is there any evidence that has been presented by the defendant that refutes what the State’s evidence is? Resp’t’s Ex. 16 at 1925. We have presented evidence as to this defendant’s involvement, we have presented evidence as to this defendant’s statement. Has the defense presented any evidence, any evidence to refute the State’s evidence? I think the answer to that is clearly, no. Id. at 1925-26. As I was saying before the objection was made, that the State’s contention is that the defendant, the defense in this case has offered no evidence that would refute the testimony of the State’s witnesses as they’ve testified in this case. Id. at 1929. The second part of this State’s evidence is the admissions by the defendant.... So there’s three folks that have come into this courtroom, sat on this stand under oath and said, “This man admitted to shooting Mr. Robert Franklin Hodges.” And we contend that evidence has not been refuted in any way. Id. at 1938-39. The Supreme Court has clearly established that the prosecutor in a criminal case cannot comment on the accused’s silence at trial and cannot ask the jury to draw adverse inferences from that silence. United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 32, 108 S.Ct. 864, 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). The Eleventh Circuit has held that prosecutorial statements are improper if they are “manifestly intended” as a comment on the defendant’s silence or if they “would naturally and necessarily be understood by the jury” as a comment on his silence. Matire v. Wainwright, 811 F.2d 1430, 1435 (11th Cir.1987); United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1362 (11th Cir.1983). The Georgia Supreme Court found that the prosecutor’s statements, read in context, did not constitute comment on petitioner’s decision not to testify “but rather permissibly noted the failure of the defense to rebut the State’s evidence.” Jenkins II, 491 S.E.2d at 58. Comments on the defense’s failure to rebut the state’s evidence are improper only if they would necessarily be understood by the jury as a comment on his silence. United States v. Garcia, 13 F.3d 1464, 1474 (11th Cir.1994); Matire, 811 F.2d at 1435. Comments addressing the failure of the defense to rebut the prosecution’s evidence are not per se impermissible. Garcia, 13 F.3d at 1474 (holding that comments on defense’s failure to rebut testimony of key prosecution witness was not comment on defendant’s failure to testify). Reading the comments at issue here in context, it is clear that they were aimed at the defense’s failure to produce evidence rather than at the petitioner’s failure to testify. Consequently, the statements would not necessarily have been understood to be comments on petitioner’s silence. Petitioner cites numerous circuit cases holding that the prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s failure to call witnesses if the only potential witness was the defendant himself. See Bergmann v. McCaughtry, 65 F.3d 1372, 1377 (7th Cir.1995); Sidebottom v. Delo, 46 F.3d 744, 759 (8th Cir.1995); United States v. Sblen-dorio, 830 F.2d 1382, 1391 (7th Cir.1987); Davis v. United States, 357 F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir.1966). However, this legal rule has never been clearly established by the United States Supreme Court. Thus, under Williams, this rule of law cannot be the basis for habeas relief. Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1523. Consequently, petitioner has failed to show that the prosecutor’s comments violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. B. Improper Admission of Hearsay— Testimony as to Silent Witnesses (Ground Two) Petitioner asserts that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation by allowing Investigator Gray to testify as to hearsay from silent witnesses. Gray testified that he received information from unidentified silent witnesses which caused him to believe petitioner was involved in the robbery and murder of Mr. Hodges. Resp’t’s Ex. 15 at 1724-27. Petitioner admits that the content of the statements made by the silent witnesses was never revealed to the jury, but asserts that Gray’s testimony was “tantamount to a hearsay statement by these witnesses that petitioner was one of the perpetrators.” Pet’r’s Mem.Supp.Pet. Habeas Corpus at 32-33 (Doc. 3). The Supreme Court has clearly established that the Confrontation Clause does not necessarily prohibit the admission of hearsay statements against a criminal defendant. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 813, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990). Rather, the Clause requires that hearsay statements, which are admissible under exceptions to the hearsay rule, bear adequate indicia of reliability. Id. at 814-15, 110 S.Ct. 3139 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Edüd 597 (1980)). The Supreme Court has not, however, addressed the issue of whether statements from an officer that information was received from unidentified witnesses, without stating the content of the information, are tantamount to hearsay. The Eleventh Circuit and the former Fifth Circuit have held that statements by an officer concerning information received during his investigation which amount to substantive evidence of a defendant’s guilt violates the Confrontation Clause. Harris v. Wainwright, 760 F.2d 1148, 1151 (11th Cir.1985) (“The district court correctly saw the issue as whether [the officer’s] recital that he obtained information ... was substantive evidence of petitioner’s guilt, both because it bolstered [the identification testimony of other witnesses] and, ... tended to connect defendant with the crime.”); Hutchins v. Wainwright, 715 F.2d 512, 515 (11th Cir.1983) (holding that reference to the statements of an unidentified eyewitness who implicated petitioner in the crime is inadmissible under the Constitution); Favre v. Henderson, 464 F.2d 359, 362 (5th Cir.1972) (holding that testimony of officer as to statements by confidential informers impheating petitioner in the crime is inadmissible hearsay). Investigator Gray’s testimony about information received from silent witnesses did not serve to implicate petitioner in this crime. Indeed, both references to information received from unidentified witnesses tended to implicate Cedric Brown and not petitioner. Q. Okay. When did y’all receive the first lead as to the identity of the perpetrators in this case? A. The investigation revealed that there was a witness across the street that saw some black males coming down the road and one of ‘em was Cedric Brown. He knew him, going down the sidewalk, around the time the incident occurred. Q. Okay. So — so, one possible suspect at that time was identified, is that correct? A. That’s correct. Resp’t’s Ex. 15 at 1724-25. Q. Okay. Without going into what— what information came in, did y’all later receive a silent witness call that was assist — some assistance to you? A. That is correct. Around 12:30 the next day. That’d been on Saturday. Q. Okay. Following this information that y’all began to develop in this case, were some search warrants issued by the Sheriffs Office? A. That’s correct. Q. And those searches took place in what area? A. In the Riceboro area at Cedric Brown’s grandmother’s house and Terry Moten, Willie Moten’s house. Q. Okay. Was Cedric Brown located A. He was not. Id. at 1726. The testimony which tended to implicate petitioner was testimony concerning statements made by Terry Roberts, a co-conspirator who testified later in the trial. Admission of hearsay statements by persons who later testify at trial does not violate the Confrontation Clause under the rationale of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) and California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (“In the usual case (including cases where prior cross-examination has occurred), the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant.”) (emphasis added); Green, 399 U.S. at 162, 90 S.Ct. 1930 (“For where the declarant is not absent, but is present to testify and to submit to cross-examination, our cases, if anything, support the conclusion that the admission of his out-of-court statements does not create a confrontation problem.”). Accordingly, the admission of this testimony did not violate petitioner’s Sixth Amendment Confrontation rights. C. Charges on Malice Murder, Parties to a Crime, and Conspiracy (Ground Three) Petitioner asserts that the trial court violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law by issuing jury instructions on malice murder, parties to a crime and conspiracy which effectively relieved the state of its burden of proof on the essential elements of the offense. Petitioner asserts that the malice murder charge relieved the state of its burden on the element of intent because it failed to require the jury to find intent to kill, as opposed to simply finding malice, and because it failed to require the jury to find that petitioner himself had the intent to kill. Petitioner also alleges that the parties to a crime charge relieved the state of its burden of proof by failing to explain that petitioner could only be convicted of malice murder under the party to a crime theory if the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner was a party to the crime of malice murder. Further, the charge allegedly failed to require that petitioner personally intended that the victim be killed. Finally, petitioner alleges that the conspiracy charge relieved the state of its burden of proof because it failed to explain how the conspiracy charge applied to the malice murder count. The Supreme Court has clearly established that the Fourteenth Amendment “prohibits the State from using evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520-24, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 215, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698-701, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). An instruction that creates a mandatory presumption on an element of the offense is unconstitutional. Francis, 471 U.S. at 314, 105 S.Ct. 1965. However, an instruction that merely “suggests to the jury a possible conclusion to be drawn if the State proves predicate facts, but does not require the jury to draw that conclusion” is not constitutionally infirm. Id. The potentially offending portions of the instruction must be considered in the context of the charge as a whole, “ ‘for whether a defendant has been accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction.’ ” Id. at 315, 105 S.Ct. 1965 (quoting Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 514, 99 S.Ct. 2450). 1. Malice Murder Charge Petitioner asserts that the malice murder charge failed to require the jury to find intent to kill as well as malice and failed to require the jury to find that petitioner personally had an intent to kill. Specifically, petitioner argues that the “abandoned and malignant heart” portion of the instruction may have lead the jurors to believe that “it was sufficient to find petitioner guilty of malice murder simply because he participated in the robbery.” Mem.Supp.Pet. Habeas Corpus at 36. That is, petitioner asserts that the portion of the instruction stating that malice may be inferred from an abandoned or malicious heart creates an unconstitutional presumption which shifts the burden of proof to the petitioner. Petitioner’s arguments are specious. The instruction, when read in context, clearly informed the jury that intent to kill is an element of malice under Georgia law. Resp’t’s Ex. 16 at 1984. See Francis, 471 U.S. at 320, 105 S.Ct. 1965 (stating that, under Georgia law, malice aforethought consists of two elements: intent and the absence of provocation); Lamb v. Jernigan, 683 F.2d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that malice under Georgia law consists of intent to kill and lack of provocation or justification). Consequently, to find the existence of malice, the jury must also find the existence of intent to kill. The jury instructions clearly set forth this principle of law for the jury. Resp’t’s Ex. 16 at 1984-85 (“Now, legal malice is not ill will or hatred. It is the unlawful intent to kill or take the life of a human being without any justification or excuse.”). Accordingly, the instruction did not fail to explain to the jury that intent to kill is a necessary element of the offense. Furthermore, the “abandoned and malignant” heart instruction does not create an unconstitutional mandatory presumption of intent. This language, like the language in Lamb v. Jernigan, “is really a directive to the jury that the finding of malice must often be based entirely on circumstantial evidence — that it is not entitled to refuse to find malice solely because direct evidence of malicious intent is lacking.” Lamb, 683 F.2d at 1340. Thus, this instruction merely informs the jury that they are permitted to infer malice from the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense, but they are not required to so infer. Francis, 471 U.S. at 314, 105 S.Ct. 1965. As such, the instruction does not create an unconstitutional mandatory presumption on the element of intent. Finally, the jury, after hearing the instruction in context, would not reasonably have believed that they could find petitioner guilty of malice murder solely based on his participation in the robbery. The court clearly instructed the jury that malice murder requires that petitioner cause the death of another human being. Resp’t’s Ex. 16 at 1984 (“A person commits murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought either express or implied, causes the death of another human being.”). Mere participation in the robbery could not reasonably be construed as “causing the death of’ Mr. Hodges. Furthermore, although the phrase “abandoned and malignant heart” is not clearly defined, the context of the instruction clearly indicates its meaning. Indeed, as the Eleventh Circuit has already found, the “abandoned and malignant heart” instruction requires that “before drawing an inference of malice, the trier of fact must first conclude that the facts surrounding the lolling indicate that the defendant acted with a ‘malignant heart.’ ” Lamb, 683 F.2d at 1340. The instruction does not, however, relieve the jury of the duty of finding that a killing occurred and that petitioner participated in the killing. The instruction merely informs the jury that they may infer intent to kill from the circumstances surrounding the killing, an inference permitted by the Constitution under the rationale of Lamb v. Jemigan. Consequently, the malice murder instruction did not violate petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. 2. Parties to a Crime Charge Petitioner asserts that the parties to a crime charge was defective because the jury could reasonably have believed that they could convict petitioner of malice murder if they found him to be a party to the crime of armed robbery. Petitioner further alleges that the charge was erroneous for failing to explain that the jury had to find that petitioner personally intended that Mr. Hodges be killed. Mem.Supp. Pet. Habeas Corpus at 38. Petitioner’s arguments are baseless. No reasonable juror would have understood the instruction to have the meaning petitioner asserts here. The court instructed the jury that all persons concerned in the commission of a crime are parties thereto. The court went on to state that “[a] person is concerned in the commission of a crime only if he directly commits the crime or intentionally aids or abets in the commission of the crime.” Resp’t’s Ex. 16 at 1988 (emphasis added). Reading this instruction in light of the ordinary rules of grammar, in order for a person to be concerned in the commission of a crime (here malice murder), the person must directly commit that crime (malice murder) or intentionally aid or abet in the commission of that crime (again malice murder). Consequently, no reasonable juror would have believed the instruction authorized a conviction for malice murder if the jury merely found petitioner to be a party to the crime of armed robbery. Furthermore, the instruction clearly requires that the jury find that petitioner intended to aid and abet in the commission of the crime (here malice murder). To find that petitioner intended to aid and abet in the commission of malice murder is equivalent to a finding that petitioner intended that Mr. Hodges be killed. Coupled with the malice murder instruction analyzed above, which also clearly requires intent to kill, the jury was sufficiently instructed on the element of intent. Accordingly, the parties to a crime instruction did not violate petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. 3. Conspiracy Charge Petitioner asserts that the conspiracy charge was erroneous because it failed to explain how the law of conspiracy applied to the malice murder count of the indictment. Essentially, petitioner claims that the instruction created the mistaken impression that the jury could find petitioner guilty of malice murder if he conspired with anyone for any purpose. Again, petitioner’s arguments are baseless. The conspiracy instruction was given at the end of the segment of instructions concerning witness credibility, impeachment of witnesses, statements elicited by custodial interrogation, and the weight the jury should give statements allegedly made by defendant. Resp’t’s Ex. 16 at 1975-83. Furthermore, unlike the parties to a crime instruction, the conspiracy charge was not given as part of the substantive law section of the instructions. The placement of the instruction plus the actual text thereof clearly indicates that this instruction was only given so that the jury could determine whether to consider hearsay statements made by some of the alleged co-conspirators. In light of the clear and unambiguous substantive instructions that followed, no reasonable juror would have believed that the jury could find petitioner guilty of malice murder if he merely conspired to rob Mr. Hodges. Consequently, the conspiracy charge did not violate petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. D. Sufficiency of Corroboration Evidence (Ground Four) and Failure to Charge that Accomplice Testimony must be Corroborated (Ground Eleven) Petitioner alleges in ground four that the trial court violated petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to submit the issue of the sufficiency of the corroboration evidence to the jury. He further alleges in ground eleven that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by failing to charge the jury that accomplice testimony must be corroborated. Georgia law provides that a person may not be convicted of a felony based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. The sufficiency of the corroboration testimony is a matter which must be determined by the jury. Bradford v. State, 261 Ga. 833, 412 S.E.2d 534, 535 (1992). However, Section 24-4-8 does not apply where the state does not rely solely on the testimony of a single accomplice. Ross v. State, 245 Ga. 173, 263 S.E.2d 913, 916 (1980); Hall v. State, 241 Ga. 252, 244 S.E.2d 833, 838 (1978); Belcher v. State, 207 Ga.App. 117, 427 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1993); Smith v. State, 205 Ga.App. 810, 424 S.E.2d 56, 59 (1992). The Supreme Court has clearly established a constitutional right to have all the factual issues necessary for a determination of guilt determined by a jury. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). Under Georgia law, the sufficiency of corroboration evidence would be such a factual issue if the state relies solely on the testimony of a single accomplice. The Georgia Supreme Court found that the state did not rely solely on Terry Roberts’s testimony in this case but also relied on defendant’s statements admitting his participation in the crime. Jenkins II, 491 S.E.2d at 59. Petitioner asserts that this finding was erroneous because the statements standing alone were not sufficient to establish petitioner’s guilt. Mem.Supp. Pet. Habeas Corpus at 46. The Georgia Supreme Court, however, determined that these statements were sufficient under Georgia law to trigger the rule of Hall v. State. It is not the province of this Court to reexamine state-court determinations of state-law questions. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-78, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Accordingly, the Court must defer to the state court’s interpretation of state law. Because the state relied on evidence other than the accomplice's testimony, the trial court was not required to submit the sufficiency of corroboration evidence to the jury and was therefore not required to charge the jury on corroboration. Consequently, there was no violation of petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights with respect to these two grounds. E. Sufficiency of the Evidence (Ground Five) Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law because the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to convict him of malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court has clearly established that due process requires that no person shall convicted except upon sufficient proof — defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). A federal court reviewing an alleged due process violation of this type must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781. Georgia law on malice murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner caused Hodges’s death with malice aforethought. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-l(a). Malice consists of intent to kill and lack of provocation or justification. Lamb, 683 F.2d at 1337. Petitioner asserts that the evidence was insufficient to ’prove beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner personally killed Mr. Hodges or that he aided and abetted Cedric Brown in the murder of Mr. Hodges. Nevertheless, petitioner concedes that “there was some evidence ... that petitioner also shot Mr. Hodges.” Mem.Supp.Pet. Habeas Corpus at 49, 51. Further, petitioner concedes that a shell casing and bullet fired from a .25 caliber pistol other than the one allegedly used by Cedric Brown was found at the scene. Id. at 49. The state’s expert witness established that this shell casing and bullet were fired from a Lorein .25 caliber pistol, the type of gun Terry Roberts testified petitioner carried into the store on the afternoon of the robbery. Resp’t’s Ex. 16 at 1870-74 (testimony of ballistics expert Kelly Fite); Resp’t’s Ex. 15 at 1670-72, 1690 (testimony of Terry Roberts stating that petitioner possessed a handgun given to him by Maurice Fleming on the day of the murder); Id. at 1739-41 (testimony of Roger Fleming stating that his .25 caliber Lorein pistol disappeared from his home immediately after a visit from Maurice Fleming). The Lorein bullet, found near the desk area where the shooting began, did not sustain much damage. Id. at 1634. Additionally, the medical examiner established that Mr. Hodges suffered five wounds, one of which was definitely fatal and a second which was potentially fatal. Id. at 1624, 1627-28. The bullet which caused the fatal wound was never recovered, but the medical examiner testified that the bullet which caused that wound would not have suffered much damage in that its trajectory was largely through soft body tissue. Id. at 1628, 1634-35. The state also produced testimony that petitioner made several incriminating statements concerning his role in the robbery. Terry Roberts, the driver of the “get away car,” testified that immediately after the robbery, petitioner stated, “Yeah, yeah, yeah, I got him, bang, bang.” Id. at 1669. Roberts also testified that petitioner and Cedric Brown were joking about the shooting, about police initially arresting someone else, and about their plans to flee to Florida. Id. at 1676-77, 1688-89. James Smith, a police officer with the city of Opalocka, Florida, testified that petitioner volunteered a statement to him after petitioner’s arrest in Florida. Specifically, he testified that petitioner was worried about the electric chair and stated “I only shot him once.” Id. at 1775-76. Finally, Kenneth McCall, a former cellmate of petitioner, testified that petitioner told McCall that he shot Mr. Hodges, whom petitioner allegedly referred to as the “Old Cracker,” twice and that he was the first person to shoot Hodges. Id. at 1844. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable jury could have found petitioner guilty of malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt. It was reasonable for the jury to infer from this testimony that petitioner shot Mr. Hodges at least once and that this shot was either the fatal shot or it enabled Cedric Brown to fire the fatal shot by wounding Mr. Hodges or otherwise impeding his escape. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to convict petitioner of malice murder, and the trial court did not violate petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights by submitting the case to the jury. F. Exclusion of Evidence at the Guilt Phase of the Trial (Ground Six) Petitioner’s sixth ground alleges that the trial court violated his right to due process of law by improperly excluding evidence in the guilt phase of his trial. Specifically, petitioner alleges that the court’s exclusion of Cedric Brown’s guilty plea and any statements made at the plea hearing as well as Brown’s mental health file denied petitioner the right to present reliable material evidence in his defense. The Supreme Court has established that criminal defendants have the constitutional right to present a defense, including the right to offer testimony and evidence in their defense. Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). However, the Supreme Court has never clearly established bright-line rules concerning particular types of evidence. Rather, the Supreme Court has established that the central issue is whether the state court’s evidentiary rulings deprive the defendant of a fair trial under the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 303, 93 S.Ct. 1038. Consequently, criminal defendants “must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence,” unless the application of those rules under the circumstances of the case would deprive defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038. Petitioner has failed to establish how the exclusion of Brown’s guilty plea, statements at his plea hearing, and mental health file deprived petitioner of a fair trial. Because the evidence clearly indicates that two different shooters were involved in the murder, Brown’s guilty plea alone does not exculpate petitioner. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Brown made any statements at his plea hearing tending to exonerate petitioner. Therefore, the trial court’s finding that this evidence was irrelevant did not deprive petitioner of a fair trial. Finally, the state court found that petitioner only sought Brown’s mental health records for impeachment purposes and held that since Brown did not testify, petitioner’s appeal on this issue was moot. Jenkins II, 491 S.E.2d at 58 n. 3. Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that this factual finding is incorrect. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Accordingly, the Court finds that the trial court did not violate petitioner’s right to due process of law by excluding this evidence from the guilt phase of petitioner’s trial. G. False and Misleading Testimony by State’s Witnesses (Ground Seven) Petitioner’s seventh ground raises another alleged due process violation: that the state failed to correct the false or misleading testimony of three of its witnesses: Keith Moran, Kenneth McCall and Thomas Howard. Specifically, petitioner asserts that Moran’s testimony falsely implied that Roberts could not be charged with murder, thus enhancing Roberts’s credibility, and implied that petitioner was aware of a plot to kill Mr. Hodges prior to the robbery. Also, petitioner claims that McCall and Howard falsely testified that McCall received no deals or promises of leniency in exchange for his testimony. The Supreme Court has clearly established that a' conviction obtained via evidence, known by the state to be false, violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Edüd 1217 (1959). Falsehoods about the credibility of a witness also violate due process. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173. However, a new trial is required only if the false testimony could in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763; Napue, 360 U.S. at 271, 79 S.Ct. 1173. Petitioner asserts that Moran’s testimony essentially stated that Terry Roberts could not be charged with the murder or felony murder of Mr. Hodges. Mem.Supp. Pet. Habeas Corpus at 55. He further alleges that the testimony implies that Moran’s “investigation must have developed some evidence that petitioner was aware of a plan to kill Mr. Hodges prior to the time that it occurred.” Id. As the Georgia Supreme Court found, Moran’s testimony, when read in context, neither stated nor implied any such thing. Jenkins II, 491 S.E.2d at 57. Petitioner has failed to present any clear and convincing evidence that this factual finding is incorrect. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Accordingly, the Court finds that Moran’s testimony was not false, and petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated by the prosecution’s failure to correct the testimony. Petitioner argues that Kenneth McCall and Charles Howard falsely testified that McCall was offered no deals or promises of leniency in exchange for his testimony. Petitioner contends that McCall was in fact rewarded for his testimony by the District Attorney through a “nice letter” written to the parole board on McCall’s behalf and through the dismissal of certain habitual violator charges over a year after the end of petitioner’s trial. Mem.Supp.Pet. Habeas Corpus at 56-57. The Georgia Supreme Court found that the dismissal of the habitual violator charges was not part of a deal for McCall’s testimony. Jenkins II, 491 S.E.2d at 57-58. Petitioner has provided no clear and convincing evidence that this factual finding is incorrect. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that McCall was ever told of the District Attorney’s practice of writing a letter to the pardon and parole board on behalf of inmates who testify on behalf of the state. It is axiomatic that there can be no deal in exchange for testimony if the District Attorney never communicated his intentions to the witness prior to the giving of the testimony. Accordingly, the Court finds that the testimony of McCall and Howard was not false, and petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated by the prosecution’s failure to correct the testimony. H. Brady Violation (Ground Eight) Petitioner argues in his eighth ground that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the prosecutor’s failure to disclose alleged exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Specifically, petitioner alleges that the prosecution failed to disclose the existence of additional criminal charges against Kenneth McCall which were pending at the time of trial. The Supreme Court has clearly established that prosecutorial suppression of evidence favorable to the accused violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). This rule applies to impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). To establish a Brady violation a defendant must prove the following: (1) that the Government possessed evidence favorable to the defendant (including impeachment evidence); (2) that the defendant does not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.1989) (internal citations omitted). See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (“[S]howing that the prosecution knew of an item of favorable evidence unknown to the defense does not amount to a Brady violation, without more. But the prosecution, which alone can know what is undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net effect of all such evidence and make disclosure when the point of ‘reasonable probability’ is reached.”) (emphasis added); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (holding that material evidence must be disclosed if there exists a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed, the trial would have been different). The Georgia Supreme Court held that because the charges were a matter of public record and because McCall admitted the existence of the habitual violator charges on cross-examination, no Brady violation existed. Jenkins II, 491 S.E.2d at 58; see also Resp’t’s Ex. 15 at 1847 (testimony of Kenneth McCall). Petitioner has not shown that this finding was an unreasonable application of relevant Supreme Court authority. Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1523. “There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one.... ” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977). Brady and its progeny only require the prosecution to disclose material information known only to the prosecution. Because McCall’s criminal record was a matter of public knowledge, the prosecution had no duty to disclose it under Brady. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555; Meros, 866 F.2d at 1304. Consequently, petitioner’s due process rights were not violated by the failure to disclose McCall’s pending habitual violator charge to the defense. I. Improper Admission of Hearsay— Testimony of Investigator Gray (Ground Nine) Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights by admitting hearsay testimony by Investigator Gray concerning statements made by Terry Roberts, Shawn Brown, and Roger Fleming. Further, petitioner asserts that the admission of these statements violated the Constitution even though Mr. Roberts and Mr. Fleming testified later at trial. Mem.Supp.Pet. Ha-beas Corpus at 64. Petitioner’s arguments have no merit. The Supreme Court has clearly established that hearsay statements may be admissible against a criminal defendant if certain requirements are met. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 814-15, 110 S.Ct. 3139 (holding that hearsay statements may be admitted if declarant is unavailable and there are certain indicia of reliability present). The Court has further held that hearsay statements made by persons who later testify at trial do not violate the Confrontation Clause. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (“In the usual case (including cases where prior cross-examination has occurred), the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant.”) (emphasis added); California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 162, 90 S.Ct. 1930 (“For where the declarant is not absent, but is present to testify and to submit to cross-examination, our cases, if anything, support the conclusion that the admission of his out-of-court statements does not create a confrontation problem.”). Consequently, petitioner’s Confrontation Clause rights were not violated by the admission of statements made by Terry Roberts and Roger Fleming. With respect to Gray’s testimony concerning statements by Shawn Brown, the Georgia Supreme Court found this testimony to be cumulative of properly admitted testimony. Jenkins II, 491 S.E.2d at 57. Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that this factual finding is incorrect and has failed to show that this finding is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1523. The Supreme Court has held that habeas petitioners “are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’ ” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). Petitioner has failed to establish any actual prejudice that occurred as a result of the trial court’s admission of hearsay statements that were wholly duplicative of the admissible testimony of Terry Roberts and other trial witnesses. Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by the admission of hearsay statements in Investigator Gray’s testimony. J. Improper Admission of Hearsay Testimony — Testimony as to Co-Conspirators’ Statements (Ground Ten) Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights by erroneously admitting hearsay statements during the testimony of Terry Roberts. Specifically, petitioner argues that the statements by Cedric Brown and Maurice Fleming were not admissible under the co-conspirator exception because the court -failed to find that the state had established a prima facie case of conspiracy prior to admitting the evidence and because the court failed to make a finding on the reliability of the statements. Mem. Supp.Pet. Habeas Corpus at 65-69. Petitioner’s first argument is not one of constitutional law. Rather, it is an argument that the state court failed to follow state law by admitting the statements before making a finding that a prima facie case of conspiracy had been proven. Petitioner’s reading of state law is erroneous. Georgia allows the admission of testimony by co-conspirators before the conspiracy has been proven, provided its existence is ultimately shown at trial. Waldrip v. State, 267 Ga. 739, 482 S.E.2d 299, 309 (1997). Accordingly, the court did not err by admitting the testimony before ruling on whether a prima facie case of conspiracy had been proven. Furthermore, the court did rule that a prima facie case of conspiracy was established. Resp’t’s Ex. 16 at 1881. The Georgia Supreme Court found that the facts supported the trial court’s ruling. Jenkins II, 491 S.E.2d at 58. Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that this factual finding was incorrect. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner provides no support for his assertion that the trial court must examine the hearsay statements for indicia of reliability under Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970). Indeed, in Dutton itself, there is no evidence that the trial court made a finding that “indicia of reliability” existed. Rather, such a finding was made by the Supreme Court when it ruled that no confrontation violation occurred as a result of the admission of the hearsay statements. Id. at 73-74, 91 S.Ct. 210. Consequently, the trial court’s failure to address the existence of indicia of reliability was not error. The Georgia Supreme Court found that sufficient indicia of reliability existed, and petitioner has failed to establish that this finding was contrary to or was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1523. Accordingly, the Court finds that the trial court did not violate petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights by admitting the testimony of Terry Roberts as to hearsay statements made by the co-conspirators. K. Improper Admission of Petitioner’s Statement to Officer Smith (Ground Twelve) Petitioner alleges in his twelfth ground that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by admitting a coerced confession. Specifically, he asserts that the evidence at trial showed that statements he made to Officer James Smith were not spontaneous, as found by the trial court in a pretrial Jacksorir-Denno hearing. Consequently, petitioner argues that the trial court erred by admitting those statements without reopening the Jackson-Denno hearing. Mem.Supp.Pet. Habeas Corpus at 72-73. At the pretrial hearing, Officer Smith testified that petitioner spontaneously stated “I only shot him once.” Mem.Supp.Pet. Habeas Corpus at 72. Petitioner asserts that at trial, Officer Smith testified that he told petitioner “to tell the truth” and “to get your life together” before petitioner made his statement. Petitioner alleges that these comments by Officer Smith, if made before petitioner’s statement, constitute custodial interrogation which requires a new Jacksorir-Denno hearing. Id. at 73-74. Reviewing Smith’s trial testimony as a whole, it is obvious that Smith did not testify in the manner asserted by petitioner. At one point during cross-examination, Smith appears to state that petitioner’s statement was made after Smith’s comments about getting his life together. However, upon further questioning, Smith clearly indicated that petitioner’s statement was made before any such comments by Smith. The Georgia Supreme Court also found that the totality of Officer Smith’s testimony did not support petitioner’s argument. Jenkins II, 491 S.E.2d at 58. Petitioner has failed to establish that this ruling was contrary to or was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1523. Accordingly, the Court finds that the trial court did not violate petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights by admitting the testimony of Officer Smith. L. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Ground Thirteen) Petitioner alleges in ground thirteen that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel due to numerous alleged errors made by his trial counsel. The Supreme Court has clearly established that criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to “reasonably effective” legal assistance. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, — U.S. --,-, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 1034, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To establish a violation of this Sixth Amendment right, petitioner must show (1) that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Flores-Ortega, 120 S.Ct. at 1034; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Both parts of the test must be satisfied in order to show a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. With respect to the first prong, the Court must respect counsel’s tactical decisions if they seem reasonable considering all the circumstances. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Consequently, great deference is given to counsel’s choices and every effort must be made “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Ultimately, to prevail on Strickland’s first prong, petitioner “must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)). To satisfy Strickland’s second prong, petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. Petitioner lists sixteen alleged errors. Seven of these alleged errors involve the failure to object to events at trial which this Court has already found did not violate petitioner’s constitutional rights. Consequently, petitioner cannot establish that his attorneys’ failure to object to these events prejudiced his defense. Johnston v. Singletary, 162 F.3d 630, 644 (11th Cir.1998) (finding that no prejudice exists when counsel fails to timely object to conduct by prosecutor and court which did not violate Constitution or Supreme Court precedent). Accordingly, the Court will address in detail only those items which have not previously been addressed in this Order. 1. Improperly Advising Petitioner not to Testify Petitioner claims his attorneys misled him regarding the probable outcome of the case and improperly advised him not to testify in his own defense. Mem.Supp.Pet. Habeas Corpus at 76-78. Petitioner concedes that ordinarily this is a question of trial strategy, but he contends that under the facts of this case, counsel were constitutionally deficient in misleading petitioner as to the status of the case and failing to have petitioner testify. Id. at 77. Petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption that these actions were a matter of trial strategy. First, viewing the trial from counsel’s point of view at the time, it was not obvious that the trial was going to result as it did. Viewing the trial as a whole, petitioner’s counsel very effectively and thoroughly cross-examined the state’s most important witnesses and managed to clearly present their alternate theory of how the robbery and murder occurred. Their failure to accurately predict which theory the jury would believe and their concomitant optimism when discussing the case with petitioner do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, petitioner has failed to establish that his attorneys’ advice against testifying was anything other than reasonable trial strategy. At the hearing in support of petitioner’s motion for a new trial, his trial counsel testified that after listening to petitioner’s version of the robbery and murder, they did not hear anything that would help the defense and they were afraid petitioner might say something on cross examination that would be detrimental to his defense. Id. at 78. “In order to show that an attorney’s strategic choice was unreasonable, a petitioner must establish that no competent counsel would have made such a choice.” Provenzano v. Singletary, 148 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 1998). Petitioner has failed to make such a showing. Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner’s trial counsel were not deficient for advising petitioner not to testify. 2. Failing to Impeach Terry Roberts with his Prior Inconsistent Statements Petitioner contends that trial counsel’s failure to use Roberts’s actual prior statements to impeach him “was grossly deficient and highly prejudicial and deprived petitioner of effective assistance of counsel.” Mem.Supp.Pet. Habeas Corpus at 80. Roberts testified on direct and on cross examination that he lied to police the first few times he spoke with them to protect himself and his cousin Maurice Fleming. Resp’t’s Ex. 15 at 1682,1686-87. Furthermore, throughout the cross-examination of Terry Roberts, petitioner’s counsel repeatedly emphasized the relationship between Roberts and Fleming, Fleming’s extensive role in the robbery, and how Fleming was already in trouble with the law at the time of the robbery. Id. at 1684-1701. There is no reasonable probability that introduction of Roberts’s actual statements to the police would have damaged his credibility any more than the highly effective cross-examination did. Accordingly, even if failure to introduce the actual statements was error, petitioner has failed to establish that this alleged error prejudiced his defense in any way. 3. Failure