Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER SCHWARTZ, District Judge. FACTUAL BACKGROUND This action arises out of a dispute concerning the copyright in certain makeup designs (the “Makeup Designs” or “Designs”) created for the cast of the Broadway musical Cats (“Cats” or “the musical”). Plaintiff Candace Anne Carell (“plaintiff’) filed this action on July 12, 1999, asserting claims for copyright infringement, false designation of origin, antitrust violations, and an accounting for profits, arising out of defendants’ use and publication of the Makeup Designs. Plaintiff also seeks a declaration of sole ownership of the copyright in the Designs. Currently before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”) and as to certain defendants pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) (“Rule 12(b)(2)”). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. I. The Parties and Subject Matter Plaintiff, a makeup designer and artist, was the makeup designer for the New York production of Cats. (Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 1, 162.) The 18 defendants include entities and individuals engaged in producing or in licensing the rights to Cats, or who own an interest in corporations that have been and are so engaged. Defendants are: (1) The Shubert Organization, Inc. (“Shubert”), a New York corporation that is a producer of Cats and a licensee of defendant The Really Useful Group, Ltd. (Id. ¶ 163); (2) John Napier (“Napier”), the set and costume designer for the musical (Id. ¶ 3); (3) The Really Useful Group, Ltd. (formerly Really Useful Company, Ltd.) (“RUG”), a British corporation that is among the producers or licensors of Cats productions in New York and overseas (Id. ¶ 165); (4) The Really Useful Theatre Co., Ltd. (“RUT”), a British corporation that is among the producers or licensors of Cats (Id. ¶ 166); Really Useful Films, Ltd. (“RUF”), a British corporation that is among the producers or licensors of Cats (Id. ¶ 167); (6) Really Useful Holdings, Ltd. (“RUH”), a British corporation that is among the producers or licensors of Cats (Id. ¶ 168); (7) The Cats Company, an organization that is among the producers of Cats and is controlled by defendant Shubert (Id. ¶¶ 10 n. 1, 169); (8) Polygram NV, a Netherlands corporation that owned approximately 30 percent of defendants RUG and/or RUT from 1991 to December 1998 (Id. ¶ 170); (9) Universal Music Group, Inc., a California corporation that acquired defendant Polygram NV and owned 30 percent of defendants RUG and/or RUT from December 1998 to mid-April 1999 (Id. ¶ 171); (10) Cameron Mackintosh, Inc., a Delaware corporation owned by individual defendant Cameron Mackintosh that is among the producers of Cats productions in London and New York (Id. ¶ 172, 180); (11) Flummery Corporation, a New York corporation that is the official licensing agent for Cats (Id. ¶ 173); (12) Nina Lannan Associates, Inc. (formerly The Nina Lannan Management Company, a division of defendant RUG from 1993 to 1997), a New York corporation that is one of the managers of defendant The Cats Company (Id. ¶¶ 10 n. 1, 174); (13) Polygram Video, a division of defendant Polygram Records, Inc. that manufactured and marketed the video version of Cats (Id. ¶ 175); (14) Polygram Records, Inc., a Delaware corporation of which Polygram Video is a division (Id. ¶ 176); (15) Gerald Schoenfeld (“Schoenfeld”), chairman of defendant Shubert (Id. ¶ 177); (16) Andrew Lloyd Webber (“Webber”), producer of the video version of Cats and sole or majority owner of defendant Really Useful businesses (Id. ¶¶ 163, 178); (17) David Geffen (“Geffen”), a producer of the New York productions of Cats (Id. ¶ 179); and (18) Cameron Mackintosh (“Mackintosh”), a producer and/or licensor of Cats productions and sole or part owner of defendant Cameron Mackintosh, Inc. (Id. ¶ 180.) II. Plaintiffs Contract and Creation of the Makeup Designs Cats is reportedly “the longest running, most financially successful property” in the history of American theater. (Id. ¶ 9.) There have been over 40 productions of the musical in 27 countries, and within the last three years there has been a United States tour, European tour, and productions in Budapest, Hamburg and Tokyo. (Id. ¶ 66-67.) The musical opened in London, England in May 1981, and is still running there. (Id. ¶ 34.) Early in 1982, plaintiff heard that Cats was coming to New York City and contacted the musical’s executive producer and manager, R. Tyler Gatchell, about designing the cast’s makeup. (Id. ¶ 31.) Communications between plaintiff, Gatchell and Napier followed, and in March 1982, The Cats Company commissioned plaintiff to create the Makeup Designs for the musical’s New York productions. (Id. ¶¶ 31-32, 58.) Napier allegedly told plaintiff that he wanted her “pure imagination” for the creation of the Designs, and plaintiff “promised to create something beautiful.” (Id. ¶¶ 5, 32.) Plaintiff was cautioned not to read the poems on which the musical is based, nor to see the London production. (Id. ¶ 32.) In August 1982, approximately two months before Cats opened at the Winter Garden Theatre (the “Theatre”) in New York City, plaintiff and Napier began what plaintiff terms a “collaboration” on the Designs. (Id. ¶ 37.) Napier provided ideas for the makeup for at least two of the Cats characters. In particular, one of plaintiffs first creations was the “White Cat,” which Napier suggested should be “soft, white, and sensual.” (Id. ¶41.) Grizabella was to be “full of aging beauty and despair, confronting her mortality.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that, for these characters, she gave Napier’s ideas full expression in her Design. (Id. ¶ 42.) Each Design contains a number of elements that “hel[p] turn human faces catlike.” (Id. ¶ 44.) Moreover, their application involves “extensive layering.” (Id. ¶ 45.) Plaintiff notes that some were created with six or seven layers and originally took as long as an hour and a half to apply. (Id.) In certain cases, plaintiff and Napier “both did hands work on a design.” (Id. ¶43.) In most of these cases, plaintiff created the Design and Napier made adjustments and suggestions. On “rare occasions,” Napier created the Design and plaintiff made alterations and suggestions. (Id.) During these design sessions, Napier did not show plaintiff Napier’s costume sketches from the London production of Cats. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 38.) While the Makeup Designs were completed by the end of September 1982, plaintiffs contract was made final on or about July 7, 1983. (Id. ¶¶ 54, 58, 59.) The contract provided for a flat fee to plaintiff of $2,000 for “executing makeup designs,” a weekly payment of $750 beginning September 20, 1982 (after the Designs had been created) and ending shortly after opening night, and a weekly stipend of $200 for the run of the show in return for plaintiffs “ongoing supervisory services.” (Id. ¶¶56, 59.) Plaintiff therefore receives annual compensation of more than $10,000 and, in total, has received over $170,000. (Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem. Law”) at 4.) During the period of creation, plaintiff also worked full time for the NBC television network, except for a brief period of leave before previews began during which she was paid the $750 weekly payment noted above. (Compl.lHI 49-50.) Plaintiff has received wide recognition for the creation of the Makeup Designs. While she is not listed as one of Napier’s assistants in the playbill for the musical’s New York production, she is credited in a-“stand-alone” playbill credit that reads: “Makeup by Candace Carell.” (Id. ¶4.) Plaintiff asserts that she has regularly conducted interviews as the musical’s makeup designer (Id. ¶¶ 63-64), participated in photo shoots with Cats characters (Id. ¶¶ 46-49), and was credited as the musical’s makeup designer by the New York Times. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 65.) III. Competing Registrations and Ownership Claims Plaintiffs contract makes no reference to copyrights in the Makeup Designs. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 56, 60.) According to plaintiff, Napier’s contract for the New York production of Cats, executed in early August 1982, did address copyrights by providing for Napier to assign his own unspecified copyrights to RUG. (Id. ¶ 61.) In 1983 and 1984, plaintiff consulted two lawyers concerning the copyrightability of the Makeup Designs, neither of whom opined that the Designs were copyrightable. (Id. ¶¶ 68, 83.) A third, Marc Jacobsen, whom plaintiff consulted in 1986 or 1987, opined that the Designs were copyrightable. (Id. ¶ 84.) Plaintiff also retained an agent and drafted a proposal for three books related to the Makeup Designs, and allegedly received authorization from Nina Lannan, an agent for The Cats Company and RUG, to proceed with the books. {Id. ¶¶ 77-78.) Lannan indicated that plaintiffs books would be considered for sale in the The-atre lobby. {Id. ¶ 79.) Plaintiffs attorney also contacted Flummery Corporation, the official licensing agent for Cats. {Id. ¶ 78.) In 1990, plaintiff “often discussed” certain projects, including the books and a makeup kit, with the president of Flummery Corporation and his wife over dinner, and the couple was allegedly enthusiastic about these projects. {Id. ¶ 81.) In October 1990, Jacobsen filed plaintiffs application for copyright registration. {Id. ¶ 85.) Plaintiffs Certificate of Registration has an effective date of October 11, 1990, and the certificate was granted on April 8, 1991. {Id. ¶¶ 85, 90.) Jacobsen registered the copyright in plaintiffs Designs as a group, and, over plaintiffs objections that Napier be given credit as joint author of certain of the Designs, filed the registration solely in plaintiffs name. {Id. ¶ 86; Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Pl.’s Mem. Law) at 10.) Jacob-sen allegedly had concluded that all of Napier’s contributions were “either de minimis or merely uneopyrightable ideas.” {Id. ¶ 87.) Plaintiff has never “licensed, assigned, or otherwise transferred any of her copyrights” in the Makeup Designs. {Id. ¶ 8.) By letter dated January 10, 1992, Jacob-sen informed the managers of The Cats Company of plaintiffs registration, and sought to negotiate a license for the company’s use of the Makeup Designs. {Id. ¶ 91.) On June 30, 1992, the company’s attorney sent plaintiff a letter by certified mail, stating that: The Cats Company and The Really Useful Company have heard that ... you are preparing a coloring book or other such book on the Cats facial designs and makeup.... The drawings and designs of the Cats faces have been duly registered for copyright in the United States Copyright Office by The Really "Useful Company and are protected by copyright in many other countries throughout the world. If you infringe upon said copyright or trademark, it will constitute a willful infringement thereof, and The Cats Company and/or The Really Useful Company will take such legal action against you as is appropriate. (Id. ¶¶ 92-93; Letter from Edward E. Col-ton to plaintiff dated June 30, 1992, Ex. D to Affirmation of Judith Jobin in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Jobin Aff.”).) Copies of the letter were sent, inter alia, to Jacobsen, Lannan, and Schoenfeld. (Ex. D to Jobin Aff.) Plaintiff alleges that the letter asserted false information, because defendants had not filed a registration for the Makeup Designs. (Transcript of oral argument held on January 10, 2000 (“Tr.”) at 37:16-20.) Plaintiff claims that the letter instead referred to certain of Napier’s costume sketches that had been registered incidentally to the registration of the 1983 publication, Cats, The Book of the Musical. (ComplJ 97.) Jacobsen’s request for a copy of The Cats Company’s registration of the “designs of Cats faces” went unanswered. {Id. ¶ 96.) Because of the threat of litigation, plaintiff subsequently was unable to find a publisher for her proposed books related to the Makeup Designs. {Id. ¶ 98.) In August 1992, The Cats Company’s attorney informed Jacobsen that the attorney would seek to cancel plaintiffs copyright registration. {Id. ¶ 104.) In March 1993, Napier, Shubert, and RUG petitioned the Copyright Office requesting cancellation of plaintiffs copyright registration in the Makeup Designs. (Id. ¶ 105.) Napier asserted in his petition that “the designs of the facial appearances ... were my creation and not those of Candace Carell.” (Id. ¶ 108.) A letter sent to plaintiff from the Copyright Office on March 81, 1993 stated that Napier had alleged that the registration made with “[plaintiffs] name given as author of the designs and copyright claimant of the designs” states incorrect facts and that Napier “[was] the author and copyright owner of the designs.” (Letter from Copyright Office to plaintiff dated March 31, 1993, Ex. A to Jobin Aff.) Also in 1993, Jacobsen unsuccessfully sought to amend plaintiffs copyright certificate to include Napier as sole author of three Designs and co-author of 15 others, leaving 10 with plaintiff as sole author. (Compl. ¶87; Jobin Aff. ¶4; Ex. B to Jobin Aff.) Plaintiff contends that Napier and RUG “repudiated co-authorship and co-ownership.” (Compl. ¶87, 120; Tr. at 34:8-9.) On July 13, 1993, Napier and RUG registered Napier’s costume sketches as “Designs for the Costumes and Facial Expressions of the Characters in the Musical Play Cats. ” (Compl-¶ 129.) While plaintiff asserts that these “facial expressions” are not the Makeup Designs, (Tr. at 34:1-5, 35:3-5.), the Copyright Office viewed Napier’s and RUG’s registration and plaintiffs 1990 registration as asserting adverse claims. On June 30, 1994, the Copyright Office informed the parties that the Office had decided not to cancel plaintiffs registration. (Compl. ¶ 125; Letter from Copyright Office to Edward A. Colton, Esq., Ex. B. to Affidavit of David Rabinowitz (“Rabinowitz Aff.”).) The notice stated inter alia that the “Copyright Office is an office of record, and is not an adjudicator of disputed claims ... it is Copyright Office policy to register both claims ... [and] to leave this matter to the courts to decide the factual issues.” (Ex. B. to Rabinowitz Aff.) In addition, the Copyright Office declined to amend plaintiffs certificate to reflect joint authorship with Napier for some of the Designs, citing defendants’ explicit rejection of co-authorship of any of the Designs. (Compl. ¶ 126; Pl.’s Mem. Law at 11.) In 1995, the managers of The Cats Company again allegedly warned plaintiff “not to claim authorship.” (Compl. ¶¶ 10 n. 1, 94.) Also in that year, RUG started a toy and game división. (Id. ¶ 99.) Through that division, in or about 1997, one of more of the defendants authorized the “creation, production, and distribution” of the “Official Cats Coloring and Activity Book.” (Id. ¶ 101.) The video version of Cats, which was taped in England, was, thereafter aired on the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) television network, and was released for international sale in the fall of 1998. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 67,165.) The video gives credit, inter alia, to RUT, RUF, and Schoenfeld, and the makeup design credit to another designer affiliated with defendants. (Jobin Aff. ¶ 7; Compl. ¶ 176.) Also in the fall of 1998, a Cats makeup kit entitled the “Face Painting Set” was released, featuring the faces of four Cats cast members. (Compl.f 102.) Plaintiff states that the “Face Painting Set” omits the name of any author; playbills or similar programs have omitted plaintiff’s name and/or credited others for the Makeup Designs; and defendants have published press releases giving credit to Napier for the Designs and omitting credit to plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 196.) PBS has also broadcast a video about the making of Cats that allegedly excluded plaintiff and featured another designer. (Id. ¶ 67.) The Cats Company has acquired an Internet web-site for merchandising these and other products. (Id.) Plaintiff commenced this action on July 12, 1999, seeking monetary damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as costs and attorneys fees. The Complaint asserts claims under: (i) the Copyright Act of 1976 (“Copyright Act”), 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 504, 505, and several foreign copyright statutes, alleging copyright infringement; (ii) the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, for a declaration of sole copyright ownership; (iii) the Lanham Act, section 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), alleging false designation of origin; (iv) the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, alleging anti-trust violations; and (v) the Copyright Act and New York common law for an accounting of profits by a co-owner, in the event that plaintiff is precluded from asserting independent copyright ownership. On December 1, 1999, the instant motion to dismiss was filed by defendants Shu-bert, RUG, RUT, RUF, RUH, The Cats Company, Flummery Corporation, Schoen-feld, and Webber. They move to dismiss the action in its entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and as against RUT, RUF and RUH pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2). Defendants also specifically allege that plaintiffs claims against Schoenfeld and Webber should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), because plaintiffs have failed to identify any actionable conduct by these defendants. (Def.’s Mem. Law at 37-39.) On January 10, 2000, the Court heard oral argument on the motion. Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties dated February 28, 2000, the following defendants joined the pending motion: Napier; Mackintosh; Cameron Mackintosh, Inc.; Nina Lannan Associates, Inc.; Polygram NV; Polygram Records; Inc.; and Universal Music Group, Inc. (Stipulation dated February 28, 2000.) Defendant Geffen joined the pending motion by stipulation of the parties dated May 2, 2000. (Stipulation dated May 2, 2000.) DISCUSSION I. Legal Standard Governing Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss an action when the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Dismissal is inappropriate, however, unless “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle him to relief.” Staron v. McDonald’s Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 355 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept the plaintiffs factual allegations as true. See Branham v. Meachum, 77 F.3d 626, 628 (2d Cir.1996); Staron, supra, 51 F.3d at 355. The Court’s function is not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at trial but merely to determine whether the Complaint itself is legally sufficient. See Festa v. Local 3 Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 905 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir.1990) II. Plaintiff’s Copyright Claims Plaintiffs first, second, and fifth causes of action are copyright claims. The first cause of action, brought pursuant to the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 504, 505, alleges that defendants infringed plaintiffs copyright in the Makeup Designs during the three-year period prior to the filing of the instant action. (Comply 185.) The second cause of action, brought pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, seeks a declaration that plaintiff is the sole owner of the copyright in the Makeup Designs, and “has the unfettered right to exploit them commercially or otherwise in any medium, as well as the right to receive damages and injunc-tive relief.” (Id. ¶ 192.) Plaintiffs fifth cause of action alternatively seeks an accounting for profits as a co-owner, pursuant to the Copyright Act, and New York common law. Moreover, in addition to her claims brought under the U.S. Copyright Act, plaintiff brings infringement claims under several foreign copyright statutes. (Id. ¶¶ 25,181.) A. Ownership Claims 1. Elements of Ownership Because the issue of ownership, as raised by the parties, is integral to assessing the sufficiency of plaintiffs infringement claims, we will first address plaintiffs claims for sole ownership and, in the alternative, for an accounting based on co-ownership. In order for a work to be copyrightable, it must be “an original work of authorship”; that is, it must be (i) original and (ii) fixed in a tangible form. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Copyright protection for an original work does not extend to “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). The Copyright Act provides that ownership “vests initially in the author or authors of the work.” Id. The author of a work is the person “who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection.” Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102). An individual claiming to be an author for copyright purposes must show “the existence of those facts of originality, of intellectual production, of thought, and conception.” Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346-347, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991) (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59-60, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349 (1884)). 2. Parties’ Disagreement On Ownership There is no disagreement between the parties that the Makeup Designs are copyrightable, or that the creator of such Designs is entitled to protection even if he or she does not apply the makeup to the show’s performers. The Designs contain the requisite degree of originality, and are fixed in tangible form on the faces of the Cats actors. Cf. Andrien v. Southern Ocean County Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir.1991) (finding that “a party can be considered an author when his or her expression of an idea is transposed by mechanical or rote transcription into tangible form under the authority of the party”); Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1108 (5th Cir.1991) (noting that authors may be entitled to copyright protection even if they do not “perform with their own hands the mechanical tasks of putting the material into the form distributed to the public”); (Ex. A to Jobin Aff.) (letter from the Copyright Office stating that “any copyright claim would have to be in creating the designs”). However, the parties disagree on the implications of plaintiffs registration of the Makeup Designs with the Copyright Office on the ownership of the Designs. While defendants acknowledge that each of the Designs can be individually authored, and, by implication, are individually copyrightable, they appear to deny that plaintiff can assert copyright ownership as to individual Designs because plaintiff registered them as “one work.” (Def.’s Mem. Law at 16.) The Court finds defendants’ position untenable. Section 408(c)(1) of the Copyright Act permits single registration for a group of “related works.” 17 U.S.C. § 408(c)(1); see also Xoom, Inc. v. Imageline, Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:98CV00542, 1999 WL 1611444, at *1 (E.D.Va. Sept. 3, 1999) (defining “group registration” as “a single registration that actually covers multiple works”); (Tr. at 57: 15-19.) That section of the Act also states that the “administrative classification of works has no significance with respect to the subject matter of copyright or the exclusive rights provided by this title.” Id. Simply because certain designs are registered as a group does not prevent the alleged owner from bringing a claim for infringement as to individual designs. See Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 93 F.Supp.2d 449, 456-59 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (finding that jury could reasonably find infringement of certain individual jewelry designs within a group of designs registered under a single copyright, and that infringement of an individual design would still be possible even if the' designs had improperly been registered as a group); Brown v. McCormick, 23 F.Supp.2d 594, 610 (D.Md.1998) (holding that designer of 15 quilt block patterns registered as a single copyright could sue for infringement with respect to any of the individual designs). In this case, because the Makeup Designs do not constitute a single work, it is a priori possible that the copyright in each of the Designs could be owned individually by plaintiff or Napier (and his assigns), or jointly where each is also a co-author. While the parties appear to agree on the facts surrounding the creation of the Makeup Designs, they disagree on the specifics of authorship and, consequently, the ownership of the Designs. Each side has made seemingly inconsistent claims. While plaintiff acknowledges that she worked “[i]n collaboration with [defendant] Napier,” she maintains that she created certain “design elements and entire designs.” (Pl.’s Mem. Law at 9.) She states that in her 1990 copyright registration, she claimed ownership to all 28 of the Designs at issue, and that this was not erroneous. But in 1993, her attorney, Jacobsen, “revised his legal opinion as to some of the designs.” (Id. at 10, 23; Compl. ¶ 87.) In particular, Jacobsen claimed that plaintiff was the sole author of 10 of the Designs, that 15 were co-authored with Napier, and 3 were authored solely by Napier. (PL’s Mem. Law at 11; Compl. ¶ 87). Plaintiff asserts that she is not bound by Jacobsen’s opinions. (Pl.’s Mem. Law at 23). While plaintiffs allegations are far from a model of clarity, it is clear that she claims sole authorship, and thereby sole ownership, of some or all of the Makeup Designs. She has consistently maintained that at least 10 of the Makeup Designs are solely hers. (Id. at 11, 24; Compl. ¶¶ 86-87; Jobin Aff. ¶ 4.) Defendants acknowledge that plaintiff created a certain number of the Designs, and specifically refer to Jacobsen’s findings as to the respective authorship of plaintiff and Napier. (Def.’s Mem. Law at 16-17.) However, they assert that they have “consistently and unequivocally treated all ‘Cats’ copyrights as their own.” (Id. at 5.) In this motion, they challenge both of plaintiffs ownership claims as time-barred, and her sole ownership claim on the basis that the Makeup Designs are a “joint work” authored by plaintiff and Napier. (Id. at 7-11, 15-18.) Because the Court finds that plaintiffs ownership claims are barred by the statute of limitations, it need not consider the joint work argument here. 3. Plaintiffs Ownership Claims are Time-Barred Pursuant to section 507(b) of the Copyright Act, a plaintiff seeking a declaration of copyright co-ownership must commence an action within three years of the accrual of the claim. See Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir.1996). Courts in this district have extended this rule to parties seeking a declaration of sole ownership. See, e.g., Minder Music Ltd. v. Mellow Smoke Music Co., No. 98 Civ. 4496(AGS), 1999 WL 82075, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1999) (applying the three-year limitations period to plaintiffs assertion of sole ownership); Aday v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 0991, 1997 WL 598410, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1997) (same); Fort Knox Music, Inc. v. Baptiste, 47 F.Supp.2d 481, 483-84 (S.D.N.Y.1999), remanded on other grounds (applying the three-year limitations period in declaratory judgment action to bar defendant songwriter from asserting sole ownership). Copyright claims begin to accrue, when the plaintiff “knows or should have known of the injury on which the claim is premised.” Merchant, supra, 92 F.3d at 56. In this case, it is clear from the facts alleged in the Complaint that plaintiffs sole ownership and accounting claims, which both involve a declaration of ownership rights, accrued more than three years prior to the commencement of the action. Although plaintiff contends that defendants appeared to recognize her “proprietary interest” in the Makeup Designs before 1992, (CompLIHÍ 11-12), she has never received royalty payments from defendants for use of her copyrights. (Id. ¶ 49; Def.’s Mem. Law at 5.) Thus, although defendants did not directly acknowledge their repudiation, of plaintiffs rights during the 1980s, their non-payment of royalties should have put her on notice of this fact. (Def.’s Mem. Law at 5.); cf. Dewan v. Blue Man Group Ltd. Partnership, 73 F.Supp.2d 382, 386-87 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (finding that non-payment of royalties was one element triggering accrual of claim in a suit for a declaration of co-ownership). Even if the non-payment of royalties were not sufficient to put plaintiff on notice as to her ownership claims, the claims accrued in 1992 based on defendants’ clear assertion of ownership and their repudiation of plaintiffs claims to both sole and co-ownership. In January 1992, plaintiff sent a letter to defendants asserting copyright ownership of the Makeup Designs and demanding that defendants seek a license from plaintiff in order to continue their theretofore illegal use of the Designs. (ComplY 91); see Fort Knox, supra, 47 F.Supp.2d at 483-84 (holding that sole ownership claim accrued when putative sole owner first attempted to assert sole ownership); Dewan, supra, 73 F.Supp.2d at 386-87 (holding that co-ownership claim accrued when plaintiff first attempted to have defendants recognize his ownership interest). Instead of complying with plaintiffs request, defendants asserted ownership of the copyrights in the Designs in their July 30, 1992 letter, in which they warned plaintiff that her use of the Designs to produce, inter alia, a Cats coloring book would constitute a “willful infringement.” (Compl.lffl 92-93.) In March 1993, Napier refused to allow plaintiff to add his name to plaintiffs copyright registration, and Napier, Shubert and RUG petitioned the Copyright Office to cancel plaintiffs registration of the Designs. In the petition, Napier asserted inter alia that “the designs of the facial appearances ... were my creation and not those of [plaintiff]”. (Id. ¶ 108.) Further, in July 1993, Napier and RUG themselves registered a copyright adverse to that of the plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 129.); cf. Aday, supra, 1997 WL 598410 at *4-5 (holding that sole ownership claim accrued when defendants first asserted ownership by entering into contract with plaintiff in which a work-for-hire clause granted sole ownership of the copyrights to defendants). Plaintiff subsequently engaged in significant correspondence with the Copyright Office concerning defendants’ cancellation proceedings. (Compl.lffl 114-116,122). Accordingly, at the latest, plaintiff was afforded notice of the facts giving rise to her ownership claims by July 1993. Because these claims accrued approximately six years prior to the commencement of the action, plaintiffs ownership claims are barred by the statute of limitations. (Tr. at 38:21-25.) 4. The Statute of Limitations Cannot Be Tolled Contrary to plaintiffs suggestion, neither equitable tolling nor equitable estop-pel will toll the statute of limitations on her copyright ownership claims in order to cure her delay in filing. (Pl.’s Mem. Law at 2-3, 5-6, 17 n. 13; Compl. ¶¶ 68, 84-89, 157, 161.) Equitable tolling tolls the statute where a plaintiff “was justifiably ignorant of his cause of action.” Netzer, 963 F.Supp. at 1316 (citing Dillman v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 784 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir.1986)). In this case, the statute of limitations cannot be tolled beyond July 1993, when, as stated above, plaintiff was unequivocally put on notice of her ownership claims by the adverse copyright registration of defendants. This is not sufficient to bring plaintiffs ownership claims within the statute of limitations. Equitable estoppel tolls the limitations period where the plaintiff knew of the existence of the cause of action but the defendants’ “egregious misconduct” caused the plaintiff to delay filing suit. Id. at 1316 (citing Buttry v. General Signal Corp., 68 F.3d 1488, 1493 (2d Cir.1995)). The doctrine only applies when the defendant “has taken active steps to prevent [the plaintiff] from suing in time, as for example, by promising not to plead the statute of limitations.” Jerry Kubecka, Inc. v. Avellino, 898 F.Supp. 963, 971 (E.D.N.Y.1995). Plaintiff states that her delay in filing suit after 1992 was due in part to ongoing settlement negotiations with defendants. (Pl.’s Mem. Law at 11; Compl. ¶¶ 23, 91-92, 156, 161.) However, these negotiations do not justify a delay in suit under an equitable estoppel theory, where the years 1992 and after where punctuated by defendants’ cease and desist letter, initiation of cancellation proceedings, registration of their own copyright, and alleged communications to potential licensees that plaintiffs exploitation of the Makeup Designs was illegal. See Dewan, supra, 73 F.Supp.2d at 386-87 (finding that several years of settlement negotiations did not warrant a finding of equitable estoppel where there were lapses in contact between the sides and where a “letter from defendants served to place [plaintiff] on notice once again that a suit was necessary”); Beneficial Capital Corp. v. Richardson, No. 92 Civ. 3785, 1995 WL 324768, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1995) (denying equitable estoppel where delay was due in part to settlement negotiations). Moreover, defendants’ threats of litigation if plaintiff claimed or exploited her alleged copyright would not equitably estop defendants from asserting the statute of limitations. See Netzer, supra, 963 F.Supp. at 1318 (finding no equitable estoppel where delay was due to “fear of harm to a plaintiffs career”). B. Domestic Infringement Claims 1. Plaintiff Has Sufficiently Pleaded An Infringement Cause of Action To withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint based on copyright infringement must allege: (1) which original works are the subject of the copyright claim; (2) that the plaintiff owns the copyrights in those works; (3) that the copyrights have been registered in accordance with the statute; and (4) “by what acts during what time” the defendant infringed the copyright. See Kelly v. L.L. Cool J., 145 F.R.D. 32, 35 (S.D.N.Y.1992), aff'd, 23 F.3d 398 (2d Cir.1994). The Court finds that plaintiffs Complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action for copyright infringement. While there is some ambiguity as to her precise ownership claims, plaintiff has specifically identified the 28 makeup Designs as the works at issue, for which she has a valid copyright registration, and has alleged sole ownership to some, if not all, of the Designs. Such pleading is sufficient to establish the first three elements of an infringement claim. See Kelly, supra, 145 F.R.D. at 36 & n. 3 (discussing these elements). Further, plaintiffs allegations of infringing acts associated with the publication of the Designs in Cats productions and through related products are adequately, albeit inartfully, plead in the Complaint with respect to most defendants. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the particular infringing acts be set out with some specificity, Franklin Elec. Publishers, Inc., 763 F.Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y.1991), and broad, sweeping allegations of infringement do not comply. See Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 639 F.Supp. 816, 820 (W.D.Mo.1986), aff'd, 833 F.2d 117 (8th Cir.1987) (plaintiffs allegation that “all other animated productions, paper products, dolls, toys, and any other merchandising and licensing products” of defendant were infringing was too broad under Rule 8). Plaintiffs Complaint narrows the infringing acts to the publication of the Makeup Designs in national and international stage productions and videos, and their illegal use in certain commercial products. (Compl.1ffl 66-82, 93-103.) These allegations are sufficiently specific for the purposes of Rule 8, despite the fact that each individual infringement was not specified. Cf. Franklin, supra, 763 F.Supp. at 4 (stating that complaint complied with Rule 8 in spite of the fact that defendants could not determine whether software elements or visual elements of the computer were claimed to be infringed); Richard Feiner and Co., Inc. v. Larry Harmon Pictures Corp., 38 F.Supp.2d 276, 279 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (finding that plaintiffs failure to specify which copyright is infringed by which act was not fatal to his infringement claim). Therefore, the Complaint satisfactorily pleads a copyright infringement claim. 2. Plaintiffs Infringement Claims Cannot Be Dismissed as Time-Barred Without addressing the sufficiency of plaintiffs domestic infringement claims, defendants assert that they should be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. They state that the infringement claims are time-barred because “[a]t its heart this matter is a dispute over ownership between plaintiff and the defendants, all of whose rights were originally derived from Napier.” (Defi’s Mem. Law at 2.) Defendants rely heavily on the Second Circuit’s decision in Merchant, supra, 92 F.3d 51. At issue in Merchant was the plaintiffs’ request for a declaration of co-ownership rights based on their alleged co-authorship of the well-known musical composition “Why Do Fools Fall in Love.” The court reversed the lower court’s declaration of co-ownership rights and damages for a time-period beginning three years prior to filing, because the jury had found that plaintiffs were charged with knowledge of their claim in 1961, over 30 years prior to filing. See id. at 56. Focusing specifically on co-ownership claims, the court held that “plaintiffs claiming to be co-authors are time-barred three years after accrual of their claim from seeking a declaration of copyright co-ownership rights and any remedies that would flow from such a declaration.” Id. In so holding, the court explicitly distinguished the application of the three-year statute of limitations as applied to copyright infringement claims. The court stated that “[o]ur holding here does not disturb our previous rulings that a copyright owner’s suit for infringement is timely if instituted within three years of each infringing act for which relief is sought ...” Id. at 57 n. 8. The Merchant court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Zuill v. Shanahan, 80 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir.1996), the final decision of which had been published three weeks earlier, and parallels Merchant in several respects. At issue in Zuill was plaintiff musicians’ request for a declaration of co-ownership rights based on their alleged co-authorship of a well-known program designed to assist children to read. Affirming the lower court’s decision to bar the action on statute of limitations grounds, the court held that “claims of co-ownership, as distinct from claims of infringement, accrue when plain and express repudiation of co-ownership is communicated to the claimant, and are barred three years from the time of repudiation.” Id. at 1369. Finding that “[cjreation, rather than infringement was the gravamen of plaintiffs’ ownership claim,” the court held that the claim “did not accrue upon subsequent publication” of the work in question. Id. at 1371. As in Merchant, the Zuill decision barred plaintiffs’ ownership claims and the remedies that flowed therefrom. See id. at 1371 (barring “a declaratory judgment of co-ownership and the relief ancillary to such a claim”). These remedies include an accounting for profits by a co-owner, which arises from equitable doctrines such as unjust enrichment and general principles of co-ownership. See id. at 1369 (citing Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 632-33 (9th Cir.1984)); cf. Merchant, supra, 92 F.3d at 51 (noting that plaintiffs also filed a claim for an accounting). However, the court noted that certain rights “can withstand the statute of limitations,” and cited to legislative history showing the Congress intended the statute of limitations under the Copyright Act to extend only to remedies, and not to substantive rights. See id. at 1369-70. Those substantive rights include, inter alia, the right as a copyright owner to sue for infringement, which lasts as long as the copyright itself, namely life of the creator plus fifty years. See id. at 1369; 17 U.S.C. § 302(b) (discussing duration of copyright protection). These substantive rights were present in neither Zuill nor Merchant, where plaintiffs’ had only claimed co-ownership, and because, in any event, co-owners cannot be liable to each other for infringement. See Zuill, supra, 80 F.3d at 1369. But such rights could be present where a plaintiff sufficiently pleads an infringement cause of action. The implication of the holdings in Merchant and Zuill is that while a dismissal of an ownership claim as time-barred bars certain remedies associated with ownership, it does not extinguish the right of a copyright owner to sue for infringement. A copyright owner can recover for infringing actions that occur within three years of filing; only infringement claims beyond three years of suit are barred. See Zuill, supra, 80 F.3d at 1370 (“[TJhe statute bars recovery on any claim for damages that accrued more than three years before commencement of suit, neither barring infringing acts within the limitations period, nor reaching back to infringements prior to the statutory period.”); cf. Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 12.05[A] (1999) (stating that where the alleged infringement “occurred within three years prior to filing, the action will not be barred even if prior infringements by the same party as to the same work are barred because they occurred more than three years previously”). Thus, while this Court interprets the holdings of Merchant and its progeny to bar plaintiffs sole ownership and co-ownership claims, see supra, the Court declines to find that her infringement claims are time-barred as a result. Under the Copyright Act, and the holdings of Merchant and Zuill, the Court finds that a plaintiffs right to sue as a copyright owner is not a remedy that flows from a declaration of ownership. Defendants seek to bring this case within the holding of Merchant by referring to cases where the gravamen of plaintiffs copyright claims was ownership. (Def.’s Mem. Law at 8-10; Tr. at 17:25-25, 18:1-10.) In particular, defendants cite to Zuill, where, as noted supra, “creation” was the gravamen of plaintiffs claim, and to Minder Music, supra, 1999 WL 820575, at *2, decided by this Court, where the Court, relying on Merchant, found that plaintiff “portray[ed][the] action as one for infringement when copyright ownership rights [were] the true matter at issue.” In Minder Music, plaintiff, owner of a 50 percent share in copyrights in certain musical compositions, brought an action asserting that he was owner of the other 50 percent share, and a claim for infringement. See id. at *1. Because the plaintiffs sole ownership claim had accrued more than three years prior to filing the action, his infringement claim was also found to be time-barred. See id. at *2. Defendants also cite to Fort Knox Music v. Baptiste, 47 F.Supp.2d 481 (S.D.N.Y.1999), a declaratory judgment action in which the court applied Merchant in barring the defendant from bringing a sole ownership claim, where the defendant clearly knew of his claimed injury decades prior to the commencement of the suit. See id. at 488-84. In addition, because the Court found that defendant’s continued attempts to challenge the plaintiffs’ copyright ownership were “patently frivolous,” the Court barred defendant from asserting “any action challenging under the Copyright Act the rights of plaintiffs or their successors, assignees, or licensees ... upon the ground that Baptiste is the sole author of that composition ...” Id. at 484-85. While the court’s holding could be read to encompass a claim for copyright infringement, the court’s decision to bar such a claim was based on the clear invalidity of defendant’s assertion of sole ownership, rather than on the operation of the statute of limitations. The cases cited by defendants are inapplicable here, because plaintiff has sufficiently articulated a cause of action for infringement that is separate and distinct from her ownership claim. The gravamen of plaintiffs copyright claims is infringement, not ownership; it is her principal cause of action and the Complaint focuses primarily on instances of infringement. (Compl. ¶¶ 1,181-85; Pl.’s Mem. Law at 4, 14 n. 14.) In this respect, the instant case is clearly distinguishable from Minder Music. Because the plaintiff in Minder Music was an acknowledged co-owner, his infringement action depended on a successful declaration of sole ownership. The ownership claim was therefore the critical element of the case, and the Court reasoned that because that claim was barred, the infringement claim was also barred. Id. at *2. Here, on the other hand, plaintiffs infringement claim is separate and distinct from the adjudication of her ownership claims. Plaintiffs ownership claims were brought as separate mechanisms for declaratory relief: her sole ownership claim was brought in response to threats of litigation by defendants to reserve the possibility of an expedited hearing under Rule 57 (Pl.’s Mem. Law at 17-18); her claim for an accounting, the co-ownership claim, was brought in the alternative to the infringement and sole ownership claims, in order to safeguard plaintiffs right to royalty payments if defendants’ succeeded on their joint authorship defense. (Id. at 17; Compl. ¶¶ 205-07.) Plaintiffs infringement claim is not dependent upon either of these claims. Barring plaintiffs claims requesting a declaration of copyright ownership cannot preclude her from suing for infringement. The instant case is more similar to Maurizio v. Goldsmith, 84 F.Supp.2d 455 (S.D.N.Y.2000). In that case, the plaintiff filed copyright infringement, co-authorship and accounting claims, arising out of the plaintiffs individual contributions to the novel The First Wives Club, which later served as the basis for a motion picture of the same title. As in this case, the dispute centered on the rights of two individuals who contributed to a project (i.e. the composition of a novel) that one party had seen to fruition and, eventually, reaped considerable profits. See id. at 458-60. Ruling on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court applied Merchant in finding that the plaintiffs ownership claims were time-barred. See id. at 463-64. However, the Court refused to recast the plaintiffs infringement claims as one for ownership, and found that the plaintiff, by sufficiently alleging her individual authorship of draft chapters of the book, and copying by the defendant, had stated a prima facie case of infringement. See id. at 468. Citing Merchant, the court declined to dismiss plaintiffs infringement claims for acts of infringement occurring within three years of the filing of the action. See id. at 463, 467-68. The Court denies the motion to dismiss plaintiffs copyright infringement claims for alleged acts of infringement occurring after July 12, 1996, three years before the filing of the present suit. As in Maurizio, and unlike the infringement claimants in Minder Music and Fort Knox, plaintiff has alleged an infringement claim sufficient to defeat defendants’ motion. Plaintiffs alleged ownership interest may therefore serve as the basis for plaintiffs infringement claims even if plaintiff is barred from seeking a formal declaration of ownership rights. Defendants argue that the holdings of, inter alia, Minder Music and Fort Knox must be deemed to apply here, because the Second Circuit “was not so simple-minded as to create a rule that a plaintiff, merely by asking for infringement remedies other than or in addition to a declaratory judgment, could rescue an otherwise time-barred claim from the statute of limitations.” (Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Def.’s Rep.”) at 2-3). The Court agrees with defendants that Merchant should not be construed as allowing plaintiffs to make an “end-run” around the statutory mandate of the Copyright Act. In fact, the decisions in Minder Music and Fort Knox demonstrate that the courts of this Circuit have not construed Merchant in this manner. In those cases, the courts recognized that the gravamen of the plaintiffs’ claims was ownership, rather than infringement. Under Merchant and its progeny, a cause of action for infringement may survive a motion to dismiss only where, in cases similar to the instant one, the plaintiff has a clear right to assert it as a claim separate from the claim of ownership. Contrary to defendants’ suggestion, allowing infringement claims to stand here would not defeat the “principles of repose integral to a properly functioning copyright market,” Netzer, supra, 963 F.Supp. at 1315, because, while inaction on an ownership claim may lull defendants into a false sense of security, a plaintiffs copyright registration and a defendant’s own infringing acts over a three-year period are sufficient to place the defendant on notice of a possible infringement claim. Neither does this decision undermine the stated goal of the Copyright Act to enhance “the predictability and certainty of copyright ownership.” Reid, supra, 490 U.S. at 749, 109 S.Ct. 2166. The record reflects that plaintiff, Napier, or both, are the owners of the copyrights in the Makeup Designs, and this Court’s further proceedings will focus on the specific parameters of that ownership in deciding the infringement question. The public interest would be compromised by a decision that precludes a purported sole owner from suing for infringement within the life of her copyright, and that interest is therefore enhanced by preservation of this important right. 3. The Makeup Designs, As a Group, Do Not Constitute a Joint Work Defendants also assert that plaintiffs infringement claim should be barred on the ground that plaintiff and Napier were co-authors, and the Makeup Designs constitute a single joint work. (Def.’s Mem. Law at 15-18.) In particular, defendants contend that because “the facts pleaded ... show that defendant John Napier [from whom all defendants’ derive their rights] was at least the co-author of [and, therefore, co-owner of the copyright in] the Makeup Designs,” plaintiffs infringement claims must be dismissed. (Id. at 15.) However, while it is true that an infringement action will not lie between co-owners because an individual may not infringe his own copyright, see Netzer, supra, 868 F.2d at 1318, the record does not support the conclusion that plaintiff and Napier were co-authors of the Makeup Designs as a group. A “joint work” under the Copyright Act is one “prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The authors of a joint work are “co-authors” or “joint authors,” and if no assignments have been made, “co-owners.” The Second Circuit has established a two-part test for joint authorship, whereby each putative co-author must have (1) fully intended, at the time of creation, to be a co-author, and (2) made independently copyrightable contributions to the work. See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir.1998) (citing Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507-508 (2d Cir.1991)). Viewing the Complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds that defendants’ claim to joint authorship cannot preclude plaintiffs assertions of her infringement claim. We first note that defendants’ reference to the Makeup Designs as a single work is misguided. As noted supi'a, the mere fact that the 28 Designs were incorporated into a single registration does not automatically make them a single work for copyright purposes. (Def.’s Mem. Law at 16; Def.’s Rep. at 8.) In the absence of a joint work, the fact that one party contributes to certain designs, but not to others, does not mean that the party is a co-author of the entire set of designs. Thus, even if plaintiff acknowledged Napier’s co-authorship of some of the Designs, this does not preclude her from bringing an infringement action to enforce her rights to those Designs that she claims she individually owns. With regard to the intent prong of the analysis, “[a]n important indicator of authorship is a contributor’s decisionmaking authority over what changes are made and what is included in a work.” Thomson, supra, 147 F.3d at 202-03 (citing Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1071-72 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that an actor’s suggestions of text did not support a claim of co-authorship where the sole author determined whether and where such suggestions were included in the work)). There is no indication in the Complaint that either plaintiff or Napier intended their “collaboration,” (CompLlif 37, 116), to be inseparable parts of a unitary whole. Rather, plaintiffs allegations support her control over the production of at least some of the Designs, with Napier contributing certain ideas and concepts to those Designs. (Id. ¶¶ 40-45, 65.) Defendants point to Jacobsen’s unsuccessful effort in 1993 to amend plaintiffs copyright registration as a reflection of co-authorship by Napier of the Designs. (Id. ¶ 87; Def.’s Mem. Law at 16-17.) However, the actions of plaintiffs attorney more than a decade after creation indicate nothing about plaintiffs intent at the time of creation. Moreover, even if Jacobsen’s actions were indicative of plaintiffs intent, at most they support joint authorship of 15 of the Designs. (Compl. ¶ 87; Jobin Aff. ¶ 4.) A finding of joint authorship to such Designs does not invalidate plaintiffs copyright infringement claim. Because defendants cannot satisfy the intent prong required to establish a joint work, the Court need not consider the copyrightability prong. C. Foreign Infringement Claims Plaintiff asserts her copyright infringement claims not only pursuant to U.S. law but also pursuant to several foreign copyright statutes, specifically those of Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom, and pursuant to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”), Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, and the Universal Copyright Convention (“UCC”), Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2732. (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 181; Pl.’s Mem. Law at 25 & n. 22.) Plaintiffs Complaint and motion papers are unclear as to whether plaintiff premises her claims upon violations of copyrights she claims to possess in other countries, or whether her claims are premised upon the infringement, under the laws of other nations, of her alleged U.S. copyright. However, the Court finds that, regardless of this ambiguity, to the extent that plaintiff alleges that some or all of the defendants in this action committed violations of foreign copyright laws, dismissal is not appropriate at this time. Defendants argue that plaintiffs foreign copyright claims are time-barred because her domestic copyright infringement claims are time-barred. (Def.’s Rep. at 10.) This argument is clearly unavailing in light of the Court’s conclusion that plaintiffs domestic infringement claims have been adequately pleaded. The question therefore is whether, if any of the defendants committed acts of infringement abroad that violate foreign copyright laws, this Court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. See Mayor of City of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 627, 94 S.Ct. 1323, 39 L.Ed.2d 630 (1974) (noting that subject matter jurisdiction can be raised by the court “sua sponte any at stage”); Manway Constr. Co. v. Hous. Auth. of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 508 (2d Cir.1983) (“It is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.”). Several courts and authorities support the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign copyright infringement claims. In Armstrong v. Virgin Records, 91 F.Supp.2d 628 (S.D.N.Y.2000), recently decided in this district, plaintiff, a jazz musician, claimed inter alia that defendants violated his copyright in a song recorded by the music group Massive Attack in the United Kingdom, and which was thereafter distributed worldwide. See id. at 630-31. He filed claims for copyright infringement under the Copyright Act and under unspecified international copyright laws. See id. at 631. The court held that it could entertain plaintiffs claims under international copyright laws on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, and, potentially, on the basis of pendent subject matter jurisdiction to plaintiffs domestic infringement claims. See id. at 637-38. Other authorities, while acknowledging that extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Copyright Act is prohibited, cf. id. at 634 (finding no extra-territorial application of the Copyright Act where allegedly infringing events entirely took place overseas; Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir.1994) (same)), have asserted that there may be a basis for jurisdiction in eases similar to the instant matter. As Professor Nimmer has explained: Even if the United States Copyright Act is clearly inoperative with respect to acts occurring outside of its jurisdiction, it does not necessarily follow that American courts are without [subject matter] jurisdiction in such a case. If the plaintiff has a valid cause of action under the copyright laws of a foreign country, and if personal jurisdiction of the defendant can be obtained in an American court, it is arguable that an action may be brought in such court for infringement of a foreign copyright law. This would be on a theory that copyright infringement constitutes a transitory cause of action, and hence, may be adjudicated in the courts of a sovereign other than the one in which the cause of action arose. Armstrong, supra, 91 F.Supp.2d at 637 (quoting 3 Nimmer, supra., § 17.03); see also 3 Paul Goldstein, Copyright, § 16.2 at 16:8-16:9 (2000) (“Subject to jurisdictional requirements, a copyright owner may sue an infringer in United States courts even though the only alleged infringement occurred in another country.”) Decisions of other courts in this Circuit support the conclusions of these authorities and the decision reached by the Armstrong court. See London Film Prods. v. Intercontinental Comm., 580 F.Supp. 47, 49-50 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (refusing to dismiss a claim by a British corporation against a New York corporation for violation of British copyright law); see also Frink America, Inc. v. Champion Road Machinery, Ltd., 961 F.Supp. 398, 404 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (refusing to dismiss claim against U.S. corporation for Canadian copyright infringement, citing London Film); cf. Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F.Supp.2d 421, 430 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (dismissing foreign copyright claims, in part because no diversity jurisdiction was present). Therefore, at this stage in the proceedings, there is no reason to believe that the Court would be foreclosed from applying foreign law to plaintiffs foreign infringement claims. Plaintiff has alleged the violation of specific foreign copyright laws, (Compl.lffl 25, 181), and the record reflects that diversity jurisdiction may be applicable to several of the defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 162-180.) Moreover, pendent jurisdiction may enable the Court to assert jurisdiction over the other defendants. See Armstrong, supra, 91 F.Supp.2d at 637. The Court therefore accepts subject matter jurisdiction over these claims at this time. Plaintiffs assertion of claims for copyright violations under the Berne Convention and UCC are, however, improper. (ComplY 181). Under both conventions, an author who is a national of a signatory country, or one who first publishes his work in any such country, is entitled to the same copyright protection in another signatory country as that latter country accords to its own