Full opinion text
DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. #41): PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. #40) OVERRULED; CONFERENCE CALL SET RICE, Chief Judge. This matter comes before the Court upon the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 41) and Plaintiff Joanne Voelkel’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. # 40). The Defendants seek summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ eleven-count amended Complaint (Doc. # SO), which alleges violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq. (Counts I, II, and III); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq. (Counts IV, VI, and IX); Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112 (Counts V, VII, and X); breach of contract (Count VIII) and conversion (Count XI). Plaintiff Joanne Voelkel seeks summary judgment on her breach of contract and conversion claims. (Counts VIII and XI). I. Factual Background The Defendants in this litigation are Jerry E. Flexman (“Flexman”), individually, and Jerry E. Flexman, Ph.D., Inc., d.b.a. the Flexman Clinic. Dr. Flexman serves as the sole shareholder and only officer of the corporation. (Jerry Flexman depo. at 8-9). The Plaintiffs are Joanne Voelkel, a former independent contractor who performed counseling services at the Flexman Clinic, and Julia and Steven Davis, who sought marital counseling from Voelkel. The present dispute stems from Flexman’s failure to provide a sign language interpreter for Voelkel’s counseling sessions with the Davises, Flexman’s termination of Voelkel’s independent contractor “affiliate agreement,” and Voelkel’s contention that she has been compensated improperly under the terms of the affiliate agreement. Voelkel began working for the Flexman Clinic in November, 1991. (Voelkel depo. at 15). She signed an “affiliate agreement” with the Clinic in 1993. The agreement identified Voelkel as an independent contractor. (Id. at 17). It also provided that her compensation would be “50% of collections.” (Voelkel affidavit at Exh. A, ¶ 6). Julia and Steven Davis first consulted Voelkel in January, 1996, seeking counseling for marital problems and Julia’s depression. (Id. at 69). During their first visit, the Davises expressed their need for an interpreter. (Id. at 70; S. Davis depo. at 23-24). They explained that Julia Davis particularly needed an interpreter, because she communicated best through sign language and was not proficient with the English language. (Id.). Voelkel left a note in Jerry Flexman’s office mailbox' on January 25, 1996, explaining the Davises’ request. (Id. at 72-73). She then spoke with Flexman personally on January 29, 1996, and he told her the Clinic had no obligation to provide the Davises with an interpreter. (Id. at 76). He also questioned who would be responsible for paying for the interpreter. (Id.). Voelkel subsequently called a social services agency, obtained a copy of the ADA, and placed it in Flexman’s mailbox. (Id. at 78-80). She then met again with the Davises on February 1, 1996, and they renewed their request. (Id. at 80). After receiving yet another interpreter request from Julia Davis on February 28, 1996, Voelkel spoke with Flexman on April 5, 1996. (Id. at 82, 85). He told her he still had not read the ADA, but believed the Clinic was not responsible. (Id. at 85). Flexman also told Voelkel she could provide the interpreter if she believed the Davises needed one. (Id.). Julia Davis then provided her own interpreter for one session. Voelkel told Flexman about the session on May 8, 1996, and explained that having an interpreter present had been beneficial. (Id. at 88). Around that time, the Davises also made a formal, written request to the Clinic for an interpreter. (Id. at 89). Flexman consulted an attorney about his legal obligation to provide such a person sometime in May, 1996. (Affidavit of Stephen Watring at ¶ 2). The attorney advised Flexman that federal law did not impose an absolute obligation upon the Clinic to provide an interpreter. He opined that the ADA would permit the Clinic to try less expensive alternatives first. (Id. at ¶ 8). Voelkel met with Flexman again on May 10, 1996. (Id. at 92). He suggested various “alternatives” to the Clinic paying for an interpreter, and once again stated that Voelkel could pay the expense herself. (Id. at 92-93). In late May, 1996, Flexman offered to set up a computer so Voelkel and the Davises could type messages during their counseling sessions. (Id. at 98). Voelkel was skeptical that a computer would resolve Julia Davis’ problem, given her limited ability to use the English language, but she agreed to try. (Id.). The Davises also agreed to try a computer. (Id. at 99). On May 81, 1996, the Davises arrived for a counseling session, and no computer was available, even though Flex-man knew about the appointment. (Id. at 102-103; S. Davis depo. at 32). Voelkel then left a detailed note in Flexman’s box explaining why the Davises needed an interpreter. (Id. at 100). She spoke with Flexman again about an interpreter on June 3, 1996. He became angry, however, and she once again agreed to try less expensive alternatives first. (Id. at 100, 103). Voelkel went on vacation until mid-June, 1996. (Id. at 23). When she returned, she found a letter in her mailbox terminating her affiliate agreement with the Clinic. (Id.). The letter was dated June 7, 1996. (Id. at 24). Voelkel met with Flexman after receiving the letter, and he agreed to allow her to maintain her relationship with the Clinic until July 31, 1996. (Id. at 25). Flexman also told Voelkel that he terminated her affiliate agreement as a result of job performance problems, including her removal of files from the office, and her failure to meet clients and complete paperwork promptly. (Id. at 25-26). Voelkel and Flexman next met on June 24, 1996, and he mentioned having received correspondence from the Davises’ attorney. (Id. at 103). The correspondence was dated June 5, 1996, and Flex-man had received it on June 7, 1996. (Jerry Flexman depo. at 49). During his conversation with Voelkel, Flexman also agreed to set up a computer for the Davises’ June 28, 1996, appointment with Voelkel. (Id. at 104). When the Davises arrived, however, the computer was not set up, and Voelkel had not heard from Flexman. (Id. at 104; S. Davis depo. at 57). The Davises then told Voelkel on July 8, 1996, that they did not want to schedule any more appointments at the Flexman Clinic. (Id. at 107). Voelkel subsequently began seeing the Davises on August 28, 1996, in her own private practice. She used a professional interpreter and paid $39 per hour for the service. (Id. at 109-110). II. Summary Judgment Standard The Court first will set forth the parties’ relative burdens once a motion for summary judgment is made. Summary judgment must be entered “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Of course, [the moving party] always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. See also Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1156 (6th Cir.1991) (The moving party has the “burden of showing that the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits in the record, construed favorably to the non-moving party, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial[,]” quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1536 [6th Cir.1987]). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party who “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Thus, “[o]nce the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact making it necessary to resolve the difference at trial.” Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir.1995). Read together, Liberty Lobby and Celotex stand for the proposition that a party may move for summary judgment by demonstrating .that the opposing party will not be able to produce sufficient evidence at trial to withstand a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir.1989). Once the burden of production has shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not sufficient to “simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). See also Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service, Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 341 (6th Cir.1994) (“The plaintiff must present more than a scintilla of evidence in support of his position; the evidence must be such that a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff’). Rather, Rule 56(e) “requires the non-moving party to go beyond the [unverified] pleadings” and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment shall be denied “[i]f there are ... ’genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.’ ” Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1374 (6th Cir.1992). Of course, in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, a court must assume as true the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the favor of that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis added). If the parties present conflicting evidence, a court may not decide which evidence to believe, by determining which parties’ affiants are more credible; rather, credibility determinations must be left to the fact-finder. 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2726. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment (in other words, in determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact), “[a] district court is not ... obligated to wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party’s claim.” InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091, 110 S.Ct. 1839, 108 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990). See also, L.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v. AT & T Information Systems, Inc., 9 F.3d 561 (7th Cir.1993); Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915 n. 7 (5th Cir.) (“Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment .... ”), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992). Thus, a court is entitled to rely, in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists on a particular issue, upon only those portions of the verified pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits submitted, specifically called to its attention by the parties. III. Julia Davis’ Americans with Disabilities Act Claims (Counts I, II, and III) Counts I, II, and III of the Plaintiffs’ amended Complaint present causes of action arising under the ADA. In Count I, Julia Davis contends the Defendants violated the ADA by failing to provide, at the Clinic’s expense, an interpreter for her counseling sessions with Voelkel. In Count II, she claims the Defendants'violated the ADA by failing to promulgate policies and procedures ensuring effective communication with deaf patients, and to notify deaf patients of those policies and procedures. Similarly, in Count III, she contends the Defendants’ failure to promulgate such policies and procedures violates ADA regulations, specifically 28 C.F.R. § 36.202. Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with a disability in their receipt of services at places of public accommodation. In pertinent part, the Act provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Unlike actions initiated by the Attorney General, when a private party alleges violations of Title III of the ADA, he or she may receive only injunctive relief, not damages. 42 U.S.C. § 12188; Jairath v. Dyer, 154 F.3d 1280, 1283 n. 7 (11th Cir.1998); Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F.Supp. 698, 707 (D.Or.1997); Atakpa v. Perimeter OB-GYN Assoc., 912 F.Supp. 1566 (N.D.Ga.1994). Furthermore, as an initial matter, a private party must establish standing to seek injunctive relief under the ADA. Jairath, 154 F.3d at 1283; Atakpa, 912 F.Supp. at 1573; Aikins v. St. Helena Hosp., 843 F.Supp. 1329, 1333 (N.D.Cal.1994). When a request for injunctive relief is based upon a past wrong, a plaintiff must show a “ ‘real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again-a likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.’ ” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). “Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding in-junctive relief ... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-496, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974); Schroedel v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 885 F.Supp. 594, 598 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (requiring a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief to show a real or immediate threat that she would be wronged again). With the foregoing requirements in mind, the Court concludes that Julia Davis lacks standing to seek injunctive relief under Title III of the ADA. Neither Julia nor Steven Davis currently visits the Flexman Clinic, and they do not intend to return in the future. (S. Davis depo. at 61; J. Davis depo. at 29). In addition, the Davises have no plans to seek counseling from anyone other than Voelkel, and she no longer is affiliated with the Flexman Clinic. (S. Davis depo. at 61). Furthermore, Voelkel stated in her deposition that she only would “consider” returning to the Flexman Clinic if its payment of independent contractors underwent “major changes.” (Voelkel depo. at 194). Even assuming that Voelkel could demonstrate entitlement to reinstatement, however, she cannot “dictate the conditions under which [s]he should be offered reinstatement.” Cross v. National Trust Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1026, 1029-1030 (6th Cir.1977). In any event, Voelkel recently abandoned her request for reinstatement, which was included in her original Complaint (Doc. # 1), but then omitted from her amended Complaint (Doc. # 30). It is well settled that Julia Davis bears the burden of establishing standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). None of the evidence currently before the Court, however, suggests that she faces a real and immediate threat of future discrimination at the Flexman Clinic. Absent some evidence indicating that the Davises are likely to resume marital counseling at the Clinic, Davis lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. Cf. Atakpa, 912 F.Supp. at 1574 (finding that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek an injunction under the ADA because she did not allege that she “will ever seek services from the defendants in the future”); Aikins, 843 F.Supp. at 1333, 1334 (finding no standing for ADA injunctive relief because the plaintiff “has shown neither that she is likely to use the hospital in the near future, nor that the defendants are likely to discriminate against her when she does use the hospital”); Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F.Supp. 317, 323 (E.D.Va.1995) (“[A] plaintiff who cannot demonstrate a likelihood that she will ever again suffer discrimination at the hands of a defendant, even one who has discriminated against her in the past, does not have standing to obtain an injunction under the ADA.”); Schroedel, 885 F.Supp. at 599 (finding that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek an injunction under the ADA absent a “real and immediate threat of repeated injury”); Naiman v. New York Univ., 1997 WL 249970 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (unpublished) (concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek injunctive relief for a sign language interpreter at a hospital, because four prior visits did not demonstrate a “real or immediate threat” of future harm). Consequently, the Court sustains the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 41) with respect to Counts I, II, and III of the Plaintiffs’ amended Complaint (Doc. # 30). IV. Julia Davis’ Discrimination Claim under the Rehabilitation Act (Count TV) In Count IV of the Plaintiffs’ amended Complaint, Julia Davis contends that the Defendants’ failure to provide a sign language interpreter violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. Section 504 prohibits recipients of federal funds from discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability. It provides, in pertinent part: “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance....” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). To establish a prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act, Julia Davis must show: (1) that she has a disability; (2) that she was otherwise qualified to participate in a program or activity; (3) that she was excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under the program or activity solely on the basis of her disability; and (4) that the program or activity at issue received federal funding. Maddox v. University of Tennessee, 62 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir.1995); Howe v. Hull, 874 F.Supp. 779, 788 (N.D.Ohio 1994). The “program or activity” at issue in the present case is the Flexman Clime’s provision of counseling services. In them Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendants present several arguments to demonstrate that Julia Davis cannot establish a prima facie case or ultimately prevail on her claim under the Rehabilitation Act. First, they question whether the Act applies to the denial of “medical” services. Second, they note that the Flexman Clinic received federal funds via Medicaid, but stress that Julia Davis personally did not, thereby suggesting an insufficient “nexus” between the alleged discrimination and the clinic’s receipt of federal funding. Third, they contend the Rehabilitation Act does not require unduly burdensome accommodation of disabled individuals. The Court will address these arguments in turn. First, the Rehabilitation Act frequently has been applied to facilities providing medical treatment. “Although section 504 was initially adopted to give handicapped individuals equal access to employment opportunities and educational programs, it has been applied in the medical context to ensure that individuals are not denied treatment or discriminated against by federally-supported entities because of a disability.” Sharrow v. Bailey, 910 F.Supp. 187, 193 (M.D.Pa.1995), citing Woolfolk v. Duncan, 872 F.Supp. 1381, 1388 (E.D.Pa.1995); see also Howe, 874 F.Supp. at 788-789 (finding potential liability under the Rehabilitation Act based upon a doctor’s failure to admit an AIDS patient); Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F.Supp. 1160, 1163-1164 (E.D.Mich.1994) (finding the Rehabilitation Act applicable to a doctor’s failure to provide a deaf patient with a sign language interpreter); Vacco v. Mid Hudson Med. Group, 877 F.Supp. 143, 149 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (noting the “long line” of case law holding that a medical clinic’s receipt of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement subjects the clinic to the Rehabilitation Act, and finding the act applicable to a clinic that failed to provide deaf patients with an interpreter for their examinations); Aikins at 1337, 1338 (applying the Rehabilitation Act based upon a doctor’s admission that he received Medicare and Medicaid payments); United States v. Baylor Univ. Medical Center, 736 F.2d 1039, 1042 (5th Cir.1984) (concluding that a medical center’s receipt of Medicare and Medicaid constituted “federal financial assistance,” bringing it within the scope of the Rehabilitation Act). Moreover, 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(3) expressly extends the Rehabilitation Act’s coverage to any entity receiving federal funds, if that entity is engaged principally in the business of providing, inter alia, health care or social services. Consequently, the Court rejects the Defendants’ suggestion that the Clinic falls outside the Act’s reach. Second, the Court finds unpersuasive the Defendants’ argument that the Rehabilitation Act does not apply because Julia Davis personally did not participate in the Medicaid program. For purposes of section 504, a “program or activity” that receives federal funds includes “all of the operations of ... an entire corporation, partnership, or other private organization, or an entire sole proprietorship ... which is principally engaged in the business of providing ... health care [or] social services .... ” 29 U.S.C. § 794(b). If such an organization receives federal funds, it may not discriminate against any of its clients, regardless of whether a particular individual is covered by Medicare or Medicaid. See Sharrow, 910 F.Supp. at 193 (“It is not necessary that federal funds be received for the care and treatment of the complaining plaintiff. Receipt of federal funding in the form of Medicare or Medicaid payments for the care rendered to any patient brings the treating physician, hospital or medical center within the scope of the Act.”); United States v. Baylor Univ. Medical Center, 736 F.2d at 1045 (recognizing that “health care facilities and other providers that receive Medicare and Medicaid funds are required, under existing statutes and long-standing Department of Health and Human Services regulations and interpretations, to provide services without discrimination not just to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, but to all patients”) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 98-442; 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (Oct. 26, 1983)); Howe, 874 F.Supp. at 789 (reasoning that the “Defendant cannot receive federal funds on the one hand, and on the other deny he is covered by the [Rehabilitation Act] simply because he received no federal funds for his involvement with [the plaintiff]”); Glam v. Vernick, 756 F.Supp. 632, 636 (D.Mass.1991) (“If the ENT Clinic is a program or activity for the purposes of § 504, then it cannot discriminate against any handicapped individuals, regardless of whether they receive Medicaid benefits or not”). Third, the Court finds some merit in the Defendants’ claim that the Rehabilitation Act, by its terms, does not require overly burdensome “accommodation” of disabled individuals. On its face, the statute provides only that a program or activity receiving federal funds shall not exclude from participation, deny benefits to, or subject to discrimination, disabled individuals solely by reason of their disability. Implementing regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services, however, define the contours of the affirmative obligation to accommodate a disabled individual. See 45 C.F.R. Part 84. Such agency regulations, promulgated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), constitute “an important source of guidance on the meaning of § 504.” Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 304 n. 24, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985). In the present case, the regulations apply to the Flexman Clinic, because it receives Federal financial assistance in the form of Medicare or Medicaid. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.2. In the context of employment discrimination, the regulations require a recipient of federal funds to make “reasonable accommodation” for a handicapped applicant or employee unless doing so “would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program.” 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a). These accommodations include “the provision of readers or interpreters, and other similar actions.” 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b). Likewise, in the context of post-secondary education, the regulations require academic institutions receiving federal funds to provide “auxiliary aids” for students with impaired sensory skills. 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d). Subpart F of 45 C.F.R. Part 84, however, specifically addresses health, welfare, and social services programs and activities that receive federal funds. 45 C.F.R. § 84.51. The Plaintiffs stress that the Rehabilitation Act applies in the present case precisely because the Flexman Clinic provides health care and/or social services. (Doc. # 51 at 19). The Court agrees and concludes that Subpart F is applicable to the present litigation. Notably, it identifies the extent of a recipient’s obligation to accommodate a hearing impaired individual’s disability. Specifically, 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(d) states: “(d) Auxiliary aids. (1) A recipient to which this subpart applies that employs fifteen or more persons shall provide appropriate auxiliary aids to persons with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills, where necessary to afford such persons an equal opportunity to benefit from the service in question.” “(2) The Director [of the Civil Rights office for the Department of Health and Human Services] may require recipients with fewer than fifteen employees to provide auxiliary aids where the provision of aids would not significantly impair the ability of the recipient to provide its benefits or services.” “(8) For purposes of this paragraph, auxiliary aids may include brailled and taped material, interpreters, and other aids for persons with impaired hearing or vision.” Commentary in Appendix A to Part 84 reiterates that a “small provider” of clinical services is not obligated under the Rehabilitation Act to provide auxiliary aids, unless directed to do so by the Health and Human Services Director: “Section 84.52(d), also a new provision, requires recipients with fifteen or more employees to provide appropriate auxiliary aids for persons with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills. Further, the Director may require a small provider to furnish auxiliary aids where the provision of aids would not adversely affect the ability of the recipient to provide its health benefits or service. Thus although a small nonprofit neighborhood clinic might not be obligated to have available an interpreter for deaf persons, the Director may require provision of such aids as may be reasonably available to ensure that qualified handicapped persons are not denied appropriate benefits or services because of their handicaps.” 45 C.F.R. Appendix A to Part 84 at Sub-part F. Consequently, pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(d), which was promulgated “to effectuate Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,” the Defendants were required to provide Julia Davis with “auxiliary aids,” including an interpreter or “other aids,” if the Clinic employed at least 15 people, or, if fewer than 15 persons were employed, if the Department of Health and Human Services specifically required the Clinic to provide such aids. Unfortunately, however, the record before the Court does not reveal precisely how many people the Flexman Clinic employed in 1996. In his deposition, Jerry Flexman testified that nine or ten workers moved with him to the Clime’s present address in late 1995. (Flexman depo. at 9-10). His testimony does not make clear, however, whether that figure included only therapists or therapists and clerical employees. (Id.). Additionally, Flexman admits using some “independent contractors,” such as Voelk-el. The Court cannot determine the number of contractors he used, or whether, in practice, they might have qualified as “employees,” even though Flexman considered them contract workers. Without this information, the Court cannot say, as a matter of law, that the Clinic had no obligation under the Rehabilitation Act to provide Julia Davis with an interpreter or other auxiliary aids. In the present case, the parties have not discussed the applicability of 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(d). Instead, they have debated the Defendants’ obligation under the Rehabilitation Act to provide an interpreter by referring to the ADA’s accommodation requirements. Both statutes prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability. The obligations imposed upon the Defendants under the two statutes, however, are not identical. As the Court has noted, 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(d) defines the extent of the Defendants’ obligations under the Rehabilitation Act. A different regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 36.303, implements Title III of the ADA and defines the obligations imposed upon a “public accommodation” to provide a disabled individual with “auxiliary aids and services.” Under 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(a), a “public accommodation” must provide a disabled individual with auxiliary aids, unless it “can demonstrate that taking those steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden, i.e., significant difficulty or expense.” Auxiliary aids and services under the ADA include interpreters or other assisted-listening devices. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b). Significantly, however, nothing in 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 excludes from the ADA’s “auxiliary aid” requirement a public accommodation employing less than 15 workers. Likewise, under the Rehabilitation Act, nothing in 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(d) provides health, welfare, or social service programs with an “undue burden” defense to the provision of auxiliary aids. The applicable Rehabilitation Act regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(d), provides that health, welfare, and social service programs employing 15 or more people, and receiving federal funds, “shall provide appropriate auxiliary aids[.]” Cf. Bravin v. Mt. Sinai Med. Center, 186 F.R.D. 293 (1999), vacated in part, on other grounds, 1999 WL 553786 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 1999) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(d) and recognizing that “[i]f the recipient ... employs fifteen or more persons, it ‘shall provide appropriate auxiliary aids ... ’ ”). Recipients employing less than 15 employees are required to provide such aids only at the direction of the Department of Health and Human Services. Consequently, under the applicable Rehabilitation Act regulation, the Court finds the Defendants’ alleged financial inability to provide an interpreter of little importance. In short, the Court finds a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment on Count IV of the Plaintiffs’ Complaint. If the Flexman Clinic employed 15 or more employees while Julia Davis visited the Clinic, or if the HHS Director demanded the provision of auxiliary aids, then 45 C.F.R. § 84.52 obligated the Clinic to provide appropriate auxiliary aids to afford Davis an equal opportunity to benefit from her counseling sessions. On the other hand, if the Clinic did not employ 15 or more persons while Julia Davis visited it, and if the HHS Director did not specifically require the Clinic to provide auxiliary aids, then the Rehabilitation Act imposed no such obligation. Based upon the record before it, however, the Court cannot resolve this issue, as a matter of law. Furthermore, assuming arguendo that the Clinic did employ the requisite number of employees, or that the Director of HHS did order the provision of auxiliary aids, the Court finds a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Defendants met their responsibility of providing Davis with appropriate auxiliary aids. Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Julia Davis, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the Defendants failed to provide any auxiliary aids for the entire six months or so that she visited the Clinic. In her deposition, Voelkel testified that Julia and Steven Davis requested an interpreter in January, 1996, during their first visit to the Clinic. (Voelkel depo. at 70, 72). On January 25, 1996, Voelkel left a note in Flexman’s office mailbox mentioning the Davises’ request. (Id. at 72-73). Voelkel raised the issue with Flexman personally on January 29, 1996, and he expressed his opinion that he had no legal obligation to provide an interpreter. (Id. at 76). Steven Davis then contacted Voelkel and requested such a person for the Davises’ next counseling session. (Id. at 77). Voelkel subsequently obtained a copy of the ADA and placed it in Flex-man’s mailbox on February 1, 1996. (Id. at 80-81). Julia Davis also made an inquiry with the Ohio Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation on February 28, 1996, and was told that the Clinic had an obligation to provide an interpreter. (Id. at 82-83). Thereafter, Voelkel met with Flexman on April 5, 1996, and discovered he had not read the copy of the ADA that she had placed in his mailbox two months earlier. (Id. at 85). At that time, Flexman suggested that Voelkel should provide the interpreter herself. (Id.). Voelkel spoke with Flexman again on May 8, 1996, and mentioned that Julia Davis had provided her own interpreter for one counseling session. (Id. at 88). Around that time, Voelkel also placed in Flexman’s mailbox a letter from the Davises formally requesting an interpreter for their counseling sessions. (Id. at 89-90). On May 10, 1996, Flexman met with Voelkel, suggested some “alternatives,” and once again stated that she could pay for the interpreter herself. (Id. at 92-93). Sometime near the end of May, 1996, Flex-man told Voelkel that he wanted to try less expensive ways of facilitating her communication with Julia Davis, and that he would set up a computer for them to type back and forth. (Id. at 97-98). Voelkel and the Davises were reluctant, but agreed to try Flexman’s suggestion. (Id. at 99). On May 31, 1996, Voelkel met the Davises for a counseling session, and no computer was available, although Voelkel had told Flexman about the Davises’ appointment. (Id. at 102-103). On that day, Voelkel left a detailed note in Flexman’s mailbox, explaining why the Davises believed an interpreter was needed. (Id. at 100). Thereafter, on June 3, 1996, Voelkel mentioned the interpreter issue to Flex-man again. He became angry, and Voelk-el agreed to try less expensive means of communication. (Id. at 100, 103). Voelkel and Flexman next met on June 24, 1996, and Flexman mentioned receiving correspondence from the Davises’ attorney. (Id. at 103-104). At that time, Flexman agreed to set up a computer for the Davises’ June 28, 1996, appointment. (Id. at 104). When the Davises arrived for their appointment, however, the computer had not been set up, and Voelkel had heard nothing from Flexman. (Id.). Finally, on July 8, 1996, the Davises told Voelkel that they did not want to schedule any more appointments with her at the Flexman Clinic. (Id. at 107). Accepting the foregoing allegations as true, and construing them in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the Defendants failed to provide necessary and appropriate auxiliary aids. Consequently, the Court rejects the Defendants’ argument that they did not violate the Rehabilitation Act, as a matter of law. In two additional arguments, however, the Defendants contend (1) that Julia Davis lacks standing to obtain injunctive relief under the Rehabilitation Act, and (2) that she cannot recover compensatory damages because Flexman did not intentionally violate the Act. With respect to Davis’ standing to obtain injunctive relief, the Court finds the Defendants’ argument persuasive. As noted earlier, the record is devoid of evidence suggesting that the Davises are likely to visit the Flexman Clinic again. Absent such evidence, Julia Davis lacks standing to seek injunctive relief under the Rehabilitation Act for the same reasons that she lacked standing under the ADA. Atakpa, 912 F.Supp. at 1573; Aikins, 843 F.Supp. at 1334; Trautz v. Weisman, 846 F.Supp. 1160, 1164-1166 (S.D.N.Y.1994). Nevertheless, the Court rejects the Defendants’ argument that Davis cannot recover compensatory damages. In Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 99 F.3d 782 (6th Cir.1996), the Sixth Circuit recognized a private cause of action for compensatory damages under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Id. at 789, and the Defendants do not dispute the general availability of such damages. Rather, they contend Davis must show intentional discrimination, by producing evidence that they were at least “deliberately indifferent” to her rights. The Defendants argue, as a matter of law, that Davis cannot meet her burden. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Julia Davis, however, the Court finds a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Flexman acted with deliberate indifference to the Davises’ requests for an interpreter. On several occasions, both in person and in writing, Voelkel conveyed to Flexman the Davises’ request for a sign language interpreter. She also provided Flexman with a copy of the ADA, and informed him that she believed he had a legal obligation to provide an interpreter. Two months later, Flex-man, who still had not read the ADA, continued to insist that the law did not require him to provide such a person. Eventually, Flexman consulted an attorney and promised to try less expensive accommodations first. Specifically, he agreed to provide the Davises with a computer so that they could type messages back and forth with Voelkel. According to Voelkel, however, Flexman never provided a cona-puter. Accepting these facts as true, and construing them in a light most favorable to Julia Davis, a reasonable trier of fact could find that Flexman acted with deliberate indifference to his legal obligations. In a final argument, Flexman contends he cannot be held individually liable under § 504, even if a viable Rehabilitation Act claim exists. After reviewing the statute, the implementing regulations, and relevant case law, the Court finds Flexman’s argument persuasive. The Rehabilitation Act prohibits disability discrimination in any “program or activity” receiving federal funds. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Section 794(b) defines “program or activity” as, inter alia, “an entire corporation, partnership, or other private organization, or an entire sole proprietorship.... ” 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(3)(A). In the present case, then, the corporation doing business as the Flex-man Clinic constitutes a “program or activity” under the Act. Furthermore, the Clinic itself is the recipient of federal Medicare and Medicaid funds, because it is the “entity that receives the money.” Moreno, 99 F.3d at 787. Therefore, it must comply with § 504’s requirements. Id. at 784. The disputed issue, however, is whether Flexman personally may be liable under § 504 because he made the decision not to provide Julia Davis with an interpreter. Arguing in favor of individual liability, the Plaintiffs cite United States v. Morvant, 843 F.Supp. 1092 (E.D.La.1994), and Howe v. Hull, 874 F.Supp. 779 (N.D.Ohio 1994). In these cases, the courts found individual liability under the ADA’s prohibition against disability discrimination “by any person who owns, leases, (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” The courts reasoned that the individual defendants “operated” a place of public accommodation within the meaning of the ADA. More importantly, however, in Howe, the court found a doctor individually liable under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In so doing, the court noted that § 504 defines a “ program or activity” receiving federal funds as “all of the operations of ... [a] corporation, partnership, or other private organization, or an entire sole proprietorship which is principally engaged in the business of providing healthcare ... any pail, of which is extended Federal financial assistance.” Howe, 874 F.Supp. at 789 (emphasis in original), quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(b). Seizing upon the “all of the operations of’ and “any part of which” language, the court reasoned that the doctor, in his various capacities at a hospital, was “part of the ‘operations of the hospital.” Id. Consequently, the Howe court found the doctor subject to individual liability. The Court finds the Howe analysis unpersuasive. The “program or activity” language quoted in Howe merely recognizes that an entire entity or sole proprietorship faces potential liability under the Rehabilitation Act if any part of its operations receive federal funding. The definition does not transform an individual into a “program or activity” receiving federal funding simply because his work comprises part of the company’s “operations.” Furthermore, the regulations promulgated under § 504 do not define “recipients” of federal funding to include officers or agents of a corporation such as the Flexman Clinic. Rather, “recipient” is defined in relevant part as: “any public or private agency, institution,.organization, or other entity, or any person to which Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through another recipient, including any successor, assignee, or transferee of a recipient, but excluding the ultimate beneficiary of the assistance.” 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f). This language is consistent with 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(3), which defines a program or activity receiving federal funds as an entire entity or sole proprietorship. In short, nothing in the language of the statute or the implementing regulations indicates the existence of individual liability under the Rehabilitation Act. Athough the Sixth Circuit has not decided the issue of individual liability under § 504, in Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir.1996), the court reviewed Title IX, which is nearly identical to the Rehabilitation Act, and noted its “strong skepticism” regarding the existence of individual liability. Id. at 728. In a concurrence, one member of the court expressed his belief that Title IX cannot “be read as subjecting anyone other than educational institutions to liability for violation of its terms.” Id. at 730 (Nelson, J., concurring). Other federal courts have agreed that individual liability does not exist under Title IX. See Smith v. Metropolitan School Dist., 128 F.3d 1014, 1018-1019 (7th Cir.1997) and cases cited therein (concluding that a Title IX suit can be maintained only against a “program or activity” that receives a federal grant, and not an individual); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir.1988); Petrone v. Cleveland State Univ., 993 F.Supp. 1119, 1125 (N.D.Ohio 1998) (Nugent, J.) (noting that “most of the courts that have addressed the issue of individual liability under Title IX have determined that there is no individual liability because ‘program or activity’ refers to the educational institution, not to its employees [or] agents”); Doe v. Petaluma City School Dist., 830 F.Supp. 1560, 1576-1577 (N.D.Cal.1993) (“Courts that have addressed the question have held that only institutions may be liable under Title IX, not individuals.”). Likewise, courts construing Title VI, which prohibits racial discrimination, have found no individual liability under that statute. Like Title IX, Title VI contains language almost identical to the Rehabilitation Act. Title VI provides in relevant part: “No person ... shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. In Godby v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 996 F.Supp. 1390, 1413 (M.D.Ala.1998), the court reasoned that only the entity actually receiving federal funds could be liable under Title VI. See also Torrespico v. Columbia College, No. 97 C 8881, 1998 WL 703450 (N.D.Ill. Sept.30, 1998) (concluding that Title VI and Title IX both provide for relief only against a “program or activity,” and not an individual). The Court finds the foregoing authorities persuasive in the present case. As noted above, Title VI, Title IX, and the Rehabilitation Act contain similar language prohibiting discrimination by “programs or activities” that receive federal funding. Furthermore, the Rehabilitation Act expressly provides that the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in Title VI are available to plaintiffs under § 504. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2). Title VI, like Title IX, has been construed as providing for liability against only the “program or activity” receiving federal funds. Furthermore, as the Court has explained, nothing in the applicable regulations suggests a broader interpretation of a “program or activity” that receives federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act. Consequently, Jerry Flexman cannot be personally liable under the Rehabilitation Act, because the corporate entity doing business as the Flexman Clinic received federal funding, not Jerry Flexman, individually. Moreover, a contrary holding would result in an anomaly: plaintiffs alleging racial or gender discrimination in violation of Title VI or Title IX would be unable to maintain an individual capacity suit, while a different result would exist for plaintiffs seeking relief under the analogous language of the Rehabilitation Act. In the Court’s view, such a situation is untenable, and not supported by the language of the Act. In reaching this conclusion, the Court is cognizant that individual liability under the Rehabilitation Act has been found when a person discriminates on the basis of disability and is in a position to accept or reject the federal funding. See, e.g., Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F.Supp. 632, 637 (D.Mass.1991); Johnson v. New York Hosp., 897 F.Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y.1995); Lee v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 958 F.Supp. 37, 45 (D.N.H.1997); but see Lane v. Maryhaven Center of Hope, 944 F.Supp. 158, 164 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (only assuming ar-guendo, for purposes of its analysis, that an individual could be liable under the Rehabilitation Act based upon his role in accepting or rejecting federal funds). With one exception, the courts finding individual liability under § 504 for persons in a position to accept or reject federal funds have done so by citing, quoting, or paraphrasing language from Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. at 606, 106 S.Ct. 2705. Specifically, they rely upon Paralyzed Veterans’ recognition that “[b]y limiting coverage [under the Act] to recipients, Congress imposes the obligations of § 504 upon those who are in a position to accept or reject those obligations as a part of the decision whether or not to 'receive' federal funds.” Relying upon this language, the courts have determined that individuals who make the decision to accept or reject federal funding face individual liability under the Rehabilitation Act. On its face, the quote from Paralyzed Veterans supports such a proposition. A review of the Court’s full opinion, however, does not support a finding of individual liability. In Paralyzed Veterans, the Court determined that various entities it identified as “airport operators” were the “recipients” of federal financial assistance, and not commercial airlines, which merely benefitted from the airport operators’ use of the aid. Id. at 605-607, 106 S.Ct. 2705. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that “Congress limited the scope of § 504 to those who actually ‘receive’ federal financial assistance because it sought to impose § 504 coverage as a form of contractual cost of the recipient’s agreement to accept federal funds.” Id. at 605, 106 S.Ct. 2705. The Court then noted that the same rationale applied to educational institutions receiving federal aid under Title VI. Id. In fact, the Court recognized that under all of “the program-specific statutes, Title VI, Title IX, and § 504, Congress enters into an arrangement in the nature of a contract with the recipients of the funds: the recipient’s acceptance of the funds triggers coverage under the nondiscrimination provision.” Id. Finally, the Court explained that “[b]y limiting coverage to recipients, Congress imposes the obligations of § 504 upon those who are in a position to accept or reject those obligations as a part of the decision whether or not to receive federal funds.” Id. at 606, 106 S.Ct. 2705. Significantly, however, Paralyzed Veterans did not address the issue of individual liability under § 504. Rather, the Court merely excluded commercial airlines from § 504’s definition of “recipient.” Although the airlines benefitted from the federal funding, the Court noted that they, unlike the airport operators, had not entered into an agreement to receive federal funds in exchange for a promise not to discriminate. Thus, the Court concluded that the only those, like the airport operators, “who are in a position to accept or reject” § 504’s obligations in exchange for federal funding may be subject to the Rehabilitation Act. When reviewed in full, the Court’s opinion cannot properly be construed as providing for individual liability under § 504. Read in context, the language cited by the other District Courts to find individual liability does not support such a proposition. Individual liability was not at issue in Paralyzed Veterans, where the airport operators and the commercial airlines both were entities, not individuals. The Court simply determined that one of the entities, the airport operators, qualified as a “recipient” under § 504, because it had elected to accept federal funding in exchange for its agreement not to discriminate. Significantly, the Paralyzed Veterans Court also recognized the parallel nature of Title VI, Title IX, and the Rehabilitation Act, noting that under each statute the recipient elects to receive federal funding and, in return, agrees to abide by certain non-discrimination requirements. Id. at 605, 106 S.Ct. 2705. As noted above, individual liability has been rejected under both Title VI and Title IX. Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, including the substantially similar language found in the three statutes, the Court finds Jerry Flex-man not subject to personal liability under § 504. The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is sustained in part and overruled in part as it relates to Count IV of the Plaintiffs’ amended Complaint. The Motion is sustained with respect to Defendant Jerry Flexman personally, and overruled with respect to the Defendant corporation doing business as the Flexman Clinic. V. Julia Davis’ Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112 Discrimination Claim (Count V) In Count V of the Plaintiffs’ amended Complaint, Julia Davis contends that the Defendants’ failure to provide a sign language interpreter discriminated against her in violation of Ohio law. More specifically, she alleges that the Defendants violated Ohio Rev.Code § 4112.02(G), which makes it an unlawful practice: “(G) For any proprietor or employee, keeper, or manager of a place of public accommodation to deny to any person, except for reasons applicable alike to all persons regardless of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap, age, or ancestry, the full enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of the place of public accommodation.” In their summary judgment Motion, the Defendants contend § 4112.02(G) does not require them to provide Julia Davis with an interpreter to accommodate her disability. After reviewing the statute and Ohio Admin. Code § 4112-5-02, the Court finds the Defendants’ argument persuasive. Originally, Ohio Rev.Code § 4112.02(G) prohibited a place of public accommodation from discriminating only on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry. Ohio Civil Rights Comm. v. Lysyj, 38 Ohio St.2d 217, 313 N.E.2d 3 (1974). In Lysyj, the Ohio Supreme Court recited the standard for finding unlawful discrimination under the statute: “When determining whether there has been unlawful discrimination under R.C. § 4112.02(G), the test is simply whether the proprietor, keeper, manager or employee of a place of public accommodation has denied any person the full enjoyment of such place for reasons not applicable alike to all persons, irrespective of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry.” Id., 313 N.E.2d at 6. The current version of R.C. § 4112.02(G), however, also prohibits age, gender, and handicap discrimination by places of public accommodation. Ohio Admin. Code (“OAC”) Chapter 4112-5, promulgated by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, provides an administrative interpretation of § 4112.02(G) and sets forth current standards for compliance. OAC § 4112-5-01. In particular, § 4112-5-06 addresses discrimination against handicapped individuals by places of public accommodation. In relevant part, OAC § 4112-5-06 provides: “(A) Discrimination prohibited. It shall constitute unlawful discrimination in violation of Chapter 4112 of the Revised Code for any facility which is a place of public accommodation to: (1) Deny any handicapped person the reasonable access to and use of the areas within such facility which are open to and used by the public in general. (2) Deny any handicapped person any term, condition, privilege, service or advantage which, upon entrance to such facility, accrues to the public in general. For example, no handicapped person shall be denied, except for reasons applicable alike to all persons regardless of handicap, the full use and employment of: (a) Recreational or social facilities within such place or public accommodation. (b) Food services within such facility. (c) Maintenance services within such facility. (d) Any service such place of public accommodation is in the business of providing.” In the present case, Julia Davis contends the Defendants’ failure to provide a sign language interpreter constituted discrimination in violation of OAC § 4112-5-06(A)(2)(d). Specifically, she claims the Defendants effectively denied her the “service” of marital counseling because she is deaf. In opposition to Davis’ claim, the Defendants argue that Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 4112, as construed by OAC § 4112-5-06(A), prohibits a facility that is a place of public accommodation from engaging in affirmative acts discrimination against the handicapped, but does not require such facilities to “accommodate” a handicap beyond making modifications to physical structures. The language of OAC § 4112-5-06 supports the Defendants’ argument. As noted above, the administrative regulations provide that a place of public accommodation shall not deny a handicapped individual the full use and enjoyment of its services except for reasons applicable to everyone. OAC § 4112-5-06(A)(2)(d). On its face, this regulation states only that a place of public accommodation may not, because of an individual’s handicap, deny that person any term, condition, privilege, service, or advantage that is available to the public in general. In the present case, the Defendants did not deny Julia Davis their counseling services. Rather, she found the services unsatisfactory in the absence of an interpreter. Nevertheless, another regulation, OAC 4112-5-06(B), suggests that places of public accommodation have some affirmative responsibility to “accommodate” the handicapped. Significantly, however, the regulation requires a place of public accommodation to “accommodate” its facilities for use by the handicapped, and the regulation’s guidelines refer to physical accommodations to facilities and structures. For example, OAC § 4112 — 5—06(B) provides: “(B) Reasonable accommodation. Whether a place of public accommodation has reasonably accommodated its facility for use by the handicapped shall be determined on a case-by-case basis; however, the following factors will be considered: (1) Whether parking spaces for the handicapped are provided in close proximity to the building entrance. (2) Whether walkways from such parking spaces have been made accessible to the handicapped. (3) Whether steps at building entrances have been supplemented by means of access to the building entrance, such as by ramps or by sloped grading. (4) Whether public entrance doorways provide the handicapped with reasonable access to such budding. (5) Whether public telephones, lavatory facilities, water fountains, elevators, corridors, vending machines, stairways, food service lanes and aisles, utility outlets of frequent or essential use, and other similar facilities within such place of public accommodation are accessible to the handicapped.” Other parts of the public accommodation regulations also suggest that OAC § 4112-5-06 only requires accommodation to facilities and structures. For example, OAC § 4112-5-06(C) places the burden of proof on the owner, proprietor, keeper, or manager of a place of public accommodation to prove “undue hardship” whenever a handicapped person is denied access to the facility. Likewise, OAC § 4112-5-06(D), which discusses the “undue hardship” defense, includes language suggesting that the duty to accommodate is limited to making physical changes to the structure or facility. OAC § 4112-5-06(D) provides: “(D) Undue hardship. Upon an owner’s, proprietor’s, keeper’s or manager’s claim of inability to accommodate the handicapped due to undue hardship, the following factors will be considered: (1) Business necessity. (2) Whether the cost of the accommodating the handicapped would be substantially disproportionate to the total cost, use or size of such place of public accommodation. (3) Whether or not it is architecturally feasible to make reasonable accommodation. (4) The requirements of other laws and contracts. (5) Other appropriate considerations the proprietor, keeper or manager of the place of public accommodation can support with objective evidence.” The Court also finds strong support in OAC § 4112-5-02(A) for its conclusion that OAC § 4112-5-06 does not require a place of public accommodation to provide an interpreter. That definition section states: “When used in Chapter 4112 of the Revised Code and Chapters 4112-5 to 4112-7 of the Administrative Code: (A) ‘Accommodation’ means a reasonable adjustment made to a job and/or the work environment that enables a qualified handicapped person to safely and substantially perform the duties of that position.” This definition, which is applicable to OAC § 4112-5-06, the public accommodation regulation, suggests that a place of public accommodation must “accommodate” the handicapped in the employment context. Unlike the implementing regulations for the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, nothing in OAC § 4112-5-06 requires a place of public accommodation to provide auxiliary aids, such as an interpreter, for deaf individuals. Rather, as explained above, the regulation requires, as an accommodation, some modification of the relevant facilities and identifies various structural considerations. It also provides an undue hardship def