Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION ROBERTS, District Judge. Plaintiffs, ten African-American current and former special agents of the United States Secret Service purporting to represent a putative class of African-American special agents who have been employed by the United States Secret Service from January 1, 1974 to the present, have filed this action against the Treasury Secretary under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994), and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. Among other things, plaintiffs claim that the Secret Service has engaged in a pattern and practice of racial discrimination in its promotion of black special agents from the GS-13 to the GS-14 level. Plaintiffs have filed an application for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin future use of the allegedly discriminatory promotion evaluation system pending resolution of this matter on the merits. Plaintiffs also claim that they have been retaliated against for engaging in protected equal employment opportunity (“EEO”) activity and seek to enjoin future retaliation. Oral argument was held on September 1, 2000. I find that the plaintiffs’ evidence thus far is insufficient to give rise to an inference that the performance evaluation system is discriminatory, but does demonstrate that some actions taken by the Secret Service since this litigation began are likely to chill other black agents from coming forward with their claims. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that, over the course of past twenty-six years, the United States Secret Service has utilized a wide variety of racially discriminatory employment practices. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the Secret Service's policies and practices have systematically discriminated against black special agents in the following areas: (1) placement in positions of GS-14 or above; (2) performance evaluations; (3) assignments to the position of acting supervisor; (4) transfers and assignments in general; (5) access to training; (6) assignment to undercover work; (7) hiring; (8) testing; (9) disciplinary policies; (10) awards and bonuses; (11) overall work environment; (12) retaliation, and (13) other practices relating to the terms and conditions of employment. The primary target of plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is the Secret Service’s performance evaluation system. A description of how that system operates is therefore in order. I. The Secret Service Special Agent Merit Promotion Plan The evaluation system at issue is known as the Secret Service Special Agent Merit Promotion Plan (“MPP”). Developed by a Secret Service Task Force in 1997, the MPP consists of three distinct parts: (1) a “First-Level” evaluation; (2) a “Peer Panel” evaluation; and (3) a “Second-Level” evaluation. (Burgess Decl., Def.’s Opp’n to PL’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“Def.’s Opp’n”) Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 6-9.) The First-Level evaluation counts for 50% of a special agent’s total MPP score while the Peer Panel and Second-Level scores are weighted at 20% and 30% respectively. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-9.) The MPP is used annually to evaluate special agents for promotion. In August, each GS-13 and GS-14 special agent who wishes to compete for a promotion is required to file a notice of his or her intent to compete. (Id. at ¶7.) However, not every GS-13 or GS-14 special agent is eligible to compete. A special agent must have completed three years “in grade” before he or she will be considered for a promotion. (Id. at ¶ 23.) For example, in order to compete for a promotion to the GS-14 level, a special agent must first have completed three years at the GS-13 level. Plaintiffs do not allege that this practice is discriminatory in any way. Special agents who elect to compete for a promotion are then evaluated by their supervisors in the First-Level evaluation. The supervisor is required to rate each candidate using a scale of one to five on ten specific elements such as writing ability, problem solving, oral communication, knowledge of Secret Service rules and regulations, leadership and management ability, and negotiation skill. (Id. at ¶ 7; Moore Decl., Attach, to Pis.’ Mem. Prelim. Inj. (“Pis.’ Mem.”) at ¶ 12.) After the supervisors complete their First-Level evaluation, they meet with the candidate to discuss the results. The candidate then has fifteen days in which to file a grievance challenging the supervisor’s score. This process is normally completed by the end of August and counts for 50% of the agent’s total MPP score. (Burgess Deck at ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs do not allege that the First-Level evaluation is discriminatory. Plaintiffs’ challenge begins with the Peer Panel evaluation which is normally administered in September. During this portion of the MPP, which accounts for 20% of the special agent’s total score, the candidate is evaluated by a panel of more senior special agents who are at least of the grade to which the candidate is seeking a promotion. So, if the competing special agent is seeking a promotion to GS-14, the peer panel would be comprised of special agents at the GS-14 level or above. The peer panel does not necessarily include the candidate’s GS-14 supervisor. (Id. at ¶ 8; Moore Deck at ¶ 15.) The peer panel reviews a written qualification statement drafted by the candidate which details his or her experience in the “protection” and “investigations” areas. The panel then compares the candidate’s statement to lists of specific “benchmark” tasks in each area. For example, the list for “protection” includes such tasks as assisting in the logistics for major events, serving as the lead advance agent for a visit by a notable foreign dignitary, and conducting a complex intelligence investigation. The panel then gives each candidate a protection score and an investigation score between one and seven. (Burgess Deck at ¶ 8.) The Second-Level evaluation begins in October. It is based on the following three elements: (1) two written qualifications statements drafted by the candidate regarding “core competencies comments that the candidate’s supervisor made in the First-Level evaluation; (3) the Peer Panel evaluation results. The written statements regarding core competencies are broken down into “leadership” and “influence and decision making.” The evaluators, a panel of representatives from the office of each of the Secret Service’s Assistant Directors, then compare the candidate’s written statements to another list of benchmark skills. These benchmarks include responding to and assuming command during emergency situations, coordinating large-scale efforts with other organizations, and supervising other agents. After comparing the candidate’s written statements with the benchmarks, the panel rates the candidate on a scale of one to seven in each of the two areas. (Burgess Decl. at ¶ 9; Moore Decl. at ¶ 17.) (2) the After this process is completed, all competing special agents are notified in November of their initial composite MPP score which is on a 100 point scale. Candidates then have the option of filing a grievance challenging their score. Final scores for the current promotion cycle are expected to be distributed in early January of 2001. Those scores will then be used by candidates to bid on available positions throughout the 2001 calendar year. (Burgess Deck at ¶¶ 10-11.) When a position opens up, the Secret Service’s Personnel Division announces a time period in which it will accept.bids from interested special agents. After the period for accepting bids has closed, the Personnel Division creates a “Merit Promotion Certificate” for the vacant position. The Merit Promotion Certificate is a list of the bidding special agents with the top 30 MPP scores (including ties), or the top 25% of bidding special agents, whichever is greater. If there are less than 30 bids, all of the bidders are considered. (Id. at ¶ 14.) The special agent with the highest MPP score is not guaranteed that he or she will be awarded the vacant position. Instead, a recommendation is made to the Director by an Advisory Board which consists of the Deputy Director, all seven of the Assistant Directors, and the Chief Counsel. The Advisory Board may recommend to the Director any individual listed on the Merit Promotion Certificate, or any competing special agent already at the grade level of the vacant position who is seeking a lateral transfer. The Director then selects who will fill the vacant position. (Id. at ¶ 15.) There are no written standards governing the Advisory Board in making its recommendation or the Director in making a selection. The only constraint on the Advisory Board and the Director is the MPP’s requirement that all selections be made on a non-discriminatory basis and that the selection “not be based on any criteria that are not job related.” (MPP, Pis.’ Supp. Ex. C at 4.) II. Plaintiffs’ Allegations Regarding MPP In this suit, plaintiffs maintain that the Peer Panel and Second-Level evaluations, which together account for 50% of the composite MPP score, operate to the systematic detriment of black special agents. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that these two portions of the MPP allow half of the candidate’s final score to be determined by the subjective preferences of evaluators who have never actually observed the candidate on the job. Plaintiffs also find fault with the absence of any published standards governing the Advisory Board or the Director in their choice of which agent on the Merit Promotion Certificate is selected to fill the vacant position. According to plaintiffs, this subjectivity has resulted in the proliferation of a “good old boys network” favoring white agents over black agents for promotions. Plaintiffs offer statistical and anecdotal evidence to support their allegations. A. Statistical Evidence Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence consists of an analysis of the representation of black special agents at the GS-13 level as compared to the GS-14 level as of July 31, 1999. Black special agents comprised 10.8% (115 out of 1068) of the total number of special agents at the GS-13 level, but only 4.2% (12 out of 287) of all special agents at the GS-14 level. According to the plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Charles Mann, this difference in representation is statistically significant at the .000044 level using a one-tail exact binomial test, which corresponds to a difference of 4.08 standard deviations under the two-tail test utilized by the Supreme Court in Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 97 S.Ct. 2736, 53 L.Ed.2d 768 (1977). (Mann Deck, Attach, to Pis.’ Mem. at ¶ 8.) In simpler terms, these figures mean that the probability that the observed disparity is due to chance is well under 1%. B. Anecdotal Evidence Plaintiffs contend that the experience of their lead plaintiff, Special Agent Reginald “Ray” Moore, provides an egregious real life example of how the MPP works to prevent black special agents from advancing in the Secret Service. After serving seven years in the Secret Service, which included stints in the Secret Service’s Miami and Baton Rouge Field Offices, Special Agent Moore was promoted to GS-13 in July of 1991. (Moore Decl. at ¶¶ 6-7.) He then served as the Course Director for the Investigative Tactics portion of the Special Agent Training Courses, and, beginning in 1994, was assigned to the Presidential Protective Detail (“PPD”) where he became Acting Assistant Special Agent In Charge (“ATSAIC”) for the Joint Operations Center at the White House. He was involuntarily transferred to the Secret Service’s Dallas Field Office in October of 1999. (Id. at ¶¶ 2-5.) Despite his credentials, Special Agent Moore has not been promoted to GS-14. As of January 1, 1999, he was ranked by the MPP as 47th out of 393 other eligible GS-13 level Special Agents, making him the highest rated black agent of all GS-13s in the Secret Service. Moore claims that during 1999, the Secret Service promoted at least 92 other special agents who had lower overall performance rankings on the MPP than he did. (Id. at ¶ 8.) According to plaintiffs, the discrimination against Moore became even more apparent during the 1999/2000 promotion cycle. On the MPP administered in 1999, Moore received a perfect 50 out of 50 in his First-Level evaluation. On the Peer Panel evaluation, he received 6.33 points out of 7.00 on the Investigation subpart and 6.67 points out of 7.00 on the Protection subpart. In the Second-Level evaluation, he received the maximum score of 7.00 on both the Leadership and Decision Making subparts. Moore’s composite score of 98.57 out of a possible 100 points made him the 20th ranked agent out of 310 eligible GS-13 level special agents in the Secret Service and still, to his knowledge, the highest rated black agent. Yet, Moore did not receive a promotion while, according to him, other lower rated agents did. (Id. at ¶¶ 9,13,16,18.) Plaintiffs contend that the Secret Service’s failure to promote Special Agent Moore strongly demonstrates the subjectivity and unfairness inherent in the current Secret Service promotion system. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the Peer Panel and Second-Level evaluations are not guided by objective criteria. Special Agent Moore claims that, because the GS-14 supervisors on the peer panel and the Assistant Directors’ representatives administering the Second-Level evaluation are unlikely to have actually observed the work of the candidate they are evaluating, they rely heavily on oral recommendations from the Special Agent In Charge (“SAIC”) over the candidate being evaluated. According to Special Agent Moore, if the SAIC does not call the GS-14 supervisors on the peer panel or the Assistant Director to lobby for the candidate’s promotion, “the candidate has virtually no chance of getting a Peer Panel or Second Level Evaluation score that would be competitive for promotion.” (Id. at ¶ 19.) Moore maintains that this problem is exemplified by comparing his 1997/1998 and 1998/1999 performance evaluations. He claims that he received a low score on his 1997/1998 Second-Level evaluation because his SAIC did not call the Assistant Director to push for Moore’s promotion, thereby contributing to a low composite score of 83 out of 100. For the 1998/1999 performance evaluation, by contrast, Moore’s SAIC did call the Assistant Director and Moore received a high Second-Level score which contributed to a high overall score of 97.03. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Despite this high composite score, however, Moore was not promoted during the 1998/1999 promotion cycle. Nor was he promoted during the 1999/2000 promotion cycle when he received an even higher score of 98.57. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Thus, Special Agent Moore believes that the MPP score is “meaningless” and that “[t]he performance evaluations merely add a veneer of legitimacy to promotion selections that are, in fact, made via the racial spoils system of the ‘good old boys’ network.” (Id.) III. Retaliation Allegations Plaintiffs’ second set of allegations charge that, since plaintiffs Moore, Sum-merour, and Turner filed an amended EEO class action complaint on February 24, 2000, the Secret Service has launched a “campaign of threats and intimidation” designed to undermine support for Black Agents of the Secret Service, Inc. (“BASS, Inc.”), an organization of black Secret Service agents involved in promoting this lawsuit. (Pis.’ Mem. at 24.) Plaintiffs also allege that the Secret Service has retaliated against the named plaintiffs. In anticipation of the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, I granted plaintiffs limited discovery on the issue of whether plaintiffs had in fact been retaliated against for engaging in protected EEO activity. Plaintiffs took the deposition of Secret Service designee Barbara Saliunas, Deputy Chief of the Secret Service’s Personnel Division, which lasted five days and covered a variety of topics. Ms. Sahunas’s deposition wound up not only addressing plaintiffs’ wide-ranging allegations of retaliation, but also some of their allegations regarding the discriminatory nature of the MPP. Plaintiffs’ retaliation allegations and the defendant’s responses to them can be summarized as follows: A. The Alleged Campaign to Undermine BASS, Inc. BASS was formed in the early 1980s as a way for black agents to communicate with each other. (Cockell Decl., Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 4 at ¶¶ 2-5.) Special Agent Summerour describes it as “an informal network of social and professional support for African-American Secret Service Agents in the Secret Service.” (Summer-our Deck, Attach, to Pis.’ Mem. at ¶ 12.) Until recently, BASS had no official organization and lacked a “formal agenda.” (Second Spriggs Decl., Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 5 at II5.) In February of 2000, plaintiffs Turner, Moore, and Summerour decided to incorporate BASS so that it would become a “democratically elected representative organization to better address issues common to all African-American Secret Service Agents.” (Summerour Decl. at ¶ 13.) The incorporation process involved “select[in‘g] interim officers and directors, preparing] by-laws, and electing a board of directors and slate of officers.” (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that, since the filing of their amended EEO class action complaint on February 24, 2000, the Secret Service has launched a concerted “campaign” to discredit BASS, Inc. in the eyes of black special agents so that they will be discouraged from supporting both BASS, Inc. and this lawsuit. This alleged campaign consists mainly of the following: (1) a Secret Service-wide e-mail sent out by Brian Stafford, Director of the Secret Service, on February 25, 2000 — the day after the plaintiffs had filed their amended EEO complaint — stating, among other things, that he was “disappointed and troubled by the allegations” and that, “It is offensive for anyone to question our commitment to equal employment opportunity for all of our employees” (Pis.’ Mem. Ex. A); (2) an e-mail from Assistant Director (“AD”) Larry Cockell, who is black, sent to all BASS members hours after Director Stafford’s e-mail in which Cockell questioned how the interim officers of BASS were going about incorporating BASS, Inc. (Pis.’ Mem. Ex. B); (3) a March 15, 2000 e-mail from AD Cockell to all BASS members stating his belief that the interim leadership of BASS, Inc. had conducted a “coup d’etat” to illegitimately seize control of the organization without consulting the membership (Pls.Mem.Ex. C); (4) a May 12, 2000 e-mail from AD Cockell to all BASS members again expressing his disappointment in the direction that BASS was taking, disaffiliating himself from BASS, Inc., and adding “I choose not to buy into this sham” (Pis’ Mem. Ex. E); (5) e-mail messages from other senior black agents to all BASS members declining nominations to be officers of BASS, Inc. even though such messages were supposed to be sent only to Special Agent Summerour, who was serving as interim secretary. (Pis.’ Mem. Ex. F.) Some of the e-mails declining nominations echoed AD Cockell’s discontent with the new direction that BASS was taking. For instance, SAIC Wallace Shields stated in a May 13,2000 e-mail, “I am very saddened by what I see among agents (and former agents) that have come such a great distance together.” He decried the “rift” that had developed, apologized to the “new agents” for what they were witnessing, and concluded, “I know that the last thing you need is to be associated with the kind of behavior that is now on the e-mail system.” SAIC Jerry Wyatt’s May 16, 2000 e-mail stated that he did not wish to be a part “of an organization that divides and alienates the majority of black agents for the sole purpose of furthering the individualistic agendas of a few_[T]he justice you claim to seek appears to be ‘Just-us’, as black agents, being ridiculed.” Plaintiffs contend that these e-mails demonstrate that several senior black secret service agents have “circled the wagons” to discourage junior black special agents from supporting BASS, Inc. and plaintiffs’ lawsuit. (Pis.’ Mem. at 26-27.) To corroborate this allegation, they have submitted the declaration of Special Agent Cheryl Montgomery-White who alleges that, after attending a meeting in February of 2000 about the incorporation of BASS and this lawsuit, she had a conversation with SAIC Keith Prewitt. SAIC Prewitt, who is black, was also at the meeting. According to Special Agent Montgomery-White, during this conversation, SAIC Prewitt told her in substance that this lawsuit is “not going anywhere” because “all the Secret Service has to do is to put [AD] Larry Cockell, [AD] Danny Spriggs, SAIC Steve Carey, SAIC Gerry Wyatt, and me out front, and the lawsuit will go [away].” (Montgomery-White Decl., Attach, to Pis.’ Notice of Filing at ¶ 51.) Plaintiffs have also noted that between May 28, 2000 and June 15, 2000, eight junior black Special Agents resigned from BASS and six of them have asked to be permanently removed from BASS’s email router. (Ivery Supp. Deck, Pls.’s Reply Supp. Prelim. Inj. Ex. 2 at Ex. A.) In response to these allegations, defendant has submitted declarations from all of the senior black agents alleged to have sent e-mails geared toward undermining BASS, Inc. and this lawsuit. These declarations generally deny any effort influenced by the Director or otherwise to “circle the wagons” or to discourage black special agents from supporting BASS, Inc. AD Cockell maintains that his e-mails were simply a personal expression of (1) his frustration after some in the media had implied that he was involved in this lawsuit, (2) his discontent with what he perceived was a radical alteration in BASS being conducted without consulting the general membership, and (3) his indignation after receiving an e-mail through the BASS e-mail router suggesting that he had been “bought off by a few high-profile promotions.” (Cockell Decl. at ¶¶ 11-17; Saliunas Dep. at 824-53) As for the e-mails from other senior black agents rejecting nominations to be officers of BASS, Inc., the senders of those e-mails claim that they were doing nothing more than responding to an e-mail which warned them that if they did not respond within 72 hours, their names would be placed on the ballot. (Cockell Decl. at ¶¶ 16-17; Spriggs Decl., Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 5 at ¶7; Carey Decl., Def.’ Opp’n Ex. 16 at ¶¶ 5-6; Rowe Decl. Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 17 at ¶¶ 5-8; Hill Deck, Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 18 at ¶¶ 4-6; Rodgers Decl., Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 19 at ¶¶ 7-10; Mapp Deck, Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 20 at ¶¶ 5-7; Shields Deck, Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 21 at ¶¶ 5-9; Carter Deck, Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 22 at ¶¶ 5-8; Wyatt Deck, Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 23 at ¶ 5.) Further, defendant contends that the senior black agents who were critical of BASS, Inc. were not attempting to undermine it or this litigation, but were merely expressing their own personal concern and disappointment over the course that BASS, Inc. was taking. Defendant has submitted no such explanatory declaration from Director Stafford concerning his e-mail. However, defendant denies that Director Stafford intended his February 25, 2000 message to be intimidating and claims that the email was designed in large part to reaffirm the Secret Service’s commitment to equal employment opportunities. (Saliu-nas Dep. at 778.) B. Special Agent Leroy Hendrix Special Agent Leroy Hendrix has been a member of the Secret Service since May of 1989 and is currently assigned to the Vice Presidential Protective Division (“VPPD”). He alleges that he has been denied a position as a “whip” on the VPPD and a promotion because of his complaints of discrimination within the VPPD and his participation in this lawsuit. A whip is a GS-13 level informal supervisor of a protective shift who acts as a supervisor in the absence of the actual shift leader, who is a GS-14 special agent. There are usually three whips on a particular detail. According to plaintiffs, obtaining a whip position drastically increases one’s chances for a promotion because of the supervisory responsibilities involved. (Hendrix Deck, Attach, to Pis.’ Mem. at ¶ 15.) Special Agent Hendrix claims that, on March 8, 2000, he sent an e-mail to the SAIC of the VPPD, Special Agent William Pickle, which complained about the lack of minority and females agents assigned to whip positions on the VPPD and expressed the belief that lesser qualified white male agents were being promoted instead. Hendrix and Pickle had a meeting the next day, barely two weeks after Director Stafford’s e-mail expressing offense and disappointment at the allegations of discrimination. At the meeting, Hendrix claims that Pickle expressed his “disappointment” in Hendrix’s belief that whip assignments were made in a discriminatory fashion. Pickle also allegedly explained that whips would in the future be chosen based primarily on the shift leader’s vote and also noted that white agents had “complained” that three “number one” whips were minorities. This alleged comment lead Special Agent Hendrix to believe that a racial quota system had been instituted limiting the number of minorities who would be made whips. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-26.) In response to Hendrix’s questions about his own personal situation, Special Agent Pickle allegedly responded that he was “certain” that Hendrix would be made a whip. However, Hendrix has riot been made a whip since and he claims that others who were made whips, including women and minorities, are less qualified than he is. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-30.) Plaintiffs have proffered additional evidence which, according to them, demonstrates that the Secret Service’s failure to make Hendrix a whip was in retaliation for his complaints about the purported racial quota system on the VPPD. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that Dawn Naples, a Special Agent on the VPPD, had a conversation with Hendrix during which she mentioned speaking to VPPD Deputy Special Agent In Charge (“DSAIC”) Tony Zotto. Zotto, who was then a primary supervisor for Hendrix’s detail, allegedly told Naples that Hendrix might have been promoted to whip had he not “gone over [Zotto’s] head” to complain about the alleged racial quota system to SAIC Pickle. (Id. at ¶ 33.) Hendrix also maintains that Zotto had previously made comments which led Hendrix to believe that he would in fact be promoted. (Id. at ¶ 34.) Aside from his non-assignment to a whip position, Special Agent Hendrix cites his non-promotion to a Resident Agent (“RA”) position in Fort Meyers, Florida as another incident of retaliation. Special Agent Hendrix bid on the position in March of 2000 and was not selected. He claims that the agent who was selected over him is less qualified for the position. (Id. at ¶ 36.) Special Agent Hendrix also alleges that he was retaliated against after a May 3, 2000 press conference he attended which announced the filing of this lawsuit. According to Hendrix, the next day, ATSAIC Lee Aivazis intentionally assigned Hendrix to do “errand boy” tasks, such as retrieving gun holsters from a company in Virginia, which were normally assigned to junior agents. (Id. at ¶¶ 37-39.) Defendant contests all of Special Agent Hendrix’s allegations. First, Special Agent Naples and DSAIC Zotto have submitted declarations in which they reject Special Agent Hendrix’s version of events. Specifically, Special Agent Naples denies ever telling Hendrix that DSAIC Zotto had said that Hendrix would have been promoted had he not gone over Zotto’s head. (Naples Deck, Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 8 at ¶ 3.) DSAIC Zotto also denies ever telling Special Agent Naples as much. (Zotto Deck, Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 9 at ¶ 3.) Second, SAIC Pickle denies that he told Hendrix during the March 9 meeting that the whip selection procedures were changing, or that he was “certain” that Hendrix would get a whip assignment. (Pickle Deck, Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 7 at ¶ 8.) SAIC Pickle also denies that there is any “quota system” in selecting whips and notes that, of the three special agents chosen for whip positions since March 9, 2000, two are black and one of the two is female. (Id. at ¶ 9.) However, SAIC Pickle did not deny saying that he was “disappointed” that Hendrix believed that a racial quota system was used in selecting whips. Third, the Secret Service officials who recommended that other agents be made whips have stated that they were unaware that Special Agent Hendrix had engaged in any protected EEO activity at the time those recommendations were made. These supervisors also cited Special Agent Hendrix’s allegedly habitual tardiness as an additional reason for why he was not selected to be a whip. (Knoll Deck Def.’s Supp. Ex. 10 at ¶¶ 5, 7-8; Wyche Deck, Def.’s Supp. Ex. 12 at ¶¶ 5-8; Roberts Deck, Def.’s Supp. Ex. 13 at ¶¶ 5-8.) Fourth, defendant submitted the declaration of AD James E. Bauer, who was responsible for selecting the special agent for the Fort Meyers RA position. AD Bauer claims that, at the time he made the selection, he was unaware that Special Agent Hendrix had made an allegation of discrimination within the VPPD or that Hendrix was involved in this lawsuit. AD Bauer also indicated that the special agent selected was more qualified for the position because (1) he had been in the Secret Service five years longer than Hendrix had, and (2) he also had proficiency in Spanish which Bauer believed would be useful. (Bauer Decl., Def.’s Supp. Ex. 2 at ¶¶ 3-4.) As for Hendrix’s “errand boy” allegation, ATSAIC Aivazis has submitted a declaration explaining that he assigned Special Agent Hendrix to the tasks at issue because Hendrix was several hours late for work that day without authorization. Ai-vazis also asserts that “picking up gun holsters is a routine task which both Special Agent Hendrix and I have previously performed.” (Second Aivazis Deck, Def.’s Supp. Ex. 9 at ¶4.) Finally, Aivazis disavows that he was motivated by retaliatory intent. C. Special Agent Luther Ivery Special Agent Luther Ivery contends that he too has been retaliated against for engaging in protected EEO activity. First, he alleges that on March 9, 2000, the SAIC of the Dignitary Protective Division, Steve Carey, allegedly told Ivery that AD Danny Spriggs, who is black, was “disappointed” when he heard that Ivery was involved in the EEO complaint underlying this case. SAIC Carey, who is also black, then allegedly warned Ivery, “If I were you, I wouldn’t be the one upfront.” (Iv-ery Deck, Attach to Pis.’ Mem. at ¶ 14.) Ivery also alleges that, since joining this litigation, he has not been promoted despite scoring a 93.8 on the MPP. He maintains that other agents, both white and black, with far lower MPP scores have been promoted instead. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-15.) Defendant counters that the reasons- for Special Agent Ivery’s non-promotion have in this lawsuit. According to defendant, since March 9, 2000, Ivery has bid on three GS-14 positions which he was not awarded. For two, Ivery was not among the top thirty GS-13s who bid so his name was not placed on the Merit Promotion Certificate. For the third, Ivery was ranked thirtieth and a special agent with a higher MPP score was selected for the promotion. (Burgess Deck at ¶¶ 18-21.) In addition, AD Spriggs claims to have harbored doubts about Special Agent Ivery’s leadership abilities because of a domestic incident that had occurred several years earlier. (Saliunas Dep., Pis.’ Supp. Ex. E at 205; Def.’s Supplemental Mem. (“Def.’s Supp.”) Ex. 21.) However, the defendant has never denied in filings or in oral argument that AD Spriggs said he was “disappointed” upon hearing that Ivery was involved in this matter. D. Special Agent John Turner Special Agent John Turner is the second highest rated GS-13 level black special agent on the MPP behind Special Agent Moore, having scored a 98.10 on the last MPP. He is currently assigned to the Protective Intelligence Squad at the Washington Field Office. He has served twice in ATSAIC positions which are normally assigned to GS-14s. He alleges that he has not been promoted to GS-14 out of retaliation for his participation in this lawsuit. He also contends that he was involuntarily transferred to his current position, which purportedly has “significantly less responsibilities” than his previous assignment, approximately one week after this action was filed on May 3, 2000. (Turner Deck, Attach to Pls.’s Mem. Supp. Prelim. Inj. at ¶¶ 4, 5,10.) Defendant maintains that Special Agent Turner’s transfer was not the result of retaliation, but rather part of a routine office rotation. According to defendant, Turner was one of thirty other agents at the Washington Field Office who were reassigned at the same time. (Dowling Decl., Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 11 at ¶ 6.) Defendant contends that Turner was among the thirty selected because he had already spent a lengthy period of time at his previous post and the Washington Field Office needed a senior GS-13 agent in the Protective Intelligence squad. (Ediger Decl., Def.’s Supp. Ex. 7 at ¶ 9.) According to defendant, Turner was also recently offered the position of group leader of his squad, which would give him additional responsibilities. (Saliunas Dep. at 366.) Plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed at oral argument that Special Agent Turner has accepted that position and will assume it shortly. With respect to the two non-promotions, defendant contends that the two agents who were promoted instead of Turner were better qualified. E. Special Agent Ray Moore Special Agent Moore maintains that he has been retaliated against throughout the EEO process. For instance, he was involuntarily transferred to the Dallas Field Office in October of 1999, days after he filed a formal class complaint in this matter. He alleges that, after his transfer, SAIC Jerry Patton, who is black, told Moore that he deserved to be promoted and would see to it that he was. However, on March 13, 2000, a newspaper article appeared in the Dallas Morning News discussing Moore’s role as lead plaintiff in this lawsuit. According to Moore, a coworker in the Dallas Field Office told him that SAIC Patton no longer wanted Moore to be promoted because of the article. Moore was not promoted even though, according to him, his job performance rating was higher than those who were. (Moore Decl. at ¶ 23.) Moore also alleges that he has bid on forty-one other promotions since this litigation began and has not been awarded any. Defendant denies that any of the actions Special Agent Moore has cited were motivated by retaliation. He has proffered evidence showing that Special Agent Moore’s transfer to Dallas had been formalized in July of 1999, well before the filing of the formal class complaint in October. (Def.’s Opp’n Exs. 13-14.) SAIC Patton denies that he withdrew his support for Special Agent Moore after the Dallas Morning News article was published and also denies that he ever told Moore that he deserved to be promoted. (Patton Decl., Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 12 at ¶¶ 3-9.) Defendant asserts that the individual who was promoted, a Hispanic agent, had a higher MPP score than Moore and was Patton’s first choice. (Burgess Decl. at ¶ 25.) With respect to the roughly forty non-promotions Moore has cited, the defendant’s agency designee was questioned about the reasons for these non-promotions during her deposition. One of the more common reasons given was Director Stafford’s policy against moving agents at taxpayer expense who had recently been moved to their current position. (Saliunas Dep. at 155-57, 186.) Another was the Director’s and Advisory Board’s alleged preference for laterally transferring GS-14s into vacant GS-14 positions rather than promoting a GS-13. (Id. at 131.) Plaintiffs note in response that neither of these two criteria is explicitly mentioned in the MPP. Plaintiffs also allege that Special Agent Moore has been retaliated against since the filing of plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. On June 1, 2000, someone mailed an anonymous complaint against Special Agent Moore to the Secret Service’ Office of Inspection here in Washington, accusing him of misusing government telephones and computers to further his lawsuit against the Secret Service. The Office of Inspection is normally responsible for investigating wrongdoing on the part of Secret Service employees. However, the Secret Service turned over the letter to the Treasury Department’s Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”), an entity outside the Secret Service, citing the potential conflict of interest due to this litigation. (Clark Decl., Def.’s Supp. Ex. 16 at ¶¶ 2-3; Saliunas Dep. at 318-19, 429-430, 440.) OIG then conducted an investigation, produced a report, and no disciplinary action was taken against Special Agent Moore. (Saliunas Dep. at 726-28; Pis.’ Supp. Ex. J.) F. Special Agent Yvette Summerour Special Agent Summerour claims that, on March 10, 2000, she was denied a requested transfer from the PPD to the Secret Service’s Major Events Division after becoming involved in this case. She further alleges that her supervisor, DSAIC Carl Truscott, told her that while she would not be transferred, other agents on the PPD who had less experience would still be given the opportunity for the transfer. Summerour claims that Truscott also told her that he did not think that any of her requested transfers were likely to succeed and that he opposed her discrimination claims. Summerour alleges that she felt as though she had no choice but to accept a lateral transfer to the Protective Intelligence Division on May 21, 2000. Moreover, Summerour, who is also the highest ranked black female on the MPP, was recently denied a promotion. (Sum-merour Decl. at ¶¶ 8-9,16,18.) In response to Special Agent Summer-our’s allegations, defendant has produced the declaration of AD Barbara Riggs, who oversees the Secret Service’s Intelligence Division. AD Riggs states that Summer-our had phoned Riggs, “personally asked” for her reassignment, and did not indicate a preference for the Major Events Division. AD Riggs believes that Summer-our’s assignment to the Intelligence Division is a “positive career move for her.” (Riggs Decl., Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 15 at ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs contend that Special Agent Sum-merour called AD Riggs only after Sum-merour became convinced that her other options had been foreclosed. DSAIC Truscott also submitted a declaration. He states that he met with Special Agent Summerour as part of his routine practice of speaking with agent’s who are approaching the end of their five-year tenure with the PPD. He indicated that he was merely attempting to encourage Special Agent Summerour to make “realistic selections given the relative number of positions available in the various offices within the Secret Service.” He adds that he does not make any reselection assignments himself, but rather merely provides advice and has neither discouraged Special Agent Summerour from bringing her discrimination claims nor retaliated against her. (Truscott Deck, Def.’s Supp. Ex. 5 at ¶¶ 3-4.) DISCUSSION Plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunction seeks two general forms of relief. First, plaintiffs seek to enjoin the use of MPP Peer Panel and Second-Level evaluations in personnel decisions regarding promotions, transfers and/or assignments. Second, plaintiffs seek an injunction against further acts of retaliation and intimidation which would include: (1) a ban on any further reprisals and acts of intimidation/retaliation against the plaintiffs and the class; (2) a Secret Service-wide e-mail affirming that no retaliatory action will be taken against anyone who participates in BASS, Inc., or this lawsuit, and that the Secret Service will discipline anyone who does retaliate; and (3) reasonable notification to plaintiffs’ counsel concerning any future transfers or employment actions involving the named plaintiffs. I. Standard of Review A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary form of relief not granted lightly. Traditionally, the plaintiff “must show 1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, 2) that [he or she] would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, 3) that an injunction would not substantially injure other interested parties, and 4) that the public ■ interest would be furthered by the injunction.” Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1066 (D.C.Cir.1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C.Cir.1977); Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 923 (D.C.Cir.1958). As the D.C. Circuit has held, “[t]hese factors interrelate on a sliding scale and must be balanced against each other.” Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1318 (D.C.Cir.1998). Defendant argues, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 94 S.Ct. 937, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974), that plaintiffs must make a heightened showing of irreparable harm because they are seeking to enjoin federal personnel practices. In Sampson, the Supreme Court ruled that a federal court could preliminarily enjoin a probationary federal employee’s discharge pending the completion of her administrative appeal. However, the Court also held that the traditional standards governing preliminary injunctions were inappropriate due to the “historical denial of all equitable relief by the federal courts” in past employment cases, coupled with the “well-established rule that the Government has traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the dispatch of its own internal affairs ... and the traditional unwillingness of courts of equity to enforce contracts for personal service either at the behest of the employer or of the employee ....” Sampson, 415 U.S. at 83-84, 94 S.Ct. 937 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Thus, a plaintiff seeking to stay a government personnel decision must “make a showing of irreparable injury sufficient in kind and degree to override these factors cutting against the general availability of preliminary injunctions in Government personnel cases.” Id. at 84, 94 S.Ct. 937. When presented with the issue of whether this heightened irreparable harm standard applies in Title VII cases, the D.C. Circuit sidestepped it. See Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 566, 575 & n. 66 (D.C.Cir.1987). However, another member of this Court has addressed the question, explicitly holding “that a more stringent showing of irreparable injury is required when a plaintiff, even in a Title VII case, seeks a preliminary injunction against the federal government in the personnel arena.” Bonds v. Heyman, 950 F.Supp. 1202, 1212 (D.D.C.1997) (Lamberth, J.). To make this “more stringent showing,” the plaintiff must demonstrate “extraordinary irreparable injury” or “that an adverse personnel action is likely to have a chilling effect on other employees who, after witnessing their fellow co-worker’s discharge or dismissal, would now refuse to file claims in fear of reprisals_” Id. at 1214-15. Here, regardless of whether this heightened standard should apply, plaintiffs have not met even the traditional standard with respect to their claim of discriminatory promotions. I also find, however, that plaintiffs have met both the traditional and the heightened standard for preliminary injunctive relief with respect to their claim that the Secret Service has engaged in activity having a chilling effect on the prospective plaintiffs’ exercise of their Title VII rights. II. Allegations that the MPP is Discriminatory A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits Plaintiffs allege that Peer Panel and Second-Level evaluations violate Title VII under two separate theories of liability. First, plaintiffs bring a “disparate treatment” claim (also known as a “pattern and practice” claim in the class action context) in which they allege that the operation of the MPP manifests an intent on the part of the Secret Service to discriminate against black special agents as a class. To prevail on such a claim, “[p]roof of illicit motive is essential, but, especially in cases alleging class-wide discrimination, illicit motive may be inferred from a sufficient showing of disparity between members of the plaintiff class and comparably qualified members of the majority group.” Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1265-66 (D.C.Cir.1984) (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 & n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977)). Plaintiffs also bring a “disparate impact” claim. Under this theory, plaintiffs are not required to prove discriminatory motive. Rather, it is enough for them to show that the challenged employment practices, though “facially neutral in their treatment of different groups ... in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, the “classic” example of a disparate impact claim occurs when the “plaintiffs allege that the defendant based employment decisions on results of a test for which members of one [race] on average received lower scores than members of the other [race].” Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 90 (D.C.Cir.1987) (citations omitted). Though the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories share some similarities, the sequence and allocations of burdens of proof differ in important ways. Because discriminatory intent is the keystone of any disparate treatment claim, “the plaintiff class will likely try to meet this ultimate burden by proving a disparity sufficient to permit an inference of discrimination [so that] plaintiff must carry the burden of persuasion as to the existence of the disparity.” Segar, 738 F.2d at 1267. Disparate impact claims, by contrast, do not seek to root out discriminatory intent, but rather aim at facially neutral practices that adversely affect minorities without a legitimate business justification. As such, “plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion as to the existence of a race-related disparity caused by an employment practice, but, once plaintiffs have made this showing, the employer bears the burden of persuasion as to the business necessity of the practice.” Id. (citation omitted). As the D.C. Circuit has noted, “an important point of convergence” between disparate treatment and disparate impact claims exists in class actions such as this one. Id. Because both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims “are attacks on the systemic results of employment practices ... proof of each claim will involve a showing of disparity between the minority and majority groups in an employer’s workforce.” Id. Thus, under both theories of liability, the plaintiffs must make a prima facie showing that a racial disparity exists. The centerpiece of such a showing is usually a statistical analysis demonstrating “a disparity in the position of members of the plaintiff class and comparably qualified whites.” Id. Anecdotal evidence regarding particular instances of alleged discrimination is frequently used to put some flesh on, the bare-boned numbers. If the plaintiffs are able to meet their initial burden of establishing that a disparity does exist, the employer can seek to refute the conclusion that a disparity exists, usually by introducing its own statistical evidence. See id. The defendant can also mount “an explanatory defense” which amounts to “a claim that the observed disparity has not resulted from illegal discrimination.” Id. at 1267-68. If the. defendant succeeds in rebutting the inference of discrimination, then it is appropriate to apply disparate impact analysis in order to determine whether the facially neutral barriers hindering minorities’ advancement are job-related. See id. at 1272 n. 19 (“Disparate impact will apply in the pattern or practice case only after plaintiffs have made' a sufficient initial showing of disparity between groups that appear to be comparably qualified, and after it has been decided that the employer’s explanation rebuts the disparate treatment claim.”). Here, it is unnecessary to proceed past the first step of the disparate treatment analysis because plaintiffs have not proffered sufficient evidence, demonstrating that a disparity exists in order to make out a prima facie case. Dr. Mann’s statistical analysis, which is based on a single statistic derived from one year of employment figures, revealed that the difference between the percentage of black GS-13s (10.8%) and black GS-14s (4.2%) was statistically significant using a one-tail test at the .000044 level. This significance level corresponded to a difference of 4.08 standard deviations under a two-tailed test. Such a small level of significance normally suggests that the observed disparity was caused by something other than chance, therefore giving rise to a rebuttable presumption of discrimination. See Palmer, 815 F.2d at 92 (noting that a finding of significance at the .05 level, which corresponds to a difference of 1.96 standard deviations under a two-tailed test, is significant enough to create an inference of discrimination); Segar, 738 F.2d at 1282. Dr. Mann’s analysis, however, is based on a critical, and potentially erroneous, assumption. Dr. Mann reasoned that “[ajssuming the representation of African-Americans among the GS-13 [special agents] as an estimate of the rate at which African-Americans should be represented among GS-14 [special agents],” the expected percentage of black GS-14s is much higher than what was actually observed. (Mann Deck at ¶ 8) (emphasis added). This assumption may not be a safe one to make under both the law of this Circuit and the facts of this case. It is well-settled that, to establish a prima facie case, plaintiffs’ proof that a racial disparity exists must “eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory explanations of the disparity, and thus permit the inference that, absent other explanation, the disparity more likely than not resulted from illegal discrimination.” Segar, 738 F.2d at 1274 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 368, 97 S.Ct. 1843). Because the most common nondiscriminatory reason for a systemic disparity in treatment is ineligibility among the minority group members, id., the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence must be “based upon a comparison of those [black special agents] eligible for selection who were actually selected with the corresponding proportion of eligible [white special agents] who were actually selected.” Palmer, 815 F.2d at 90 (emphasis added). See also Segar, 738 F.2d at 1274 (panel opinion); id. at 1299 (concurring opinion) (noting that plaintiffs’ statistics must “compare the employer’s relevant work force with the qualified population in the relevant labor market”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Put yet another way, “[i]t is not enough ... to prove that blacks form a smaller percentage of the managers than they do of all employees in a given firm, unless there is also a showing that within the black employees the portion of persons qualified for the higher type of position is significantly greater than the portion now holding those jobs.” Metrocare v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 679 F.2d 922, 930 (D.C.Cir.1982). In this case, a comparison of the percentage of black GS-13s to the percentage of black GS-14s is not meaningful unless all of the black GS-13s are eligible to be promoted to GS-14. The record does not establish that prerequisite. It is undisputed that, in order to be eligible for a promotion, a special agent must have first completed three years “in grade.” (Burgess Decl. at ¶ 23.) Moreover, it is also undisputed that eligible special agents must bid to be considered for a promotion. This suggests that, for reasons presumably unrelated to race, not every black GS-13 is eligible to be promoted to GS-14, and of those who are eligible, not all are considered for a promotion. Plaintiffs do not contend otherwise. Plaintiffs’ statistical analysis therefore does not demonstrate that a racial disparity exists in the promotion of GS-13s to GS-14. Dr. Mann’s study focused solely on the percentage of black GS-13s versus the percentage of black GS-14s as of July 31, 1999. However, he did not differentiate between GS-13s who were eligible to be considered for promotion from those who were ineligible during the period leading up to July 31, 1999. Such a comparison could yield results drastically different from those reached by Dr. Mann. Defendant has proffered that, as of January of 1999, the Secret Service employed 106 black GS-13 special agents. Of those 106 agents, only 36 had completed three years in grade and only 16 had actually bid for a promotion. (Saliunas Deck, Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 6 at ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs, who bear the burden of establishing that a disparity exists, thus have not supplied the relevant statistic: the percentage of black GS-13s who competed for and won a promotion versus the percentage of white GS-13s who competed for and won a promotion. Because plaintiffs’ statistical analysis is insufficient to raise the presumption of class-wide discrimination through statistical evidence, I need not address the additional statistical evidence defendant has provided in rebuttal. Plaintiffs’ failure to make a statistical showing of a disparity between the percentage of eligible whites and blacks promoted to the GS-14 level largely deprives plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence of its probative value. See Ste. Marie v. Eastern R.R. Ass’n, 650 F.2d 395, 405 (2d Cir.1981) (noting that, in the absence of relevant statistics, seven individual incidents of alleged subjective decision-making were insufficient to give rise to an inference of pattern and practice discrimination). Plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence rests largely on the declaration of one agent— Special Agent Moore — and the defendant has contested the inferences that Special Agent Moore has drawn from his experience. Nevertheless, no matter whether Special Agent Moore has in fact been the victim of discrimination, a pattern and practice claim cannot rest on a single incident or even a few incidents of discrimination. See id. Accordingly, I find that plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that operation of the Peer Panel and Second-Level evaluations systematically discriminate against black GS-13 special agents. B. Other Factors Because plaintiffs thus far have failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, I shall not dwell long on the remaining factors I must consider. Without a showing that there is a disparity in the treatment of eligible black GS-13 level agents, plaintiffs cannot establish that they will be irreparably harmed, let alone extraordinarily irreparably harmed under the Sampson standard, if an injunction does not issue. I also have considered plaintiffs’ claim that the harm they could face without an injunction is enhanced by the fact that this is a presidential election year, during which leadership positions on the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Campaign details are at stake. According to the Secret Service, however, virtually all of the highly-coveted positions that plaintiffs claim they will be denied if use of the MPP is not enjoined have already been filled or are temporary lateral assignments rather than promotions. (Spriggs Deck, Def.’s Opp’n Ex. 24 at ¶¶ 9, 11) (stating that selection for leadership assignments on the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Campaign Detail and for the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics have already been filled); (Third Spriggs Deck, Def.’s Supp. Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 14-15) (stating that assignments for positions at Opsail 2000 (which has already occurred), the United Nations General Assembly Millennium Event, and the 2001 Presidential Inauguration are all temporary lateral assignments). These facts further diminish the likelihood of imminent and irreparable harm to the plaintiffs. The balance of harms and public interest also do not favor the issuance of in-junctive relief on this claim. Enjoining the Secret Service from using its current promotion system when that system has not been shown to create racial disparities in promotions would cause an undue disruption in the operation of the Secret Service. Likewise, while the public interest is served by enjoining unlawful discrimination, it is against the public interest to disrupt the functioning of a government agency, particularly one with as important and sensitive a role as the Secret Service, without a strong showing that the discrimination is real rather than perceived. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunction that would stop the Secret Service from using the Peer Panel and Second-Level evaluations in upcoming promotion and transfer decisions will be denied. III. Retaliation A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits Plaintiffs allege that they have been retaliated against for their participation in this lawsuit and the preceding EEO process. In evaluating a retaliation claim, courts proceed through three steps, beginning with the plaintiffs’ establishment of a prima facie case. See Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 520 (D.C.Cir.2000). To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) that he or she has engaged in statutorily protected behavior, (2) that his or her employer took an adverse personnel action against him or her, and (3) that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action. See Cones, 199 F.3d at 521; Paquin v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 119 F.3d 23, 31 (D.C.Cir.1997); Barnes v. Small, 840 F.2d 972, 976 (D.C.Cir.1988); Mitchell v. Baldrige, 759 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C.Cir.1985). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the employer “must articulate a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for its action .... ” Cones, 199 F.3d at 520. If such a reason is given, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to “establish[] that the reason asserted by the employer is pretext for retaliation.” Id. Plaintiffs’ allegations of retaliation are wide-ranging and have given rise to numerous factual disputes. Having reviewed the entire record in this case, which contains roughly seventy-five declarations from those who have alleged and been accused of retaliation plus the lengthy deposition testimony of the Secret Service’s agency designee, I am not convinced that plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their retaliation claims. Rather, I find that the evidence to date is in equipoise at best. As a threshold matter, there is a serious question as to whether plaintiffs will be able to state a prima facie case with respect to several of their allegations because many of the challenged employment actions would not appear to rise to the level of “adverse action” that is required by this Circuit. In assessing whether an employee has been subjected to adverse employment action, the D.C. Circuit is “less concerned with the kind of employment action involved, than with its effect on the employee” and therefore “no particular type of personnel action [is] automatically excluded from serving as the basis of a cause of action under [Title VII].” Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 455 (D.C.Cir.1999). However, in addressing whether lateral transfers are cognizable as adverse employment actions. Brown announced the following rule: [A] plaintiff who is made to undertake or who is denied a lateral transfer- — that is, one in which she suffers no diminution in pay or benefits — does not suffer an actionable injury unless there are some other materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privilege of her employment or her future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the plaintiff has suffered objectively tangible harm. Id. at 457. Materially adverse employment actions causing