Full opinion text
Opinion CARMAN, Chief Judge. Plaintiff, Ford Motor Company (Ford), challenges the U.S. Customs Service’s (Customs) assessment of duties at the rate of 25% ad valorem on eleven entries of foreign engines and transmissions imported and instahed in trucks by plaintiff in a Foreign Trade Subzone (FTSZ) in Louisville, Kentucky. Plaintiff seeks to recover $5,000,000 in ahegedly excess duties paid to Customs, asserting clerical errors committed by plaintiffs employee in designating the status of the entries at issue as “Non-Privileged Foreign” (NPF) instead of “Privileged Domestic” (PD) and in failing to pay timely required duties owed caused plaintiff to pay more duties than were actually due. Plaintiff also asserts Customs abused its discretion in extending liquidation of the eleven entries at issue in this case on three separate occasions pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1504(b)(1) (1982), and, therefore, the eleven entries should be deemed liquidated by operation of law, “as entered,” one year after the dates of entry. Alternatively, plaintiff maintains the entries should be deemed liquidated after the first extension expired, or, alternatively, after the second extension expired. Defendant, United States, maintains plaintiffs failure to designate appropriately the status of the entries at issue and to pay timely the required duties owed are not remediable as “clerical errors,” and Customs did not abuse its discretion in extending the liquidations. This case comes before this Court on remand from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit). See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 157 F.3d 849 (Fed.Cir.1998) {Ford II). The Federal Circuit vacated this Court’s grant of defendant’s summary judgment motion and remanded the case for further proceedings because it found genuine issues of material fact prevented a determination on summary judgment of whether Customs abused its discretion in extending the time for liquidation and whether Ford committed correctable “clerical errors.” This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1988). I. BacKGround A. Louisville Foreign Trade Subzone In the early 1980s, Ford applied to establish a Foreign Trade Subzone at its Louisville, Kentucky assembly plant which manufactured cars (Bronco IIs) and trucks (Rangers). Ford informed Customs that it intended to use the FTSZ to assemble imported engines and transmissions into cars and trucks. Ford’s rationale for establishing the FTSZ was to take advantage of Customs’s laws and regulations that would enable Ford to minimize the duties paid on imported engines and transmissions assembled into cars and trucks. A FTSZ, though located in the United States, receives treatment under Customs’s laws as a territory outside of the United States. See generally 15 C.F.R. § 400.1(c) (1992). At a FTSZ, an importer has the “choice of paying duties either at the rate applicable to the foreign material in its condition as admitted into a zone, or if used in manufacturing or processing, to the emerging product.” Id. During the relevant times for this case, the duty rate for a completed car was only 2.6% ad valorem. The duty rate for imported engines and transmissions was 3.8% ad valo-rem. The duty rate for completed trucks was much higher-25% ad valorem. Thus, by locating its Louisville plant in a FTSZ, Ford could pay the duty rate of 2.6% ad valorem (for completed cars) on the imported engines and transmissions for cars and could continue to pay the duty rate of 3.3% ad valorem on the imported engines and transmissions for trucks. To qualify for FTSZ treatment, the regulations required Ford to conduct its operations in a specific manner. To take advantage of the lower rate applicable to completed cars, Ford had to select “Non-Privileged Foreign” status on a Customs Form 214 (CF 214) when the engines and transmissions to be assembled into cars entered the FTSZ. When NPF status was selected for the engines and transmissions for cars, Ford could defer payment of duties on the car parts until it had assembled them into completed cars and thereby capture the rate for completed cars, rather than for car parts. On the other hand, because the duty rate applicable to completed trucks was substantially higher than the duty rate ápplicable to engines and transmissions for trucks which entered as parts, to take advantage of the lower duty rate applicable to engines and transmissions for trucks, Ford had to select “Privileged Domestic” status on a CF 214 when the parts destined for use in trucks entered the FTSZ. By selecting PD status, Ford was to pay the lower component duty rate before the engines and transmissions entered the FTSZ and, thus, reduce the duties paid on finished trucks. For either of these two designations, payment needed to accompany Customs Form 7501 (CF 7501), which identifies merchandise entering the commerce of the United States. Thus, to successfully operate the FTSZ, Ford had to identify each part entering the FTSZ as either a car part or a truck part, and then, based on that identification, select the correct FTSZ status and pay duty at the appropriate time and rate. Ford appointed Elma D. (Moe) Tullock, one of Ford’s traffic expediters (also known as parts chasers), to be the Louisville FTSZ Coordinator (also referred to as the FTSZ Agent and/or FTSZ Representative). As part of his duties as the FTSZ Coordinator, Tullock was responsible for completing the Customs’s forms necessary for the daily operations of the FTSZ. B. Entries Made Between December 1985 and February 1986 Ford’s Louisville FTSZ operated for less than three months. In the beginning of January 1986, Tullock began to experience difficulty handling certain Customs aspects of the Louisville FTSZ. From December 80, 1985, to February 7, 1986, Ford incorrectly entered NPF-designated engines and transmissions contained in completed trucks at the parts rate instead of the rate applicable to completed trucks. For the entries at issue, Tullock checked the NPF box on all the CF 214s and paid no duty up front. Tullock described each entering part as “transmissions for trucks,” “transmissions for autos,” “engines for trucks,” or “engines for autos.” Each Customs’s form set forth a 2.6% rate for the car parts and a 3.3% rate for the truck parts. The eleven entries were replete with errors. Product descriptions, duty rates, and tariff item numbers were incorrect. In mid-February 1986, Ford ceased operations of the FTSZ. In that time, only the subject eleven entries were entered from the Lousiville FTSZ into the commerce of the United States. At some point in late January or early February 1986, Ford met with Customs Import Specialist Richard McNally in Ohio and disclosed the errors made. Ford representatives requested that McNally permit Ford to change the zone status of the truck parts to PD. In June 1986, McNally informed Ford that he could not change the zone status of the truck parts. In June or July 1986, McNally re-computed the duties due by changing the duty rate applicable to the engines and transmissions in trucks, which had been entered at a 3.3% ad valorem rate, to the truck rate of 25% ad valorem. In July 1986, McNally prepared an Importer’s Premises Visit-Significant Importation Report. During the same month, McNally also prepared a Memorandum of Information Received for the Customs Office of Enforcement/Investigation. Customs began a civil fraud investigation of the entries at issue under 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1982) in August 1986. The investigation continued through at least March 1990. C. Customs’s Extensions and Liquidations and Ford’s Protest The eleven entries at issue were liquidated on December 1, 1989, after three one-year extensions at the 25% duty rate for finished trucks. In response to plaintiffs interrogatories, defendant stated the basis for the issuance of the three successive one-year extensions was that “ ‘there was an ongoing investigation regarding an alleged violation under 19 U.S.C. § 1592.’ ” (Pretrial Order, Sched. C, Undisputed Facts, ¶ 48.) Defendant also advised in response to plaintiffs interrogatories there were two outstanding appraisement and classification issues: (1) a memorandum from Customs Headquarters requested that liquidation of entries containing Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) 807.00 claims from all Ford FTSZ which received electrical products manufactured in a certain location be extended; and (2) Customs was concerned specifically that Ford had improperly classified cars as trucks. The final additional duty assessed on the eleven entries was more than $5,000,000. Two of the eleven entries were reliquidat-ed in February 1990 to make technical corrections. In the liquidations, Customs accepted Ford’s 807.00 claims. Ford timely protested the liquidations and paid the additional duties assessed. With this background in place, the Court now turns to the parties’ contentions and the Court’s discussion of the issues. The factual determinations appearing in the discussion section constitute findings of fact by the Court but have been deferred in order to achieve an orderly presentation of the issues. II. Contentions of the PaRties A. Plaintiff Ford argues the eleven entries at issue should be deemed liquidated by operation of law, “as entered,” one year after the dates of entry pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a) (1982) because Customs did not have a valid basis for extending liquidation under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(b)(1). Alternatively, Ford maintains, at the very least, the entries should be deemed liquidated after the first extension expired, or, in the alternative, after the second extension expired. Specifically, Ford argues Customs failed to show “information needed for the proper appraisement or classification of the merchandise [was] not available to the appropriate customs officer,” as required by subsection (b)(1) of 19 U.S.C. § 1504, the statutory basis upon which Customs relies in granting the three extensions. Ford contends no evidence adduced at trial shows McNally needed more information for appraisement or classification of the entries at issue. First, Ford contends, McNally’s Significant Importation Report dated July 1986 indicates McNally had the eleven entries in his possession and correspondence and documents from Ford. Further, McNally testified at trial he could not recall requesting additional documents or information from Ford or Customs. Second, Ford contends when asked at his deposition in 1994 whether he expected additional classification and value information after his July 1986 report, McNally stated he could not remember but that he must have needed more information because he did not liquidate the entries. Ford points out, as did the Federal Circuit, that such reasoning is circular and does not help Customs show it acted reasonably. See Ford II, 157 F.3d at 856. Third, although McNally stated at trial he referred the matter to the Office of Enforcement for “more information” and because of the amount of duty involved, Ford contends the Significant Importation Report, which indicates why McNally referred the matter, is silent as to any need for information. When asked at trial, McNally could not recall the reason for the referral. Moreover, Customs Special Agent George F. Fritz, Jr., who reviewed the Memorandum of Information Received with McNally, testified he understood the Memorandum to be a request for the office to investigate whether there was any culpability on Ford’s part. Further, even though McNally stated one of the reasons he did not liquidate the entries was because it was the policy of Customs to withhold liquidations on entries under referral, McNally could not recall any other reasons for extending the liquidation. Ford argues any presumption of correctness that attaches to the actions of Customs officers under 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1) (1994) is defeated by McNally’s own testimony. Further, Ford 'Contends, defendant’s argument that McNally had many concerns about the entries does not help because there is no evidence that the concerns translated into information needed for classification or appraisal. Moreover, according to Ford, the two Customs agents who conducted the § 1592 investigation confirmed McNally neither sought nor expected information needed to classify or appraise the merchandise at issue as both Special Agent Fritz and Special Agent Charles David Kyle, Jr. testified that McNally never asked them to obtain any information or documentation. Additionally, although Hilton B. Duckworth, the Cincinnati Port Director and McNally’s supervisor, testified as to his recollection of additional reasons liquidation was extended, including to verify the accuracy of information in McNally’s possession, Duckworth testified that he was not involved in making the decision to extend liquidation and any involvement he might have had in approving the decision likely occurred after the decision was made. Ford also asserts no testimony at trial states how the desire to “verify” information translates into a need for more information. Moreover, Ford asserts the evidence shows Duckworth could not recall any instance in which McNally ever told Duckworth that he needed additional information from the agents or indicated he expected to receive such information. According to Ford, McNally’s silence to his supervisor belies any presumption he needed information. Ford also contends Clinton Littlefield’s, the Assistant District Director for Commercial Operations in Cleveland, citation of a pending 807 audit fails to support the reasonableness of the extensions. As the audit only covered four of the eleven entries and as it was concerned with possible commingling of U.S. and foreign parts assembled into radios entered by Ford Electronics & Refrigeration Corporation (FERCO) in Landsdale, Pennsylvania, the 807 audit could not affect the liquidation of the Louisville entries in this case. Ford contends the primary reason given by McNally for extending the liquidations-because it was the policy of Customs to withhold liquidation while a § 1592 investigation was pending-also fails to satisfy the statutory requirement. Ford argues to satisfy the statutory standard, Customs must establish, in accordance with the Federal Circuit in Ford II, that the investigation was “reasonably expected to produce information about ‘appraisement’ and ‘classification.’ ” Ford II, 157 F.3d at 856. Ford argues a “reasonable expectation” requires proof of both a subjective reasonable expectation as well as an objective reasonable expectation. Thus, Ford contends, McNally must have had both a subjective expectation that the fraud investigation would produce information needed for classification or appraisement and that expectation must have been objectively reasonable. Ford argues, however, that McNally did not tell his supervisor that he needed information, nor did he seek or request information of any kind from the agents. Thus, according to Ford, McNally’s own conduct demonstrates he had no “expectation” that the investigation would produce classification or appraisement information. Though Ford acknowledges McNally admitted that with regard to any investigation one cannot know with certainty what the investigation will uncover, Ford contends the issue is not a theoretical question but rather a practical one-whether McNally himself had a reasonable expectation. Ford asserts the evidence at trial does not demonstrate such an expectation. Additionally, Ford argues, even if the Court were to find Customs needed additional information and initially had reason to expect that the § 1592 investigation would produce information needed for ap-praisement or classification of the merchandise at issue, the extensions-particu-' larly the second and third extensions-cannot be sustained because Customs took an unreasonable amount of time to seek and process the information and complete the investigation. Specifically, Ford contends the evidence at trial demonstrates there were long stretches of time in which no work was performed on the Ford matter. First, Ford points to evidence concerning the length of the fraud investigation which began in August 1986 and lasted at least through March 1990. During the first few months, from August 1986 to November 1987, the case was assigned to Special Agent Fritz. While there was activity on the case from August 1986 through March 1987, Fritz admits there was no work performed on the case from March until the case was reassigned on November 19, 1987. Thus, the case remained idle for seven and one-half months before the second extension in October 1987. Moreover, though Fritz was assigned to the Cincinnati Airport for thirty days in the fall of 1986, opened the Bowling Green office for thirty days during the summer of 1987, and was on sick leave in November 1987, no evidence explains adequately Fritz’s neglect of the file from March through November. The neglect, Ford contends, does not justify the 1987 extension. Once the file was transferred to Special Agent Kyle and after Kyle reviewed the file in early 1988, Kyle testified all that needed to be done was for McNally to determine the appropriate rate of duty and provide Kyle with that information. Though Kyle testified he had a heavy workload at the time, Ford points out he stated it was not his workload which impeded him. Kyle testified that for some seven or eight months in 1988 McNally did no work on the Ford matter. Moreover, Ford contends, notes from a February 21, 1989, meeting show McNally had not calculated the duty loss. McNally was supposed to rectify discrepancies in figures on various documents but had known about these needs for several years. Ford contends McNally did not provide an explanation at trial on why it took him so long to rectify the discrepancies. Kyle even took the unusual step, Ford argues, of writing McNally to request the information after months of delay. Thus, according to Ford, as no explanation was provided regarding why it took McNally three years to rectify such discrepancies, Customs should not be permitted to justify the October 1988 extension. Ford also argues McNally’s delay was not justified with regard to any 807 issues. According to Ford, evidence showed that in January 1986 Tullock sent McNally information concerning 807.00 values of imported engines and transmissions. At a meeting in February 1987, McNally’s notes indicate 807 information was on file and that McNally would send a request for further information regarding 807 if necessary. No such request was sent by McNally. The unreasonableness of McNally’s failure over a two year period to request additional 807 information is, according to Ford, confirmed when in late 1989 based on the same information he had in February 1987, McNally concluded there was no 807 problem. Thus, Ford argues, Customs should not be permitted to justify the extensions on the grounds that the investigation was continuing or that necessary information had not been reviewed. Ford additionally argues the evidence adduced at trial establishes that, despite being properly trained and supervised, Tullock failed to follow clear, complete, and binding instructions, and thus committed correctable “clerical errors” under 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1) (1982). Ford contends a subordinate commits clerical error when he “ ‘is given binding instructions on 'particular aspects of a task, no duty devolves upon him to exercise discretion or judgment in carrying out those aspects, ’ ” and he “acts contrary to those instructions.” (Pl.’s Post-Tr. Br. at 25 (quoting Ford II, 157 F.3d at 860).) Ford argues the record firmly establishes Tullock was given clear, complete, and binding instructions to designate truck parts as PD and to pay duty on those parts before they entered the FTSZ and to designate car parts as NPF and to pay duty on those parts as the assembled cars exited the zone. Instructions were provided in writing (e.g., Ford’s FTSZ manual and other materials Tullock received) and orally and were reviewed with Tullock by Lars Anderson, Ford Headquarter’s staff person who coordinated the FTSZ program. Ford cites Tullock’s contemporaneous memorandum dated January 17, 1985, as proof Tullock received and understood those instructions. Ford also cites Tul-lock’s testimony at trial that he communicated his understanding of the instructions to Anderson verbally as proof that he understood them. Although some truck and car parts at the plant were interchangeable, Ford argues this issue is irrelevant, as Ford Headquarters predetermined the destination of all parts when it created the daily material records report. Thus, all Tullock had to do was to follow the instructions and designate the parts destined for trucks as PD and pay duty up front and designate the parts destined for cars as NPF and pay duty when the assembled cars exited the zone. Ford additionally argues Tullock had no discretion to deviate from the clear, binding instructions. For example, Ford argues Tullock had no discretion regarding the designation of zone status, the payment of duties on car and truck parts, the determination of NPF or PD status, the determination of how to make an entry, or the determination of which engine or transmission went into cars or trucks. As Tullock was given binding instructions regarding the designation of zone status and the timing of payments, no duty devolved on him to exercise original thought or judgment in assigning import status to truck parts or in determining when to make payments. As Tullock acted contrary to the binding instructions, his errors in designating truck parts PD and in failing to pay timely the duty on those parts were “clerical errors.” Ford argues Tullock was also well-trained. According to Ford, the record establishes Anderson was in frequent contact with Tullock. Tullock visited other FTSZs, such as the FTSZs in Wayne, Michigan and Wixom, Ohio and saw firsthand how they operated. Further, Ford points out, Anderson reviewed documents with Tullock and visited Tullock in Louisville on numerous occasions. Tullock could contact Anderson or Moody, Supervisor of Ford’s Customs Department and overseer of the FTSZ, at any time with questions. Ford argues no special training was necessary, as the government contends, regarding how Tullock needed to handle interchangeable parts as Ford Headquarters predetermined how many parts were needed for what vehicles, and Tullock had no authority to deviate from those determinations. Thus, Ford argues, the record demonstrates Tullock was adequately trained. Ford also asserts Tullock was well-supervised. Ford points to the evidence at trial that Anderson was in frequent contact with Tullock, thereby making the fact that William Kuchenbrod, Tullock’s parts chaser supervisor, was not trained in FTSZ matters irrelevant. Further, Ford contends, Anderson met with Tullock at Ford Headquarters and visited Tullock at the Louisville plant. Thus, according to Ford, Tullock was also well-supervised. Applying these facts to the legal standard for “clerical error” as enunciated by the Federal Circuit, Ford argues, the only conclusion is that Tullock’s errors constituted “clerical errors” under the statute. B. Defendant Defendant argues evidence at trial shows Customs, in its discretion, determined to extend liquidation of the eleven entries at issue while it waited for further information it believed necessary to ensure the correct classification and appraisement of the imported merchandise at issue. In order for Ford to prove Customs abused its discretion, the government argues, Ford must eliminate “ ‘all possible grounds’” for the three extensions and establish that the relevant Customs officials extended the liquidations “ “with actual knowledge that no basis exist[ed] for so doing.’ ” (Def.’s Pre-Tr. Br. at 4 (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 6 F.3d 763, 768 (Fed.Cir.1993)).) The government argues Ford has not met this burden. The government further contends it is entitled to rely on a presumption of regularity that the import specialist properly performed his duties, and the government is entitled to a statutory presumption that Customs’s decisions to extend liquidation were correct. The burden of proving otherwise is on Ford. These presumptions, the government asserts, are not defeated by a Customs officer’s failure to recall specific information, as Ford appears to claim in its papers. The government argues McNally was waiting for information he reasonably believed could affect the classification or ap-praisement of the merchandise. McNally testified he did not remember specific details regarding the entries, but he authenticated the content of documents he wrote or signed. The documents he authenticated, the government contends, indicate a number of concerns McNally had regarding the entries related to the classification or appraisement of the merchandise at issue. The government asserts evidence at trial shows areas of concern included, but were not limited to: how the FTZ was set up, what articles entered and left the FTSZ, the proper tariff provisions for the merchandise leaving the zone, the method used by Ford to account for controlled merchandise in the zone, calculation errors on the entry papers, Ford’s “807” claims on some of the entries, the basis for the selection of “NPF” status ... why completed vehicles were entered as parts, and the amount of duty loss attributable to these entries. (Def.’s Post-Tr. Br. at 4.) Accordingly, further information was needed from Ford for the proper classification or appraisement of the merchandise at issue. The government attempts to refute Ford’s argument that because the Memorandum of Information Received and Significant Importation Report state the matter was referred for investigation because a lot of duty was at stake, the matter could not have been referred because of a need for additional classification or appraisement information. The government argues several witnesses testified that the documents were not comprehensive. Moreover, the government argues, evidence at trial demonstrates that a significant potential loss of revenue arising because of apparent substantive errors would “be a signal that something is amiss with the information provided for purposes of classifying and/or appraising the entered merchandise.” (Def.’s Reply to PL’s Post-Tr. Br. at 3.) The government also disputes Ford’s characterization of McNally’s lack of recollection regarding asking for information from Fritz or Kyle. According to the government, Fritz stated he did not recall any request for specific information by McNally, and Kyle stated to the best of his knowledge, McNally was not waiting for information. The government essentially argues Ford’s characterizations of the testimony are misleading. The government also asserts Ford’s circularity argument is without merit. Ford introduced at trial evidence of deposition testimony of McNally wherein he testified although he could not remember any specific information he was waiting for after he referred the matter to investigation, he must have been waiting for additional information because he referred the matter for investigation, and the entries were not liquidated. The government contends Ford’s focus on this aspect of McNally’s testimony is misplaced. Although the government admits that at first blush such reasoning may appear circular, it is, in effect, logical. As McNally had been an import specialist for thirty years, the government argues, “it would be inconceivable that [he] did not know the existing statutory bases for extending liquidations.” (Def.’s Post-Tr. Br. at 4.) Thus, McNally’s statement that he must have needed more information by virtue of the fact that the liquidations were extended was merely shorthand for indicating that for as much as he knew the statutory requirements for extending liquidation, the fact that he had extended the liquidations necessarily meant he needed additional information. The government argues the testimony of Duckworth supports the assertion that the entries remained unliquidated until 1989 because McNally needed more information. The government points to testimony by Duckworth that he required import specialists under his supervision to justify why significant entries remained unliqui-dated following an anniversary date. Although some of the entries reviewed were immediately liquidated, the remaining entries were those for which the import specialists determined more information was needed. The government contends Duck-worth’s signature on the referral memorandum indicates he concurred in the decision to refer the entries for investigation knowing that liquidation could be extended only if Customs needed more information to classify or appraise the merchandise properly. The government also contends although McNally extended liquidation in part because it was Customs’s policy to withhold liquidations while a § 1592 investigation was pending, Customs anticipated information could be disclosed regarding the classification or appraisement of the entries at issue as a result of the investigation. For example, the government points to, among other evidence, McNally’s testimony at trial that the estimated duties he derived in 1986 could have been changed based on information he might have received prior to liquidation as a result of the investigation. The government also points to Duck-worth’s recollection that the entries were extended to verify information needed to classify correctly the merchandise in light of possible fraud and withholding of duties. Although Duckworth testified he could not recall anything about the valuation of the merchandise that would call into question McNally’s July 1986 estimated loss of revenue calculation, the government points to Duckworth’s testimony that potential fraud in any investigation calls into question all aspects of the importation-including the veracity of the information provided to Customs for use in classifying and appraising the merchandise. Thus, McNally appropriately withheld liquidation pending results of the investigation. That McNally ultimately had to liquidate without the benefit of the results of the investigation, the government contends, does not negate the reasonableness of awaiting those results. The government asserts the actual information obtained in the course of an investigation and whether that information would affect the merchandise at issue regarding its classification or appraisement cannot be known until the investigation is complete. Thus, the government contends, Ford was unable at trial to meet its burden of proof and adduce sufficient evidence to eliminate all possible grounds for the three extensions. As the investigation involved the classification or appraisement of the imported merchandise and the appropriate Customs official was awaiting information resulting from that investigation, so long as the investigation continued, Customs had a reasonable basis for extending the liquidation periods. Thus, according to the government, Ford cannot demonstrate it is entitled to relief. Additionally, the government argues, the manner in which the investigation was conducted and the total amount of time consumed were reasonable under the circumstances. Although Special Agent George Fritz, the special agent initially assigned to investigate the Ford entries, 'undertook investigative activities from the beginning of the investigation in August 1986 through March 1987, Fritz admitted at trial that he did not undertake any additional significant activities on the Ford case between March 4, 1987, and November 19, 1987. The government points out, however, that Fritz explained he had other priorities during that time, including other investigations. Moreover, the government points to Fritz’s testimony that when the file was ultimately transferred to the Bowling Green office in November 1987, there was more work to be done on the investigation, including interviewing Ford and Customs personnel. Additionally, the government cites testimony of Special Agent Kyle, to whom the case was reassigned in the Bowling Green office, which shows as head of the new office, Kyle had responsibility for acquiring new furniture, equipment, and personnel in addition to his normal duties as a special agent. Kyle testified these additional tasks took from one to two years to complete. Kyle further testified it took several months for him to familiarize himself with the Ford file which Kyle confirmed required additional personnel be interviewed to complete the investigation. Although Kyle testified he began having trouble completing his investigation in 1988 because he had not received information from McNally, the government asserts Kyle -never formalized or forwarded his requests in writing until after a meeting held on February 21, 1989. Thus, the government notes, there is no indication that any request had been made prior to the February 21 meeting. Under the circumstances, the government contends, the amount of time consumed for the investigation was reasonable. The reasonableness of the duration of the investigation from the time it was reassigned to Kyle, the government asserts, was reinforced by testimony of Robert Cortesi, the Resident In Charge at U.S. Customs in Cincinnati, Ohio. Cortesi testified that the time gaps between the listed activities in his review reports of Kyle’s investigation of the Ford entries were reasonable because the activity in any given case depends on a number of factors, including the activity of the office and other responsibilities of the assigned agent. As part of the time Kyle conducted the Ford investigation was devoted to setting up the Bowling Green office and given the amount of information that had to be reviewed and analyzed in this case, Cortesi confirmed the amount of time consumed by the investigation was reasonable. Thus, the government argues, “Ford has not demonstrated that the amount of time consumed was unreasonable or that the investigation could have or should have concluded sooner.” (Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Post-Tr. Br. at 7.) Additionally, the government contends Ford’s failure to designate the imported parts as PD and to deposit duties before the merchandise entered the Louisville FTSZ do not constitute correctable “clerical errors” under 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1). According to the government, a clerical error is a “ ‘mistake made by a clerk or other subordinate, upon whom devolves no duty to exercise judgment in writing or copying the figures or in exercising his intention.’ ” (Def.’s Pretr. Br. at 12 (quoting PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 7 CIT 118, 124 (1984)).) The government asserts, however, that evidence at trial shows that as the FTSZ Coordinator, Tullock held a position that required him to assume significant responsibilities and exercise considerable judgment in performing those duties. For example, as FTSZ Coordinator, Tullock was involved in establishing the FTSZ and was charged with handling the paperwork relating to the parts to be “controlled” within the zone. Moreover, the government asserts, the evidence at trial demonstrates Tullock was not well-trained or well-supervised. Regarding training, the government points to evidence at trial that the list of parts to be controlled identified in a memorandum entitled “Status of Louisville Assembly Plant as a Foreign Trade Zone,” dated January 17, 1985, from Tullock to William Kuchen-brod, Tullock’s parts control supervisor, indicates all seven parts identified in the memorandum could be used for either cars or trucks. However, the memorandum “does not indicate how these interchangeable parts were to be divided between Bronco II parts and Ranger parts before entering the zone.” (Def.’s Post-Tr. Br. at 22.) Nor was there any mention of NPF or PD or “how Tullock would cause the parts to be designated as either ‘PD’ or ‘NPF.’ ” (Id.) Kuchenbrod testified, however, that as far as he knew, engines and transmissions for Bronco IIs were not segregated from engines and transmissions for Rangers when they entered the plant. Thus, there would be no way of knowing which type of vehicle the part would ultimately end up in because, prior to production, no one kept track. Thus, the government argues, Kuchenbrod’s testimony does not support that Ford adequately trained Tullock. Testimony from Moody, the government argues, further fails to demonstrate that Ford adequately trained Tullock. First, Moody acknowledged at trial that he was not aware that some of the parts to be controlled in the FTSZ were interchangeable and that had he known, he would have removed any common usage parts from the program. Further, Moody testified that in setting up the FTSZ at Louisville, Tullock visited other FTSZ that were already operating. Tullock was expected to copy the inventory and record keeping systems of the other plants. The government notes, however, that none of these plants had to control common usage parts. Thus, the training Tullock received was not adequate for the unique features at the Louisville FTSZ. Additionally, the only written material provided to Tullock was Ford’s FTSZ manual. The government points out, however, that the manual was used for all of Ford’s FTSZs and was not specific to the Louisville plant. Indeed, the government asserts, the document is silent with respect to how to deal with PD merchandise. In sum, the government claims, Moody’s testimony does not demonstrate that Tullock was adequately instructed and trained on how to be a FTSZ Coordinator at Louisville. Moreover, the government contends, Tullock’s own testimony at trial does not demonstrate he was instructed and trained adequately on how to be a FTSZ Coordinator. According to Tullock, he had to do the paperwork based on observations from other plants, but he was unable to do the paperwork adequately as the other plants were not operating zones with different vehicles coming down the same assembly line. Thus, there was no correlation between the zones at the plants where he received his training and the job he was actually supposed to do. Moreover, Tul-lock testified no one explained to him how to do the paperwork differently. Thus, the government asserts, he was not adequately trained. Regarding supervision, the government argues, Tullock was essentially left on his own at Louisville to manage the FTSZ and prepare all applicable paperwork and was not supervised by anyone at the Louisville plant with knowledge of foreign trade zone management. Kuchenbrod, who was Tul-lock’s only officially designated supervisor within the Ford organization, testified he “knew almost nothing about Tulloek’s FTZ responsibilities.” (Def.’s Post-Tr. Br. at 20.) According to Kuchenbrod, Anderson and Moody, division people from Ford Headquarters, were the people to whom Tullock would turn with any problems or concerns. When Tullock told Kuchenbrod he was having trouble, Kuchenbrod would tell him to call the division people. The government points out, however, Kuchen-brod did not know whether Tullock heeded that advice, and when Kuchenbrod would ask whether Tullock received the information he needed, Tullock would sometimes say, “No.” Further, Anderson testified that once the zone was established, there was no requirement that the zone had to report formally to Anderson’s office. Anderson testified Kuchenbrod was Tullock’s supervisor. The government points out, however, that Tullock was the only person at the Louisville plant with any knowledge regarding FTSZs. The government argues such negligence by Ford is not remediable under § 1520(c). Thus, the government contends, Ford has not sustained its burden of demonstrating either that Customs acted unlawfully in extending liquidation of the entries at issue or that the NPF designation of and the failure to pay duties on the entries are correctable errors under the statute. III. Discussion A. Legality of the Extensions of Liquidation 1. Standard of Review This Court reviews Customs’s decisions to extend the time to liquidate under an abuse of discretion standard. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994); Ford II, 157 F.3d at 855; St. Paul, 6 F.3d at 768; International Cargo & Surety Ins. Co. v. United States, 15 CIT 541, 542, 779 F.Supp. 174, 176 (1991); Detroit Zoological Soc’y v. United States, 10 CIT 133, 137-38, 630 F.Supp. 1350, 1356 (1986) (decisions to extend liquidation reviewed for arbitrariness and abuse of discretion). Such an abuse of discretion “may arise only when an extension is granted even following elimination of all possible grounds for such an extension.” St. Paul, 6 F.3d at 768. Thus, the Court cannot uphold a decision to extend the liquidation if “it can be shown that the importer ... eliminated all reasonable bases for making that decision.” Id. “Extending a period of liquidation with actual knowledge that no basis exists for so doing,” for example, “would be an abuse of Customs’ discretion.” Id. Thus, there is “a narrow limitation on Customs’ discretion to extend the period of liquidation.” Id. In determining whether Customs’s decisions to extend liquidation are sufficiently unreasonable to constitute an abuse of discretion, “the decision[s] of [Customs] ... [are] presumed to be correct,” and the burden of proving otherwise is on the importer. 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1); St. Paul, 6 F.3d at 768; see generally Century Importers, Inc. v. United States, 205 F.3d 1308, 1311 (Fed.Cir.2000). This presumption is only a procedural device which allocates the burden of producing sufficient evidence. See Universal Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 492-93 (Fed.Cir.1997). St. Paul requires that the importer overcome the presumption of correctness by a preponderance of the evidence. See St. Paul, 6 F.3d at 769. The Federal Circuit has defined preponderance of the evidence as “ ‘the greater weight of evidence, evidence which is more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it.’ ” Id. (quoting Hale v. Department of Transp., FAA, 772 F.2d 882, 885 (Fed.Cir.1985)). Further, the government is entitled to rely on a presumption of regularity, that is, “it may be presumed that the import specialist ... properly performed [his] duties.” Id.; see also 2 Kenneth S. Broun, et al., MoCor-Micx on Evidenoe § 348, at 438-39 (John W. Strong, ed., 5th ed.1999). 2. Legislative Scheme Imported merchandise not liquidated within one year of its entry into the United States “shall be deemed liquidated at the rate of duty, value, quantity, and amount of duties asserted at the time of entry by the importer....” 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a). The statute provides, however, Customs may extend the period in which to liquidate an entry under three specific circumstances, including if “information needed for the proper appraisement or classification of the merchandise is not available to the appropriate customs officer.” 19 U.S.C. § 1504(b)(1). Customs’s regulation additionally requires that any individual extension may not exceed one year. See 19 C.F.R. § 159.12(a)(1) (1985). Almost no circumstance justifies a delay in liquidation beyond four years. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (1982). 3. Extension of Time to Liquidate Customs invokes subsection (b)(l)-“information needed for the proper appraisement or classification of the merchandise is not available to the appropriate customs officer”-to justify its extensions. As Customs invokes subsection (b)(1) to justify its extensions, to prevail in this case, plaintiff must prove, pursuant to St. Paul, 6 F.3d at 768, that it was unreasonable for Customs to extend liquidation on the premise that information needed for the proper ap-praisement or classification of the merchandise was not available to the appropriate customs officer. Here, plaintiff has not made a sufficient showing to meet its burden. a. Initial Extension The government appears to put forward principally two reasons why Customs’s decisions to extend liquidation were reasonable. First, the government argues the appropriate Customs official postponed liquidating the eleven entries while waiting for further information which was necessary to ensure the correct classification and appraisement of the imported merchandise. Second, although Customs extended the liquidation because it was Customs’s policy to extend liquidation during the pendency of a § 1592 investigation, it was reasonably expected that the fraud investigation could produce information affecting the classification or appraisement of the merchandise thus justifying the extensions. The government points to the following evidence to support its argument that Customs’s decisions to extend liquidation were reasonable. Defendant supports its first contention by pointing to documentary evidence that McNally authenticated at trial indicating he had certain concerns that needed to be addressed through discussions with Ford and/or through an investigation. The documents include handwritten notes from meetings in January 1986 and February 1987 and the Significant Importation Report. {See Def.’s Post-Tr. Br. at 3-4 (citing Plaintiffs Exhibits (PL’s Exs.) 1, 3, 8, and 58 discussed in the Trial Transcript (Trial Tr.) at 90-96, 102-04, 111-12, 126, and 185-86).) These documents indicate concerns regarding, among others things, Ford’s 807 TSUS claims on some of the entries. The government acknowledges that although other areas of concern may also have existed, “McNally could not remember any specific concerns other than those noted in his documents” at trial. {Id. at 4.) Moreover, the government argues, the fact that the Significant Importation Report only indicates the matter was referred for investigation because of the quantum of money involved and not because of any need for additional information, does not prove the matter was not referred for additional information. Defendant points to testimony by various Customs officials indicating the Significant Importation Report is not intended to be comprehensive. (See Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Post-Tr. Br. at 2-3 (citing Trial Tr. at 725-26 and 752-53).) Defendant also argues testimony at trial revealed that “a significant potential loss of revenue arising because of apparent substantive errors in the entries would ... be a signal that something is amiss with the information provided for purposes of classifying and/or appraising the entered merchandise.” (Id. at 3 (citing Trial Tr. at 729-30).) Additionally, defendant points to the testimony of Hilton Duckworth to support its contention that further information was needed to classify and appraise the merchandise. Duckworth testified that if any entries remained unliquidated, all import specialists under his supervision had to “justify [to him] why entries remain unliq-uidated.” Trial Tr. at 782. Duckworth further testified that a “rather significant percentage of entries — were immediately liquidated because there were no question [sic] concerning how the merchandise should be appraised and classified” and those that were not liquidated right away were reviewed by import specialists. Trial Tr. at 790. According to Duckworth, the “review was to determine whether or not the entries could be liquidated immediately or whether [the import specialist] needed additional information, in which case the entries would be placed in holding files ...” until the import specialist “took action to obtain information.” Trial Tr. at 791. Finally, the government argues Duckworth’s testimony indicates it would be “unusual” for McNally to have had all the information needed to liquidate the entries properly but not to have taken that information into account until his final calculation. Duckworth testified, “with the significance of these importations, the amount of duty involved, the import specialist would have reviewed this situation from every possible angle, and other people would have looked at it.” Trial Tr. at 862. To support its second contention, the government points to McNally’s testimony that whether a § 1592 investigation and/or an importer’s culpability would affect the classification or appraisement of merchandise would “depend on the particular circumstances,” (Def.’s Post-Tr. Br. at 5 (citing Trial Tr. at 168)), and that McNally’s estimate of the duty increase initially identified by him in the summer of 1986 “could have changed” “based on additional information [McNally] might have received prior to liquidation.” (Id. (citing Trial Tr. at 237).) The government also points to Duckworth’s affirmative response to questioning at trial that the circumstances under which fraud would be investigated could affect the information used by an import specialist to classify or appraise properly the merchandise. (-See id. at 8 (citing Trial Tr. at 807-08).) The government additionally points to testimony by Fritz and Cortesi to support further this concept. (See id. at 13 (citing Trial Tr. at 361 and 370) and 17 (citing Trial Tr. at 727).) Testimony provided at trial, the government asserts, further indicates it is impossible to know, at the outset of an investigation, what information will be uncovered. (See Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Post-Tr. Br. at 6 (citing Trial Tr. at 807-08, 819-20, and 874-76).) Moreover, the government points to Duckworth’s testimony that he recalled in this case the entries were extended “to verify information needed to correctly classify the merchandise in light of the possible fraud and withholding of duties.” (Def.’s Post-Tr. Br. at 9 (citing Trial Tr. at 818).) Additionally, the government argues, although Duckworth and Littlefield may not have made the decision to extend liquidation, there is no dispute that they knew liquidations could be extended only if Customs needed more information to classify and appraise properly the merchandise, and they nevertheless approved the extensions. As the witnesses were government officials, the government argues, it should be presumed their actions were proper. To prove Customs’s extensions of liquidation were unreasonable, plaintiff appears to argue essentially two points. Plaintiff suggests no information was needed for the proper appraisement or classification of the merchandise by the appropriate Customs officer because: 1) McNally, the Customs officer in Cincinnati responsible for classifying and appraising the merchandise, had all the information required to complete the liquidation by mid-1986, and evidence from trial fails to support the proposition that he needed additional information for the proper appraisement or classification of the merchandise; and 2) McNally only extended the liquidation because it was Customs’s policy to withhold automatically liquidation during the pen-dency of a § 1592 investigation, and McNally had no reasonable expectation that the investigation would produce information needed for classification or ap-praisement. To support its contentions, Ford points to the Significant Importation Report dated July 29, 1986, which indicates McNally had in his possession as of the date of the report the eleven entries, correspondence, and documents from Ford and Ford’s operating manual. (See Pl.’s Post-Tr. Br. at 2 (citing Pl.’s Ex. 8-3).) Further, Ford points to McNally’s testimony at trial that he could not recall whether he subsequently requested additional documents or information from Ford or Customs after mid-1986. (See id. at 2-3 (citing Trial Tr. at 137).) Ford also points to the language in the Significant Importation Report stating that McNally prepared a Memorandum of Information Received to the Office of Enforcement solely “ ‘[biased on the significant amount of duty involved,’ ” (id. (quoting Pl.’s Ex. 8-3)), and to McNally’s deposition testimony in 1994 that he could not recall any other reasons for the referral. Ford also cites McNally’s testimony that he did not liquidate because it was Customs’s policy not to liquidate entries under a § 1592 investigation and that he could not recall any other reasons why he did not liquidate the entries. Given McNally’s testimony, Ford argues, “it cannot be presumed that McNally extended liquidation because he needed additional classification or value information.” (Id. at 4.) Additionally, Ford cites the testimony of two Customs’s agents-Special Agents Fritz and Kyle. According to Ford, Fritz testified “McNally never asked [Fritz] to obtain any information or documentation.” (Id. (citing Trial Tr. at 307).) Kyle testified McNally did not “ ‘either notify [Kyle] through writing or verbally in person’ ” that McNally needed information to allow him to liquidate the entries. (Id. at 5 (quoting Trial Tr. at 445).) Further, Ford points to evidence that although Duckworth, McNally’s supervisor, could recall other reasons for extending liquidation, he was not involved in making the decision to extend liquidation and, in all probability, did not justify the extensions until after the fact. (See id. (citing Trial Tr. at 814).) Moreover, Ford points to testimony by Duckworth that he could not recall any instances in which McNally told him he needed additional information from anyone in order to classify or appraise the merchandise. (See id. at 6 (citing Trial Tr. at 822).) Ford asserts, “McNally’s silence to his supervisor belies any presumption that he needed more information.” (Id.) To support its second contention, Ford additionally argues in order to justify the liquidation extension under the investigation, the Federal Circuit required that the record “ ‘show that the fraud investigation was reasonably expected to produce information about “appraisement” and “classification.” ’ ” (Id at 9 (quoting Ford II, 157 F.3d at 856) (emphasis in original).) Ford interprets this standard as requiring that the relevant Customs officer, in this case McNally, “must have had a subjective expectation that the fraud investigation would produce information needed for classification or appraisement that was otherwise unavailable, and that expectation must have been objectively reasonable.” (Id. (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 291, 298 (7th Cir.1981) (identifying elements of “reasonable expectation” in employment law context)).) Ford argues because the evidence shows McNally did not tell his supervisor he needed information nor did he seek or request information of any kind from the agents, he had no expectation that the investigation would produce needed classification or appraisement information. Moreover, Ford argues, the evidence is clear that in this case, even if there is a theoretical possibility that the fraud investigation could produce information regarding classification or appraisement, the evidence shows McNally had no such subjective expectation. Further, to support its second contention, Ford argues evidence in the record indicates Customs could not reasonably expect the investigation would yield needed classification or appraisement information from the mere pendency of an 807 audit of FERCO. First, Ford points to evidence that Ford only claimed 807 treatment on four of the eleven entries. (See id. at 7 (citing Ct. Ex. 1, Sched. C, ¶ 50).) Second, Ford points to evidence it claims shows the FERCO audit was only concerned with possible commingling of U.S. and foreign parts assembled into radios entered by FERCO at Landsdale, Pennsylvania, see Pl.’s Ex. 50, and not with 807 claims on the subject entries involving engines and transmissions in Louisville. Upon examination of the documentary and testimonial evidence admitted at trial, this Court finds Ford has not put forth sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of showing it was unreasonable for Customs to extend liquidation on the premise that information needed for the proper appraisement or classification of the merchandise was not available to the appropriate Customs officer. Ford has not met its burden of eliminating all reasonable bases for extending the liquidation and thus has not shown Customs abused its discretion in deciding to extend liquidation in the first instance. First, the evidence to which Ford cites to support its contention Customs had all information needed to classify or appraise the merchandise by the initial extension fails to demonstrate the same. Although the Significant Importation Report indicates that as of July 1986, McNally had certain information, such evidence is not dispositive that McNally did not need additional information. Indeed, evidence adduced at trial indicates otherwise. For example, evidence indicates that, at least initially, McNally had some concerns there might be an 807 issue regarding the imported engines and transmissions in the Louisville FTSZ. See Trial Tr. at 893. Documentary evidence further indicates that at least as of February 6, 1987, Tulloek agreed to furnish any additional information needed concerning the 807 issue to Customs. This apparent need for 807 information exists despite the fact that, in hindsight, as Ford points out, it appears the 807 issue may not have concerned engines and transmissions at the Louisville FTSZ but rather electronic parts entered through Philadelphia or Landsdale. See Trial Tr. at 889-93. The testimony combined with the documentary evidence indicating Tulloek would forward needed information concerning the 807 issue indicates to this Court that some information concerning the 807 issue was believed to be outstanding at least as of February 1987. Additionally, Duckworth testified the entries were extended in part “to verify information ... in order to be able to make a correct classification of the imported merchandise.” Trial Tr. at 818. That Customs extended liquidation in part to verify information suggests additional information might have been needed to assure the accuracy of the information already in Customs’s possession. Moreover, that McNally could not recall any instances in which he requested additional documents or information from Ford or Customs is inconclusive. McNally’s failure to recall that he requested information is neither evidence he never requested information nor, more importantly, evidence he did not need additional information. Based on the evidence presented by Ford, it simply has not been able to show it was unreasonable for Customs to extend liquidation on the premise that information needed for the proper classification or appraisement of the merchandise was unavailable to the appropriate Customs officer. Second, regarding Ford’s citation to the Significant Importation Report, testimony at trial indicates the Significant Importation Report is not intended to be a comprehensive document. See Trial Tr. at 725-26 and 752-53. Thus, the fact that the Significant Importation Report only indicates the reason for the referral was because of the significant amount of duty involved does not prove McNally did not also refer the case because information was needed to classify or appraise the merchandise. Additionally, the evidence put forth by Ford concerning the testimonies of Fritz, Kyle, and Duckworth fails to show it was unreasonable for Customs to extend liquidation on the premise that information needed for the proper appraisement or classification of the merchandise was not available to the appropriate Customs officer. First, the credibility of both Fritz’s and Kyle’s statements to which Ford cites is called into question in light of the surrounding testimony of each witness. Ford points to Fritz’s statement that McNally did not “ever ask [Fritz] to obtain any information for him.” Trial Tr. at 307. In the previous question, however, Fritz testified that he could not recall McNally “ever asking of [him] that [he] obtain any particular documentation for [McNally].” Trial Tr. at 307. The Court is skeptical that Fritz could remember that McNally never asked Fritz to obtain