Full opinion text
AMENDED OPINION SLEET, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION. Robert I. Wechsler once owned a vessel named the ATLAS. On November 23, 1996, this ship caught fire while it was docked at the Georgetown Yacht Basin. The fire damaged a portion of the dock and destroyed several of the surrounding boats. The resulting losses are estimated at over $1 million. Wechsler subsequently filed an action in admiralty with this court to limit his liability to cost of the only salvageable item left from the ATLAS after the fire — a brass propeller worth approximately $500. See 46 App. U.S.C.A. § 181 et seq. (West Supp.2000). Several of the claimants have filed motions for sanctions as a result of certain actions taken by Wechsler in the aftermath of the fire. In their submissions, they essentially argue that Wechsler’s lawsuit should be dismissed and, as a consequence, the cap on his liability removed because he failed to preserve (if not intentionally destroyed) the ATLAS. In opposition, Wechsler argues that these claimants had an opportunity to preserve the vessel when the ship was raised but declined to do so. Wechsler further contends that the ATLAS was preserved for a sufficiently lengthy period of time to allow all of the interested parties to conduct an appropriate inspection. Wechsler has also moved for summary judgment. In his motion, he argues that no party has been able to introduce sufficient evidentiary support for their claims that the fire started onboard the ATLAS. This inability, ironically, appears to be due in large part to the destruction of the vessel. Finally, the Georgetown Yacht Basin has moved for summary judgment on the claims for negligence, breach of contract and common law bailment which Wechsler and another boat owner have brought against the marina. After considering these submissions in light of the governing law, the court has decided to impose a dispositive sanction against Wechsler for his destruction of the ATLAS. Given the record evidence, the court concludes that the vessel was destroyed in an attempt to prevent the claimants from conducting further inspections of the remains and, thus, possibly determining the cause and origin of the fire. Because the disposal of the ATLAS has substantially prejudiced the claimants by preventing them from establishing their claims, a dispositive sanction is necessary to not only punish Wechsler for his culpable conduct but also deter others from engaging in similar misconduct in the future. In light of this ruling, Wechsler’s motion for summary judgment will be denied as moot. Finally, the court will grant Georgetown’s motion for summary judgment because the exculpatory language contained within its slip rental agreement absolves the marina from any liability due to its negligence. In addition, given the unrestricted access which was afforded to the owners of the two vessels in question, the court cannot conclude that they were bailed articles. The following sections explain the basis for these rulings in greater detail. II. BACKGROUND. Built in 1964, the ATLAS was a fifty-seven foot wooden yacht. At the time of the fire, Wechsler was storing the vessel at the Georgetown Yacht Basin. He rarely used the boat after having moved to Florida. In fact, for the two years which preceded the fire, Wechsler had been trying to sell the ship and had only been onboard it twice. During this time, it seems that any maintenance on the vessel was performed by Skipjack Cove Marina. A. The Condition Of The ATLAS Before The Fire. Insurance records from the relevant time period show that the ATLAS was not in peak condition. For example, a 1987 survey found that “the electrics, wiring, and systems were in a very poor condition” and did not comply with National Fire Protection Association (“NFPA”) standards. A 1991 survey reached a similar conclusion, finding that the battery terminals were not clean and that there was loose and obsolete wiring throughout the vessel. This survey also recommended that ground fault breakers should be installed in several outlets and that all circuits should be protected by fuses or breakers so that the ATLAS could come into compliance with the standards annun-ciated by the American Boat and Yacht Council (“ABYC”). Given the general condition of the ATLAS and its electrical system in particular, the 1991 survey concluded that the vessel was not a good insurance risk. In 1993, another survey was conducted. It reached the same conclusion concerning the electrical system. Among other things, this survey found that: the AC [alternating current] power supply for the air conditioner water pump has been spliced without a junction box using twist-on wire connectors and the pump has lost its grounding connection; there is an ungrounded AC receptacle inside the forward hanging locker on the starboard side of the main cabin along with an AC receptacle which has been removed from its mounting box and left unsecured; a two conductor lamp cord has been wired into this receptacle and also one in the midship guest cabin receptacle; light gauge AC power feed wires have been improperly installed on the main AC feeder cables inside the AC distribution box; the AC grounding has been connected to the AC neutral side of the hot water heater breaker box.... The DC [direct current] wiring has numerous unsecured and improperly routed wires under the flybridge console and in the engine compartment. There are some unhooked and abandoned wires. There has been a[n] unfused 12 volt power supply improperly tapped into the center bank of batteries. Based on these findings, the 1993 survey concluded that “[t]he vessel should be attended to by a qualified marine electrician knowledgeable of proper marine wiring practices and ABYC standards.” The report further explained that both the AC and DC wiring “should have [the] necessary revisions and repairs made in order to bring the vessel’s wiring to current ABYC standards.” All these surveys show that, prior to the fire, there were several problems with the AC and DC electrical systems onboard the ATLAS. The insurance inspectors concluded that these systems fell below the applicable safety standards which governed in this particular area. These inspectors also found that several repairs to the ATLAS needed to be made before it could be considered a “good marine [insurance] risk.” Despite these findings, it appears that Wechsler did not ask Skipjack to perform any electrical work on the vessel. While Wechsler claims that these problems were in fact corrected, none of Skipjack’s work orders or invoices contain any mention of anyone performing any work on the electrical systems onboard the ATLAS. Although Wechsler claims that Skipjack’s records from this time are incomplete, he has not produced any canceled checks or receipts from any repair service which show that the work was actually completed. Nevertheless, during discovery, a letter dated August 25, 1994 was produced by Wechsler. The letter was seemingly authored by the individual who conducted the 1993 survey of the ATLAS on behalf of Wechsler’s insurance company (Windsor-Mount Joy). It appeared to confirm that the necessary repairs had in fact been made to the vessel’s electrical system. This one-sentence letter stated that “the recommendations addressed in the ... 1993 survey have been completed.” On March 10, 1998, the surveyor who supposedly wrote the August 25th letter (Woodrow W. Loller) was deposed. He testified that, at Wechsler’s request, he conducted a survey of the ATLAS in August of 1994 and found that “the problems [mentioned in the 1993 survey] had been corrected.” Loller also testified that he spent three hours on board the vessel making these verifications. He further stated that he was alone while he conducted his inspection. Finally, while still under oath, Loller testified that he had summarized his conclusions in the August 25, 1994 letter which he sent to Wechsler. Thus, even though there were no billing records or other notes in Loller’s files to support his claim that he actually visited the ATLAS in August of 1994 and even though there were no photographs or reports which documented the findings that he made during his inspection, Loller remained steadfast in his claim that he actually inspected the vessel and found that the recommended repairs had been made. However, one day after his deposition, Lol-ler recanted large portions of this testimony. After having had the opportunity to confer with Wechsler’s legal counsel and Harold Mountz, the manager of Windsor-Mount Joy’s maritime insurance division, Loller submitted an errata sheet which corrected several “errors” in his earlier testimony. For example, Loller explained that, upon further examination of the August 25th letter, he was able to determine that neither he nor anyone under his control created or produced the document. As Loller himself wrote, the letter “was produced without [his] knowledge or authorization.” In fact, he called the letter a “forgery.” Given the dramatic change in his testimony, Loller’s deposition was reconvened. Upon further questioning, Loller stated that contrary to his earlier testimony, Wechsler was not the one who had requested the follow-up survey of the ATLAS in 1994. Instead, Loller stated, it was Mountz who made this request. Lol-ler also stated that he first saw the August 25th letter in the Spring of 1997 when it was faxed to him by someone at Windsor-Mount Joy. According to Loller, the letter was sent to him in an attempt to jog his memory concerning events so that he would sign an affidavit which stated that he had “later inspected the ... ATLAS ... and confirmed that all of the electrical deficiencies noted in [his] report of July 7, 1993 had been completely and competently corrected.” Despite all of these inconsistencies in his recollection and explanation of events, Lol-ler remained confident that he did in fact conduct a subsequent inspection of the ATLAS in 1994. Specifically, Loller testified that Mountz asked him to re-inspect the vessel. Loller also testified that Mountz told him that he did not have to prepare a written report or, for that matter, even send a letter which confirmed that this inspection had been completed and that all of the necessary repairs had been made. Instead, Loller claims, he merely communicated these findings to Mountz during a telephone conversation which occurred at some unspecified time. The court,- however, has not been provided with any telephone logs or other records which would indicate that this conversation actually took place. In addition, Wechsler has not introduced any records or notes of any kind which recount the topic of this supposed conversation. Thus, save for one letter which was admittedly “forged,” there is no documentary or other corroborating evidence to support the assertion that Loller inspected the ATLAS in 1994. There are no billing records, receipts or notations of any kind to suggest that Loller boarded the vessel and verified that the numerous electrical problems which he noted in 1993 had been corrected. Instead, on this point, there is only the testimony of Loller himself which is at best inconsistent. Therefore, it is distinctly possible that Loller did not inspect the ATLAS in 1994. Of course, if he did not actually inspect the vessel, then he could not have confirmed that the necessary repairs had been made. As a result, it is quite possible that the electrical problems which were recounted in 1987, 1991 and 1993 surveys were never corrected. As mentioned earlier, there is no independent corroborating evidence which shows that any repairs to the electrical system were made. Wechsler has not submitted any bills or receipts from any repair service which might have made these repairs. Nor has he introduced any canceled checks to show that a repair bill was actually paid. In fact, despite the voluminous discovery which has occurred in this case, Wechsler has not even been able to identify the person who allegedly repaired the problems with the ship’s electrical system. Thus, the only support which Wech-sler has for his contention that the needed electrical repairs were in fact made is Lol-ler’s testimony which, as previously explained, is highly questionable. Furthermore, with the destruction of the ATLAS, it is not possible for the claimants to now prove that the electrical problems which were noted in the 1987, 1991, and 1993 surveys were not corrected. Instead, the claimants can only posit that the repairs were not made given the circumstances surrounding the August 25th letter, the significant change in Loller’s testimony and the lack of any corroborating evidence to suggest that the electrical problems were in fact corrected. B. The Raising Of The Atlas After The Fire. As mentioned earlier, the ATLAS caught fire during the early morning hours of November 23, 1996. Although it is not exactly clear how this fire started, several of the claimants suspect that the blaze was caused by the vessel’s electrical system. Before the ATLAS could be towed from the dock, the fire spread to two neighboring vessels — the JACE and the SWAN SONG. Like the ATLAS, these two boats also burned to their waterlines, rendering them unsalvageable. However, unlike the ATLAS, it does not appear as if these vessels sank to the bottom of the river after having been gutted by the fire. The dock itself even caught fire that night, along with at least six other ships in surrounding slips. In particular, the HOPE SO TOO, the MIMA IV, the JANIE-D, the TOY YOT, the SAND LAR, the ENTOURAGE and the SIX REASONS were all damaged in the fire, although not as severely as the ATLAS, JACE, and SWAN SONG. The damage to Georgetown’s dock has been estimated to be in excess of $400,000. By the time that the smoke had cleared, the insurance underwriters for the ATLAS, the JACE, the SWAN SONG and Georgetown had retained investigators, surveyors, and other experts to assess the overall damage caused by the fire and to determine the fire’s cause and origin. These insurance companies were Windsor-Mount Joy for the ATLAS, American Eagle for the JACE, Chubb for the SWAN SONG, and Reliance for Georgetown. Recognizing that their vessels had to be removed from the navigable waterways because they were creating an environmental hazard by leaking diesel fuel, the ATLAS, JACE, and SWAN SONG interests agreed to retain a marine salvor. They also agreed that Catherine McLaughlin of Windsor-Mount Joy would be responsible for hiring the salvor. She would also serve as the salvor’s sole point of contact for the salvage operation. McLaughlin then retained a marine salvage company by the name of Martin G. Imbach, Inc. The company itself was run by Manus E. McGeady. He had over thirty years of experience as a marine salvor and would supervise the salvage operation personally. The operation itself was scheduled to commence on November 30, 1996. First, the ATLAS would be raised. Then, it would be removed along with the JACE and the SWAN SONG. According to Georgetown, four days before the operation was scheduled to commence, a dispute arose over whether the parties would be able to conduct a joint survey of the ATLAS after it had been raised. Although it . appears that McLaughlin was initially against the idea, it seems that she eventually relented in the face of several letters which Georgetown’s counsel had sent to her and Mountz. One of these letters stated, inter alia, that: [Jjoint surveys are customary in marine eases.... Courts have held that if a party refuses to permit a joint survey, then such a refusal is done at the party’s own risk and peril.... [S]uch a refusal may ultimately prejudice a party’s position in subsequent litigation. A subsequent letter informed McLaughlin and Mountz that Georgetown was “concerned about the spoliation of evidence” and was, therefore, “reiteratfing its] request for a joint survey.” Ultimately, McLaughlin and Mountz capitulated. On November 29, 1996, six days after the fire and one day before the salvage operation was set to commence, representatives on behalf of the ATLAS, JACE, and SWAN SONG interests along with Georgetown met at the dock to review how the ATLAS would be raised. During this meeting, McGeady stated that he intended to place two slings under the keel of the ATLAS at opposite ends of the vessel. He would then use a floating crane to lift the vessel out of the water. According to McGeady, this way was the “most reasonable and efficient method available to try to raise the ATLAS intact” to the surface of the water. However, McGeady then went on to say that if the vessel were raised in this manner, it might break apart upon reaching the surface of the water. Apparently, the divers who had attached the lifting straps to the ship had observed that its hull had been severely burned during the fire. As a result, the structural integrity of the vessel was highly questionable. Thus, once the ATLAS cleared the surface of the water and the full weight of the vessel was displaced along the weakened hull, it was quite likely that the ship would snap in two. Nevertheless, all of the representatives who were present at the scene do not appear to have objected when McGeady recommended using two slings to raise the ATLAS. The following day, the ATLAS was raised. Again, representatives on behalf of all the interested claimants were present. When they first arrived on the scene, they noticed that McLaughlin had stretched a length of yellow tape across the dock. As she stood in front of it, she initially told the others that they would have to stay behind the line until she and the Maryland Deputy Fire Marshall conducted their inspection of the ATLAS. After the ATLAS had been partially lifted out of the water, the operation was briefly halted so that the investigators, surveyors and other experts could videotape and photograph the vessel. However, no one was allowed on board the yacht because the Deputy Fire Marshal was concerned that it might break apart given the weakened condition of the hull. During this time, Georgetown’s surveyor (Stephen Mason) expressed a concern that was apparently echoed by some (if not all) of the others present. Specifically, if the operation was going to continue and the ATLAS was going to be lifted out of the water, then (as even Wechsler himself has conceded) the vessel “would very likely ... break apart since the hull and keel were severely burned and lacked the internal integrity to stay intact when raised all the way out of the water.” At this point in time, the parties apparently discussed how to best proceed with the operation. McGeady asked whether the vessel should be raised for forensic value or for disposal as wreckage. In response, McLaughlin apparently told McGeady that she wanted the wreck removed for the purposes of disposal. The remainder of the parties, however, seem to have told the salvor that the vessel should be raised intact to preserve its forensic value because, without a complete vessel, it would be extremely difficult (if not impossible) to determine the cause of the fire. McGeady then informed them that while he could accomplish this task, he would have to lower the vessel back into the water and bring in a team of divers to construct a wooden cradle or brace underneath the boat. As a result, the salvage operation would be delayed at least another two to three days. Also, the cost of raising the ATLAS would increase dramatically. According to McLaughlin, “the expense would have been outrageous.” McLaughlin informed the others who were present that Windsor-Mount Joy would not pay for these additional costs. Nevertheless, she did invite the other interests to pay for the cradle. No one on the scene, however, was willing to cover this expense. Nor did anyone suggest splitting the cost among all of the interested parties. In apparent response to McLaughlin’s proposal, Chubb’s surveyor (Robert Gunther) pointed out that one of Imbach’s divers was still on the scene. He could easily slip back into the water and attach additional lifting straps to the ATLAS which might be sufficient to support the weight of the boat as it was lifted out of the water. Apparently, the task would take no more than two or three hours, adding little to Imbach’s bill. Mason then recommended that if nothing else, the diver could attach a third strap around the middle of the boat which would take no more than an hour to complete. Again, in response to these suggestions, McLaughlin stated that if Chubb, Reliance, or any of the other underwriters were willing to pay the additional costs of these proposed methods, then they were free to do so. Windsor-Mount Joy, however, would not be footing this portion of the bill. During these remarks, McLaughlin may have made a comment along the following lines: And, if the vessel breaks apart into a million pieces, then Windsor-Mount Joy will be in a better defensive position in any subsequent litigation since, without an intact vessel, it will be very difficult to prove negligence. In any event, it does not appear as if any of the other representatives took McLaughlin up on her offer. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that any one of these individuals was willing to pay for the additional costs of raising the ATLAS in a manner that would better ensure its preservation. Instead, the record demonstrates that all of these representatives refused to cover these additional costs either individually or collectively. For example, the representative for the JACE interests has testified that he “would have preferred to have ... the remains ... brought up intact.” He, however, “wasn’t going to spend [his] own money” to do it. Georgetown’s representative also did not volunteer to pay the additional costs because, in his client’s view, it “wasn’t [the marina’s] obligation to be financially responsible for the raising of the vessel, the preserving of the vessel or anything of that nature.” In this respect, even though the parties might not have expressly consented to the method by which the ATLAS was raised, none of them were actually willing to incur the additional costs associated with raising the vessel in a manner which was more likely to preserve the integrity of the hull. Thus, while the claimants may have grudgingly accepted the use of the two-sling method, the record makes it clear that they were nonetheless willing to accept this method even though it might lead to the destruction of the vessel. The operation to raise the ATLAS then resumed. Upon clearing the water, the vessel predictably collapsed under its own weight. Apparently, the slings cut into the charred wood of the hull. As the ATLAS was raised higher out of the water, the slings dug deeper into the vessel. Ultimately, the ship broke into two or three pieces, dumping a tremendous amount of charred wreckage and burned debris into the water. Most relevant to these proceedings, as the ATLAS broke apart, a number of components from the vessel’s electrical system spilled into the water. It seems that the sheer force of their descent ripped several of the electrical wires out of the vessel as well. Ultimately, the two largest pieces of the ATLAS were placed into a nearby hopper barge. After conducting a cursory inspection of the remains, all of the experts who were present (including the Deputy Fire Marshal) preliminarily concluded that, given the condition of the ATLAS, it was not possible to determine the cause of the fire at the time. However, several of these experts did suspect that the fire started onboard the ATLAS. In an effort to keep the costs of the operation down, the JACE and the SWAN SONG interests asked if the wreckage of their vessels could be placed in the hopper barge on top of the remains of the ATLAS and then towed to Imbach’s facilities in Baltimore, Maryland. McLaughlin acceded to this request. C. The Subsequent Storage And Destruction Of The ATLAS. The hopper barged arrived at the Im-bach facility later that day. On December 1, 1996, the contents of the barge were made available for inspection. The first inspection occurred on December 2, 1996 when Gunther (who represented the SWAN SONG interests) and Charles Skord (who represented the JACE interests) examined the wreckage to confirm that these two vessels had actually been destroyed in the fire. Two days later, Georgetown’s expert on the cause and origin of the fire (Gerald Kufta) inspected the ATLAS. Given the condition of the wreckage, he concluded that he could not determine the cause of the blaze. Kufta also explained that when he finished his examination of the vessel on December 4, 1996, he considered his investigation to be complete. He simply saw no reason or need to return to the Imbach facility to conduct a subsequent examination. Some of the other parties, however, were more intent on pursuing the matter. In particular, on December 5, 1996, Chubb’s legal counsel wrote to McGeady, stating: I just spoke with ... our surveyor, and he informed me that you required an authorization letter to preserve the remains [of the vessels] past Friday, December 6, 1996. Please accept this letter authorizing you to preserve the remains of the three vessels until further notice. Additionally, we will be responsible for the storage charges for the vessels until further notice. If there are any problems with this request, please contact me.... The next inspection occurred on December 10, 1996. That day, Chubb’s surveyor (Gunther) examined the ATLAS with William Cysyk, who was Chubb’s expert on the cause and origin of the fire. During his examination of the vessel, Cysyk concluded that he required the assistance of an electrical expert before his examination could go any further. In the days that followed, it seems that Wechsler’s representatives used a crane to lift up one of the pieces of the ATLAS. This section was then turned upside down, and one of the vessel’s brass propellers was removed. It is this propeller which is the subject of this limitation of liability action. In the process of removing this item from the ATLAS, additional debris spilled out of the hull. On the morning of December 12, 1996, Gunther and Cysyk returned to the Im-bach facility with Chubb’s newly-retained electrical expert (Clifton Patton). It seems that Mason and Skord were also present at this time. Prior to the scheduled inspection, Cysyk stated that he would not be able to complete his examination of the vessel because it had recently rained and the water which had collected at the bottom of the hopper barge that held the ATLAS, JACE, and SWAN SONG needed to be removed. Cysyk also explained that he required a crane to remove the JACE and the SWAN SONG from atop the ATLAS before he could properly inspect the pieces of the hull. Finally, Cysyk stated that he wanted to move what was left of the ATLAS to a different location, where he could reconstruct the ship to gain a better understanding of where the fire might have started and how it might have spread. At this point in time, McLaughlin informed Chubb’s representatives that the boat would be destroyed at noon. Somewhat surprised, Cysyk responded by offering to assume responsibility for all of the costs associated with storing the vessel. McLaughlin, however, replied to this offer by telling Cysyk that the ATLAS was going to be “crunched” at twelve o’clock. There would be no further debate. At his deposition, Mountz explained that he and McLaughlin arrived at this conclusion through a “mutual understanding” with each other. In light of the destruction of the ATLAS, all of the experts in this case have concluded that they are not able to definitively determine the cause and origin of the November 23, 1996 fire. Many of these experts, however, suspect that the blaze started onboard the ATLAS possibly as a result of the vessel’s electrical problems. II. DISCUSSION. All of the claimants have moved for sanctions on the grounds that Wechsler failed to preserve (if not intentionally destroyed) the ATLAS. Wechsler and Georgetown have also filed motions for summary judgment. According to Wech-sler, the court should dispose of the claims against him since their is no evidence to suggest that he is in any way responsible for causing the fire. In its motion, the marina argues that the claims for negligence, breach of contract, and common law bailment fail as a matter of law in light of the evidence that has been produced in this case. Given its significance, the court will first discuss the issue of sanctions. Then, it will turn to an analysis of the summary judgment motions. A. The Motions For Sanctions. A party who has reason to anticipate litigation has an affirmative duty to preserve evidence which might be relevant to the issues in the lawsuit. See, e.g., Howell v. Maytag, 168 F.R.D. 502, 505 (M.D.Pa.1996) (citing Baliotis v. McNeil, 870 F.Supp. 1285, 1290 (M.D.Pa.1994)); accord Shamis v. Ambassador Factors Corp., 34 F.Supp.2d 879, 888-89 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (asking whether the party “knew or should have known that the destroyed evidence was relevant to pending, imminent, or reasonably foreseeable litigation”); Bass v. General Motors Corp., 929 F.Supp. 1287, 1288 (W.D.Mo.1996) (same). A party who breaches this duty by destroying relevant evidence or by allowing relevant evidence to be destroyed may be sanctioned by the court. See, e.g., Howell, 168 F.R.D. at 505; accord Telecom Intn’l Am. Ltd. v. AT & T Corp., 189 F.R.D. 76, 81 (S.D.N.Y.1999). When this destruction is willful or in bad faith and intended to prevent the other side from examining the evidence, the court may impose the most severe sanction of them all — the outright dismissal of a claim or the entry of a default judgment. See Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 74 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[T]he even harsher sanction of default [or dismissal] may be imposed as a sanction for the intentional destruction of evidence if the party seeking the evidence has been severely prejudiced and no lesser sanction is adequate.”); accord Telecom, 189 F.R.D. at 81 (noting that the sanction of dismissal is a “drastic remedy” which should be imposed only in “extreme circumstances,” such as when a party wilfully destroys evidence or otherwise acts in bad faith) (relying on West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir.1999)); Baliotis, 870 F.Supp. at 1289 (“A sanction that has the ‘drastic’ result of judgment being entered against the party who has lost or destroyed evidence must be regarded as a ‘last resort,’ to be imposed only ‘if no alternative remedy by way of a lesser, but equally efficient, sanction is available.’ ”) (citations omitted). When determining whether to impose sanctions for the spoliation of evidence, this court must consider the following three factors: (1) the degree of fault and personal responsibility of the party who destroyed the evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the other party; and (3) the availability of lesser sanctions which would avoid any unfairness to the innocent party while, at the same time, serving as a sufficient penalty to deter the same type of conduct in the future. See Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir.1994); accord Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Liebert Corp., 1998 WL 363834, at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1998). As the Schmid court emphasized, when determining the degree of fault and personal responsibility attributable to the party that destroyed the evidence, the court must consider whether that party intended to impair the ability of the other side to effectively litigate its case. 13 F.3d at 80; see also Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir.1995) (“[I]t must appear that there has been an actual suppression or withholding of the evidence. No unfavorable inference arises when the circumstances indicate that the document or article in question has been lost or accidentally destroyed, or where the failure to produce it is otherwise properly accounted for.”); accord Collins v. Throckmorton, 425 A.2d 146, 150 (Del.1980) (“[W]here a litigant intentionally suppresses or destroys pertinent evidence, an inference arises that such evidence would be unfavorable to his case.”). In addition, when considering the degree of prejudice suffered by the party that did not destroy the evidence, the court should take into account whether that party had a meaningful opportunity to examine the evidence in question before it was destroyed. See Thiele v. Oddy’s Auto & Marine, Inc., 906 F.Supp. 158, 162 (W.D.N.Y.1995). As the Thiele court explained, when one side is completely deprived of the opportunity to inspect the evidence because it was destroyed after the other side had a chance to examine it, then sanctions for spoliation are generally appropriate. Id. at 162-63 (“[W]ithout any ability to examine the boat, [the third-party defendant] will be greatly frustrated in its ability to defend its case. Since [the plaintiff] is plainly at fault for allowing the boat to be placed in a landfill, any claims against [the third-party defendant] must be dismissed.”); see also Baliotis, 870 F.Supp. at 1290-91 (“At a minimum ... an opportunity for inspection should be afforded ... before relevant evidence is destroyed.”). Citing these twin principles, Wechsler argues that “there is no legal basis for the imposition of sanctions against [him]” because he “afforded ... the ... claimants repeated opportunities to inspect the very evidence [that] they now contend was spo-liated.” Wechsler also argues that the claimants “h[ave] only [themselves] to blame for the lost materials” given their refusal to pay for the construction of a brace or the addition of a third strap when the ATLAS was raised. In order to best address these arguments, the court will separately consider the events which occurred when the ATLAS was raised and those which transpired after the vessel was taken to the Imbach facility and ultimately destroyed. 1. The raising of the ATLAS. At the outset, the court notes the numerous hurdles which Wechsler’s representatives put into place in an apparent attempt to prevent the other parties from inspecting the ATLAS. For example, McLaughlin initially refused to let these interested parties conduct a joint survey of the vessel even though this type of inspection appears to be customary in the field. Later, McLaughlin was only willing to allow these parties to be in the “general vicinity” when the ATLAS was raised. Although she eventually capitulated and permitted the various representatives to be present on the scene, she met them with a length of yellow tape stretched across the dock on the morning that the ATLAS was raised. She then told them that no one could cross this line until she and the Deputy Fire Marshall had inspected the ATLAS. She subsequently instructed McGeady to treat the ATLAS as if it was being raised as wreckage instead of for its forensic value. Finally, McLaughlin refused to consider additional methods of raising the ATLAS which had a higher probability of leaving the vessel intact. Nevertheless, despite her intransigence, McLaughlin did inform all of the parties who were present that they could raise the ATLAS in any manner that they saw fit as long as they were willing to bear the additional expenses associated with the endeavor. No one, however, took McLaughlin up on her offer. There was not one representative on the scene who was willing to incur the additional costs associated with constructing a cradle or attaching a third sling. Furthermore, none of the representatives were willing to enter into an agreement to divide these additional costs evenly amongst themselves so that one party did not bear the entire financial burden of a more extensive recovery operation. For example, although the representative for the JACE interests “would have preferred to have ... the remains ... brought up intact,” he “wasn’t going to spend [his] own money” to do it. Likewise, Georgetown’s representative believed that it “wasn’t [the marina’s] obligation to be financially responsible for the raising of the vessel, the preserving of the vessel or anything of that nature.” Under these circumstances, it would be inequitable to sanction Wechsler for the manner in which the ATLAS was raised. In coming to this conclusion, the court is not condoning the conduct of either McLaughlin or Windsor-Mount Joy. In the court’s opinion, their behavior should not be emulated. Admittedly, to her credit, McLaughlin did not instruct McGeady to use a clam shell bucket to scoop the ATLAS up off the river bottom piece by piece. Nevertheless, it is troubling that McLaughlin refused to cover the additional expense of using one or two more slings to raise the ship since it does not seem that this method of recovery would have significantly increased the costs of or time needed to complete the salvage operation. As previously explained, when a party has reason to believe that a lawsuit may be filed, that party has an obligation to preserve relevant evidence. See Howell, 168 F.R.D. at 505; Baliotis, 870 F.Supp. at 1290; see also Shamis, 34 F.Supp.2d at 888-89 (asking whether the party “knew or should have known that the destroyed evidence was relevant to pending, imminent, or reasonably foreseeable litigation”). Here, McLaughlin and her colleagues at Windsor-Mount Joy had to have either known or suspected that litigation would likely occur. A fire had just destroyed or damaged several boats at a marina, and numerous insurance companies were interested in raising the wreckage to determine the cause and origin of the blaze. However, instead of incurring the relatively minor costs associated with raising the ATLAS in a manner which might better preserve its remains, McLaughlin adopted a strategy which everyone recognized would almost assuredly lead to the vessel’s destruction. Nevertheless, all of the interested parties in this litigation those who have moved for sanctions) had the opportunity to raise the ATLAS in any manner that they saw fit. Furthermore, the individuals present at the scene were not the boat owners themselves who had just lost their vessels as a result of the fire. Instead, these individuals were representatives from the various underwriters which insured the boats which had been destroyed. In other words, the people who were present at the scene had a great deal of experience in these situations. Given their level of sophistication, they knew or should have known that lawsuits would eventually be filed. They also had an idea of the types of evidence which would be relevant any ensuing litigation. Furthermore, they represented companies with not only substantial financial resources but also a significant stake in any subsequent legal proceeding. Despite this experience and these interests, none of these individuals were willing to pay any of the additional costs associated with the construction of a brace or the use of a third or fourth strap. In fact, these representatives apparently did not even consider the possibility of sharing these expenses amongst themselves. Given this record, it would be inequitable to sanction Wechsler for the manner in which the ATLAS was raised. In short, while his representatives at Windsor-Mount Joy played a significant role in directing how the vessel would be recovered, it appears that any of the representatives from the other insurance companies could have stepped in at any time to ensure that the ATLAS would be raised in a different manner with a higher probability of preserving the vessel. In this respect, Wechsler is correct. The claimants have only themselves (or, more accurately, their insurers) to blame for the initial loss of the ATLAS. Even though these parties might be prejudiced by the destruction of this evidence, this prejudice was avoidable. In short, the claimants had the opportunity and the ability to preserve the vessel, yet they failed to do so. Under these circumstances, the court cannot sanction Wech-sler for an event which was not entirely of his own making. Finally, the court wishes to emphasize that if McLaughlin had been dealing with the victims of the fire themselves instead of with representatives from their insurance companies, this decision would have been different. In the opinion of the court, it is one thing to hold sophisticated parties with vast financial resources responsible for their failure to take seemingly reasonable steps to preserve evidence which they know or should know might be relevant to a future lawsuit. It is quite another thing to give the victims of an accident a ultimatum like the one which was issued here. In general, victims are lay people. They typically do not possess a substantial amount of knowledge concerning the operation of the legal system or the requirements imposed by the law. More important, as victims, they will have just suffered some form of tragedy. Thus, they may not be in the best position, whether psychologically or financially, to take steps which would be in their long-term interests. Here, McLaughlin did not put the victims in this position. Instead, she was dealing directly with representatives from the companies which had insured the victims. Because these commercial entities had the knowledge and experience to appreciate the significance of the ATLAS, in addition to the financial resources to preserve the vessel, they cannot shift all of the blame for the manner in which the recovery operation was conducted to Wechsler. The court, however, does not reach the same conclusion concerning the ultimate destruction of the vessel. 2. The storage and destruction of the ATLAS. The wreckage of the ATLAS was first made available to the parties for inspection on December 2, 1996. On that day, representatives on behalf of the SWAN SONG and the JACE interests (Gunther and Skord) examined the wreckage primarily to confirm that these two vessels had actually been destroyed in the fire. On December 4, 1996, one of Georgetown’s representatives (Kufta) inspected the ATLAS. He concluded his investigation that day, finding that it was not possible to determine the cause of the fire given the condition of the ATLAS. As Kufta has since explained, after December 4th, he saw no need to return to the Imbach facility for a subsequent examination. Chubb, which had insured the SWAN SONG, however, was interested in further examining the ATLAS. For this reason, one of its attorneys sent McGeady a letter on December 5, 1996 which asked him to “preserve the remains of the three vessels until further notice.” The letter also informed McGeady that Chubb “w[ould] be responsible for the storage charges for the vessels.... ” The next inspection occurred on December 10, 1996. That day, Gunther and Cy-syk examined the ATLAS to determine the cause and origin of the fire. However, Cysyk postponed part of the inspection because he required additional assistance from an electrical expert. Subsequently, Wechsler’s representatives used a crane to lift one of the pieces of the ATLAS out of the barge. This section was then turned upside down, and one of the vessel’s brass propellers was removed. In the process, additional debris spilled out of the hull. On the morning of December 12, 1996, Gunther and Cysyk returned to the Im-bach facility with Patton (their electrical expert). Mason and Skord also appear to have been there. Upon observing the remains of the ATLAS, JACE and SWANSONG in the hopper barge, Cysyk said that he would not be able to complete his examination that day. First, the barge needed to be drained of the rain water which had accumulated as the result of a recent storm. Second, the JACE and the SWAN SONG were still sitting on top of the ATLAS and needed to be removed before a close inspection of the vessel could proceed. Finally, Cysyk stated that he wanted to move the remains of the ATLAS to a nearby location where he could reconstruct the ship to gain a better understanding of where the fire might have started and how it might have spread. In response, McLaughlin informed Cy-syk and the others who were there that the ATLAS would be “crunched” at noon. Although Cysyk told McLaughlin that Chubb would assume responsibility for all of the costs associated with storing the vessel, she informed him that the ATLAS would be destroyed by twelve o’clock. Over the objections of the parties, the vessel was disposed of that day. According to Mountz, he arrived at this decision through a “mutual understanding” with McLaughlin. a. The degree of fault and personal responsibility on the part of Wechsler .and his representatives. Under these circumstances, there can be no question that Wechsler’s representatives acted intentionally when they destroyed the ATLAS. Cysyk and others at the scene had asked for the vessel to be preserved. Cysyk even explained that Chubb would bear the additional costs associated with storing the wreckage. Nevertheless, McLaughlin ordered the ship crushed. Thus, the destruction of the ATLAS was not accidental or inadvertent. See Brewer, 72 F.3d at 334 (“No unfavorable inference arises when the circumstances indicate that the document or article in question has been lost or accidentally destroyed, or where the failure to produce it is otherwise properly accounted for.”). Furthermore, given the record, it would appear that this conduct was intended to prevent the other interests from further inspecting the ATLAS. From the outset, McLaughlin was reluctant to let any party examine the vessel. She initially refused to permit a joint inspection. She later stated that the other parties could only be in the “general vicinity” of the salvage operation. It was only after the parties pressed the issue that McLaughlin agreed to allow them on the scene. However, when they first arrived, McLaughlin had stretched a length of yellow tape across the dock. Standing in front of it, she told the others that they would have to stay behind the line until she and the Deputy Fire Marshall conducted their inspection of the ATLAS. Furthermore, even if the court were to put aside that intractable stance which McLaughlin took concerning the manner by which the ATLAS would be raised, once the ship reached the surface of the water, McLaughlin told McGeady that he should simply remove and dispose of the wreck instead of attempting to preserve the forensic value of the vessel. In addition, even though McLaughlin may have permitted a number of initial inspections to occur at the Imbach facility, there appears to have been no reason to destroy the ATLAS on December 12, 1996. Chubb had already committed to paying the additional storage costs of the vessel, and Cysyk emphasized this point when he asked McLaughlin to preserve the boat. Specifically, he told McLaughlin, “If you’re going to destroy [the ATLAS] anyway, give it to me so that I can have the boat.... I’m willing to pay for all the costs. It’s not going to cost you a dime.... ” Given this statement, McLaughlin had no reason to dispose of the ATLAS. In fact, the only reason which the court can discern for destroying the vessel under these circumstances would be to prevent the claimants from inspecting the ship and possibly discovering the cause and origin of the fire. Admittedly, Wechsler correctly points out that “[t]he scope of the duty to preserve evidence is not boundless.” See Baliotis, 870 F.Supp. at 1290-91 (quoting Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., 266 N.J.Super. 222, 628 A.2d 1108, 1122 (1993).) However, as these and other cases make clear, a party still must act reasonably under the circumstances. See, e.g., Kolanovic v. Gida, 77 F.Supp.2d 595, 602-03 (D.N.J.1999); accord Hirsch, 628 A.2d at 1122. In this case, it was not reasonable to destroy the ATLAS after another party had already agreed to pay for the vessel’s continued storage. Cf. Hirsch, 628 A.2d at 1122 (explaining that it is reasonable to impose a deadline for inspecting the evidence and to insist that the other party bear the expense of preserving the evidence if it is needed beyond that deadline). In addition, the ATLAS itself had only been in storage for two weeks, and at least one interested party was asking for the vessel to be preserved so that a more thorough inspection could be conducted. Cf. Kolanovic, 77 F.Supp.2d at 603 (concluding that the defendant acted reasonably when he preserved the evidence “for at least seventeen (17) months after the accident occurred” especially since “he was never affirmatively told or asked by [the] plaintiffs to retain the [evidence], nor did [the] plaintiffs request that he send the ladder to [an expert for testing]”). In this respect, the court is not persuaded by Wechsler’s argument that he fulfilled his duty to preserve evidence by simply providing “an opportunity for inspection before the evidence in question [wa]s destroyed.” This statement paints with too broad a brush. In the opinion of the court, the crucial question is whether the other side had an adequate or meaningful opportunity to inspect the evidence. See Henderson v. Tyrrell, 80 Wash.App. 592, 910 P.2d 522, 532 (1996) (“Another important consideration is whether the loss or destruction of the evidence has resulted in an investigative advantage for one party over another or whether the adverse party was afforded an adequate opportunity to examine the evidence.”); American States Ins. Co. v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 94 Ohio Misc.2d 172, 704 N.E.2d 1280, 1284 (1997) (“[W]hen the item made unavailable by the offending party is inextricably connected to the evidence which the offending party believes to have caused the fire and if its importance is foreseeable, such evidence should be retained for inspection until the opposing party has a reasonable opportunity, after notice, to conduct an examination by its experts.”) (relying ón Hirsch, 628 A.2d at 1122). Of course, when a party is denied any opportunity to examine the evidence, this test would automatically be satisfied. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 F.3d 801, 804 (6th Cir.1999) (“A court may exclude expert testimony as a sanction for spoiling evidence if it determines that the evidence has been intentionally altered or destroyed by a party or its expert before the defense had an opportunity to examine the evidence.”); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Engineering & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 369 (9th Cir.1992) (emphasizing that the plaintiffs “destruction of evidence was not in dispute” and noting that this misconduct “precluded [the defendant] from any opportunity to inspect the evidence”); see also DeLong v. A-Top Air Conditioning Co., 710 So.2d 706, 707 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1998) (“After a careful review of the record before us, we cannot conclude that the lower court abused its discretion in imposing the ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice where the appellees demonstrated their inability to completely set forth their defense without having had the opportunity to examine and test the lost evidence.”) (per curiam); accord Conderman v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 180 Misc.2d 8, 687 N.Y.S.2d 213, 216 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1998) (“When a party alters, loses or destroys key evidence before it can be examined by the other party’s expert, the court should dismiss the pleadings of the party responsible for the spoliation”). However, in the opinion of the court, this standard could also be met when a party who has already conducted an initial inspection of the evidence asks for the material to be preserved so that additional tests or experiments can be conducted. Disposing of the evidence under these circumstances would generally be considered unreasonable since it would be unacceptable for one side to destroy evidence when it knows that the other side is interested in preserving the máterial for further review or inspection. The unreasonableness of this type of conduct is only heightened when the side asking to preserve the evidence has also offered to pay all of the additional costs associated with its continued storage. This is exactly what occurred her. As previously explained, no party had a meaningful opportunity to physically inspect the ATLAS when it was raised because the Deputy Fire Marshall would not let anyone onboard the vessel out of a concern for their safety. Although the ATLAS may have been photographed or videotaped at the time, the court does not consider this type of cursory review to equate with an actual physical inspection of the vessel. Moreover, although several experts concluded that they would not be able to determine the cause and origin of the fire given the condition of the ATLAS after it was raised, Cysyk believed that he could reconstruct the ship and, thus, gain some insight into where and how the fire started. In fact, as he testified at his deposition, My goal would have been to recover every possible piece of evidence from the barge, the boat itself, the items on the boat, those items that had fallen into the water, recover all of those items and put the boat back together again. Having done that ... I feel pretty confident [that] I could have figured out where the fire started and what caused it. It was for this reason that Chubb was willing to incur the additional storage costs associated with preserving the vessel. Thus, from Wechsler’s perspective, the only reason to dispose of the boat would be to prevent the claimants from possibly discovering the cause of the fire. If Wechsler and his representatives truly considered the ATLAS to be exculpatory, they would not have destroyed the wreckage so quickly- b. The degree of prejudice suffered by the other parties. Admittedly, it seems that Cysyk had never reconstructed a vessel before, although he did have substantial experience reconstructing the accident scenes of numerous buildings which had burned down. Furthermore, as pointed out at Cysyk’s deposition, it was not clear whether reconstructing the ATLAS would actually enable the expert to determine if the fire started onboard the vessel. In addition, even if he could make this determination, it might not be possible to determine how the fire actually started. Again, the ATLAS had broken apart during the recovery operation and spilled a large portion of its contents into the water. Thus, it might not have been possible to recover numerous key pieces of evidence, such as parts of the hull or components from the vessel’s electrical system. Furthermore, even if these items could have been recovered, they might have been so badly damaged as to be of little or no value in determining the cause and origin of the fire. Unfortunately, with the destruction of the ATLAS, it is now impossible to definitively answer these questions. It is, therefore, impossible to determine whether there was any merit to Cysyk’s reconstruction theory. For example, if the ATLAS had been preserved, Cysyk could have at least attempted to reconstruct the vessel. If his efforts proved successful, he might have been able to determine the cause and origin of the fire. Specifically, he might have been able to prove that the fire originated onboard the ATLAS. Of course, Wechsler could have retained his own expert who might have come to a different conclusion given the evidence. In this event, the parties could have litigated the merits of the issue before the court. However, with the destruction of the ATLAS, they are now precluded from doing so. Conversely, Cysyk might have found that the fire started elsewhere and simply spread to the ATLAS. In the alternative, he could have determined that it was not possible to come to any conclusions concerning the cause or origin of the fire because certain crucial pieces of evidence were either missing or so severely destroyed as a result of the fire that they were of no forensic value. Moreover, even if Cysyk might not have been able to identify the cause and origin of the fire after reconstructing the ATLAS, he still might have been able to confirm whether the electrical problems which had been noted in the three previous insurance surveys had been corrected. For example, Cysyk might have found that much of the wiring remained loose, spliced, and ungrounded. Of course, Cysyk could have instead found that the needed repairs had in fact been made. In these respects, Cysyk’s plan to reconstruct the ALAS could have absolved Wechsler from liability just as easily as it could have implicated him in the fire. When viewed in this light, the prejudice suffered in this case would seem to be the lost opportunity to reach a more definitive conclusion concerning the cause and origin of the fire. The court views this type of prejudice extremely seriously. The court does not agree with Wechsler’s claim that Cysyk’s reconstruction plan “was actually pointless since there was no realistic hope that ‘reconstruction’ efforts could identify the cause of the fire.” Under Schmid, a party need only “come forward with plausible, concrete suggestions as to what the [lost] evidence might have been.” 13 F.3d at 80. Contrary to Wechsler’s apparent contentions, a party need not conclusively demonstrate that the evidence would have established liability on the part of the spoliator. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd., 167 F.R.D. 90, 115 (D.Colo.1996) (noting that the party moving for sanctions “has the initial burden to establish some minimal relevancy of any discarded or destroyed materials to the circumstances of the litigation”) (eim phasis added); see also Skeete v. McKinsey & Co., Inc., 1993 WL 256659, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1993) (explaining that the “moving party usually sets forth some type of extrinsic evidence as to the content of the missing materials which demonstrates the extent to which such materials would have been harmful to the spoliator”); Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 76-77 (requiring “a nexus between the proposed [adverse] inference and the information contained within the lost evidence” which is generally demonstrated by “some extrinsic evidence of the content of the evidence ... to determine in what respect and to what extent it would have been detrimental”). As other courts have noted in a related context, it is impossible to know what the destroyed evidence would have shown.... It would seem to be pure guesswork, even if the destroyed evidence went against the spoliator, to calculate what it would have contributed to the plaintiffs success on the merits [in] the underlying lawsuit. See Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 150 Ill.App.3d 248, 103 Ill.Dec. 774, 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1320 (1987) (questioning the propriety of recognizing an independent cause of action for the tort for spoliation); see also Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Minn.1990) (quoting Petrik for the same reason); Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co., 796 F.Supp. 966, 969-70 (W.D.La.1992) (quoting Federated). In this case, there can be no question concerning the relevancy of the ATLAS to any future legal proceeding. The vessel had burned down, and several individuals (including the Deputy Fire Marshall) apparently believed that the fire began on-board the ship. See, e.g., Mathias v. Jacobs, 197 F.R.D. 29, 38 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (requiring “some showing indicating that the destroyed evidence would have been relevant to the contested issue.”) (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir.1998)); see also Gates, 167 F.R.D. at 104 (considering “the materiality and value of the suppressed evidence upon the ability of a victim to fully and fairly prepare for trial”). Furthermore, with the destruction of the ATLAS, the claimants have been denied a full and fair opportunity to prepare their case for trial. Again, without the vessel, there appears to be no way to prove or disprove wh