Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER VRATIL, District Judge. Plaintiff alleges that her employer, the City of Leawood, Kansas, through its police department, discriminated against her on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The matter is before the Court on plaintiffs Motion For Leave To File Second Amended Petition And Supporting Suggestions (Doc. # 64) filed July 21, 2000; defendants’ Motion To Dismiss (Doc #43) filed June 2, 2000; Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 87) filed September 22, 2000; plaintiffs Motion For Reconsideration Of The Pretrial Order (Doc. # 99) filed November 8, 2000; defendants’ informal motion to strike plaintiffs statement of un-controverted facts in Defendant City Of Leawoods’ Reply To Plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 125) filed February 15, 2001; and Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To File Sur-Reply To Defendants’ Reply To Plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 128) filed March 6, 2001. For reasons stated below, the Court sustains defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part, overrules defendants’ motions to dismiss and to strike plaintiffs statement of facts, and sustains plaintiffs motions for reconsideration, to amend and to file a sur-reply. Factual Background The following facts are either undisputed or, where disputed, construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Plaintiff worked as a civilian employee at the Leawood police department for nine years, from June 15,1987 through September 8, 1996. The Leawood Police Department consists of civilian employees and sworn officers. Civilian employees such as plaintiff work in the administrative division and sworn officers work in the patrol division. Each division is supervised by a captain. Periodically, the captains rotate. The administrative division consists of three departments: dispatch, records and the court clerk’s office. Plaintiff originally worked as a dispatcher. Less than 18 months after she started work, defendants promoted her. Consequently, for the last seven years, from March 1989 to August 1996, plaintiff supervised the other dispatchers and served as senior communications officer. Plaintiff received excellent evaluations in her yearly performance reviews. Upon her initial employment, plaintiff received a copy of defendants’ sexual harassment policy. Before March 1989, Ronald Anderson, captain of the administrative services division, made plaintiffs workplace environment uncomfortable because he was having an affair with Sue Keller, who then served as senior communications officer and supervised plaintiffs work as a dispatcher. Anderson supervised Keller and thus indirectly supervised plaintiff. During the affair, Anderson chastised plaintiff for disloyalty because she did not tell him that rumors about the affair were circulating throughout the department. He also issued plaintiff a letter of reprimand on the subject. Plaintiff complained about this admonishment to Stephen Cox, Chief of Police. Cox told plaintiff to not worry about the incident. Six months after the affair began, Keller left the police department. Plaintiff then filled Keller’s position as senior communications officer and Anderson became her direct supervisor. While Anderson supervised plaintiff, he made negative comments to her about taking sick leave to care for her child and not working overtime because she had child care difficulties. Anderson advised plaintiff that other employees might think plaintiff had a bad work ethic. Plaintiff does not know Anderson’s policy on child care issues with regard to the other people he supervised or whether he treated her differently than other employees. Plaintiff told Anderson that she had a personality conflict with Rose Coleman, supervisor of court services. Anderson counseled plaintiff that the conflict was a “girl thing” and said that he did not like to supervise women. Anderson, along with Sidney Mitchell, Captain of Patrol, also reprimanded plaintiff for taking smoke breaks with Cox. Plaintiff made several verbal complaints to Cox about Anderson. In December 1994, plaintiff lodged a written complaint with Cox about Anderson’s negative comments and generally hostile attitude toward women. Plaintiff began to document her complaints because she felt insecure in her job. The written complaint alleged that Anderson’s comments and actions impaired plaintiffs employment and that he discriminated against her because she was a new mother. Plaintiff documented 23 episodes which illustrated Anderson’s lack of support for her as a supervisor and stated that Anderson harassed her due to her child care responsibilities. Plaintiffs complaint did not contain the verbal complaints she had earlier made to Cox about Anderson. Under defendants’ policy, an employee can report possible harassment to an immediate supervisor, a department head or the human resources director. Following plaintiffs complaint, Cox rotated the captain positions so that Anderson oversaw patrol and ended his supervision of plaintiff. Cox told Anderson that he was making the switch because Anderson’s goal was to retire as captain of patrol. Cox did not tell Anderson any other reason for the rotation, nor did he inform him of plaintiffs complaint, meet with him to discuss discrimination issues or reprimand him in any way. Moreover, in violation of city policy, Cox did not relay plaintiffs complaint to the human resources department for the city. Another employee, Shirley Whiles, told Anderson that plaintiff had instigated the transfer and planned to sue him for sex harassment. In any event, Mitchell became the new administrative services captain and supervised plaintiff. Cox told Mitchell about plaintiff’s discrimination complaint. He asked Mitchell to not tell Anderson about it and to be alert for any impending problems that might occur if Anderson learned of the complaint. After Anderson’s transfer, plaintiff encountered department-wide rumors that she was having an affair with Cox. Plaintiff and Cox had a close professional relationship but not a sexually intimate one. Plaintiff viewed Cox as a mentor. In the fall of 1995 through May of 1996, however, Cox led plaintiff to believe that he wanted a sexual relationship. In early fall of 1995, while he was having personal problems, Cox told plaintiff “I don’t know what’s wrong with me, maybe I should have an affair.” Plaintiff responded, “Well, maybe you should.” Cox replied, ‘Would you like to volunteer?” Plaintiff laughed and told Cox, “You know, no, you’re my Chief.” Cox repeated this request twice: once during a smoke break while plaintiff was at work and again when plaintiff resigned on August 8, 1996. During the smoke break, Cox told plaintiff, “You know the offer still stands.” Plaintiff responded, “What offer?” and Cox replied, “To have an affair.” Plaintiff said, “No, I don’t think so.” Cox told her, “You know you hold my career in your hands right now.” Plaintiff told him, ‘You don’t need to worry about your job.” Plaintiff continued to think of Cox as a friend and felt that she could control the situation as long as Cox did not demand sexual favors. Plaintiff had gallbladder surgery in January of 1996 and Cox visited her in the hospital and kissed her on the lips. Also in January of 1996, Cox insisted on taking plaintiff to the grocery store in bad weather when her husband was out of town. After the trip, he kissed plaintiff good-bye and she told him “Don’t do this, please.” Exhibit B in Appendix To Plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 119) at 84-85. Plaintiff became uncomfortable because she felt that Cox wanted something in return for taking her to the store in bad weather. Cox also made plaintiff uncomfortable during this time period by holding her hand when he took plaintiff to lunch (and paid for their meals). After one of the lunch dates, Cox attempted to kiss plaintiff. In April or May of 1996, Cox and plaintiff met for a drink after work. Cox saw a portion of plaintiff’s bra and remarked “God, I love your taste in bras.” Exhibit B in Appendix To Plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 119) at 81:24. This comment was the first overtly sexual remark that Cox had made toward plaintiff. Immediately after Cox made the comment, plaintiff told Cox that his requests for an affair and his comment about her bra made her uncomfortable. Cox did not make any other sexual comments or overtures until three months later, on the date plaintiff resigned, August 8, 1996. Other than the second overture about an affair during a smoke break, it does not appear that any of the incidents between plaintiff and Cox took place at work. Mitchell and Anderson believed that there was something more to the relationship between Cox and plaintiff, and they chastised plaintiff for taking smoke breaks with Cox and appearing to be too friendly with him. Anderson also downgraded plaintiff on one of her yearly evaluations because of her relationship with Cox. Department-wide rumors spread about the relationship between plaintiff and Cox. Cox took no steps to stop the rumors about the two of them. Cox did not follow plaintiffs suggestion that city employees, rather than outside contractors, perform janitorial work at the police station. This suggestion arose from an incident when the son of a contractor had entered the women’s locker room and ejaculated on plaintiffs clothing. Plaintiff never reported Cox’s behavior because she felt that she had the situation under control and that reporting Cox would jeopardize her career. Plaintiff believed that “[gjoing over the chief of police’s head is putting your head on a chopping block as far as your career is concerned ... as long as I was able to keep him in check, I wasn’t going to [Julie Hakan, the City’s human resources director].” Exhibit B in Appendix To Plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 119) at 82:19-23. In spite of Cox’s behavior, plaintiff considered him a friend until the time of her resignation. In fact, she. invited Cox and his wife to her home so that their granddaughter could play with her daughter. On May 28, 1996, plaintiff assisted in breathalyser training for the police department. Off-duty members of the police department volunteered to be test subjects for the training. The police department gave the participants specific amounts of alcoholic beverages and then performed dexterity and Intoxilyzer tests on the subjects. Some of the employees got quite intoxicated, becoming ill and behaving inappropriately. One female employee got drunk, became ill in the bathroom, then returned outside, put her head on Cox’s feet and wrapped her arms around his ankles. Plaintiff stumbled in the parking lot and a police officer joked about her condition. Plaintiff made an obscene gesture to him. Following this exercise, Mitchell met with plaintiff to discuss her behavior. Mitchell documented this meeting in a letter to plaintiff’s file. According to the letter, Mitchell spent a good portion of the meeting chastising plaintiff for her relationship with Cox because he deemed it to be inappropriate and disruptive. Mitchell told plaintiff that others in the department resented and disliked her due to her relationship with Cox. He also told plaintiff that she should not take smoke breaks with Cox. Plaintiff responded that Cox was the one who asked her to go on the smoke breaks and that Mitchell had not seen the e-mails that Cox had sent her. Mitchell consulted Hakan before disciplining plaintiff. Hakan did not make any other recommendation, although she knew that plaintiff had been drinking during the incident and that it was not a smart idea to have supervisors or employees drink at work. The next day, June 6, 1996, Mitchell suspended plaintiff for one day because she had not behaved properly while intoxicated. The other female employee who had behaved poorly did not receive any punishment. In spite of this, while she was employed with defendants, plaintiff had no complaints about Mitchell. During the investigation of the breathalyser incident, Hakan learned that people in the department believed that Cox and plaintiff were more than office buddies. Hakan also discovered that Mitchell thought that plaintiff flaunted her relationship with Cox and called him over to her house when her husband was out of town. Hakan filed a memorandum on June 6, 1996, stating that she would try to determine if the relationship between plaintiff and Cox was consensual. On June 27, 1996, plaintiff testified at an administrative hearing regarding the termination of another employee, Rose Coleman. Defendants had terminated Coleman for falsifying payroll records. The police department employed three civilian supervisors: Coleman, who supervised the court clerk’s office, Shirley Whiles, supervisor of records, and plaintiff. Anderson had supervised Coleman during part of her time at the police department. Coleman appealed her termination and the City held a hearing at which Whiles, who handled the police department payroll and maintained department records, testified about pay record discrepancies. Whiles had previously discussed the general subject of payroll fraud with plaintiff and asked for advice in dealing with the problem. During the course of the hearing, the City also examined allegations that plaintiff had improperly reviewed Coleman’s performance evaluation and shared the evaluation with Whiles. By mistake, Anderson had saved several employee evaluations in a public file on the computer network. Plaintiff claims that under the rules in defendants’ employee handbook, it is appropriate at times for supervisors to view and discuss employee evaluations (including those of other supervisors) within their ranks. Defendants dispute this interpretation of the policy but present no evidence in support of their interpretation. At her deposition plaintiff testified that she told Whiles about Anderson’s error because Whiles was having problems with Anderson. Mitchell later asked Hakan to investigate the incident and find out how an employee’s evaluation came to be publicly disseminated. Mitchell interviewed plaintiff, Whiles, Georgia Steenbergen and Jill Manson. Mitchell advised plaintiff and Whiles that failure to be truthful during the investigation could be cause for discipline, up to and including termination. Whiles testified that plaintiff had pulled up Coleman’s evaluation on Whiles’ computer screen. Steenbergen, an eyewitness, corroborated this testimony and reported that plaintiff had said “Look at this” as she pulled up a document on Whiles’ screen. The eyewitness and Whiles said that as plaintiff pulled up the evaluation, she remarked “[e]njoy your reading.” Manson said that Whiles told her that plaintiff had pulled up Coleman’s evaluation on her computer. Plaintiff testified that she had merely sent Whiles an e-mail about the problem telling her where the evaluation was located, and may have said “happy reading,” but that she did not send Whiles any files or pull up anything on Whiles’ computer. The gist of the conflict in testimony was that plaintiff claimed that she had only sent Whiles an e-mail but Whiles claimed that plaintiff had pulled up the evaluation on her computer. Hakan investigated the possibility that plaintiffs e-mail existed by checking computer logs. Plaintiff considered the computer error in saving the evaluation to be a records issue. Whiles looked at Coleman’s evaluation in spite of the fact that she believed it was wrong to look at another employee’s evaluation. At the Coleman hearing on June 27, Hakan learned for the first time that plaintiff had considered filing a sexual harassment suit against Anderson and that she had filed a written complaint about him with Cox. On July 3, 1996, Cox wrote Hakan a memo about plaintiffs pri- or complaint about Anderson. On July 12, 1996, Anderson met to discuss this disclosure with Hakan and Dick Garafano, City Manager. Anderson had previously heard rumors that plaintiff had considered a sexual harassment suit against him and that she in fact had asked other employees if they knew attorneys. This meeting, however, provided Anderson’s first confirmation of that information. During the meeting, which was tape-recorded, Anderson told Hakan and Garafano that a sexual relationship between Cox and plaintiff seemed obvious, but that plaintiffs influence over Cox worried him more and he feared plaintiff was out to get him. He said “I’m scared to death of Donna” and “[Donna’s] going to be real unhappy ... I think she’s going to get me ... she’s vindictive.” Exhibit 9 to Exhibit D in Appendix To Plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 119) at 10, 21. Anderson also confirmed that he had had an affair with Keller. When Anderson mentioned that it might be difficult for him and plaintiff to work together, Hakan asked him why he thought that plaintiff might not leave the police department before he did. Anderson asked why someone had not been punished for the Coleman incident and suggested that the parties involved take a lie detector test. Anderson told Hakan and Garafano that he had once “dinged” plaintiff on a performance review because of her relationship with Cox. Anderson thought that Cox had thrown him to the wolves to protect plaintiff. Following this meeting, Hakan recommended that Garafano meet with Cox to discuss the situation. On July 15, 1996, three days after the meeting between Anderson, Hakan and Garafano, Hakan met with plaintiff to discuss her sexual harassment complaints against Anderson. At that meeting plaintiff told Hakan that she felt Anderson had harassed her in the past but that she had always been able to do her job and that it was no longer a problem since Anderson’s supervisory role over her had ended. After the meeting, Hakan wrote a memo to recount what she had discussed with plaintiff. Plaintiff approved the memo. Following this meeting, plaintiff learned that Anderson had never learned about her earlier complaint. She then became dissatisfied with the way in which Cox had handled the matter. Plaintiff also found out that the City had only conducted one sexual harassment training workshop in 17 years. No training about gender discrimination had occurred during her employment. Cox bore responsibility for ensuring equal opportunities for women at the police department and stated in his deposition that the police department had a poor record of training its employees about gender-based discrimination. Cox stated that the department provided more training for dogs in the canine unit than discrimination training to protect women. Among the sworn officers, only one woman had ever achieved a rank above entry-level police officer. During Cox’s 17 years at the police department, five or six other women had filed harassment complaints but no one had been terminated for discrimination. After Anderson learned of plaintiffs disclosure, he spoke with Cox. Anderson was very angry with Cox because (1) Cox had not told him the real reason for terminating his supervision of plaintiff in 1994, and (2) Cox and Mitchell had not allowed him to assist in investigating the payroll record violations which had led to Coleman’s termination. Cox sent Garafano an e-mail on July 18, 1996, which stated “I’m not going to let [Anderson] take a fall on this deal ... I’m ultimately responsible for all that goes on here.” Exhibit C in Appendix To Plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 119) at 177:6-9. According to plaintiff, this remark demonstrates that Cox was intent on saving Anderson from any negative repercussions of plaintiffs harassment complaint. At his deposition Cox could not remember the context in which he made the remark or whether it was in response to Coleman’s falsification of payroll records or plaintiffs accusations of sexual harassment. Cox did tell plaintiff, however, that Anderson had learned of her earlier complaint and that he was very angry. Following Mitchell’s investigation of the Coleman hearing, but before Hakan completed her search of defendants’ e-mail logs, Mitchell believed that plaintiff had lied in both the Coleman hearing and the internal investigation. As a result, he recommended her termination. Hakan concurred, based on plaintiffs failure to be truthful and the fact that she had improperly shared another employee’s performance review. At the time of her recommendation, Hakan did not know how plaintiff had procured Coleman’s evaluation and she was unaware that it was available in a public file folder on the computer system which all employees had access to. Hakan’s department merely advises department heads whether they can or cannot discipline employees. Neither she nor Mitchell suggested that Whiles be punished or reprimanded in any way. On August 7, 1996, Hakan and Mitchell met with Cox and advised him of their recommendation to terminate plaintiff. A day later, on August 8, 1996, Cox gave plaintiff the option of resigning with two weeks pay or being fired for reviewing Coleman’s performance evaluation, discussing it with another employee, and not being truthful during the hearing about pulling up the report on Whiles’ computer. Hakan knew that Cox had issued this ultimatum but she did nothing to protect plaintiff. Defendants did not tell plaintiff the outcome of the Coleman investigation. At the time, Cox did not know whether plaintiff had sent Whiles an e-mail since Hakan had not completed the e-mail log investigation. Cox based part of his decision on Steenberger’s testimony, but Steenberger never saw Coleman’s evaluation on Whiles’ computer screen; she merely heard plaintiff and Whiles talking and saw plaintiff work at Whiles’ computer. Plaintiff insisted that she had done nothing wrong, but Cox told her that no matter what she said, she would be fired. Exhibit J in Appendix To Plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 119). Cox told plaintiff they were still investigating the conflicting testimony and if an e-mail was discovered as plaintiff alleged, she would still be fired for showing Coleman’s evaluation to Shirley Whiles, and if no e-mail were found, she would be fired for lying. Cox told plaintiff that “they” would find something because she had stepped on too many toes. WThen plaintiff said that it was not right and that she would sue, Cox told her that she would only be hurting herself. Cox also repeated his offer to have an affair with plaintiff and said that since plaintiff no longer worked at the department nobody could say anything about it. In his deposition, Cox characterized the conclusion of plaintiffs employment as “constructive termination” and said that plaintiff was forced to resign. During Cox’s deposition, plaintiffs counsel asked him if plaintiffs testimony and While’s testimony could be reconciled if plaintiff had sent Whiles an e-mail and then opened the e-mail on Whiles’ computer. Cox replied “[y]eah, that’s possible.” Exhibit C in Appendix To Plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 119) at 146:3. That scenario could be reconciled with the third-party eyewitness testimony, but plaintiff herself has never espoused it. Indeed it is directly contrary to plaintiffs testimony that she did not pull up anything on Whiles’ computer. Before plaintiff resigned, Cox wrote Hakan a memo which said that if Whiles had lied, “Shirley gets away unscathed and Donna has paid with her job.” Exhibit 15 to Exhibit D in Appendix To Plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 119). Cox also wrote plaintiff a letter after her resignation stating that she had paid a big price for the Coleman incident and possibly, their relationship and he hoped that she would forgive him. Anderson did not have any input or participate in the decision to terminate plaintiff. Plaintiff tendered her resignation on August 8, 1996 with an effective date of September 8, 1996. Plaintiff stated that she was resigning to move to Iowa with her husband. At the time, plaintiff had no intention of moving, but in November 1996 she and her husband did so. After plaintiffs resignation, on September 18, 1996, Cox sent Hakan. a letter which stated that there was bad blood between Anderson and plaintiff, likely because of Anderson’s affair with Keller. He said that the quickest way for the police department to end up in court would be for plaintiff to suspect that Anderson had been a catalyst for her Constructive discharge. Cox noted, however, that he did not know if there was any cause and effect relationship at issue. Cox also sent plaintiff a letter which said that he had gotten the dry heaves after she left and that Mitchell and Anderson had both warned him that he was getting too close to her. He also said that Garafano knew he had mishandled the entire Coleman controversy. Cox admitted that he had done a thousand things wrong, but that it was now too late and plaintiff had paid the big price. He said that he wanted to remain her friend, but he could not do so if he had to spill his guts to her. Finally, Cox asked plaintiff to forgive him. Defendants received a letter from their attorney on September 24, 1996 stating that Cox’s actions cost them ■ money and would strengthen plaintiffs case, and that Cox should be punished. Procedural Background On March 10, 1997, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Kansas Human Rights Commission (“KHRC”).' Plaintiff said that she felt threatened in her position because of Anderson’s attitude about attending to sick children and that she had complained to Cox about him; that Mitchell and Anderson had reprimanded her for taking smoke breaks with Cox; that defendants had harassed her due to her gender, subjected her to disparate treatment, and ultimately fired her for pursuing her rights; that Anderson learned of her earlier complaint when she gave testimony in an unrelated matter; and that after Anderson learned of the information, Cox gave plaintiff the ultimatum to either resign or be fired. Finally, plaintiff recited Cox’s statement told her that “they” would find some reason to fire her. She later received a 300-day letter from the KHRC and a “Right to Sue” letter from the EEOC. Plaintiff then filed her original complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. She filed her first amended complaint on February 25, 1999. The Western District of Missouri transferred the case to this Court and defendant filed its answer to plaintiffs complaint on January 12, 2000. Plaintiffs complaint alleges numerous incidents of sexual discrimination and harassment by Anderson, Mitchell and Cox throughout the course of her employment. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendants maintained a hostile work environment (Count I), engaged in disparate treatment and retaliated against plaintiff for filing a sexual harassment complaint (Count ID, and constructively discharged her from her employment (Count III). Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on all claims which involve Anderson because plaintiff did not timely file discrimination charges as to him. They also contend that plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies as to the hostile work environment and disparate treatment claims, since the EEOC charge only contained the date of plaintiffs termination and discussed Anderson’s conduct. Defendants further assert that summary judgment is appropriate for Count I, plaintiffs hostile work environment claim, because (1) Anderson’s pre 1994 conduct was not based on sex; (2) plaintiff did not believe that the harassment affected her employment and the harassment was not severe or pervasive; and (3) plaintiffs suit is barred under Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998), and Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998), since defendants had a reasonable policy in place to prevent harassing behavior but plaintiff did not utilize it. Plaintiff responds that any incidents which involve Anderson’s conduct outside the statutory period are actionable under the continuing violation doctrine, and that a reasonable EEOC investigation would have revealed her hostile work environment and disparate treatment claims. Moreover, plaintiff contends that defendants’ harassment was based upon sex, that she felt that it affected her employment, that a reasonable person would have felt that her work environment was objectively abusive or hostile, and that the Faragher defense is not applicable because she suffered a tangible employment action. Defendants assert that plaintiffs disparate treatment claims in Count II must fail because (1) plaintiff cannot establish a pri-ma facie case since defendants did not treat similarly situated males differently than they treated her; and (2) defendants had legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for their employment actions: they suspended plaintiff because she made an obscene gesture to a superior officer and they fired her because she lied during the Coleman hearing and subsequent internal investigation. Plaintiff responds that she does state a prima facie case since only women could have affairs with Cox, and that the stated reasons for any adverse employment actions are pretextual. Defendants contend that plaintiffs retaliation claim in Count II must fail because (1) plaintiff has not engaged in any statutorily protected activity since discrimination did not prompt her 1994 complaints and the pretrial order does not contain her 1996 complaints; (2) the record does not reveal a causal connection between any protected activity and plaintiffs termination; and (3) defendants had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to terminate plaintiff: she improperly shared a supervisor’s evaluation with another supervisor and lied about it in an internal investigation. Plaintiff contends that these reasons are pretextual. Defendants argue that Count III, plaintiffs constructive discharge claim, must fail because plaintiff resigned and defendants did not terminate her. Plaintiff contests this characterization of her decision to resign. In plaintiffs response to defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiff adds 222 new statements of uncontroverted fact. In their reply brief, defendants argued that these statements do not comport with D. Kan. Rule 56.1 and should be stricken from the record. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a sur-reply to defend her right to file these statements. See Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To File Sur-Reply To Defendants’ Reply To Plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 128) filed March 6, 2001. Defendants respond that their reply does not raise issues which warrant a sur-reply, that the sur-reply is unnecessary and will delay resolution of this matter, and that if plaintiff is allowed to file a sur-reply, defendants should get to file a sur-reply. See Defendants’ Objections To Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To File Sur-Reply To Defendants’ Reply To Plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doe. # 129) filed March 13, 2001. Finally, defendants contend that plaintiff waived her right to a jury trial since she has not served them with a separate jury demand. In separate motions, plaintiff seeks leave to amend her complaint to add a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and also seeks reconsideration of the pretrial order. Defendants respond that plaintiffs motion to amend is untimely and unduly prejudicial, and that plaintiffs motion for reconsideration is without merit. Summary Judgment Analysis Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1538-39 (10th Cir.1993). A factual dispute is “material” only if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A “genuine” factual dispute requires more than a mere scintilla of evidence. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Hicks v. City of Watonga, Okla., 942 F.2d 737, 743 (10th Cir.1991). Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate that genuine issues remain for trial “as to those disposi-tive matters for which it carries the burden of proof.” Applied Genetics Int’l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Secs., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir.1990); see also Mat-sushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87,106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir.1991). The nonmoving party may not rest on its pleadings but must set forth specific facts. Applied Genetics, 912 F.2d at 1241. The Court must view the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See Deepwater Invs., Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). Summary judgment may be granted if the non-moving party’s evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “In a response to a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rely on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on suspicion, and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will turn up at trial.” Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir.1988). Essentially, the inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52,106 S.Ct. 2505. I. Failure To Timely File Discrimination Charges Against Anderson Timely filing of a charge with the EEOC is a prerequisite to suit under Title VII. See Jones v. Runyon, 91 F.3d 1398, 1399 (10th Cir.1996); see also Nash v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., No. 97-2285, 1998 WL 230961 (D.Kan. April 14, 1998). To be in compliance, plaintiff must file an EEOC charge within 300 days of defendants’ allegedly unlawful action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); see also Harrell, 957 F.Supp. at 1219. Thus it is essential that plaintiffs complaint allege discriminatory acts within the statutory period. Defendants allege that all of plaintiffs discrimination claims as to Anderson are time-barred because they exclusively involve events which are outside the 300 day statute of limitations for EEOC/KHRC charges, i.e. (1) the actions in 1994 which precipitated plaintiffs complaint to Cox, and (2) his affair with Keller. Plaintiff concedes that “examining Anderson’s conduct in a vacuum” would lead to the conclusion that the pre 1995 allegations as to Anderson are time-barred. She argues, however, that Anderson’s conduct, coupled with that of Cox, constitutes a continuing violation which defeats the normal 300 day statutory limitation. Plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 118) at 49. The continuing violation doctrine permits a Title VII plaintiff to include allegations which occur outside the statutory time period if such incidents are sufficiently related to events within the limitations period, thereby constituting a continuing pattern of discrimination. See Mascheroni v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Cal, 28 F.3d 1554, 1560 (10th Cir.1994). The continuing violation doctrine “is premised on the equitable notion that the statute of limitations should not begin to run until a reasonable person would be aware that his or her rights have been violated.” Martin v. Nannie & the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1415 n. 6 (10th Cir.1993). Plaintiff can establish a continuing violation by showing either (1) a series of related acts taken against her, one of which falls within the statutory time period; or (2) “the maintenance of a company-wide policy of discrimination both before and during the limitations period.” Benhardt v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of the County of Wyan-dotte, 9 F.Supp.2d 1252, 1258 (D.Kan. 1998) (citations omitted). Though plaintiff states that the continuing violation doctrine allows all of her allegations to be incorporated, she does not specifically invoke either prong of the doctrine. She discusses the lack of gender discrimination awareness training and states that five or six other women lodged sexual harassment complaints while working for defendants. Her legal argument, however, addresses only the “related acts” prong. Under this prong, plaintiff must show that (1) at least one instance of the discriminatory practice occurred within the fifing period; and (2) the earlier acts were part of a continuing policy or practice that includes the act or acts within the statutory period. Id. at 1415. To establish a continuing violation, plaintiff must identify a discriminatory practice that falls within the limitations period. See Mascheroni, 28 F.3d at 1561. Plaintiff alleges the following incidents of discrimination within the statutory period: warnings by Mitchell and Anderson about plaintiffs relationship with Cox; Anderson’s possible role in her constructive discharge; plaintiffs one-day suspension for the breathalyser incident; Cox’s requests for an affair, Cox’s holding of plaintiffs hand and Cox’s comment on plaintiffs bra. As noted above, the conduct which led to plaintiffs written complaint against Anderson is outside the statutory period, as is Anderson’s affair with Keller. Plaintiff claims that in both respects, however, Anderson’s earlier conduct is part of a continuing violation because it and Cox’s relationship with plaintiff which occurred within the statutory period “relate to adulterous relationships in the workplace and attitudes toward women.” Plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 118) at 49. Defendants respond that since plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for her hostile work environment claims, she cannot boot strap her time-barred allegations against Anderson onto the hostile work environment claims. Having identified the material which is inside the statutory period, the Court must determine whether the earlier acts were part of a continuing practice that includes plaintiffs constructive discharge and Anderson’s possible role in it, as well as the warnings by Mitchell and Anderson. The Tenth Circuit has adopted a three-part test to determine whether multiple acts of discrimination are related and therefore constitute a continuing pattern of discrimination. This test requires the Court to consider (1) the subject matter of the alleged violations; (2) the frequency of the violations; and (3) the permanence of the violations. See Maseheron% 28 F.3d at 1561 (quoting Martin, 3 F.3d at 1415). No one factor, however, is decisive. See Holmes v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 176 F.3d 488, 1999 WL 285826, at *4 n. 3 (10th Cir. May 7,1999). 1. Subject Matter The subject matter prong of the continuing violation doctrine is not satisfied by merely stating that all the incidents of discrimination involve the same subject matter because they are all directed at women. Plaintiff must show that the type of discrimination outside the statutory period is the same as that within the time limitation. See Bailey, 941 F.Supp. at 1025 (subject matter prong met when all incidents involved sexual harassment of plaintiff); Martin, 3 F.3d at 1415 (same). Retaliation is a different type of discrimination than offensive comments and advances. See Benhardt, 9 F.Supp.2d at 1259. Under these standards, the Court concludes that plaintiffs claims outside the statutory period do not share subject matter with her claims inside the statutory period. (a) Relationship between the conduct which precipitated the 1994 complaint against Anderson and his warnings about plaintiffs relationship with Cox Plaintiff has not shown that the conduct which led to her written complaint against Anderson involves the same subject matter as his warnings to plaintiff about her relationship with Cox. Anderson’s earlier behavior concerned his supervision of plaintiffs work. His later warnings about plaintiffs relationship with Cox were unrelated to that role or to the subject matter of plaintiffs earlier complaint. Plaintiff does not show any connection between the two subjects. (b) Relationship between the conduct which precipitated the 1994 complaint against Anderson and plaintiffs constructive discharge (including Anderson’s possible role in it) Defendants argue that Anderson’s role in the constructive discharge is unsupported by admissible evidence, purely speculative and wholly dissimilar to plaintiffs 1994 complaint. The conduct which precipitated plaintiffs written complaint against Anderson in 1994 consisted of allegations that Anderson had penalized plaintiff for child care responsibilities, failed to support her decisions as a supervisor and stated that he did not like working with women. If such conduct constituted discrimination, it related to a hostile work environment. On this record, Anderson’s possible role in plaintiff’s constructive discharge would be retaliation. As mentioned above, retaliation is a different type of discrimination from offensive comment or disparate treatment, so the subject matter prong of the continuing violation test is not met for these allegations. (c) Relationship between the Anderson-Keller affair and Anderson’s warnings to plaintiff about her relationship with Cox Plaintiff has not shown that Anderson’s affair with Keller involved the same subject matter as his warnings about plaintiffs relationship with Cox. In Benhardt, this Court analyzed alleged incidents of discrimination using such criteria as whether the incidents involved offensive comments or advances “directed to plaintiff individually” or “directed at an entire group of individuals.” 9 F.Supp.2d at 1259. Although Anderson’s affair with Keller and his later warnings to plaintiff share the theme of adulterous behavior, any harmful effects of Anderson’s affair were shared by a group while Anderson’s warnings to plaintiff were directed to her alone. Anderson’s affair did not involve plaintiff in any way other than the fact she worked with him and Keller. Anderson did reprimand plaintiff for not telling him that her subordinates were gossiping about the affair, but the basis for the reprimand was a perceived lack of loyalty on plaintiffs part. Later, Anderson chastised plaintiff for maintaining a relationship with Cox which created the appearance of impropriety. Far from condoning a possible affair, as Anderson’s relationship with Keller might have indicated, Anderson actively discouraged the association between plaintiff and Cox. Plaintiff has not demonstrated any subject matter relationship between Anderson’s warnings to her and his own affair with Keller. (d) Relationship between the Anderson-Keller affair and plaintiffs constructive discharge (including Anderson’s possible role in it) Plaintiff has not demonstrated any subject matter connection between Anderson’s affair and her later constructive discharge. Defendants allegedly fired plaintiff because she had filed a complaint against Anderson in 1994. Even if Anderson’s affair created a hostile work environment for plaintiff, retaliation is a different type of discrimination than a hostile, working environment. (e)Relationship between the Anderson-Keller affair and/or Anderson’s conduct which precipitated plaintiffs 1994 complaint, and plaintiffs one day suspension Plaintiff does not advance any argument that her one day suspension following the breathalyser incident bears any subject. matter relationship to either Anderson’s affair with Keller or the conduct which precipitated the 1994 complaint. The Court cannot find any similar subject matter between these events. Thus the subject matter prong of the continuing violation test is not met. (f) Relationship between the Anderson-Keller affair and/or Anderson’s conduct which precipitated plaintiffs 1994 complaint, and Cox’s actions and behavior toward plaintiff. Anderson’s affair with Keller and Cox’s request for an affair with plaintiff present a closer case on the subject matter analysis. These events, however, are readily distinguishable. In and before 1989, Anderson had a consensual affair with another employee. In 1995 and 1996 Cox asked plaintiff on three occasions if she would like to have an affair. Though adultery or the prospect of adultery is present in both scenarios, they involve completely different actors, different time periods and different responses. For purposes of the continuing violation test, the relationships do not involve the same subject matter. The same is true of Anderson’s pre-1994 behavior and Cox’s dealings with plaintiff. Plaintiff does not allege that Cox failed to support her supervisory duties or chastised her for not working any overtime because she had a child — the major subject of her complaints against Anderson. 2. Frequency Of The Violations Plaintiff has not satisfied the frequency prong of the continuing violation test. Sporadic and unrelated incidents do not satisfy the frequency test. See Stapp v. Ovemite Transp. Co., 995 F.Supp. 1207, 1213 (D.Kan.1998) (five harassing comments in three years too sporadic to satisfy test). Plaintiff alleges that Anderson and Keller had an affair in the late 1980s, that Anderson was not a supportive supervisor, that Anderson and Mitchell made comments about the appearance of impropriety in the relationship between Cox and plaintiff, that Mitchell subjected her to disparate discipline following the breathalyser incident, that Anderson may have had a role in her constructive discharge, and that Cox asked her to have an affair. In Holmes, the Tenth Circuit found that the plaintiffs list of 15 alleged discriminatory remarks and actions “presented a list of sporadic and varying employer actions, not frequently recurring instances of similar race or age-related discriminatory conduct.” 1999 WL 285826, at *2^1. The Tenth Circuit has also held that observing one act of alleged harassment and hearing about another within the statutory period (a year after the harassment) constituted infrequent, isolated and discrete conduct that did “not rise to the level of a dogged pattern of discrimination.” Purrington v. Univ. of Utah, 996 F.2d 1025, 1028-29 (10th Cir.1993). Like Holmes, plaintiff has outlined a relatively few varying, sporadic and completely unrelated employer actions over her seven year tenure with defendants. The same people did not repeat the same course of conduct into the statutory period, over the period of plaintiffs employment. Plaintiffs facts are wholly inadequate to satisfy the frequency prong of the continuing violation test. 3. Permanence The permanence prong of the continuing violation test asks “whether the nature of the violations should trigger an employee’s awareness of the need to assert her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate.” Benhardt, 9 F.Supp.2d at 1260 (citing Martin, 3 F.3d at 1415). The EEOC charge clearly states that plaintiff complained about Anderson’s harassment and that Cox therefore removed Anderson from his role as plaintiffs supervisor. The fact that plaintiff filed a complaint with Cox establishes her awareness of the alleged harassing conduct. Plaintiff knew that she could complain to Cox again, if necessary. Plaintiff has not identified any permanent effect of Anderson’s conduct that extended into the statutory time period. Therefore plaintiff has not satisfied the permanence prong of the continuing violation test for either Anderson’s pre-1994 conduct or his affair with Keller. See also Bullington v. United Air Lines, 186 F.3d 1301, 1311 (10th Cir.1999) (complaint of sex discrimination to hiring personnel illustrated that plaintiff had sufficient notice to file claim and could not use continuing violation doctrine). For all these reasons, Anderson’s conduct before 1994, including his affair with Keller, is outside the statutory period and does not fall within the continuing violation exception to the statutory period for purposes of plaintiffs discrimination claims. The only claims as to Anderson that are within the statutory period are the warnings about plaintiffs relationship with Cox and the hypothetical role which he might have played in plaintiffs termination. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on any claims as to Anderson’s conduct which occurred outside the 300-day period of limitations. II. Failure To Exhaust Administrative Remedies Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to any hostile work environment or disparate treatment claim because her EEOC charge relates only to the date of the constructive discharge and the conduct of Anderson that might have led to her discharge. See Harrell v. Spangler, Inc., 957 F.Supp. 1215, 1219 (D.Kan.1997); Gulley v. Orr, 905 F.2d 1383, 1384 (10th Cir.1990). The exhaustion requirement serves two purposes: to give notice of the alleged violation to the respondent, and to give the EEOC an opportunity to conciliate the claim, effectuating Title VU’s goal of securing voluntary compliance. See In-gels v. Thiokol Corp., 42 F.3d 616, 625 (10th Cir.1994) (citations omitted). “Allowing a complaint to encompass allegations outside the ambit of the predicate charge would circumvent the administrative agency’s investigatory and conciliatory role as well as deprive the charged party [of] notice of the charge.” Harrell, 957 F.Supp. at 1219 (quoting Jensen v. Board of County Comm’rs, 636 F.Supp. 293, 298 CD.Kan.1986)). Defendants assert that plaintiffs EEOC charge covers only the date and conduct surrounding plaintiffs constructive discharge and Anderson’s alleged retaliation. Defendants conclude that plaintiffs hostile work environment and disparate treatment claims are therefore precluded for failure to exhaust. See Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 88) filed September 22, 2000 at 15. Plaintiff argues that a liberal construction of her charge would lead to a conclusion that she sufficiently included Cox’s conduct since she stated that Cox constructively terminated her and she makes a general allegation of hostile work environment due to gender. This factual account, plaintiff argues, sufficiently put defendants on notice that Cox’s actions might be at issue in this matter. As an initial matter, plaintiffs charge can be liberally construed to cover more than a claim for retaliation. It seeks relief under Title VII for “Hostile Environment, [Retaliation and Constructive Discharge.” Exhibit A in Plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 118) filed January 16, 2001 at 4. In addition, it clearly states that plaintiff “was subjected to disparate treatment.” Exhibit K in Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. #88) at 23. The Court therefore rejects defendants’ arguments that plaintiffs charge precludes her hostile work environment and disparate treatment claims. Defendants also argue that summary judgment is proper as to plaintiffs hostile work environment claim because the EEOC charge only discusses Anderson’s conduct, and not that of Cox or any other member of the police department. The Court disagrees. Though defendants assert that plaintiffs EEOC charge implicates only Anderson, it explicitly names Mitchell. It does not allege any incident in which Cox treated plaintiff inappropriately, but allegations as to Cox may be included in plaintiffs lawsuit under Title VII if they are “reasonably related” to the allegations listed in the charge. Ar- amburu v. Boeing, 112 F.3d 1398, 1409 (10th Cir.1997) (citing Brown v. Harts-home Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 864 F.2d 680, 682 (10th Cir.1988)). “[Consideration of complaints not expressly included in an EEOC charge is appropriate where the conduct alleged would fall within the scope of an EEOC investigation which would reasonably grow out of the charges actually made.” Martin, 3 F.3d at 1416 n. 7. Plaintiffs EEOC complaint asserts that sex discrimination tainted her career with the police department, that Cox told plaintiff that their “friendship” had prompted her constructive discharge, and that Anderson and Mitchell told plaintiff that her relationship with Cox gave the appearance of impropriety. A reasonable investigation would have necessarily examined the relationship between Cox and plaintiff and thereby uncovered Cox’s three requests for an affair. Although plaintiff could have been more explicit in naming Cox, her EEOC charge contains sufficient allegations to support a Title VII hostile work environment claim as to Cox as well as Mitchell and Anderson (who are named participants in the EEOC charge), and as to plaintiffs disparate treatment claim. III. Count I: Hostile Work Environment Claim In order to successfully state a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) the conduct in question was unwelcome; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive working environment; and (5) some basis exists for imputing liability to the employer. See Bailey v. West, 941 F.Supp. 1023, 1026 (D.Kan.1996); Eichenwald v. Krigel’s Inc., 908 F.Supp. 1531, 1539 (D.Kan.1995). Plaintiff must show that sexually-oriented conduct had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with her work performance or created an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. See Martin, 3 F.3d at 1418. A. Whether Alleged Harassment Was Based On Sex Defendants argue that plaintiffs claim as to Anderson is barred because his 1994 comments were not sexual in nature or gender specific. In making this argument, defendants address Anderson’s affair and the conduct which precipitated plaintiffs complaint in 1994. The Court has held that these matters are outside the statutory period and are not within the continuing violation exception to the statute of limitations. Defendants’ argument is therefore moot. B. Effect Of Alleged Harassment On Plaintiffs Employment In order to survive summary judgment, plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that “(1) the alleged harassing conduct was severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment, and (2) plaintiff subjectively perceived the environment to be abusive.” Coker v. Ball Janitor Serv., Inc., 208 F.3d 225, 2000 WL 305487, at *4 (10th Cir. Mar.24, 2000) (citations omitted). Defendants first argue that plaintiff cannot meet the subjective prong of this test. In order to prevail on the subjective component of this test, the law does not require a plaintiff to show that the dis-criminatorily abusive work environment seriously affected her psychological well-being, Harris, 510 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. 367, or that it tangibly impaired her work performance, id. at 25, 114 S.Ct. 367 (Sca-lia, J., concurring). Likewise it does not require that she quit or wanted to quit the employment in question. Davis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 142 F.Sd 1334, 1341 (10th Cir.1998). Defendants argue that plaintiff fails the subjective prong of the test because she has “steadfastly asserted that she was never unable to do her job because of any sexual intimidation, request, comment or innuendo ... and denied that her work environment was in any way affected by actions of Chief Cox.” Defendant City Of Leawood’s Reply To Plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 125) filed February 15, 2001 at 29. Defendants emphasize that plaintiff considered Cox a friend up to the time of her forced resignation, voluntarily socialized with him and denied that his actions affected her work environment. Plaintiff contends that she has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact whether she subjectively considered her environment to be hostile and abusive. She told Cox that his comment about her bra made her uncomfortable, that his behavior made her “[s]exually uncomfortable” and that “[i]t was unwarranted, it was unwanted.” Exhibit B in Appendix To Plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 119) at 83:1-2. When Cox took plaintiff to the grocery store and kissed her good-bye, she told him “Don’t do this, please.” Exhibit B in Appendix To Plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 119) at 84-85. Plaintiff was uncomfortable because she felt that Cox wanted something in return for taking her to the store in bad weather. Plaintiff did not report this or other behavior because “[gjoing over the chief of police’s head is putting your head on a chopping block as far as your career is concerned ... as long as I was able to keep him in check, I wasn’t going to [Hakan].” Id. at 82:19-23. This evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact whether plaintiff perceived her working environment to be abusive. Under Davis, an employee need not quit her job or show that her work suffered in order to raise a triable issue of fact whether she perceived her work environment to be abusive. 142 F.3d at 1341. A genuine issue of material fact can be raised if the employee states that her workplace made her stressed out, that the she hated the harasser’s behavior and that it shocked her, and that she wanted to avoid the situation. See id. at 1342; Coker, 2000 WL 305487, at *6 (similar facts to this case, but subjectively hostile work environment not found because plaintiff did not tell supervisor that advances were unwelcome). Defendants also claim that their conduct was not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment and that they are entitled to summary judgment on the objective prong of the test. This prong analyzes whether the severity or pervasiveness of the alleged harassment created an objectively hostile or abusive work environment. See Coker, 2000 WL 305487, at *4. Defendants argue that “casual or isolated manifestations of discriminatory conduct, such as a few sexual comments or slurs, may not support a cause of action.” Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 88) at 20 (citing Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 883 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir.1987)). The effect of the alleged discriminatory conduct on plaintiffs working environment can only be determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances present in the workplace, including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). The Court must consider whether “the harassing conduct [is] sufficiently severe [such] that a reasonable person would find the work environment hostile or abusive.” Smith v. Norwest Financial Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408,1413 (10th Cir.1997). Plaintiff alleges that the following events within the statutory time period made her environm