Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DE MENT, District Judge. Before the court is a “Motion to Dismiss, For Judgment on the Pleadings, or in the Alternative for Full or Partial Summary Judgment,” and Memorandum Brief in Support Thereof (“Defs.’ Mem.Br.”), submitted by Defendants Houston County Department of Human Resources, Lucia B. Parsons, and Donna Jones Bowman on October 6, 1995. Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition (“Pis.’ Mem. in Opp.”) on December 12,1995, wherein Plaintiffs also request partial summary judgment against Defendant Jones [Bowman] for her liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants filed a Reply to Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition (“Defs.’ Reply”) on January 12, 1996. After carefully considering the arguments of counsel, the relevant law and the record as a whole, the court finds that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is due to be denied in part and granted in part, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is due to be denied, and Defendants’ remaining Motions are due to be denied as moot. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs, who are Native American residents of Houston County, Alabama, commenced this action on May 11,1995, by filing a Complaint against numerous Defendants, including law enforcement officials in Houston County, the Houston County Commission, the Houston County Department of Human Resources (“Houston County DHR”), and Lucia Parsons and Donna Jones Bowman who at all times relevant to this action were employees of Houston County DHR. Lucia Parsons was at all times relevant to this action the County Director of the Houston County Department of Human Resources. Plaintiffs’ original Complaint asserted claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1983 and the laws and Constitution of the State of Alabama. On July 7, 1995, in response to a June 13, 1995 Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Houston County DHR, Parsons, and Bowman, this court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing with prejudice: (1) Plaintiffs’ claims against Houston County DHR and Defendants Bowman and Parsons in their official capacities; (2) Plaintiffs’ supplemental state law and Alabama Constitutional monetary damages claims against the Houston County DHR and Defendants Bowman and Parsons in their official capacities. The court dismissed Plaintiffs remaining § 1983 claims without prejudice and granted Plaintiffs’ leave to file an amended complaint in conformity with the Memorandum Opinion and Order. Further, the court reserved ruling on Defendants’ qualified immunity and substantive immunity defenses pending a response by Plaintiffs to the court’s Order that they “show cause” why Defendants Bowman and Parsons in their individual capacities are not entitled to qualified and substantive immunity for the § 1983 and state claims. Finally, the court Ordered the Plaintiffs to provide the court with authority that would allow the court to hear a claim for state constitutional violations asserted against Bowman and Parsons in their individual capacities and to identify the specific sections and subsections of the Alabama Constitution forming the basis of Plaintiffs’ Alabama State Constitutional claims. Ross v. State of Ala., 893 F.Supp. 1545, 1556 (M.D.Ala.1995). On September 6, 1995, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, wherein Plaintiffs allege claims against the various Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983,1985(3), and 1988, as well as Article I, Sections 1, 6, and 22 of the Alabama State Constitution, and other state law. The factual basis of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint stems from events occurring on or about May 11, 1993. Plaintiffs allege that at on that date, Defendant Jerry Hunt, an officer of the Houston County, Alabama Sheriffs Department, unlawfully entered the Plaintiffs’ residence without consent, a search warrant or probable cause that an offense had been committed. Plaintiffs further aver that later the same day Hunt and Defendant Leroy Wood, also an officer of the Houston County Sheriffs Department, and Defendant Bowman: (1) entered Plaintiffs’ residence knowing that voluntary permission to enter had not been granted (Amend.Compl.t 32); (2) detained Plaintiff Jennifer Ross and the minor children Jessica Ross, Selina Ross and Jarred Paul Dakota Son of Two Nations Ban-ta (Amend.ComplJ 32); (3) informed Plaintiff Jennifer Ross that the minor children would be removed from the home and taken into custody (Amend.ComplA 34); and (4) required that a relative, Plaintiff Debbie Woods, take the minor children into her physical custody and remove them to the State of Florida, knowing that no court order or order granting temporary protective custody for the State of Alabama existed. (Amend.Compl.lffl 37, 38.) Plaintiffs further allege that the Plaintiff minor children remained in Woods’ physical custody in the state of Florida for approximately one to two months, where after the Plaintiff adults moved to the State of Georgia and the Plaintiff minor children returned to their parents. (Amend. Comply 40.) Plaintiffs allege that none of the requirements of Alabama Code § 26-14-1, et seq., nor DHR regulations and procedures were complied with prior to the Plaintiff minor children being taken into the custody of Plaintiff Debbie Woods. (Amend Compl. ¶44.) Specifically, Plaintiffs contend, inter alia: (1) they never received notice, either verbal or written, that a complaint of child neglect had been lodged against them, (Compl.¶ 43); (2) no written investigative report was completed, (Compl.¶ 46); and (3) DHR conducted no home study regarding the placement of the children into the physical custody of Debbie Woods. (Amend. Comply 49.) ' Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Parsons, the County Director of the Houston County DHR, assigned Plaintiffs’ case to Defendant Bowman, a caseworker within DHR. (Amend. Comply 42.) According to Plaintiffs, Defendant Parsons was aware of Defendant Bowman’s failure to follow the relevant Alabama Code provisions and DHR regulations, and nevertheless failed to take corrective measures, provide adequate training or take disciplinary action against Bowman. (Amend. CompLIfii 52, 53.) The Complaint alleges that the Houston County DHR, Bowman and Parsons, among others, deprived Plaintiffs of various constitutional rights. Specifically, the Amended Complaint alleges that Bowman and Parsons violated Plaintiffs’ rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Amend.ComplA 59a); Plaintiffs’ rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them,' pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments (Amend. Comply 59b); Plaintiffs’ rights not to be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, and the right to equal protection of the laws, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment (Amend.ComplA 59c); Plaintiffs’ rights to privacy in their home, pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, Section 5 of the Alabama Constitution (Amend.ComplJ 59d); Plaintiffs’ rights to be free from invasion of the familial right to privacy between parents and their children as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment (Amend.Compl.f 59e); and minor Plaintiffs’ rights to be free from the state’s restraint of their individual liberty without providing for their basic human needs, e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety, as secured for them under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment. (Amend.Compl.t 59f). Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiffs of said Constitutional rights, because Plaintiffs were American Indians, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). (Amend. Compl.¶ 60.). Additionally, plaintiffs allege various state tort claims, including outrage, negligence, assault, and false imprisonment, as well as violations of various provisions of the Alabama Constitution. Defendants Houston County DHR, Parsons, and Bowman request that the court dismiss or grant summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims against them. Plaintiffs request that the court grant partial summary judgment against Defendant Bowman. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must assume that the factual allegations in the complaint are true. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Assuming that the facts are true, a complaint may be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) only “if it is clear that no relief could be granted” under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the movant “sustains a very high burden.” Jackam v. Hospital Corp. of America Mideast, Ltd., 800 F.2d 1577, 1579 (11th Cir.1986) (citing Currie v. Cayman Resources Corp., 595 F.Supp. 1364, 1376 (N.D.Ga.1984)). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that “motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be denied unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claims.” Jackam, 800 F.2d at 1579 (quoting Bracewell v. Nicholson Air Servs., Inc., 680 F.2d 103, 104 (11th Cir.1982)). DISCUSSION I.Defendant Houston County DHR Defendant Houston County DHR urges the court to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims against it, on grounds that the court’s July 6, 1995 Memorandum Opinion and Order previously addressed Plaintiffs’ claims against this Defendant, and found that all claims were due to be dismissed with prejudice. See Ross, 893 F.Supp. at 1556. In response to Defendant Houston County DHR’s Motion, Plaintiffs state that they, in fact, bring no claims against Houston County DHR in their Amended Complaint, but rather list Houston County DHR as a Party simply to be consistent and to prevent confusion. (Pis.’ Mem. in Opp. at 6.) As the court has previously dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Houston County DHR with prejudice, and Plaintiffs state that they bring no claims against this Defendant in their Amended Complaint, the court finds that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Houston County DHR is due to be denied as moot. Further, the court directs the Clerk of the Court to remove said Defendant from the caption of this case. II. Defendants Bowman and Parsons in their Official Capacities Defendants Bowman and Parsons urge the court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against them in their official capacities, as all such claims were dismissed by this court in its July 9, 1995 Memorandum Opinion and Order. See Ross, 893 F.Supp. at 1556. Plaintiffs acknowledge this previous dismissal, and state that their Amended Complaint brings claims against Bowman and Parsons in their individual capacities only. (Pls’.Mem. in Opp. at 6, 18.) Hence, the court finds that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Parsons and Bowman in their official capacities is due to be denied as moot. III. Defendants Parsons and Jones in their Individual Capacities A. State Constitutional Claims Plaintiffs concede that there is no state remedy against individuals for violations of the Alabama State Constitution. (Pis.’ Mem. in Opp. at 7, 8.) Hence, the court finds that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is due to be granted with respect to Plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims against Defendants Bowman and Parsons in their Individual capacities. B. Jp2 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims Defendants Bowman and Parsons urge the court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims on numerous grounds, including failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and qualified immunity. Before addressing Defendants’ qualified immunity defense, the court must first determine whether Plaintiffs have alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, — U.S.-,-n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1714 n. 5, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). Once making this determination, the court will address Defendants’ qualified immunity defense. Id. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants Parsons and Bowman deprived them of numerous constitutional rights as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code creates a mechanism for recovering monetary damages from and securing injunctive relief against governmental actors and entities whose action(s) under color of state or local law deprive a plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution or federal statutes. Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; rather, it provides a remedy for deprivation of federal rights established elsewhere. See Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 934 (11th Cir.1989). Thus, in considering a Motion to Dismiss, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has asserted a cognizable claim under § 1983. See Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1564 (11th Cir.1994). To state a claim for relief, § 1983 litigants have the burden of alleging two elements with some factual detail: “(1) that they suffered a deprivation of ‘rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States,” and (2) that a person “acting under color of law” caused the deprivation, either by an act or omission. Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir.1987) (citation omitted). In the court’s previous Memorandum Opinion and Order in this case, the court found Plaintiffs to have satisfactorily pled that Defendants Bowman and Parsons acted under color of state law. Ross, 893 F.Supp. at 1553. However, the court found that Plaintiffs failed to fulfill the heightened pleading requirement in alleging deprivations of underlying constitutional rights. Id. at 1554. The court instructed Plaintiffs to allege with specificity both the material facts upon which they base their claims, and the specific provisions of each constitutional amendment Defendants allegedly violated. Id. at 1554. As stated, once the court has determined whether Plaintiffs state a cognizable constitutional claim, the court must assess whether Defendants Bowman and Parsons are entitled to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court of the United States has held “that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). This circuit uses a two-step analysis to determine whether qualified immunity is available. First, the defendant must show that she acted within the scope of her discretionary authority. See Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1545 (11th Cir.1995). Once the defendant has so shown, the plaintiff must show that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Id. A government official acts within her discretionary authority if the actions were (1) “undertaken pursuant to the performance of [her] duties” and (2) “within the scope of [her] authority.” Lenz, 51 F.3d at 1545 (quoting Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir.1988)). The determination that an officer was acting within her discretionary authority is a “low hurdle” to clear. Godby v. Montgomery Co. Bd. of Educ., 996 F.Supp. 1390, 1400 (M.D.Ala.1998) (Albritton, J.) (citing Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559 (11th Cir.1994)). Once this determination has been made: plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the federal rights allegedly violated were clearly established.... This burden is not easily discharged: “that qualified immunity protects government actors is the usual rule; only in exceptional cases will government actors have no shield against claims made against them in their individual capacities.” Plaintiffs cannot carry their burden of proving the law to be clearly established by stating constitutional rights in general terms. Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 1528, 1532 (11th Cir.1996) (quoting Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir.1994)). In fact, the Eleventh Circuit has held: The most common error we encounter [in qualified immunity cases], as a reviewing court, occurs on this point: courts must not permit plaintiffs to discharge their burden [of proving the violation of a clearly established right] by referring to general rules and to the violation of abstract “rights.” Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1150. “Instead, for qualified immunity to be denied, ‘pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel ... the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what defendant is doing violates federal law in the circumstances.’ (additional quotation omitted)” Flores v. Satz, 137 F.3d 1275, 1277 (11th Cir.1998) (quoting McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1562, amended on other grounds, 101 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir.1996)). Here, Plaintiffs allege violations of the following constitutional rights: (1) Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; (2) Plaintiffs’ Sixth Amendment rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them; (3) Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights not to be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; (4) Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection of the laws; (5) Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights to privacy in their home; (6) Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from invasion of the familial right to privacy between parents and their children; and (7) Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment rights to be free from the state’s restraint of their individual liberty without providing for their basic human needs, e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety. The court will now address each of the substantive constitutional violations alleged in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint to determine whether they sufficiently state a claim. Where the court determines that Plaintiffs’ allegations sufficiently allege a constitutional violation, the court will then determine whether Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. 1. Defendant Bowman a. Fourth Amendment Right to be Free from Unreasonable Search and Seizure Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Bowman violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege: Without search or arrest warrants or other legal process directing or authorizing a search or investigation and without prior permission to enter or search the premises, defendant ] [Bowman], knowing that voluntary permission to enter had not been granted, and that entry was being made under the threat of arrest, entered and searched each of the plaintiffs’ residences and detained plaintiff, Jennifer Ross, and the minor children, Jessica Ross, Selina Ross and Jarred Paul Dakota Son of Two Nations Banta, at their residence. (Amend.ComplJ 32.) The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. 4. The Fourth Amendment’s protection “unquestionably extends beyond criminal investigations to civil and administrative contexts.” Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1548 n. 7 (11th Cir.1995) (citing Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 66 n. 11, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)). It is well-settled that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment, absent exigent circumstances. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Lenz, 51 F.3d at 1548. Accordingly, assuming the facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint are true, the court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a Fourth Amendment violation against Defendant Bowman. However, the court finds that Defendant Bowman is nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity on this claim, as Plaintiffs have failed to show that a reasonable person in Defendant Bowman’s position would have known that she was imposing on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. In making this determination, the court notes the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540 (11th Cir.1995). In that case, a child’s grandparents brought a § 1983 action against a social worker for allegedly violating their Fourth Amendment rights when the social worker entered their house and retrieved some belongings of the child when the child was being removed from her father’s custody after an investigator for the Florida Department of Health and Human Services concluded that the child was being abused. Lenz, 51 F.3d at 1543, 1550. First, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the social worker was acting within her discretionary authority when she entered the home and collected the child’s personal belongings, as Florida law permits state social workers to take children into protective custody if an investigator determines it necessary to protect the child. Lenz, 51 F.3d at 1551. Then, the Eleventh Circuit examined whether the social worker violated a clearly established right by entering the plaintiffs’ home and seizing some of the child’s belongings. Lenz, 51 F.3d at 1551. In finding that the social worker was entitled to qualified immunity, the court stated: The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches. Unreasonableness is determined by a case-by-case balancing of the state’s interests against the individual’s. (citations omitted) In the Fourth Amendment context, therefore, the law of qualified immunity provides that [the social worker] need not predict whether the interest of the state in retrieving personal effects for a child’s comfort will be deemed to outweigh the privacy interests of the suspected abusers. Neither must she err on the side of caution and assume that such searches are unreasonable. See Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1149. Lenz, 51 F.3d at 1551-52. Hence, the Eleventh Circuit found that the defendant social worker was entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim. Id. Under Alabama law, DHR, its agents and employees have wide-ranging duties and responsibilities where there are reports that a child’s welfare is in jeopardy. For example, DHR is charged with making investigations upon oral or written reports of child abuse, Ala.Code § 26-14-7 (1975), and DHR is authorized to take a child into protective custody initially and without the consent of the child’s parents if the circumstances are such that continuing custody with the parents presents an imminent danger to the child’s life or health. Ala.Code § 26-14-6 (1975); Foy, 94 F.3d at 1530. The court finds that, here, Defendant Bowman’s decisions concerning the Plaintiff minor children’s care involved the exercise of her professional judgment and discretion. Hence, the court finds , that her actions were within the scope of her discretionary authority when she allegedly engaged in the actions asserted by Plaintiffs. Assuming that Plaintiffs’ allegations concerning Defendant Bowman’s actions are true, here, as in Lenz, the state’s social worker was obligated, under state law, to assess the validity of reports concerning the Plaintiff minor children’s welfare and to take appropriate action. Lenz, 51 F.3d at 1551. In light of Lenz and absent any case law cited by Plaintiffs to the contrary, the court finds that it is not sufficiently clear that the Fourth Amendment prohibits as unreasonable entries such as Defendant Bowman’s, nor is it sufficiently clear that Defendant’s alleged “detainment” of the Plaintiff minor children was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the court finds that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Bowman with respect to her § 1983 claims for Fourth Amendment violations is due to be granted. b. Violations of Plaintiffs’ Sixth Amendment Rights to be Informed of the Nature of the Accusation Against them Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Bowman failed to inform Plaintiffs of the nature and causes of action against them and took action against them without arrest or formal charges being brought, in violation of the Sixth Amendment. (Amend. Compl.t 32-40.) The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires that in every criminal prosecution the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him or her. U.S. Const, amend VI. Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant Bowman caused Plaintiffs to be criminally prosecuted. Indeed, Plaintiffs were not arrested. Plaintiffs fail to cite to any authority to support a Sixth Amendment claim in this context. Hence, the court finds that Plaintiffs fail to state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Sixth Amendment, and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on this claim is due to be granted. See GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir.1998). c. Plaintiffs’ Due Process Rights Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Bowman deprived them of their due process rights, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Amend.Compl^ 59c). Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Bowman violated their due process rights by failing to follow the mandates of Alabama Code section 26-14-1, et seq. (Pis.’ Mem. in Opp. at 13 (citing Amend Compl. ¶¶ 32-40; 43-45; 48-52)). Ala.Code § 26-14-1, et seq. provides for procedures for investigating and reporting allegations of child abuse, as well as procedures that are to be followed prior to taking a child into protective custody. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in “life, liberty or property” without the due process of law. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). The Due Process clause provides two different kinds of constitutional protections: procedural due process and substantive due process. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir.1994). Substantive due process protects those rights that are “fundamental,” that is, rights contemplated by the Federal Constitution as “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Id. at 1556. Areas in which substantive due process rights are created only by state law are not subject to substantive due process protection under the Due Process clause, but rather procedural due process. Id. at 1556. Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant violated both their substantive and procedural due process rights by failing to follow the mandates of Ala.Code § 26-17-1 et seq. (Pis.’ Mem. in Opp. at 13.) Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Bowman failed to follow the relevant procedures prior to placing the plaintiff minor children into the physical custody of Debbie Woods. (Amend.Compl^ 49.) The court construes Plaintiffs’ Complaint to allege that Defendant’s failure to follow these procedures deprived them of substantive due process rights in that said failure resulted in a loss of liberty. Plaintiffs fail to state, however, what liberty interest they were deprived of. Paragraph 59e of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint asserts that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ right “to be free from invasion in the familial right to privacy between parents and their children as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Amend. Comply 59e.) The court construes this as a claim of deprivation of Plaintiffs’ substantive liberty interest in family privacy. Further, Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts .that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ rights to be free from the state’s restraint of their individual liberty without providing for their basic human needs, “as is secured for them under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.” (Amend.Compl.1[.59f.) For the reasons stated, infra, the court construes this assertion as a claim of violation of Plaintiffs’ substantive liberty interests, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, as well. The court will address the viability of each of these substantive due process claims later in its discussion. The court now turns to Plaintiffs’ claim of deprivation of procedural due process. To prevail on a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty or property; (2) governmental deprivation of that interest; and (B) the constitutional inadequacy of procedures accompanying the deprivation. Bank of Jackson County v. Cherry, 980 F.2d 1362, 1366 (11th Cir.1993). The sine qua non of a due process claim is that the plaintiff has a recognized “life, liberty, or property” interest within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Thus, the threshold inquiry for the court is whether Plaintiffs state a deprivation of a recognized interest. Again, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Bowman deprived them of their life, liberty or property interests by failing to adequately follow the requirements of Ala. Code § 26-17-1, et seq. (Amend.Compl. ¶ 59c.) The Eleventh Circuit has stated that where a comprehensive child welfare statute creates a legitimate and sufficiently vested claim of entitlement, children may state a procedural due process claim based upon a deprivation of a liberty interest when officials fail to follow the law’s mandates. Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 799 (11th Cir.1987) (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 572, 92 S.Ct. 2701). The court must look to state law to determine whether the statutes at issue “indicate an intention to bestow benefits upon children placed by the state in foster homes,” such that these benefits give rise to a legitimate and vested claim of entitlement for procedural due process purposes. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 798. The legislative purpose for enacting the Child Abuse Reporting Act, Ala.Code § 26-14-1 et seq., is as follows: In order to protect children whose health and welfare may be adversely affected through abuse and neglect, the legislature hereby provides for the reporting of such cases to the appropriate authorities. It is the intent of the legislature that, as a result of such efforts, and through the cooperation of state, county, local agencies and divisions of government, protective services shall be made available in an effort to prevent further abuses and neglect, to safeguard and enforce the general welfare of such children, and to encourage cooperation among the states in dealing with the problems of child abuse. Ala.Code § 26-14-2 (1975); C.B. v. Bobo, 659 So.2d 98, 101 (Ala.1995). The Alabama Supreme Court has held that the Child Abuse Reporting Act does not confer a private right of action for any breach of duty to report child abuse or neglect, as imposed by the statute, C.B., 659 So.2d at 102. Hence, it would appear that Ala.Code 26-14-1 et seq. does not create an entitlement for the children effected for purposes of stating a procedural due process claim. In so far as Plaintiffs attempt to state a claim for the deprivation of the Plaintiff minor children’s procedural due process rights, the court finds that such claims must fail. However, Plaintiffs also appear to attempt to state a claim for the violation of the parent’s procedural due process rights, rather than the children’s due process rights. Hence, the court must determine whether Ala.Code § 26-14-1 et seq. entitles the Plaintiff parents to any procedural protections. In Farina v. City of Tampa, 874 F.Supp. 383 (M.D.Fla.1994), the district court found that city police officers violated a plaintiffs’ due process rights when they returned a child to its biological mother without conducting a pre-deprivation hearing pursuant to Florida law. In that case, the court determined that the plaintiffs stated a procedural due process claim because they had a liberty interest entitlement under a relevant Florida statute. Farina, 874 F.Supp. at 385. Specifically, the court found that the Florida statute at issue “clearly indicates an intent on the part of the legislature to afford certain rights to persons with physical custody. Pursuant to the statute, Plaintiffs were entitled to reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before Defendants determined that [the child] should be placed in [his mother’s] custody.” Farina, 874 F.Supp. at 386. Thus, the court found that there existed a liberty interest with which the state interfered, thus satisfying the first prong of a prima facie claim for procedural due process. Farina, 874 F.Supp. at 386. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has indicated that individuals are entitled to certain procedural protections prior to being investigated for child abuse. In H.R. v. State Dep’t of Human Resources, 612 So.2d 477, 479 (Ala.Civ.App.1992), the court stated that: The legislature in enacting § 26-14-7 provided for an investigation of written or oral reports of abuse or dependency of children. It provided that the investigation may include an examination of the home where the child resides and an interview with the child in the home. It recognized that permission from the person responsible for the child is to be obtained before the examination or interview. It is to be logically assumed that in the great majority of such investigations, permission for entry to the home is not denied. However, if such denial occurs, as in this case, the legislature, aware of the right of privacy of a person’s home and the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, ¶ 5 of the Alabama Constitution ... provided a proper solution to the problem of such denial. The legislature said “if admission to the home ... cannot be obtained, then a court of competent jurisdiction, upon cause shown, shall order the parents ... to allow ... the investigation.” H.R., 612 So.2d at 479. Subsequent to this decision by the Alabama Court of Appeals, the Alabama legislature enacted Ala.Code § 26-14-7.1, which delineates specific “due process” rights for those accused of abuse and neglect. Ala.Code § 26-14-7.1 (1975) (1997 Supp.). These include rights to written notice, and the right to a hearing. Id. Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiffs have stated a deprivation of the Plaintiff parents’ recognized liberty interest sufficient to state a procedural due process claim. However, in assessing the validity of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim, the court’s inquiry does not rest here. “In procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in ‘life, liberty, or property’ is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). A constitutional violation claim under § 1983 is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due process. Id. Hence, the court must next determine whether Plaintiffs have alleged that the procedures attendant upon their liberty deprivation were constitutionally adequate; such a determination must examine the procedural safeguards built into the statutory or administrative procedure at issue, and any remedies for erroneous deprivations provided by statute or tort law. Id. Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Bowman deprived them or their procedural due process rights by failing to follow the mandates of Ala.Code § 26-14-1, et seq. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Bowman: (1) informed Plaintiff Jennifer Ross that the Plaintiff minor children would be removed from the home and taken into custody, absent a court order being obtained (Amend.Compl.t 34); and (2) required Plaintiff Debbie Woods to take the Plaintiff minor children into her physical custody and move them to the state of Florida, absent any court order of temporary or protective custody. (Amend.ComplA 37). Plaintiffs contend that the children remained with Woods for approximately one to two months. (Amend. Compl-¶ 40.) Plaintiffs further contend that they never received notice, either verbal or written, that a complaint of neglect of the children had been lodged against them, (Amend.ComplA 43), despite the fact that Alabama law requires that the Defendants investigate and file a written report of such allegations, and that the Defendants may only remove the Plaintiff minor children for “cause shown.” (Amend.ComplA 44.) Further, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Bowman failed to complete a written investigative report or compile written recommendations, pursuant to the mandates of Ala.Code § 26-14-1 et seq., and failed to conduct a home study or obtain any type of court order prior to placing the children in the physical custody of Debbie Woods. (Amend. Compl.lffl 45-51.) The court finds that, despite these allegations, Plaintiffs have failed to show an inadequate remedy. In so finding, the court is bound by the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision in Powell v. Georgia Dep’t of Human Services, 114 F.3d 1074 (11th Cir.1997). In that case, the plaintiff sued employees of the Richmond County Department of Family and Children Services under § 1983 for the death of his infant son, claiming, inter alia, that the defendants violated his son’s procedural due process rights in their failure to follow the Richmond County Child Abuse Protocol (“the Protocol”). Powell, 114 F.3d at 1080. In rejecting this claim, the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to state a procedural due process claim because the State provided him with adequate post-deprivation process, as the plaintiff was free to pursue a damage claim in state court under state tort law. Powell, 114 F.3d at 1074. In so finding, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished the facts at issue in Powell from those at issue in Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). There, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, a former state mental health hospital patient, brought a § 1983 claim for procedural due process violations for the state’s alleged failure to have in place appropriate pre-commitment safeguards to ensure that mental hospital patients are in fact competent to sign forms authorizing their voluntary admission and treatment. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 115. The Court held that the plaintiff stated a procedural due process claim because the deprivation of the plaintiff’s liberty was predictable and a pre-depri-vation process was feasible. Zinermon, 114 F.3d at 136. In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit held that the facts at issue in Powell were more analogous to those at issue in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). Powell, 114 F.3d at 1081. In those cases, the Supreme Court held that there is no procedural due process violation when the act complained of is the random and unauthorized act of a state employee for which post-deprivation process is available. Powell, 114 F.3d at 1081 (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194; Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541, 101 S.Ct. 1908). In Powell, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Protocol already provided pre-deprivation procedures for caseworkers to follow; no other feasible predeprivation procedure was apparent. Powell, 114 F.3d at 1082. Because the plaintiffs in Powell could bring state tort claims against the defendants, they were similarly provided with adequate post-deprivation remedies. Powell, 114 F.3d at 1082. Here, as in Powell, Plaintiffs do not appear to be challenging the adequacy of Ala.Code § 26-14-1 et seq.; rather, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Bowman did not follow the mandates of the statute. See Powell, 114 F.3d at 1082. Hence, Plaintiffs offer no alternative predeprivation procedure that Defendant Bowman could have or should have followed. Instead, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant’s failure to follow the requirements of the statute deprived them of then-liberty interests. Here, too, as in Powell, Plaintiffs may bring claims under Alabama state tort law, which Plaintiffs have chosen to bring in conjunction with their federal claims. Hence, the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a procedural due process deprivation, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim as to Defendant Bowman is due to be granted. In addition and in the alternative, the court finds that, even if Plaintiffs did state a claim for procedural due process, Defendant Bowman is immune from such claims pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity. See Powell, 114 F.3d at 1082-83 (court cannot conclude that there was a clearly established constitutional right to some additional predeprivation procedure or that it was clearly established that an additional predeprivational procedure was feasible); Foy, 94 F.3d at 1532 n. 4 (“Defendants cannot be said to have violated clearly established federal law simply by failing ... to follow provisions of the Alabama code or state regulations which govern child custody matters.”). d. Violation of Equal Protection of the Law Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Bowman violated their rights to equal protection of the laws. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.” U.S. Const, amend. 14. “The Equal Protection Clause ‘is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.’ ” Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 258 (11th Cir.1989) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)). Thus, to establish an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must initially show that he or she was treated differently from other individuals similarly situated. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249. Nowhere in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is any differential treatment by Defendant Bowman alleged. Plaintiffs state that they are Native American Indians. (Amend.Comply 19.) Plaintiffs further allege discrimination on the basis of race, color and ethnicity on the part of Defendant Tommy Harper. (Amend.Compl.HK 56, 57.) However, Plaintiffs make no allegations of discrimination on the basis of race, color or ethnicity with respect to Defendant Bowman. Further, Plaintiffs make no allegations whatsoever regarding their differential treatment vis a vis similarly situated individuals. Hence, the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to allege a claim of violation of Equal Protection; accordingly Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims based on the Equal Protection Clause are due to be dismissed. See GJR Investments, Inc., 132 F.3d at 1367 (affirming district court’s dismissal of equal protection claim where plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege unequal treatment or discriminatory motive on behalf of defendant). e. Violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment Rights to Privacy in their Home Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Bowman violated their Fourth Amendment Rights to privacy in their own home. (Amend. ComplV 59d.) The court finds that this claim is a derivative of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim for warrantless search and seizure. See Lenz, 51 F.3d at 1548 (citizens’ security in their homes lies at the core of the Fourth Amendment, hence a violation of this right infringes upon a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy). For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim for violation of their Fourth Amendment rights is due to be dismissed. f. Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Rights to be Free From Invasion of the Familial Right to Privacy Between Parents and Their Children Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Bowman’s actions violated Plaintiffs’ rights to be free from invasion of the familial right to privacy between parents and their children as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Amend. Comply 59e.) The Supreme Court, in various situations, has recognized a fundamental liberty interest in familial integrity and preserving the family unit. See e.g. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (unwed father’s fundamental right in the care and custody of a child); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953) (parents’ right to care, custody, management and companionship of their minor children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944) (parents’ fundamental interest in religious upbringing); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (parents’ fundamental interest in their children’s education). See also Foy, 94 F.3d at 1536. The Eleventh Circuit has stated that, in order to prevail on a claim of family privacy, parents need to prove that a state actor interfered with a protected liberty interest without sufficient justification. Foy, 94 F.3d at 1536. Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Bowman “unjustifiably” interfered with the integrity of their family unit when, absent any written investigative report, home study, formal complaint, or order granting custody, she required that the Plaintiff minor children be removed from their parents and placed in the custody of Plaintiff Debbie Woods. (Amend.Compl.UH 37-51.) Accordingly, the court finds that, for purposes of this Motion only, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a claim of violation of their “familial right to privacy” pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the court nevertheless finds that Plaintiffs fail to overcome Defendant Bowman’s claim of qualified immunity on this claim. The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “family relationships are an area of state concern, and the state has a compelling interest in removing children who may be abused.” Foy, 94 F.3d at 1536 (citing Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.1987)). Further, the court has stated that: Violations of the right to family association are determined by a balancing of competing interests.... So, state officials who act to investigate or to protect children where there are allegations of abuse almost never act within the contours of “clearly established law.” Foy, 94 F.3d at 1536 (internal citations and quotations omitted). DHR has wide-ranging duties and responsibilities under Alabama law where there are reports that a child’s welfare is in jeopardy. Foy, 94 F.3d at 1530 n. 2. Here, Defendant Bowman, as a DHR social worker, is charged with the responsibility of protecting children in investigations of abuse and/or neglect. Ala.Code § 26-14-1, et seq. DHR is authorized to take a child into protective custody, initially, without the consent of the child’s parents, if the circumstances are such that continuing custody with the parents presents an imminent danger to the child’s life or health. Ala.Code § 26-14-6; Foy, 94 F.3d at 1530 n. 2. Plaintiffs concede that Defendant Bowman acted pursuant to a report accusing Plaintiffs of child neglect. (Amend. Compl.f 41.) Although Plaintiffs allege that said report was “erroneous and false,” (Amend.Compl.1141), Defendant Bowman nevertheless is charged with responding to such reports and taking action as she deems appropriate. See Ala.Code § 26-14-7. Accordingly, the court finds that Defendant Bowman was acting with her discretionary authority. Further, in light of the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that state actors responding to allegations of abuse almost never act within the contours of “clearly established law,” and in light of Plaintiffs’ failure to point to any clearly established law to support their proposition that reasonable persons in Defendant’s position would know that they were in violation of Plaintiffs’ rights to familial integrity, the court finds that Defendant Bowman is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim on this ground is due to be dismissed, g. Violation of Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment Rights Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Bowman violated the Plaintiff minor children’s Eighth Amendment Rights to be free from the state’s restraint of their individual liberty without providing for their basic human needs, e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety. (Amend. Compl.f59f.) Plaintiffs contend that this claim stems from the fact that Defendant Bowman’s “constructive removal” of the minor Plaintiffs from their parents’ custody without formally establishing the dependency of the minor children left them in “constructive foster placement” without the state providing for their care. (Pis.’ Mem. in Opp. at 13.) In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires states to provide medical care to incarcerated prisoners. Specifically, the Court reasoned that because the prisoner is unable “by the reason of the deprivation of his liberty [to] care for himself,” it is only “just” that the State be required to take care of him. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103, 97 S.Ct. 285 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court extended this analysis beyond the Eighth Amendment context in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). There, the Court held that an involuntarily committed mental patient retains a liberty interest to be protected substantively under the due process clause, and thus the State is required to provide “reasonable safety” to these patients. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324, 102 S.Ct. 2452. Further, the Court held that the State must also provide “adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit has applied this rationale to recognize a liberty interest where a child is involuntarily placed in a foster home. Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir.1987) (en banc). Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a child involuntarily placed in a foster home is in a situation so analogous to a prisoner in a penal institution and a child confined in a mental health facility that the foster child may bring a Section 1983 action for violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 797. The court assumes that Plaintiffs’ claims under the Eighth Amendment and Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is meant to state a substantive liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, analogous to the liberty interest in Estelle, Youngberg, and Taylor. The court finds that, for purposes of this Motion to Dismiss only, Plaintiffs have alleged a “special relationship” between the state and the plaintiff minor children giving rise to a Taylor-type Section 1983 claim. Specifically, the court finds, for purposes of this Motion only, that Plaintiffs have alleged that the Plaintiff minor children were in a foster care relationship with the state. In a foster care situation, the state places the child, whether voluntarily or not, into the care of persons the state has chosen. Wooten v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 696, 699 (11th Cir.1995). These foster families provide for the child’s physical needs on behalf of the state. Id. The state exercises control and dominion over the child in a foster care situation, giving rise to a foster care child’s Section 1983 claim for a violation of a constitutional right if the child is injured by his or her foster family. Wooten, 49 F.3d at 699 (citing Taylor, 818 F.2d 791). Here, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Bowman threatened Plaintiffs that their children would be removed from the home and taken into custody. (Amend.Compl.fl 34.) Plaintiffs further contend that, out of fear and confusion, they telephoned a relative, Plaintiff Debbie Woods, and Defendant Bowman “required” Woods to take the children into her physical custody and remove them to the state of Florida, where the children remained for approximately one to two months. (Amend.Compl.lffl 36, 37, 40.) Although Plaintiffs state that no order granting protective or temporary custody of the children to the State of Alabama or Debbie Woods was ever sought or obtained by any employee or agent of Houston County DHR, (Amend. CompLIffi 50, 51), they nevertheless contend that Defendant Bowman’s actions resulted in “constructive” foster ease placement with Debbie Woods. (Pis.’ Mem. in Opp. at 13.) Assuming these allegations are true, and drawing all inferences arising from them in favor of Plaintiffs, the court finds that, for purposes of this Motion only, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant Bowman effectively placed the Plaintiff minor children in the custody of Debbie Woods, thus giving rise to a special relationship analogous to a foster care relationship. Nevertheless, the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that the plaintiff minor children suffered any deprivation of their “basic needs” while in Debbie Woods’ custody. In discussing the necessary elements of a Section 1983 claim for deprivation of liberty in a foster care situation, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that defendants may be held liable under Section 1983 if they exhibited deliberate indifference to a known injury, a known risk, or a specific duty and their failure to perform the duty or act to ameliorate the risk of injury was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs deprivation of rights under the constitution. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 797. “Only where it is alleged and the proof shows that the state officials were deliberately indifferent to the welfare of the child will liability be imposed.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant Bowman deprived minor Plaintiffs of freedom from the “state’s restraint of their individual liberty without providing for their basic needs, e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety, as is secured for them under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” (Amend.ComplA 59f.) However, nowhere in Plaintiffs’ pleadings does the court find any facts giving rise to this allegation; nor do Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Bowman was “deliberately indifferent” to any such deprivation of basic needs while the children were in Debbie Woods’ custody. Hence, the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead this claim with the requisite specificity. Generally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure impose minimal pleading standards and require only “a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). However, as this court has previously reminded Plaintiffs, a more stringent pleading standard is required to state a claim under § 1983. GJR Investments, Inc., 132 F.3d at 1367; Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556 (11th Cir.1984). Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that in civil rights actions, courts may dismiss a complaint “as insufficient where the allegations it contains are vague and conclusory.” Fullman, 739 F.2d at 556-57 (citations omitted). Further, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that in all complaints where liability is predicated upon § 1983, “some factual detail is necessary” and that this “heightened Rule 8 requirement — as the law of the circuit — must be applied by the district courts.” Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir.1992); see also GJR Investments, Inc., 132 F.3d at 1368 (‘We stress at this point .. that the heightened pleading requirement is the law of this circuit.”). The Eleventh Circuit explained that “ ‘in an effort to eliminate nonmeritorious claims on the pleadings and to protect public officials from protracted litigation involving specious claims, we, and other courts, have tightened the application of Rule 8 to § 1983 claims.’ ” Oladeinde, 963 F.2d at 1485 (quoting Arnold v. Board of Educ. of Escambia County, 880 F.2d 305, 309 (11th Cir.1989)). Pleading with specificity is particularly important where, as here, a defendant asserts the defense of qualified immunity, and the court must decide whether the conduct complained of violates a “clearly established” constitutional or federal statutory right. GJR Investments, Inc., 132 F.3d at 1367. The court has previously allowed Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint to state their Section 1983 claims with the requisite specificity. Ross, 893 F.Supp. at 1554. Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiffs failure to state a claim for deprivation of liberty for failure to provide for Plaintiff minor children’s basic needs necessitates dismissal of this claim. 2. Defendant Parsons Plaintiffs also bring § 1983 claims against Defendant Bowman’s supervisor, Defendant Parsons. A supervisor may not be held liable pursuant to § 1983 for a constitutional violation on the basis of respondeat superior, but only on the basis of his or her wrongful behavior. See Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1443 (11th Cir.1985). “Supervisory liability occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation. The causal connection can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he [or she] fails to do so.” Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1052 (11th Cir.1996) (quoting Cross v. State of Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1508 (11th Cir.1995) (internal quotations omitted)). Courts within the Eleventh Circuit employ the following three-prong test to determine a supervisor’s liability: “(1) whether, in failing adequately to train and supervise subordinates, [the supervisor] was deliberately indifferent to [the plaintiffs rights]; (2) whether a reasonable person in the supervisor’s position would know that his (or her) failure to train and supervise reflected deliberate indifference; and (3) whether his [or her] conduct was causally related to the constitutional infringement by [the supervisor’s] subordinate[s].” Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836-37 (11th Cir.1990) (footnote omitted). Here, Plaintiffs do not contend that Defendant Parsons personally participated in the alleged deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Rather, Plaintiffs state that Parson’s Section 1983 liability turns not on whether, after placed on notice, her alleged inaction, failure, or deliberate indifference “create[d] a causal connection between her omissions and (Bowman’s) illegal behavior.” (Pis.’ Mem. in Opp. at 25.) As a threshold matter, the court notes that Defendant Parsons may not be held liable under § 1983 for any of Defendant Bowman’s actions which may have been in violation of Alabama state laws or regulations, or the Alabama Constitution. Section 1983 actions may only be brought for a defendant’s actions which allegedly deprived a plaintiff of a right or rights secured by the Constitution or by federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Further, the court has already determined that Defendant Bowman, Defendant Parson’s subordinate, did not violate Plaintiffs’ Sixth Amendment rights, Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection or procedural due process, or Eighth Amendment rights-construed as a claim under the substantive due process clause for deprivation of basic needs. Hence, the court cannot impose li