Full opinion text
ORDER QUIST, District Judge. In accordance with the Opinion entered this day: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Strike Affidavits (docket #116) and Second Motion to Strike Affidavits (docket # 121) are DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (docket # 117) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (docket # 47) is DENIED. This case is closed, OPINION AND ORDER Table of Contents I. Facts.1108 II. Statutory Background.1108 A. National Park Service Organic Act.1109 B. Isle Royale National Park Act.1109 C. Isle Royale Wilderness Statute.1109 D. The Wilderness Act .1110 E. Root-Bryce Treaty of 1909 .1110 F. National Environmental Policy Act.1111 G. Rehabilitation Act and Americans With Disabilities.1111 III. Motion Standard.1111 IV. Motions to Strike.1112 V. Analysis .1113 A. Standing.1113 B. Violations of Law.1116 1. Wilderness Act.1116 2. Isle Royale National Park Act.1119 3. Root-Bryce Treaty.■.■.1119 4. Isle Royale Wilderness Act .1119 6. National Park Service Organic Act and Isle Royale National Park Act_1124 6. NEPA.1125 a. Rigorous Analysis.1127 b. Lack of Site-Specific Analysis.1129 c. Failure to Prepare Supplemental EIS .1131 d. Failure to Disclose Critical Documents.1132 e. Lack of Accuracy and Integrity.1132 7. Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act.1134 C. Arbitrary and Capricious Acts.1135 VI. Conclusion.1140 OPINION The controversy in this case centers around Isle Royale, a national park located on an island in the waters of Lake Superi- or. Plaintiffs, a group of motorboaters who regularly visit Isle Royale, filed this action pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 to 706, seeking review of a General Management Plan (“GMP”) adopted by the National Park Service (referred to as “NPS” or collectively with the other defendants as “Defendants”) to govern its administration of Isle Royale National Park for the next 15 to 20 years. Plaintiffs claim that the NPS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting the GMP and that the GMP violates various laws. Now before the Court are the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. I. Facts Isle Royale (sometimes referred to as the “Park”) is a national park located in the waters of Lake Superior. In addition to being a national park, Isle Royale is also a federal wilderness area. Isle Royale is managed by NPS, which, as will be explained in the section of this Opinion regarding relevant statutes, enjoys broad statutory authority to regulate the Park. Beginning in February 1994, and pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § la-7 (which provides that “[gjeneral management plans for the preservation and use of each unit of the National Park System ... shall be prepared and revised in a timely manner by the Director of the National Park Service”), NPS began the process of preparing a GMP to guide its administration of the island. A series of public meetings were held, and in March, 1998, NPS produced a draft GMP, which also served as an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) required by the National Environmental Policy Act. The draft GMP contained five alternative plans (A — E), one of which was the preferred plan selected by Defendants. Comments on the draft GMP from the public and various government agencies were submitted to the NPS. Based on those comments, the NPS made revisions to the proposed plan. A final GMP/EIS was produced in August 1998. The GMP outlined the alternatives for managing the Park, identifying alternative D, as revised, as the proposed alternative. A record of decision (“ROD”) selecting the proposed alternative was executed on May 11, 1999. The goal of the proposed alternative was stated as follows: to meet the diverse expectations and needs of Isle Royale visitors while emphasizing the natural quiet that is fundamental to wilderness experiences. All park areas will be available to all visitors, so long as users participate in ways that are consistent with the access, facilities, and opportunities provided. Management zones will provide guidance for managing specific areas for desired visitor experiehce and resource conditions. (ROD at 1, AR at 14799). In order to implement this goal, Campgrounds will be designed and access provided to separate motorized and non-motorized uses in a few areas; certain docks will be removed or relocated, for example, and some new campgrounds will be provided. A variety of uses will be available that will be fairly evenly distributed across the island. Use limits may become necessary in some management zones to prevent overcrowding and maintain quiet and solitude. Quiet/no-wake water zones will be established to reduce noise and wake impacts in numerous areas. Other regulations aimed at reducing sound associated with humans will also be implemented. (Id.). Plaintiffs disagree with numerous aspects of the proposed action as detailed in the GMP, particularly those affecting mo-torboaters. They filed this suit on August 18, 1999, and filed a first amended Complaint on March 6, 2000, requesting that this Court permanently enjoin NPS from implementing the GMP. Plaintiffs allege that the proposed actions of removing docks, shelters, and the Indian Portage Trail; dividing the Park into zones allowing varying levels of use and modification of the environment within these levels; and proposing the future creation of non-motorized zones, violate the statutes listed below, in spite of the broad authority these statutes give NPS to regulate and manage the Park. II. Statutory Background The NPS, as a unit of the Department of the Interior, manages Isle Royale. The source of its statutory authority, and other relevant statutes, follow. The sum provisions of these statutes are that Isle Royale is a National Park, a wilderness under the Wilderness Act, and is managed by NPS pursuant to statutory authority. A. National Park Service Organic Act 16 U.S.C. § 1, a section of the National Park Service Organic Act (“NPSOA”), enacted in 1916, creates the National Park Service. It provides: There is created in the Department of the Interior a service to be called the National Park Service, which shall be under the charge of a director .... The service ... shall promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known as national parks ... by such means and measures as conform to the fundamental purpose of the said parks, ... which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations. 16 U.S.C. § 1. In addition, 16 U.S.C. § la-2(h) affirms NPS’ authority to [promulgate and enforce regulations concerning boating and other activities on or relating to waters located within areas of the National Park System, including waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States: Provided, that any regulations adopted pursuant to this subsection shall be complementary to, and not in derogation of, the authority of the United States Coast Guard to regulate the use of waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States B. Isle Royale National Park Act The provisions designating and governing Isle Royale’s creation as a national park, adopted in 1931, are contained at 16 U.S.C. §§ 408-408Í. (The “Isle Royale National Park Act” or “IRNPA”). Section 1 of IRNPA provides that “[w]hen title to all alienated lands within Isle Royale in Lake Superior ... and immediately surrounding islands ... shall have been vested in the United States, ... said area shall be, and is hereby, established, dedicated, and set apart as a public park for the benefit and enjoyment of the people....” 16 U.S.C. § 408. Section 3 of IRNPA provides that: “The administration, protection, and development of the aforesaid park shall be exercised under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior by the National Park Service, subject to the provisions of [NPSOA].” 16 U.S.C. § 408b. The boundaries of the Park “include any submerged lands within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States within four and one-half miles of the shoreline of Isle Royale and the surrounding islands .... ” 16 U.S.C. § 408g. C.Isle Royale Wilderness Statute Isle Royale was made a part of the nation’s wilderness system by the Act of October 20, 1976, Pub.L.No. 94-567, 90 Stat. 2692 (1976). The relevant provisions of this statute provide [t]hat in accordance with section 3(c) of the Wilderness Act the following lands are hereby designated as wilderness, and shall be administered by the Secretary of the Interior in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Wilderness Act: (f) Isle Royale National Park, Michigan, wilderness comprising one hundred and thirty-one thousand eight hundred and eighty acres, and potential wilderness additions comprising two hundred and thirty-one acres .... Id. The legislative history of this act contains the following language: “The Committee understands that no significant expansion of boat docks numbers [sic] is anticipated, but that continued maintenance of these facilities is essential to the continued ease of access as well as the health and safety of the visitors.” S.Rep. No. 94-1357, at 5 (1976). D. The Wilderness Act The Wilderness System itself was established in 1964 by the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 to 1136. The Wilderness Act provides that it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress to secure for the American people of present and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness. For this purpose there is hereby established a National Wilderness Preservation System to be composed of federally owned areas designated by Congress as “wilderness areas”, and these shall be administered for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of these areas, the preservation of their wilderness character, and for the gathering and dissemination of information regarding their use and enjoyment as wilderness. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a). Wilderness areas are declared to be areas which “ha[ve] outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation.” 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c)(2). 16 U.S.C. § 1131(b) provides that “[t]he inclusion of an area in the National Wilderness Preservation System notwithstanding, the area shall continue to be managed by the Department and agency having jurisdiction thereover immediately before its inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation System unless otherwise provided by Act of Congress.” Thus, under this provision, NPS continues to manage Isle Royale. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a)(3) clarifies NPS’ authority to manage Isle Royale; it provides that [njothing in this Act shall modify the statutory authority under which units of the national park system are created. Further, the designation of any area of any park, monument, or other unit of the national park system as a wilderness area pursuant to this Act shall in no manner lower the standards evolved for the use and preservation of such park ... in accordance with [NPSOA], 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) provides guidance for any agency administering a wilderness area: Except as otherwise provided in this Act each agency administering any area designated as wilderness shall be responsible for preserving the wilderness character of the area and shall so administer such area for such other purposes for which it may have been established as also to preserve its wilderness character. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, wilderness areas shall be devoted to the public purposes of recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and historic use. E. Root-Bryce Treaty of 1909 The Root-Bryce Treaty of 1909, also known as the Boundary Waters Treaty, provides that with respect to boundary waters between the United States and Canada: The High Contracting Parties agree that the navigation of all navigable boundary waters shall forever continue free and open for the purposes of commerce to the inhabitants and to the ships, vessels, and boats of both countries equally, subject, however, to any laws and regulations of either country, within its own territory, not inconsistent with such privilege of free navigation and applying equally and without discrimination to the inhabitants, ships, vessels, and boats of both countries. 36 Stat. 2448. See also Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1257 (8th Cir.1981) (quoting treaty language). F. National Environmental Policy Act The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 requires that agencies proposing a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment must prepare a detailed statement regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action, including an analysis of alternatives to the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). This statement is referred to as an EIS. NEPA is meant to foster better decision-making and informed public participation for actions that affect the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4321; 40 C.F.R. § 1501.1(b), (c). G. Rehabilitation Act and Americans With Disabilities Act Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with a disability “under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Similarly, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”) provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. III. Motion Standard Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The rule requires that the disputed facts be material. Material facts are facts which are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute over trivial facts which are not necessary in order to apply the substantive law does not prevent the granting of a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. The rule also requires the dispute to be genuine. A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return judgment for the non-moving party. Id. This standard requires the non-moving party to present more than a scintilla of evidence to defeat the motion. Id. at 251, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citing Schuylkill and Dauphin Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448, 20 L.Ed. 867 (1871)). A moving party who does not have the burden of proof at trial may properly support a motion for summary judgment by showing the court that there is no evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the motion is so supported, the party opposing the motion must then demonstrate with “concrete evidence” that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id.; Frank v. D’Ambrosi, 4 F.3d 1378, 1384 (6th Cir.1993). The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, but may grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Agristor Financial Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th Cir.1992)(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). Because Plaintiffs’ claims in this case are brought under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the scope of the Court’s review is very narrow. In an APA review, a court may set aside an agency’s decision only if it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E); Neighbors Organized to Insure a Sound Env’t, Inc. v. McArtor, 878 F.2d 174, 178 (6th Cir.1989). In applying this standard, “the Court must consider whether the agency acted within the scope of its legal authority, adequately explained its decision, based its decision on facts in the record, and considered the relevant factors.” Nat’l Park & Conservation Ass’n v. Stanton, 54 F.Supp.2d 7, 11 (D.D.C.1999). Although the standard is deferential, “the agency must articulate a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ ” GTE Midwest, Inc. v. FCC, 233 F.3d 341, 344-45 (6th Cir.2000)(quoting City of Brookings Mun. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 822 F.2d 1153, 1165 (D.C.Cir.1987)). IV. Motions to Strike Defendants have moved to strike the affidavits filed by Plaintiffs in support of their motion. In their first motion to strike, Defendants request that the Court strike the affidavits of John E. Kappler and Fred Bieti attached to Plaintiffs’ memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment. Those affidavits are primarily addressed to the issue of whether Defendants used accurate figures in the GMP/EIS as required by the National Environmental Policy Act and the regulations under that Act. Defendants’ second motion requests that the Court strike the affidavits of James P. Markham, Fred Bieti, Edward T. Glowacki, John E. Kappler, and David W. Hand, submitted by Plaintiffs with their response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Those affidavits are primarily concerned with the issue of standing. A court’s review of an agency’s decision is generally confined to the administrative record, which includes all the materials before the agency at the time it made its decision. See Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 638 (6th Cir.1997). Thus, “the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.” Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 1244, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973). However, courts have recognized limited exceptions to the general rule. For example, the record may be supplemented when the agency deliberately or negligently excludes documents, to provide background information pertaining to whether the agency considered all the relevant factors, and to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was adequate. Slater, 120 F.3d at 638; Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F.Supp. 1291, 1308 (W.D.Wash.1994). The Court finds that the first Kappler and Bieti affidavits may be properly considered under the limited exceptions noted above because they go to the issue of whether Defendants used inaccurate figures in violation of NEPA and are primarily based on matters in the administrative record. However the affidavits will be ignored to the extent that they are argumentative or question the mental processes used by Defendants in reaching their decision. The Court will also consider the second set of affidavits solely on the limited issue of standing. Therefore, Defendants’ motions to strike will be denied. V. Analysis A. Standing Defendants initially argued that Plaintiffs did not have standing, but subsequently abandoned this claim at oral argument. However, standing is a jurisdictional issue, Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 771, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 1861, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000), and “[t]he requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the nature of limits of the judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without exception.’ ” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998)(quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 511, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884)). “For a court to pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires.” Id. at 101, 118 S.Ct. 1003. Therefore, this Court will examine the issue of standing sua sponte. Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623 (6th Cir.1997), establishes Plaintiffs’ standing in this case in most respects. In that case, the court noted that “it appears well-established that a final EIS [environmental impact statement] or the ROD issued thereon constitute the ‘final agency action’ for purposes of the APA.” Id. at 631. The GMP in this case also serves as the final EIS. Therefore, Plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit. Plaintiffs are also appropriate parties to bring the suit because they engage in motorboating in and around the Park and face injury to these interests if Defendant carries out its plans under the GMP. See Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance v. Babbitt, 96 F.Supp.2d 1288, 1293-95 (D.Wy.2000) (stating that “ ‘geographical nexus to’ and ‘actual use of the area affected by the Proposed Action” give plaintiff standing under NEPA and concluding that the causation and likely relief prongs of standing were met where plaintiff alleged violation of NEPA procedures and favorable result for plaintiff could force additional agency plan-ningXquoting Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 450-51 (10th Cir.1996)). Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert a violation of NPS-12. See Jackson Hole, 96 F.Supp.2d at 1294-97. NPS-12 is merely an unenforceable statement of policy by the agency. Id. Similarly, Plaintiffs have no standing to sue Defendants for violating the “statement of park purpose” contained on page 13 of the GMP and the statement of the “overall concept” contained on page 34 of the GMP, since these are merely general policy statements by Defendants, not sources of positive rights for Plaintiffs. Id. Plaintiffs have standing under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs stated in their complaint that the membership of the Isle Royale Boaters’ Association includes members who are disabled. Since “Rule 56(e) ... requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,’ ” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56), a mere statement in the complaint that Plaintiffs’ membership includes disabled members is not sufficient to establish that Plaintiffs suffer from disabilities. In several of Plaintiffs’ affidavits, affinis allege that they will suffer harm as a result of the impact of the proposed action on themselves and disabled family or friends. (Markham Aff. ¶ 7; Bieti Aff. ¶¶ 10 and 11; Glowacki Aff. ¶ 7; Kappler Aff. ¶ 3, Pis.’ Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Exs. A-D.) This Court must determine whether these allegations give Plaintiffs standing to sue under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. All of Plaintiffs’ allegations other than Kappler’s involve ADA and Rehabilitation Act challenges in which Plaintiffs do not allege that they are themselves handicapped or disabled. A threshold question regarding Plaintiffs’ standing under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act is whether Plaintiffs have standing to challenge violation of those acts if they are not handicapped but are affected by the alleged violations. The Rehabilitation Act extends its remedies to “any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under section 504 of this Act.” 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2). In reviewing this provision, the court in Weber v. Cranston School Committee, 212 F.3d 41 (1st Cir.2000), stated: Courts have construed the phrase “any person aggrieved” as an expression of Congressional intent to accord standing to the fullest extent permitted by the case and controversy provision of Article III. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972) ...; Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir.1971) ...; see also Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C.Cir.1976).... Consistent with the broad construction of the statutory enforcement language of Title VI and the Rehabilitation Act, the anti-retaliation regulation applies to “any individual” who has been intimidated, threatened, coerced, or discriminated against “for the purpose of interfering with [protected rights]” under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act or the Rehabilitation Act. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e); see id. § 104.61 (incorporating the Title VI anti-retaliation regulation into the Rehabilitation Act). Given the broad remedial provisions of Title VI and the Rehabilitation Act and the breadth of the anti-retaliation regulation adopted pursuant to those laws, it is not surprising that courts have accorded standing to non-disabled individuals suing because of retaliation for attempts to vindicate the rights of a disabled person. Id. at 48-49. While this case does not involve retaliation against Plaintiffs for attempting to vindicate the rights of the disabled, it remains the case that 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) provides remedies for “any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under section 504 of this Act.” Id. (emphasis added). The Department of the Interior is a “Federal provider of ... assistance under section 504 of this Act”; it provides assistance to a “department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government”, 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A). See 43 C.F.R. §§ 17.1, 17.2 and 17 App. A to Subpart A (dealing with “programfs] or activities] receiving Federal financial assistance from the Department of the Interior”, 43 C.F.R. § 17.1, and listing “program[s] for which financial assistance is authorized under a law administered by the department [of the Interior], including programs and activities that are federally-assisted under the laws listed in appendix A to this sub-part.” 43 C.F.R. § 17.2(a).) Therefore 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) applies to the Department of the Interior, and the broad remedies provision of that statute means that non-disabled individuals who are affected by discrimination against disabled individuals can have standing to bring suit under the Rehabilitation Act if they are directly affected by the action taken against the disabled individual. The same logic applies to the ADA claim in this case. The only section of the ADA under which this claim may conceivably be brought is 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and the ADA provides that “[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794a) shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this title provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 202 [42 U.S.C. § 12132].” 42 U.S.C. § 12133. Thus, Plaintiffs have standing to sue under the ADA on the same terms as under the Rehabilitation Act even though they are not themselves disabled. Paragraph 11 of Bieti’s affidavit notes that due to a congenital heart defect, his son was required to have refrigerated medicine at the Park. Paragraph 10 of that affidavit notes that imposition of a no-generator rule makes carrying refrigerated medicines impossible in affected areas. However, as to Bieti’s son, the allegations are in the past tense, (“[w]hen he was younger and we were boating at Isle Ro-yale, we were required to keep life saving rectal morphine suppositories on board” (Bieti Aff. ¶ 11)), with no claim that this situation exists at present. In paragraph 10 Bieti states that because of the no-generator rule, he and his wife can no longer camp with a physician and his wife who need to keep refrigerated medicines they carry for visitor protection. To have standing under the ADA, an affected individual must have a disability which “ ‘substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual ....’” Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir.1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)) (alteration in original). Plaintiffs must succeed in establishing specific facts showing that Defendant is not entitled to judgment in order to survive a motion for summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The mere allegation that this doctor carries medicines for visitor protection does not establish that the doctor is disabled or that the medicines are for persons with a disability. The Bieti affidavit does not establish standing under the ADA. Similarly, because the standards for determining a disability under the Rehabilitation Act and the APA are the same, see Thompson v. Williamson County, 219 F.3d 555, 557 n. 3 (6th Cir.2000), this Court finds that Bieti does not show standing to sue under the Rehabilitation Act. Paragraph 7 of the Glowacki affidavit alleges that Glowacki’s wife has “two specific chronic health issues that preclude[ ] her[] from taking on backpacking due to its strenuous nature”, and that for this reason they usually dock at Chippewa Harbor and use the Indian Portage Trail, which the GMP proposes be removed. (Glowacki Aff. ¶ 7.) However, the Sixth Circuit has established that “moderate difficulty or pain experienced while walking does not rise to the level of a disability.” Penny, 128 F.3d at 415. While Ms. Glo-wacki may have extreme difficulty walking, Mr. Glowacki has not established this in his affidavit. His wife may have nothing more than moderate difficulty or pain while walking. Accordingly, Mr. Glowacki has not established that he has standing under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Paragraph 3 of Kappler’s second affidavit alleges that the closing of Indian Portage Trail “would again serve to discourage or limit certain categories of visitors such as the older group of which I am a member at age 57 from hiking Isle Ro-yale.” (Kappler Aff. ¶3.) As with Glo-wacki’s allegations, these allegations are not sufficient to establish that Kappler is handicapped for purposes of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, since they do not establish anything other than “moderate difficulty or pain experienced while walking”, Penny, 128 F.3d at 415, if they establish that. The only remaining allegation of effects on the handicapped appears at Paragraph 7 of the Markham affidavit. This paragraph states: Each year I make one trip to Isle Royale solely for the purpose of taking a handicapped friend. This individual has limited mobility. For him to leave the boat and experience the island itself, the boat must be secured to a dock that is large enough and strong enough to transfer him ashore.... he also requires medication that must be refrigerated, which makes a lot of the places that I used to take him not available because I cannot use my onboard generator. (Markham Aff. ¶ 7.) Walking is a major life activity, Penny, 128 F.3d at 415, and an individual who cannot get out of a boat and onto Isle Royale without the use of a dock is substantially limited in his ability to walk. Therefore, the facts alleged in the Markham affidavit are sufficient to allow Plaintiffs standing under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Article III standing requirements are met by Plaintiffs’ allegations. Article III standing requires actual injury, that the injury can fairly be traced to the challenged conduct, and that the injury can be redressed by the relief requested. See Weber, 212 F.3d at 47 n. 7 (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982)). Plaintiffs will not be able to make visits to areas of the Park as they have in the past because of changes proposed by the GMP; and changes would not occur if this Court struck down or altered the GMP. Plaintiffs have standing on all other issues. Though the court in Jackson Hole held that plaintiff did not have standing to sue under 16 U.S.C. § la-7, this Court agrees with the 9th Circuit, which has found that plaintiffs do have standing to sue under the National Park Service Organic Act. See Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Jensen, 108 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir.1997) (addressing plaintiffs claims under the Organic Act on the merits). Plaintiffs also have standing to sue under the Wilderness Act and the Isle Royale Enabling and Wilderness Acts. See id. at 1069 (addressing plaintiffs claims under the Wilderness Act on the merits); Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115, 1121-25 (8th Cir.1999) (addressing plaintiffs’ claims under the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act, Publ. L. No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1649 (1978) on the merits). This Court sees no reason not to hold that Plaintiffs have a legal interest under any of these Acts, which contain substantive or procedural provisions which benefit those who visit national parks and wildernesses. See, e.g. Alaska Wildlife, 108 F.3d at 1070 (stating that “the Secretary [of the Interior] may not exercise his authority to the detriment of the [NPS Organic] Act’s purpose,” which is to “conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects ... and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner ... as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations”). B. Violations of Law 1. Wilderness Act Plaintiffs allege that the removal of docks, shelters, and the Indian Portage Trail; dividing the park into zones allowing varying levels of use and modification of the environment within these levels; and proposing the future creation of non-motorized zones, violate the Wilderness Act and accompanying regulations. Plaintiffs also allege that the zoning provisions violate the rights of the holders of life leases within the Park. Plaintiffs further allege that these actions violate one of the statements of park purpose on page 13 of the GMP. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ actions violate the following Wilderness Act regulation: Regulations respecting administration and use of areas under the jurisdiction of the Secretary [of the Interior] which may be designated as wilderness areas by statute shall be developed with a view to protecting such areas and preserving their wilderness character for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, with inconsistent uses held to a minimum. 43 C.F.R. § 19.6. On page 13 of the GMP, the NPS notes its intention to “preserve and protect the park’s wilderness character for use and enjoyment by present and future generations.” (GMP at 13.) Removal or replacement of four docks is not arbitrary and capricious. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) provides that there should generally be no motorboats allowed in wilderness areas except as necessary to meet the minimum requirements of the administration of the area. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) provides that where motorboat uses have already been established within an area that becomes wilderness, such use may be permitted to continue “subject to such restrictions as the Secretary of Agriculture deems desirable.” While in this case it is the Secretary of the Interior, or the NPS, that regulates Isle Royale, there is no reason that 1133(d) should not apply to their regulation of the Park. Even if it did not, the NPS maintains the ability under 16 U.S.C. §§ 1, 1131(b) and 1133(a)(3) to regulate the Park. These decisions are based on their zoning of the island. While Plaintiffs will not have access to these particular docks any longer, they will in fact have access to more docks after the plan is completed than they currently do. (GMP 34-37.) The ability to replace particular docks is part of the NPS’ ability to regulate the Park. The removal of the breakwater is explained at page 37 of the GMP as justified by separation of park uses and the removal of an impediment to natural current and sedimentation. Therefore, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, this action is adequately explained. Safety concerns of removal of docks are addressed at page 142 of the GMP. The GMP notes that “protected bays, coves, and lee sides of islands” provide safe places for boats during storms. The safety of boaters has not been ignored under the GMP. Similar logic prevails regarding Plaintiffs access to shelters and campgrounds. The Wilderness Act generally prohibits shelters in wilderness areas. A lessening of the number of shelters readily accessible to motorboaters from 88 to 70 cannot be said to be arbitrary and capricious in these circumstances. The possible lessening of campgrounds immediately accessible to boaters is not sufficient in this case to be deemed arbitrary and capricious. In fact, there will be 22 docks with campgrounds on Lake Superior under the GMP, as opposed to 20 currently. (GMP at 35.) Moreover, as Defendants point out, Plaintiffs will maintain the ability to access all shelters in the same way as nonmotorboa-ters: by hiking, kayaking, canoeing, etc., to those particular campgrounds. The decision to eliminate Indian Portage Trail is also not arbitrary and capricious. Indian Portage Trail was proposed to be eliminated to relieve use pressure, separate uses, and protect archaeological resources. (GMP at 36-37, 150). NPS did not ignore the recommendations of Dr. Rolf Peterson in making this decision. Dr. Peterson, the principal investigator of wolf-moose research at Isle Royale, informed NPS that “[w]here wolves are concerned the effect of removing this trail is just as apt to be negative as positive”; that “there is some value in leaving (or maintaining) things as they are”; but that “I doubt very much that there will be any influence on wolves” by removing this trail. (AR at 13509.) NPS specifically noted in the GMP that “[w]ildlife information was consulted during development of this plan in an attempt to avoid sensitive habitats.... Researchers and other resource experts were consulted. Some displacement of wildlife could result from dispersal of visitation around the island .... This impact would be minor.” (GMP at 109.) These findings are consistent with those of Dr. Peterson. Furthermore, the GMP went on to note that “[s]tudy of the wolf and moose relationship on Isle Royale has already produced significant results” and that “convening a panel of subject matter experts if dramatic wolf population changes occur would involve those who would benefit substantially from continued research.” (GMP at 109.) The Court notes that no evidence pointed out in the record establishes the likelihood of such a change. NPS did not ignore Dr. Peterson’s findings regarding the potential effect on the wolf population of removing Indian Portage Trail and did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in proposing the removal of that trail. 16 U.S.C. § 1 creates NPS and gives it the power to regulate the national park system. Pursuant to this authority, NPS zones areas within its jurisdiction to determine the level and type of use of a given area. Under 16 U.S.C. § 1131(b) and 1133(a)(3), NPS maintains the ability to control Isle Royale, which was under NPS’s jurisdiction prior to its designation as wilderness. Thus, NPS may properly engage in the zoning of areas of Isle Ro-yale. This zoning does not consist of either removing or placing areas into or out of wilderness status by NPS. Rather, it involves regulating use either within or outside of Congressionally approved wilderness areas. Unless the zoning violates the Wilderness Act, it is permissible. The zoning does not violate the Wilderness Act. The proposed zoning comports with 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c)’s provision that “except as necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area ... there shall be no ... structure or installation within any such area.” Defendants have proposed a minimal amount of additional campsites, in keeping with allowing the public access to the Park. Defendants have not “removed” Raspberry Island or a portion of McCargoe Cove from wilderness status. They do propose classifying them as frontcountry or wilderness portal areas. NPS may alter these areas for “essential visitor and park operational needs,” (GMP at 30-31), but this is consistent with 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c)’s mandates. NPS has not proposed building anything in these areas other than a campground, which is neither a structure nor installation. (GMP at 34 (“Because all new campgrounds would lie within designated or potential wilderness areas, no shelters would be constructed”).) Furthermore, this campground is reasonably deemed by NPS to be necessary to meet essential Park needs. NPS has also not classified nonwilderness areas in and around Barnum Island, Siskiwit Bay, Moskey Basin, Threemile Campground, or McCargoe Cove as wilderness. NPS has proposed that some areas in these locations are to be designated as backcountry. Backcountry zoning is more restrictive than developed, front-country, and wilderness portal zoning, but is not an attempt by NPS to classify these areas as wilderness. Instead, such a classification is within the NPS’ discretion to manage the Park under the statutes already mentioned. Plaintiffs do not have standing to pursue them claims regarding NPS’ possible future determination of nonmotorized zones. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), establishes that in order to have standing to sue, “[flirst, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” ’ ” Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 (citations omitted). The GMP states that “[i]f goals for quiet are not met in the quiet/no-wake zone, and substantial compliance with noise regulations cannot be achieved, creation of some nonmotorized areas would be considered through an amendment to the General Management Plan.” (GMP at 37 (italics in original).) Plaintiffs have not suffered an “actual or imminent” harm under this provision, since whether or not any action will be taken towards implementing nonmotorized zones depends on what happens after the implementation of the quiet/no-wake zones. See, e.g. Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1214 (10th Cir.1998) (plaintiffs had no standing under NEPA, but would have standing if the Defendants “decide to amend the land use plan”). Plaintiffs also have not shown an injury in fact as to their claim that the GMP impinges on the rights of current leaseholders in the Park. None of the Plaintiffs have alleged themselves to be such leaseholders, so they do not have standing to pursue these claims. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 (“stating that the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ ”)(emphasis added). 2.Isle Royale National Park Act Plaintiffs allege in paragraph 27 of their first amended complaint that NPS’ possible future zoning of waters as nonmotorized zones violates the Isle Royale National Park Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 408-408?. For the reasons stated above (relating to Plaintiffs’ allegations that possible future nonmotorized zones violates the Wilderness Act), Plaintiffs do not have standing to pursue this claim. 3.Root-Bryce Treaty Plaintiffs also allege in paragraph 27 of their complaint that the Root-Bryce Treaty, also known as the Boundary Waters Act, 36 Stat. 2449, is violated by the possible future creation of nonmotorized zones. For the reasons already stated, Plaintiffs do not have standing to raise this claim at this time. 4.Isle Royale Wilderness Act Plaintiffs allege that the NPS has violated the Isle Royale Wilderness Act, Pub.L.No. 94-567, 90 Stat. 2692 (1976). They point to the following language in the legislative history in support of this claim: “The Committee understands that no significant expansion of boat docks numbers [sic] is anticipated, but that continued maintenance of these facilities is essential to the continued ease of access as well as the health and safety of the visitors.” S.Rep. No. 94-1357, at 5 (1976). Plaintiffs claim that NPS has failed to maintain docks properly and that the proposed implementation of NPS’s plan to remove four docks and add six new docks violates the Isle Royale Wilderness Act, as evidenced by the quoted language from the legislative history. They also allege that this act is violated because docks in Hugginin Cove and Hay Bay, which were usable in 1976, have either been allowed to deteriorate so as to be unusable, or have been removed, and because NPS has taken over docks formerly used by the public in Rock Harbor and designated them as being for NPS use only. NPS’ decisions as to dock locations under the GMP cannot be deemed contrary to the Isle Royale Wilderness Act. As has been mentioned, NPS maintains discretion to manage Isle Royale, and this discretion includes the ability to manage Isle Royale’s waters. Whether or not this Court agrees with the proposed placement is not the issue; rather, the issue is whether the proposed placements violate statutory language or are arbitrary and capricious. Under the GMP, Plaintiffs will have access to two more docks than they have current access to. There is no indication in the record that the total amount of dock space will be any less under the GMP than the total amount of dock space currently available. While Plaintiffs may not agree with the placement of the new docks, this matter is firmly within the NPS’ discretion under the relevant statutes. The fact that Plaintiffs will have more docks available shows that their “ease of access” to the Park is not being hampered by the proposed dock demolition and construction under the GMP. Regarding the maintenance issue, Plaintiffs have submitted a letter from Isle Royale’s superintendent, Douglas A. Barnard, to John C. Ylitalo, a member of “the first group of concerned boaters that I [Barnard] met with .... ” (Letter from Barnard to Ylitalo of 5/8/97 at 1.) This letter was not submitted to this Court as part of the administrative record. The administrative record in a case “includes all materials compiled by the agency[] that were before the agency at the time the decision was made.” Slater, 120 F.3d at 638 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). “Several reasons justify supplementation of the administrative record, such as when an agency deliberately or negligently excludes certain documents ....” Id. In the case at hand, the letter from Barnard to Ylitalo was certainly “before the agency at the time the decision was made”; it was written on May 8, 1997, and the GMP was issued on August 17, 1998. This document will therefore be admitted to supplement the administrative record, because it was either deliberately or negligently excluded from the record and its consideration helps the full and accurate resolution of this case. In this letter, Barnard admits that “[w]e have not been able to devote funding to the docks, all of which are deteriorating rapidly and need extensive repair.” (Letter from Barnard to Ylitalo at 2.) NPS has an obligation under the language contained in the legislative history of the Isle Royale Wilderness Act to maintain the docks at the Park. It appears that they may not be meeting their obligations in this respect. On the other hand, Plaintiffs have cited no evidence in the record showing that any docks have been allowed to deteriorate so as to be unusable. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have cited no evidence in the record which shows that NPS’ failure to maintain the docks has had any effect on Plaintiffs. Even assuming that every dock on the island is in need of maintenance, if Plaintiffs cannot show that they have suffered some concrete harm as a result they do not have standing under Lujan. The only concrete injuries Plaintiffs allege due to a lack of maintenance on the docks is that two docks have become unusable and the dock at Siskiwit Bay has been slated to be demolished. Plaintiffs’ lack of demonstration of any evidence in the administrative record on these points means that summary judgment is proper for defendants. “ ‘[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.’ ” Florida Power & Light, Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 1607, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985) (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 1244, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973)). “The task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706, to the agency decision based on the record the agency presents to the reviewing court.” Id. at 743-44, 105 S.Ct. at 1607. Therefore, while a court may allow supplementation of the administrative record, see Slater, 120 F.3d at 638, such supplementation should be limited. Id. In light of the fact that “the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence”, Florida Power & Light, 470 U.S. at 743, 105 S.Ct. at 1607, and that Plaintiffs have cited no facts in the administrative record in support of their contention that three docks have been affected or will be potentially affected in one way or another due to a lack of maintenance, summary judgment against them is proper. While Rule 56(c) provides that “[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, ... together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” id., [i]n eases like the instant one, where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.” Such a motion, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, will be “made and supported as provided in this rule,” and Rule 56(e) therefore requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (1986). To put it succinctly, in a case requesting review of agency action under the APA, a party challenging the action as arbitrary and capricious may not withstand a summary judgment motion by the government without citing to the administrative record, or, possibly, some evidence outside of the administrative record, on the relevant point. Because Plaintiffs have not done so, summary judgment against them on this point is warranted. Even if Plaintiffs identified evidence outside the administrative record regarding these contentions, this Court believes that two docks becoming unusable due to lack of maintenance, and one’s lack of maintenance factoring into a decision to replace that dock, does not rise to the level of violating the requirements of the Isle Royale Wilderness Act. That act contemplates the continued maintenance of docks at the Park; it does not contemplate the continued maintenance and existence to perpetuity of every dock currently at the Park. Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded as much in oral argument. Thus, even if Plaintiffs did have standing to sue as to a lack of maintenance on all the docks, the only effects they have alleged to result from this lack of maintenance do not rise to the level of violating the Isle Royale Wilderness Act. It is true that NPS noted that “[a]ll four docks proposed for removal ... would have to be replaced within the life of the plan,” (GMP at 141); but the life of the plan is “at least the next 15- — 20 years.” (GMP at v.) In addition, NPS itself “agrees that the need to repair or replace facilities does not, in and of itself, justify changing the park’s infrastructure.” (GMP at 161.) Therefore, NPS stated that maintenance considerations were not the primary considerations in replacing the four docks they propose replacing, and Plaintiffs have pointed to no evidence in the record to refute this claim. Indeed, replacement of the four docks at issue with the six proposed docks is perfectly consistent with NPS’ desire to separate uses in the Park and “meet the diverse expectations and needs of Isle Royale visitors.” (GMP at 34.) Plaintiffs also allege that NPS taking over docks in Rock Harbor and designating them solely for NPS use violates the Isle Royale Wilderness Act. Again, they have pointed to no evidence in the administrative record as to this claim, so summary judgment on this point is appropriate. It seems highly doubtful that NPS closed enough docks in this area to impede substantially on the right of boaters to access the Park. Plaintiffs are entitled to an examination of the legislative history of the Isle Royale Wilderness Act. ‘When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). “If [the agency’s] choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history, that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.” Id. at 845, 104 S.Ct. at 2783 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis added). “[E]ven the most basic general principles of statutory construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent. Accordingly, we turn to the legislative history of [the relevant act].” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 94 S.Ct. 690, 693, 38 L.Ed.2d 646 (1974) (citation omitted). But see Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417, 112 S.Ct. 1394, 1401, 118 L.Ed.2d 52 (1992) (“If the agency interpretation is not in conflict with the plain language of the statute, deference is due”) (citing K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 292, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1818, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988)). “As in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of [the statute] in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve.” Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 118, 103 S.Ct. 986, 995, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, alteration in original). Keeping in mind that specific statutory language controls general language, FDIC v. Bates, 42 F.3d 369, 372 (6th Cir.1994), it appears that the purposes Congress sought to serve are best achieved by construing the legislative history to guarantee boaters sufficient access to docks at the Park to assure their ease of access and safety, while not requiring NPS to maintain all existing docks in their existing locations. In making Isle Royale a part of the National Wilderness system, Congress made the Park part of an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and which (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man’s work substantially unnoticeable; [and] (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation .... 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c). Congress also made Isle Royale into an area “administered by the Secretary of the Interior in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Wilderness Act.” P.L. 94-567, 90 Stat. 2692 § 6. NPS is proposing to change the location of a number of docks, not to eliminate docks without replacing them. One of its primary objectives in doing so is to separate uses, that is, to ensure that the park “has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation.” 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c). It is also attempting to protect the wilderness resource and to administer Isle Royale “for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave [it] unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of these areas [and] the preservation of their wilderness character.” 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a). Were NPS proposing to eliminate and replace all current docks, the language of the legislative history might be implicated. Similarly, the language of the statute might be implicated if NPS was proposing a large reduction in the amount of available dock space. But that is not the situation presented in this case. Instead, NPS has proposed changing the locations of four docks, and adding two additional docks, with no indications in the record that this will result in drastically fewer docking opportunities for boaters. In these circumstances, and in light of the purposes of Congress in classifying Isle Royale as a wilderness, this Court cannot say that NPS’ proposed actions violate the Isle Royale Wilderness Act. 5. National Park Service Organic Act and Isle Royale National Park Act Plaintiffs state that both the NPSOA and the IRNPA mandate that NPS balance the goals of use and enjoyment and of resource protection. They claim that the GMP emphasizes resource protection at the expense of visitor use and enjoyment, and that it therefore violates these acts. The GMP, however, does not emphasize resource protection over visitor use and enjoyment. For one thing, there will be more docks after the GMP than existed before. As to the location of the docks, these are based mostly on the Park’s zoning, which is meant to establish a separation of uses. (GMP at 34 (“Docks would be removed from a few campgrounds to reduce noise and better meet the expectations of hikers and paddlers in these areas. Similarly, several new campgrounds with docks for motorboaters and paddlers are proposed in areas that are not accessible by trail. Docks would not be removed until the new docks in the vicinity were available for public use”).) The establishment of quiet/no-wake water zones is based equally on the goals of “reducing] noise and wake impacts.” (Id.) Again, this action is not based primarily on protecting resources, but, instead, on the goals of reducing wake impacts, and reducing noise to meet the expectations of hikers and paddlers. The same is true as regards the GMP’s restrictions upon on-board generator use by motorboaters, as well as other actions taken to maintain quiet in the Park. These actions, and others like them that may be proposed in the future, are meant “[t]o protect the natural quiet and wilderness values sought by most visitors.” (Id.) Removal of the Indian Portage Trail would be undertaken to “relieve use pressure in the area, separate uses, and protect archeological resources.” (Id. at 36.) Here again, separating uses is one of the goals meant to be achieved; elimination of the trail is not simply based on environmental concerns. Removal of the dock and breakwater at Siskiwit Bay is explained on page 37 of the GMP as permitting separation of uses and allowing reestablishment of the natural current along the shoreline. It seems likely that removal of the breakwater does not contribute to separation of uses. Removal of the breakwater, however, if based solely on environmental concerns, does not mean that the GMP as a whole emphasizes resource protection over use and enjoyment. NPS is charged with protecting the resources in the Park. Taking an action such as removing a breakwater is consistent with its mandate to protect t