Full opinion text
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE MASTER COMPLAINT BARKER, District Judge. This cause is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss the Master Complaint in this Multi District Litigation (“MDL”), filed by defendants Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., (“Firestone”) and Ford Motor Company (“Ford”). The motion is fully briefed, and the Court, being duly advised, GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the motion for the reasons set forth below. BACKGROUND The Master Complaint, which was filed in this Court on January 2, 2001, combines dozens of class action complaints involving Firestone tires that were filed in or removed to federal district courts throughout the country and transferred to this MDL proceeding. The named Plaintiffs in the Master Complaint are residents of 27 different states who seek to represent a class (“the Tire Class”) essentially consisting of “all persons and entities in the United States who now own or lease, or owned or leased, vehicles that are or were equipped with Firestone-brand ATX, ATX II, Firehawk ATX, ATX 23 Degree, Wide-track Radial Baja, Wilderness, or other comparably designed or manufactured Firestone-brand, steel-belted radial tires” (“the Tires”) and a separate class (“the Explorer Diminution Class”) essentially consisting of “all persons and entities in the United States who now own or lease, or owned or leased, Ford Explorer sport-utility vehicles, regardless of the tires with which those Explorers were equipped.” Defendant Firestone is an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in Nashville, Tennessee. Defendant Ford is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Dearborn, Michigan. The specific claims asserted in the Master Complaint are set out in detail below, but in general Plaintiffs allege that the Tires are defective due to their design and/or method of manufacture. The defect causes the Tires to have “an unreasonably dangerous propensity to suffer complete or substantial tread separation or ‘belt leaves belt’ separation.” Master Complaint, ¶ 4. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that certain models of the Ford Explorer have “significant handling and stability defects” which created “a substantial risk of rollovers and other safety problems.” Id., ¶¶ 63-66, 70. In order to compensate for these stability defects, Plaintiffs allege that Ford and Firestone agreed to lower the recommended tire pressure on the Firestone tires that were used as original equipment on the Explorer. This had the effect of lowering the likelihood of rollover accidents, but also had the effect of exacerbating the tire defect and “substantially increasing] the risk of tread separation and other catastrophic tire failures.” Id. at ¶¶ 70-71. The Master Complaint asserts federal claims pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1), and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962, and pendent state law claims for unjust enrichment, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, negligence, violation of consumer protection statutes, and redhibition (under Louisiana statute). The Master Complaint specifically excludes any claims for personal injury or wrongful death resulting from accidents caused by the alleged defects; rather, it seeks remedies for those Tire and Explorer owners who have not been involved in accidents, but allegedly have suffered injury simply because they own(ed) or lease(d) defective vehicles or vehicles with defective tires. ANALYSIS OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS I. Choice of Law Defendants have moved to dismiss the Master Complaint on a variety of grounds. Before addressing any of the arguments raised by Defendants, we must first determine the appropriate law to apply to each of Plaintiffs’ claims. For the federal claims asserted in the Master Complaint, the answer is relatively straightforward: for any questions of federal law about which federal circuits disagree, this Court, as the transferee court, applies the law of the federal circuit in which it sits, in this case the Seventh Circuit. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“[T]he law of a transferor forum on a federal question ... merits close consideration, but does not have stare decisis effect in a transferee forum situated in another circuit.”), judgment aff'd. by Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 109 S.Ct. 1676, 104 L.Ed.2d 113 (1989); Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1126 (7th Cir.1993) (“We agree with Korean Air Lines that a transferee court normally should use its own best judgment about the meaning of federal law when evaluating a federal claim.... ”). The choice of law issue for the state law claims in the Master Complaint is more complex, however. The threshold question is whether the relevant substantive laws of the different states involved are sufficiently different to require a choice of law analysis. See Jean v. Dugan, 20 F.3d 255, 260 (7th Cir.1994) (citation omitted) (“This court has held that before ‘entangling itself in messy issues of conflict of laws a court ought to satisfy itself that there actually is a difference between the relevant laws of the different states.’ ”). We conclude that Defendants have demonstrated such differences in the relevant states’ laws. We move to the next question, that is, which state’s choice of law analysis should be used. Guidance is provided by the Seventh Circuit’s holding that the choice of law rules of the forum state must be applied to determine the appropriate law to be applied to state law claims, whether they are premised on diversity of citizenship or are pendent to federal claims. Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 681 (7th Cir.1986). In MDL proceedings, the forum state generally is the state in which the transferor court of each individual action sits; in other words, the transferee court must make an independent choice of law determination for each state from which a case was transferred into the MDL proceeding. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594, 610 (7th Cir.1981) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964); In Re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass., on July 31, 1973, 399 F.Supp. 1106 (D.Mass.1975)). However, the parties agree that this Court should be treated as the forum court because Plaintiffs filed their Master Complaint in this Court. Indiana’s choice of law rules therefore are applicable. A. Law Applicable to Plaintiffs’ Tort Claims The Master Complaint asserts a common law negligence claim, as well as a claim for violation of state consumer protection statutes, the latter of which we view to be most closely analogous to a common law tort claim for fraudulent misrepresentation and therefore subject to the choice of law analysis for tort claims. Indiana follows a modified form of the traditional lex loci delicti commissi rule in analyzing the choice of law question in tort cases. Hubbard Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind.1987). Under the traditional rule, the substantive law of the “place of the tort” is applied-that is, the state in which the last event necessary to make the defendant liable for the alleged wrong took place, typically the state in which the injury occurred. Id. at 1073. Under the modified rule established by the Indiana Supreme Court in Greeson, this rule applies unless the place of the tort “bears little connection to the legal action.” In those cases, other factors are considered, such as: 1) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; 2) the residence or place of business of the parties; and 3) the place where the relationship between the parties is centered. Id. at 1073-74 (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 145(2) (1971)). “These factors should be evaluated according to their relative importance to the particular issues being litigated.” Id. at 1074. Following the dictates of Greeson, we begin our choice of law analysis for the tort claims in the Master Complaint by determining the place of the tort for each named Plaintiff. As noted above, the place of the tort typically is the state in which the injury to the plaintiff occurred. In this case, Defendants argue, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that any injury suffered by Plaintiffs occurred in each Plaintiffs home state, or perhaps more precisely in the state in which each Plaintiff purchased an Explorer or one or more of the Tires. Whether these states “bear little connection” to this litigation turns on the nature of the tort claims in this action. The essence of Plaintiffs’ tort claims is that Defendants were negligent in “designing, manufacturing, advertising, and selling” vehicles and tires that were unreasonably dangerous. Master Complaint, ¶ 327. This negligence allegedly caused Plaintiffs to suffer actual damages and has threatened them with “irreparable harm by undue risk of physical injuries or death.” Id. at ¶ 329. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants violated “any and all state consumer protection statutes” in a number of ways, including by representing “through their advertising, warranties, and other express representations, that the [Firestone tires] and Explorers had benefits or characteristics that they did not actually have.” Id. at ¶ 308. Plaintiffs therefore seek compensatory and punitive damages as well as equitable relief. The basic factual allegations in the Master Complaint relating to Plaintiffs’ tort claims are as follow: 1. The Firestone tires at issue are defective due to their design and/or method of manufacture. The defect causes the tires to have “an unreasonably dangerous propensity to suffer complete or substantial tread separation or ‘belt leaves belt’ separation.” Master Complaint, ¶ 4. 2. Ford designed, marketed and sold the Explorer with “significant handling and stability defects” which created “a substantial risk of rollovers and other safety problems.” Id. at ¶¶ 63-66, 70. 3. Ford’s engineers recommended certain design modifications that would correct these defects, but Ford did not implement those changes because they would have caused a delay in production of the Explorer. Id. at ¶ 70. 4. Instead of implementing the modifications recommended by their engineers, Ford, with Bridgestone and Firestone’s agreement, utilized a “quick fix” to the Explorer’s rollover problem: it lowered the tire pressure on the Firestone tires used as original equipment on the Explorer. This had the effect of lowering the likelihood of rollover accidents, but also had the effect of exacerbating the tire defect and “substantially increasing] the risk of tread separation and other catastrophic tire failures.” Id. at ¶¶ 70-71. 5. Defendants failed to conduct safety tests on the Explorer with the lowered tire pressure. Id. at ¶ 78. 6. Defendants knew that the Explorer’s weight capacity of 750 to 1310 pounds, depending on the model, was likely to be exceeded with normal use of the vehicle, thereby further increasing the risk of tire failure. Id. at ¶ 77. 7. Defendants knew of the defects in the Firestone tires and the Explorer and the fact that they had caused numerous accidents resulting in serious injuries and death, especially in hot weather climates, but chose to “cover up” those defects for several years before finally announcing a limited recall in August 2000. Id. at ¶¶ 79-93. 8. The August 2000 recall was inadequate because it did not include all models of Firestone tires with the tread separation defect. Id. at ¶ 105. 9. Ford has increased its recommended tire pressure for Explorers, forcing Explorer owners into “a potentially deadly catch 22” of choosing between the higher tire pressure, which leads to a higher rollover risk, or the lower tire pressure, which leads to a higher tread separation risk. Id. at ¶¶ 120-21. 10. Defendants made fraudulent misrepresentations in their national advertising campaigns regarding the “features, safety, quality, and value” of the Firestone tires and Explorers which induced the Plaintiffs to purchase or lease them. Id. at ¶ 122. An examination of these allegations indicates that the place where each allegedly defective tire and/or Explorer was purchased or used is insignificant to Plaintiffs’ claims. All of the alleged tortious conduct took place at each Defendant’s principal place of business — Michigan for Ford, Tennessee for Firestone. Ford and Firestone sell their products in every state in the nation. The place where each Plaintiff purchased his or her vehicle or tire is entirely irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ tort claims, as evidenced by the fact that, under Plaintiffs’ theory, each Plaintiff would have suffered the identical injury wherever he or she purchased or used the defective tire or vehicle. Thus, we conclude that any place where the tort manifested itself other than the point of manufacturing and marketing has little connection to the tort claims in the Master Complaint. This result is consistent with Indiana cases and federal cases applying Indiana law. For example, in KPMG Peat Marwick v. Asher, 689 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), a class of nearly 600 Indiana farmers sued the accounting firm of KPMG Peat Marwick (“Peat Marwick”) for negligently auditing the financial statements of Merchants Grain, Inc. (“MGI”), a company that operated grain elevators in Indiana and other states. MGI filed bankruptcy after failing to pay for the grain the farmers deposited in MGI’s elevators. The farmers alleged that Peat Marwick’s negligent audit of MGI permitted MGI to renew its federal license to operate grain elevators, and that “had the financial statements fairly portrayed the financial condition of MGI in all material respects, MGI would not have been eligible for USDA licensing.” Id. at 1285. The court applied the Indiana choice of law rule for tort claims as set forth in Greeson. The parties agreed that the place of the tort was Indiana, and the defendant argued that Indiana had a significant connection to the lawsuit because the plaintiffs were farmers who resided in Indiana and deposited their grain in elevators located in Indiana in “alleged reliance upon the existence of a USDA license posted on the wall” in Indiana. The court, however, disagreed, noting that: Designated evidence indicated the audit was prepared by Peat Marwick in Missouri, for a client whose principal place of business was Missouri, for submission to a Missouri office of USDA, which office then relicensed MGI. The presence of these facts in an action for accountant negligence render insignificant, in a choice-or-law [sic.] analysis, the Indiana nature of the farmers’ contacts. Id. at 1287. In other words, because all of the defendant’s conduct relevant to the plaintiffs’ tort claims took place in Missouri, and the plaintiffs would have suffered the same injury whether they had deposited their grain in Indiana or in an MGI elevator located in another state, the court determined that Indiana’s connection to the lawsuit was insignificant. See also Castelli v. Steele, 700 F.Supp. 449 (S.D.Ind.1988) (finding that the place of the tort, Illinois, bore little connection to a medical malpractice action filed by an Illinois resident who received alleged negligent medical care while in Indiana and negligent advice in Illinois over the phone from the same Indiana doctor). Because in this case any place other than where the Tires and the Explorers were manufactured bears no significant connection to the Plaintiffs’ tort claims, Greeson instructs that we must consider other factors to determine the appropriate law to apply, such as: the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, the residence or place of business of the parties, and the place where the relationship between the parties is centered. These and any other relevant factors are to be evaluated “according to their relative importance to the particular issues being litigated.” Greeson, 515 N.E.2d at 1074. Applying the Greeson factors to this case, we note that the named Plaintiffs reside in 27 different states, and the proposed classes include residents of all 50 states and the District of Columbia. However, as discussed in detail above, we find no basis on which to conclude that the residences of Plaintiffs are important to this litigation. Neither is the fact that Firestone, by virtue of its place of incorporation, is an Ohio corporation or that Ford is a Delaware corporation. Further, the relationship between the parties is simply that of buyer and seller; while Plaintiffs allegedly were injured because they bought Defendants’ products, the place where they were purchased is not significant to a Plaintiffs tort claims. What is significant, and what will be the focus of this litigation, is the conduct of Defendants as manufacturers. As set forth above, Plaintiffs assert, and Defendants do not dispute, that virtually all of the alleged tortious conduct by the Defendants took place at each Defendant’s principal place of business-Michigan for Ford and Tennessee for Firestone. In short, that is where the allegedly defective tires and Explorers were designed; that is where Ford allegedly made the decision not to institute the design changes recommended by its engineers, but rather to lower the recommended tire pressure for the Explorer; that is where decisions regarding advertising were made; and that is where all decisions regarding the scope of the recall were made. Just as the court in Asher determined that Missouri law should apply because Missouri was “the place where virtually all of the acts of the alleged negligent audit occurred,” 689 N.E.2d at 1287, and the court in Castelli determined that Indiana law should apply because all of the defendant-doctors’ alleged negligent actions occurred in Indiana, 700 F.Supp. at 454-44, this court determines that, for purposes of Plaintiffs’ tort claims, the law of Michigan should apply to Ford and the law of Tennessee should apply to Firestone. Further, Plaintiffs’ claims for violation of state consumer protection statutes will be treated as a claim for violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”), Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.901 et seq., against Ford, and a claim for violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), TenmCode Ann. § 47-18-104 et seq., against Firestone. To the extent that the Master Complaint purports to assert claims under any other states’ consumer protection statutes, those claims are hereby DISMISSED. B. Law Applicable to Plaintiffs’ Contract Claims In addition to their tort claims, Plaintiffs assert claims for breach- of express warranty and breach of implied warranty. These claims, which are premised on sections of the Uniform Commercial Code, sound in contract, and therefore Indiana’s choice of law rules for contract claims apply. See Thiele v. Faygo Beverage, Inc., 489 N.E.2d 562, 577 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) (holding that warranty actions based on the Uniform Commercial Code sound in contract). In addition, Plaintiffs assert a claim for unjust enrichment, which is a quasi-contractual claim, and is therefore also analyzed under the choice of law rules for contracts. See Community Care Centers, Inc. v. Sullivan, 701 N.E.2d 1234, 1239 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (describing claim for unjust enrichment as quasi-contractual in nature), trans. denied (1999); Johnson v. Ventra Group, Inc., 191 F.3d 732, 741 (6th Cir.1999) (citation omitted) (noting that “Michigan’s choice of law rules governing contract actions have also been applied to the quasi-contractual claim of unjust enrichment”). To determine the applicable law in a contract claim, Indiana courts “ ‘will consider all acts of the parties touching the transaction in relation to the several states involved and will apply as the law governing the transaction the law of that state with which the facts are in most intimate contact.’ ” Greeson, 515 N.E.2d at 1073 (citation omitted). For all of the reasons noted in the previous discussion of Plaintiffs’ tort claims, we conclude that Tennessee and Michigan have the most intimate contact with the facts relevant to Plaintiffs’ breach of warranty claims against Firestone and Ford, respectively. While Defendants note that “Plaintiffs presumably negotiated and acquired their tires and/or vehicles, primarily used their equipment, and negotiated and received any repair or replacement in their home states,” Reply Brief 1 at 9, these are not the most significant acts relevant to Plaintiffs’ breach of warranty claims. In reality, there was no negotiation between the parties regarding either the warranties or the tire replacement under the recall. Indeed, under Plaintiffs’ theories, it is entirely irrelevant where each Plaintiff purchased Defendants’ products, used Defendants’ products most regularly, or resided at the time of purchase or when the Master Complaint was filed. Therefore, it cannot be said that any of those states has the most intimate contacts with the facts of this case. Instead, the facts in dispute all center in Tennessee and Michigan, where Defendants made and executed their decisions regarding both the formation of and alleged breach of any applicable warranties. Therefore, we shall apply Tennessee law to Plaintiffs’ contract-based claims against Firestone, and Michigan law to Plaintiffs’ contract-based claims against Ford. C. Choice of Law Analysis Applied to Plaintiffs’ Redhibition Claims In addition to the claims discussed above, the Fourteenth Claim for Relief in the Master Complaint is a claim for breach of the warranty against redhibitory defects under Louisiana law. Redhibition is the voidance of a sale of a consumer product on the ground that the product has a defect rendering it either useless or so imperfect that the buyer would not have originally purchased it. Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Ed.1999). Louisiana courts generally treat such claims as contractual in nature. See Scruggs v. Minton Equip. Co., Inc., 722 So.2d 130, 132 (La.App.1998) (stating that it is “well settled” that “[r]edhibition is based primarily in contract”); but see Datamatic, Inc. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 613 F.Supp. 715, 718 (W.D.La.1985) (citing Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.1963)) (“Redhibition cases have been aligned with tort actions in conflicts analysis.”). Whether viewed as a contract or tort action, however, as noted above, Michigan and Tennessee law, not Louisiana law, apply to Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs do not allege that a redhibition claim is viable under either Tennessee or Michigan law; therefore, Plaintiffs may not maintain an action for breach of warranty against red-hibitory defects in this action, and Plaintiffs’ fourteenth claim for relief is hereby DISMISSED. II. Standard Applicable to Motion to Dismiss Defendants move to dismiss various claims in the Master Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that each fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This motion may be granted as to any given claim only if it is clear that Plaintiffs could not prove any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the Master Complaint that would support their claim for relief. See Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 402 (7th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 880, 121 S.Ct. 191, 148 L.Ed.2d 132. In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all facts asserted in the Master Complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in Plaintiffs’ favor. Id. The Court must also consider facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss, as long as they are consistent with the Master Complaint. Highsmith v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 18 F.3d 434, 439-40 (7th Cir.1994). III. Sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ Allegations of Injury Defendants contend that the state law claims of all but three of the named Plaintiffs should be dismissed because Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they have suffered any legally cognizable injury as a result of Defendants’ actions. Simply put, Defendants argue that the law provides no remedy for a defective product unless or until the defect manifests itself in some way and causes injury to person or property, and in this case Plaintiffs have alleged only that there is a risk that the alleged defects may cause a tread separation and/or rollover accident in the future. The Tire Class Plaintiffs counter that the injury to their tires has, in fact, manifested itself because, as a result of the defect in the Tires, “[a]s soon as any driving is done, the tire starts to deteriorate abnormally, developing fatigue cracks that, while imperceptible at first, grow and spread” and will eventually lead to tread separation. Plaintiffs’ Opposition at 54 (emphasis in original). The Explorer Diminution Class alleges that.it has suffered injury in the form of the diminished resale value of their Explorers. Because the nature of injury required to maintain a cause of action differs depending upon the legal theory asserted, we will examine each cause of action in the Master Complaint to determine whether the injury pled by Plaintiffs is sufficient. A. Negligence In their Thirteenth Claim for Relief, entitled “Negligence,” Plaintiffs assert the following: 326. [Defendants] had a duty to Plaintiffs and the Classes to exercise reasonable and ordinary care in the formulation, testing, design, manufacture, and marketing of the Tires and Explorers. 327. [Defendants] breached their duty to Plaintiffs and the Classes by designing, manufacturing, advertising and selling the Plaintiffs and the Classes Tires that have an unreasonably dangerous propensity to experience a sudden and substantial tread separation, and Explorers that have an unreasonably dangerous propensity to roll over, and by failing to promptly recall the Tires and Explorers or take other appropriate remedial action. 328. [Defendants] should have known that the tires and Explorers were unreasonably dangerous and not as warranted and represented by [Defendants]. 329. As a direct and proximate cause of [Defendants’] negligence, Plaintiffs and the Classes have suffered actual damages, and members of the Classes are threatened with irreparable harm by undue risk of physical injuries or death. This is a classic product liability tort claim: Plaintiffs allege that Defendants designed and sold unreasonably dangerous (that is, defective) products that have caused them injury. However, the injuries alleged by Plaintiffs are not the typical tort damages of injury to person or property resulting from malfunction of a defective product. Indeed, the Tire Class Plaintiffs’ tires have not malfunctioned (or, as Plaintiffs would say, have not, malfunctioned yet); neither have the Explorer Diminution Class Plaintiffs’ vehicles malfunctioned. Rather, Plaintiffs allege that they have been injured by their propensity to malfunction. The issue, then, is whether, under Michigan or Tennessee law, this is a sufficient assertion of injury to sustain a product liability tort claim. Our view is that it is not. The sale of a defective product, in and of itself, is not an actionable tort. An essential element of a product liability tort claim is an injury to the plaintiffs person or property: An actionable tort, whether based on negligence or strict liability, consists of two elements: a failure to act in accordance with the standard of care required by law and a resultant injury. While the sale of a defective product creates a potential for liability, the law grants no cause of action for inchoate wrongs. However egregious the legal fault, there is no cause of action for negligence or products liability until there is “actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another.” Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1136 (5th Cir.1985) (citing Pros-ser and Keeton on Torts, § 30 at 165 (5th ed.1984)); see also Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir.1985) (“[T]here is generally no cause of action in tort until a plaintiff has suffered identifiable, compensable injury”). As Prosser and Keeton explain, “[t]he threat of future harm, not yet realized, is not enough. Negligent conduct is itself not such an interference with the interests of the world at large that there is any right to complain of it, or to be free from it, except in the case of some individual whose interests have suffered.” W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts 165 (5th ed.1984). Although Plaintiffs assert that the Tires have developed fatigue cracks, they do not allege that those cracks have in any way affected the current performance of the Tires. Rather, what the Tire Class Plaintiffs really seek to recover for in this action is the possibility, or increased probability as compared to a non-defective tire, that the Tires will suffer a tread separation in the future because of the defect. Similarly, those Plaintiffs who own(ed) or lease(d) Explorers (including the Explorer subclass in the Tire Class and the Explorer Diminution Class Plaintiffs) seek to recover for the possibility that their Explorers will roll over, or for the lower resale price they might get because of that possibility. These simply are not cognizable tort injuries. Analogous cases from throughout the country support this holding. For example, in Weaver v. Chrysler Corp., 172 F.R.D. 96 (S.D.N.Y.1997), the plaintiff alleged that integrated safety seats in certain Chrysler vehicles were defective because they improperly unlatched and separated. The court found the fact that the plaintiff did not allege that the child seat in his vehicle had ever malfunctioned to be fatal to the plaintiffs tort claims. Id. at 100 (“Where, as here, a product performs satisfactorily and never exhibits the alleged defect, no cause of action lies.”). Similarly, in In re Air Bag Prods. Liab. Lit., 7 F.Supp.2d 792 (E.D.La.1998), the plaintiffs alleged that the air bags in their automobiles were defective because they could seriously injure or kill front seat passengers when they deployed. The court determined that the plaintiffs had failed to state a tort claim because they themselves had not been injured by the air bags; in other words, they had not suffered any manifest injury as a result of the defect. Id. at 806 (“Thus, plaintiffs’ failure to demonstrate or, even allege, manifest injury or defect shatters an essential element of all their tort and implied warranty claims.”). See also Willett v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 929 F.2d 1094, 1099-1100 (5th Cir.1991) (while deciding the case on other grounds, noting that “[wjhile we recognize that the fear of an unknowable, but potentially fatal, defect in a heart valve is perfectly rational, and almost certainly sincere, we have serious concerns about permitting recovery for such fear absent actual failure of the valve”); Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 794 F.Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (“New York generally does not recognize a cause of action for a faulty heart valve until the valve actually fails and causes a physical harm.”), aff'd in part and rev’d in part, 984 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.1993); Pfizer, Inc. v. Farsian, 682 So.2d 405, 407 (Ala.1996) (“Alabama courts have never allowed a recovery based on a product that ... is and has been working properly.”). The cases cited by Plaintiffs do not support their contention that they have suffered an actionable tort injury. In San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 37 Cal.App.4th 1318, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 305 (1995), the plaintiff school district sued for damages resulting from the presence of asbestos-containing products in some of its school buildings. In the context of determining when the statute of limitations began to run on the plaintiffs claims, the court considered the issue of “what constitutes the element of damage for purposes of strict liability and negligence.” Id. at 1327, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d at 310. The court determined that the mere presence of asbestos in a building did not constitute an actionable injury for tort purposes, because “the mere presence of asbestos constitutes only a threat of future harm.” Id. at 1330, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d at 315. Instead, tort injury occurs when asbestos contamination occurs-that is, when asbestos fibers are released into the air of the building. Id. at 1334, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d at 314. It is at that point that the health of the occupants of the building is threatened, and therefore it is at that point that a tort injury has occurred. Application of this holding to the facts of the instant case makes it clear that simply owning tires or a vehicle with a defect is much like owning a building with asbestos in it. Plaintiffs are faced with the threat that the tires may suffer from a tread separation incident at any given moment, or that their vehicle will roll over in the event of an accident, in the same way the building owner is faced with the threat that the asbestos may escape into the air at any given moment. But until that occurs, no legally cognizable tort has been committed. Neither does In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir.1990), support Plaintiffs’ position. In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that they were exposed to PCBs released into the environment by the defendants, and that as a result they suffered immune system damage that left them susceptible to a variety of illnesses, none of which they had yet contracted. The plaintiffs asserted that they were required to undergo medical monitoring so that if they ultimately did contract an illness as a result of their PCB exposure, it would be detected and treated as early as possible. The plaintiffs sought to recover the cost of that medical monitoring from the defendants. In determining that the “non-traditional tort” of medical monitoring did exist under Pennsylvania law, the court made clear that its holding was based upon a policy decision that plaintiffs who are exposed to toxic substances and must undergo medical surveillance as a result are entitled to a remedy. The court acknowledged the fact that traditional tort law would not provide such plaintiffs with a remedy, because they could not demonstrate the manifest injury usually required for a tort claim. Therefore, it was necessary for a new tort cause of action-one with the very narrow remedy of compensation for necessary medical monitoring-to be created in order to fill the void. Obviously, this narrow new tort is wholly inapplicable to Plaintiffs’ claims in this case, and Plaintiffs’ attempt to analogize their request for replacement tires to the remedy of medical monitoring is, while creative, ultimately unavailing. For the reasons set forth above, as to all Plaintiffs except Gustafson, Wehking, and Simpson, Plaintiffs’ Thirteenth Claim for Relief is hereby DISMISSED, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. B. RICO Claims Plaintiffs’ claims asserted in their Second through Seventh Claims for Relief of the Master Complaint are based on the federal RICO Act. They allege on behalf of the Tire Class (Second Claim for Relief) and the Explorer Diminution Class (Third Claim for Relief) that defendants received income from a pattern of racketeering and used or invested that income to operate and expand the enterprises defined in the Master Complaint, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). Master Complaint, ¶¶ 239, 266. On behalf of the Tire Class (Fourth Claim for Relief) and the Explorer Diminution Class (Fifth Claim for Relief), Plaintiffs allege that the defendants conducted and/or participated in the conduct of the affairs of the “enterprises” through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Id. at ¶¶ 274, 284. In Sixth Claim for Relief (on behalf of the Tire Class) and Seventh Claim for Relief (on behalf of the Explorer Diminution Class), Plaintiffs allege that Defendants conspired, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), to commit the aforementioned violations of sections 1962(a) and 1962(c). Id. at ¶¶ 291, 295. In order to maintain a civil action for damages under any of these theories, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 requires that a plaintiff plead and prove that he has been “injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.” Just as Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs have not pled a cognizable injury to support their negligence claims, they also argue that all of Plaintiffs’ RICO claims must fail for lack of the requisite injury to business or property. For each of the RICO claims asserted on behalf of the Tire Class, Plaintiffs allege that they have been injured because: they have been forced to bear the financial loss associated with the cost of replacing the Tires and/or the diminished value of their vehicles equipped with the Tires now that the truth regarding their safety and lack of roadworthiness is known. Plaintiffs and the Tire Class were also injured because Defendants withheld information about safety risks concerning the Tires which, if known, would have caused consumers not to buy or lease, or to pay substantially less for, the Tires or vehicles equipped with the Tires. Master Complaint, ¶¶241, 278, and 292. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants’ RICO violations have injured the Explorer Diminution Class because: they have been forced to bear the financial loss associated with the diminished value of their Explorers now that the truth regarding their safety and lack of roadworthiness is known. Plaintiffs and the Explorer Diminution Class were also injured because defendants withheld information about the safety risks concerning the Explorer which, if known, would have caused consumers not to purchase or lease, or to pay substantially less for, Explorers. Id. at ¶¶ 268, 288, and 296. The Master Complaint does not allege that those Plaintiffs who have replaced their tires did so as a result of their tires failing, nor does it allege that Plaintiffs suffered any pecuniary loss as the result of actual tire failure. The Master Complaint also does not allege that any plaintiff has incurred an actual monetary loss as the result of the alleged diminished value of the Tires or Explorers by selling or attempting to sell them. The nature of Plaintiffs’ alleged RICO injuries are thus of two general but interdependent types. First, they claim that the Tires (or vehicles equipped with them) and Explorers are not worth' what they paid for them or that they would not have bought them at all. In other words, their injury is the diminished value of their property. Second, Plaintiffs claim to have been injured because they have expended money — either in purchasing the Tires and/or Explorers or in replacing allegedly defective tires. We hold that these allegations do not satisfy the injury to business or property requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1964. Federal courts have consistently and repeatedly held that to satisfy the injury requirement of section 1964, a plaintiff must prove an actual, concrete monetary loss (i.e., an “out-of-pocket” loss). See, e.g., In re Taxable Municipal Bond Securities Litigation, 51 F.3d 518, 523 (5th Cir.1995) (RICO claim dismissed for failure to show conclusive financial loss); Steele v. Hospital Corp. of America, 36 F.3d 69, 70-71 (9th Cir.1994) (patients who had not paid out money as a result of alleged scheme that reduced their insurance benefits could not show required concrete financial loss); Dornberger v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 961 F.Supp. 506, 521-22 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (RICO injury requires showing of actual, out-of pocket financial loss). An injury that is speculative or contingent on future events that may or may not occur is insufficient to satisfy the injury requirement. See, e.g., Imagineering v. Knighten Bros. Construction, 976 F.2d 1303, 1310-11 (9th Cir.1992) (RICO claim dismissed because alleged injury required speculation that other events would have occurred); Lincoln House v. Dupre, 903 F.2d 845, 847 (1st Cir.1990) (allegation of RICO injury that is contingent on outcome of separate litigation is purely speculative and not ripe for resolution); Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, 897 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir.1990) (plaintiffs allegation that RICO violation would cause him to lose commissions in future too speculative to satisfy injury requirement); Arabian American Oil. Co. v. Scarfone, 713 F.Supp. 1420, 1421 (M.D.Fl.1989) (speculation that injury might be inflicted is insufficient to state RICO claim); Anitora Travel v. Lapian, 677 F.Supp. 209, 216 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (no RICO injury absent allegation of actual, present injury, rather than speculative injury that may only possibly occur in the future). Guided by these principles, we turn to an examination of Plaintiffs’ specific allegations of the injury caused by Defendants’ RICO violations. As noted above, Plaintiffs allege, both on behalf of the Tire Class and the Explorer Diminution Class, that Defendants’ fraudulent conduct induced them to purchase tires and/or vehicles that, because of their inherent defects, are of diminished value. They maintain that they have suffered an injury for which RICO provides a remedy because they “paid inflated prices to buy or lease products the market has now devalued because their previously concealed design defects render them unsafe.” Plaintiffs’ Opposition at 43. According to Plaintiffs, these diminished values, along with the “out-of-pocket costs Plaintiffs are paying to replace inherently defective tires,” demonstrate that Plaintiffs “have already sustained real pecuniary losses.” Id. Despite their description of injury in the past tense, Plaintiffs’ assertion of financial loss is grounded in the possibility of future events that may cause them to suffer the loss associated with the products they claim are defective or diminished in value: the tires that they have unilaterally replaced or may replace in the future may suffer tread separation; they may receive on trade-in or resale of their Explorers (or other vehicles equipped with the Tires) less than they would have received absent the alleged defects. As numerous appellate and district courts have held, however, RICO affords a monetary remedy only to plaintiffs who have actually realized the diminished value or experienced product failure, and not to those who allege a risk (or even a probability) of such loss. In Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472 (3d Cir.2000), the Third Circuit recently addressed a similar claim. The plaintiffs were insured members of an HMO plan provided by Aetna. They asserted RICO claims based primarily on the defendants’ alleged fraudulent advertising about the quality and features of the HMO plan, maintaining that they were injured because the defendants actually maintained procedures and practices inconsistent with their advertising campaign. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ RICO violations caused them to pay “more for their HMO plans than those plans were worth.” Id. at 480. Relying on numerous RICO decisions requiring tangible financial loss, the Third Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ “overpayment” theory of RICO injury. The court held that: appellants cannot establish that they suffered a tangible economic harm com-pensable under RICO unless they allege that health care they received under Aetna’s plan actually was compromised or diminished as a result of Aetna’s management decisions challenged in the complaint.... There is no factual basis for appellants’ conclusory allegation that they have been injured in their “property” because the health insurance they actually received was inferior and therefore “worth less” than what they paid for it. Id. at 488. The Third Circuit’s discussion of the plaintiffs’ diminution in value theory is particularly instructive in this case: [W]e also reject appellants’ theory of RICO injury resting on the purported diminution in product value because, ... as a matter of simple logic, they obviously cannot show that they actually received something “inferior” and “worth less” absent individualized allegations concerning the quantity and quality of health care benefits Aetna provided under its HMO plan. Put differently, assuming arguendo that the injury claimed is predicated solely on the alleged financial loss of premium dollars stemming from appellants’ purchase of an “inferior health care product,” the harm alleged, ie., overpayment, cannot exist absent proof of some level of inferi- or treatment under Aetna’s HMO plan. Rather, the occurrence of an injury-causing event such as, for example, a denial of adequate care or a delay in treatment is viewed more appropriately as the contingency upon which appellants’ economic damages are dependent. In other words, allegations of the foregoing nature are necessary to provide the factual basis for appellants’ otherwise conclusory allegation that they have been injured in their “property” because they overpaid for Aetna’s inferi- or health care product. Id. at 492-94. Like the HMO enrollees in Maio who alleged they had overpaid for an inferior product, Plaintiffs here have not suffered cognizable RICO injury by virtue of their purchases of the Tires or Explorers, absent particularized allegations of the inferi- or performance of those products. The actual failure of the Tires or Explorers, like the failure of the HMO plans to provide the quality care advertised, is a contingency upon which Plaintiffs’ economic damages are dependent. The Maio court also found the plaintiffs’ theory of RICO injury untenable because it was predicated on the conclusion that the economic value of the product purchased was reduced because of the possibility that the alleged inferiority of the product would manifest itself at some point in the future, just as Plaintiffs here allege that the possibility of tire or vehicle failure reduces their property’s value or necessitates replacement. The court rejected the notion that present economic harm has been alleged when it “necessarily is contingent upon the impact of events in the future which have not yet occurred.” Id. at 494-95. That theory, the court held, requires impermissible factual speculation about events that may not occur and would “expand! ] the concept of RICO injury beyond the boundaries of reason.” Id. at 496. Similarly, in First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding, 2,1 F.3d 763 (2d Cir.1994), the Second Circuit upheld the dismissal of RICO claims because the plaintiff had not yet incurred an actual injury. The plaintiff bank claimed that the defendants had fraudulently induced it to make non-recourse loans by misrepresenting the value of the properties pledged as collateral. The bank was injured, it alleged, because it had lent more funds than it would have had it known the true value of the collateral and was thus undersecured for the excess amounts. The bank also alleged injury as a result of having to increase its reserves to cover the potential risk of the borrowers’ default. The bank did not allege, however, that the fraudulently induced loans were in default or that it had had to foreclose on the insufficient collateral. Id. at 766-67. The Second Circuit noted that, under the bank’s theory, it would have been injured even if the loans were ultimately repaid in full with interest, id. at 767-68, just as Plaintiffs in this case would recover under their theory even if their tires and/or Explorers perform without failure throughout their normal useful life and even if they never actually lose money by selling them. Nevertheless, the Gelt plaintiff argued that it suffered an “immediate quantifiable injury when the loans were made because ... [it] assumed additional risk of loss, and ‘[f]or all practical purposes the[ ] additional funds were lost the moment the loans were made.’ ” Id. at 768. That argument, nearly identical to the argument of Plaintiffs here that they sustained a monetary injury as soon as they purchased the Tires and/or Explorers, or “as soon as the rubber hit the road,” did not persuade the Second Circuit: [W]e reject FNB’s novel theory that it was damaged simply by being underse-cured when, with respect to those loans not yet foreclosed, the actual damages it will suffer, if any, are yet to be determined. Id. The failure to allege the plaintiffs actual realization of her property’s diminished value led to dismissal of the RICO claims asserted in Oscar v. University Students Co-operative Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc). The plaintiff, a tenant in an apartment building, brought a RICO action against the owner and tenants of a neighboring apartment building. She claimed that the illegal conduct of her neighbors had decreased the value of her property. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of her RICO claim because she did not allege that she had ever sublet or tried to sublet her apartment, or “even that she ever wished or -intended to sublet the apartment.” Her alleged loss was, according to the Ninth Circuit, “therefore purely speculative.” Id. at 787. See also Pelfresne v. Village of Rosemont, 22 F.Supp.2d 756, 765 (N.D.Ill.1998) (allegation that plaintiff would lose the fair market value of his property in the future insufficient to support RICO claim). Substantial support for our conclusion that Plaintiffs’ diminished value theory does not satisfy the requirements of section 1964 can also be found in a recent unpublished decision of the District of Columbia district court. In Tri-State Express v. Cummins Engine, Civ. A. 99-00220(HHK) (D.D.C. September 11, 2000), the court dismissed the RICO claims of truck owners who alleged that they had been injured because the defendants’ conduct had “reduced the present economic value” of their trucks and engines. Id., slip op. at 6. Relying, as we have, on Maio, Gelt, and Steele, the court held that the plaintiffs had not alleged any realized, concrete injury as a result of the alleged defects, “but only the potential for harm,” and that the speculative or future injuries suggested by the plaintiffs were “insufficient to activate RICO’s remedial scheme.” Id., slip op. at 13-14. The principle that emerges from all of the decisions discussed above is that a plaintiff alleges a cognizable injury (one that is concrete, tangible, and not speculative or contingent) as a result of a purchase only where the diminished value of the plaintiffs property has actually been realized or when the alleged infirmity in the purchased property has otherwise tangibly manifested itself. For this reason, Plaintiffs’ allegations that they paid more for the Tires and Explorers than they are worth, or that they have incurred or will incur the cost of replacing Tires that have never manifested the alleged defect, are insufficient to sustain their RICO claims. None of the RICO decisions cited by Plaintiffs counsels a different conclusion. The court in Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 1988 WL 116542, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11988 (N.D.Ill.1988), addressed the RICO injury requirement in the context of a purchase of a business. The plaintiffs alleged that they were induced by fraud to purchase a company that had concealed debt-non-eontingent liability — that had produced an immediate, quantifiable loss. Id. at 1988 WL 116542, *3, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11988, *8. See also Grove Holding v. First Wisconsin Nat’l Bank, 803 F.Supp. 1486, 1509 (E.D.Wis.1992) (RICO injury where plaintiffs had purchased company, the assets and liabilities of which had been misrepresented). In the remaining decisions cited by Plaintiffs, the courts found the injury requirement to have been met because the monetary loss had already been incurred or the infirmity in the product purchased had already manifested itself. See Lentz v. Pan American, 1991 WL 240739, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16445 (E.D.Pa.1991) (plaintiff purchased security services he did not receive); In re Synthroid Marketing Litigation, 188 F.R.D. 295 (N.D.Ill.1999) (loss occurred upon purchase; not dependent on any future event); In re Merrill Lynch Limited Partnerships Litigation, 7 F.Supp.2d 256 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (plaintiffs’ injuries not speculative because allegation was that limited partnerships purchased could, at point of their purchase, never achieve their promised objectives). The allegations of RICO injury in this case are very different from the allegations made in the cases Plaintiffs rely upon. Whether Plaintiffs received what they allege they paid for (tires and vehicles that perform as warranted) is contingent on future events that may or may not occur. One decision cited by Plaintiffs, In re Cordis, 1992 WL 754061 (S.D.Ohio 1992), does appear to lend support to Plaintiffs’ position that they can recover under RICO for diminished value and replacement costs. In that case, the district court found that the plaintiffs who alleged they had purchased faulty pacemakers had adequately alleged an injury under section 1964 for “the diminished value of the product and the costs associated with implanting and explanting the product.” Id. at *3. In reaching this conclusion, the court drew analogies to recoveries by purchasers in the antitrust and securities fraud contexts and found no basis for “a principled distinction” between those purchasers and the purchasers of the allegedly defective pacemakers. Id. Cordis is distinguishable from this case on two grounds. First, it is not entirely clear that the Cordis court assumed that any contingency was involved, i.e., whether the plaintiffs’ pacemakers would ultimately be removed and replaced. Second, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ RICO claims for failure to allege an enterprise, so its discussion of injury was not necessary to its judgment. Notwithstanding these distinctions, one could plausibly conclude that the result we reach here cannot fairly be harmonized with the analysis employed in Cordis. If that is so, we decline to follow Cordis. First, as noted above, the weight of authority on the issue presented is decidedly contrary to the analysis of Cordis. Moreover, because Cordis was decided in 1992, the court did not have the benefit of this weight of authority, including the Third Circuit’s decision in Maio, the Second Circuit’s decision in Gelt, and the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Oscar and Steele. Second, we do see the basis for a principled distinction between the losses alleged by Plaintiffs here and the purchase loss of a plaintiff in the antitrust or securities fraud context. Although the nature of the injury to business or property required by the RICO Act does not differ appreciably from the nature of the injury required to sustain an antitrust or securities fraud claim, the accrual of the injury may differ based on the facts alleged and the legal theory employed. For all the reasons stated above, we hold that Plaintiffs have not alleged an injury cognizable under 18 U.S.C. § 1964. The Second through Seventh Claims for Relief of the Master Complaint are thus hereby DISMISSED. C. Claims under Consumer Protection Statutes In their Tenth Claim for Relief, entitled “Violation of All States’ Consumer Protection Statutes,” Plaintiffs allege the following: 308. [Defendants] engaged in unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of any and all state consumer protection statutes when they represented, through their advertising, warranties, and other express representations, that the Tires and Explorers had benefits or characteristics that they did not actually have. [Defendants] further violated state consumer protection statutes when they falsely represented that the Tires and Explorers were of a particular standard or quality when they were not. Finally, [Defendants] violated state consumer protection statutes when they advertised the Tires and Explorers with the intent not to sell them as advertised, and when, in so doing, they concealed and suppressed facts material to the true characteristics, standards, and quality of these products. 809. [Defendants’] deceptive practices were specifically designed to induce Plaintiffs and the Classes to buy the Tires and Explorers. 310. To this day, [Defendants] continue to engage in unlawful practices in violation of state consumer protection statutes. 311. As a direct and proximate result of [Defendants’] unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices, Plaintiffs and the Classes have suffered actual damages and members of the Classes are threatened with irreparable harm by undue risk of physical injuries or death. In short, Plaintiffs allege the basic components of a consumer protection claim-unfair or deceptive acts or practices, committed in the pursuit of trade or commerce, which result in loss. As in their arguments for dismissing the negligence and RICO claims, Defendants contend that all Plaintiffs except those who have suffered a tread separation fail to state a claim because they do not plead injury. Reply Brief III at 13-14. Defendants’ argument, though successful to defeat Plaintiffs’ negligence and RICO claims, is unconvincing in the realm of consumer protection claims. Rather than injury, as required for RICO or negligence claims, to state a consumer protection cause of action, Plaintiffs need plead only “loss.” The TCPA provides that “[a]ny person who suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property ... as a result ... of an unfair or deceptive act or practice ... may bring an action individually to recover actual damages.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-18 — 109(a)(1) (emphasis added). The MCPA similarly sets forth a claim for the greater of actual damages or $250.00 for “[a] person who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this act.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.911(b)(2) (emphasis added). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot recover under the relevant consumer protection statutes because they “have not alleged that they experienced any manifestation of the alleged defect or injury.” Brief III at 3. Courts interpreting the terms “ascertainable loss” and “loss” in consumer protection statutes disagree. For instance, in Hinchliffe v. American Motors Corp., 184 Conn. 607, 440 A.2d 810, 813-14 (1981), the Supreme Court of Connecticut interpreted the term “ascertainable loss” in the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”), ruling that a consumer who had bought a vehicle advertised as “full-time four-wheel drive” but was actually equipped with a “limited slip differential mechanism” suffered a loss under CUTPA. In so ruling, the Court reasoned that “[wjhenever a consumer has received something other than what he bargained for, he has suffered a loss of money or property.” Id. at 814. Here, Plaintiffs allege, among other claims, that they expected to receive Tires and Explorers “of a particular standard or quality” but actually received Tires and Explorers of a lower standard or quality. Master Complaint, ¶ 308. Such an allegation is a classic example of “receiv[ing] something other than what [they] bargained for.” See Hinchliffe, 440 A.2d at 814. Furthermore, unlike with RICO claims, this alleged diminution in value satisfies the loss requirement. Compare Maio, 221 F.3d at 492 (“[W]e also reject appellants’ theory of RICO injury resting on the purported diminution in value because, ... as a matter of simple logic, they obviously cannot show that they actually received something ‘inferior’ and ‘worth less’ absent individualized allegations concerning the quantity and quality of health care benefits Aetna provided under its HMO plah.”) with Hin-chliffe, 440 A.2d at 814 (“[Ojbviously such diminution [in value] would satisfy the statute.”). The Court views as convincing this interpretation of the New Jersey and Connecticut consu