Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER SULLIVAN, District Judge. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs commenced this action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief and request this Court to enjoin the enforcement of final regulations issued by the defendants on December 20, 2000. The regulations are published at 65 Federal Register 79920-80107 under Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945, also known as the Black Lung Benefits Act(“BLBA”). The BLBA provides benefits “to coal miners who are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis and to the surviving dependents of miners whose death was due to such disease.” 30 U.S.C. § 901(a). The subject regulations are organized into four principal parts. The first part, 20 C.F.R. Part 718, sets forth the medical proof necessary to establish entitlement to black lung benefits. The second part, 20 C.F.R. Part 722, prescribes criteria for determining whether a state’s workers’ compensation program provides “adequate coverage,” 30 U.S.C. § 931(b), and therefore provides the exclusive means of black lung recovery for miners in that state. The third part, 20 C.F.R. Part 725, sets forth the procedures for adjudicating claims. And the fourth part, 20 C.F.R. Part 726, establishes guidelines for the insurance or self-insurance obligations imposed on coal mine operators by the BLBA. Pending before the Court are plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and defendants’ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Also pending is intervenors’ motion for summary judgment, which does not support defendants’ motion to dismiss, but does support defendants’ defense of the challenged regulations. The defendants and intervenors have also filed motions to strike certain affidavits attached to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as outside the administrative record. Plaintiffs have also filed a motion to vacate and remand the proceedings, based on plaintiffs’ contention that the current administration does not support the policy choices behind the rules. Finally, the Coal Mining Compensation Rating Bureau of Pennsylvania filed a motion to appear as amicus curiae. On June 18, 2001, the Court granted plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Voluntary Dismissal of Claims. Count I paragraph 23(q), Count V paragraph 40(r), and Count VIII paragraph 52(f) of plaintiffs’ amended complaint were dismissed without prejudice. Additionally, plaintiffs’ did not provide any discussion or only cursory argument in their pleadings regarding several of the rules challenged in their amended complaint. Although plaintiffs’ argue that they have not abandoned any claims, those for which they provide only cursory argument are deemed conceded. See, e.g., Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry, 107 F.3d 32, 39 (D.C.Cir.1997). Upon consideration of the pending motions, the points and authorities in support of and in opposition thereto, the arguments of counsel, and for the reasons set forth herein, the Court will DENY plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint on jurisdictional grounds. Further, the Court will GRANT intervenors’ and defendants’ motions for summary judgment defending the challenged regulations. THE PARTIES Plaintiffs are the National Mining Association, the national trade association for the U.S. mining industry, the Old Republic Insurance Company, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and American Mining Insurance Company, commercial insurance carriers, the Ohio Valley Coal Company, an underground coal operator, and the American Iron & Steel Institute, a trade association whose members have or had financial interests in coal mines. Defendants are Elaine L. Chao, Secretary of Labor, and the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”). The Secretary of Labor is authorized by the BLBA to issue regulations governing the administration of the BLBA. The DOL has principal responsibility for the implementation and administration of the BLBA. Intervenors are the United Mine Workers of America, a labor union, the National Black Lung Association, an advocacy group representing current and retired coal miners, Mike South, a former coal miner, a clinic that provides screening, diagnostic and other services to patients with black lung disease, and several current or prospective claimants for benefits. BACKGROUND 1. Facts Giving Rise to this Litigation On January 22, 1997, the DOL issued a notice of proposed revisions to the BLBA regulations. 62 Fed.Reg. 3338-3435 (Jan. 22, 1997) (Admin. Record Doc. No. 00001). The DOL allowed interested parties until March 24, 1997 to file comments. That deadline was extended twice. 64 Fed.Reg. 54966 (Oct. 8, 1999) (Admin. Record Doc. No. 00345). The comment period closed on August 21, 1997. At that time, the DOL had received almost 200 comments.. The DOL also held two public hearings at which more than 50 people testified; the comments and testimony came mainly from coal mine operators, the National Mining Association, representatives of the insurance and claims-servicing industries, coal miners and their survivors, the National Black Lung Association, the United Mine Workers of America, the American Bar Association, and physicians and attorneys who practice in the field of black lung compensation. Id. On October 8, 1999, after reviewing the comments and seeking guidance from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”) (Admin. Record Doc. Nos. 00327 and 00333), the DOL issued a second notice. 64 Fed.Reg. 54966-55072 (Oct. 8, 1999) (Admin. Record Doc. No. 00345). The second notice revised some of the earlier proposed regulations and included an initial analysis under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. See id. at 55006-09. The DOL allowed interested parties until December 7, 1999 to file comments. That deadline was extended to January 6, 2000. 64 Fed.Reg. 62997 (Nov. 18, 1999) (Admin. Record Doc. No. 00531). The DOL received 37 comments during the second comment period. Id. On December 20, 2000, after considering the comments and testimony, the advice of NIOSH, and the reports of three expert consultants, the DOL issued final rules and a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. 65 Fed.Reg. 79920-80107 (Dec. 20, 2000) (Admin. Record Doc. No. 01071). On January 19, 2001, the new rules went into effect. Id. at 79920. On December 22, 2000, plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging several of the final rules. On January 26, 2001, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, along with a motion for preliminary injunction to stay the effective date of the rules. On February 9, 2001, the Court entered a Preliminary Injunction Order with the consent of defendants and plaintiffs, and “without objection” of the intervenors. II. Black Lung Disease Pneumoconiosis is commonly known as “black lung disease.” It is “a dreadful and insidious disease which interferes with the respiratory functions of its victims,” and “slowly and progressively makes the very act of breathing more and more difficult.” Curse v. Dir., OWCP, 843 F.2d 456, 457 (11th Cir.1988) (quoting 124 Cong. Rec. S2,333 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. Williams)). It “affects a high percentage of American coal workers with severe, and frequently crippling, chronic respiratory impairment” caused by “long-term inhalation of coal dust.” Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 6, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2888, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). As the disease advances, it may cause physical disability and ultimately “may induce death by cardiac failure, and may contribute to other causes of death.” Id. at 7, 96 S.Ct. 2882. III. Statutory and Regulatory Background Under the BLBA, the administrative process begins when a miner or his survivor files a claim with the District Director in the DOL’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (“OWCP”). The District Director investigates the claim, notifies the interested parties, and makes a preliminary determination as to whether the claimant is eligible for benefits and which mine employer should be held responsible. 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.301-725.422. Coal mine operators are primarily responsible for paying these claims. 30 U.S.C. § 932(a). However, if a mine operator responsible for a victim’s disability or death cannot be identified or the responsible operator fails to pay the benefits awarded, the claim is paid from the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (“Trust Fund”), which is financed by an excise tax on coal sales. 30 U.S.C. §§ 932, 934; 26 U.S.C. §§ 4121, 9501(d)(1). Either party may appeal the decision of the District Director and request a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.450-725.480. The ALJ’s decision may be appealed by either party to the DOL’s Benefits Review Board, 20 C.F.R. § 725.481, and ultimately to the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred. 33 U.S.C. § 921(c); 20 C.F.R. § 725.482. JURISDICTION The BLBA does not designate the forum where a judicial challenge to the facial validity of regulations promulgated under it may be resolved. Plaintiffs and intervenors argue that jurisdiction to resolve such challenges vests in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Defendants contend that facial challenges to the rules are inextricably intertwined with benefits determinations. Thus, defendants maintain that this Court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims, because exclusive jurisdiction to review black lung benefits determinations vests with the federal courts of appeals. In support of this argument, defendants rely primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 114 S.Ct 771, 127 L.Ed.2d 29 (1994). Defendants argue that Thunder Basin holds that when it is discernible from a statute’s language, structure, purpose, and legislative history that the review scheme prescribed by that statute was intended by Congress to be exclusive, that scheme must not be circumvented. Id. at 207-16, 114 S.Ct. 771. In Thunder Basin, the Supreme Court held that the statutory review scheme of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977 (the Mine Act), 30 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq, revealed a congressional intent to preclude district courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over pre-enforcement challenges to the Act. 510 U.S. at 202, 114 S.Ct. 771. Thunder Basin involved a challenge to an instruction issued by the Mine Safety and Health Administration to a mine operator. Rather than seek administrative review, the mine operator sought a pre-enforcement injunction directly from the district court. Id. at 204-05, 114 S.Ct. 771. The Mine Act provides for review of all violations of its regulations by an ALJ, id. at 209, 114 S.Ct. 771 followed by review by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, and then review by a court of appeals. Id. at 204, 207-08, 114 S.Ct. 771. The Mine Act’s review scheme applies to violations of “any mandatory health or safety standard, rule, order, or regulation.” 510 U.S. at 207, 114 S.Ct. 771 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court held that although the Mine Act is silent on the question of pre-enforcement claims, “the Mine Act’s comprehensive enforcement structure, combined with the legislative history’s clear concern with channeling and streamlining the enforcement process, establishes a ‘fairly discernible’ intent [by Congress] to preclude district court review” over ordinary challenges under the Act. Id. at 216, 114 S.Ct. 771 (quoting Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 2457, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984)). However, Thunder Basin did not involve a challenge to rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Defendants argue that in view of the similarities between the review schemes of the BLBA and the Mine Act, Thunder Basin precludes this Court’s jurisdiction over all of plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants are correct that jurisdiction to review black lung benefits determinations vests with the courts of appeals. That does not necessarily mean, however, that this Court lacks jurisdiction over facial challenges to rules promulgated under the BLBA and the APA. The district court has expressly found, albeit prior to Thunder Basin, that it possessed jurisdiction to review an earlier challenge to black lung regulations under the BLBA. See Nat’l Indep. Coal Operator’s Ass’n v. Brennan, 372 F.Supp. 16 (D.D.C.1974), aff'd, 419 U.S. 955, 95 S.Ct. 216, 42 L.Ed.2d 172 (1974). Moreover, D.C. Circuit precedent, following Thunder Basin, interpreting the OSH Act and its regulatory scheme is controlling. The OSH Act provides, that “any person adversely affected by a standard issued under this section may ... file a petition challenging the validity of such standard with the United States courts of appeals.” (emphasis added). 29 U.S.C. § 655(f). In Workplace Health & Safety Council v. Reich, 56 F.3d 1465 (D.C.Cir.1995), which involved a challenge to DOL rulemaking under the OSH Act, the Circuit held that since the challenged rule was a regulation, rather than a standard, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction. “[A] party seeking to challenge a standard ... may petition a court of appeals, but a party seeking to challenge a regulation must seek review in the District Court.” Id. 1467. In reaching this conclusion, the Circuit noted that “[a]bsent some express statutory directive to the contrary, persons seeking review of agency action first go to district court [under APA § 703] rather than to a court of appeals.” Id. (quoting Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Pena, 17 F.3d 1478, 1481 (D.C.Cir.1994)). The D.C. Circuit recently reaffirmed the principle of law that the APA provides a default standard of review where a statute does not otherwise provide a standard. See Al-Fayed v. Central Intelligence Agency, 264 F.3d 300, 2001 WL 788094 (July 13, 2001)(citing Workplace Health, 56 F.3d at 1467). The BLBA provides an explicit scheme of judicial review only for “orders” without mentioning the term “rule” or “regulation.” 33 U.S.C. § 921. Although neither the BLBA nor the Longshore Act contain definitions of the terms “rule” or “order,” the APA provides concise definitions of each: “Order” is defined as “the whole or part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but including licensing.” APA § 651(6) (emphasis added); “Rule” is defined as “the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular effect designed to implement, interpret, or describe law or policy ...” APA § 551(4). The APA makes a sharp distinction between these two terms. Since the jurisdictional scheme of the BLBA pertains to compensation orders, rather than rules, and contains no express statutory directive depriving district courts of jurisdiction to review agency rulemaking under the APA, this Court concludes that jurisdiction properly vests in the District Court to consider plaintiffs’ challenges to the new black lung regulations. STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings and evidence ‘show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See Beverly Enter., Inc. v. Herman, 119 F.Supp.2d 1, 3-4 (D.D.C.2000). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate when it is established “beyond doubt that the plaintifffs] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] claim which would entitle [them] to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The Court is bound by a highly deferential standard when reviewing an agency’s action under the APA. The Court shall “not [ ] substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 823, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). Rather, the Court must evaluate whether the agency’s decision was “based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” Id.See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2867, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). An agency’s action must be upheld if the agency’s reasons and policy choices “conform to ‘certain minimal standards of rationality.’ ” Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 521 (D.C.Cir.1983) (citation omitted). When the evidence can reasonably be interpreted to support the agency’s action, the Court must uphold that action, “despite the fact that the same evidence is susceptible of another interpretation.” Public Citizen v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1495 (D.C.Cir.1986). Generally, plaintiffs bear a heavy burden of demonstrating the invalidity of agency regulations. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C.Cir.1976) (en banc). The Court must afford an agency even greater deference when the agency’s decision rests on an evaluation of complex scientific data within the agency’s technical expertise. In this circumstance, a reviewing court “must generally be at its most deferential.” Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103, 103 S.Ct 2246, 2255, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983). See also Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C.Cir.1997). “An agency making fact-based determinations in its own field of expertise, particularly where those determinations are wrapped up with scientific judgments, must be permitted ‘to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more persuasive.’ ” Downer v. United States, 97 F.3d 999, 1002 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 1861, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989)). Where an agency’s decision turns on issues requiring the exercise of technical or scientific judgment, “it is not for the judicial branch to undertake comparative evaluations of conflicting scientific evidence,” Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1211, 1216 (D.C.Cir.1987). The Court’s role is simply to exercise its “narrowly defined duty of holding agencies to certain minimal standards of rationality.” Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 36. An agency’s interpretation of a statute it is charged with implementing is entitled to deference so long as its interpretation is reasonable and not precluded by an unambiguous statutory command to the contrary. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). See also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 1662, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000); Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 19, 120 S.Ct. 1084, 1097, 146 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000). See generally, Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417, 112 S.Ct. 1394, 1401, 118 L.Ed.2d 52 (1992) (“judicial deference to reasonable interpretations by an agency of a statute that it administers” is a “dominant, well-settled principle of federal law”). It is not difficult for an agency to establish that its- statutory construction “reflects a reasonable interpretation of the law.” Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 409, 116 S.Ct. 1396, 1406, 134 L.Ed.2d 593 (1996). The Court must uphold an agency’s interpretation, even if that interpretation is not the only one the agency permissively could have adopted. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 1767, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778 n. 11). The agency’s construction need not be “the best,” United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 394, 119 S.Ct. 1392, 143 L.Ed.2d 480 (1999) (quoting Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 523 U.S. 382, 389, 118 S.Ct. 1413, 140 L.Ed.2d 542 (1998)), nor “the most natural” interpretation of the statute. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702, 111 S.Ct. 2524, 2537, 115 L.Ed.2d 604 (1991). However, the agency’s interpretation must not be “flatly contradicted” by the plain language of the statute. IRS v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 494 U.S. 922, 928, 110 S.Ct. 1623, 108 L.Ed.2d 914 (1990). THE CHALLENGED REGULATIONS 20 C.F.R. § 718.104: This rule requires an ALJ to consider the nature and duration of the relationship between the treating physician and the miner when evaluating a treating physician’s report. After considering the credibility of the physician’s opinion in light of its reasoning, documentation, other relevant evidence, and the record as a whole, an ALJ may give the treating physician’s opinion controlling weight. Plaintiffs claim that this section is impermissibly retroactive, violates the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 919(d), constitutes illegal burden-shifting, is arbitrary and capricious, treats parties unequally, and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 718.201: This rule redefines pneumoconiosis to include both clinical and legal pneumoconiosis. “Legal” pneumoconiosis includes any chronic lung disease or impairment “arising out of coal mine employment.” This section also recognizes that pneumoconiosis is a “latent and progressive disease” that may only become detectable after cessation of exposure to coal dust. Plaintiffs claim that this section is impermissibly retroactive, violates the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 902, creates an illegal burden-shifting presumption, denies plaintiffs a “Full and Fair Hearing,” is arbitrary and capricious, treats parties unequally, was promulgated in violation of 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 601-12, and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 718.202: This rule defines the standards used for determining the existence of pneumoconiosis, which include a diagnostic chest x-ray. Even with a negative x-ray, however, a determination that pneumoconiosis exists may be made if the physician’s diagnosis of the disease is supported by objective medical evidence and reasoned medical opinion. Plaintiffs claim that this section is arbitrary and capricious. 20 C.F.R. § 718.204: This rule defines causation for total disability due to pneumoconiosis. It establishes that in determining whether a miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, any non-pulmonary or non-respiratory condition or disease that caused an independent disability shall not be considered. Plaintiffs claim that this section is im-permissibly retroactive, violates the BLBA 30 U.S.C. §§ 902, 923, was promulgated in violation of 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 601-12, denies them a “Full and Fair Hearing,” is arbitrary and capricious, treats parties unequally, and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c)(5): This rule provides that for claims filed after January 1, 1982, pneumoconiosis constitutes a “substantially contributing cause” of death, if it hastened the death of the miner. Plaintiffs claim that this section is im-permissibly retroactive, violates the Long-shore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 919(d), the BLBA 30 U.S.C. § 901, was promulgated in violation of 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 601-12, creates an illegal burden-shifting presumption, is arbitrary and capricious, treats parties unequally, and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(d): This rule requires that claims filed before January 1, 1982, shall be considered on an expedited basis. It also provides that claimants bear the initial burden to develop medical evidence to establish death by pneumoconiosis, and will prevail unless the weight of evidence establishes that the miner’s death was not due to pneumoconiosis. Plaintiffs claim that this subsection is impermissibly retroactive, violates the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 919(d), the BLBA 30 U.S.C. § 901, was promulgated in violation of 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 601-12, creates an illegal burden-shifting presumption, is arbitrary and capricious, treats parties unequally, and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 718.301: This rule provides that a miner’s length of employment can be presumed if the miner worked in one or more mines for the number of years required. The length of coal mine work-history must be computed pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(32). Plaintiffs claim that this section is impermissibly retroactive and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 718.304: This rule creates a presumption of total disability or death due to pneumoconiosis when the disease is demonstrated by x-ray, meets international classification standards, or is diagnosed by biopsy upon finding “massive lesions” in the lungs, or by other reasonable means. Plaintiffs claim that this section is arbitrary and capricious. 20 C.F.R. § 725.2(c): This rule provides that 20 C.F.R. § 725 applies to all claims paid or filed on or after January 19, 2001, and to all claims pending on that date with the exception of a number of listed sections. This rule defines a pending claim as any claim not finally denied more than one year prior to January 19, 2001. Plaintiffs claim that this section is impermissibly retroactive, exceeds the DOL’s scope of authority, and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.4(a): This rule applies 20 C.F.R. § 718 to claims filed before March 31, 1980. All claims filed prior to April 1, 1980 fall under 20 C.F.R. § 727(c). Plaintiffs claim that this section is im-permissibly retroactive and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(6): This rule expands the definition of “benefits” from those payable under § 514 or Title IV, Part C, to include “any expenses related to medical examination and testing” authorized by the designated director. Plaintiffs claim that this section is impermissibly retroactive, violates their due process rights, and violates the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 928. 20 C.F.R. § 725.101 (a)(29): This rule defines “total” and “partial” disability as provided in 20 C.F.R. § 718. Plaintiffs claim that this section is impermissibly retroactive and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(31): This rule defines “workers’ compensation law” as any law providing for payment to an employee from an employer for an occupational disability. Payments funded wholly from the general revenue are exempted from the definition of workers’ compensation payments under this section. Plaintiffs claim that this section is impermissibly retroactive, violates their due process rights, and violates the BLBA, 30 U.S.C. § 932. 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a) (32): This rule provides that a “year” is a period of 365 or 366 days, or “partial periods totaling one year during which a miner worked in or around a coal mine for at least 125 working days.” Plaintiffs claim that this subsection is impermissibly retroactive and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.103: This rule provides that any party raising an allegation bears the burden of proving facts in support of it, except as otherwise provided in this chapter. Plaintiffs claim that this section is impermissibly retroactive, violates the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 919(d), and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.202(b): This rule creates a presumption that coal mine construction and transportation workers were exposed to coal dust during all periods of employment in or around a coal mine or a preparation facility. The presumption can be rebutted by evidence showing the claimant was not exposed. to coal mine dust, or did not work regularly in or around a mine or preparation facility. Plaintiffs claim that this section is im-permissibly retroactive, arbitrary and capricious, and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.204: This rule describes the criteria for determining if a claimant qualifies for augmented benefits as a miner’s spouse. The new rule deleted a provision in the previous regulation, precluding augmentation for more than one spouse at the same time. Plaintiffs claim that this section is im-permissibly retroactive and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.209: This rule provides the criteria for determining if a miner’s child qualifies for augmentation of benefits. A child is eligible if: (1) unmarried and less than eighteen years of age, (2) eighteen or older and a full-time student, or (3) eighteen or older with a disability. Plaintiffs claim that this section is impermissibly retroactive and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.212(b): This rule describes the conditions under which a surviving or divorced spouse may be eligible for benefits and that concurrent recovery by more than one qualified spouse is no longer precluded under this section. Plaintiffs claim that this subsection is impermissibly retroactive, exceeds the scope of the DOL’s authority, and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.213(c): This rule limits the duration of a spouse or surviving spouse’s entitlement to benefits. The newly added subsection provides that spouses may qualify for reentitlement after termination of benefits, if their claims meet the requirements under 20 C.F.R. § 725.212. Plaintiffs claim that this section is impermissibly retroactive, exceeds the scope of the DOL’s authority, and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.214(d): This rule provides the criteria for determining when a claimant is a surviving spouse. A surviving spouse is anyone who went through a marriage ceremony with a miner, even if that ceremony is invalid due to a legal impediment, so long as the parties did not know it was invalid, and were living together at the time of the miner’s death. Recovery under this subsection is no longer precluded if another claimant qualifies as a spouse under a different subsection. Plaintiffs claim that this section is impermissibly retroactive, exceeds the scope of the DOL’s authority, and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.219(c)(d): This rule describes the criteria for determining the duration of entitlement to benefits for a miner’s child. Subsection (c) provides that a child whose benefits terminated at age eighteen or later may become reentitled if unmarried, a full-time student, and under twenty-three years of age. Subsection (d) allows a child whose benefits terminated due to a marriage to reapply if the marriage ends, and § 725.218 requirements are met. Plaintiffs claim that these subsections are impermissibly retroactive, exceed the scope of the DOL’s authority, and violate their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d): This rule controls the effect of a prior denial of benefits on a new claim filed more than a year after denial of the previous claim. It provides that such claims must be denied unless the claimant demonstrates a change in a condition of entitlement. Plaintiffs claim that this subsection is impermissibly retroactive, exceeds the scope of the DOL’s authority, creates an illegal burden-shifting presumption, denies them a “Full and Fair Hearing,” is arbitrary and capricious, treats parties unequally, violates their due process rights, and was promulgated in violation of 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 601-12. 20 C.F.R. § 725.310: This rule describes the procedure for modification of awards and denials, and provides that a district director may reconsider the terms or denial of an award if there is a change in condition or mistake of fact. This regulation precludes the offset or collection of an overpayment of benefits paid when the modification proceedings result in a finding that a decrease in the award is warranted, provided the claimant is not at fault for the overpayment. However, if an increase in award results from a mistake of fact, it shall be applied retroactively to the date of the original award. Plaintiffs claim that this section violates the BLBA, 30 U.S.C. § 932, denies them a “Full and Fair Hearing,” and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.365: This rule authorizes a lien against benefit awards upon approval of attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs claim that this section is arbitrary and capricious and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.366: This rule provides the procedure for collecting attorney’s fees which are permitted when they are “reasonably commensurate” with work performed. Plaintiffs claim that this section exceeds the scope of the DOL’s authority, violates the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 928, and is arbitrary and capricious. 20 C.F.R. § 725.867: This rule requires responsible operators to pay attorney’s fees if the operator: (1) did not accept claimant’s entitlement to benefits within 30 days of the claim and was found liable; (2) refused to pay medical expense; or (3) sought a decrease and did not prevail. Fees under this section are paid directly to the claimant. Plaintiffs claim that this section exceeds the scope of the DOL’s authority, violates the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 928, and is arbitrary and capricious. 20 C.F.R. § 725405: This rule describes the procedure for developing medical evidence. It requires the DOL to schedule a complete pulmonary evaluation for the miner after receiving his claim. In the case of a survivor’s claim, the DOL must compile all medical evidence that is both necessary and available to evaluate the claim. Plaintiffs claim that this section treats parties unequally. 20 C.F.R. § 725.406: This rule requires that all applicants must be afforded a free, complete pulmonary exam. The miner must select an evaluating physician from a list of physicians near his residence, provided by the district director. The physician’s evaluation must comply with § 718 standards. The rule also provides that a responsible operator must reimburse the fund for all medical exams under this chapter if found liable. Plaintiffs claim that this section violates 33 U.S.C. §§ 923, 928, the BLBA. 30 U.S.C. § 923, and treats parties unequally. 20 C.F.R. § 725.407: This rule describes the procedure for identifying and notifying responsible operators of an applicant’s claim for benefits. The district director must investigate whether there are any responsible operators and provide them with a copy of the application and all evidence submitted by the claimant regarding miner’s employment history. Plaintiffs claim that this section denies them a “Full and Fair Hearing.” 20 C.F.R. § 725.408: This rule requires operators to express an intent to accept or contest their status, once notified of their identification as potentially liable. To contest the allegation, the .operator has ninety days to admit or deny five factual assertions. Failure to respond constitutes a waiver of the right to contest liability on any of the five grounds. Plaintiffs claim that this section, in its entirety, violates 33 U.S.C. §§ 923, 928, violates the BLBA 30 U.S.C. § 923, denies them a “Full and Fair Hearing,” treats parties unequally, and violates their due process rights. They also argue that subsection (a)(3), in particular, violates the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 919(d), as well as the BLBA, creates an illegal burden-shifting presumption, and is arbitrary and capricious. 20 C.F.R. § 725.409: This rule provides that when a claim is dismissed as abandoned, the dismissal shall be construed as a finding that the claimant failed to establish any applicable condition of entitlement. Abandonment may be found if the claimant fails to: (1) submit to a required exam without good cause; (2) submit evidence sufficient to resolve the claim; (3) pursue the claim with reasonable diligence, or (4) attend an informal conference without good cause. Survivors may adjudicate additional claims if finality is waived. Plaintiffs claim that this section violates the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 923, 928, the BLBA, 30 U.S.C. § 923, denies them a “Full and Fair Hearing,” and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.410: This rule instructs the district director to issue a schedule for submission of additional evidence after the collection of medical evidence under § 725.405. The schedule contains the designation of a responsible operator, and allows that operator sixty days to submit evidence identifying other potentially-liable operators. Plaintiffs claim that this section denies them a “Full and Fair Hearing,” and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.411-418: These rules set limitations on the amount and type of medical evidence that may be submitted by the parties, and the procedures for reviewing that evidence. Section 725.411 requires that if there is no responsible operator and the first pulmonary evaluation supports eligibility, then the district director must not admit a second evaluation. Sections 725.412 and 725.414 provide for a waiver by the operator of submission of evidence disputing its status as a responsible operator, if not done in a timely manner. Section 725.415 describes the procedure for reviewing all evidence submitted, and allows for further submissions to identify other potentially liable operators. Section 725.416 authorizes the district director to conduct an informal conference to aid the voluntary resolution of claims. After such conference, pursuant to § 725.417, the district director must prepare a stipulation of contested and uncontested issues and allow for the submission of additional evidence. The district director’s final decision and order must meet the criteria described in § 725.418. Plaintiffs claim that these sections violate the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 923, 928, the BLBA, 30 U.S.C. § 923, deny them a “Full and Fair Hearing,” and violate their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.414: This rule precludes submission by either party of more than two chest x-rays, pulmonary function tests, blood gas tests, and medical reports, and only allows one autopsy and one biopsy report. It also bars submission of more than two medical opinions by either party. Further, defendants may not submit evidence to dispute their status as responsible operators more than ninety days after receipt of notification of that status. Plaintiffs claim that this section is arbitrary and capricious, and treats the parties unequally. 20 C.F.R. § 725.456: This rule bars admission of any documentary evidence describing the liability of operators that was not first submitted to the district director, absent extraordinary circumstances. It also allows the medical evidence limits established in § 725.414 to be breached for good cause. All parties may object to documentary evidence submitted. Plaintiffs claim that this section violates the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 919(d), contains an illegal burden-shifting presumption, and is arbitrary and capricious. 20 C.F.R. § 725.457: This rule limits witness testimony, to those who meet the criteria described in § 725.414, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. It also requires that a physician testifying to the miner’s physical condition must have prepared a report or the party on whose behalf he is testifying must have submitted fewer medical reports than allowed by § 726.414. Plaintiffs claim that this section violates the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 919(d), contains an illegal burden-shifting presumption, and is arbitrary and capricious. 20 C.F.R. § 725.458: This rule limits the deposition testimony of a physician to the scope described in § 725.458. Plaintiffs claim that this section violates the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 919(d), contains an illegal burden-shifting presumption, and is arbitrary and capricious. 20 C.F.R. § 725.459: This rule shifts responsibility for cross-examination fees of claimant’s expert witnesses to the responsible operator or fund, if payment of such fees would deprive the claimant of ordinary and necessary living expenses (per 20 C.F.R. § 404.508). It also provides for payment of nonexpert witness fees and expenses, consistent with those paid in the courts of the United States. Reasonable expert witness fees and expenses may be charged to the responsible operator if the claimant is awarded benefits. Plaintiffs claim that this section violates the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 928. 20 C.F.R. § 725465: This rule permits dismissal of a claim for cause by an ALJ if the claimant fails to attend a hearing without good cause, comply with an order, or if the claim was already adjudicated (except per § 725.4(d)). The new rule prohibits dismissal of a responsible operator absent a motion or written agreement from the District Director. Plaintiffs claim that this section violates the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 919(d), denies them a “Full and Fair Hearing,” and is arbitrary and capricious. 20 C.F.R. § 725493: This rule defines employment to include any relationship where an operator derives a benefit from work performed by a miner who is compensated by the operator in some manner. Plaintiffs claim that this section exceeds the scope of the DOL’s authority, denies them a “Full and Fair Hearing,” and is arbitrary and capricious. 20 C.F.R. § 725.495: This rule describes the criteria for defining a responsible operator as the miner’s most recent employer(s) (per § 725.494). If more than one operator employed the miner “most recently,” liability lies first with operator that directed, controlled or supervised the miner. If the most recent employer was self-insured when employing the miner, but can no longer afford to self-insure, the claim must be paid by the Fund. Plaintiffs claim that this section violates the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 919(d), creates an illegal burden-shifting presumption, and is arbitrary and capricious. 20 C.F.R. § 725.502: This rule provides that benefits are due when an order requiring payment is issued by the district director, notwithstanding any further pending appeals or other litigation. To comply with an order, the responsible operator must pay all benefits due from the effective date of the award plus interest. Plaintiffs claim that this section is impermissibly retroactive, violates the Long-shore Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 906, 919(d), violates the BLBA, 30 U.S.C. § 932, creates an illegal burden-shifting presumption, is arbitrary and capricious, and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.503: This rule provides that approved benefits are payable at either the date of onset of total disability by pneumoconiosis or, if that date cannot be determined, the date the claim was filed. Modification claims shall be considered payable from the date of onset if changed conditions were found, or the date of filing if the date of onset is undetermined or the modification is based on a mistake of fact. Plaintiffs claim that this section is impermissibly retroactive, violates the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 906, 919(d), violates the BLBA, 30 U.S.C. § 932, is arbitrary and capricious, and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.530: This rule provides that a responsible operator who fails to pay benefits and interest due will be considered to be in default (§ 725.605 will apply). Under the new rule, a claimant who does not receive benefits within ten days of the due date is entitled to a penalty payment of twenty percent of that award. Plaintiffs claim that this section is arbitrary and capricious. 20 C.F.R. § 725.607: This rule provides that the responsible operator must pay additional compensation to a beneficiary if they fail to pay benefits awarded within ten days of the due date. This compensation must be paid even if the fund paid benefits owed by the operator in the interim. Plaintiffs claim that this section is im-permissibly retroactive, violates the Long-shore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 932, is arbitrary and capricious, and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.608: This rule requires an operator to pay interest to beneficiaries or the fund when they fail to pay benefits due or when retroactive benefits are awarded. The new rule also requires that interest be paid to beneficiaries when additional compensation is required under § 725.607, and when medical services are rendered or entitlement to such services is determined. Interest shall also accrue on a final award of attorneys fees. Plaintiffs claim that this section is ipermissibly retroactive, violates the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 932, and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 725.701: This rule requires responsible operators to furnish medical benefits and costs to qualified miners. The new rule adds a requirement that receipt of treatment or supplies for a pulmonary disorder creates a presumption that the disorder was caused by pneumoconiosis. This presumption can be rebutted with credible evidence that the treatment: (1) was not for a pulmonary disorder; (2) was unconnected with the miner’s disability; or (3) was unnecessary for effective treatment of the miner’s disability. Evidence that the miner does not have or was not totally disabled by pneumoconiosis is not enough to defeat the presumption. The new rule also adds that the treating physician’s opinion may be entitled to controlling weight, per § 718.104(d). Plaintiffs claim that this section is impermissibly retroactive, violates the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 907, 919(d), creates an illegal burden-shifting presumption, denies them a “Full and Fair Hearing,” is arbitrary and capricious, was promulgated in violation of 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 601-12, and violates their due process rights. 20 C.F.R. § 726.8(d): This new rule defines the terms “employ” and “employment” to include any relationship where an operator derives a benefit from work performed by a miner who is compensated by the operator in some manner, echoing § 725.493. It explicitly requires that this relationship be construed as broadly as possible, specifically precluding escape from liability by operators whose financial arrangements funnel payments to employees through other business entities. Plaintiffs claim that this subsection is impermissibly retroactive, exceeds the scope of the DOL’s authority, denies them a “Full and Fair Hearing,” is arbitrary and capricious, violates their due process rights, and was promulgated in violation of 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 601-12. DISCUSSION I. Count 1: Retroactive Application of the Revised Rules Plaintiffs claim that §§ 725.2(c) and 725.4(a) apply many of the revised rules retroactively, including generally: (i) the definition of pneumoconiosis, (ii) the criteria for establishing pneumoconiosis as the cause of death, (iii) the codification of the criteria for establishing total disability, (iv) the notice given to parties regarding when benefits are due, and (v) the determination of benefits when there is more than one surviving spouse. Plaintiffs claim that the application of these rules to both pending and newly filed claims is impermissible under Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988), because Congress did not authorize the DOL to write retroactive rules, yet the rules announce new substantive legal standards and have a retroactive effect. Defendants concede that the DOL does not have the authority to promulgate retroactive regulations. See 30 U.S.C. § 936. Rather, defendants argue, and the Court is persuaded, that the rules are not retroactive for two reasons. First, some of the rules apply only to claims submitted after their effective date. Second, the rules that do apply to pending claims simply clarify legal principles that were already in effect and do not change the substantive standards of entitlement. The DOL’s eharac-terization of their own rules is entitled to “great weight.” McCreary v. Offner, 1 F.Supp.2d 32, 36 (D.D.C.1998), aff'd, 172 F.3d 76 (D.C.Cir.1999) (citation omitted). To determine whether a rule is retroactive, the Court must examine “the nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event.” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269-270, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). A rule is retroactive if “it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.” Id. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483. “An administrative rule is retroactive if it takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing law, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or consideration already past.” Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 177 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C.Cir.1999). However, imposing a new duty or liability does not always constitute an unlawful retroactive approach, see Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 456, 118 S.Ct. 909, 139 L.Ed.2d 895 (1998), nor is such an approach unlawful just because it upsets or disappoints expectations. See Usery, 428 U.S. at 16, 96 S.Ct. 2882 (1976)(citing Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 67 S.Ct. 1140, 91 L.Ed. 1368 (1947)). When rules simply clarify legal principles that were in effect when complained-of conduct occurred, their application is not impermissi-bly retroactive. See Regions Hosp., 522 U.S. at 456, 118 S.Ct. 909; Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744 n. 3, 116 S.Ct. 1730, 135 L.Ed.2d 25 (1996) (regulations that clarify prior law may apply retrospectively). Plaintiffs claim that revised § 725.309 erects a scheme for eliminating finality in the adjudication of black lung claims under the BLBA. Section § 725.309 provides that a subsequent claim for black lung benefits must be denied unless the claimant can establish that a legally significant condition of entitlement (such as the health status of the miner) has changed since a previous claim was adjudicated. § 725.309(d). Plaintiffs argue that this rule imposes liability in violation of ordinary principles of res judicata and upsets the reasonable expectations of finality embodied in the BLBA and reflected in insurance agreements. Section § 725.309 applies only to claims submitted after the effective date of the regulations, and the claimant must establish that a legally significant condition of entitlement has changed since a previous claim was adjudicated. While the subsequent claim looks to past events (such as exposure to coal mine dust) for its adjudication, that does not make the subsequent claim any more retroactive than the initial claim. Further, the revised § 725.309 differs little from the prior rule, 20 C.F.R. § 725.309 (2000), other than to explain what constitutes a “material change in condition.” The Court finds that this rule is not impermissibly retroactive. Plaintiffs claim that § 718.104(d), the “treating physician” rule, is impermissibly retroactive. In the Court’s view, this rule is not impermissibly'retroactive because it applies only to medical opinions developed after the effective date of the rule. § 718.101(b). Plaintiffs claim that the definition of “pneumoconiosis” in § 718.201(a)(2) is impermissibly retroactive. The BLBA defines pneumoconiosis as “a chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine employment.” 30 U.S.C. § 902(b). The former rule repeated the statutory definition and added that it included, but was not limited to, seven enumerated diseases which the medical community classifies as “pneumoconiosis.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.201 (2000). The regulatory definition of pneumoconio-sis always included (a) certain specific diseases labeled by the medical community as being “pneumoconiosis,” id., and (b) all other kinds of “chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine employment.” Id. See 65 Fed.Reg. at 79937-38. The new rule does not substantively change that definition. All the new rule does is attach the label “clinical pneumoconiosis” to those diseases identified in medical nomenclature as pneumoconiosis, § 718.201(a)(1), and “legal pneumoconiosis” to any “chronic lung disease or impairment and its sequelae arising out of coal mine employment,” including but not limited to, “any chronic restrictive or obstructive pulmonary disease.” § 718.201(a)(2). These revisions do not change the legal landscape in any meaningful way. Similarly, § 718.201(c), recognizing that pneumoconiosis may be “latent and progressive,” adds nothing new to the legal landscape. The ailments that fall within the ambit of “any chronic dust disease,” 30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (emphasis added), and “a chronic dust disease,” § 718.201 (emphasis added), are broad enough to include any chronic dust disease that is “latent and progressive.” § 718.201(c). The DOL, the Supreme Court, and the various courts of appeals have all previously recognized that pneumoconiosis is a latent and progressive disease. See 65 Fed.Reg. 79971-72; Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. at 7, 96 S.Ct. 2882; Mullins Coal Co., 484 U.S. at 151, 108 S.Ct. 427; E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Dir., OWCP, 220 F.3d 250, 258-59 (4th Cir.2000); Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey, 109 F.3d 445, 450-51 (8th Cir.1997); Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308, 314-15 (3d Cir.1995), The codification of this legally established fact announces nothing new. The remaining rules plaintiffs challenge on retroactivity grounds can also be permissibly applied to pending claims. Section 726.209, setting forth when a claimant may receive increased benefits for having a dependent child, is the same as the previous rule in 20 C.F.R. § 726.209 (2000). See 65 Fed.Reg. at 79963. Similarly, a mine operator’s liability under the new “medical benefits” rule in § 725.701 is substantively the same as it was previously in 20 C.F.R. § 725.701(b) (2000). The new rule simply provides that when a miner establishes total disability, due to pneumo-coniosis, and receives medical services for a pulmonary disorder, there is a rebuttable presumption that the disorder was caused or aggravated by the pneumoconiosis. § 725.701(e). This statement codifies the DOL’s long standing policy. See Coal Mine (BLBA) Proc. Manual, Ch. 3-301, ¶ 7a; Ch. 3—500, ¶ 8a (Feb.1980). See also Gulf & W. Indus. v. Ling, 176 F.3d at 233-34; Gen. Trucking Corp. v. Salyers, 175 F.3d at 324; Doris Coal Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 938 F.2d at 496-97. Section 718.204(a), the “total disability” rule, which provides that only impairments which affect the miner’s ability to breathe are relevant to the disability issue codifies the existing state of the law. 65 Fed.Reg. 79947; 64 Fed.Reg. at 54979; 62 Fed.Reg. at 3345. See, e.g., Beatty v. Danri Corp. & Triangle Enter., 49 F.3d 998, 1001-02 (3d Cir.1995); Jewell Smokeless Coal Corp. v. Street, 42 F.3d 241, 244 (4th Cir.1994); Lollar v. Ala. By-Prods. Corp., 893 F.2d 1258, 1262-63 (11th Cir.1990); Bosco v. Twin Pines Coal Co., 892 F.2d 1473, 1480 (10th Cir.1989); Adams v. Dir., OWCP, 886 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir.1989). The exclusion of non-respiratory and non-pulmonary impairments is consistent with the DOL’s interpretation of the prior regulation. See 65 Fed.Reg. at 79947; 64 Fed. Reg. at 54979; 62 Fed.Reg. at 3344-45. See also Cross Mountain Coal Inc. v. Ward, 93 F.3d 211, 217 (6th Cir.1996); Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. McAngues, 996 F.2d 130, 134-35 (6th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1040, 114 S.Ct. 683, 126 L.Ed.2d 650 (1994); Twin Pines Coal Co. v. Dep’t of Labor, 854 F.2d 1212, 1215 (10th Cir.1988); Peabody Coal Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 778 F.2d 358, 363 (7th Cir.1985). But see Peabody Coal Co. v. Vigna, 22 F.3d 1388, 1394 (7th Cir.1994). The Court finds that these revisions do not change the legal landscape in any significant way. The only change to § 718.205, the “death due to pneumoconiosis” rule, is an explanation that pneumoconiosis should be deemed to be a “substantially contributing cause” where it “hastened” the miner’s death. § 718.205(c)(5). This mirror’s the DOL’s previous understanding of the term. See 65 Fed.Reg. at 79949-50; 64 Fed.Reg. at 54980-82; 62 Fed.Reg. at 3345-48. See also Bradberry v. Dir., OWCP, 117 F.3d 1361, 1365-66 (11th Cir.1997); N. Coal Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 100 F.3d 871, 874 (10th Cir.1996); Brown v. Rock Creek Mining Co., 996 F.2d 812, 816 (6th Cir.1993); Peabody Coal Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 972 F.2d 178, 183 (7th Cir.1992); Shuff v. Cedar Coal Co., 967 F.2d 977, 980 (4th Cir.1992); Lukosevicz v. Dir., OWCP, 888 F.2d 1001, 1006 (3d Cir.1989). Section 725.101 defines the term “benefits” as including “all money or other benefits paid or payable” on account of “disability or death due to pneumoconiosis,” by including “any expenses related to the medical examination and testing authorized by the District Director pursuant to § 725.406.” § 725.101(a)(6). Section 725.406 implements the BLBA’s requirement that each claimant be provided an opportunity to establish his entitlement by means of a pulmonary evaluation. 30 U.S.C. § 923(b). The prior version of the rule provided that the Trust Fund “shall be reimbursed for such payments by an operator, if any, found liable for the payment of benefits to the claimant,” § 725.406(c) (2000). The new rule simply makes §§ 725.101 and 725.406(c) consistent. See 64 Fed.Reg. at 54982. This is not a substantive change. Section 725.502 clarifies the dates on which benefits become due and adjudicatory orders become effective. It does not alter the mine operator’s legal obligation to pay benefits or change the amounts due. Section 725.503 provides that approved benefits are payable at either the date of onset of total disability by pneumoconiosis or, if that date cannot be determined, the date the claim was filed. In plaintiffs brief they acknowledge that this is essentially the same rule that has been in effect since 1978. See Plaintiffs’ Brief at 13. Section 725.502, in conjunction with § 725.503, does not create an impermissible retroactive effect. Section 725.530 provides that a responsible operator is in default if he fails to pay benefits that are due and that a claimant who does not receive any benefits within ten days of the date they become due is entitled to additional compensation equal to 20 percent of the benefits. § 725.530(a) (incorporating § 725.607). This is not impermissibly retroactive. Section 725.607 provides generally for the payment of additional compensation in an amount equal to 20 percent of any benefits that are not paid by a responsible operator within ten days after they become due. The revised rule is substantively the same as the prior regulation. 20 C.F.R. § 725.607 (2000). Section 725.608 provides generally for the payment of simple annual interest when a responsible operator fails to pay benefits, medical benefits, additional compensation, or attorney’s fees as required. This rule simply clarifies the obligations and rights of parties with respect to the payment of interest, but does not increase the amount of interest payable in any claim. The insurance-related provision in § 726.8(d) does not impose any monetary liability on coal mine operators, retroactively or otherwise. It only ensures that insurance companies remain liable for amounts that are co-extensive with the liability of the mine operators whom they insure and encourages operators to make sure that their employees are all covered by insurance as required by law. Section 718.104 codifies judicial precedent recognizing that an ongoing relationship between a miner and his physician may justify giving weight to that opinion. 62 Fed.Reg. 3342, and cases cited. The Court finds that the codification of this evidentiary standard does not substantively change the burden on the parties. Sections 725.204, 725.214, 725.212, 725.213, 725.219 were promulgated by the DOL to bring erroneous interpretations in prior rules in conformity with the BLBA. Sections 725.204 and 725.214 recognize that a “deemed” spouse of a living and deceased miner is eligible for black lung benefits regardless of any compensation paid to actual spouses. These revisions brin