Full opinion text
DECISION AND ORDER ARCARA, District Judge. This case was referred to Magistrate Judge Leslie G. Foschio, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), on April 7, 2000. On December 22, 2000, defendants filed a joint motion for dismissal, to strike surplusage and for suppression of evidence. On January 10, 2001, the government filed a response to the motion. Magistrate Judge Foschio heard oral argument on the motion on March 15, 2001. On April 19, 2001, Magistrate Judge Foschio filed a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss and for suppression of evidence be denied. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 58.2(a)(2) of the Local Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (“Local Rules of Criminal Procedure”), defendants were required to file any objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation by May 7, 2001. On May 3, 2001, defendants filed a motion for an extension of time to file objections, stating that they needed additional time to evaluate the 78-page Report and Recommendation. On May 4, 2001, the Court granted the motion and extended the time to file objections to June 4, 2001. On June 4, 2001, defendants filed a second motion for extension of time. This time, defendants stated the need for the extension as follows: While a draft of these objections has been prepared, this additional time is needed in order to circulate and finalize the objections. That process necessarily requires the coordination of efforts and incorporation of changes and revisions among counsel for five of the six defendants. That same day, June 4, 2001, the Court granted defendants’ motion and extended the time to file objections to June 8, 2001. On Friday, June 8, 2001, at 4:27 p.m., defendants filed yet a third motion for extension of time. This time, defendants explained the need for the extension as follows: While a draft of these objections has been prepared, this additional time is needed in order to circulate and finalize the objections. That process necessarily requires the coordination of efforts and incorporation of changes and revisions among counsel for five of the six defendants. This is obviously the exact same reason given in their June 4th motion. On Monday, June 11, 2001, before the Court had a chance to rule on or even consider the June 8th motion for an extension, defendants submitted their proposed objections. The objections are 93 pages long. Along with the objections, defendants filed a motion for permission to exceed the 25-page limit for briefs contained in Rule 49.1(e) of the Local Rules of Criminal Procedure. After careful consideration, the Court denies defendants’ June 8th motion for extension of time. Defendants waited until the last minute to file their extension motion, clearly assuming that the Court would automatically grant the motion. However, the Court has granted defendants two previous extensions, and they have cited no new reason for a third extension. Defendants have already been given additional time to circulate and finalize their proposed objections. No satisfactory explanation is given as to why the time was insufficient. Absent a sufficient reason, this Court expects that its scheduling orders will be obeyed. Scheduling orders are not mere formalities that can be disregarded or treated cavalierly. Waiting until one-half hour before the close of business on the day the objections are due to file a motion for an extension of time demonstrates a lack diligence in trying to comply with the Court’s scheduling orders. Accordingly, because defendants’ objections were not filed by June 8, 2001, they are untimely and the Court shall not consider them. Affcer carefully reviewing the Report and Recommendation, the record in this case, and the pleadings and materials submitted by the parties, and no objections having been timely filed, it is hereby ORDERED, that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and for the reasons set forth in Magistrate Judge Foschio’s Report and Recommendation, the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss and for suppression of evidence is denied. Trial in this case shall commence on July 17, 2001 at 9:30 a.m. A final pretrial conference shall be held on July 5, 2001 at 2:00 p.m. IT IS SO ORDERED. REPORT and RECOMMENDATION FOSCHIO, United States Magistrate Judge. JURISDICTION This matter was referred to the undersigned, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § § 636(b)(1)(A) and 636(b)(1)(B), on April 7, 2000 by Hon. Richard J. Arcara. The matter is presently before the court on Defendants’ Joint Motion for Dismissal, to Strike Surplusage, and for Suppression of Evidence filed December 22, 2000 (“Defendants’ Motion”) (Doc. # 66). BACKGROUND In this case, Defendants Darnyl Parker, Ferby, Rodriguez, and Hill are charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 241, conspiracy to violate federally protected civil rights (Count I); and 18 U.S.C. § 371, conspiracy to commit theft of government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (Count II); Defendants Darnyl Parker, Ferby, and Rodriguez are charged with theft of government property on January 7, 2000, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 641 and 2 (Count III). Defendants Darnyl Parker, Ferby, Rodriguez, and Hill are charged with theft of government property on February 13, 2000, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 641 and 2 (Count IV). Count V of the Indictment charges Defendants Darnyl Parker, Ferby, Rodriguez, and Hill with conspiracy to commit robbery and extortion, including under col- or of official right, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Count VI of the Indictment charges Defendants Darnyl Parker, Ferby, Rodriguez, and Hill with an attempted violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 1951 and 2, by robbery and extortion, including under col- or of official right, on February 13, 2000, by the taking and obtaining of $36,442 from an undercover agent believed by Defendants to be a drug dealer. Count VII charges Darnyl Parker, Ferby, Rodriguez, and Hill with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), carrying and possession of a firearm in furtherance of the crimes of violence alleged in Counts V and VI. Defendant Darnyl Parker is individually charged with obtaining $1,000, on November 17, 2000, from a confidential source, whom Defendant believed to be a drug dealer, by extortion, including under color of official right, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 1951 and 2 (Count VIII). Parker is also charged with obtaining, on January 5, 2000, $1,000 from the confidential source, by extortion, including under color of official right, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 1951 and 2. Parker is further charged, in Count X, with conducting and attempting to conduct, a financial transaction involving the transfer and delivery of $2,500, represented to be proceeds of an unlawful narcotics transaction prohibited by 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 1956(a)(3)(A) and 2. In Count XI, the Indictment charges Defendants Darnyl Parker, William Parker, and Reno Sayles with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, on November 2, 1999, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Finally, Defendant Ferby is charged, in Count XII, with obtaining information from a government agency, through unauthorized access to a computer, for unlawful purposes and private gain, as alleged in Counts I, II, and III, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 1030(a)(2)(B), 1030(c)(2)(B) and 2. On August 28, 2000, Defendants filed a motion for a bill of particulars and discovery. (Doc. #42). An Amended Bill of Particulars was filed by the Government on September 13, 2000 (Doc. # 48). By Decision and Order (“the D & O”) dated November 3, 2000 (Doc. # 54), the motion was granted in part, denied in part, and dismissed as moot in part. Defendants subsequently filed objections. On February 27, 2001, District Judge Arcara rejected Defendants’ objections and affirmed the D & O (Doc. # 81). Defendants’ Joint Memorandum of Law was filed December 27, 2000 (Doc. # 67); Defendants’ Amended Joint Memorandum of Law was filed December 29, 2000 (Doc. # 67) (“Defendants’ Memorandum”). The Government’s Response to Defendants’ Motions was filed on January 10, 2001 (Doc. # 70); the Government’s Amended Response was filed on January 23, 2001 (Doc. # 72) (“Government’s Response”). Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Law was filed January 23, 2001 (Doc. # 71) (“Defendants’ Reply”). Oral argument was conducted March 15, 2001. FACTS Defendants Darnyl Parker, Rodriguez, and Hill are police officers employed by the City of Buffalo Police Department, a law enforcement agency operating under the laws of the State of New York, and are alleged during the relevant time periods, to have been assigned as detectives to the Department’s Narcotics Unit. Indictment Introduction ¶ ¶ 1-2. Defendant Ferby is an agent employed by the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) and, during the relevant periods as alleged in the Indictment, assigned to the same Buffalo Police Narcotics Unit as Parker, Rodriguez, and Hill. Id, ¶ 2. The Indictment alleges that Defendants Darnyl Parker, Ferby, Rodriguez, and Hill, while acting as police officers under color of state law, engaged in a conspiracy to violate the constitutional rights of certain persons, including “Jamaican” drug dealers within the City of Buffalo, specifically the protections against unreasonable search and seizure and the right to due process of law. Indictment Count I ¶2. The conspiracy is alleged to have commenced no later than November 10, 1999 when Defendant Darnyl Parker met with a known drug trafficker, but who, unknown to Parker, was then also a confidential source (“CS-1”) for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). Indictment Count I ¶4. On November 2, 1999, at a meeting between Parker and CS-1 at Parker’s residence, CS-1 gave Parker $2,500, representing part of the proceeds of Parker’s earlier $5,000 stake in a prospective cocaine transaction, conducted by CS-1, to be reinvested for Parker’s benefit and profit by CS-1 in a future cocaine transaction. Indictment Count X; Complaint, ¶ 13. During a meeting with CS-1 on November 10, 1999, Parker stated to CS-1 that Parker and others were interested in robbing “Jamaicans,” apparently referring to illegal drug traffickers from that country, and asked CS-1 if he knew any such persons. Indictment Count I, ¶ 14. Parker pursued the subject with CS-1 at meetings with CS-1 on November 17 and November 23,1999. Id, ¶ ¶ 6, 7. At the November 17th meeting, CS-1 paid Parker $1,000 in government funds in return for sensitive law enforcement information provided by Parker to CS-1 and another person regarding local drug investigations. Complaint, ¶ ¶ 6, 15; Indictment Count VIII. Also, at the same meeting, Parker is alleged to have repeatedly requested CS-1 to sell some cocaine to Parker’s son, William Parker, a co-defendant in Count XI. Indictment Count XI; Complaint, ¶ 15. During the November 17th meeting with CS-1, Parker also stated to CS-1 that he was interested in robbing the Jamaican drug traffickers, but had no interest in arresting them, and assured CS-1 he would be compensated for his assistance in Parker’s robbery plan. Complaint, ¶ 15. Following two meetings with CS-1 on December 22 and December 29, 1999, Parker was told by CS-1, on January 5, 2000, that the supposed Jamaican drug dealer would soon be in Buffalo, that CS-1 would inform Parker of the location of the drug dealer’s stash house on West Avenue in Buffalo and vehicle description, and that the dealer would have money on him. Indictment Count I, ¶ ¶ 9-11. At the December 22nd meeting, Parker said to CS-1, “Let’s do it, let’s do it, let’s do it.” At the December 29th meeting, Parker asked CS-1 to give him two days prior notice of the drug dealer’s expected visit “so I can get ready.” Id., ¶ ¶ 9,11. On January 5, 2000, during a meeting with Parker at his residence in Buffalo, CS-1 paid Parker another $1,000 in government funds for providing CS-1 with sensitive law enforcement information. Indictment Count IX; Amended Bill of Particulars No. 22; Complaint, ¶ 24. After conducting surveillance on what they believed was the Jamaican drug dealer’s stash house at 929 West Avenue in Buffalo on January 7, 2000, Defendants Darnyl Parker, Ferby, and Rodriguez, while acting in their official capacity as Buffalo police officers, at about noontime, made a warrantless and unauthorized forcible entry into the apartment at the purported drug dealer’s stash house intending to steal cash and property belonging to the dealer, during which entry they stole a gold watch and a gold ring which had been secretly placed there by investigators. Indictment Count I, ¶ 17; Amended Bill of Particulars No.13. Subsequently, on January 10, 2000, at approximately 9 a.m., in furtherance of the conspiracy, Ferby allegedly made a computer inquiry regarding reported criminal activity at the 929 West Avenue address through a federal government information data base using facilities at the local DEA office. Id., ¶ 20; Amended Bill of Particulars No. 29. After an unsuccessful attempt by Defendants Parker and Hill to effect a further unlawful reentry into the West Avenue stash house, which took place on January 15, 2000, Parker met with CS-1 on January 24, 2000 at which time Parker requested CS-1 inform him when the “Jamaican” drug dealer would be in Buffalo so that Parker “can have [his] people ready.” Indictment Count I, ¶ ¶ 25-27. Parker again met with CS-1 to ascertain when the drug dealer would arrive in Buffalo and was told by CS-1 that the drug dealer would be at a particular location in the City of Buffalo on February 13, 2000. Id., ¶ ¶ 29, 30. On February 13, 2000, after surveillance of the alleged drug dealer, then unknown to Defendants to be an undercover agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), Kevin White (“Agent White”), Defendants Darnyl Parker, Ferby, Rodriguez, and Hill, acting in their official capacity as Buffalo police officers and believing Agent White to be the “Jamaican” drug dealer previously identified by CS-1, stopped, detained and searched Agent White, and his vehicle, eventually robbing Agent White of $36,442 in government funds which Defendants then believed to be proceeds of narcotics trafficking by White, posing as the Jamaican drug dealer previously described to Defendants by CS-1. Indictment, ¶ 33. Defendants’ stop, search, and seizure of White, and the robbery took place early in the evening on February 13th in a public parking lot at the corner of Elmwood Avenue and Allen Street in Buffalo. Amended Bill of Particulars No. 13. According to the Indictment, Defendants never officially reported the stop of Agent White nor the seizure of the money from White, nor did Defendants inventory the money, turn it in to the Buffalo Police Department as evidence, give White a receipt for the money taken from him, or arrest White as a narcotics trafficking suspect. Indictment Count I, ¶ ¶ 36, 39. Instead, Defendants converted the funds for their own purposes or those of another person. Id., ¶ 38. It is also alleged that when Defendants stopped and robbed White, the fact that they were armed facilitated their ability to threaten White, and to successfully complete the planned robbery. Id., ¶ 4. The Defendants’ burglary, and attempted break-in, at the West Avenue apartment were the subject of video and audio surveillance. Complaint, ¶ ¶ 26, 31. The stop, detention, search and seizure of money from Agent White on February 12, 2000 was also monitored by surveillance along with intercepts of Defendant Parker’s cellular telephone conversations with his three co-conspirators. Complaint, ¶ ¶ 53, 54 n. 6, 63. Most of the conversations between Defendant Darnyl Parker and CS-1 were consensually recorded by the investigators. Id., ¶ 3. For CS-l’s assistance in setting up Defendants’ scheme to rob the “Jamaican” drug dealer, Darnyl Parker allegedly gave CS-1 $7,000, on February 14, 2000, at a meeting at Parker’s residence, as his share of the robbery proceeds. Indictment Count I, ¶ 35; Complaint, ¶ 65. At that time, Parker asked CS-1 to sell some cocaine to Parker’s son, co-defendant William Parker, and CS-1 indicated he would contact Parker in the future to arrange for a cocaine distribution to William Parker. Indictment Count XI; Complaint, ¶ 65. Allegedly, Darnyl Parker again met with CS-1 on, Tuesday, February 22, 2000 at which time CS-1 told Parker that William Parker should arrange to pay CS-1 some money toward the purchase of cocaine if William Parker still was interested. Indictment Count XI; Complaint, ¶ 68. Dar-nyl Parker told CS-1 to contact him that Friday to arrange for making the payment. Complaint, ¶ 68. Darnyl Parker eventually telephoned CS-1 on Monday, February 25, 2000, and, later that day, phoned Reno Sayles, a relative and co-defendant in Count XI, to contact Parker regarding arranging for the cocaine sale to William Parker. Indictment Count XI; Complaint, ¶ ¶ 69, 70. At about 3 p.m., Darnyl Parker, William Parker, Reno Sayles and CS-1 met at Darnyl Parker’s residence at which time Darnyl Parker placed an order with CS-1 for one half of a kilogram of cocaine for Sayles and William Parker, and gave CS-1 $6,600, one-half of the total price, as an advance payment. Indictment Count XI; Complaint 73. DISCUSSION I. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1) and the Sixth Amendment. Defendants move to dismiss Counts I, II, and IV — XI as insufficiently pleaded in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1) and constitutional requirements for federal indictments. Defendants’ Motion ¶ ¶ 13-30 (Count I); Id., ¶ 36 (Count II); Id., ¶ ¶ 55-57 (Count IV); Id., ¶ ¶ 58-63, 65-69 (Count V); Id., ¶ ¶ 70-75 (Count VI); Id., ¶ ¶ 83-86 (Count VII); Id., ¶¶ 87-88 (Counts VIII & IX); Id., ¶ ¶ 97-98 (Count X); and Id., ¶ 101 (Count XI). An indictment is facially valid and constitutionally sufficient if it contains the elements of the offense charged, fairly informs a defendant of the charges against which he must defend, and enables a defendant to plead double jeopardy in bar of further prosecution. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); United States v. Hernandez, 980 F.2d 868, 871 (2d Cir.1992). Further, a federal indictment need only track the language of the statute which defines the charged offense and, if necessary to apprise the defendant of the nature of the accusation against him, state the time and place of the alleged offense in approximate terms. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962); United States v. Covino, 837 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir.1988). Where an indictment tracks the statutory language, it should nevertheless provide “facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offence, coming under the general description, with which he is charged.” Hamling, supra, at 117-18, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The form of the indictment is governed by Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(e)(1) and requires that the indictment “be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” It is well settled that indictments which track the statutory language defining an offense are, as a general rule, sufficient under Rule 7(c) so long as its application to a particular defendant is clear. United States v. Upton, 856 F.Supp. 727, 739 (E.D.N.Y.1994). An indictment which complies with Rule 7(c)(1) satisfies the Sixth Amendment’s requirement that the charge inform the defendant of the “nature and cause of the accusation.” Russell, supra, at 763-64, 82 S.Ct. 1038. Accord United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 44 (2d Cir.1999); Upton, supra, at 738. A fair reading of the challenged counts shows they all track the language of the statutes upon which they are based and fairly apprise Defendants of the essential facts of the alleged offenses, as well as the nature and circumstances of the charges, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1) and the Sixth Amendment. A. Count I — Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights. Count I provides 41 paragraphs of specific facts upon which the alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 is based. As relevant, § 241 outlaws conspiracies “to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any state ... in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured ... by the constitution.” In sum, Count I alleges Defendants agreed to violate the constitutional rights of supposed drug dealers. Count I further specifies Defendants acted with an intent to violate the Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Fourteenth Amendment right to freedom from a deprivation under state law of liberty and property without due process. As such, the Count fairly tracks the language of § 241, and provides ample details of the way Defendants entered the conspiracy and acted in furtherance of it, and therefore fairly alleges the nature and circumstances of the offense charged. Count I is therefore not subject to dismissal upon the grounds asserted by Defendants. B. Count II — Conspiracy to Steal Government Property. This count alleges Defendants conspired to commit a theft of government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 641 and 371. As relevant, § 641 prohibits embezzlement, stealing, purloining, or knowing conversion of government property. Section 371 punishes any conspiracy to “commit any offense against the United States.” Count II failiy tracks the language of both the statutes, and together with the realle-gation of paragraphs 4 — 41 of the Indictment with references to Count I, as the required overt acts, it details the Defendants’ entry into the alleged scheme and the circumstances of Defendants’ plan to steal property owned by the Government. Count II thus contains a plain statement of the facts underlying the charge, and adequately apprises Defendants of the nature and circumstances of the offense against them. As such, it is not subject to dismissal for insufficient pleading. C. Count TV — Theft of Government Property. Count IV alleges Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 641 by stealing and converting money taken from Agent White on February 13, 2000. The count fairly tracks § 641, the substance of which is stated above, and therefore is sufficient on its face. D. Count V — Hobbs Act Conspiracy. Count V charges Defendants conspired to obstruct, delay and affect interstate commerce by robbery, and extortion including claim of right in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, during the period November 10, 1999 through March 2, 2000 by taking money from a confidential source and a government undercover agent. As relevant, § 1951 states that any person who “in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce ... by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do” violates the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Extortion is defined to include “obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). As such, the count tracks the language of the statute, provides the general circumstances of the alleged offense, and there is no basis to dismiss it. E. Count VI — Attempt to Violate the Hobbs Act. Count VI alleges an attempt to obstruct, delay and affect interstate commerce of robbery and extortion by taking money from the undercover agent on February 13, 2000 by threats of force, and consent induced by wrongful use of force or threats of force, from the agent who Defendants believed was a drug dealer. Here, again, the count substantially tracks the statute, as recited above, and provides reasonable specifics permitting Defendants a fair opportunity to defend. Accordingly, it is sufficient on its face and not subject to dismissal. F. Count VII — Firearm Violation. In this count, Defendants are alleged to have knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully carried and possessed a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). As relevant, § 924(c) punishes any person “who, during and in relation to any crime of violence ... uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm”. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The count specifically alleges the predicate crimes of violence as required by § 924(c) to be the alleged Hobbs Act violations alleged in Counts V and VI. Therefore, this count also tracks the statute, and provides fair detail as to nature and circumstances of the offense. Accordingly, there is no basis to dismiss. G. Count VIII — Hobbs Act Violation. This count charges Defendant Darnyl Parker with an attempt to interfere with commerce by extortion of $1,000 from a confidential source in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, the Hobbs Act. The relevant text of § 1951 is stated, supra, at 445. As such, Count VIII tracks the language of the statute and provides the essential facts upon which the charge is based. There is no basis to dismiss on the grounds asserted by Defendants. H. Count X — Money Laundering. Count X charges Defendant Parker with knowingly and wilfully engaging, and attempting to engage, on February 2, 1999, in a financial transaction with a cooperating source involving the transfer and delivery of $2,500 represented to constitute proceeds of an unlawful drug transaction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(A). As relevant, § 1956(a)(3)(A) prohibits conducting or attempting to conduct, with intent to carry on “specific unlawful activity,” a financial transaction involving property, including currency, § 1956(c)(5), “represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.” The statute defines specified unlawful activity to include illicit drug trafficking. §§ 1956(c)(7)(A); 1961(1). “Represented” is defined to include representations made by a law enforcement officer or another person at the direction of a federal investigator or prosecutor. § 1956(a)(3)(A). As such, the count tracks the elements of § 1956(a)(3)(A), and provides notice of the essential facts upon which the charge is based. Accordingly, the count is not subject to dismissal. I. Count XI — Narcotics Conspiracy. This count charges Defendants Darnyl Parker, William Parker and Reno Sayles with a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine between November 17, 1999 and March 2, 2000 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. As relevant, § 846 prohibits conspiracies entered into for the purpose of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), by possession, distribution or possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, including cocaine. As such, Count XI fairly tracks the statute, provides sufficient details of the basis of the charge, and is not subject to dismissal. Accordingly, as to each count challenged by Defendants as insufficiently pleaded in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1) and the Sixth Amendment, the court finds the count substantially tracks the language of each statute and provides sufficient notice of the nature and circumstances of each charge. There is, therefore, no merit to Defendants’ motion on this ground. 2. Duplicity. Defendants move to dismiss Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX on the grounds they are duplicitous. Defendants’ Motion, ¶ ¶ 14 — 30 (Count I); Id., ¶ ¶ 46— 49 (Count II); Defendants’ Reply at 8-10 (Count III); Defendants’ Motion, ¶ ¶ 55— 57 (Count IV); Id., ¶ ¶ 64 — 69 (Count V); Id., ¶ ¶ 76 — 79 (Count VI), Id., ¶ ¶ 92-93 (Counts VIII and IX); see generally Defendants’ Memorandum at 12-13; Defendants’ Reply at 4-13. In particular, Defendants assert that because Count I alleges that the general purposes of the conspiracy were to “rob and steal money, property and drugs ... and to convert” such to their own use, Indictment Count I ¶ 3, the count charges three different offenses, and is therefore duplicitous. Defendants’ Memorandum at 12; Defendants’ Reply at 4. The same argument is raised by Defendants against Count II as it alleges, Indictment Count II ¶ 2, that Defendants conspired to commit an offense against the United States by stealing, purloining, and converting government funds and property. Id. Defendants similarly attack Counts III and IV in that these counts charge Defendants with stealing, purloining, and converting government property located at the West Avenue apartment on January 7, 2000 (Parker, Ferby, and Rodriguez) (Count III), and the $36,442 in government funds from Agent White on February 13, 2000 (Parker, Ferby, Rodriguez, and Hill) (Count IV), respectively. Id. Further, Defendants move against Count V on the ground that the count alleges a violation of the Hobbs Act by conspiracy to obstruct, delay, and affect commerce through robbery and extortion, and Count VI on the ground that this count alleges an attempted violation of the Hobbs Act through robbery, extortion and under color of official right. Defendants’ Reply at 10-13. Finally, Defendants argue Count VIII, charging Defendant Dar-nyl Parker with a Hobbs Act violation, and Count IX, charging Parker with a second Hobbs Act violation, should be dismissed because these counts allege crimes committed through the use of force, threats of force, extortion, and under color of official right. Id. According to Defendants, as these Hobbs Act violation counts allege the respective offenses were committed through acts described as stealing, purloining, converting, robbery, force, threats of force, extortion, and under color of right, the counts allege more than one crime and, hence, are duplicitous. Defendants’ Memorandum at 12-13; Defendants’ Reply at 4-13. “An indictment is duplicitous if it joins two or more distinct crimes in a single count.” United States v. Aracri, 968 F.2d 1512, 1518 (2d Cir.1992) (citing United States v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892, 896 (2d Cir.1980)); United States v. Droms, 566 F.2d 361, 363 (2d Cir.1977); United States v. Gleave, 786 F.Supp. 258, 264 (W.D.N.Y.1992), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313 (1994). The test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one offense charged is “whether each provision in the count requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). A count of an indictment should only be ruled impermissibly duplicitous when the policy goals underlying this doctrine are offended, ie., “if a general verdict of guilty might actually conceal contrary findings as to different alleged crimes, or if an appropriate basis for sentencing is not provided.” United States v. Margiotta, 646 F.2d 729, 732-33 (2d Cir.1981). As to conspiracy charges, it is established law that a conspiracy may be alleged to have multiple purposes. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 54, 63 S.Ct. 99, 87 L.Ed. 23 (1942) (“for conspiracy is the crime and that is one, however diverse its objects”). Thus, a conspiracy count alleging the conspiracy had multiple objectives is not duplicitous. United States v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892, 896-97 (2d Cir.1980) (“allegation in single count of conspiracy to commit several crimes is not duplicitous because conspiracy is one crime despite diverse objects”). Further, a count of an indictment is not duplicitous if the allegation states that the offense has been committed in more than one way or through different means. See United States v. Schwartz, 899 F.2d 243, 246 (3rd Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 901, 111 S.Ct. 259, 112 L.Ed.2d 217 (1990) (bank fraud); United States v. Berardi 675 F.2d 894, 897 (7th Cir.1982) (obstruction of justice); United States v. Droms, supra, at 363 (falsifying financial statements to IRS); United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424, 435 (2d Cir.) (conspiracy committed by alternate means not duplicitous), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949, 93 S.Ct. 268, 34 L.Ed.2d 219 (1972); United States v. Wesley, 918 F.Supp. 81, 86 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (receipt or possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). Where, therefore, the statute defining the offense defines disjunctively, ie., through the use of the conjunctive “or,” the means by which the statute may be violated, it is permissible to allege the offense in the indictment conjunctively, i.e., through the use of the conjunctive “and.” United States v. Astolas, 487 F.2d 275, 279 (2d Cir.1973) (citing United States v. Conti 361 F.2d 153 (2d Cir.1966), rev’d on other grounds, 390 U.S. 204, 88 S.Ct. 899, 19 L.Ed.2d 1035 (1968)), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 955, 94 S.Ct. 1968, 40 L.Ed.2d 305 (1974). In such a case, a conviction will be sustained “if the evidence justifies a finding that the statute was violated in any of the ways alleged.” Id., see also Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420, 90 S.Ct. 642, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970); United States v. Burton, 871 F.2d 1566, 1572 (11th Cir.1989) (issue presented under 18 U.S.C. § 641); United States v. Hicks, 619 F.2d 752, 758 (8th Cir.1980) (noting rule is “well known” and stating that upon trial court usually instructs jury in the “disjunctive form used in the statute.”); United States v. Viserto, 596 F.2d 531, 538 (2d Cir.1979) (charge of distribution and possession with intent to distribute in single count alleging violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) upheld); United States v. Wyant, 576 F.2d 1312, 1319 (8th Cir.1978) (quoting United States v. Conti, supra.); United States v. UCO Oil Company, 546 F.2d 833, 837 (9th Cir.1976). Indeed, charging in the disjunctive “would make the indictment bad for uncertainty, so it is necessary to connect them [the actions of defendant alleged to violate the statute] with the conjunctive ‘and’ before the evidence can be admitted as to more than one act.” Joyce v. United States, 454 F.2d 971, 977 (D.C.Cir.) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 969, 92 S.Ct. 1188, 31 L.Ed.2d 242 (1972). As the court in Joyce, supra, stated, “[t]his favors the accused for he will be charged with only one offense and a judgment on a general verdict of guilty upon that count will bar further prosecution on all matters alleged therein.” Id. In Counts I and II, the allegations charging that the object of Defendants’ conspiracy was “to rob and steal” from its intended victims, Indictment, Count I ¶ 3; Count II, ¶ 3, are permitted as conspiracies may have multiple objectives, Braver-man, supra, and as stated, Discussion, supra, at 447-48, an indictment may allege conjunctively what a statute defines disjunctively as the prohibited means by which the offense may be accomplished. Here, as discussed, Discussion, supra, at 444, each count of the Indictment challenged by Defendants, fairly tracks the language of the respective statutory provision upon which the count is alleged to be based. Specifically, Count I alleges that Defendants, while acting under color of state law, conspired to violate the constitutional rights and privileges of persons within the City of Buffalo during the period between November 10, 1999 and March 2, 2000 through injury, oppression, threats, and intimidation. The allegations relating to this count describe a scheme by which the Defendants, acting as police officers, sought to rob and steal from suspected “Jamaican” drug dealers their illegal drugs and drug trafficking proceeds after being identified to Defendants by a known drug trafficker, and, in furtherance of the conspiracy, carried out a warrantless entry into, and theft from, a supposed drug stash house, and a subsequent theft of suspected drug money from an undercover agent believed by Defendants to be such for a “Jamaican” drug dealer. Indictment Count I, ¶ ¶ 3-41. Count II, based on the general allegations set forth with Count I, charges Defendants with a conspiracy to steal, purloin, and convert government property, namely the valuables and cash planted by investigators at the undercover stash house on West Avenue taken by Defendants on January 7, 2000, and the cash in the possession of the undercover agent posing as a drug dealer taken by Defendants on February 13, 2000, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. As stated, a conspiracy count is not duplicitous because it alleges that the conspiracy had multiple objects. Braverman, supra; Murray, supra. Further, to the extent that Counts I and II charge in the conjunctive how the objective of the conspiracies charged were to be accomplished, such allegations properly allege the alternative means by which the defined offense may be committed. Aracri, supra; Carson, supra. Accordingly, neither Count I nor Count II is duplicitous for the reasons asserted by Defendants. Counts III and IV charge thefts of government property, namely the cash taken from the supposed West Avenue stash house on January 7, 2000, and from Agent White on February 13, 2000, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. Defendants attack these counts as duplicitous in that, according to Defendants, because the counts allege Defendants stole, purloined, and converted the cash, the counts each charge at least two distinct crimes. Defendant’s Reply at 8. As relevant, 18 U.S.C. § 641 prohibits embezzlement, stealing, purloining, or “knowingly” converting any “money” or “thing of value of the United States.” Count III charges that Defendants Parker, Ferby, and Rodriguez, on January 7, 2000 “did knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully steal, purloin, and convert to their own use, and the use of another, certain property and things of value of the United States having a value in excess of $1,000” described as a gold watch and ring. Indictment at 16. Count IV alleges identical conduct by all four Defendants with respect to the taking of cash from Agent White on February 13, 2000. Indictment at 16-17. Thus, each count tracks the language of § 641, and alleges, conjunc-tively, the alternative means by which the offense as defined in the statute may be committed. That a count in an indictment asserts, as stated in the relevant statute, that the offense may be committed in a variety of ways does not render the count duplicitous. “A duplicitous indictment, which alleges several offenses in the same count, must be distinguished from ‘the allegation in a single count of the commission of a crime by several means.’ ” Aracri, supra, at 1517 (quoting Murray, supra, at 896). “The latter is not duplicitous.” Id. Moreover, even if the conduct alleged could have been charged in separate counts, the fact that such conduct is alleged in a single count does not render the indictment duplicitous where the indictment tracks the elements of the offense as defined in the statute. United States v. Zolli 51 F.R.D. 522, 527 (S.D.N.Y.1970) (“[a duplicity] inquiry is necessary only where the indictment is" not framed in the statutory language.”) In Zolli, the count challenged as duplicitous charged defendants with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 — intimidation of a federal witness and obstruction of justice. Rejecting defendants’ contention that the separate clauses of the statute describing witness intimidation and obstruction of justice stated separate offenses, the court found that § 1503 established the offense of obstruction of justice through the alternative means as defined in the statute and, accordingly, such means were properly included in a single count. Zolli supra, at 528. Nor is there any merit to Defendants’ contention regarding Counts III and IV that as the alternative means by which a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 may be accomplished, ie., to steal, purloin, or convert, commonly recognized forms of the crime of theft, are, included as elements of the underlying offense defined by § 641, alleging them in a single count renders the count duplicitous. Defendants’ Memorandum at 12-13. To assert that an element of a crime is a separate offense merely because it incorporates a common law crime does not make the element itself an offense which may be separately charged in an indictment. Rather, it remains an element regardless of whether the crimes are defined by the statute to constitute, as here, alternative means by which the offense, as defined by the statute, may be committed. Moreover, § 641 does not seek to punish the embezzling, stealing, purloining or conversion as crimes per se, rather, it prohibits any such form of theft of government property. It is black letter law that a crime is defined by its elements. Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (West 1990) at 520 (defining “elements” as “[tjhose constituent parts of a crime which must be proved by the prosecution to sustain a conviction.”). Defendants’ argument that the alternative means of committing the crime of violating § 641, as defined in the statute, brings to mind the observation, attributed to Lincoln, that calling a dog’s tail a leg will not thereby cause the dog to have five legs as the dog’s tail remains a tail and not a dog’s leg no matter what it is called. Defendants can therefore no more transmute an element of a crime into a separate offense by referring to it as such than could calling the dog’s tail a leg in Lincoln’s aphorism change the number of legs on the dog. In United States v. Hill, 835 F.2d 759 (10th Cir.1987), relied on by Defendants, Defendants’ Reply at 8-9, the indictment, charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641, only alleged defendant, an erratic cooperating witness, had stolen drug buy money from the DEA, and failed to conjunctively allege a theft by conversion of the subject government property; however, the evidence at trial proved only that defendant converted the buy money after receiving it from the agency. Hill, supra, at 763-64. Finding a prejudicial variance, the court refused to affirm defendant’s conviction upon the indictment. Id. As such, Hill provides no support for Defendants’ contention that the challenged counts in this case are duplicitous. Rather, by implication, the case holds that a conjunctive pleading of the alternative forms of theft defined by § 641 is proper, and indeed, necessary, to accommodate potential variations in the Government’s evidence at trial. Accordingly, where, as here, the indictment charges an offense the commission of which the statute provides may be accomplished by alternative means, as defined elements of the offense, the duplicity doctrine is inapplicable. See Zolli supra, at 527. Defendants’ attacks on Counts V, VI, VIII, and IX of the Indictment for duplicity, Defendants’ Memorandum at 12; Defendants’ Reply at 10-13, fail for the same reasons. Count V charges all Defendants with a conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act by robbery and extortion as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1951 based on an agreement to unlawfully take money from CS-1 and Agent White. Count VI charges all Defendants with violating § 1951 by taking money from Agent White on February 13, 2000 by force and consent obtained under color of right. Counts VTII and IX charge Defendant Parker with violating § 1951 in connection with two takings of money from CS-1, the confidential source with whom Parker had been dealing. However, as discussed, a conspiracy may be alleged to have multiple purposes and offenses generally may be alleged to have been committed by alternate means without becoming duplicitous. Defendants argue that Counts V, VI, VIII, and IX should be found to be duplicitous based on United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112 (3d Cir.1975). Defendants’ Reply at 10-13. In Starks, the indictment charged, in a single count, both conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act and an attempt to do so. Starks, supra, at 116. Relying on United States v. Jacobs, 451 F.2d 530, 534 (5th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955, 92 S.Ct. 1170, 31 L.Ed.2d 231 (1972), the court in Starks stated that the Hobbs Act enacted four separate offenses — robbery, extortion, attempted robbery or extortion, and conspiracy to commit robbery or extortion. Starks, supra, at 115 n. 4. As the court in Starks found the challenged count charged both a conspiracy and an attempted violation of the statute, the court held it was improper, and that the government should have been required to elect upon which form of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 it requested a verdict, or the indictment should have been dismissed. Id. However, in the case at bar, Defendants are charged with conspiracy to violate § 1951 as to “Jamaican” drug dealers in Count V, and with an attempt to violate § 1951 in Count VI as to particular supposed “Jamaican” drug dealer, Agent White. Moreover, Count VIII charges Defendant Darnyl Parker with an attempt to violate § 1951 as to CS-1 on a particular occasion and, in Count IX, Parker is charged with a second attempt to violate § 1951 as to CS-1 on a different occasion. In the instant case, as the alleged § 1951 conspiracy, Count V, and the three attempted violations of § 1951 (Counts VI, VIII & IX) are each stated in separate counts, Starks is inapposite to Defendants’ motion. Additionally, as each of these counts tracks the language of the respective statute, § 1951, it is not duplicitous. Zolli, supra. Finally, as discussed, an indictment which charges conjunctively what the statute prohibits disjunctively, is not duplicitous. Discussion, supra, at 447-48. Thus, there is no merit to Defendants’ contention that Count V, VI, VIII, and IX are subject to dismissal on duplicity grounds. Even assuming any of the counts challenged by Defendants were found to be duplicitous such fact does not require dismissal as the remedy of a special jury instruction to assure unanimity will avoid any prejudice to Defendants. United States v. Weller, 238 F.3d 1215, 1219-220 (10th Cir.2001) (rejecting argument that 18 U.S.C. § 656 charge of embezzlement and willful misapplication are duplicitous and approving special instruction requiring jury be unanimous on either means of committing “a single offense.”); Drams, supra, at 362 n. 1 (“Duplicity, of course, is a rule of pleading and would in no event be fatal to the count.”); Bins v. United States, 331 F.2d 390, 393 (5th Cir.1964) (recognizing “approved procedure for submitting duplicitous counts [to jury] by limiting instructions”); Gleave, supra, at 265 (noting use of special jury instruction requiring unanimity on specific evidence of culpability to guard against potential jury confusion where defendants claimed duplicity). Further, should the trial judge determine, after hearing all of the Government’s proof, that there nevertheless exists a serious risk of jury confusion, another remedy would be to require the Government to elect among the alternative theories of culpability presented rather than to dismiss that count of the indictment. United States v. Vario, 1989 WL 253781 *8 (E.D.N.Y.1989) (an appropriate remedy when a count is duplicitous is to have the government elect the charge contained in the count upon which it will rely); United States v. Kearney, 444 F.Supp. 1290, 1295 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (“Unless the defects inherent in a duplicitous count have not been obviated by the contents of a bill of particulars or appropriate jury instructions ... the appropriate remedy for a duplicitous count is to require the government to elect one of the multiple offenses embraced therein on which to proceed.”) (citing cases). Finally, based on the extensive discovery provided to Defendants regarding the expected evidence at trial as well as the details of the background of the investigation as recited in the Indictment, Defendants have been given adequate notice of the basis of the Government’s case as to each count. Additionally, Discussion, supra, at 451, special instructions to the jury can avoid the risk that a finding of guilt on any offenses claimed by Defendants to be included improperly within a single count, will lack unanimity. Thus, even if it is assumed that any duplicity exits regarding any count of the Indictment as challenged by Defendants, such will not violate, in this case, the policies underlying the duplicity doctrine requiring dismissal of the counts prior to trial. See Margiotta, supra, at 733 (single count containing several allegations which could have been separately stated as offenses not duplicitous unless failure to do so “risks unfairness to the defendant.”). Here, based on the detailed allegations contained in the Indictment, the extensive discovery available to Defendants, and the availability of special instructions to the jury to assure a unanimous verdict, no such unfairness to Defendants will result if the Government is not required to separately allege the acts which Defendants assert render the counts duplicitous. Accordingly, Defendants’ attack on the Indictment based on any asserted duplicity is without merit. 3. Failure to State an Offense. Defendants also seek to dismiss Counts I, II, and IV — XI of the Indictment on the ground that upon the facts as stated, the counts fail, as matter of law, to establish the respective offenses charged. Defendants’ Motion, ¶ ¶ 6-12 (Count I); Id., ¶¶ 36-39, ¶¶ 42-45, ¶ ¶ 48 — 49 (Count II); Id., ¶¶ 50-54 (Count IV); Id., ¶¶ 58-63 (Count V); Id., ¶ ¶ 70-75 (Count VI); Id., ¶¶ 80-82 (Count VII); Id., ¶¶ 87-91 (Counts VIII & IX); ¶ ¶ 94-96, ¶ 98 (Count X); Id., ¶ ¶ 99-100 (Count XI.) A. Count I — Conspiracy to Violate § m. Defendants assert that Count I should be dismissed as, based on the facts stated in the Indictment, Defendants could not as a matter of law have violated any constitutional right of Agent White, the person whom Defendants believed was a drug dealer when they took the alleged action against him on February 13, 2000. Indictment, ¶ 33. Defendants’ Memorandum at 13-26; Defendants’ Reply 15-24. Specifically, Defendants contend that (i) as the undercover agent, as part of the investigation, expected Defendants to stop him and voluntarily handed over the money at Defendants’ alleged request, the encounter was consensual and therefore could not constitute a seizure within the Fourth Amendment; (ii) no unlawful search and seizure occurred as, based on the facts alleged in the Indictment, Defendants had probable cause to stop the agent whom they reasonably believed to be a drug dealer and seize what they reasonably believed to be proceeds of drug trafficking; (in) as the money reasonably believed by Defendants to be drug trafficking proceeds seized from the undercover agent was subject to forfeiture and as under the relation back doctrine there was no lawful ownership interest in the money by the agent or government, it was thus legally impossible for Defendants to commit a theft of government property as to the money; and (iv) any corrupt intent by Defendants, as alleged in the Indictment, does not vitiate Defendants’ reasonable objective belief that they were acting with probable cause thereby rendering it impossible that Defendants acted in violation of the agent’s constitutional rights, relying on Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) and Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Defendants’ Memorandum at 14-20. There are several errors in Defendants’ contentions. Under federal law, intentional violations of constitutional rights are subject to two forms of criminal prosecution. 18 U.S.C. § 242 prohibits willful violations of the constitutionally protected rights of persons and discrimination based on race or alien status. 18 U.S.C. § 241, prohibiting any conspiracy to violate federal constitutional rights, the offense of which Defendants are charged, is considered the companion statute to § 242 and is subject to similar requirements of proof as to the element of willfulness set forth in § 242. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 117, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945) (Rutledge, J.) (concurring op.); United States v. McClean, 528 F.2d 1250, 1255 (2d Cir.1976) (extortionate police seizure of money from drug dealers pursuant to a conspiracy “would also have constituted a violation of § 241”). It is fundamental that when law enforcement officers commit actionable wrongs against individuals, such conduct may constitute a violation of the person’s constitutional rights even though if the same action were taken by a wrongdoer not acting under color of law the conduct would not constitute'such a violation. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 391-92, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). “An agent acting — albeit unconstitutionally — in the name of the [state] possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own.” Id. at 392, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (citing cases). Thus, where one acting under color of state law commits a crime against an individual, which impairs a constitutionally protected personal or property interest, such conduct may be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 242. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 261, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (conviction of state judge under § 242 for rape of employees may be sustained if defendant had fair warning that conduct subject to criminal liability under § 242 as violating victim’s liberty interest right to be free from assaults without due process). The fact that a victim of police illegality may also be guilty of criminal behavior, which motivated the investigative activity, does not disentitle such person to the protection of the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendment, and such illegality may constitute a violation of § 242. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 137, 74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561 (1954) (“If the officials have willfully deprived a citizen of the United States of a right or privilege secured to him by the Fourteenth amendment, that being the right to be secure ... against unreasonable searches ... their conduct may constitute a federal crime under ... [18 U.S.C. § 242]”) (warrantless search and seizure by police of home of suspected gambler); McClean, supra, at 1254-55 (conviction for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 to violate 18 U.S.C. § 242 and for violation of § 242 upheld where police extorted from drug dealers proceeds of drug trafficking). See also United States v. Alonso, 740 F.2d 862, 872 (11th Cir.1984) (conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for violation of due process rights of persons with ownership interests in drug trafficking proceeds upheld where police fraudulently removed funds from police department property room) (citing McClean, supra.). Willful conduct taken by officers with the specific intent to violate rights made specific by the provisions of the Constitution or decisions of the courts interpreting them will support a conviction under § 242. Screws, supra, at 103-04, 65 S.Ct. 1031. “The fact that the defendants may not have been thinking in constitutional terms is not material where their aim was not to enforce local law but to deprive a citizen of a right and that right was protected by the Constitution.” Id. at 105, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (emphasis added). Thus, if the evidence demonstrates that a police officer did not act with the purpose of enforcing the law but, rather, with a criminal intent and thereby willfully violated a federally protected right, criminal liability under § 242 may attach. If criminal liability under § 242 arises based on such circumstances, as a completed offense, it follows that, where an officer conspires with similar intent to violate such protected rights, criminal culpability also arises under § 241. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (where “predominant purpose of the conspiracy is to impede or prevent exercise of [a constitutional right],” culpability under § 241 attaches regardless of defendant’s other motives). It is well established that a conspiracy charge does not i-equire a showing that the unlawful objectives of the conspiracy be accomplished. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 694, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975). “The law of conspiracy identifies the agreement to engage in a criminal venture as an event of sufficient threat to social order to permit the imposition of criminal sanctions for the agreement alone ... regardless of whether the crime agreed upon is actually committed.” Id. (citing United States v. Bayer, 331 U,S. 532, 542, 67 S.Ct. 1394, 91 L.Ed. 1654 (1947)). “Criminal intent has crystallized, and the likelihood of actual, fulfilled commission warrants preventive action.” Feola, at 694, 95 S.Ct. 1255; United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 553 n. 9. (2d Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Everett, 692 F.2d 596, 600 (9th Cir.1982) (“[T]he crime of conspiracy is complete upon the agreement to violate the law, ... and is not dependent upon the ultimate success or failure of the planned scheme.”), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051, 103 S.Ct. 1498, 75 L.Ed.2d 930(1983)). Further, the crime of conspiracy does not require that the object of the unlawful agreement be capable of fruition. “[T]he impossibility that the defendants’ conduct would result in consummation of the contemplated substantive crime is not persuasive or controlling.” United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033, 1037 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894, 97 S.Ct. 253, 50 L.Ed.2d 176 (1976). Moreover, a mistaken belief by alleged conspirators as to the existence of facts which provide the basis for federal prosecution is no defense to a conspiracy charge to commit the substantive offense which is the object of the conspiracy. Feola, supra, (holding that knowledge of the true identity of victim as a federal officer unnecessary to an indictment for conspiracy to assault a federal officer); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 591 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (upholding Hobbs Act conspiracy convictions based on receiving money to influence official conduct from undercover agents posing as foreign business persons seeking favorable official action using government funds), cert denied, 457 U.S. 1106, 102 S.Ct. 2906, 73 L.Ed.2d 1315 (1982); United States v. Rose, 590 F.2d 232, 235 (7th Cir.1978) (upholding conviction for conspiracy to engage in interstate transportation of stolen goods defendants erroneously believed to be stolen by undercover agents who never intended to engage in the planned theft), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 S.Ct. 2859, 61 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979); Craven v. United States, 22 F.2d 605, 609 (1st Cir.1927) (sustaining conviction for conspiracy to illegally import foreign liquor despite defendants’ erroneous beliefs that liquor was of foreign origin). “It is ... irrelevant that the ends of the conspiracy were from the very inception of the agreement objectively unattainable.” Jannotti, supra, at 591 (citing cases). But see Ventimiglia v. United States, 242 F.2d 620 (4th Cir.1957) (mistaken belief that person to whom defendants made payments was a union representative negated conviction for conspiracy to violate 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) prohibiting employer payments to union representative). While a legal impossibility that a defendant could have intended to commit an alleged unlawful objective may, in limited circumstances, constitute a defense to a conspiracy charge, no facts in the Indictment support a finding that it was legally impossible for Defendants to conspire with the intent to violate federal constitutional rights. “Unless a legal impossibility arising at the time of the act [which is the object of the conspiracy] relates back to cover the intent which precedes the substantive act and makes it [the substantive act] non-criminal ... [such impossibility of intent] does not apply to the inchoate crime of conspiracy ....” Perry E. Mann, Jr., Case Comment, Impossibility in ConspiRACY, 15 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 122, 127 (1958). See also Developments in the Law, CRIMINAL Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L.Rev. 922, 944-45 (1959) (noting that “unless unlawful intent [going to the object of the conspiracy] is legally impossible, an anti-social combination exists.”) (citing, as an example of such legal impossibility, Foster v. Com