Full opinion text
DECISION AND ENTRY AWARDING PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF $3060.00 FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF DU-PLICATIVE TRIAL PREPARATION MADE NECESSARY BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT’S UNTIMELY NOTIFICATION THAT SHE WOULD BE SEEKING A CONTINUANCE; FINDINGS OF FACT; EXPANDED OPINION; CONCLUSIONS OF LAW; PROCEDURES SET FORTH TO BE FOLLOWED BY COUNSEL RICE, Chief Judge. For a number of years, the Plaintiff disposed of waste from a coal tar products plant it operated in an abandoned sand and gravel pit in Ironton, Ohio, known as the Goldcamp Disposal Area (“GDA”). The Defendant, which operated a foundry in Ironton, also dumped wastes into the GDA. After the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) placed the GDA on the National Priorities List (“NPL”), Plaintiff entered into two agreements with the EPA, under which it agreed to investigate the environmental hazards at the GDA and to clean up that facility. Through December 31, 1994, the Plaintiff had incurred response costs in excess of $12,000,000 to comply with those agreements, and it is estimated that the total cost will be $30,000,000. The Plaintiff brought this action, seeking to recover a portion of the more than $12,000,000 that it had expended through 1994, under §§ 107(a) and 113(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a) and 9613(f). In addition, the Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the Defendant is liable for costs it has incurred since 1994 and that it will incur in the future, as well as prejudgment interest. The Defendant has asserted a counterclaim against the Plaintiff, seeking contribution from the latter, pursuant to § 113(f) of CERCLA. This matter was tried with the Court sitting as finder of fact. Pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court now states its Findings of Fact separately from its Conclusions of Law. However, before setting forth its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court will rule upon the Plaintiffs request that the Defendant be required to compensate it for a portion of the attorney’s fees it incurred to prepare for trial herein. Although the trial of this litigation was initially scheduled to commence in August, 1994, it was continued until February, 1995, at the request of Defendant’s counsel. That continuance was granted because one of the Defendant’s attorneys was scheduled to give birth within a matter of weeks of the date upon which the trial had been scheduled to commence. Defendant’s counsel did not, however, inform her counterpart that she would be seeking a continuance until June 16, 1994. The Court granted the requested continuance on June 24, 1994. Since the Plaintiffs counsel had begun trial preparation, when Defendant’s counsel mentioned that she would be seeking a continuance, this Court, in its Decision of February 10, 1995 (Doc. # 156), conditionally sustained the Plaintiffs request that the Defendant be required to compensate it for a portion of the attorney’s fees it had incurred to prepare for trial which had been scheduled to commence in August, 1994. This Court conditionally sustained the Plaintiffs request (rather than sustaining it outright), because the Plaintiff had not documented the amount of time that its counsel had expended in trial preparation, before being informed by Defendant’s counsel on June 16th that she would be seeking a continuance, and, further, because Plaintiffs counsel had failed to provide a reasonable explanation as to why he had continued to prepare for trial between June 16th, the date on which Defendant’s counsel told her counterpart that she would be seeking a continuance, and June 24th, the date on which the Court granted Defendant’s request for a continuance. Doc. # 156 at 2. In addition, the Court was unable to ascertain “what trial preparation, undertaken and accomplished in order to prepare for the February 6, 1995, trial date, proved to be duplicative of that which had been undertaken in advance of the previously established trial date of August 15, 1994.” Id. Accordingly, the Court directed the Plaintiffs counsel to submit an additional filing, documenting the amount and extent of trial preparation expended for the August, 1994, trial date, which was: (1) undertaken prior to June 16, 1994, when Defendant’s counsel advised that she would be seeking a continuance of the then established trial date of August 15, 1994; (2) undertaken between June 16,1994, when so notified that a continuance would be sought, and this Court’s granting the Defendant’s Motion for Continuance, during a telephone conference call on June 24, 1994; and (3) undertaken, and accomplished for the February 6, 1995, trial, which, in actuality, proved to be duplicative of that undertaken by Plaintiffs counsel for the continued trial date of August 15, 1994. Id. at 3. The Court also afforded Defendant the opportunity to file a responsive memorandum. The parties have submitted memoranda and documentation on this issue (see Docs. # 182 and # 183), and the Court now turns to its resolution. The Plaintiff has requested that the Court require the Defendant to compensate it the sum of $6,000.00, for duplicative trial preparation. The Plaintiff has supported that request with an affidavit of its counsel, David Toomey (“Toomey”), to which invoices that were submitted to the Plaintiff are attached. In his affidavit, Toomey focuses solely upon trial preparation that occurred during May and December, 1994, and has provided invoices for only those months. He has highlighted those invoices to indicate what portion of a particular entry of time was for trial preparation. Toomey has also added a column to the invoices for trial preparation time. According to Toomey, he and co-counsel billed their client $14,176.50, for 89.6 hours expended for trial preparation during the month of June, 1994. Toomey states that a significant portion of the trial preparation that was undertaken in June, 1994, was expended to draft the Final Pretrial Order. During December, 1994, Plaintiffs counsel expended 107 hours on trial preparation, billing their client $21,091.00. According to Toomey, a significant portion of the trial preparation undertaken during December, 1994, was also devoted to drafting the Final Pretrial Order. Based upon his knowledge of what was done to prepare for the trial of this lawsuit, as well as his experience as a trial lawyer, Toomey opines that $6,000.00 is a reasonable estimate for duplicated time. Toomey does not otherwise explain his estimate. In opposing the Plaintiffs request for an award of attorney’s fees, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff erroneously presumes that much of the effort that its counsel expended in June, 1994, had to be duplicated in December of that year. According to the Defendant, much of the activity set forth in the invoices attached to Toomey’s affidavit, should have been completed in June, if done properly. Thus, the Defendant contends that any duplication in effort was for the benefit of the Plaintiff, for which it (Defendant) should not be required to provide compensation. In addition, the Defendant argues that Toomey has failed to present sufficient basis for his opinion that $6,000.00 is a reasonable estimate of the expenses incurred by his client for duplicative effort. Finally, the Defendant argues that the description of the services performed, set forth on the invoices, fails to provide sufficient detail to show the precise pretrial activities performed, thus causing it to guess at what activities actually took place. This Court agrees with the Defendant that the Plaintiffs documentation of the expenses that it incurred for duplicative trial preparation by its counsel is somewhat meager. For instance, Toomey’s estimate of $6,000.00 is not supported other than by his statement that it is based upon his knowledge of this case and his experience as a trial lawyer. In addition, the descriptions in the invoices submitted by the Plaintiff of the activities undertaken (particularly those by Toomey) lack detail. Those descriptions do not allow the Court to determine whether activity undertaken in December was duplicative of that performed in June, or whether the December activity merely constituted a completion of that which began in June. Nevertheless, the Court cannot agree with Defendant that the Plaintiff should be denied any recovery of fees. The uncontroverted evidence before the Court is that Plaintiffs counsel engaged in significant trial preparation, before Defendant’s counsel gave notice that she would be requesting a continuance. One cannot put aside a task, as complex as preparing for a trial of this nature, for a period of months, without, at a minimum, having to engage in the dupli-cative activity of once again “coming up to speed.” Moreover, Toomey states that he and co-counsel were, indeed, forced to engage in duplicative activity as a result of the continuance. ■ Therefore, the Court is left with two, equally firm convictions: 1) that the Plaintiff has failed to justify, in an adequate fashion, Toomey’s estimate that $6,000.00 is a reasonable estimate for the expenses his client incurred as a result of the dupli-cative work performed by counsel, which was occasioned by Defendant’s untimely request for the continuance; and 2) that it would be improper to deny all recovery to the Plaintiff. The Court deems it appropriate to award Plaintiff the sum of $3060.00. That sum is based upon the premise that the Plaintiffs counsel undertook some duplicative activities in December, if for no other reason than to become familiar once again with the nuances of this case, after the five month delay occasioned by the continuance. Three individuals were involved in trial preparation in both June and December. The Court deems it appropriate to compensate the Plaintiff for six hours of time at the normal hourly rate of each of those three individuals, which was, at the time in question, $275.00, $165.00, and $70.00, respectively, for a sum of $3060.00. Accordingly, the Court orders the Defendant to' pay the Plaintiff the sum of $3060.00, as compensation for the expenses incurred by the latter for duplicative trial preparation made necessary by the untimely notification by Defendant’s counsel that she would be seeking a continuance. Having resolved that issue, the Court now turns to its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the merits of this litigation. I.Findings of Fact A. The Parties, their Operations and the GDA 1. Plaintiff AlliedSignal, Inc. (“Plaintiff’ or “Allied”), is a Delaware corporation, whose principal place of business is located within the state of New Jersey. Plaintiff is the successor corporation to Allied Chemical Corporation. 2. Defendant Amcast Corporation (“Defendant” or “Amcast”) is an Ohio corporation, whose principal place of business is located within this state. Until December, 1983, Defendant conducted business under the names of Dayton Malleable Iron Company and Dayton Malleable, Inc. In December, 1983, the Defendant adopted its current name. 3. At all relevant times, Plaintiff operated two, related industrial facilities in Ironton, to wit: a coke plant and a coal tar plant. At the latter facility, Plaintiff processed coal tar, a by-product of its coking operations. This litigation arises out of the Plaintiffs activities at its coal tar plant, and the disposal of the wastes generated at that facility. Plaintiff produced coal tar pitch, creosote oils, phthalic anhy-dride, anthracene and naphthalene at the coal tar plant. Those processes generated high levels of hazardous waste, including polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (“PAHs”), some of which were carcinogenic. The PAHs generated at Allied’s coal tar plant included benzo(a)pyrene, ben-zo(b)fluoranthene, benzo(k)fluoranthene, dibenzo(ah)anthracene, chrysene, acena-phthlene, anthracene, fluorene, fluoran-thene, naphthalene, phenanthrene, pyrene and 2 methylnapthalene. Of those PAHs, benzo(a)pyrene, benzo(b)fluoranthene, benzo(k)fluoranthene, dibenzo(ah)anthra-cene and chrysene were carcinogenic. In addition, the Plaintiffs processes generated ammonia and chlorides. 4.Beginning in 1916, and continuing through .December, 1983, Defendant operated a malleable iron foundry in Ironton. At that facility, the Defendant manufactured products by pouring molten metal into sand molds. The sand molds were prepared by mixing together sand, water, bentonite clay, seacoal and either cereal (such as flour) or sawdust. Defendant’s facility, like other foundries, recycled the sand that it used in the molds, so that the sand would be repeatedly used. After a point, however, all sand used by the Defendant was discarded and replaced by new sand. 6. During the Defendant’s manufacturing process, molten metal would be poured into a sand mold, which contained a small amount of seacoal. When the molten metal came into contact with the seacoal, much of that material was completely burned. A second portion did not ignite at all. A third portion of the seacoal was partially burned and, thus, was transformed into PAHs, through a process called pyrolysis. The PAHs generated through that process are the same as those which were generated through the Plaintiffs industrial processes. Thus, the Defendant generated the following carcinogenic PAHs, to wit: benzo(a)pyrene, benzo(b)fluoranthene, ben-zo(k)fluoranthene, dibenzo(ah)anthracene and chrysene. However, the quantity of those chemicals formed by the Defendant’s processes was much smaller than that which resulted from the Plaintiffs operations. 6.Beginning in 1945 and continuing until 1977, Plaintiff disposed of all of the industrial wastes which were generated at its- coal tar plant in the Goldcamp Disposal Area (“GDA”), an abandoned sand and gravel pit. The GDA is located in Ironton, next to the Ohio River, adjacent to Plaintiffs coal tar plant and four to five blocks from Defendant’s foundry. That site encompasses approximately eleven acres, of which approximately three were used to dispose of waste. Beginning in approximately 1950 and continuing through 1977, Defendant disposed some of its foundry wastes in the GDA. In 1955, Plaintiff purchased the GDA from its former owners, Henry and Margaret Goldcamp, after which Plaintiff exercised control over the waste disposed of at that site. Over the years, other entities also disposed of very small quantities of waste at the GDA. 7. In 1977, all waste disposal at the GDA ceased. In 1979, the Plaintiff, under the supervision of the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (“OEPA”), closed the GDA and covered it with a semi-permeable cap. B. Waste Disposed of at the GDA 8. Between 1945 and 1977, the Plaintiff disposed of all the waste it generated from its coal tar plant into the GDA. The Plaintiffs waste was largely organic. A substantial portion of that waste was in a semisolid or liquid state. The Plaintiff disposed of 29,759 tons of anthracene residue, which had a 65% PAH content. In addition, the Plaintiff disposed of 9,000 tons of anthracene salts, which consisted of 100% PAHs. Plaintiff also disposed of 2,000 tons of creosote spillage, 1,592 tons of coal tar residues and 32,005 tons of coal tar pitch, all of which had a 10% PAH content. 9. Between 1950 and 1977, the Defendant dumped a significant amount of waste into the GDA. The Defendant’s waste was largely inorganic, comprised primarily of sand. The Defendant delivered that waste to the GDA in dump trucks, which its employees unloaded. That waste included spent foundry sand, broken cores which Defendant had used in its casting process, waste from the foundry’s cupolas and other miscellaneous waste generated at that facility. Included with the spent foundry sand were small quantities of the following carcinogenic PAHs, to wit: ben-zo(a)pyrene, benzo(b)fluoranthene, ben-zo(k)fluoranthene, dibenzo(ah)anthracene and chrysene. When the Defendant dumped its spent foundry sand into the GDA, the carcinogenic PAHs were bonded to the individual grains of sand. The Defendant’s waste also included phenolics. 10. The wastes of both parties were deposited into the GDA, side by side. In other words, Plaintiffs waste was not placed in one area of the facility, with Defendant disposing of its waste in another. Frequently, the waste of the two parties was mixed together by a bulldozer operated by employees of the Plaintiff. 11. PAHs are not normally soluble. As a result, the PAHs that were bonded to the spent foundry sand that the Defendant had deposited into the GDA were not likely to leach, i.e., to migrate from that sand to the groundwater which lay below that waste site, through the normal action of rainwater. However, the Plaintiff deposited anthracene waste into the GDA, in liquid form and at a high temperature. When that hot, liquid anthracene waste mixed with the spent foundry sand deposited by the Defendant, it had the effect of scrubbing off the PAHs bonded to that sand. The PAHs contained in the Defendant’s waste stream then became mixed with and indistinguishable from those compounds which the Plaintiff had deposited into the GDA, producing “mixed PAHs.” 12. Some of the mixed PAHs, which had been contributed to the GDA by both the Plaintiff and the Defendant, then migrated through the soil and were able to reach the groundwater in the aquifer which lay below the GDA. Being insoluble, those compounds did not mix with the water; rather, they sank until they reached the bedrock at the bottom of the aquifer, since the molecular weight of the PAHs was greater than that of the water in the aquifer. Those PAHs, referred to as nonaqueous phase liquids, remain at the bottom of the aquifer and constitute the NAPS layer. 13. By volume, Plaintiff contributed 72% of the waste to the GDA, while Defendant deposited 28% of that waste. In addition to depositing a greater quantity of waste into the GDA, the hazardous component of Plaintiffs waste was much greater. Although the waste streams generated by the Plaintiff and the Defendant both contained PAHs, the Plaintiff deposited 97% to 98% of the total amount of those compounds that went into the GDA, while Defendant was responsible for the remaining 2% to 3%. In addition, Plaintiffs practice of depositing hot, liquid anthracene waste allowed the PAHs, which had been formed during the Defendant’s industrial processes, to be released from the spent foundry sand and ultimately to reach the groundwater in the aquifer. 14. The parties have stipulated that the carcinogenic PAHs, deposited into the GDA and released into the groundwater from it, are hazardous substances under CERCLA. C. The Cleanup of the GDA 15. In 1982, the OEPA had demanded that Allied and Amcast jointly pay $35 million to clean up the GDA. Subsequently, the OEPA withdrew its demand that Defendant fund the cleanup. In 1983, the EPA placed the Allied Chemical/Ironton Coke facility on the NPL. The EPA divided that hazardous waste site into two operable units, to wit: the GDA and the coke planVlagoons area. This litigation involves only the GDA. 16. On April 11, 1984, Plaintiff entered into an Administrative Consent Order with the EPA and the OEPA, under which it agreed to perform and to fund a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (“RI/FS”) at the GDA. Defendant is not a party to that Order. Plaintiff expended approximately $1,162,000 to complete the RI/FS. Defendant has not paid any portion of the funds so paid. The Plaintiff performed the RI/FS under the close direction and supervision of the EPA and the OEPA. 17. During the RI/FS, Plaintiff did not characterize the waste that parties other than itself and Defendant had deposited at the GDA. In addition, Plaintiff did not document any analytical testing of either its wastes or those of Defendant that had been so deposited. 18. On September 29, 1988, the EPA issued a Record of Decision (“ROD”) for ■ the GDA. That document adopted a remedy that is composed of three major components. First, the ROD requires that a cap, which complies with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, be placed over the surface of that facility. Second, the ROD requires that a low permeability slurry wall be constructed to surround the GDA. That slurry wall must extend from the surface to the bedrock below the GDA, in order to prevent hazardous substances released from that facility from migrating further into the environment. Third, the groundwater, both inside and outside the slurry wall containment system, must be extracted and treated, until stipulated cleanup standards are achieved. 19. In addition, the ROD required that a study be conducted of the NAPS layer. The Plaintiff conducted that study between November, 1990, and February, 1993, at a cost of $800,000, a sum to which the Defendant contributed nothing. As a result of that study, the EPA has not altered the selected remedy for the GDA hazardous waste site. 20. The primary concern at the GDA hazardous waste site is the groundwater. The ROD established cleanup standards for seven chemicals, to wit: ammonia, which must be reduced to 0.5 parts per million; chloride, which must be reduced to 250 parts per million; total cyanide, which must be reduced to 0.2 parts per million; phenolics, which must be reduced to between 0.3 and 3.5 parts per million; benzene, which must be reduced to 0.005 parts per million; naphthalene, which must be reduced to 0.69 parts per million; and benzo(a)pyrene, a carcinogenic PAH, which must be reduced to 0.005 parts per billion. Given that the cleanup standard for benzo(a)pyrene, a carcinogenic PAH, is so much more stringent than that for any other substance, that carcinogenic PAH is driving the cleanup of the groundwater that lies below that hazardous waste site. In other words, when the benzo(a)pyrene has been sufficiently removed from the groundwater, the remedy at that facility will have been completed. Except for ben-zo(a)pyrene, Defendant’s waste either did not contain the chemicals for which cleanup standards were established in the ROD, or the concentrations of those chemicals which were contained therein were below those standards. 21. On March 9, 1989, the EPA issued an Administrative Order, directing both the Plaintiff and the Defendant to implement the remedy selected by the EPA and set forth in the ROD. In particular, the Plaintiff and the Defendant were ordered to submit, within 60 days of the entry of the order, a plan for the remedial design/remedial action (“RD/RA”) phase of the cleanup. Plaintiff has complied with that order, while the Defendant has declined to participate. On a number of occasions, Plaintiff has asked the EPA to take action against the Defendant for its refusal to participate the RD/RA phase of the cleanup. The EPA has not taken any such action against the Defendant. 22. Through December 81, 1994, the Plaintiff had expended the sum of $12,423,137, in connection with the cleanup of the GDA. That sum is composed of $1,162,000, to conduct the RI/FS; $800,000, to study the NAPS layer; and $10,461,137, to implement the ROD by conducting the RD/RA. It is expected that the total cost of cleaning up the GDA will be $30,000,000. The Defendant has not contributed any money to the cleanup process. D. Defendant’s Liability under CERCLA 23. Defendant arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances, including the carcinogenic PAH, benzo(a)pyrene, at the GDA. 24. The GDA is a site where hazardous substances, including the carcinogenic PAH, benzo(a)pyrene, have been deposited. 25. The hazardous substances deposited into the GDA, including those contributed by the Defendant, have migrated from the GDA to the groundwater which lies below that facility. 26. As a result of the release of hazardous substances from the GDA, the Plaintiff, through December 31, 1994, had incurred necessary response costs in the sum of $12,423,137, has continued to incur those costs after that date and will continue to incur such costs in the future. 27. The Plaintiff has incurred its response costs in compliance with the two orders issued by the EPA, pursuant to § 106 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606. Indeed, the EPA and the OEPA have closely directed and supervised the activities of the Plaintiff with regard to the RI/FS, the study of the NAPS layer and the implementation of the ROD. 28. The Plaintiff has incurred those costs in substantial compliance with the National Contingency Plan (“NCP”). 29. Defendant is liable for 2% of the response costs incurred by the Plaintiff, through December 31, 1994, for all tasks except the cap for the GDA. Defendant is liable for 28% of the cost of the cap. II. Opinion In its Complaint (Doc. # 1), the Plaintiff sets forth a claims under §§ 107(a) and 113(f) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a) and 9613(f), requesting that the Court order the Defendant to pay for a portion of the expenses it (Plaintiff) had incurred through December 31, 1994. In addition, the Plaintiff requests that the Court enter a Declaratory Judgment, requiring the Defendant to pay a portion of the costs 'it (Plaintiff) has incurred since the end of 1994 and will incur in the future, and, finally, that the Court award it prejudgment interest. As a protective measure, the Defendant has asserted a counterclaim against the Plaintiff, seeking contribution. To resolve the Plaintiffs claims and Defendant’s counterclaim, the Court must address the following categories of issues, to wit: 1) may CERCLA be applied retroactively and is that statute constitutional; 2) is the Plaintiffs claim one for contribution, under § 113(f), or is it entitled to maintain a cost recovery action under § 107(a); 3) is the Defendant liable under CERCLA; 4) for what portion of the expenses Plaintiff had incurred through the trial of this litigation is the Defendant liable; and 5) is the Plaintiff entitled to the requested declaratory relief and/or prejudgment interest? The Court will address those issues in the above order. A. Retroactive Application and Constitutionality of CERCLA On September 30, 1996, this Court entered an Order (Doc. # 189), in which it invited the parties to submit memoranda addressing United States v. Olin, 927 F.Supp. 1502 (S.D.Ala.1996), reversed, 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir.1997), in which the District Court had concluded that CERC-LA could not be applied retroactively to activity which occurred before its effective date, December 11, 1980, and that Congress had exceeded the authority granted to it by the Commerce Clause, Article I, § 8, Clause 3, of the United States Constitution, when it enacted CERCLA. The parties have submitted their memoranda. See Docs. ## 190-92. In its memoranda, the Plaintiff states that it considers Olin to have been decided correctly by the District Court. Indeed, the Plaintiff and a number of other corporations filed an amicus brief in the Eleventh Circuit supporting the District Court’s decision therein. That said, however, the Plaintiff points out that Olin was a decision by only one District Judge and that it has not been followed by other courts. The Plaintiff contends that, therefore, reliance upon the decision of the District Court in Olin may be premature. The Defendant, on the other hand, suggests that this Court follow the decision by the District Court in Olin and dismiss the Plaintiffs claim under CERCLA. Since a conclusion either that CERCLA cannot be applied retroactively or that Congress exceeded the authority granted to it by the Commerce Clause when it enacted that statute would prevent the Court from holding the Defendant liable under that statute, the Court will resolve the two issues addressed in Olin, before turning to the merits of the Plaintiffs claim under CERCLA. As a means of analysis, the Court will initially discuss the question of whether CERCLA can be applied retroactively, following which it will discuss the constitutionality of that statute under the Commerce Clause. Before engaging in that analysis, however, the Court believes that it must explain why it is appropriate to discuss the District Court’s decision in Olin, even though that decision was subsequently reversed by the Eleventh Circuit. The parties filed their memoranda addressing that decision before the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion. In its memorandum, the Defendant argued that this Court should follow the result reached by the District Court therein and, thus, that this Court should hold both that CERCLA cannot be applied retroactively and that the statute violates the Commerce Clause. Certainly, this Court cannot resolve the arguments raised by the Defendant herein without determining whether the District Court in Olin correctly decided those issues. Moreover, since the Sixth Circuit has not resolved the issues of whether, in light of recent Supreme Court authority, CERCLA can be applied retroactively or was enacted in accordance with the authority granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause, issues which it may well consider on any appeal taken from this Decision, including a brief discussion of the Olin court’s analysis, even though ultimately discredited by the Eleventh Circuit, will be instructive. 1. Retroactivity In Olin, the District Court noted that all federal courts which had considered the question had concluded that CERCLA could be applied retroactively. 927 F.Supp. at 1507. Nevertheless, the Olin court did not consider those decisions to be persuasive, because those decisions predated Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), which, according to the Olin court, “demolished the interpretive premises on which prior, cases had concluded that CERCLA is retroactive.” 927 F.Supp. at 1508. In Landgraf, the Supreme Court concluded that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 could not be applied retroactively (i.e., to conduct occurring before its effective date) and set forth the analytical framework which must be followed to determine whether a statute may be applied retroactively: When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result. 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483. When it enacted CERCLA, Congress did not expressly indicate that said statute was to be applied retroactively or that it was not to be so applied. Section 302(a) of CERCLA provides that “[ujnless otherwise provided, all provisions of this Act shall be effective on the date of the enactment of this Act.” 94 Stat. 2767, 2808. In Landgraf, the Supreme Court concluded that a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which contained similar language, did not constitute such an express statement. Id. at 257-63, 114 S.Ct. 1483. See also, Moore v. Califano, 633 F.2d 727, 733 (6th Cir.1980) (notion that a statement in a statute that it shall take effect upon its enactment is inconclusive as to whether retroactive application was intended). To impose CERCLA liability upon the Defendant in this case would be to give “retroactive effect” to that statute. The GDA was closed in 1977; however, CERCLA did not become effective until December 11, 1980. In other words, the Plaintiff is seeking to impose liability upon the Defendant for conduct which did not violate CERCLA when the latter engaged in it, since that statute was not in effect when the Defendant so acted. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-70, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (noting that a statute applies retroactively when it “attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment”). Consequently, the Court must apply the presumption against retroactive application “absent clear congressional intent favoring such result.” For reasons which follow, the Court concludes that both the text of CERCLA and its legislative history furnish such intent. The first indication that Congress intended that CERCLA would be applied retroactively is the preamble to that statute, which provides that it is an act “[t]o provide for liability, compensation, cleanup and emergency responses for hazardous substances released into the environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.” 94 Stat, 2767. It is not possible “[t]o provide for liability ... for ... the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites” without applying CERCLA retroactively. A “cleanup” necessarily contemplates action on a site to remediate a condition already in existence. Therefore, if this Court did not so apply that statute, it would be required to deny one of the Congressionally declared purposes of that enactment. Accord, Nova Chemicals, Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F.Supp. 1098 (E.D.Tenn.1996). The text of CERC-LA also lends support to the conclusion that it is to be applied retroactively. For instance, § 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), imposes liability upon responsible parties for three types of costs, to wit: removal and remedial actions, other necessary response costs and damages to natural resources. However, in § 107(f) of that statute, Congress expressly prohibited the imposition of liability for damages to natural resources “where such damages and the release of a hazardous substance from which such damages resulted have occurred wholly before the enactment of this Act.” 94 Stat. 22767, 2783. If Congress had not intended that liability for the remaining costs, i.e., removal and remedial actions and for other response costs, to be imposed for conduct occurring before the effective date of CERCLA, it would have not been necessary to create an exemption for liability for damage to natural resources based upon conduct occurring before that date. Several other courts have relied upon the negative implication of the exemption contained in § 107(f) in order to conclude that Congress clearly intended that CERCLA would be applied retroactively. See e.g., Ninth Avenue Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F.Supp. 651 (N.D.Ind.1996); State of Nevada ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. United States, 925 F.Supp. 691 (D.Nev.1996). In addition, § 107(a), which is the provision of CERC-LA under which liability is imposed upon responsible parties, is phrased in the past tense. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (imposing liability upon any person “who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility into which hazardous substances were disposed of’); id at § 9607(a)(3) (imposing liability upon any person who “arranged” for the transportation or disposal of any hazardous substances); id. at § 9607(a)(4) (imposing liability upon person who accepts or “accepted” hazardous waste for disposal). After Landgraf other courts have found that the use of the past tense in this key provision of CERCLA demonstrates clear Congressional intent that such statute is to be applied retroactively. See e.g., Ninth Avenue, 946 F.Supp. at 658. Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit, when it reversed the District Court’s decision in Olin, noted that § 103(c) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c), required any person, who owned or operated a facility at the time when hazardous substances had been disposed of, to notify the EPA within 180 days of the effective date of CERCLA. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that § 103(c) addressed conduct that had occurred before the enactment of that statute and that, therefore, Congress had intended that statute to be applied retroactively. United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1513 (11th Cir.1997). In addition to the text of CERCLA, its legislative history is indicative of clear Congressional intent that the statute should be applied retroactively. CERCLA was enacted to fill a gap left by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., a statute, the purpose of which is to prevent future harm, rather than to remediate that which has occurred in the past. See H. Rep. 96-1016, Part I, at 17, reprinted in, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120. Rather than focusing on the future, CERCLA looks to the past. That statute addresses what the House Report called the “tragic consequences” of the “inactive hazardous waste site problem.” Id. To address that problem, CERCLA directs the Administrator of the EPA to take emergency actions with respect to such sites and creates a federal, strict liability cause of action “to enable the Administrator to pursue rapid recovery of costs incurred for the costs of such actions undertaken by him from the persons liable therefor and to induce such persons voluntarily to pursue appropriate environmental response actions with respect to inactive hazardous waste sites.” Id. It is simply not possible to fulfill the second purpose identified by the House Report (i.e., allowing the government to recover the costs it has incurred to remediate inactive hazardous waste sites from the persons responsible), unless CERCLA is applied retroactively (i.e., to conduct which occurred before its effective date). Accord, Olin, 107 F.3d at 1513-14. In short, use of the term “inactive hazardous waste sites” presupposes a site which at a prior point in time, i.e., prior to the enactment of the legislation, was active by being utilized for disposal. In sum, this Court agrees with the overwhelming majority of federal courts, including the Eleventh Circuit in Olin, which have concluded, both before and after Landgraf, that Congress clearly intended that CERCLA be applied so as to impose liability for conduct which occurred before December 11, 1980, the effective date of that statute. Accordingly, the Court holds that the Defendant can be liable herein, despite the fact that its actions, upon which liability would be predicated, occurred before CERCLA was enacted. 2. Constitutionality of CERCLA The District Court in Olin, relying upon United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), also concluded that CERCLA violates the Commerce Clause, Article I, § 8, Clause 3, of the United States Constitution. 927 F.Supp. at 1521-33. In Lopez, the Supreme Court concluded that, by enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A), Congress had exceeded the authority bestowed upon it by the Commerce Clause. The Lopez Court summarized the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence by restating the “three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power:” First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.... Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.... Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, ... i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 558-59, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (citations omitted). See also, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 276-77, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). After summarily concluding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not come within Congress’ authority under either of the first two categories (514 U.S. at 559, 115 S.Ct. 1624), the Lopez Court turned to the third category of Congressional authority. The Lopez Court also held that the statute did not come within the third category of Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, writing that “[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.” 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624. See also Id. at 580, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“unlike earlier cases to come before the Court here neither the actors nor their conduct have a commercial character, and neither the purposes nor the design of the statute have an evident commercial nexus”). Herein, the Court need not consider whether CERCLA regulates the channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce. Rather, for reasons which follow, the Court concludes that CERCLA regulates activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Before engaging in this analysis, the Court believes that it is appropriate to set forth certain principles which inform that analytical framework. In the context of a challenge to a statute on the basis that, by enacting it, Congress exceeded the powers granted to it by the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has said that “[i]t is established beyond peradventure that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to [a court] with a presumption of constitutionality .... ” Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 69 L.Ed.2d 40 (1981) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the issue to resolve is whether Congress had a rational basis for believing that the activity regulated by CERCLA substantially affects interstate commerce. United States v. McHenry, 97 F.3d 125, 127 (6th Cir.1996). Lastly, in the wake of Lopez, the Sixth Circuit has sounded the cautionary note that “the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence ‘still counsels great restraint.’ ” United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1452 (6th Cir.1996) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). In Olin, the District Court concluded that the activity regulated by CERCLA did not substantially affect interstate commerce, because that statute did not regulate economic activity. 927 F.Supp. at 1532. Rather, since the case before it was a proposed consent decree which would have provided for the remediation of a closed landfill, that court concluded that CERCLA related strictly to real estate, the regulation of which was traditionally left to the states. Id. at 1532-33. Like every court which has subsequently considered the question, this Court disagrees with the analysis employed and the conclusion reached by the District Court in Olin. See e.g., United States v. NL Industries, Inc., 936 F.Supp. 545 (S.D.Ill.1996); Nova Chemicals, supra; United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 1996 WL 637559 (N.D.N.Y.1996). The fact that environmental legislation enacted by Congress impacts upon the use of land does not mean that said statute violates the Commerce Clause. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., supra, the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., predicated upon the argument that the Commerce Clause did not authorize Congress to enact a statute, which the plaintiffs had argued essentially regulated the use of land. According to the plaintiffs, the regulation of land-use was a local activity, over which the states had authority. In rejecting that challenge, the Supreme Court wrote: [A]ppellees’ contention is that the “rational basis” test should not apply in this case because the Act regulates land use, a local activity not affecting interstate commerce.. But even assuming that ap-pellees correctly characterize the land use' regulated by the Act as a “local” activity, their argument is unpersuasive. The denomination of an activity as a “local” or “intrastate” activity does not resolve the question whether Congress may regulate it under the Commerce Clause. As previously noted, the commerce power “extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce.” United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. [110, 119, 62 S.Ct. 523, 86 L.Ed. 726 (1942) ]. 452 U.S. at 280-81, 101 S.Ct. 2352. Accordingly, the Court turns to the question of whether the disposal of hazardous substances affects interstate commerce. An important purpose of CERCLA is to protect groundwater from contamination caused by inactive, hazardous waste sites. 42 U.S.C. § 9618 (high priority shall be given to cleaning up hazardous waste sites from which the release of hazardous substances has contaminated or threatens to contaminate groundwater). See also, H. Rep. 96-1016, Part I, at 18, reprinted in, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6122 (noting the harm that inactive landfills have caused to groundwater, rendering local water supplies unusable). The Supreme Court has recognized that groundwater is an article of interstate commerce. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 73 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1982). See also, Id. at 954, 102 S.Ct. 3456 (“Ground water overdraft is a national problem and Congress has the power to deal with it on that scale.”). Certainly, Congress could have rationally believed that the number of inactive waste sites, leaking hazardous substances into the groundwater, would affect the quality of a product that moved in interstate commerce. In addition, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that CERCLA regulates activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, since the growth of the chemical industry, coupled with the concomitant increased disposal of the waste that it generated, had caused significant harm to a number of interstate industries, such as agriculture and fishing. 107 F.3d at 1510-11. Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that Congress did not exceed its power under the Commerce Clause when it enacted CERCLA. B. Is the Plaintiffs Claim One for Contribution, under § 118(f), or is it Entitled to Maintain a Cost Recovery Action under § 107(a) ? Having concluded that CERCLA may be applied retroactively and that Congress did not violate the Commerce Clause by enacting that statute, the Court now turns to the merits of the Plaintiffs claim under CERCLA. As is stated above, the Plaintiff brings its claim under both § 107(a) and § 113(f). Under § 107(a)(4)(B), a person incurring response costs may maintain an action against any potentially responsible persons, to recover “any other necessary costs incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). Under § 113(f)(1), any person may initiate an action seeking contribution “from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 107(a).” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). Thus, the Plaintiff has two potential avenues of recovery from the Defendant, to wit: a cost recovery action under § 107(a) and an action for contribution under § 113(f). The majority of courts which have considered the question, including the Sixth and all other Circuits, have concluded that a party, which is itself partially responsible for the condition of a hazardous waste site, cannot maintain a cost recovery action, under § 107(a), against another responsible party. See Centerior Service Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344 (6th Cir.1998); Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville and Denton R. Co., 142 F.3d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 963, 119 S.Ct. 407, 142 L.Ed.2d 330 (1998); Sun Company, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1113, 118 S.Ct. 1045, 140 L.Ed.2d 110 (1998); Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937, 118 S.Ct. 2340, 141 L.Ed.2d 711 (1998); Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel of Kansas, Inc., 100 F.3d 792 (10th Cir.1996); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11 th Cir.1996); Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 934-35 (8th Cir.1995); United States v. Colorado & Eastern R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536-38 (10th Cir.1995); United Technologies v. Browning-Ferris Industries, 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183, 115 S.Ct. 1176, 130 L.Ed.2d 1128 (1995); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir.1994); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir.1989); SC Holdings, Inc. v. A.A.A. Realty Co., 935 F.Supp. 1354, 1362-1365 (D.N.J.1996) (and cases cited therein at 1362); Dartron Corp. v. Uniroyal Chemical Co., Inc., 917 F.Supp. 1173, 1181-82 (N.D.Ohio 1996). Contra Adhesives Research, Inc. v. American Inks & Coatings Corp., 931 F.Supp. 1231 (M.D.Pa.1996); Charter Township of Oshtemo v. American Cyanamid Co., 910 F.Supp. 332 (W.D.Mich.1995). Despite the explicit language of § 107(a)(4)(B), that a potentially responsible person is liable to “any other person’,” courts have concluded that only an innocent party (such as a person whose property is contaminated, without his permission, by the act of another) may maintain a cost recovery action under that provision. See e.g., Centerior, 153 F.3d at 350; Akzo Coatings, 30 F.3d at 764. A number of reasons have supported the conclusion that one potentially responsible party cannot maintain a cost recovery action against another such party. For instance, to allow such an action would cause § 113(f) to be rendered meaningless and to be swallowed by § 107(a). See e.g., Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1536; United Technologies, 33 F.3d at 101. Moreover, other provisions of CERCLA would be adversely affected by allowing such actions. Under § 113(f)(2), any person who has settled its liability with the EPA is not liable for contribution. That protection would be of small comfort if another potentially responsible party could maintain a cost recovery action against that settlor. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs CERCLA claim is solely one for contribution, under § 113(f)(1) of that statute. As a consequence, the Defendant’s counterclaim for contribution is moot. In addition, the Plaintiff has the burden of establishing the Defendant’s equitable share of the costs to clean up the GDA. Centerior, 158 F.3d at 348. C. Is Defendant Liable under CERCLA? Having concluded that the Plaintiff may only seek contribution, the Court turns to the question of whether the Defendant is liable for same. Section 113(f)(1), which statutorily creates the right of contribution, provides: Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 107(a), during or following any civil action under section 106 or under section 107(a). Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 106 or section 107. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). Thus, it can be seen that, even though the Plaintiffs claim is under § 113(f)(1), § 107(a) remains relevant, since a party can obtain contribution, under the former, only from a person who is liable under the latter. See Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Menasha Corp., 228 F.3d 648, 653 (6th Cir.2000); Centerior, 153 F.3d at 350. Therefore, Plaintiffs initial burden is to establish that the Defendant is liable under § 107(a). In order to establish such liability, a plaintiff must establish the following elements by the preponderance of the evidence, to wit: 1) that the defendant is within one of the four categories of potentially responsible parties set forth in § 107(a); 2) that the site is a “facility,” as defined by § 101(9) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9); 3) that there has been a release or threatened release of hazardous substances at the “facility”; 4) that the plaintiff incurred necessary “response costs,” responding to that release or threatened release; and 6) that the costs incurred are consistent with the NCP. Prisco v. A & D Carting Corp., 168 F.3d 593, 602-03 (2nd Cir.1999); Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Rockwell International, 171 F.3d 1065, 1068 (6th Cir.1999); Centerior, 153 F.3d at 347-48. The Court need not devote a significant amount of time to the first four elements set forth above. The evidence, including the facts to which the parties have stipulated in the Final Pretrial Order, establish those elements. First, § 107(a)(3) provides, inter alia, that any person who has arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances at any facility is liable under CERCLA. The Court has found, above, that Defendant Amcast arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances, including the carcinogenic PAH, benzo(a)pyrene, at the GDA, and is, therefore, a potentially responsible party. Second, § 101(9) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9), defines the term “facility” broadly to include any landfill or area into which hazardous substances have been disposed. In the Final Pretrial Order, the parties agreed that the GDA is such a facility, as defined by § 101(9). Third, the term “release” is defined by § 101(22) to include any escaping or leaching into the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). Section 101(8) of CERCLA defines the environment to in-elude groundwater. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8). The Court has found that the carcinogenic PAH benzo(a)pyrene and other hazardous substances migrated from the GDA, where the parties had disposed of them, to the groundwater that lies below that facility. Thus, there has been a release of hazardous substances from the GDA. Fourth, although the term “response costs” is not defined by CERCLA, the words “respond” and “response” are defined as “remove, removal, remedy, and' remedial action.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25). Those terms are defined by the preceding subsections: (23) The terms “remove” or “removal” means (sic) the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage' to the public health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release. The term includes, in addition, without being limited to, security fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of threatened individuals not otherwise provided for, action taken under section 9604(b) of this title, and any emergency assistance which may be provided under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. (24) The terms “remedy” or “remedial action” means (sic) those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the environment. The term includes, but is not limited to, such actions at the location of the release as storage, confinement, perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of released hazardous substances and associated contaminated materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive wastes, dredging or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking containers, collection of leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or incineration, provision of alternative water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to assure that such actions protect the public health and welfare and the environment. The term includes the costs of permanent relocation of residents and businesses and community facilities where the President determines that, alone or in combination with other measures, such relocation is more cost-effective than and environmentally preferable to the transportation, storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition offsite of hazardous substances, or may otherwise be necessary to protect the public health or welfare; the term includes offsite transport and off-site storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition of hazardous substances and associated contaminated materials. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) and (24). This Court has found, above, that the Plaintiff incurred response costs under CERCLA. The RI/FS and the study of the NAPS layer qualify as removal actions, which are defined to include “such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances.” In addition, implementing the remedy adopted by the EPA in the ROD, by conducting the RD/RA, which included developing plans for the implementation of the chosen remedy and executing same, comes within the definition of remedial action, which includes activities such as covers for a hazardous waste site and treatment of hazardous wastes. The remaining element is whether the Plaintiff has incurred those response costs in a manner that is consistent with the NCP. The Court engages in a two-step analysis of this issue, initially determining which version of the NCP is applicable (at least with regard to the question of how a court should determine whether the response costs were incurred in a manner that complies with the NCP) and, then, deciding whether the Plaintiff has met the requirements of the NCP. As a means of analysis, the Court will address those two issues in the above order. The NCP “is a series of regulations promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency. The regulations establish criteria and provide guidance for site evaluation and cost effectiveness, planning of cleanup actions, and consideration of alternative remedial options.” Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Pierson Tp., 851 F.Supp. 850, 855-56 (W.D.Mich.1994), affirmed, 1996 WL 338624 (6th Cir.1996). The NCP, which has been promulgated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a), is set forth at 40 C.F.R. Part 300. Three versions of the NCP have been in effect during the time that Plaintiff incurred its response costs. In April, 1984, when the Plaintiff entered into an 'Administrative Consent Order with the EPA, under which it agreed to conduct, an RI/FS at its expense, the 1982 version of the NCP was in effect. Effective February 18, 1986, the EPA revised and amended the NCP, adopting the 1986 version. See 50 F.R. 47912. After the Plaintiff had completed the RI/FS and had begun the study of the NAPS layer and the RD/RA, the EPA, in 1990, once again amended and revised the NCP. See 55 F.R. 8666. Of particular present importance is the different manner in which those three versions have addressed the issue of participation by private parties in the cleanup of hazardous waste sites and the question of under what circumstances such participation will be deemed to be consistent with the NCP. The second question is important, because, as is explained below, the 1990 version of the NCP expressly sets forth the standards which are to be applied to ascertain whether a private party’s response costs were incurred in a manner that was consistent with the NCP, while the earlier versions were silent on that point. The 1982 version of the NCP m