Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM and ORDER WOLF, District Judge. Plaintiffs Sebago, Inc. (“Sebago”), and Robert Karam, Michael Biszko and Alan Biszko doing business as Flint Village Plaza (“the Flint Village plaintiffs”) brought this case, individually and as the representatives of a proposed class of plaintiffs, against defendants Beazer East, Inc. (“Beazer”) and Manville Corp. (“Manville”). Plaintiffs base their action upon defendants’ alleged misrepresentations regarding phenolic foam roof insulation (“PFRI”), and upon various defects in the design of PFRI, which defendants developed, marketed and manufactured. The Second Amended and Consolidated Complaint alleges violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); RICO conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); fraud; negligent misrepresentation; negligence; breach of express warranty; breach of implied warranties; violation of deceptive trade practices statutes, and strict product liability. Defendants have filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b). For the reasons stated below, the court is denying in part and allowing in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss. More specifically, both defendants’ motions to dismiss are being allowed as to plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claim (Count IV), negligence claim (Count V), and strict product liability claim (Count IX). Both defendants’ motions to dismiss are being denied as to plaintiffs’ RICO claim (Count I) and the RICO conspiracy claim (Count II). Both defendants’ motions to dismiss the deceptive trade practices claim (Count VIII) are denied as to the Flint Village plaintiffs and allowed as to Sebego. Defendant Manville’s motions to dismiss are being allowed as to the fraud claim (Count III) and the breach of express warranty claim (Count VI). Defendant Hoppers’ motions to dismiss the fraud claim (Count III) are denied as to the Flint Village plaintiffs and allowed as to Sebego. Defendant Hoppers’ motions to dismiss the breach of express warranty claim are denied as to Sebego and allowed as to the Flint Village plaintiffs. As a result, no party is dismissed from this action. A scheduling conference will held on May 12,1998, at 4:00 p.m. I. THE ALLEGED FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The facts as presented here are drawn from the allegations in the Second Amended and Consolidated Complaint (“Compl.”) and do not constitute findings by the Court. Plaintiff Sebago, a Maine corporation, owns a building which serves as its headquarters in Gorham, Maine. Compl., ¶ 21. Plaintiff Robert Karam, a resident of Massachusetts, and plaintiffs Michael and Alan Biszko, residents of Rhode Island, are the owners of Flint Village Plaza, a shopping center located in Fall River, Massachusetts. Id. at ¶ 22. Defendant Beazer is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. Id. at ¶ 23. It is the successor in interest to Hoppers Company, Inc., a Delaware corporation (collectively, “Hoppers”). Manville Corp. and Schuller International, Inc. (collectively, “Manville”) are Delaware corporations with principal places of business in Colorado. Schuller is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Manville. Id. PFRI is a thermal insulation product intended for use in flat and low slope roofing systems. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 8. Once exposed to moisture, PFRI degrades and releases an acidic leachate, which, over time, causes severe corrosion to the metal components of roofing systems, resulting in property damage and a risk of personal injury from collapsing structures. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 15. The defendants knew most property owners — including plaintiffs and other class members— ordinarily rely upon their contractor, builder, roofing contractor or other “specifier” of building products (collectively, “Specifiers”) to determine the appropriate type of insulation. Id. at ¶ 3. During the class period, defendants possessed detailed technical information indicating that PFRI was highly corrosive and unfit for its intended purposes as roof insulation. Id. at ¶¶ 31-32, 49. The defendants nonetheless manufactured and sold the product. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 2, 34-35, 48, 59-62. The defendants also engaged in an intentional campaign of false advertising by publishing brochures that deceived the general public and the roofing industry about the properties of PFRI. Id. at ¶ 3. In addition, the defendants published their brochure in Sweet’s Catalog, a multi-volume set of books distributed nationally to Specifiers. By failing to disclose PFRI’s defects, the defendants also obtained the imprimatur of national organizations that rate building products. Id. at ¶¶ 10-13. As a result, PFRI was installed in thousands of buildings across the country. Id. at ¶¶ 3-6, 48. Defendant Manville designed and supplied Koppers with fiber glass facers, which comprise the front and back of the PFRI, no later than 1985. Id. at ¶ 27. In addition, Manville actively worked with Koppers in the development, testing, manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of PFRI products no later than 1986. Id. at 28. Defendants formalized this relationship by establishing the MA-KO Insulation Company in October of 1987. Id. The PFRI installed on both plaintiffs’ buildings contains a fiber glass facer manufactured by Manville. Id. at ¶ 76. In 1987 or 1988, the prior owner of Seba-go’s corporate headquarters building purchased and installed PFRI in its roof as part of a renovation. Id. at ¶ 73. Plaintiffs allege that defendants “fraudulently induced” the manufacturer of the roof membrane of Sebe-go’s building — Cooley Roofing Systems, Inc. — to approve the use of PFRI. Id. at ¶ 74. Sebago claims the PFRI and fiberglass facer caused approximately $100,000 in damage to its property. Id. at ¶ 75. The Flint Village plaintiffs developed the Flint Village Plaza in Fall River, Massachusetts in 1987, and served as the general contractor. Id. at ¶ 78. The Flint Village plaintiffs’ roofing subcontractor, Galego Roofing Systems, Inc., sent the plaintiffs a Koppers brochure. See id. at ¶¶ 5, 7, 8. Biszko read and reviewed the Koppers brochure sent by Galego, and reviewed the 1987 Sweet’s Catalog File regarding Kopper’s PFRI. Id. at ¶ 78. Plaintiffs allege that: [i]n direct reliance on the Defendants’ claims as to the suitability of using their PFRI product in flat or lowslope roof systems, and in reliance on the approval given to PFRI by the manufacturer of their roof membrane ..., they and their partner, Plaintiff Karam, purchased and installed PFRI in the roof assembly of the Flint Village Plaza in the fall of 1987. Id. at ¶ 79. The Flint Village plaintiffs claim that the PFRI and fiberglass facer caused damages, amounting to several hundred thousand dollars, which include damage to their and their tenants’ property, lost rents, and diminution in the shopping plaza’s value. Id. at ¶ 80. Sebago initiated this action on January 12, 1996, by filing a diversity-based nationwide class action complaint. On March 29, 1996, counsel for Sebago filed an identical action on behalf of the Flint Village plaintiffs. Defendants moved to dismiss both complaints on various grounds. By stipulation and order dated July 1, 1996, the two actions were consolidated. On July 15, 1996, plaintiffs filed an amended and consolidated class action complaint. On August 8, 1996, defendants filed motions to dismiss this complaint and to stay discovery pending resolution of the motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs filed a consolidated opposition to the motions to dismiss and motion to stay discovery on October 31, 1996, and defendants replied on December 13, 1996. The motion to stay discovery was allowed on March 5,1997. Following a hearing on defendants’ motions to dismiss on April 16, 1997, the Court ordered the plaintiffs to file a further amended complaint by May 16,1997, to cure defects identified by the defendants. Plaintiffs served the Complaint on May 19, 1997. Defendants’ four motions to dismiss followed. A further hearing was held on January 28-29,1998. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must take the allegations in the complaint as true and must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs.” Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993). “A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir.1991) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The standard for stating a claim upon which relief can be granted is not, however, “toothless.” Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1989). Plaintiffs must set forth “ ‘factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.’ ” Id. (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir.1988)). In addition, Rule 9(b) requires that “[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud shall be stated with particularity.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). The First Circuit has interpreted this rule to require “specification of the time, place, and content of an alleged false representation, but not the circumstances or evidence from which fraudulent intent could be inferred.” McGinty v. Beranger Volkswagen, Inc., 633 F.2d 226, 228 (1st Cir.1980). “When multiple defendants are involved in eases arising in this circuit, Rule 9(b) requires that fraud be alleged particularly as to each defendant.” Goebel v. Schmid Brothers, 871 F.Supp. 68, 73 (D.Mass.1994); see also Fleet Credit Corp. v. Sion, 893 F.2d 441, 444-45 (1st Cir.1990); Kuney Int’l S.A. v. Dilanni, 746 F.Supp. 234, 237 (D.Mass.1990). III. THE RICO CLAIMS (COUNTS I and II) RICO’s provision for civil actions provides that: [a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). A plaintiff can establish standing under § 1964(c) only by demonstrating: (1) a violation of § 1962, and (2) harm “by reason of’ the violation. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 495-497, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985); Pujol v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 829 F.2d 1201, 1205 (1st Cir.1987). To state a claim pursuant to § 1962(c), a plaintiff must allege “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496, 105 S.Ct. 3275 (footnote omitted). The phrase “by reason of’ requires that the prohibited conduct constitute both the “but for” cause (i.e., “cause-in-fact” or “factual” cause) and proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992); see also Gabovitch v. Shear, 70 F.3d 1252, 1995 WL 697319, *1 (1st Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1175, 116 S.Ct. 1269, 134 L.Ed.2d 216 (1996). Thus, to state a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must state facts sufficient: (i) to portray specific instances of racketeering activity within the reach of the RICO statute, and (ii) to demonstrate that the racketeering activity is both the “but-for” and proximate cause of the plaintiffs damages. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268, 112 S.Ct. 1311; Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495-97, 105 S.Ct. 3275. A. Plaintiffs Adequately Allege a Pattern of Racketeering Activity An act of “racketeering activity,” commonly referred to as a “predicate act,” is defined to include, among other things, acts of wire and mail fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). The plaintiffs have alleged that the defendants violated both the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Compl., ¶¶ 113-115. A “pattern” requires, at a minimum, two acts of racketeering activity within ten years of one another. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3275 (1985). Civil RICO plaintiffs who allege mail or wire fraud must also comply with the particularity requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). New England Data Services, Inc. v. Becher, 829 F.2d 286, 292 (1st Cir.1987) (RICO complaint does not satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement where “plaintiffs have merely stated conclusory allegations of mail and wire fraud ... with no description of any time, place or content of the communication”). Where, as here, the complaint involves multiple defendants, then “each defendants’ role must be particularized with respect to their alleged involvement in the fraud.” Kuney, 746 F.Supp. at 237; see also Fleet Credit, 893 F.2d at 444-45 (complaint asserting that defendants committed multiple violations of mail fraud not particular enough except with reference to those mailings identified by date and parties). In the context of RICO mail and wire fraud, however, the First Circuit has concluded that courts should refrain from automatic dismissal of inadequate complaints, and should instead make a determination as to whether a sufficient factual basis to warrant the allowance. of discovery has been alleged. New England Data Services, 829 F.2d at 291-92. Finally, presaging the causation analysis discussed below, it is evident that the only relevant instances of alleged mail or wire fraud in this ease are those that occurred before or in 1987, the year that PFRI was installed in the roofs of the plaintiffs’ buildings. Plaintiffs have not alleged wire fraud with particularity. To state a claim of wire fraud, the plaintiffs must allege with particularity: 1) a scheme to defraud by means of false pretenses, 2) the defendant’s knowing and willful participation in the scheme with the intent to defraud, and 3) the use of interstate wire communications in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme. United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1011 (1st Cir.1993); United States v. Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1989). The plaintiffs allege generally that the defendants used interstate wire communications in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme. Compl., ¶¶ 113, 115. General allegations of wire fraud, however, do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b). New England Data Services, 829 F.2d at 292 (RICO complaint does not satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement where “plaintiffs have merely stated eonclusory allegations of mail and wire fraud ... with no description of any time, place or content of the communication.”). Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to state a RICO claim predicated on wire fraud. Plaintiffs, however, have adequately alleged mail fraud with regard to defendant Koppers. To allege mail fraud, the plaintiff must show: 1) a scheme to defraud, 2) the defendant’s knowing and willful participation in the scheme with the intent to defraud, and 3) the use of the United States mail in furtherance of the scheme. Cassiere, 4 F.3d at 1011. The Complaint alleges with particularity that Koppers, knowingly and with an intent to defraud, mailed allegedly fraudulent brochures and other documents on over 50 occasions. Compl., ¶ 114. The plaintiffs, therefore, allege a pattern of racketeering activity. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3275. Plaintiffs have also adequately alleged mail fraud with regard to Manville. While the plaintiffs cannot attribute the particular allegations of Koppers’ mail fraud to defendant Manville, Kuney, 746 F.Supp. at 237, the Complaint alleges sufficient acts of mail fraud by Manville itself to allege a pattern of racketeering. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3275. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Manville published two research reports in industry or trade publications, which were subsequently distributed by mail throughout the United States before or in 1987. Compl., ¶ 114(b)(v) and (vi). The plaintiffs allege that the defendants undertook those two publications as part of a common scheme to defraud the public about the PFRI. In Sedima, the court suggested that a plaintiff may establish a pattern by demonstrating that the predicate acts “have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.” 473 U.S. at 496 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3275 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)). Accordingly, those two instances sufficiently allege a pattern of racketeering activity. See id.; see also Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1130 (5th Cir.1988) (“Under RICO, each use of the mails to accomplish the same scheme is a separate predicate act.”). In addition, further discovery may provide additional instances of alleged mail fraud attributable to Manville. See New England Data Services, 829 F.2d at 291-92. In sum, the plaintiffs have adequately alleged a pattern of racketeering with regard to both defendants. B. Plaintiffs Adequately Allege an Enterprise RICO plaintiffs must allege that the RICO enterprise has an ascertainable structure separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages. See Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that RICO enterprise, whether formal or informal, must be “an entity separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages”); Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 441-442, n. 10 (1st Cir.1995) (same); Stephens, Inc. v. Geldermann, Inc., 962 F.2d 808, 815-816 (8th Cir.1992) (“[A]n enterprise cannot simply be the undertaking of the acts of racketeering, neither can it be the minimal association which surrounds these acts.”) (quoting United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 664 (8th Cir.1982)). Here, plaintiffs have adequately alleged a RICO enterprise with a distinct structure separate and apart from the predicate acts comprising the racketeering activity. See, e.g, United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1201 (8th Cir.1982) (holding that an arson ring had a structure distinct from the predicate acts of mail fraud because the arson ring carried on various other activities, such as purchasing, repairing, and destroying property, and could have accomplished its fraud without the use of the mails by hand delivering its insurance claims); United States v. Salemme, 1997 WL 37530, *1 (D.Mass.1997) (“The function of overseeing and coordinating the commission of several different offenses and- other activities on an on-going basis is adequate to satisfy the separate existence requirement.”) (quoting United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 651 (3rd Cir.1993)). Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendants formed an “association in fact,” which includes the defendants, the MA-KO Insulation Company, which was formed in October of 1987 and not named as a defendant, as well as other individuals responsible for the research, development and marketing of PFRI. Compl., ¶ 104. More importantly, plaintiffs allege that no later than 1986— before the PFRI was installed in the plaintiffs’ building — the defendants cooperated in the development and marketing of PFRI. Id. at ¶ 28. Plaintiffs aver that, through the defendants’ cooperation and formation of the MA-KO Insulation Co., the defendants oversaw and coordinated the predicate acts of mail fraud alleged in the complaint. Id. at ¶ 107. During the same time that the defendants allegedly committed the predicate acts, the defendants were also involved in “overseeing and coordinating” other activities, such as research, and technical and product development with respect to the PFRI products. Id. at ¶ 111. In addition, plaintiffs allege that defendants obtained technical reports concerning PFRI, concealed the true results, and published falsified results. Id. at ¶ 114. Because the defendants’ activities had a structure separate and apart from the alleged pattern of racketeering activity, the plaintiffs have adequately alleged a RICO enterprise. See, e.g., Salemme, 1997 WL 37530, *1. C. The Plaintiffs Adequately Allege Causation The plaintiffs contend that they satisfy the standing requirements of RICO because they have alleged that the defendants’ misrepresentations and omissions constituted the proximate and factual cause of their injuries. Defendants contend, however, that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a plaintiff must allege and prove actual, detrimental reliance in order to state a civil RICO claim. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the First Circuit has rendered a decision on this precise issue. The question, then, is whether the proximate causation prerequisite requires actual, detrimental reliance in the context of RICO predicate acts of mail and wire fraud. Several courts have addressed this question, and the majority have agreed with the defendants’ position. See, e.g., Chisolm v. TranSouth Financial Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499 (11th Cir.1991); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1311 (2nd Cir.1990); Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1188 n. 10 (4th Cir.1988); Blount Financial Services, Inc. v. Walter E. Heller and Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987); B.V. Optische Industrie De Oude Delft v. Hologic, Inc., 909 F.Supp. 162, 170 (S.D.N.Y.1995). In Brandenburg, for exam-pie, the Fourth Circuit began its mail and wire fraud analysis with the proposition that a causal nexus is required to state a RICO claim, and ended with the conclusion that “detrimental reliance by the victim ... is necessary to establish injury to business or property ‘by reason’ of a predicate act of mail fraud within the meaning of § 1964(c).” 859 F.2d at 1188 n. 10. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, interpreted proximate causation in the mail and wire fraud context to require the plaintiff to demonstrate detrimental reliance. In another civil RICO case predicated on mail fraud, the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme. Pelletier, 921 F.2d at 1499. The Pelletier court also made this statement while interpreting proximate cause principles. In addition, one district court in this circuit has broached this issue, holding that reliance must be pled. General Electric Co. v. Lyon, 894 F.Supp. 544, 554 (D.Mass.1995) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ditmore, 729 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1984)). Other courts,-however, explicitly reject the need for the civil RICO plaintiff to allege detrimental reliance on the mailed representations. See Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1294 n. 18 (3d Cir.1995) (stating that “[d]e-fendants’ assertion that the mailings involved must themselves be relied upon by the victim of the fraud in order for a RICO claim to be established is inaccurate”); Akin v. Q-L Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (“Plaintiffs’ problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of maü fraud.”); Abell, 858 F.2d at 1129-130 (upholding RICO claim based on maü fraud without requiring proof of reliance); Armco Indus. Credit. Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475, 481-482 (5th Cir.1986) (same). This court finds that the line of cases that decline to read into RICO maü fraud cases a requirement of actual, detrimental reliance are most faithful to the statute and, in any event, most persuasive. Those courts imposing a reliance requirement were apparently influenced by their view of the nature of common law fraud, and were proceeding to read the requirements of common law fraud into the maü fraud statute. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (citation omitted). In Chisolm, for example, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reasoned that “where fraud is alleged as a proximate cause of the injury, the fraud must be a “classic ” one. In other words, the plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant’s material misrepresentation.” 95 F.3d at 337 (emphasis added); see also B.V. Optische Industrie, 909 F.Supp. at 170 (reasoning that ahowing plaintiffs in civü RICO action to allege mail fraud without aüeging reliance would mean extending the common law definition of fraud which the court could not justify). Under the mail fraud statute, however, reliance is not an element of the offense. As indicated earlier, a plaintiff may prove maü fraud by establishing that: (1) defendants engaged in a scheme to defraud, (2) the defendants or someone associated with the scheme used the mails for the scheme, .and (3) the use of the maüs was for the purpose of effectuating the scheme. Cassiere, 4 F.3d at 1011; Serrano, 870 F.2d at 6. In contrast to common law fraud, the statute creates no requirement of detrimental reliance. See, e.g., Harkness v. Fitzgerald, 701 A.2d 370, 372 (Me.1997); Danca v. Taunton Sav. Bank, 385 Mass. 1, 8, 429 N.E.2d 1129 (1982). As the First Circuit has recognized, the aim of the mail and wire fraud statutes is to punish the scheme to defraud rather than the end result. United States v. Allard, 926 F.2d 1237, 1242 (1st Cir.1991) (“It is not necessary to establish that the intended victim was actually defrauded.”) (citations omitted). Recognizing that the maü fraud statute does not expressly require actual reliance, some courts find a reliance requirement in the “by reason of’ language of the RICO statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). The “by reason of’ language in RICO, however, is to be interpreted in keeping with general tort principles of proximate causation. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268, 112 S.Ct. 1311. An examination of Holmes, the policies underlying RICO, and the fraudulent nature of mail fraud indicate that a reliance requirement should not be read into RICO. In Holmes, the Court held that an alleged stock manipulation scheme that disabled two broker-dealers from meeting obligations to customers did not proximately cause the claimed injury of a plaintiff-corporation sub-rogated to the rights of the broker-dealers’ non-purchasing customers. Id. at 270-71, 112 S.Ct. 1311. The alleged injury was too remote to satisfy the proximate cause requirement because only an intervening insolvency connected the RICO conspirators’ acts to the customers’ injuries. Id. at 271, 112 S.Ct. 1311. When the Supreme Court announced the proximate cause prerequisite to § 1964(c) standing in Holmes, it explained that: [WJe use “proximate cause” to label generically the judicial tools used to limit a person’s responsibility for the consequences of that person’s own acts. At bottom, the notion of proximate cause reflects “ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively possible, or of what is administratively possible and convenient.” Accordingly, among the many shapes this concept took at common law ... was a demand for some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged. Id. at 268, 112 S.Ct. 1311 (citations omitted). While the Court described proximate cause as demanding a “direct” relation between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiffs alleged injury, the Court also observed that it did not mean to preclude all possibility of recovery for injury that was caused indirectly: [T]he infinite variety of claims that may arise make it virtually impossible to announce a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every case. [0]ur use of the term “direct” should merely be understood as a reference to the proximate-cause en-quiry that is informed by the concerns set out in the text. We do not necessarily use it in the same sense as courts before us have and intimate no opinion on results they reached. Id. at 273-274 n. 20, 112 S.Ct. 1311 (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court set forth three concerns in the text that inform the proximate cause analysis: “First, the less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintiffs damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent factors.” Id. at 269, 112 S.Ct. 1311. “Second, ... recognizing claims of the indirectly injured would force courts to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts, to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries.” Id. Third, “directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without any of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely.” Id. In the context of this case, these concerns weigh in favor of finding that the plaintiffs have standing to assert their RICO claim. Allowing Sebago and the Flint Village plaintiffs to advance them RICO claims against these defendants will not create administratively inconvenient or unmanageable litigation. Nor will these plaintiffs’ claims lead to duplicative recoveries. Finally, recognizing that these plaintiffs have standing will further RICO’s statutory goal of encouraging directly injured victims to act as private attorneys general to vindicate the law. Here, the plaintiffs are owners of buildings allegedly damaged by latent defects of PFRI. Because of the latent nature of the damage allegedly caused by PFRI, the former owner of Sebago’s building cannot reasonably be described as having been directly injured. Rather, the plaintiffs as present owners of buildings with alleged structural damage caused by PFRI’s latent defects can be said to have been “truly injured in some meaningful sense.” See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 279, 112 S.Ct. 1311 (O’Connor, J., concurring). As such, allowing plaintiffs to press their claims here will further RICO’s statutory goal of encouraging directly injured victims to act as private attorneys general to vindicate the law. The policies on which RICO is based also inform the proximate cause analysis. In the circumstances of this case, the policies underlying RICO negate a requirement of reliance in the context of mail fraud predicate acts. In Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498-99, 105 S.Ct. 3275, the Supreme Court broadly interpreted the purposes and structure of the federal civil RICO provisions, rejecting a more restrictive interpretation. The Court found that Congress purposefully drafted a broad statute designed to encompass, prohibit, and punish activity that it defined as racketeering: RICO is to be read broadly. This is the lesson not only of Congress’ self-consciously expansive language and overall approach, see United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-587, [101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246] (1981), but also of its express admonition that RICO is to “be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes,” Pub.L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947. Id. While aware that civil RICO was being used to encompass activity well beyond the range of the “archetypal, intimidating mobster,” the Supreme Court held that this reality was not inconsistent with Congress’ intent. Id. at 499, 105 S.Ct. 3275. The Court stated that “[t]he ‘extraordinary’ uses to which civil RICO has been put appear to be primarily the result of the breadth of the predicate offenses, in particular the inclusion of wire, mail, and securities fraud, and the failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of ‘pattern’.” Id. at 500, 105 S.Ct. 3275. If this was Congress’ intent, the Court held, the courts should not frustrate it. Id. at 499-500, 105 S.Ct. 3275 (“It is not for the judiciary to eliminate the private action in situations where Congress has provided it simply because plaintiffs are not taking advantage of it in its more difficult applications.”). The underlying predicate act, in this case mail fraud, also informs the “proximate cause” analysis. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 288, 112 S.Ct. 1311 (Scalia, J., concurring). As mentioned previously, it is well established that the government need not prove actual detrimental reliance in criminal mail and wire fraud prosecutions. In civil RICO cases, there is no persuasive reason to add an additional requirement of detrimental reliance. The heart of this case is fraud. “[T]he general rule in fraud cases ... is that you are liable only to an intended victim.” Matter of EDC Inc., 930 F.2d 1275, 1279 (7th Cir.1991). However, “[o]ne can be an intended victim without being the primary victim.” Id. Here, assuming the truth of the plaintiffs’ allegations for the purposes of the motions to dismiss, the plaintiffs are among the intended victims of the defendants’ alleged fraudulent scheme because the plaintiffs are the owners of the buildings that the PFRI has allegedly damaged. See id. In view of both the policies of the RICO state and the mail fraud statute, the court concludes that a civil RICO plaintiff basing a claim on mail fraud need only allege “but for” causation and proximate causation to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268, 112 S.Ct. 1311. Direct, detrimental reliance is not required. A defendant’s breach of a legal duty is a cause in fact of the plaintiffs’ harm if that harm would not have occurred “but for” the breach. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 432(1) (1965)). The second aspect of the causation analysis is proximate cause, the touchstone of which is foreseeability. The pertinent inquiry in determining the existence of proximate, or “legal,” cause is “whether the conduct has been so significant and important a cause that the defendant should be held responsible.” Chisolm, 95 F.3d at 336 (quoting Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 42, p. 272 (5th ed.1984)). Assuming that the defendants have committed the acts alleged, however, it is for a jury apply the law of proximate causation and decide whether the plaintiffs were in the zone of foreseeable plaintiffs and whether the defendants’ actions were a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs’ harm. Peckham v. Continental Cas. Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 830, 837 (1st Cir.1990) (holding that questions of causation “are normally grist for the jury’s mill.”); Swift v. United States, 866 F.2d 507, 510 (1st Cir.1989) (“Application of the legal cause standard to the circumstances of a particular case is a function ordinarily performed by, and peculiarly within the competence of, the factfinder.”); W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 321 (5th ed.1984) (“ ‘proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, to be solved by the exercise of good common sense in the consideration of the evidence of each particular case.’ ”) (citation and footnotes omitted). Thus, the court cannot properly rule as a matter of law that plaintiffs were outside the zone of foreseeable plaintiffs or that the defendants’ actions were not a substantial factor. To the contrary, accepting the plaintiffs’ allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences from them, it appears that both plaintiffs were among the intended victims of the alleged fraud. For purposes of these motions to dismiss, therefore, plaintiffs adequately plead causation and state a substantive RICO claim. D. Plaintiffs Adequately Allege a RICO Conspiracy Plaintiffs also adequately allege a RICO conspiracy. To state a RICO conspiracy claim pursuant to § 1962(d), the plaintiff must allege “(1) the existence of enterprise affecting interstate commerce, (2) that the defendant knowingly joined the conspiracy to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise, (3) that the defendant participated in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise, and (4) that the defendant did so through a pattern of racketeering activity by agreeing to commit, or in fact committing, two or more predicate offenses.” Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. P & B Autobody, 43 F.3d 1546, 1561 (1st Cir.1994); Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp., 942 F.2d 34, 41 (1st Cir.1991). Defendants contend that the plaintiffs have failed to allege the agreement necessary to plead adequately a RICO conspiracy. This argument is not meritorious. The plaintiffs have stated facts from which the court could infer an agreement to commit at least two predicate acts. Compl., ¶¶ 28-31, 104-107. More specifically, the allegation that Manville actively participated with Koppers in the marketing of PFRI no later than 1986, when considered in combination with the allegation that defendants had knowledge of PFRI’s alleged defects and concealed that information from the public, provides a basis to infer an agreement. Compl., ¶ 48. Accordingly, the plaintiffs RICO conspiracy claim survives the defendants’ motions to dismiss. IV. THE STATE LAW CLAIMS A. Fraud (COUNT III) To allege fraud under Massachusetts law, the plaintiff must prove that the defendants: (1) made misrepresentations of a material fact, (2) that they knew, or should have known, to be false, (3) which were made to induce the defendants to act thereon, (4) that the defendants did, indeed, act thereon, (5) in reasonable reliance that the statements were true. Danca, 385 Mass. at 8, 429 N.E.2d 1129; Snyder v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 368 Mass. 433, 444, 333 N.E.2d 421 (1975); Zimmerman v. Kent, 31 Mass.App.Ct. 72, 77, 575 N.E.2d 70 (1991). Similarly, to allege fraud under Maine law, the plaintiff must allege: “(1) the making of a false representation; (2) of a material fact; (3) with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it is true or false; (4) for the purposes of inducing another to act upon it; and (5) justifiable and detrimental reliance by the other.” Harkness, 701 A.2d at 372; Grover v. Minette-Mills, Inc., 638 A.2d 712, 716 (Me.1994). The defendants contend that plaintiffs have failed to allege reliance with the particularity required by Rule 9(b) to state a claim under either Massachusetts or Maine law. As described below, defendants’ contention is correct with regard to Sebago, but not with regal’d to the Flint Village plaintiffs. 1. The Flint Village plaintiffs Adequately Allege Reliance on Koppers’ Representations The Flint Village plaintiffs have adequately pled direct reliance as to. defendant Koppers by alleging that: (1) their roofing sub-contractor mailed them a Koppers’ brochure; (2) that Biszko as agent for the Flint Village plaintiffs reviewed the brochure and the 1987 Sweet’s Catalog regarding Koppers’ PFRI; and (3) that in direct reliance on defendants’ claims regarding PFRI, “they and their partner ... purchased and installed PFRI....” Compl., ¶¶ 78-79. Defendants contend that Galego, a roofing subcontractor, likely made the decision to purchase and install the PFRI, not the plaintiffs. However, taking the allegations in the complaint as true and making all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, Watterson, 987 F.2d at 3, the Flint Village plaintiffs unambiguously state that Biszko as agent read the Koppers’ brochure in the fall of 1987, and in reliance on the representations purchased and installed the defendants’ PFRI. In so doing, the Flint Village plaintiffs have complied with the time, place and content requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). McGinty, 633 F.2d at 228. The Flint Village plaintiffs, therefore, have adequately pled direct reliance on Koppers’ representations. 2. Sebago Fails to Allege Direct or Indirect Reliance on Koppers’ Misrepresentations Sebago does not allege direct reliance. A more difficult question is presented by Sebago’s claims of indirect reliance. Both Maine and Massachusetts courts have recognized “[a] cause of action for misrepresentation to third parties exists only for a misrepresentation made by Defendant to such third parties if the Defendant intended, or had reason to expect, that on repetition, the statements would influence Plaintiffs conduct to Plaintiffs detriment.” Reed Paper Co. v. Procter & Gamble Distributing Co., 807 F.Supp. 840, 845 (D.Me.1992) (Carter, J.) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 533); see also Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 577 F.Supp. 1281, 1287 (D.Mass.1983). However, a claim of indirect misrepresentation requires that “the 'terms' of the alleged misrepresentation ... ‘be repeated,’ or its ‘substance communicated’ ... to the complaining party in order for an action to lie.” Brockton Sav. Bank, 577 F.Supp. at 1287. Here, Sebago fails to plead indirect reliance because the complaint fails to allege that the former owner of Sebago’s building or . anyone else repeated the terms or substance of the alleged misrepresentation to Sebago. Reed Paper, 807 F.Supp. at 845. Thus, Sebago fails to allege adequately a state law fraud claim. Id. Sebago, however, advances a more expansive theory of indirect reliance than that articulated in Reed Paper, 807 F.Supp. at 845. Plaintiffs contend that owners of buildings are presumed to rely on Specifiers, and that Specificers are presumed to rely on misrepresentations in building manufacturer’s brochures and Sweet’s Catalog. Plaintiffs submit that this “twice-presumed indirect reliance” meets the standard of justifiable and detrimental reliance required by the Maine courts. See, e.g., Harkness, 701 A.2d at 372; Grover, 638 A.2d at 716. In support of their theory, plaintiffs urge this court to adopt the reasoning of the First Circuit’s decision in Learjet Corp. v. Spenlinhauer, in which it was found that Kansas law did not require the precise terms of the misrepresentations to be communicated to the plaintiffs. 901 F.2d 198, 200-202 (1st Cir.1990). In Learjet, Spenlinhauer had purchased a plane. In a dispute concerning the price of modifications to the plane, Spenlin-hauer alleged that Learjet had made misrepresentations to the Federal Aviation Administration (the “FAA”); and that, in reliance on those misrepresentations, the FAA certified the plane. In reliance on the FAA’s certification, Spenlinhauer purchased the plane. The First Circuit observed that the Kansas courts have held that a plaintiff may recover for fraudulent misrepresentation based on indirect reliance on the misrepresentations even where defendant’s actual words were never conveyed to the plaintiff. Id. at 201-202 (citing Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 241 Kan. 441, 738 P.2d 1210, 1228 (1987); Citizens State Bank, Moundridge v. Gilmore, 226 Kan. 662, 603 P.2d 605 (1979)). Because the Kansas courts gave authoritative weight to the §§ 531 and 533 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the First Circuit concluded that Spenlinhauer had stated a claim under Kansas law for fraud. Learjet, 901 F.2d at 203. A United States District Court for the District of Maine has recognized the theory of indirect reliance that requires repetition of the terms or substance of the misrepresentation. Reed Paper, 807 F.Supp. at 845. Although the decision in Reed Paper was issued by a former justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”), Judge Gene Carter, the Maine SJC has not rendered a decision on the theory of indirect reliance which Sebago proffers. “Absent controlling state court precedent, a federal court sitting in diversity may ... undertake [a] prediction ‘when the course [the] state courts would take is reasonably clear.’ ” Lyons v. National Car Rental Systems, Inc., 30 F.3d 240, 245 (1st Cir.1994) (quoting Vanhaaren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 989 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993)); Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co., 757 F.2d 440, 443 n. 3 (1st Cir.1985); Carey v. Mt. Desert Island Hosp., 910 F.Supp. 7, 11 (D.Me.1995). However, “the First Circuit has also repeatedly warned that a plaintiff who ... selects a federal forum in preference to an available state forum may not expect the federal court to steer state law into unprecedented configurations.” Martel v. Stafford, 992 F.2d 1244, 1247 (1st Cir.1993); Catrone v. Thoroughbred Racing Associations of N.A., Inc., 929 F.2d 881, 889 (1st Cir.1991); Porter v. Nutter, 913 F.2d 37, 40-41 (1st Cir.1990). In the instant case it is not reasonably clear that the Maine SJC would hold that a fraud claim can be maintained by a plaintiff to whom an alleged misrepresentation was not made or even repeated. Plaintiffs’ reliance on the fact that Maine and Massachusetts have recognized the principles articulated in §§ 531 and 533 is unavailing. See, e.g., McKinnon v. Tibbetts, 440 A.2d 1028, 1031 (Me.1982) (citing § 531, Comment c (1977)); International Totalizing Systems, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 29 Mass.App.Ct. 424, 560 N.E.2d 749, 754 n. 12 (1990) (citing § 531). The fact that Maine and Massachusetts courts have cited §§ 531 and 533 on a few occasions does not make it reasonably clear that they would adopt the expansive view of indirect reliance articulated by the Kansas courts. Cf. Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 426 Mass. 491, 498, 688 N.E.2d 1368 (1998) (observing in discussion of § 552 that “[although the Restatement standard has been widely adopted by other jurisdictions, courts differ in their interpretations of the standard.") (emphasis added). Nor do the other cases cited by the plaintiffs provide a basis to find that it is reasonably clear that the Maine SJC would concur with the view expressed by the courts in Kansas. It is true that in Rowan County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 332 N.C. 1, 418 S.E.2d 648, 660-61 (1992), the North Carolina court did not require proof of the direct repetition of the terms or substance of the alleged misrepresentation. The Rowan County court, however, based its decision on a North Carolina state decision providing that “proof of circumstances from which the jury may reasonably infer the fact is sufficient” in proving the element of reliance. Id. at 661 (citing W.R. Grace v. Strickland, 188 N.C. 369, 124 S.E. 856, 858 (1924)). Plaintiffs in this case have not referred the court to any Maine authority that supports the same position. In addition, the California court in Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 35 Cal.3d 197, 219, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660 (Cal.1983), in holding that direct repetition of the alleged repetition was not required, recognized that § 533 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts did “not quite cover the present case.” Although the California Supreme Court might modify its requirements for the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation by diverting from the letter of § 533, such an action does not provide a basis to find it reasonably clear that the Maine SJC would do so. Rather, the decision of the United States District Court in Reed Paper, 807 F.Supp. at 845, suggests that Maine SJC would not. 3. Sebago Fails to Allege Reliance Based on the Defendants’ Failure to Disclose Material Facts Sebago contends that it has adequately alleged reliance by alleging that defendants failed to disclose, and indeed suppressed, information it was required to reveal. Under Maine law, “[w]hen a plaintiff alleges not an affirmative false statement, but rather a failure to disclose rising to the level of a misrepresentation, the plaintiff must prove either (1) active concealment of the truth, or (2) a specific relationship imposing on the defendant an affirmative duty to disclose.” Fitzgerald v. Gamester, 658 A.2d 1065, 1069 (Me.1995) (citing H.E.P, Dev. Group, Inc. v. Nelson, 606 A.2d 774, 775 (Me.1992)). It is not clear whether the Maine courts apply the rale in Fitzgerald where, as here, the plaintiff alleges both affirmative false statements and a failure to disclose. Nevertheless, Fitzgerald is not applicable to this case. In Fitzgerald, the plaintiff purchased a well from the defendants. The court held that evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to establish the defendant seller’s liability for fraud because the seller did not disclose the material fact that the well had been abandoned due to contamination. The court also found that the evidence indicated that the seller failed to disclose the known fact of the contaminated well for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to purchase the farm. The court determined that the purchaser justifiably relied on the omission, and, consequently, suffered damages including the cost of purchasing water and other expenses connected with the well. The rule of active concealment in Fitzgerald, therefore, provides a cause of action in fraud for a purchaser against a seller. 658 A.2d at 1069. Sebago, however, stands in a position once removed from the party who purchased the PFRI. Assuming the truth of Sebago’s allegations for the purpose of these motions to dismiss, it is neither alleged, nor to be reasonably inferred, that the defendants actively concealed the truth about the allegedly defective quality of PFRI for the purpose of inducing Sebago to purchase its building from the building’s former owner. The lack of any direct relationship or transaction between Sebago and the defendants is also fatal to Sebago’s arguments regarding partial disclosure. As the First Circuit stated in V.S.H. Realty, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., “[although there may be ‘no duty imposed upon one party to a transaction to speak for the information of the other ... if he does speak with reference to a given point of information, voluntarily or at the other’s request, he is bound to speak honestly and to divulge all the material facts bearing upon the point that lie within his knowledge. Fragmentary information may be as misleading ... as active misrepresentation, and half-truths may be as actionable as whole lies....” 757 F.2d 411, 414-15 (1st Cir.1985) (citations omitted). There is, however, no authority for the proposition that such a duty exists in the absence of a transaction between Sebago and the defendants. See Logan Equipment Corp. v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 736 F.Supp. 1188, 1200 (D.Mass.1990) (“[M]ere nondisclosure generally will not support any cause of action for misrepresentation.”). Nor is it reasonably clear that the Maine SJC would find there to be such a duty in the circumstances alleged by Sebago. Plaintiffs have not alleged that Sebago and the defendants had a “specific relationship imposing on the defendant an affirmative duty to disclose.” See Fitzgerald, 658 A.2d at 1069. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have not alleged facts on which relief could be granted based upon any alleged failure to disclose material information to Sebago. 4. Neither Plaintiff Adequately Alleges Reliance Upon Defendant Manville’s Representations With regard to defendant Manville, both plaintiffs fail to allege reliance with the requisite particularity because the Second Amended and Consolidated Complaint fails to allege that they relied on any representation made by Manville. The plaintiffs cannot attribute Koppers’ alleged misrepresentations to Manville in the context of Rule 9(b)’s particular pleading requirements. Goebel, 871 F.Supp. at 73 (“when multiple defendants are involved in cases arising in this circuit, Rule 9(b) requires that fraud be alleged particularly as to each defendant”); Rhone v. Energy North, Inc., 790 F.Supp. 353, 361 (D.Mass.1991) (same). Accordingly, both plaintiffs fail to state a fraud claim with regard to Manville. In sum, the Flint Village plaintiffs have pled direct reliance with regard to Koppers, but have failed to plead reliance with regard to Manville. Sebago has failed to plead reliance on any theory. Accordingly, the Flint Village plaintiffs’ fraud claim against Man-ville and Sebago’s fraud claims against both defendants are being dismissed. B. Negligence (Count IV) and Strict Liability (Count IX) The court need not linger long over the Flint Village plaintiffs’ strict liability claim because Massachusetts does not apply § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “and, consequently, there is no recovery on the basis of strict liability in tort under Massachusetts law.” Ramcharran v. Carraro Graphic Equipment, Inc., 823 F.Supp. 63, 67 (D.Mass.1993); see also Mason v. General Motors Corp., 397 Mass. 183, 190-191, 490 N.E.2d 437 (1986). Accordingly, the Flint Village plaintiffs’ strict, liability claim is being dismissed. The defendants contend that both plaintiffs’ negligence and Sebago’s strict liability claims are barred by the economic loss doctrine. Under Massachusetts and Maine law, the economic loss doctrine provides that purely economic losses are not recoverable in negligence and strict liability actions in the absence of personal injury or damage to property other than the product itself. See Jacobs v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 420 Mass. 323, 329 n. 5, 649 N.E.2d 758 (1995); Oceanside at Pine Point Condominium Owners Ass’n. v. Peachtree Doors, Inc., 659 A.2d 267, 270 (Me.1995); FMR Corporation v. Boston Edison Company, 415 Mass. 393, 395, 613 N.E.2d 902 (1993); Bay State-Spray & Provincetown Steamship, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 404 Mass. 103, 107, 533 N.E.2d 1350 (1989); see also East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871-875, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986) (setting out economic loss doctrine followed by majority of jurisdictions including Massachusetts and Maine). Massachusetts courts have defined economic loss as “damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product or consequent loss of profits without any claim of personal injury or damage to other property.” Marcil v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 9 Mass.App.Ct. 625, 630 n. 3, 403 N.E.2d 430 (1980). The rationale underlying the economic loss doctrine is that damage to a product itself “means simply that the product has not met the customer’s expectations, or, in other words, that the customer has received ‘insufficient product value.’ The maintenance of product value and quality is precisely the purpose of express and implied warranties.” East River, 476 U.S. at 872, 106 S.Ct. 2295 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the economic loss doctrine draws a distinction between the situation where the injury suffered is merely the “failure of the product to function properly,” id. at 868, 106 S.Ct. 2295, and the situation, traditionally within the purview of tort law, where the plaintiff has been exposed, through a hazardous product, to an unreasonable risk of injury to his person or property. See Oceanside, 659 A.2d at 270. The Supreme Court has described the distinction between tort and contract as resting: on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. When a product injures only itself the reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak and those for leaving the party to its contractual remedies are strong. The tort concern with safety is reduced when an injury is only to the product itself. When a person is injured, the “cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune,” and one the person is not prepared to meet. In contrast, when a product injures itself, the commercial user stands to lose the value of the product, risks the displeasure of its customers who find that the product does not meet their needs, or, as in this case, experiences increased costs in performing a service. Losses like these can be insured. Society need not presume that a customer needs special protection. The increased cost to the public that would result from holding a manufacturer liable in tort for injury to the product itself is not justified. East River, 476 U.S. at 871-72, 106 S.Ct. 2295 (citations omitted). While the parties agree that both Massachusetts and Maine recognize the economic loss doctrine, they disagree over the proper definition of the relevant “product” and the “other property.” The plaintiffs contend that the relevant product is the PFRI insulation and its fiberglass facer. The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the PFRI and facer are component parts of a finished product, which is the entire building. The analysis involved in deciding whether the economic loss doctrine bars the plaintiffs’ negligence and strict liability claims requires two steps. First, it must be determined what constitutes the “relevant product” and the “other property.” Second, it must be determined whether the plaintiffs have alleged damage to the “other property.” If the relevant product, within the meaning of the economic loss doctrine, is “the building,” then in this case the product only caused economic damage to itself, and the economic loss doctrine forecloses recovery in negligence and strict product liability. Conversely, if the relevant product is the PFRI and facer, assuming plaintiffs’s allegations that damage was caused to “other property,” then the economic loss doctrine would not bar plaintiffs’ negligence and strict liability claims. 1. Defining the Relevant Product a. Component Parts are Integrated into the Relevant Product In the context of claims based on defective components, most courts have held that the relevant “product” is the finished product into which the component is integrated. See, e.g., King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047, 1051 (3d Cir.1988) (no recovery for damage caused by chemical to seed potatoes because plaintiffs purchased treated seed potatoes, not chemical), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030, 109 S.Ct. 839, 102 L.Ed.2d 971 (1989); American Home Assurance Co. v. Major Tool and Mach., Inc., 767 F.2d 446, 447-48 (8th Cir.1985) (turbine assembler could not recover in tort from manufacturer of defective component parts because damage from those defective parts to remainder of turbine was not damage to other property); Hadar v. Concordia Yacht Builders, 886 F.Supp. 1082, 1097-98 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (“Hadar I”) (rejecting yacht owner’s tort and warranty claims based on argument that defective epoxy resin caused delamination of yacht’s hull because plaintiff sought only economic losses) (applying Massachusetts law); Easling v. Glen-Gery Corp., 804 F.Supp. 585, 590 (D.N.J.1992) (no recovery for building damage caused by defective bricks because plaintiffs purchased completed apartment complex and not load of bricks); Oceanside, 659 A.2d at 271 (no recovery for building damage caused by defective windows because plaintiff owners purchased completed condominium units and not windows); Casa Clara Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino and Sons, Inc., 620 So.2d 1244, 1247 (Fla.1993) (no recovery for damages caused to a condominium by defective concrete because plaintiffs purchased finished homes, not component parts). In arriving at this result, these courts rely on the premise that one must look to the product purchased or bargained for by the plaintiff rather than the product sold by the defendant. See, e.g., Oceanside, 659 A.2d at 271 (holding that in eases involving component parts the court should “look to the product purchased by the plaintiff, as opposed to the product sold by the defendant, to determine whether a product has injured only itself’); King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047, 1051 (3rd Cir.1988) (“We perceive no principled basis for affording the purchaser of a defective product greater relief against the manufacturer of a component part that has rendered a product defective than against the manufacturer of the assembled defective product. This counsels against looking to the component part to define the product and ‘economic loss.’ ”); Shipco 2295, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 825 F.2d 925, 930 (5th Cir.1987) (in context of tort claim for economic loss, product means the finished product bargained for by buyer, rather than individual component parts of that product), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007, 108 S.Ct. 1472, 99 L.Ed.2d 701(1988); Casa Clara Condominium, 620 So.2d at 1247 (“The character of a loss determines the appropriate remedies, and, to determine the character of a loss, one must look to the product purchased by the plaintiff, not the product sold by the defendant.”). This premise has been described as the “purchaser’s perspective” or “objec