Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER BABCOCK, Chief Judge. Defendants Jefferson County Sheriffs Department (Sheriffs Department) and Sheriff John C. Stone, Former Jefferson County Sheriff Ronald Beckham, Deputy Sheriff Neil Gardner, Deputy Sheriff John Hicks, Deputy Sheriff Mark M. Miller, Deputy Sheriff Tonya Williams (incorrectly identified as Tanya Williams), Deputy Sheriff Mike Guerra, and Deputy Sheriff Phillip Lebeda, (collectively, Sheriff Defendants) move, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss all claims brought by Plaintiffs Richard R. Castaldo, Dominic R. Castaldo, and Connie Michalik, (collectively, Plaintiffs). In a separate Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Defendants Jefferson County School District R-l (School District) and Frank DeAngelis, Howard Cornell, Peter Horvath, William Butts, Garrett Talocco, Judy Kelly, Tom Tonelli, and Tom Johnson (collectively, individual School Defendants), also seek dismissal. After consideration of the motions, briefs, arguments of counsel, and for the following reasons, I grant the motions. I. Facts A. General Allegations The following facts are alleged in Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint. On April 20, 1999, at approximately 11:20 a.m., Plaintiff Richard Castaldo, a Columbine High School student, was shot and seriously injured outside the school near the rear door to the cafeteria, (C/O) ¶¶ 1, 24, by fellow students Dylan Klebold and/or Eric Harris. C/O ¶¶ 24-25. The attack, apparently in the planning stages for more than a year, involved complex preparations, including construction of bombs and the acquisition and modification of firearms. C/O ¶ 26. Harris’ and Klebold’s actions resulted in the deaths of twelve students and one teacher, and serious physical injuries to some twenty-six others, including Richard Castaldo. Id. at ¶ 29. B. Sheriff Defendants Sheriff Stone has served as the Sheriff of Jefferson County, Colorado since January 1999. C/O ¶ 24. Sheriff Beckham was the Sheriff at all material times until January 1999. Id. at ¶ 115. Plaintiffs allege that in January 1998, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold broke into a van to steal tools. The two were apprehended by the Sheriffs Department, prosecuted by the Jefferson County District Attorney, and placed in a Jefferson County juvenile offender diversion program on March 28, 1998. C/O ¶ 68. The Sheriff Defendants, including but not limited to Deputies Gardner, Hicks, Lebeda, and Healy knew, based on statements contained in a Web site, that Harris and Klebold were in violation of the terms of the diversion program. C/O ¶ 95. On March 18, 1998, shortly before Harris and Klebold were placed in the diversion program, Deputy Miller received a complaint from Randall Brown, a Jefferson County citizen, that Eric Harris had made repeated threats against the life of his son, Brooks Brown, also a Columbine student. C/O ¶ 69. According to Mr. Brown, Harris talked often about making pipe bombs and killing people. Id. During their meeting, Mr. Brown and his wife gave Deputy Miller a printout of information contained on Harris’ Web site. See C/O Attachment, Exhibit A. These pages contain: 1) death threats; 2) written plans to use pipe bombs to kill numerous people; 3) a specific description of a pipe bomb detonated by the pair; and 4) descriptions of other bombs being built by Harris and Klebold. C/O ¶ 69; See Exhibit A. After meeting with the Browns, Deputy Miller completed an incident report, attached the Web site printout, and submitted it to his supervisor, Deputy Lebeda. C/O ¶ 71. At Deputy Lebeda’s direction, Deputy Miller’s report, including the Web site printout, was forwarded to Deputy Gardner, assigned full-time to Columbine High School as a student resource officer. C/O ¶ 72. Deputy Gardner’s job duties as school resource officer included contact with students and school staff and awareness of law enforcement issues and student safety. See C/O ¶ 53. Deputy Gardner was also briefed on the reports concerning Harris and Klebold. Id. at ¶ 73. Deputy Hicks, assigned to investigate the Web site information, C/O ¶ 117, met with Mr. and Mrs. Brown and bomb squad deputies, including Deputy Guerra. Id. at ¶ 81. Deputies Healy and Williams were also assigned investigative duties concerning the Web site. Id. at ¶ 82. Apparently, the Sheriffs Department unsuccessfully attempted to access the Web site. See Exhibit A. Plaintiffs allege that the Web site remained accessible until after the attack. Id. at ¶ 97. Prior to April 20, 1999, Harris added the following information to the Web site on “three different information panels”: Hobbies: Preparing1 for the big April 20! You’ll all be sorry that day. Occupation: Senior at CHS and the rest is still unpublished. Personal Quote: when in doubt, pull it out. (computers) -shut up and shoot it-quit whining, it’s just a flesh wound-Kill Em AALLLL!!!! Id. at ¶ 98. The Complaint does not contain the date this information was added or if the statements were made together or separately. At some point after the first meeting between Deputy Hicks and the Browns, initial steps were taken to obtain a search warrant in connection with Harris’ activities. C/O ¶ 85. Ultimately, the search warrant application was halted by “someone in a position of authority in the Sheriffs Department.” Id. At approximately the same time, all follow-up on the Brown’s complaint “apparently ceased.” Id. at ¶ 86. Plaintiffs allege that investigation of the Browns’ report and the Web site was intentionally aborted by someone in authority in the Sheriffs department for reasons unrelated to legitimate law enforcement considerations. C/O ¶¶ 85-89. In radio communications during the immediate aftermath of the attack, two deputies refer to one of the shooters as “the Sheriffs guy.” Id. at ¶¶ 91, 92. C. School Defendants Defendant DeAngelis was the Columbine High School principal. C/O ¶ 10. There are no allegations that Mr. DeAn-gelis knew Harris and Klebold. Plaintiffs allege that “Columbine High School officials knew ... about Harris and Klebold talking about blowing up the school.” C/O ¶ 166. As principal of Columbine, Defendant DeAngelis is a Columbine High School official. Therefore, it is alleged that Defendant DeAngelis knew that Harris and Klebold talked about blowing up the school. There are no allegations that Mr. DeAngelis knew about any other activities of Harris and Klebold. Plaintiffs allege that Columbine disciplinary assistant principal, Defendant Hor-vath, also a Columbine High School official, was aware of Harris’ and Klebold’s probationary status for the van break-in, id. at ¶ 149, and their school suspension for hacking into school computers and stealing locker combinations. Id. at ¶ 150. Before the shootings, Mr. Horvath thought that Harris “was on the edge of losing control.” Afterward, he admitted that he “was not totally shocked” that Harris and Klebold “did it.” Id. at ¶ 149. As a Columbine official, he knew that Harris and Klebold talked about blowing up the school. Id. at ¶ 167. Defendant Butts was a counselor assigned to Dylan Klebold. Several weeks before April 20, 1999, Defendant teacher Judy Kelly provided Mr. Butts with a copy of a story written by Klebold because of her concern over its vicious nature. C/O ¶¶ 151, 161. Plaintiffs allege he also knew or should have known of Klebold’s other activities. Id. Defendant Talocco was a teacher in a video production class in which Eric Harris presented a videotape filmed inside the school depicting himself and Dylan Klebold enacting revenge shootings of other Columbine students, including athletes, using-fake guns. C/O ¶ 152. Mr. Talocco allowed Harris and Klebold to participate in other video production classes in which they were not enrolled and had frequent contact with them in the school’s video lab. Id. at ¶ 14. Other videos presented by Harris and Klebold in Defendant Talocco’s class show Harris and Klebold carrying guns, presumably fake, down the school hallways, id. at ¶ 53, computer graphics of the school exploding, id. at ¶ 154, and a collage of violent shooting scenes from commercial movies. Id. at ¶ 155. In these videos and in class discussion, Harris and Klebold spoke of killing, of their ownership of guns, and of their bombmaking abilities. Id. at ¶ 157. In addition, Defendant Talocco was responsible for being familiar with student-produced materials placed on the school’s tech lab computer and video productions kept on the school’s server. Id. at ¶ 159. The school’s video lab contained multiple videos depicting “various students ... in videos involving firearms,” and a video taken somewhere in the mountains showing Harris shooting a shotgun and Klebold shooting a TEK-9, two of the weapons used in the April 20th attack. Id. at ¶ 159. Defendants Johnson and Kelly were teachers of Harris’ and Klebold’s psychology and creative writing classes. In each class, Harris and Klebold wrote and spoke of their hatred, anger, possession of firearms, and desire and intent to kill and injure others, including Columbine students. C/O ¶¶ 160,163. In the fall of 1998, in Harris’ and Kle-bold’s Government and Economics class, taught by Defendant Tonelli, the pair submitted a video depicting themselves as “hit men” hired by “geeks” to avenge abuse by “jocks.” C/O ¶ 164. In this video, filmed on school premises, Harris and Klebold enacted shooting “jocks,” spoke of killing, and used a computer graphics program to depict the school exploding. Id. Plaintiffs allege that Deputy Gardner and the other Sheriff Defendants never informed the School Defendants of the Web site contents. See C/O ¶¶ 79,100. In the alternative, they allege that the School Defendants were aware of the contents of Harris’ Web site well before April 20, 1999. See C/O ¶ 167. According to Plaintiffs, Deputy Gardner knew or should have known the information available to the Columbine teachers and school officials, including the video tapes, writings and verbal statements. Id. at ¶¶ 74,168. II. Claims Plaintiffs assert the following claims against the Sheriff Defendants and the School Defendants: Claim One Willful and wanton conduct against the Sheriff Defendants, individually, except the Jefferson County Sheriffs Department — failure to investigate. Claim Two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — Deprivation of right to life, liberty, and personal security— against individual Sheriff Defendants, except the Jefferson County Sheriffs Department — failure to investigate— based on creating or substantially enhancing the danger faced by Plaintiffs. Claim Three 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — Deprivation of right to life, liberty, and personal security— against Sheriffs Beckham and Stone, in their official capacities, and the Jefferson County Sheriffs Department, based on inadequate policies, practices, and training. Claim Four Willful and wanton conduct against individual School Defendants, in their individual capacities, except the Jefferson County School District R-l. Claim Five 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — Deprivation of right to life, liberty, and personal security— against individual School Defendants, in their individual capacities, except the Jefferson County School District R-l based on special relationship and creating or substantially enhancing the danger faced by Plaintiffs. Claim Six 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — Deprivation of right to life, liberty, and personal security— against Defendants DeAngelis, in his official capacity, and the Jefferson County School District R-l, for inadequate policies, customs, practices, and training. Claim Eleven Violation of Colorado Constitution, Art, II, Secs. 6, 25, against Sheriff Defendants, except Jefferson County Sheriffs Department, in their individual capacities. Claim Twelve Violation of Colorado Constitution, Art. II, Secs. 6, 25, against School Defendants, except Jefferson County School District R-l, in their individual capacities. These claims are premised on Defendants’ alleged actions and omissions preceding the Columbine attack but not during the attack itself. Defendants move, pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss all federal claims for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted. Further, the individual Defendants, accepting as true Plaintiffs’ well pleaded facts, assert entitlement to qualified immunity from suit as to the § 1983 claims. They also seek dismissal of Claim One and Claim Four as barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, § 24-10-101, et seq. and Claims Eleven and Twelve for reasons later addressed. III. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Under Rule 12(b)(6), I may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). If the plaintiff has pleaded facts that would support a legally cognizable claim for relief, a motion to dismiss should be denied. Id. I accept as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, and view those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir.1998). All reasonable inferences must be construed in the plaintiffs favor. See Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir.1998). Materials attached to a complaint and incorporated into it may be considered without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one of summary judgment. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir.1991). IV. Qualified Immunity All individual Defendants maintain they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the contours of the pertinent law were not clearly established on April 20,1999. The principles of qualified immunity are settled. The purpose of a qualified immunity defense under § 1983 is to limit the deleterious effects that the risks of civil liability would otherwise have on government operations at all levels, federal, state, and local. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Discretionary decisions by government actors inevitably impact the lives of private individuals, sometimes with harmful effects. Moreover, such decisions are inescapably imperfect. Especially in the context of police work, decisions must be made in an atmosphere of great uncertainty. Holding police officers liable in hindsight for every injurious consequence of their actions would paralyze the functions of law enforcement. See Tangwall v. Stuckey, 135 F.3d 510, 520 (7th Cir.1998); Torchinsky v. Siwinski 942 F.2d 257, 260 (4th Cir.1991). The same can be said of public school administrators and teachers. Qualified immunity thus allows officials the freedom to exercise fair judgment, protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Qualified immunity under § 1983 shields officials from civil liability unless their actions violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The linchpin of qualified immunity is objective reasonableness. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034. So long as a public official’s actions, viewed from the perspective of the official at the time, can be seen within the range of reasonableness, then no liability will attach. See id. Important to this reasonableness inquiry is whether the rights alleged to have been violated were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727. If the law supporting the allegedly violated rights was not clearly established, then immunity must lie. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034; Tarantino v. Baker, 825 F.2d 772, 774 (4th Cir.1987). Where the law is clearly established, and where no reasonable official could believe he was acting in accordance with it, qualified immunity will not attach. The purpose of this doctrine is to ensure that government actors such as police officers and public school teachers have notice of the extent of constitutional restrictions on their behavior. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984). Thus, qualified immunity prevents officials from being blindsided. In a § 1983 suit for an alleged violation of a constitutional right, the requisites of a qualified immunity defense must be considered in proper sequence. Where a defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 199-201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2155-56 (2000). Qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). The privilege is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Id. As a result, the Supreme Court has stressed “the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991). In Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991), the Supreme Court clarified the appropriate framework for reviewing qualified immunity from § 1983 substantive due process claims. Under Siegert, I must first determine whether Plaintiffs “ha[ve] asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all.” Id. at 232, 111 S.Ct. 1789. If Plaintiffs have asserted the violation of a constitutional right, then I determine whether that right was clearly established so that reasonable officials in Defendants’ situation would have understood their conduct violated that right. Id. at 233, 111 S.Ct. 1789; Liebson v. New Mexico Corrections Dept., 73 F.3d 274, 276 (10th Cir.1996); Martinez v. Mafchir, 35 F.3d 1486, 1490 (10th Cir.1994). V. Claims Against the Sheriff Defendants A. Claim One — Willful and Wanton Conduct Against the Sheriff Defendants, individually, except the Jefferson County Sheriffs Department — failure to investigate The Sheriff Defendants move to dismiss Claim One: 1) because it is barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 24-10-103(4)(a); and 2) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 1. Colorado Governmental Immunity Act The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 24-10-101, et seq. (CGIA), covers “all the circumstances under which the state, any of its political subdivisions, or the public employees of such public entities may be liable in actions which lie in tort.” Id. at § 102. The term “public entity” is defined as “the state, county, city and county, municipality, school district ... and every other kind of district, agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision thereof organized pursuant to law.” Id. at § 103(5). “Public employee” is defined as “an officer, employee, servant, or authorized volunteer of the public entity.” Id. at § 103(4). There is no dispute that the Sheriff Defendants are public employees under the CGIA. A public employee may only be held liable for conduct that is willful and wanton: [a] public employee shall be immune from liability in any claim for injury ... which lies in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by a claimant and which arises out of an act or omission of such employee occurring during the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment unless the act or omission causing injury was willful and wanton. Id. at § 118(2)(a) (emphasis added). In any action alleging that an act of a public employee was willful and wanton, “the specific factual basis of such allegations shall be stated in the complaint.” Id. at § 110(5)(a). Failure to plead the factual basis results in dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at § 110(5)(b). Whether a plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim based upon willful and wanton conduct is a matter determined by the court. Barham v. Scalia, 928 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Colo.App.1996). The phrase “willful and wanton” is not defined in the CGIA. I look then to controlling Colorado case law to assess the conduct alleged here. In Terror Mining Co., Inc. v. Roter, 866 P.2d 929 (Colo.1994) the mother of two small children brought tort claims against the children’s father for injuries suffered in a vehicle accident. The father, Dr. Ro-ter, asserted parental immunity. Dr. Ro-ter, an orthopaedic surgeon, incorporated Terror Mining Company, Inc. (TM) to operate a gold mine and was its sole shareholder and employee. Dr. Roter was working the gold mine accompanied by his daughters, ages two and four years. Dr. Roter attempted to transport a large mining cable spool from an upper driveway to a lower storage area using a Unimog, an off-road construction vehicle designed to accommodate multiple tasks including transporting heavy equipment to job sites, snowplowing, sweeping, front-end loading, trenching and backfilling. Much like a pick-up truck in appearance, the Unimog rides high above the ground on oversized tires. The Unimog has several attachments which can be fitted at the front, middle or rear of the vehicle. The Unimog was equipped with both a 1600 pound front end loader and a 2000 pound counterweight. The counterweight was secured to the posterior bed of the Unimog with a steel restraining band. After Dr. Roter loaded the steel cable in the front end loader, his two daughters asked Dr. Roter if they could ride in the rear of the Unimog. Dr. Roter agreed and placed them in the rear bed of the vehicle. He then drove down a gravel and dirt road that runs parallel to and roughly thirty to forty feet above Boulder Creek. The road has a grade of approximately seven percent (7%). The counterweight broke loose, propelling the counterweight forward. The resulting shift in the position of the counterweight threw the Uni-mog out of balance, causing Dr. Roter to lose control of the vehicle. Dr. Roter jumped out of the vehicle and tried to rescue his children. Before he could reach them the Unimog ran over the edge of the road. The children were thrown into Boulder Creek and sustained severe injuries. The issue addressed by the Colorado Supreme Court was whether Dr. Roter’s actions qualified under the “willful and wanton misconduct” exception to the parental immunity doctrine. Id. at 930. The Roter Court cited the following definitions of “willful and wanton” conduct: 1. where defendant pursues a highly hazardous course with the knowledge that tragic consequences are highly probable, defendant’s conduct is reckless or wanton, and not merely negligent or careless. Steeves v. Smiley, 144 Colo. 5, 9-10, 354 P.2d 1011, 1014 (1960). (emphasis added); 2. ordinary or simple negligence should be considered as resulting from a passive mind, while a willful and wanton disregard is the result of an active and purposeful intent. Pettingell v. Moede, 129 Colo. 484, 271 P.2d 1038 (1954); 3. willful and wanton conduct, for purposes of awarding exemplary damages, “means conduct purposefully committed which the actor must have realized as dangerous, done heedlessly and recklessly, without regard to the consequences, or of the rights and safety of others”. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13 — 21-102(l)(b)(1987). Roter, 866 P.2d at 934. The Court then incorporated in its “willful and wanton” analysis the following language from Steeves: in order to fall within the scope of the willful and wanton misconduct exception to the parental immunity doctrine, the Roter children would need to allege in their complaint or assert in their response in opposition to Dr. Roter’s motion, facts that would, at the least, raise an inference that when Dr. Roter placed his children in the bed of the Unimog for the purpose of transporting the spool of cable, he did so consciously, knowingly, with reckless disregard of, or intentionally having considered that the tragic consequences which occurred were “highly probable.” Id. (emphasis added). In conclusion, however, the Roter Court employed slightly different language: Thus, we concur with the district court that while the facts alleged ... might suggest that Dr. Roter’s conduct ... was unreasonable or negligent, plaintiffs] failed to sufficiently plead specific facts ... upon which a reasonable inference could be drawn that Dr. Roter purposefully pursued an activity that he had considered, more likely than not, would result in the tragic accident injuring the Roter children. Id. (emphasis added.). In both instances, however, probability terms were used in assessing whether Dr. Roter’s conduct was “willful and wanton.” Id. Four months later, the Colorado Supreme Court decided Moody v. Ungerer, 885 P.2d 200 (Colo.1994), the most recent Colorado Supreme Court decision concerning willful and wanton conduct under the CGIA. After noting that “willful and wanton” is not defined by the CGIA, the Moody Court recited the following definitions of the phrase “willful and wanton:” 1. Section 13-21-102(l)(b)(exemplary damages): As used in this section, “willful and wanton conduct” means conduct purposefully committed which the actor must have realized as dangerous, done heedlessly and recklessly, without regard to consequences, or of the rights and safety of others, particularly the plaintiff. 2. Pettingell v. Moede, 129 Colo. 484, 491, 271 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1954): “wholly disregardful of the rights, feelings and safety of others ... at times even implying] an element of evil.” (automobile guest statute) 3. Blacks Law Dictionary 1434-35 (5th ed.1979) In order to constitute ‘willful and wanton’ misconduct, act or omission must be not only negligent, but exhibit conscious disregard for safety of others. Inexplicably, the Moody Court neither cited nor referred to Roter or Steeves defining “willful and wanton” as a state of mind to include “knowledge that ... consequences are highly probable.” At first glance, there appears to be an ambiguity between the standards I consider in evaluating the Sheriff Defendants’ conduct. Upon close reading of Pettingell, however, the cases are consistent. In Pettingell, the court explained: Willful action means voluntary; by choice; intentional; purposeful. Wantonness signifies an even higher degree of culpability in that it is wholly disregardful of the rights, feelings and safety of others. It may, at times, even imply an element of evil. One may be said to be guilty of “wanton and willful disregard” when he is conscious of his misconduct, and although having no intent to injure any one, from his knowledge of surrounding circumstances and existing conditions is aware that his conduct in the natural sequence of events will probably result in injury to his guest, and is unconcerned over the possibility of such result. Id. at 1042. (emphasis added). As stated, the Pettingell Court employed probability language in its definition of “willful and wanton.” Because Moody cited Pettingell, Moody can be said to fairly represent Roter’s holding as to “willful and wanton” conduct. I note that Roter employed probability language in defining “willful and wanton” in an immunity context as distinguished from exemplary damages. Although immunity there was parental, the immunity here is governmental, entitled to at least equal treatment. For purposes of this case, I construe controlling Colorado court authority to mean that for a defendant’s conduct to be “willful and wanton” under the CGIA that defendant must be adequately alleged to have purposefully pursued a course of action or inaction that he or she considered would probably result in the harm to Plaintiffs. Here, the Sheriff Defendants’ alleged conduct involves actions and omissions. The Defendants responded to the Brown’s complaint, met or talked with the Browns on three occasions, attempted unsuccessfully to access the Web site page, forwarded the report of the Brown’s police complaint to Deputy Gardner, and consulted the bomb squad about the Web site’s references to the pipe bombs. It appears that the Jefferson County Sheriffs Department investigators attempted, unsuccessfully, to link the pipe bomb information to pipe bomb activity in the area. See C/O Attachment A. Thus, the Sheriff Defendants took action addressing the Web site’s specific information. The information contained in the Web site information is vague and rambling. Harris expresses his wish to blow up a downtown area in a big city. He writes that he lives in Denver and that he “would love to kill almost all of its residents.” In the same paragraph, he specifies that people with “rich snobby attitude,” “fitness fuekheads,” and people who pay taxes would be his most likely targets. See C/O Exhibit A. There is, no mention of Columbine High School or its student body. The information later added to the Web site adds little. These three pieces of information are not linked together or to the prior Web site information. The April 20th reference and the personal quote are cryptic and Harris’ reference to Columbine is not menacing or threatening. Plaintiffs fairly argue that there was more that the Sheriff Defendants could have done to investigate Harris’ and Klebold’s actions. While true, in light of the vague, diffuse, rambling nature of Harris’ writings, and the lack of results garnered by the investigation, I conclude that the Sheriff Defendants’ actions or omissions, while possibly negligent or arguably grossly negligent, do not constitute willful and wanton conduct sufficient to abrogate governmental immunity under Colorado law. See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-102(1)(16); Moody, 885 P.2d 200; Pettingell, 271 P.2d 1038. In later addressing Claim Two against Deputy Gardner, I conclude that Plaintiffs have alleged conduct on his part that was reckless in conscious disregard of risk to Plaintiffs. That conclusion arguably negates his entitlement to immunity under the CGIA. I will assume it does. See infra, section (V)(B)(2)(d). Consequently, for purposes of further analysis I conclude Plaintiffs’ Claim One is barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act as to all Sheriff Defendants except Defendant Gardner. 2. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss In the alternative, the Sheriff Defendants move to dismiss Claim One on the grounds that there is no cognizable claim under Colorado law for failure to forecast or prevent a crime. In response, Plaintiffs contend that the Sheriff Defendants owed a duty to Richard Castaldo and the other Columbine High School students, as members of the public, to protect them from harm by investigating adequately reports of impending criminal activity in light of the seriousness of the potential harm presented in the reports. See C/O ¶ 62. In Plaintiffs’ view, this duty arose from special relationships that existed, collectively, among the School, the Sheriff Defendants, Harris and Klebold, and the Columbine victims. See Response Brief, p. 38. In viewing these relationships collectively, Plaintiffs in essence attempt to blend their response to Claim One against the Sheriff Defendants and Claim Four against the School Defendants. Even so, I analyze independently the claims against each set of Defendants. Guiding principles have emerged from Colorado cases addressing whether police officers owe a duty to crime victims who are injured by third parties. Generally, there is no duty to prevent a third person from harming another unless a special relationship exists between the defendant and the wrongdoer or between the defendant and the victim. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo.1986) citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315. See also Solano v. Goff, 985 P.2d 53 (Colo.App.1999). a. Special relationship Pursuant to Leake and its progeny, under Colorado law a special relationship giving rising to a legal duty of care has been confined to circumstances where: 1) a citizen, either perpetrator or victim, was in the custody or control of the police under circumstances giving rise to a duty of care, Leake, 720 P.2d at 163; 2) law enforcement, officers’ actions created reasonable reliance on the part of the victims that the police would assist or protect them, Whitcomb v. City and County of Denver, 731 P.2d 749 (Colo.App.1986); or 3) there is a statutory duty of care; see Leake, 720 P.2d at 162; Dare v. Sobule, 674 P.2d 960 (Colo.1984). i. Custody or Control over Plaintiffs or Harris and Klebold There are no allegations of a prior relationship between the Plaintiffs and any of the Sheriff Defendants. Plaintiffs’ complaint contains no allegations that at the time of the attack or at any time before the attack, the Sheriffs Department or the individual Sheriff Defendants had custody or control over Harris and Klebold. Thus, there was no custody or control by the Sheriffs Department over the Plaintiffs or Harris and Klebold. In their Response Brief, Plaintiffs refer to Harris’ and Klebold’s previous arrest by the Sheriff Defendants and the fact that they were on probation as grounds for finding a special relationship between Harris and Klebold and the Sheriff Defendants. I disagree. Harris and Klebold were arrested for a property crime, prosecuted by the Jefferson County District Attorney’s Office, and assigned to a state-administered probation department for oversight under the Juvenile Diversion Program. Moreover, none of the Sheriff Defendants are alleged to have: 1) been responsible for supervising Harris and Klebold during their participation in this diversion program; or 2) had any contact with them during this time. Under these circumstances, I conclude that the Sheriff Defendants had neither custody of nor exercised any control over Harris, Klebold, or the Columbine victims, including Richard Castaldo. Therefore, there was no special relationship among any of these persons. ii. Reliance or Creation or Enhancement of Peril Plaintiffs do not allege that the Sheriff Defendants created or enhanced the danger to the victims, including Richard Cas-taldo, faced from Harris and Klebold. Rather, Claim One is grounded solely in the “special relationship” circumstance that may give rise to a legal duty of care in Colorado. See C/O ¶¶ 64-66. There is no basis to conclude there was a special relationship based on this theory. iii. “in loco parentis” In a novel approach, Plaintiffs argue that the Sheriff Defendants, through Deputy Gardner as school resource officer, had a special relationship with the Columbine students, including Richard Castaldo, pursuant to the “in loco parentis” doctrine. See C/O ¶ 64. Plaintiffs contend further that through Deputy Gardner’s alleged special relationship with the Columbine students, and the other Sheriff Defendants’ opportunity to interact with Deputy Gardner concerning information regarding Harris and Klebold, the other Sheriff Defendants shared this relationship with and owed a similar duty to the Columbine High School students. Id. at ¶ 66. I disagree. According to Plaintiffs where, as here, there is a law enforcement presence on campus the school resource officer becomes part of the school-student relationship. See State v. Angelia D.B., 211 Wis.2d 140, 564 N.W.2d 682 (1997); In the Matter of Josue T., 128 N.M. 56, 989 P.2d 431 (1999); People v. Dilworth, 169 Ill.2d 195, 214 Ill.Dec. 456, 661 N.E.2d 310 (1996). Plaintiffs argue that the School Defendants share a special relationship with the Columbine High School students leading to “duties to protect students in their custody from foreseeable harm” under the doctrine of “in loco parentis.” See Response Brief, p. 39. Plaintiffs seek to graft this alleged relationship onto Deputy Gardner, and through him, to the other Sheriff Defendants. See id. The phrase “in loco parentis” means “[i]n the place of a parent”. Black’s Law Dictionary 403 (5th ed.1983). By this common law doctrine, a parent “ ‘may ... delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed.’ ” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton 515 U.S. 646, 655, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995) quoting W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 441 (1769). The genesis of the in loco parentis doctrine in the school setting is mandatory school attendance law. See, e.g., Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 159 F.3d 1253, 1261 (10th Cir.1998); Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 569 (11th Cir.1997); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir.1993); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1370-73 (3d Cir.1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079, 113 S.Ct. 1045, 122 L.Ed.2d 354 (1993); J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272-73 (7th Cir.1990). According to this theory, while students are present at school by mandatory attendance law, the school steps into the role of the parent, becoming “in loco parentis.” Under the in loco parentis doctrine, the school officials are said to have a duty to act reasonably to protect students from foreseeable harm while on school grounds. Plaintiffs’ argument fails for two reasons. First, the Tenth Circuit has consistently held without reference to the “in loco parentis” doctrine that compulsory attendance laws do not create an affirmative constitutional duty for school officials to protect students from private harm while attending school. See DeAnzona v. City & County of Denver, 222 F.3d 1229, 1234 (10th Cir.2000); Graham v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 1-89, 22 F.3d 991 (10th Cir.1994); Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 732 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 914, 113 S.Ct. 1266, 122 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993). See Section (V)(B)(1), infra, for analysis of these cases. Second, Plaintiffs do not cite, and research fails to reveal, any authority applying the in loco parentis doctrine to law enforcement entities or personnel. Instead, Plaintiffs cite three search and seizure eases from foreign jurisdictions. See Angelia D.B., 211 Wis.2d 140, 564 N.W.2d 682 (1997). In the Matter of Josue T., 128 N.M. 56, 989 P.2d 431 (1999); Dilworth, 169 Ill.2d 195, 214 Ill.Dec. 456, 661 N.E.2d 310 (1996). Significantly, these three cases involved law enforcement officers acting with or at the behest of school officials so that they were acting on behalf of or in place of the school officials. These cases do not, however, rest their holdings on the in loco parentis doctrine or impose the responsibilities of an in loco parentis relationship upon the involved police agency. Accordingly, I conclude that the Sheriff Defendants were not in a special relationship with the Plaintiffs based on the “in loco parentis” doctrine. b. Solano Factors Claim One fails assuming a special relationship. In Solano, 985 P.2d 53, the Court listed factors to be examined to determine the existence of a duty in situations where special relationships exist: 1) the foreseeability of harm to others; 2) the social utility of the defendant’s conduct; 3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against injury or harm; and 4) the practical consequences of placing such a duty upon the police. Id. at 54. The Solano court concluded that the county sheriff owed no legal duty to the surviving heirs of a man murdered by an inmate who had escaped from the county jail. Solano, 985 P.2d 53. In determining that no duty of care existed, the Solano Court assumed the existence of a special relationship between the sheriff and the inmate. This was but the threshold consideration. The Court then analyzed and balanced each of the other factors before concluding that there was no legal duty. In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that while foreseeability was an important factor, “foreseeability by itself does not establish the existence of a legal duty.” Id. at 54 citing Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo.1989). i. Foreseeability of Harm The question of foreseeability “ ‘includes whatever is likely enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonably thoughtful person would take account of it in guiding practical conduct.’ ” Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43, 48 (Colo.1987) quoting 3 F. Harper, F. James, & O. Gray, The Law of Torts § 18.2 at 658-59 (2d ed.1986). Evidence of past similar acts is sufficient to find that such acts in the future are foreseeable. See, e.g., Taco Bell, 744 P.2d at 48 (evidence of ten armed robberies at particular Taco Bell restaurant in three years sufficiently established that harm to customers as result of criminal acts by third persons was foreseeable by Taco Bell); Cohen v. Southland Corp., 157 Cal.App.3d 130, 203 Cal.Rptr. 572, 576-77 (Cal.App.4 Dist.1984) (evidence of one prior armed robbery at a 7-Eleven store together with evidence of more than one robbery per store per annum at other 7-Elevens in the area sufficient to make foreseeability a triable issue of fact). Simply because something has not yet happened, however, does not necessarily negate foreseeability. Taco Bell, 744 P.2d at 48. Instead, foreseeability is based on common sense perceptions of the risks created by various conditions and circumstances. Solano, 985 P.2d at 54 citing Taco Bell, 744 P.2d at 48. See also, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 289 (1965). Again, while important, foreseeability alone does not establish the existence of a legal duty. Solano, 985 P.2d at 54; Perreira, 768 P.2d 1198; Taco Bell, 744 P.2d at 49; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344, comment f (1965). Plaintiffs allege that the events of April 20, 1999 were foreseeable based on the contents of: 1) the Web site; 2) the videotapes created during classes at Columbine High School; 3) a writing assignment turned in by Dylan Klebold in School Defendant Kelly’s creative writing class; see Exhibit B; and 4) various writings and discussions in school presentations. See Response Brief, p. 41. a. Web site I have reviewed the Web site pages attached and incorporated into Plaintiffs Complaint. See Exhibit A. These pages consist of rambling, obscene, non-specific diatribes against various groups: 1) mall patrons who walk slowly; 2) people who stand in the middle of hallways and will not move; 3) “stupid” people; 4) Jon Benet Ramsey; 5) people who don’t understand computers; 6) people who cut in lines; 7) liars; 8) weather forecasters; 9) those who think wrestling is real; 10) young smokers; 11) racists; 12) people who don’t believe in personal hygiene; 13) Star Wars fans; 14) phone solicitors; and 15) people who mispronounce words. See id. The pages also contain descriptions of the construction and detonation of pipe bombs. While clearly disturbing, no specific target is discernable from these unfocused writings. The Web site pages contain a single express threat against the life of Brooks Brown. The threat is not expressed in the context of Brown’s status as a Columbine student. Indeed, Columbine High School and its students are not mentioned. See Exhibit A. The only reference to school contained in the Web pages is: “YOU KNOW WHAT I LOVE? — SCHOOL’ (sic) YOU KNOW WHAT I HATE?— SCHOOLWORK!” See id. This content does not forecast the Columbine attack. b.classroom videos In a video production class at Columbine High School taught by School Defendant Taloceo, Harris presented a videotape depicting himself and Klebold enacting revenge shootings on other Columbine students. The video was filmed at Columbine and the actors used fake guns. C/O ¶ 152. Other videos presented by Harris and Kle-bold in this class showed them carrying guns, presumably fake, down the school hallways, C/O ¶ 153, and computer graphics of the school exploding. Id. at ¶ 154. School Defendant Talocco also viewed a video showing Harris and Klebold firing real guns. C/O ¶ 156. In addition, Columbine High School’s video lab contained a video recorded in the mountains showing Harris firing a shotgun and Klebold shooting a TEK-9, apparently two of the weapons used in the April 20, 1999 attack. C/O ¶ 159. Plaintiffs allege that Deputy Gardner knew or should have known of the information contained in these video tapes. See C/O ¶ 74. When the contents of these videotapes are coupled with the information contained on the Web site, the seriousness of the Web site threats become apparent and the focus of Harris’ and Kle-bold’s rage emerges — Columbine High School and their fellow students. Based on these two sources of information, the foreseeability factor weighs in favor of imposition of a duty on Deputy Gardner — the only individual Sheriff Defendant alleged to have had knowledge of this information. See C/O ¶¶ 73-74. c. Klebold’s creative writing assignment Attached to and incorporated into Plaintiffs’s Complaint is a creative writing assignment Klebold submitted in School Defendant Kelly’s class. See C/O Exhibit B. This violent story, related by an anonymous third person observer, concerns a man dressed in a long black trench coat carrying a duffel bag and armed to the hilt who approaches a “popular bar” in the “center of the average-sized town.” Id. After encountering nine “college-preps,” outside of the bar, the man systematically slaughters all nine. Because the man detonated remotely placed explosive devises as a diversionary tactic, he is able to carry out his diabolical plan with impunity and avoid capture by the police. Id. Plaintiffs characterize Klebold’s story as “frighteningfly] similar! ] to the actual attack ...” As chilling and vicious as it is, the story does not forecast an attack on Columbine High School. The story takes place at 1:00 a.m. outside of a bar in an unnamed “average size town.” The assailant is described as a “man,” not a high school student. The tenor of the writing supports this description as well. Moreover, the story contains no references to Columbine, specifically, or any other school. Based on this document alone, the Columbine High School attack was not foreseeable. d. various writings and discussions in school presentations It is alleged that in psychology and creative writing classes, Harris and Klebold produced writings describing or demonstrating “some or all of the following: their hatred, anger, possession of firearms, and desire and intent to kill and injure others, including Columbine students.” C/O ¶¶ 160, 163. In one of Harris’ assignments, he wrote his story from the perspective of a shotgun shell. C/O ¶ 162. Harris also wrote that as a child, he liked to pretend he was shooting people. Id. These allegations present a mixed picture as to foreseeability. As to Harris’ story from the view of a shotgun shell, there is nothing specifically predictive about this writing. Similarly, his writing that as a child he liked to pretend he was shooting people is disturbing but not predictive. The generally described writings containing expressions of Harris’ and Kle-bold’s “hatred, anger, possession of firearms, and desire and intent to kill and injure others, including Columbine students,” see C/O ¶¶ 160, 163, weigh in favor of imposition of a duty on Deputy Gardner. I conclude that Deputy Gardner’s alleged knowledge of the Web site information and the information known to each of the School Defendant teachers weighs in favor of imposing a duty on him. See C/O ¶ 74. Because there are no similar allegations as to the other Sheriff Defendants, this factor weighs against imposing a duty on them. ii. Social Utility of Law Enforcement The second factor is the social utility of the individual Sheriff Defendants’ conduct. In arguing that this factor does not favor the Sheriff Defendants, Plaintiffs point to alleged specific instances of misconduct. This approach misapprehends the nature of this analysis. The appropriate inquiry is to assess the social utility of the Sheriffs Department’s conduct as a whole. See Davenport v. Community Corrections, 962 P.2d 963 (Colo.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1068, 119 S.Ct. 1462, 143 L.Ed.2d 547 (1999). In Davenport, a community corrections resident sentenced on a burglary conviction had a history of alcohol abuse. While in defendant’s facility, he had a series of drug and alcohol related infractions. Despite these infractions, he was granted a weekend pass during which he was involved in a car accident in which Davenport was seriously injured. In assessing the social utility factor, the Court considered the function and purpose of community corrections as a whole, including such aspects as sentencing options, rehabilitation prospects, positive impact on victim restitution, and fiscal savings. See Davenport, 962 P.2d at 968-69. The social utility of the Sheriffs Department’s function and purpose and, by extension, the Sheriff Defendants is high. Their mission is to keep the peace to the best of their abilities and to protect the public so that the citizenry can live and work in a relatively safe world. See Solano, 985 P.2d at 55. In this case imposition of a duty would undermine the Sheriffs Department’s high social utility by establishing real disincentive to act. This factor weighs against imposition of a duty. iii. magnitude of the burden of guarding against injury or harm Plaintiffs see the burden on the Sheriff Defendants as slight. In contrast, the Sheriff Defendants view the burden as immense, “requiring police officers to follow every single reasonable and unreasonable lead, investigate every complaint, and make predictions about human behavior” Sheriff Defendants’ Brief, p. 23. The Sheriff Defendants’ burden is not as onerous as they describe. Imposition of the burden of investigating a legitimate complaint is no more than that which is expected as a normal course of action. However, it is speculative to say that a proper investigation of the Web site printout would have led to prevention of the Columbine tragedy. As I stated, there is nothing in the Web site information linking Harris’ diatribes to Columbine High School or the student body. Moreover, the Browns’ complaint was lodged thirteen months before the attack. There is no statutory or case precedent charging law enforcement officers with the duty of predicting violent acts. Indeed, pursuant to Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-117 (1987), Colorado mental health professionals including psychiatrists, psychologists, and psychiatric nurses, are exempt from civil liability for damages for failure to warn or protect any person against a mental health patient’s violent behavior. It further exempts mental health care providers from civil liability for failure to predict such violent behavior, “except where the patient has communicated to the mental health care provider a serious threat of imminent physical violence against á specific person or persons.” See id. The law should not impose a higher duty on law enforcement officers than that expected of mental health professionals who routinely deal with such issues. Moreover, if I were to apply the standard in § 13-21-117 to the information known to the Sheriff Defendants the threats, while serious, could not be deemed imminent and were not directed against anyone except Brooks Brown. He is not a party to this action. Under these circumstances, this factor weighs against imposing a legal duty. iv. practical consequences of imposing a duty As discussed in Solano, imposing liability on the individual Sheriff Defendants for the conduct of third parties who have no violent history would render law enforcement officers insurers for such conduct. This would have inevitable negative consequences for all aspects of police work including investigations and arrests with real potential to significantly undermine effective law enforcement. Indeed, the spectre .of personal liability in the circumstances here creates a disincentive to even enter law enforcement. Because these consequences would detrimentally affect the public, this factor also weighs against imposing a legal duty. In summary, even assuming a requisite special relationship, consideration of the relevant factors, under the circumstances alleged here, leads to the conclusion that imposition of a legal duty on the Sheriff Defendants, including Deputy Gardner, is not warranted. c. Statutory Duty In the alternative, Plaintiffs contend that Colo. Rev. Stats. §§ 30-10-515 and 506 create a duty on the part of the sheriffs “to take seriously and follow through to investigate threats to the peace of Jefferson County for the protection of its residents.” Response, p.37. See also, C/O ¶ 108. These statutory sections provide, in pertinent part: § 30-10-516. Sheriffs to preserve peace — command aid It is the duty of the sheriffs, undersher-iffs, and deputies to keep and preserve the peace in their respective counties, and to quiet and suppress all affrays, riots, and unlawful assemblies and insurrections .... § 30-10-506. Deputies — liability of sheriff Each sheriff may appoint as many deputies as he may think proper, for whose official acts and those of his undersheriff he shall be responsible, and may revoke such appointments at his pleasure. Persons may also be deputized by such sheriff or undersheriff in writing to do particular acts; the sheriff and his sureties shall be responsible on his official bond for the default or misconduct of his undersheriff and deputies. The Sheriff Defendants agree their mission is to enforce the law, investigate potential criminal activities, make arrests, and aid the prosecution of various criminal activities as appropriate. See Sheriff Defendants’ Reply Brief, p. 13. This mission does not mean, however, that the Sheriff Defendants are liable for the acts of violence perpetrated by Harris and Klebold. The Colorado Supreme Court has held that in the absence of a clear expression of intent to create a tort remedy, a statute cannot be the basis of a tort claim against a public entity or official. See Board of County Comm’rs v. Moreland, 764 P.2d 812 (Colo.1988); Quintana v. Industrial Comm’n, 178 Colo. 131, 495 P.2d 1137 (1972). While § 516 and § 506 define generally the powers and duties of the county sheriff and subordinates, they do not create an actionable legal duty upon which they can be sued. Section 30-10-506 provides that a county sheriff is liable for the tortious acts of his or her subordinates but does not by itself create a duty to act. Accordingly, nothing in § 30-10-506 indicates an intent to create an actionable duty or form the basis of a tort claim against the sheriff. No Colorado court has held that violation of § 30-10-516 creates an actionable tort. A nearly identical statute, Colo.Rev. Stat. § 31-4-112 provides that chiefs of police have powers and duties similar to those applicable to county sheriffs. Nowhere in Leake, Whitcomb, Potter or any other case have the Colorado courts held that § 31-4-112 or any other statute or regulation regarding law enforcement officers create a duty to act. By their plain terms, neither § 30-10-506 nor § 30-10-516 contain any expression of intent to create a tort remedy. Therefore, as a matter of law, no action for willful and wanton conduct may be brought against the Sheriff Defendants based on these statutes. See Moreland, 764 P.2d 812 (Colo.1988); Quintano, 178 Colo. 131, 495 P.2d 1137. In the absence of a duty, the Sheriff Defendants are entitled to dismissal of Claim One. B. Claim Two — 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Deprivation of right to life, liberty, and personal security — against individual Sheriff Defendants, except the Sheriffs Department — failure to investigate — based on creating or substantially enhancing the danger faced by Plaintiffs — special relationship — duty to protect Columbine High School students The Sheriff Defendants move to dismiss Claim Two in which Plaintiffs assert a substantive due process violation based on alleged improper investigative efforts by Defendants. For the following reasons, I grant the motion. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution explicitly guarantees to each citizen that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right of appropriate procedural process, not implicated in this case, before a state can act to deprive an individual of his or her life, liberty, or property. The Fourteenth Amendment also contains a judicially recognized substantive due process component that protects an individual’s life, liberty and property against “certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). Violation of substantive due process rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is remedied through 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This section, enacted in its original form in 1871, was specifically designed to provide a means for redress of violations of the rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment by state actors. As described by the United States Supreme Court, § 1983 developed in the following manner: As a result of the new structure of law that emerged in the post-Civil War era — and especially of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was its centerpiece — the role of the Federal Government as guarantor of basic federal rights against state power was clearly established.... Section 1983 opened the Federal Courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation. * * ❖ * * * The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the Federal Courts between the states and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights — to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, ‘whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.’ Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-40, 242, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972). • While implemented to provide a means of redress for the deprivation of life, liberty or property by state action, neither § 1983 nor the Fourteenth Amendment transform mere torts into constitutional violations. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332, 106 S.Ct. 662. Instead, the Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from the arbitrary, abusive, or oppressive use of governmental power. Id. This basic principle of due process jurisprudence dictates that the Fourteenth Amendment does not confer an “affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.” DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). In DeShaney, the Supreme Court announced the now firmly entrenched rule that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not impose a constitutional duty upon a state to protect individuals from private violence. See id. at 195-97, 109 S.Ct. 998. The Winnebago County Departme