Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION SULLIVAN, District Judge. Plaintiffs filed this case seeking a belat,ed remedy for the horrible suffering to which they were subjected by the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran more than 20 years ago. There is no dispute that members of the plaintiff class were held hostage, and at times tortured, for 444 days after being seized from the United States Embassy in Tehran by Iranian governmental officials. There is also no dispute that the spouses and children of those hostages, who comprise the remainder of the plaintiff class, were also held hostage during this time, unable to resume the normalcy of their daily lives without knowing when or if their loved ones would return. There is also no dispute that had plaintiffs been so treated by fellow United States citizens, such actions would lead to civil, and indeed, criminal liability. Unfortunately, this litigation has only continued the roller coaster ride onto which plaintiffs were thrust over 20 years ago. Members of this plaintiff class previously attempted to sue Iran, but their claims were dismissed because Congress had not waived Iran’s sovereign immunity. See Persinger v. Islamic Republic Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C.Cir.1984); McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.1983); Ledgerwood v. State of Iran, 617 F.Supp. 311 (D.D.C.1985). In 1996, Congress passed the Federal Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“the 1996 Anti-terrorism Act”) and the Flatow Amendment, which together waived foreign sovereign immunity and created a cause of action for individuals harmed by state-sponsored acts of terrorism. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) and note. With the assistance of their counsel, plaintiffs brought this action under those statutes, arguing that this new cause of action applied to the 1979 hostage taking in Tehran, and asking for compensatory and punitive damages of $33 billion. Iran chose not to defend its actions in this Court, despite its long history of adjudicating claims in this Circuit. See, e.g., McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F.3d 1101 (D.C.Cir.2001). Plaintiffs therefore proceeded with their claims unopposed, and at plaintiffs’ request the Court entered a default judgment on liability on August 13, 2001. The Court scheduled a date for a trial to hear evidence on damages, at which several of the plaintiffs were scheduled to testify about their experiences. The Court did not look lightly upon requiring plaintiffs to relive their terrible ordeal and appreciated the difficulty of both testifying and witnessing such testimony. On the eve of trial, however, the State Department, recently made aware of plaintiffs’ claims, attempted to intervene, vacate the judgment, and dismiss the suit. Plaintiffs’ hopes of recovery were once again placed in jeopardy. The United States argued that the Algiers Accords, the 1980 bi-lateral agreement between the United States and Iran, by which the hostages’ release was secured, and its implementing regulations, contain a prohibition on lawsuits arising out of the hostage-taking at issue here. See Govt’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Vacate of 10/12/01. Because no act by Congress had specifically abrogated the Accords, the government argued, that agreement precludes plaintiffs’ claims and the case should be dismissed. The United States also raised several other arguments interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act that this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ claims, and that plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed on the merits. Because of the last-minute nature of the government’s last minute to intervene, rather than deny plaintiffs, many of whom had traveled from distant parts of the country, the opportunity to present their testimony on the record, the Court proceeded with the trial. For two days, the Court heard the harrowing accounts of 444 days spent in captivity from both the former hostages and their family members. The Court scheduled a later date to hear argument on the government’s motions and established a briefing schedule to afford the plaintiffs an opportunity to respond to the government’s arguments. The Court also directed plaintiffs’ counsel to explain why they had not brought the Algiers Accords to the Court’s attention earlier. On November 28, 2001, the date that the government’s reply brief was due, the case took yet another dramatic turn. The government informed the Court that Congress had recently passed, and the President had signed on that very day, an appropriations bill with a provision amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act that specifically referred to this case. See Subsection 626(c) of Pub.L. 107-77, 115 Stat. 748 (2001) (“Subsection 626(c)”). After hearing argument from counsel on the impact of the appropriations rider, this Court expressed its serious concern about the lack of clarity in Congress’ recent action. After the Court took this case under advisement, Congress acted yet again. On December 20, 2001, Congress passed yet another appropriations rider that added a technical amendment to Subsection 626(c) and contained language in its legislative history purporting to explain the legislative intent behind the earlier Subsection 626(c). See Section 208 of the Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub.L. 107-117, 115 Stat. 2230 (“Section 208”). However, rather than proceed with the requisite clarity and assurance of purpose needed when legislating in the realm of foreign affairs, Congress chose to enact two provisions about which only one thing is clear: Congress’ intent to interfere with ongoing litigation. This Court takes very seriously the question of whether Congress by these actions has impermissibly intruded on the exclusive judicial authority granted to this Court by virtue of Article III of the U.S.Constitution. Ultimately, however, this Court need not resolve these important constitutional questions because while Congress’ intent to interfere with this litigation was clear, its intent to abrogate the Algiers Accords was not. Were this Court empowered to judge by its sense of justice, the heart-breaking accounts of the emotional and physical toll of those 444 days on plaintiffs would be more than sufficient justification for granting all the relief that they request. However, this Court is bound to apply the law that Congress has created, according to the rules of interpretation that the Supreme Court has determined. There are two branches of government that are empowered to abrogate and rescind the Algiers Accords, and the judiciary is not one of them. The political considerations that must be balanced prior to such a decision are beyond both the expertise and the •mandate of this Court. Unless and until either the legislative or executive branch acts clearly and decisively, this Court can not grant plaintiffs the relief they seek. Finally, while the actions of the co-equal branches of government are generally entitled to the due respect of this Court, this Court can not ignore the reality of what has occurred here. Both Congress and the President have expressed their support for these plaintiffs’ quest for justice, while failing to act definitively to enable these former hostages to fulfill that quest. If the political consequences of overturning the Algiers Accords are too great, so be it, and my co-equal counterparts should say so. However, the only branches of government with the power to make that difficult decision should not with one hand express support for plaintiffs and with the other leave it to this Court to play the role of the messenger of bad news. Congress and the President possess both the power to decide and the obligation to decide with clarity. Upon consideration of the government’s motion to intervene, to vacate the entry of default judgment, and to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims, the responses and replies thereto, the further briefing requested by the Court, as well as the many oral arguments of counsel, this Court has no choice but to grant the government’s motions and dismiss this case. BACKGROUND I. Events of 1979 and 1980 On November 4, 1979, Iranian militants seized the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran, and took as hostages more than 50 U.S. diplomatic and military personnel who were stationed there. At the same time, representatives of the Iranian government detained the American diplomatic personnel who were meeting with government representatives at the Iranian Ministry of. Foreign Affairs. All of the seized individuals were citizens of the United States. All of the seized individuals were present in Iran with the permission of the Iranian government, and were serving as representatives of the United States. These hostages remained in Iranian custody for 444 days and were subjected to physical and mental torture and inhumane conditions of confinement. At the non-jury trial conducted in this case, former hostages testified about the treatment they endured. The hostages were often blindfolded and tied to chairs or other objects for prolonged periods of time. They were at times kept in isolation from one another, and denied the right to communicate with one another or their families. Several hostages recounted physical abuse, including being kicked, beaten, punched, walked blindfolded into obstacles such as trees, and being exposed with minimal clothing to the elements. The hostages were imprisoned in cold, dark locations, including prisons, and were given only minimal clothing, food, water, and medical care. The hostages were repeatedly interrogated by their Iranian captors. Several hostages told of being threatened with release to chanting mobs or being placed on trial in Iran for being spies. One former hostage testified that during one interrogation he was told that his wife and children were in danger, as one of his interrogators recited exactly where the hostage’s disabled son went to school, what bus he rode, and the location of his home. That hostage was told that unless he confessed his son’s fingers and toes would be delivered to his wife and mother. The former hostages also testified about simulated executions, in which they were awakened in the middle of the night, marched outside, forced to lean against a wall while listening to what they believed was a firing squad preparing its weapons and taking aim, only to be called off at the last second. While the hostages themselves experienced 444 days of abuse, their spouses and children suffered as well. The spouses and children of former hostages testified before this Court about the dramatic impact that not knowing when or if their loved ones would return had on their lives. Spouses of the former hostages recounted their different ways of coping, including organizing a national “Yellow Ribbon” campaign to express support for bringing the hostages home. The children of former hostages testified about the impact of the experience on their childhood and lives. There is no dispute that, at all relevant times, the individuals who seized and maintained custody of the former hostages were acting as authorized representatives of the Iranian government. The government of Iran fully endorsed, supported, and condoned the horrible conditions to which these hostages were subjected. The government of Iran refused to honor the repeated requests of the United States and third parties to release the hostages or improve the conditions of their confinement. It was not until January 20, 1981 that the hostages were finally released. II. The Algiers Accords In order to obtain the freedom of the plaintiff hostages, the United States entered into an international executive agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran on January 19, 1981. That agreement was embodied in two declarations of the government of Algeria, and became known as the Algiers Accords. See Govt’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Int. of 10/12/01, Ex. 1 (Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (“General Declaration”); Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of American and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Claims Settlement Declaration”)) (both reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 223); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 458 U.S. 654, 662-665, 101 S.Ct. 2972, 69 L.Ed.2d 918 (1981). The Algiers Accords include a number of interlocking commitments made by both countries, reflecting the stated principles of (i) “restor[ing] the financial position of Iran ... to that which existed prior to November 14, 1979,” and (ii) “termi-nat[ing] all litigation as between the Government of each party and the nationals of the other, and [bringing] about the settlement and termination of all such claims through binding arbitration.” General Declaration, General Principles ¶ ¶ A, B, 20 I.L.M. at 224. The United States agreed to release the Iranian assets within its jurisdiction that it had frozen after the hostage-taking occurred, id. at ¶¶ 4-6, 8, 20 I.L.M. at 225-27, and “to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran.” Id., General Principles ¶ B. The United States agreed to “prohibit all further litigation based on such claims,” and to bring about their resolution through binding arbitration, before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal established under the Claims Settlement Declaration, Arts. I, II, 20 I.L.M. at 230-31. In return, Iran agreed to place $1 billion of its repatriated financial assets in an escrow account in the Central Bank of Algeria, for the purpose of satisfying awards made against Iran by the Claims Tribunal. General Declaration, ¶7. Iran further agreed to maintain a minimum balance of $500 million in the escrow account until all such awards have been satisfied. Id; see also Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 664-65, 101 S.Ct. 2972. In addition to establishing the Claims Tribunal, the Algiers Accords specifically addressed any claims that the U.S. hostages might assert against Iran. In the General Declaration, the United States agreed to bar and preclude the prosecution against Iran of any pending or future claim of the United States or a United States national arising out of events occurring before the date of this declaration related to (A) the seizure of the 52 United States nationals on November 4, 1979, (B) their subsequent detention, (C) injury to United' States property or property of the United States nationals within the embassy compound in Tehran after November 3, 1979, and (D) injury to the United States national or their property as a result of popular movements in the course of the Islamic Revolution in Iran which were not an act of the Government of Iran. General Declaration, ¶ 11, 20 I.L.M. at 227. The United States also agreed to “bar and preclude the prosecution against Iran in the courts of the United States of any pending or future claim asserted by persons other than the United States nationals arising out of the events specified [above].” Id. In addition, these claims are expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. Claims Settlement Declaration Act, Art. II, 20 I.L.M. at 231. III. Executive Order No. 12283 and Implementing Regulations In order to implement the Algiers Accords, President Jimmy Carter issued a series of Executive Orders on January 19, 1981, the last day of his term in office. Exec. Order Nos. 12276-12285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-7932 (Jan. 19, 1981). President Ronald Reagan ratified those orders by Executive Order No. 12294 on February 24, 1981. 46 Fed.Reg. 14111 (Feb. 24, 1981). Executive Order 12283 is entitled, “Non-Prosecution of Claims of Hostages and for Actions at the United States Embassy and Elsewhere.” 46 Fed.Reg. 7927 (Jan. 19, 1981). That Executive Order states that as reflected in the Algiers Accords, and to begin the process of normalization of relations between the United States and Iran: The Secretary of the Treasury shall promulgate regulations: (a)prohibiting any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction from prosecuting in any court within the United States or elsewhere any claim against the Government of Iran arising out of events occurring before the date of this Order relating to (1) the seizure of the hostages on November 4,1979, (2) their subsequent detention, (3) injury to United States property or property of United States nationals within the United States Embassy compound in Tehran after November 3,1979, or (4)injury to United States nationals or their property as a result of popular movements in the course of the Islamic Revolution in Iran which were not an act of the Government of Iran; (b) prohibiting any person not a U.S. national from prosecuting any such claim in any court within the United States; (c) ordering the termination of any previously instituted judicial proceedings based upon such claims; and (d) prohibiting the enforcement of any judicial order issued in the course of such proceedings. Id. at 1-101. Furthermore, Executive Order 12283 granted the Attorney General the authority to “take all appropriate measures to notify all appropriate courts of the existence of this Order and implementing regulations and the resulting termination of litigation.” Id. at 1-102. Pursuant to this directive, the Treasury Department promulgated regulations on February 26,1981 that state: [p]ersons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States are prohibited from prosecuting in any court within the United States or elsewhere ... any claim against the Government of Iran arising out of events occurring before January 19,1981 relating to: (1) The seizure of the hostages on November 4,1979; [or] (2) The subsequent detention of such hostages ... 31 C.F.R. § 535.216(a). IV.Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) generally grants foreign states immunity from liability in United States courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. Congress has created several specific exceptions to this immunity. This Court lacks jurisdiction over any claim against a foreign government unless one of these exceptions is met. As the Supreme Court has explained, a “foreign state is presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts; unless a specified exception applies, a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign state.” Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 123 L.Ed.2d 47 (1993). V. Federal Anti-Terrorism, and Effective Death Penalty Act The 1996 Antiterrorism Act created a specific exception to the FSIA and thereby waived foreign sovereign immunity for certain state-sponsored terrorist acts. Pub.L. 104-132 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)). Foreign sovereign immunity is waived under the Antiterrorism Act if plaintiffs establish the following: 1) personal injury or death caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking; 2) the act was either perpetrated by a foreign state directly or by a non-state actor which receives material support or resources from the foreign state defendant; 3) the act or provision of material support or resources is engaged in by an agent, official, or employee of the foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, agency, or employment; 4) the foreign state has been designated as state sponsor of terrorism 5) if the incident occurred within the foreign state defendant’s territory, that the plaintiff offered the defendants a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the matter; 6) either the plaintiff of the victim was a United States national at the time of the incident; 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7); see also H.R.Rep. No. 383, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.1995 at 137-138, available at 1995 WL 731698. VI. The Flatow Amendment Although the Antiterrorism Act waived the immunity of foreign states, questions remained as to what causes of action were available to plaintiffs who suffered at the hands of state-sponsored terrorism. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C.1998). To resolve those questions, Congress enacted a separate amendment to the FSIA later in 1996 that created a civil cause of action for acts that satisfy the requirements of the sovereign immunity waiver in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). That amendment took the form of an appropriations' rider entitled the Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, Pub.L. No. 104-208, § 589, 110 Stat. 3009-172 (commonly known as “the Flatow Amendment”). As this Court reflected in Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran: In [the Flatow Amendment’s sponsor’s] experience as the Chairman of the House Task Force on Counterterrorism and Unconventional Warfare and member of the House National Security Committee, in order for the exception for immunity to have the desired deterrent effect, the potential civil liability for foreign states which commit and sponsor acts of terrorism would have to be substantial. 999 F.Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C.1998) (citing Congressman Jim Saxton, News Release, Saxton to Flatow Family: “Be Strong, America is Behind You” (February 26, 1997)). The Flatow Amendment conditions civil liability on the six elements of the sovereign immunity waiver in the Antiterrorism Act at § 1605(e)(7). See § 1605 note. In addition, the Flatow Amendment adds a seventh element to the private right of action: No action shall be maintained under this action [SIC] if an official, employee, or agent of the United States, while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency would not be liable for such acts if carried out within the United States. Id. Once those seven elements are established, a defendant shall be liable for “money damages which may include economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages.” Id. YII. Procedural History of this Case Plaintiffs commenced this action against the Islamic Republic of Iran on December 29, 2000. See Plfs’ Complaint. On February 23, 2001, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint naming the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a party-defendant. See Plfs’ First Amended Complaint. The named plaintiffs are three former hostages and the wife and child of a former hostage, who brought the action on behalf of themselves and a class “comprising Americans taken hostage by defendants from the American Embassy or from the Foreign Ministry in Iran in 1979, their spouses, and their children who are victims of [defendants’ conduct ...” First Amended Complaint, ¶ ¶ 4-8,11. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges violations of the Antiterrorism Act, the Flatow Amendment, and the common law of the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs’ common law claims include the torts of assault, battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, consortium, solatium, and unjust enrichment. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs are named as defendants for their role in perpetrating the capture and imprisonment of members of the plaintiff class. The plaintiffs seek $33 billion dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. The defendants were properly served in accordance with statutory procedures, see 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4). Despite service of process, defendants failed to make an appearance in this case: Consequently, after having certified the class on June 6, 2001, upon plaintiffs’ request the Court entered a default judgment against defendants on August 17, 2001. The Court scheduled a trial for Monday, October 15, 2001 to determine the appropriate amount of damages. VIII. United States’ Intervention On Friday, October 12, 2001, the Court was informed for the first time that the United States intended to file a motion to intervene. The Court immediately held a conference call with the plaintiffs’ counsel and counsel for the United States to discuss this development. The Court allowed the government to fide its motions, and requested a preliminary response from plaintiffs by Sunday, October 14, 2001. Late in the evening on October 12, 2001, the United States filed an Emergency Motion to Intervene and to Adjourn Hearing on Plaintiffs’ Damages Pending Decision on the United States’ Motion to Dismiss. The United States argued that it is entitled to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) because its interest in upholding the obligations of the Algiers Accords is implicated by this litigation, and alternatively, that the Court should grant permissive intervention. The United States also filed a Motion to Vacate Default Judgment and Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Claims. In that motion, the United States argued that the default judgment on liability should be vacated for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the exceptions to FSIA created by the Antiterrorism Act do not apply here because Iran was not designated as a state-sponsor of terrorism as a result of this hostage-taking. Further, the United States argued that upholding the commitments of the Algiers Accords justifies relief from the default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). Once the default judgment is vacated, argued the United States, the Court should dismiss plaintiffs’ claims because the Court lacks jurisdiction, because plaintiffs’ claims do not satisfy the elements of the Flatow Amendment, and are barred by the Algiers Accords. Pursuant to the Court’s request, plaintiffs submitted an initial response on Sunday, October 14, 2001 and objected to the United States’ intervention as untimely and improper. On the morning of October 15, 2001, the Court declined to hear argument on the government’s filings, in light of the late hour of the attempted intervention and the considerable importance of the upcoming trial to the plaintiff witnesses. The Court set a briefing schedule for plaintiffs’ response to the government motions, set a motions hearing date of December 13, 2001, and went forward with the trial. The Court heard the testimony of plaintiffs for two days. On October 30, 2001, the Court ordered the parties to brief the following issue in their upcoming submissions: Did plaintiffs’ counsel have a heightened duty to disclose to the Court any adverse controlling authority given the ex parte nature of the proceedings in this case? Did plaintiffs’ counsel violate that duty to disclose, and if so, what is the appropriate action for the Court to take? On November 5, 2001, plaintiffs filed a motion to strike the government’s motion to intervene and motion to vacate and dismiss. Plaintiffs argued that the government had no authority to intervene and that the only proper status for the government under 28 U.S.C. § 517 is as amicus curiae. On November 16, 2001, plaintiffs filed their oppositions to the United States’ motions. Once again plaintiffs challenged the United States’ intervention as untimely and improper. The plaintiffs also argued that the government lacked standing to raise a defense on the merits to plaintiffs claims against Iran, that the Algiers Accords provides no defense to Iran, and that the Algiers Accords does not trump statutes passed by Congress. Finally, plaintiffs counsel argued that they did reveal to the Court the only precedent from this Circuit that refers to the Algiers Accords as a potential bar to plaintiffs recovery, the Persinger case. Persinger v. Islamic Republic Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C.Cir.1984). Furthermore, plaintiffs were not obligated to disclose the Algiers Accords and their implementing regulations because, they argued, they have been abrogated by the 1996 Anti-terrorism Act and therefore are not controlling authority. IX. Subsection 626(c) of the 2002 Justice, Commerce, and Treasury Appropriations Act On November 28, 2001, the Court was informed that the President had signed into law H.R. 2500, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., the 2002 appropriations act for the Departments of Justice, Commerce, and Treasury. Pub.L. 107-77, 115 Stat. 748 (2001). Subsection 626(c) of that act contained a substantive amendment to the FSIA which provides, in full: Amend 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A) by inserting at the end, and before the semicolon, the following: “or the act is related to Case Number 1:00CV03110 (ESG) [sic] in the United States District Court for District of Columbia.” The Conference Committee Report that accompanied H.R. 2500 contained the following language with respect to subsection 626(c): [s]ubsection (c) quashes the State Department’s motion to vacate the judgment obtained by plaintiffs in Case Number 1:00CV03U0 (ESG)[sic] in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Consistent with current law, subsection (c) does not require the United States Government to make any payments to satisfy the judgment. The House bill did not contain a provision on this matter. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 278, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. at 170 (2001). Subsection 626(c) was not included in the versions of the appropriations bills that were passed in the Senate and House of Representatives. Rather, it first emerged in conference as a replacement for language in the Senate bill that would have made plaintiffs eligible for payment of any judgment awarded in this case from the U.S. Treasury. As an amendment added in conference, it was never the subject of hearings or floor debate. After the Conference Committee agreement was reported, H.R. 2500 passed the House and Senate, also without any debate on § 626(c). See 147 Cong.Rec. H8144-H8159 (Nov. 14, 2001); 147 Cong.Rec. S11878-S11886 (Nov. 15, 2001). Upon signing H.R. 2500 into law on November 28, 2001, the President included the following in his signing statement: [S]ubsection (c) ... purports to remove Iran’s immunity from suit in a case brought by the 1979 Tehran hostages in the District Court for the District of Columbia. To the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, the executive branch will act, and encourage the courts to act, with regard to subsection 626(c) of the Act in a manner consistent with the obligations of the United States under the Algiers Accords that achieved the release of the U.S. hostages in 1981. Statement by the President, November 28, 2001, available at 2001 WL 1509507 (White House). The Court ordered the parties to further brief the impact of this new law and heard oral argument on December 13, 2001. At that hearing, the Court expressed its concern for the lack of clarity of the recent Congressional enactment and the significance of the arguments made by the United States. The Court took the case under advisement, and directed the parties to inform the Court of any further Congressional developments. X. Section 208 of the 2002 Defense Appropriations Act In late December 2001, Congress acted yet again with respect to this case. On December 20, 2001, Congress passed, and on January 10, 2002, President Bush signed into law, the Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub.L. 107-117, 115 Stat. 2230. Section 208 of this Act provides, in full, that “Section 626(c) of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002 (Public Law 107-77) is amended by striking ‘1:00CV03110 (ESG)’ and inserting T:00CV03110 (EGS).’ ” While the statutory text contained only this technical amendment to this Judge’s initials, the Joint Explanatory Statement issued by the Conference Committee to accompany the report of the final bill to both Houses of Congress, included the following language: Sec. 208. — The conference agreement includes Section 208, proposed as Section 105 of Division D of the Senate bill, making a technical correction to Section 626 of Public Law 107 77. The language included in Section 626(c) of Public Law 107-77 quashed the Department of State’s motion to vacate the judgment obtained by plaintiffs in Case Number 1:00CV03110 (EGS) and reaffirmed the validity of this claim and its retroactive application. Nevertheless, the Department of State continued to argue that the judgment obtained in Case Number 1:00CV03110 (EGS) should be vacated after Public Law 107-77 was enacted. The provision included in Section 626(c) of Public Law 107-77 acknowledges that, notwithstanding any other authority, the American citizens who were taken hostage by the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 have a claim against Iran under the Antiterrorism Act of 1996 and the provision specifically allows the judgment to stand for purposes of award [sic] damages consistent with Section 2002 of the Victims of Terrorism Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-386, 114 Stat. 1541). H.R.Cong.Rep. 107-350 at 422-23 (emphasis added). Upon signing the Act into law, President Bush expressed his opinion that Section 208 makes technical correction ... but does nothing to alter the effect of that provision or any other provision of law. Since the enactment of sub-section 626(c) and consistent with it, the executive branch has encouraged the courts to act, and will continue to encourage the court to act, in a manner consistent with the obligations of the United States under the Algiers Accords that achieved the release of U.S. hostages in 1981. Govt’s Supp.Resp. of 1/29/02, Ex. 46. Just prior to a scheduled status hearing on January 14, 2002, plaintiffs informed the Court of this latest development, and the Court ordered further briefing on the subject. Plaintiffs argue that both the recent legislative enactments provide jurisdiction and a cause of action for plaintiffs, as they demonstrate a clear intent to abrogate the Algiers Accords. The government concedes that subsection 626(c) provides this Court with jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs claims, but that the Algiers Accords continue to provide a substantive bar to plaintiffs’ action against the government of Iran because Congress has not expressly abrogated that agreement. Section 208 was not the only additional Congressional reaction to this case. On December 20, 2001, Senator Harkin introduced S.1877, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001), a bill providing the following: Cause of Action: Notwithstanding the Algiers Accords, any other international agreement, or any other provision of law, a former Iranian hostage or immediate relative shall have a cause of action for money damages against the Government of Iran for the hostage taking and any death, disability, or other injury (including pain and suffering and financial loss) to the former Iranian hostage resulting from the former Iranian hostage’s period of captivity in Iran. 147 Cong.Ree. S13965, S13966 (Dec. 20, 2001). In addition to creating a cause of action, the bill also contains a section providing jurisdiction notwithstanding the Algiers Accords, and definitions of the Accords, “former Iranian hostage,” “immediate relative,” and “period of captivity.” Id. Senator Harkin himself explained that he introduced this bill in response to this Court’s reluctance to make a final judgment and to order the Government of Iran to pay damages unless the Congress takes further legislative action to clearly and irrefutably abrogate the Algiers Accords insofar as necessary to allow the Americans held hostage and their families to sue in federal court and recover damages from the Government of Iran. Id. On January 31, 2002, plaintiffs provided the Court with a letter from Senator Harkin explaining to the Departments of Justice and State that his bill has been tabled in light of his belief that “there is no longer any need for the Congress to act on this legislation because it is superceded by the enactment of the clarification provision included in the FY 2002 Defense Appropriations Act ...” See Plfs’ Reply of 1/31/02, Ex. C. On February 20, 2002, this Court once again heard oral argument on the legal significance of these recent developments, and once again took the case under advisement. On February 22, 2002, plaintiffs filed a supplemental brief with the Court, attempting to respond to a question posed by the Court to counsel at the February 20, 2002 hearing. Despite the fact that plaintiffs filing raised new legal arguments after over four months of ongoing briefing, the Court felt it necessary to issue one final request for further briefing by the parties on the legal standard for abrogation of an international executive agreement. That briefing was completed on March 14, 2002. DISCUSSION I. United States’ Motion to Intervene A. Intervention as of Right The United States has the right to intervene in this lawsuit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. The United States has a sufficient cognizable interest in the outcome of this litigation, its intervention was timely, its interest could be impaired by the outcome of this litigation, and no party sufficiently represents that interest. Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a); Smoke v. Norton, 252 F.3d 468, 471 (D.C.Cir.2001). 1. The United States Has Asserted a Cognizable Interest The interest asserted by the United States is the “adherence to its commit-merits under the Algiers Accords,” and “meeting its obligation to terminate legal proceedings that have been brought in contravention of an international legal agreement to which the United States is a party.” Govt’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Int. of 10/12/01 at 16-17. This specific interest has been recognized by the D.C. Circuit as sufficient to justify intervention in actions against Iran in the past. Persinger v. Islamic Republic Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C.Cir.1984); Am. Int’l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430, 433, 435-36 (D.C.Cir.1981). In addition to the interest in adherence to its international commitments, the United States also has an undeniable interest in the enforcement of its laws, which include Executive Order 12283 and its implementing regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 535.216(a), both of which prohibit lawsuits arising out of the hostage taking at issue here. Both of these interests are sufficiently “cognizable” for purposes of Rule 24(a)(2). Plaintiffs argue that the United States’ intervention is improper because the United States “has no possibility of being cast in judgment as a defendant.” Plfs’ Mem. in Opp. to Int. of 11/16/01 at 14. This argument is devoid of merit. Intervention is not limited under Rule 24(a) to those who may be sued by plaintiff, but rather to those who can meet the four requirements of that Rule. Plaintiffs cite no precedent that supports this theory. On the contrary, courts often allow the United States to intervene in cases that implicate its interest but pose no threat of liability. See e.g., Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir.1992); Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.1991); Camacho v. Autoridad de Telefonos de Puerto Rico, 868 F.2d 482 (1st Cir.1989); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir.1985). Persinger, in which the D.C. Circuit allowed the United States to intervene to protect the very interest at stake here, is one such case. 729 F.2d at 837. Plaintiffs then argue that the United States lacks a cognizable interest because Iran has waived all defenses by refusing to appear in this court, and therefore the United States lacks standing to assert defenses on behalf of Iran. Plfs’ Mem. in Opp. to Int. of 11/16/01 at 15-19. Plaintiffs consistently mischaracterize the nature of the interest asserted by the United States. The United States is not seeking to vindicate Iran’s interests, but rather its own commitment under a binding international agreement, and its ever-present interest in the enforcement of its laws. Finally, plaintiffs rely on Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified Vessel or Vessels to argue that the United States’ interests in the enforcement of the Algiers Accords and their implementing regulations are not sufficient to warrant intervention. 22 F.Supp.2d 521 (E.D.Va.1998); Plfs Mem. in Opp. to Int. of 11/16/01 at 18, 20. In Sea Hunt, after the district court granted plaintiff exclusive salvage rights, the United States sought to intervene to assert Spain’s claim of ownership on behalf of Spain. Id. at 522. The district court observed that the United States took the “unique position ... of holding itself out as counsel for Spain.” Id. at 522-523. That court held that the relevant treaty with Spain did not provide the authority for such intervention. The scenario addressed by Sea Hunt differs in several significant aspects from this case. First, the Court in Sea Hunt held that the United States’ treaty obligations to Spain could be served sufficiently by allowing Spain to appear in United States courts. In contrast, the Algiers Accords expressly place an affirmative obligation on the United States “to bar and preclude” the prosecution of eases against Iran. Furthermore, Executive Order 12283 granted the Attorney General the specific authority to “take all appropriate measures to notify all appropriate courts of the existence of this Order and implementing regulations and the resulting termination of litigation.” 46 Fed.Reg. 7927 (Jan. 19, 1981) at 1-102. Finally, in contrast to Sea Hunt, regardless of the plaintiffs’ assertions to the contrary, the United States has not sought to intervene on behalf of Iran, but rather to uphold its international obligations and its interest in enforcing its own laws. 2. The United States’ Motion to Intervene was Timely Plaintiffs strenuously object to the United States’ motion to intervene as untimely. However, as the D.C. Circuit has explained, “the relevant time from which to assess [the] right of intervention is when [the applicant] knew or should have known that any of its rights would be directly affected by the litigation.” Nat’l Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422, 433-34 (D.C.Cir.1989), rev’d on other grounds, 497 U.S. 871, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). The appropriate starting point for the timeliness inquiry is not the date that the would-be intervener became aware of the existence of the litigation, but the date the intervener became aware of the implications of the litigation. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 394, 97 S.Ct. 2464, 53 L.Ed.2d 423 (1977) (post-judgment motion for intervention timely despite intervener’s awareness of litigation where it became clear that named representatives would not adequately represented unnamed class members on appeal); see also Smoke v. Norton, 252 F.3d at 470-71 (holding that a post-judgment motion for intervention was timely when applicant promptly moved for intervention after it learned that government would not appeal from district court’s adverse ruling and thus no longer adequately represented the movant’s interests.). The United States moved for intervention less than 30 days after the responsible officials within the State Department became aware that the United States’ interest in upholding'the Algiers Accords was threatened by this litigation. Plaintiffs have argued that certain employees of the federal government were made aware of this lawsuit as early as February of 2001. See Plfs Mem. in Opp. to Int. of 11/16/01 at 4 - 8. Plaintiffs have not, however, presented any evidence to dispute the United States’ claim that the relevant officials in the State Department became aware of the nature of this suit only in September of 2001. See Govt’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Int. of 10/12/01, Ex. 5; Govt’s Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Int. of 11/28/01 at 4-11. The United States has submitted affidavits to support its claim that none of the individuals at various federal agencies to whom plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ counsel allegedly mentioned this lawsuit was aware of the potential conflict with the Algiers Accords. Govt’s Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Int. of 11/28/01, Ex. 9-22. Nor did any of those officials, including an employee at the CIA’s Office of Public Affairs, two members of the CIA General Counsel’s Office, a trial attorney from the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, attorneys from the United States’ Attorney’s Office in Dallas, Texas, and others, have reason to be aware of the details of an international executive agreement between the United States and Iran signed in 1981. Furthermore, plaintiffs citation to NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365, 93 S.Ct. 2591, 37 L.Ed.2d 648 (1973) is unpersuasive. While the United States’ October 12, 2001, motion to intervene in this case did threaten to disrupt the scheduled trial in this case on October 15, 2001, it did not threaten the availability of any relief for plaintiffs. Unlike NAACP, where a primary election was set to proceed on the basis of the district lines at issue in the lawsuit less than three months after the attempted intervention, id. at 357-58 n. 10, 93 S.Ct. 2591, no impending outside factors serve to impact this Court’s ability to award judgment. The Court in NAACP based its holding of untimeliness in part on the serious prejudice such intervention would cause the parties: “Granting the [NAACP’s] motion to intervene possessed the potential for seriously disrupting [New York’s] electoral process.” Id. at 369, 93 S.Ct. 2591; see also NRDC v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 908 (D.C.Cir.1977) (“[e]ven if there was a delay in seeking intervention ... a determination of timeliness would also have to weigh ... whether that delay would unfairly disadvantage the original parties.”) Plaintiffs here have identified no such prejudice. 3. Impairment of United States’ Interest Denying the United States’ request to intervene will lead to the impairment of its asserted interests in this case. The United States’ asserted interest in this case is “adherence to its commitments under the Algiers Accords,” and “meeting its obligation to terminate legal proceedings that have been brought in contravention of an international legal agreement to which the United States is a party.” Govt’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Int. of 10/12/01 at 16-17. The United States assumed an affirmative duty under the Accords to intervene and terminate any legal proceedings that contravene the Accords. Denying the United States the ability to intervene to protect its obligations will certainly impair that affirmative obligation. More generally, the United States also seeks here to ensure its laws, including Executive Order 12283 and its implementing regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 535.216(a), are enforced. Denying the United States the right to intervene will certainly undermine this interest, as no other party to this case seeks to enforce those laws. 4. Inadequate Representation In order for the United States to be granted intervention of right under Rule 24(a), the United States must show only that the representation of its interests by other parties in the case may be inadequate. NRDC v. Costle, 561 F.2d at 911. The only party present in this litigation are plaintiffs. Plaintiffs adamantly oppose the position asserted by the United States, and certainly could not be held to represent that position. Iran has chosen not to defend itself in this Court, and therefore could not be said to represent the United States’ position. Because it has demonstrated a cognizable interest in this case that no other party adequately represents, that could be impaired by the denial of intervention, and that was timely asserted, the United States has satisfied the requirements for intervention pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). B. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ motion to strike the United States’ motion to intervene as beyond the United States’ statutory authority is wholly without merit. Plaintiffs argue that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517 the only permissible role for the United States in this litigation is as amicus curiae. To prove this point, plaintiffs rely on a multitude of cases in which the United States filed amicus briefs. E.g., In re Austrian and German Holocaust Litigation, 250 F.3d 156 (2d Cir.2001); Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir.1997). Strikingly, none of the cases cited by plaintiffs indicated in any way that the United States is limited to filing an amicus brief or precluded from moving to intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). Nothing in the langúage of § 517 limits the United States’ participation in any way: “[t]he Solicitor General, or any officer of the Department of Justice, may be sent by the Attorney General to any State or district in the United States to attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the United States ...” 28 U.S.C. § 517. The United States clearly has the authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517 to move to intervene in a case should it believe that its interests are sufficiently implicated, and has done so on countless occasions. E.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 562, 103 S.Ct. 2558, 77 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983) (United States intervened to protect its interest in the Pecos River); Crater Corp. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 255 F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2001) (United States intervened in patent infringement action to prevent disclosures that would adversely affect national security). Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit has allowed the United States to intervene to protect the very interest that is at stake here, the United States’ obligations under the Algiers Accords. See Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C.Cir.1984); Am. Int’l Group Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430, 433 (D.C.Cir.1981). Indeed, Executive Order 12283 itself grants the Attorney General the specific authority to “take all appropriate measures to notify all appropriate courts of the existence of this Order and implementing regulations and the resulting termination of litigation.” 46 Fed.Reg. 7927 (Jan. 19, 1981) at 1-102. Plaintiffs also argue in their motion to strike that where the government faces no liability as a defendant, it can only participate in a lawsuit as amicus. Plfs’ Mot. to Strike of 11/05/01 at 4. Once again, plaintiffs seem to have invented this limitation on the right to intervene out of whole cloth. As discussed above, the United States has often intervened in cases to protect its interests where it is not hable as a defendant. E.g., Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir.1992); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir.1985). The only question relevant to determining the permissibility of the United States’ intervention is whether the United States has fulfilled the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) or (b). It is striking that plaintiffs’ motion never mentions this Rule. II. United States’ Motion to Vacate Under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may relieve a party from a “final judgment, order or proceeding” for a variety of reasons, including error or mistake by the Court, because the “judgment is void,” or “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a) and (b)(4), (6). The United States has intervened in this case as a defendant and has moved to vacate this Court’s August 17, 2001 judgment on liability on several grounds. This Court vacates that judgment both because it was entered in contravention of the requirements of the FSIA, and because the Court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims at the time judgment was entered. A. This Court’s Default Judgment on Liability is Vacated on Statutory Grounds. Notwithstanding this Court’s entry of a default on August 17, 2001, the FSIA mandates that a default judgment for a specific monetary amount may not be entered against a foreign state until plaintiffs have “establish[ed] [their] claim or right to relief by evidence that is satisfactory to the Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). Thus, in order for a court to enter judgment against a foreign state, plaintiffs must put forth satisfactory evidence to support each element of their claim. E.g., Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F.Supp.2d 97, 100 n. 3 (D.D.C.2000). Hence, in previous cases brought against Iran under the cause of action created by the Flatow Amendment this Court has consistently held non-jury trials to hear testimony on the issue of liability as well as damages prior to the entry of judgment. See Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C.2001); Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C.2001); Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F.Supp.2d 107 (D.D.C.2000); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F.Supp.2d 62 (D.D.C.1998). As of August 17, 2001, the Court had not yet received any evidence and testimony to support the elements of each of plaintiffs’ claims. That evidence was not heard until the bench trial on October 15 and 16, 2001. Therefore, the Court’s entry of default on liability on August 17, 2001 violated the express provisions of the FSIA. That default order is therefore invalid and is hereby vacated. B. The Default Judgment on Liability Should Also be Vacated Because this Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Hear this Claim at the Time the Judgment Was Entered. The default judgment entered on August 17, 2001 should also be vacated because at the time that judgment was entered on liability for the plaintiffs, this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ claims. 1. Prior to the enactment of subsection 626(c), this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ claims. A judgment is void for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) if the court that rendered it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim, and as such must be vacated by the court. See, e.g., Robinson Eng’g Co. Pension Plan and Trust v. George, 223 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir.2000); United States v. Forma, 42 F.3d 759, 762 (2d Cir.1994); Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 736 F.Supp. 1, 8 (D.D.C.1990) (court has “no alternative” but to vacate a default judgment entered without subject matter jurisdiction). Furthermore, plaintiffs’ argument that the United States can not move to set aside the judgment because it is not a “party” to this lawsuit is now moot, as the Court has allowed the United States to intervene as a defendant. See Plfs Mem. in Opp. to Govt’s Mot. to Vacate and Dismiss of 11/16/01, at 3-4. Rule 60 provides the proper procedural tool for an intervener to request relief from a prior judgment. See, e.g., Dillard v. Baldwin County Comm’rs, 225 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Kentucky Util. Co., 927 F.2d 252, 255 (6th Cir.1991); Williams & Humbert, Ltd. v. W & H Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd., No. 83-1905, 1988 WL 66213 (D.D.C. June 17, 1988) (granting intervener’s Rule 60(b) to vacate final judgment). This Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ claims when it entered judgment in August, 2001 because prior to subsection 626(c)’s amendment to FSIA in November 2001, plaintiffs could not prove all the elements required to meet the 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act’s exception to Iran’s sovereign immunity. In particular, Iran was not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time of the 1979-1981 hostage taking or as a result of that hostage taking. The exception to foreign sovereign immunity created by the 1996 Antiterrorism Act specifically states: the court shall decline to hear a claim under this paragraph— (A) if the foreign state was not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under [other specific federal statutes] at the time the act occurred, unless later so designated as a result of such act. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). There is no dispute over the fact that Iran was not officially designated a state sponsor of terrorism under the specific federal statutes named in the Anti-terrorism Act, the Export Administration Act or the Foreign Assistance Act, at the time that plaintiffs were taken and held hostage. Iran was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism on January 23,1984, three years after the hostages were released. See Dept of State, Office of the Secretary, Determination Pursuant to Section 6[j] of the Export Administration Act of 1979— Iran, 49 Fed.Reg. 2836 (Jan. 23, 1984). Plaintiffs contend that Iran was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism as a result of the hostage taking of 1979 - 1981. This argument is contradicted by State Department documents contemporaneous to the designation. The government argues that Iran was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism for its support of terrorist activities around the world that occurred after the hostages’ release. See Govt’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Vacate of 10/12/01 at 12. The March 1984 edition of the State Department Bulletin, which constitutes the “official record of U.S. foreign policy,” states that Iran was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism “based on convincing evidence o[f] a broad Iranian policy of furthering terrorism beyond its borders.” Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No.2084, 77 (March 1984); (Exhibit 8 to Govt’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Vacate of 10/12/01) (emphasis added). In addition, the Cumulative Digest of the United States Practice in International Law, prepared by the State Department’s Office of Legal Advisor, states that Iran was designated “a[s] a result of [its] actions ... occurring subsequent to the Algiers Accords.” Office of the Legal Advisor, United States Department of State, Cumulative Digest of the United States Practice in International Law, 1981-1988, Book III, 3023; (Exhibit 8 to Govt’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Vacate of 10/12/01) (emphasis added). Letters from the Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, dated January 19,1984, transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Senate Majority Leader, and other senior members of Congress add further support to this argument. Those letters explain that “[a] careful review of the facts and statements by the Government of Iran over the last two years shows convincing evidence of broad Iranian policy furthering terrorism beyond its borders.” Govt’s Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Vacate of 11/28/01, Ex. 28. These letters make no reference to the seizure or detention of plaintiffs. In response to the government’s argument, plaintiffs make two arguments: first, that because the government did not appear at the evidentiary hearing the Court must accept plaintiffs evidence as uncontroverted, and second, plaintiffs testimonial evidence supports the fact that Iran was designated as a state sponsor as a result of the hostage-taking at issue here. The first of plaintiffs’ arguments is easily dismissed. The issue raised by the government goes to subject matter jurisdiction of this Court, and in order to resolve that question this Court will appropriately review the public record that existed at the time the designation was made. Fed.R.Evid. 201(b). During the bench trial, plaintiffs offered the testimony of a former hostage, Professor William Daugherty, to support their argument. See also Plfs’ Mem. in Opp. to Govt’s Mot. to Vacate of 11/16/01, at 18-19. Professor Daugherty testified that there was “no doubt” in his mind that the seizure and detention of the hostages from 1979 through 1981 was one of the reasons for the Secretary of State’s decision to designate Iran on the list of terrorist nations in 1984. Transcript of Trial Proceedings, at 189. Upon further questioning of the Court, however, it became clear that at the time of that designation Professor Daugherty was an employee of the CIA, not the State Department. He admitted that he did not know what “went across the Secretary’s desk,” or to what extent the hostage-taking played a role in the Secretary’s decision-making process. Id. at 185, 187, 195. He admitted that his “opinion” about the designation was based on “speculation.” Id. at 199, 209-10. It is obvious from Professor Daugherty’s testimony that he did not have personal knowledge of the matter and as such his testimony can not be competent evidence of the reasons for the Secretary of State’s