Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER SCHEINDLIN, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION Within days of the September 11th attacks against the United States, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York and the FBI — -working with numerous federal, state and local agencies — initiated a federal grand jury to investigate those attacks. The grand jury was investigating, among other offenses, the crimes of destroying and conspiracy to destroy aircraft, see 18 U.S.C. § 32, bombing and bombing conspiracy, see 18 U.S.C. § 844, and seditious conspiracy to levy war against the United States of America, see 18 U.S.C. § 2384. To facilitate the investigation, the government issued subpoenas and warrants calling for material witnesses to testify before the grand jury. On September 21, 2001, a material witness warrant was issued for Osama Awadallah. After Awadal-lah was detained and held for twenty days in various locations, he testified before the grand jury in New York on October 10 and October 15, 2001. Three days after Awadallah finished testifying, the government issued a complaint charging him with two counts of knowingly making a false material declaration before the grand jury. See Complaint, United States v. Osama Awadallah, No. 01 Mag. 1833 (filed October 18, 2001) ¶¶ 1-2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a)). Awadallah was arrested on October 21, 2001, and indicted on two counts of perjury on October 31, 2001. See Awadallah, 173 F.Supp.2d at 187. Bail with conditions was set on November 27, 2001, see id. at 192, and Awadallah satisfied those conditions on December 13, 2001. According to the government, “Awadallah faces a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment (the combined statutory maximum on the two counts, pursuant to Section 3A1.4 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines).” 11/20/01 Letter from Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) Robin Baker to the Court at 3. Awadallah now makes several motions related to the perjury charges. First, he moves. to dismiss the Indictment on the grounds that (1) he properly recanted his false testimony, thereby barring prosecution, (2) the government violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by not informing him of his rights as a foreign national, (3) the government interfered with his right to counsel, and (4) the government denied him due process while holding him in custody prior to his grand jury appearance as well as during his testimony. See 12/3/01 Notice of Motion ¶¶ 1-4. Second, Awadallah moves to suppress (1) all physical evidence found by law enforcement officers who searched his home, computer and cars, and (2) all statements that he made to any government agent from September 20, 2001 through October 3, 2001. See id. ¶¶ 7-8. Third, Awadallah moves to dismiss the second count of perjury because it is “immaterial, redundant and duplicative of Count One” and for “[a]n order striking certain prejudicial and improper material from the indictment and prohibiting the government from making any reference to such matters at trial.” Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Awadallah’s final motion is for “[a]n order granting evidentiary hearings on the above motions” where applicable. Id. ¶ 9. For the reasons discussed below, these motions are denied in part and granted in part. An evidentiary hearing is scheduled for February 15, 2002. II. SUMMARY These motions collectively raise the question of whether the evidence against Awadallah should be suppressed and the Indictment dismissed. There are essentially three grounds offered in support of this result. First, if the government lacked probable cause to detain Awadallah, thereby unlawfully arresting him, then everything flowing from that unlawful arrest must be suppressed. Second, if the consent that he gave to search his home and cars as well as to speak with investigating agents was involuntary, then everything flowing from that consent must be suppressed. Third, if the government’s conduct from the inception of the investigation through its presentation before the Grand Jury violated Awadallah’s .rights under the Constitution and the material witness statute, then all of the evidence must be suppressed, which would effectively result in the dismissal of the Indictment. For these reasons, an evidentiary hearing must be held. III. LEGAL STANDARD The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “requir[e] the judge to receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision on a ... motion to suppress.” Charles A. Wright et al., 3 Federal Practice & Procedure § 675 (2d ed. Supp. 2001). Although suppression hearings are not always required, a court should hold a hearing when the motion alleges facts that, if proved, would require the suppression of evidence. See id.; see also United States v. Pena, 961 F.2d 333, 339 (2d Cir.1992) (stating that an “evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress ordinarily is required if the moving papers are sufficiently definite, specific, detailed and nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that [there are] contested issues of fact going to the validity of the search.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). A court should also hold a hearing when the defendant’s allegations, if proven true, would result in dismissal of the indictment. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 281 (2d Cir.1974) (holding that the district court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing when defendant’s allegations, if proven, would result in dishiissal); United States v. Orsini, 402 F.Supp. 1218, 1219 (E.D.N.Y.1975) (holding that an evidentiary hearing was required because allegations of due process violations, if substantiated, would require dismissal of indictment). For the sole purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required, I will assume that Awadallah’s allegations are true. These allegations are taken directly from his attorney’s affirmation in support of these motions, which have been adopted by Awadallah. See generally 12/3/01 Affirmation of Jesse Ber-man, Defendant’s Attorney, in Support of Motion to Dismiss (“Berman Aff.”); see also 12/26/01 Affidavit of Osama Awadal-lah, attached to the 12/28/01 Reply Affirmation of Jesse Berman (“Reply ’ Aff.”) (adopting all of the statements in Berman’s Moving Affirmation). IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND ALLEGATIONS A. The Defendant Awadallah is a lawful permanent resident of the United States and a citizen of Jordan. See November 21, 2001 Transcript of Bail Hearing (“11/21/01 Bail Tr.”) at 40. In April 1999, at the age of eighteen, he entered this country with the goal of becoming a United States citizen. See Grand Jury Transcript 10/10/01 (“10/10/01 GJ Tr.”) at 8-9. While residing in this country, Awadallah has only lived in California, where his father and three of his brothers reside. See Bail Tr. at 15-22. Over the last two and a half years, Awa-dallah has been employed as a gas station attendant, flower deliverer, janitor and, most recently, licensed security guard. See Awadallah, 173 F.Supp.2d at 188; see also 10/10/01 GJ Tr. at 27-28. He has never been convicted of any crime or ever been arrested. See Awadallah, 173 F.Supp.2d at 188. Awadallah’s main reason for moving to the United States was to attend college and work here. See 10/10/01 GJ Tr. at 8; see also 9/22/01 FBI Form 302 (“FBI 302”). In the autumn of 2001, he began his second year at Gross-mont College where he mainly studied “English as a Second Language.” See 10/10/01 GJ Tr. at 20. B. Events Prior to Awadallah’s Grand Jury Testimony On the afternoon of September 20, 2001, approximately twenty FBI agents surrounded Awadallah on the street outside his home in San Diego. See Berman Aff. ¶ 14. The FBI agents ordered Awadallah to come to their office. See id. None of the agents advised Awadallah of his rights under Miranda, his right to refuse searches of Ms home or cars, or his right to contact the Jordanian consulate. See id. When Awadallah asked to phone his brother Jamal, the agents refused him permission. See id. When Awadallah asked to enter his oym home, the agents told him he could not go inside. See id. Awadal-lah also asked if he could drive in his car to the FBI office but the FBI agents insisted that he go in an agent’s car. See id. Although the FBI agents told Awadallah that his interview at the San Diego office would last around thirty minutes, he was questioned until midnight. See id. ¶¶ 14-15. At some point during the interview, the agents explained that while searching a car that belonged to Nawaf Al-Hazmi, a suspected terrorist m the September 11th attack on the Pentagon, agents had found a piece of paper with the words “Osama 589-5316.” See 10/10/01 GJ Tr. at 76. This number matched Awadallah’s home phone number when he lived in La Mesa, California, two years earlier. See id. at 74. The agents also told Awadallah to sign forms stating that he consented to their searches of his home and cars. See Ber-man Aff. ¶ 15. Awadallah signed the forms, but he now claims that the agents did not explain their meaning and that he never understood them. See id. The agents never advised Awadallah of his Miranda rights. See id. ¶ 14. The agents constantly reminded Awadallah that he was not a United States citizen. See id. ¶ 15. The agents returned Awadallah to his home after midnight. See id. Less than six hours later, at six o’clock in the morning, some of the FBI agents returned and told him he had to go back to the office to take a lie detector test. See id. Prior to taking a series of three polygraph tests, the agent who administered the test covered the lens of a surveillance camera, which prevented the procedure from being filmed. See id. ¶ 16. When the lie detector tests ended, the FBI agents accused Awadallah of lying although the record does not indicate any basis for this accusation. See id. The agents then handcuffed, fingerprinted and photographed him. See id. When Awa-dallah asked to call his brother, the FBI agents told him that he could not make any calls until he was taken to the San Diego Metropolitan Correctional Center (“San Diego MCC”). See id. Awadallah arrived at the San Diego MCC around 4:00 p.m. and was permitted to call his brother at approximately 6:00 p.m. See id. The same day, Awadallah’s family hired a lawyer, Randall Hamud, to represent Awadallah. See id. Hamud went to the San Diego MCC that evening but was told that Awadallah was not there. See id. After an hour and a half of insisting that Awadallah was being detained there, a correctional officer sent Hamud to the attorney interview room, but Awadallah was never produced. See id. Instead, another inmate was produced after which Hamud was instructed to leave the facility. See id. Hamud’s first meeting with Awadallah occurred the next day. See id. The government also obtained a material witness warrant for Awadallah’s arrest on September 21, although it is unclear whether this occurred before or after Awa-dallah was incarcerated. That warrant, issued by a judge of this Court pursuant to the material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144, was based on a sworn affidavit by an FBI agent and relied in large part on the previous day’s interview of Awadallah and searches of his home and cars. The affidavit also stated that the FBI had found Awadallah’s telephone number in the car belonging to Nawaf Al-Hazmi. The agent who signed the affidavit stated: “I believe, based on the facts set out above, that there is no condition or combination of conditions that would reasonably assure the appearance of the Witness. Accordingly, I respectfully submit that the Witness be detained upon being produced for presentment,' to ensure that the grand jury will receive the Witness’s testimony.” As a devout Muslim, Awadallah does not eat non-halal. food (e.g., swine/pork or its by-products). See Berman Aff. ¶ 17. For the first five days that he was detained as a material witness, the correctional facility only served him non-halal meals, which affected his ability to eat a sufficient amount of food. See id. ¶ 18. He was not given toilet paper or soap for two days and, for three to four days, he was not allowed to shower. See id. ¶ 17. In addition, the floor of his cell was flooded with water when a toilet backed up. See id.; see also 9/25/01 Transcript of Detention Hearing Before Magistrate Judge Ruben Brooks (“9/25/01 Det. Tr.”), at 51. The correctional facility did not fix the problem for at least two days. See Berman Aff. ¶ 17. On September 25, Magistrate Judge Brooks held a detention hearing for Awa-dallah. See 9/25/01 Det. Tr. at 45-61, 74-88, 106-24, 130-32. At the hearing, Ha-mud- argued, among other things, that Awadallah had never evaded process and the government had not served Awadallah with a subpoena. See id. at 48. Hamud offered to turn in Awadallah’s passport and “work out whatever deal we need to make with the U.S. Attorney’s Office to have him testify either by deposition here or testify in New York.” Id. at 52. After hearing the testimony of various witnesses brought on Awadallah’s behalf, the Magistrate Judge noted that the material .witness statute directs a court to consider the factors described in the statute pertaining to the release or detention of a defendant pending trial. The Magistrate Judge then stated that “the charges are such that it is a factor that will be treated as weighing in favor of detention.” 9/25/01 Det. Tr. at 130. Based on a consideration of the factors set forth in the statute, the Magistrate' Judge rejected Hamud’s offer of “an own recognizance bond or a modest bond in the amount of $1,000” and concluded “I don’t feel that either of these proposals would assure his attendance at proceedings that are the subject of this hearing.” 9/25/01 Det. Tr. at 132. Hamud then- offered any bah “that would, in [the court’s] mind, help to ensure Mr. Awadallah’s appearance.” Id. at 134. The Magistrate Judge answered: I considered that while I was in chambers and asked myself if I put a $100,000 figure down, if I put a $200,000 figure down, would my decision be any different. And that by itself is not enough to change the decision because bail frequently involves, at least in my mind, items more than money.... So an abstract number is — is not enough to change the balances. Id. at 135. The Magistrate Judge did not, however, determine whether there were any conditions of release that would “reasonably assure the appearance” of Awadal-lah before the grand jury as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). See id. at 138-39. “The defendant spent two more days at the San Diego MCC, then a night at a jail in San Bernardino.” 1/4/02 Ltr. at 6. At the San Bernardino County jail, Awadallah was denied permission to make any phone calls. See Berman Aff. ¶ 18. The guards there also forced him to strip naked before a female officer. At one point, an officer twisted his arm, forced him to bow and pushed his face to the floor. See id. Because he was only provided one meal that contained non-halal meat, Awadallah only ate an apple the entire day. See id. The government transferred Awadallah to a federal facility in Oklahoma City on September 28. See 1/4/02 Ltr. at 6. While in Oklahoma, a guard threw shoes at his head and face, cursed at him and made insulting remarks about his religion. See Berman Aff. ¶ 19. On October 1, 2001, Awadallah was shackled in leg irons and flown to New York City. He arrived at approximately 9:00 p.m. See 1/4/02 Ltr. at 6. At the New York airport, the United States marshals threatened to get his brother and cursed “the Arabs.” Berman Aff. ¶ 20. The marshals then transported him to the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York (“New York MCC”) where he was placed in a room so cold that his body turned blue. See id. ¶ 21. Awadallah was then taken to a doctor. After being examined, a guard caused his hand to bleed by pushing him into a door and a wall while he was handcuffed. See id. The same guard also kicked his leg shackles and pulled him by the hair to force him to face an American flag. See id. ¶ 21. The next day, October 2, 2001, the marshals transported Awadallah to this Court. With his hands cuffed behind his back and bound to his feet, the transporting marshals pinched his upper arms so hard that they were bruised. See id. In the elevator, the marshals made his left foot bleed by kicking it and the supervising marshal threatened to kill him. See id. The New York MCC did not provide Awadallah any halal meals for the first fifteen to twenty-five days that he was detained. See id. The correctional facility also placed him in solitary confinement. See id. Every time Awadallah was moved off of his floor, the guards strip searched and videotaped him with a hand-held camera. See id. From his arrival on October 1 until the time he testified to the grand jury on October 10, the MCC did not permit any family members to visit Awa-dallah or allow him to telephone Berman. See id. During this entire time, Awadallah was held only as a material witness, not as a defendant. C. October 10, 2001: Awadallah’s Grand Jury Testimony When the government presented Awa-dallah to the grand jury as a material witness on October 10, he was dressed in prison clothes and escorted into the room by FBI agents. See id. ¶ 23. The agents kept him handcuffed to the witness chair throughout his testimony. See id. He was questioned by two prosecutors rather than one. See id. ¶ 24. During his testimony, one of the prosecutors interrupted him, spoke in a very loud voice, argued with him and made inappropriate judgmental remarks before the grand jurors. See id. ¶¶ 24-26. After a colloquy, Awadallah entered the grand jury room at 10:57 a.m. and began his testimony. Because his English skills are limited, an Arabic translator was available in case he needed help. AUSA Baker introduced herself and the other prosecutor, George Toscas. Baker then stated to Awadallah: “I want you to understand that if you knowingly and intentionally provide information that is false or misleading, you could be charged with ... perjury, false statements before the Grand Jury, and obstruction of justice, all of which are felonies under federal law.” 10/10/01 GJ Tr. at 5. Awadallah responded that he understood. See id. AUSA Baker began by asking Awadal-lah to describe where he had worked since he had entered the United States, what he had studied, where he had lived, and the approximate time periods for each. See id. at 6-13. Awadallah was also asked to name those people who lived with him. See id. at 14-17, 23-27. Over the course of several dozen questions, Awadallah named at least seventeen individuals with whom he had lived. See id. He could only remember the full first and last names of five but, on some of the occasions when he forgot an individual’s name, he attempted to remember their nationality. See id. at 17, 25. When Awadallah forgot a name that he had mentioned in his previous interviews with the FBI or other government officials, the prosecutors attempted to refresh his memory. For example, at one point, the following exchange took place: Q: Let’s start with the people who lived with you. You mentioned Ya-zid. What’s Yazid’s last name? A: Yazid Al-Salmi. Q: And then you mentioned two people both Samir. What are their last names? A: One is Samir Kawaraia. I don’t know the other one. Q: Do you remember telling us the other day that the other Samir’s last name was Abdoun? A: Yes, maybe, Samir Abdoun. That is true. * * * * * * Q: Did someone named Tilal also stay in the apartment? A: Yes, that is true. He stayed one month. Not a long time. That is why I didn’t remember. Id. at 25-26. After Awadallah answered questions about his time in the United States, the government handed him twenty pictures and asked him to state whether he recognized the person in each photograph. See id. at 30. The first picture that Awadallah recognized was the fourteenth shown to him, a picture of Nawaf Al-Hazmi. See id. at 31. At this point, the government began to ask Awadallah about when he first meet Al-Hazmi and Awadallah stopped looking at the pictures. See id. According to the testimony, Awadallah explained that he first met Al-Hazmi in the spring of 2000, a year and a half earlier, while Awadallah was working at a gas station. See id. After Awadallah named everyone he could remember working at the gas station, the following exchange (which relates to the first charge of perjury) took place: Q: So let’s go back to when you first met Nawaf Al-Hazmi. You said you were at the Texaco. Do you remember who else was there that day? A: As far as I know, until now, Moh-dar, and he was with another one. Q: You are saying that Nawaf was with someone else? A: Yes. Q: Were you there first when Nawaf and the other person arrived or were they there when you arrived? A: I think I was there when they arrived. Q: And did someone introduce you to Nawaf? A: I don’t think so. Because we are Arab, we introduced ourselves to each other. We don’t need somebody to introduce. We just see somebody, “Oh, hi, how are you doing?” And we speak to each other. Q: Who was the other person who was with Nawaf [Al-Hazmi] that day? A: I don’t know. Q: Had you ever seen that person before? A: No. Q: I take it that it was a man? A: Yes. Q: Do you know what country he was from? A: No. Nawaf or the other guy? Q: The other man who was with Na-waf. A: No. Q: Did you ever learn any part of that man’s name? A: No. Id. at 35-36; see also Indictment ¶¶ 11 and ll(a)-(e) (quoting the Grand Jury testimony). A few moments later, Awadallah testified: Q: So you saw Mohdar and Nawaf speak with each other that day? A: Yes. Q: Did Mohdar speak with the other person who was with Nawaf? A: I’m not sure. I can’t remember. Q: When you and Nawaf were talking to each other, where was the other man who had been with Nawaf? A: I didn’t pay attention. Q: Was he standing right near you when you were talking to Nawaf? A: He was standing near to Nawaf. Q: And you and Nawaf spoke to each other but this other man didn’t say anything? A: No, I said like “Hello. How are you doing?” That is it. Q: Did he say what his name was? A: Maybe he said, but I can’t remember. I’m not sure. Q: Before this day at the gas station, had you ever seen this other man before? A: No. Q: Before this day at the gas station, had you ever seen Nawaf before? A: No. Q: After this day at the gas station, did you ever see the other man again? A: I saw him with him, with Nawaf. They usually were together. Q: Were you ever on any later occasion introduced to this other man by name? A: No. Q: So as you sit here today, you don’t know if you ever knew his name? A: Maybe he mentioned his name and I didn’t catch it or something. Something like that. But after that I didn’t take his name or catch his name again. Id. at 39-40. The government then moved on and began to ask Awadallah about the first conversation he had with Nawaf that lasted about five to ten minutes. See id. at 41-42. Awadallah also testified that the last time he saw Nawaf Al-Hazmi was ten months earlier, in December 2000, at a mosque during Ramadan. See id. at 42. The government asked ‘What did you and he talk about [the last time]?” and Awadal-lah responded: A: Like, “Hi, how are you doing?” Then he told me “I’m leaving to LA.” I told him, “What are you going to do there?” He said “I’m going to flying school.” Q: Did you and he say anything else this day? A: No. I’m not sure, I think we were eating, breaking our fast that day or something, and there is a lot of people. Id. at 43. Awadallah testified that, over the six to seven months that Awadallah knew Nawaf Al-Hazmi, they saw each other about thirty-five to forty times — mostly at the mosque (about twenty times) or gas station (about fifteen to twenty times). See id. at 46-47, 51. The government then asked: Q: Do you remember whether he ever had anyone with him at the gas station besides the other people who worked there? A: The one I mentioned. Q: On the first day that you met him, you are talking about the other man who was with him that day? A: Yes. Q: Were there other days when that same man was with him at the gas station? A: Yes. Q: About how many times? A: Five to ten times? Q: Did you come to have any understanding of what the connection was between Nawaf and this other man? A: No. Q: Do you know, for example, whether they were good friends? A: Well, it seems to me they are good friends. When they are always together, that means they are good friends. Id. at 48-49. Beside seeing Al-Hazmi at the mosque or gas station, Awadallah also testified that he saw him on two other occasions. First, they went with some other individuals to a restaurant for dinner once after attending mosque. See id. at 46, 62. Second, on one occasion Awadallah went to Al-Hazmi’s house after Al-Hazmi asked him how to change the text on his computer from English to Arabic and also how to listen to music on the web. See id. at 43, 53-54. Awadallah had previously explained how to do these things, but when Al-Hazmi was unable to make it work, Awadallah offered to help him. See id. at 54. Awadallah testified: Q: What did you and Nawaf do there at his house that day? A: He make tea for us and I tried to do the computer. I stayed around 15 minutes trying to do the computer, change it, but it doesn’t work. Then we left. Q: When you say trying to change it, what were you trying to change? A: The language, from English to Arabic. Q: And you were not successful? A:No. Q: Did you do anything else with the computer while you were there that dav? A: We tried to go on to the Internet, but the Internet was very bad. He didn’t have a good Internet. So one time it fail, one time it doesn’t work. So we left it. I mean, the computer were very slow and very old. Q: What were you trying to do on the Internet? A: Go inside and look at web pages. Q: What kind of web pages? A: There is no specific web pages. What I know, like Ayna. Q: Is that an Arabic web site? A: Yes. Q: With what kind of material on it? A: Everything. Q: Like what? A: Everything. Q: Can you describe some of the things that are on it? A: Business, sports, religion, video games, whatever you want. Q: What else? Did you try any other web site? A: Yes, MSN. But that doesn’t work. Something like that. Arabia. Q: Any others? A: No. Maybe, but until now I remember this. Id. at 56-58. Awadallah then gave testimony about the time that he went to dinner with Al-Hazmi. See id. at 62-64. After the prosecutors clarified that Awa-dallah had mentioned every time he had seen Al-Hazmi, they returned to questioning Awadallah about the man who he saw with Al-Hazmi: Q: Besides all the times that you have told us about now, can you think of any other time that you saw Nawaf? A: No. Q: The other man who you mentioned who was with Nawaf sometimes at the gas station and sometimes at the mosque, did you ever see the other man anywhere else? A: No. Q: Did you ever see that other man alone, not with Nawaf? A: No. I didn’t pay attention to his picture very much. That is why I didn’t make a communication with him. Q: (Mr. Toscas) Excuse me, you didn’t pay attention to what? A: I didn’t pay attention so much to his face or his appearance, so I didn’t recognize him so much. Id. at 64. After asking a few more questions, AUSA Baker suggested taking a ten-minute recess. See id. at 66. When the grand jury reconvened, AUSA Baker began by stating: Q: Before we continue with the photographs, the other man who you saw with Nawaf sometimes at the mosque and sometimes at the gas station, did you ever speak with him yourself? A: No. Q: Not even to exchange greetings? A: No. I mean, the first time, yes. Q: Did you ever overhear him speaking with someone else? A: No. Q: What I’m trying to figure out is — I assume you heard him speaking in Arabic, or when you spoke to him you spoke to him in Arabic? & A:Yes. Q: Could you tell by the way he spoke Arabic which country he was from? A: I don’t know. Because Arabic sometimes doesn’t have an accent, even if there is a different country. Sometimes it doesn’t have an accent. It was the same of my language, the same thing, the same of my accent. Q: Was there anything about his appearance that would allow you to give us an opinion of where he may have been from? A: Maybe he is from Saudi Arabia, maybe. I have no idea. Q: Can you describe him for us, his appearance? A: He is taller than Nawaf and skinny. But his face, I’m not sure. He has a little beard. That is the appearance of him, taller and skinny and a little beard. Q: Did he have black hair? A: I think so. Q: What color eyes? A: I don’t know. Q: What was his skin color like? A: Brown. Q: More brown than yourself, for example? A: Yes. Q: Was he darker or lighter than Na-waf? A: The same. Q: Can you estimate how old he was? A: 23 maybe, 24, around this time, 25 maybe. Because the age sometimes doesn’t exist with appearance. Q: Did you ever see him talking with anyone beside Nawaf? A: Maybe the first time at the gas station, maybe he talked to Mohdar, I’m not sure. But he was standing besides Nawaf. But other ones, no. Q: You never saw him talk to anyone at the mosque? A: No. Because, I mean, I didn’t pay attention to him. Q: Well, if we wanted to try to figure out who he was, do you have any suggestion on who we would ask to get more information? A: Mohdar maybe, if you ask him. Id. at 66-69. The government resumed asking Awa-dallah about whether he recognized anyone else in the pictures, see id. at 69-73, and whether the phone number that the agents found in Nawaf Al-Hazmi’s car belonged to him, see id. at 74-75. Awadallah agreed that the phone number must belong to him, although he could not remember giving it to Al-Hazmi. See id. at 76-77. When asked, “For what reason did you give your telephone number to Na-waf?,” Awadallah explained: A: There is not specific reason. Just when we see each other, not just Nawaf, or other brothers, “Okay, this is my phone number, take it if you need something, just call me.” Something like that. Q: Do you remember when you gave your telephone number to Nawaf? A: No. But if it is the same phone number, it must be at the time I used to live on Parkway Drive, if this is the Parkway Drive phone number. So it must be at that period. Q: Remind us again about when was that, from what month to what month? A: On Parkway Drive? Q: Yes. A: From the end of March, I would say, April, May, June, July. Id. at 76-77. The government then asked Awadallah several dozen questions about Al-Hazmi. See id. at 78-84. "When asked whether he had ever helped Al-Hazmi in any way other than with his computer, Awadallah answered no. See id. Awadallah was also asked about a picture of Osama bin Laden that Awadallah had printed from the FBI’s ten most-wanted list on the Internet, see id. at 86-88, and some videos that the government had seized when conducting its search of his cars, see id. at 89-95. AUSA Baker then asked for a moment to confer privately with the other prosecutor, see id. at 95, and upon returning asked that the witness be excused, see id. at 96. After a three-minute colloquy, the grand jury’s foreperson reminded Awadallah that he was “still under oath,” id. at 97, and AUSA Baker stated: “Actually, I apologize to the members of the Grand Jury and to the witness. On turning my pages I just realized that I have an additional line of questions that I should put to the witness.” Id. The Grand Jury adjourned at 1:26 p.m. and reconvened at 2:55 p.m. See id. at 97-98. After lunch, AUSA Baker began by asking Awadallah whether he was required to keep a journal for any classes at Gross-mont College. See id. at 98. When asked for clarification, she explained: “There was a document that belonged to you that I haven’t seen that was described to me as a journal. I would understand that word to mean where basically you would keep descriptive entries of things that you had done on particular days.... ” Id. Awadal-lah responded: “No, but maybe we have an essay. I don’t know what you are talking about, but that is what comes to mind.” Id. AUSA Baker asked a few more questions about whether he kept a journal for school and then stated: Q: It has been reported to me that in some book or notebook, some document created by you in connection with your schooling at Grossmont that you wrote something in which you said that you knew Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdar. A: No. Q: You are saying that you did not write anything like that? A: Yes. Q: You have obviously told us that you did know Nawaf Al-Hazmi? A: Yes. Q: Do you deny knowing Khalid Al-Mihdar? A: Yes. Q: So, in other words, you are saying you did not know anyone named Khalid Al-Mihdar? A: No. Id. at 99-100. AUSA Baker proceeded to ask over sixty questions about various subjects (e.g., who Awadallah had emailed the week before he was arrested), see id. at 100-11, before stating: Q: Going back to what I was asking you before about whether you were keeping a journal, if it refreshes your recollection or helps you to know what I’m asking about, apparently the book or the portfolio, whatever it is, was blue in color. A: Yes, but I have to see it to know what is inside this book to say yes or no. Because I have a grammar book that is blue color. Q: Do you recall writing at any time in any book that you owned or had in your possession the names of Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdar? A: No. Id. at 111-12. AUSA Baker switched subjects and asked a dozen questions about a class Awadallah took at Grossmont before she asked the witness to be excused at 3:18 p.m. See id. at 112-14. A three-minute colloquy then took place. See id. at 115. When Awadallah returned to the Grand Jury, AUSA Baker asked approximately fifty questions about how Awadallah supported himself when he first came to the United States, why he changed jobs, his understanding of “fatwa,” whether he had ever seen a picture of Osama bin Laden before looking at the FBI’s website, the demographics of Grossmont College, and the types of discussion that he had with Al-Hazmi. See id. at 115-123. AUSA Baker asked for the witness to be excused at 3:34 p.m. See id. at 123-24. Fifty minutes later, at 4:25 p.m., Awa-dallah was recalled to the grand jury. See id. at 125. The foreperson reminded Awa-dallah that he was still under oath. See id. The court reporter presented Awadallah with a photocopy of an exam booklet (commonly referred to as a “blue book”). See id. The following questions and answers followed: Q: Mr. Awadallah, the court reporter has handed you a document marked as Grand Jury Exhibit 41. Do you recognize that document? A: Yes. Q: Is that an exam booklet that you prepared? A: Yes, that is for my teacher right now. Q: You filled in all the writing in that booklet, it is yours? A: Yes. Q: Why don’t you just flip through it and see if that is all your writing. (Witness perusing document.) A: Yes. Q: When did you prepare this examination booklet? A: Very soon. It is not so far. Like a month ago. Not a month, no, I have 20 days here already. I would say during the month before the 21st of September. Q: It says on the front, “Name — Osa-ma Awadallah.” Underneath that it says “Subject — ESL 103.” Is that the name of the class for which you prepared this? A: Yes. Q: And was your instructor for that class Mimi Pollack? A: Yes. Q: You testified earlier that you did know someone named Nawaf Al-Haz-mi, correct? A: Yes. Q: And you testified earlier that you did not know anyone named Khalid, correct? A: Yes. Q: I’m looking at the next-to-last page of the document. I’m going to show it to you in a minute but I want to read it out loud because the grand jurors won’t be able to see when you are looking at it. At the top of the page, it says “Exercise 9.” Then it has the number 4. “I have been in SD since 1998. I have always wanted to meet as much people as I can. I have met many people from many countries. One of the” — and I think it is supposed to be ‘quietest,’ although it is not spelled quite right — “One of the quietest people I have met is Nawaf. Another one, his name Khalid. They have stayed in San Diego for 6 months.” Then it continues after that. Did I read it correctly? A: This handwriting is not my handwriting. All of them is my handwriting except “his name Khalid.” I wouldn’t write Khalid like that. Q: If you excuse me, I’m going to come and stand next to you. I don’t want to lean over you, but the only way we can see it at the same time is if I stand here. A: Okay. Looking at the color here, it is darker more than the other. See, all the paper have the same color except here, it is like this, slanted, and the color here is more darker. Do you see that? Q: I want you to be very specific because I want your testimony to be clear. Let’s start at the top of the page. It says “Exercise 9.” Did you write that? A: Yes. Q: And then it has the number 4. Did you write that? A: Yes. Q: Then the next sentence is “I have been in SD since 1998.” Did you write that? A: Yes. Q: The next sentence is “I have always wanted to meet as much people as much as I can.” Did you write that? A: I think so, yes. Q: Then the next sentence is “I have met many people from many countries.” Did you write that? A: Yes. Q: Then the next sentence is “One of the quietest people I have met is Na-waf.” Did you write that? A: Yes. Q: Then the next sentence on the line— A: Hold on. Wait a minute. No, “Na-waf,” no, it is not my handwriting. Q: Did you write the rest of that sentence up to the word “is”? A: “One of the quietest people I have met,” right, but the name is not my handwriting. Q: So you are saying that you wrote all the rest of that sentence but not the name “Nawaf’? A: Yes. Q: And the next sentence says, on the actual line that is drawn on the page, it says “Another one, his Khalid.” Then in between “his” and “Khalid” someone drew a little arrow and above that is the word “name.” Did you write “another one”? A: “Another one,” yes, it is my handwriting. Q: How about “his”? A: No. Q: How about “name”? A: No. Q: And “Khalid”? A: No. Q: So you are saying you wrote “another one,” but not the other three words of that sentence? A: Yes. Q: After that, it continues “They have stayed in SD for 6 months.” A: “They have stayed,” this is my handwriting. “SD” is not my handwriting. Q: After that, it continues— Id. at 126-29; see also Indictment ¶¶ 12, 12(b)-(m). The prosecutor continued the line of questioning and eventually stated: Q: What I would like to do is hand you a highlighter and I’m going to give you back the document, and for anything on this page that you say is not your writing I would like you to mark it. For the things that you can’t tell, wait a minute, and I will have you mark those a different way. A: Okay. Q: So if you would, with the yellow highlighter, please mark the things that you say you can see them on the page and they are not your handwriting. (The witness complies.) Q: I’m going to ask you to do one last thing and then I think we are going to take a break. I’m going to hand you now a blue pen and what I would like you to do is on the same page underline anything where you can’t tell whether it is your writing or not. (The witness complies.) Ms. Baker: I would note for the record that it is 4:59 according to the clock in the room. We appreciate the Grand Jury’s patience in staying late. We are not going to conclude the questioning of the witness at this minute or in the next few minutes. It seems that some of you do need to leave now that you have stayed an hour over. In that case, I would ask that the witness be excused at this time and we will continue with his testimony at another time. 10/10/01 GJ Tr. at 142-43. D. Events Subsequent to Awadal-lah’s October 10 Grand Jury Testimony After his testimony, Awadallah met with his attorneys, Berman and Hamud. During the conference, Berman came out of the room and conferred with the AUSA Baker. Baker advised Berman that Awa-dallah would have to return to the grand jury on October 15. She also told Berman that Awadallah would be shown the original examination booklet. Counsel asked that the government consent to Awadal-lah’s release on bail. AUSA Baker called Hamud on the evening of October 10 and informed him that the government would not consent because it believed that Awa-dallah had lied to the grand jury. See Baker Aff. ¶ 6. Prior to his second appearance, Awadal-lah reviewed the original examination booklet, spoke with his friend and co-prisoner Mohdar, and consulted with his attorneys. See Bérman Aff. ¶ 9. E. Awadallah’s Second Grand Jury Testimony On October 15, Awadallah again testified before the Grand Jury. At that time, he testified that the man who was sometimes with Nawaf had told Awadallah his name the first time they met. See 10/15/01 GJ Tr. at 5. The prosecutor asked, “As you sit here today, do you remember any part of that other man’s name?,” to which Awadal-lah replied “No.” Id. at 6. The prosecutor then handed Awadallah some photographs and asked whether he recognized any of the people in the pictures. See id. Awa-dallah stated that he recognized one and that the person in the photograph looked like the person who he had met with Al-Hazmi. See id. at 7. When asked if he “recalled any part of this man’s name,” Awadallah testified that “he thought that man’s name was Khalid.” Id. at 8; see also id. at 13-15, 27-28. Awadallah never admitted that he testified falsely on October 10 with respect to his knowledge of -the name of Nawafs companion.. Awadallah repeatedly testified that it was not until after his grand jury testimony had concluded on October 10, and his recollection was refreshed, that he realized that he did know that the man’s name was Khalid. He repeatedly testified that he had been “confused” during his first grand jury appearance, not that he had lied. Explaining his confusion, he stated: “Because the printing here [in the copy] is not the same as the original. I can’t see exactly my handwriting and I was confused at that time.” * * * * * * “I can’t tell if this [the copy] is my handwriting or not. And at that time I was really confused if it was really my handwriting.” * * * * * * “[W]hen you askéd me [on October 10], I wasn’t sure; so I didn’t say that I know his name.... But when I go back and I refresh my mind, I am trying really to remember what exactly the person who is that person was named Khalid.” * * * * * * “[D]uring the period of time that I forgot and said I did not know him, I had some kind of confusion, I couldn’t remember. That’s why I said I don’t know. But when I saw my original document here [referring to original exam booklet], I made sure and then I remembered that this was a person I knew.” Id. at 13, 25, 27-28, 64. Awadallah asserts that, after reviewing the original exam booklet, he “corrected” his previous grand jury testimony by giving the following testimony. Berman Aff. ¶ 8. Q: Do you recall any part of this man’s name? A: I think Khalid. * * * * * * Q: Do you recognize Grand Jury Exhibit 59 as being your original exam booklet? A: Yes. Q: All right. It’s open now to the page which shows Exercise 9 that we were just discussing. A: Yes. Q: I would like you to take a minute and look it over. And my question for you is going to be whether all of the writing that appears on that page is your handwriting? A: Yes. Q: Are you saying that all of the writing on that page is your handwriting? A: Yes.... Because the printing here [the copy was marked as grand jury exhibit 41] is not the same as the original. I can’t see exactly my handwriting and I was confused at that time. I was a little nervous and so I said some of it is not my handwriting, but these, all of it is in my handwriting. 10/15/01 GJ Tr. at 8,12-13. Awadallah is now charged with making a false declaration to the grand jury when he testified on October 10 that he did not know Khalid Al-Mihdhar’s name. See Awadallah, 173 F.Supp.2d at 187-88. Awadallah is also charged with lying to the grand jury when he denied that he wrote the name “Khalid” and certain other words in the exam booklet. See id. at 188. V. THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT Awadallah argues that the indictment for perjury must be dismissed for four reasons: (1) he recanted his false testimony; (2) the government violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by not informing him of his rights as a foreign national; (3) the government interfered with his right to counsel; and (4) the government denied him due process while holding him in custody both prior to his grand jury appearance and during his appearance. See Notice of Motion ¶¶ 1-4. A. The Recantation Defense: 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d), recantation is a complete defense to a charge of perjury before a grand jury. Specifically section 1623(d) states: Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding in which a declaration is made, the person making the declaration admits such declaration to be false, such admission shall bar prosecution under this section if, at the time the admission is made, the declaration has not substantially affected the proceeding, or it has not become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (emphasis added). As the plain language of the statute shows, a recantation will only bar prosecution for perjury if the defendant admits that his allegedly perjurious statement is “false”. Every Circuit Court that has addressed this issue, including this Circuit, has held that the recantation defense is an issue of law to be decided by the court. These courts have also agreed that the defense can only be invoked if the defendant unequivocally admits that his allegedly perjurious statements were false. See United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 283 n.9 (2d Cir.1973); see also Tobias, 863 F.2d at 689 (“[A] defendant must unequivocally repudiate his prior testimony to satisfy § 1623(d).”); United States v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 37, 45 (1st Cir.1985) (“[A] mere implicit admission of rendering false testimony does not satisfy the requirement of an effective recantation under section 1623(d). A witness must make an outright retraction and repudiation of prior false testimony.”); United States v. Goguen, 723 F.2d 1012, 1018 (1st Cir.1983) (“[F]or an effective recantation, the accused must come forward and explain unambiguously and specifically which of his answers in prior testimony were false and in what respects they were false.”); D’Auria, 672 F.2d at 1091-92 (“[I]n order to recant the witness must, as a condition precedent to giving truthful testimony, admit that his perjurious testimony was false. An outright retraction and repudiation of his false testimony is essential to a ‘recantation’ within the meaning of the statute.”). Awadallah contends that he was “confused” or he “forgot,” or that the photocopy of the examination booklet was not clear, but has not admitted that his testimony was “false”. While the questions of whether he was “confused” or “forgot” may be relevant to the issue of whether he knowingly lied to the grand jury, that is a question of fact for the jury to decide. The only question that this Court must decide, as a matter of law, is whether he made a timely recantation by “admitting] [that his] declaration [was] false.” 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d). Awadallah made no such admission. Even if Awadallah’s October 15 testimony were read as a retraction and repudiation of his allegedly false testimony, his recantation defense would fail because he does not meet the “manifestation” requirement of the section 1623(d). Pursuant to section 1623(d), recantation is only a defense if, at the time the defendant admits the falsity of his statement, “it has not become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed.” Id. This element is a necessary pre-condition to asserting the recantation defense. See United States v. Fornaro, 894 F.2d 508, 511 (2d Cir.1990) (“We therefore hold that recantation is an effective bar to prosecution only if the false statement has not substantially affected the proceeding and if it has' not become manifest that the falsity has been or will be exposed.” (emphasis in original)). “The proper test to apply ... when determining whether recantation occurred before imminent exposure was manifest, is whether the fact that the statements have been or will be exposed as false is objectively manifest to the declarant.” United States v. Smith, 35 F.3d 344, 347 (8th Cir.1994). Awadallah had various reasons to know, prior to his October 15 testimony, that his allegedly false testimony would be exposed. First, Awadallah’s counsel had been informed that the government believed he lied on October 10. See Baker Aff. ¶ 6. Second, with respect to the charge in Count One — that Awadallah lied when he stated that he did not know the name of the man who was with Nawaf — the examination booklet itself made manifest that he had known the name, at least at the time he wrote the booklet. Third, with respect to the allegation in Count Two — that Awa-dallah lied when he said he had not written Nawaf s and Khalid’s names in his exam booklet — Awadallah’s own testimony that he had written everything in the exam booklet made it manifest, at least to an objective declarant, that the falsity of one statement or the other would be exposed. Accordingly, the recantation defense fails as a matter of law. It is worth mentioning that Awadallah is not alone in his failure. The recantation defense appears to be an illusion — often asserted but never found. The parties have brought no case to the Court’s attention, nor has the Court found any case, in which a defendant has successfully asserted that, at the time of his recantation, it was not manifest that his prior false statement might be exposed. It is not difficult to understand this result given the courts’ broad interpretation of the terms “admits to be false” and “manifest.” Under these interpretations, a defendant must seemingly incriminate himself by admitting that he intentionally made a false statement (i.e., committed perjury) and then pray that a court will find that the falsity of his previous statement was not already manifest. This interpretation, in effect, nullifies the statute because, to invoke the defense, a defendant must forfeit his Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination. This, in turn, ignores the canon of statutory construction under which courts must generally interpret statutes to avoid constitutional problems. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 2279, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001). Nonetheless, this Court is bound by precedent and Awadallah’s recantation defense must be rejected. B. Right to Counsel Awadallah next argues that this Court should exercise its supervisory powers to dismiss the indictment based on the fact that the government repeatedly deprived him of his constitutional right to an attorney. See Berman Aff. ¶¶ 14-16, 18 and 21. According to Awadallah, he was without counsel when questioned by the FBI agents on September 20 and 21 and when he took a polygraph test on September 21. See id. Moreover, he was not allowed to contact his attorney when he was at the San Bernardino jail or when he was being held at the New York MCC prior to his grand jury testimony. See id. ¶¶ 18, 21. On the other hand, Awadallah had the benefit of counsel at many critical times. He was represented by counsel the day before and the day of his bail hearing in San Diego, at his presentment in New York, during his proffer sessions with the government in New York, during his two grand jury appearances, between his first and second grand jury appearance, and following his grand jury appearances. See 1/4/02 Ltr. at 6-7; see also generally, Ber-man Aff. and Reply Aff. While Awadallah recognizes that he had some access to counsel, he argues that it was too little and too late. He claims that, because of the deprivation he experienced during the period prior to his grand jury testimony, he was ultimately “too exhausted and disoriented [to] properly avail himself of the services of his counsel.” Reply Aff. ¶ 23. According to his counsel, Awa-dallah’s debilitated condition at the grand jury hearing was evidenced by the fact that, during the entire first day of testimony, he never once requested the opportunity to speak to his counsel. See id. To support his proposition that this Court may dismiss the Indictment based on the alleged deprivations, Awadallah cites United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 505, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983), McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943) and Toscanino, supra. While confirming this Court’s supervisory powers over the administration of justice, these cases do not support the proposition that interference with access to counsel justifies dismissing a properly returned indictment. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that there was no violation of due process where police failed to inform a suspect undergoing interrogation that his family had hired an attorney. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432-34, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). Even if interference with a defendant’s right to counsel might justify dismissal of an indictment under some circumstances, it would not be appropriate here. Awadal-lah had access to counsel before, during and after his grand jury testimony. While the alleged deprivations Awadallah experienced at other times are troubling, they do not, in isolation, violate due process. Accordingly, dismissal of the Indictment on this ground is not warranted. C. The Violation of the Vienna Convention The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is a 1963 multilateral treaty to which the United States and Jordan are parties. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77, 100-101. Among other things, the treaty provides that when a foreign national is arrested, that national may request that the arresting agency notify the national’s consulate or consular official of the arrest. See id. art. 36(l)(b). The consular official may then visit the national, help to provide legal counsel, or arrange for a visit with the national’s family. See id. art. 36(l)(e). Awadallah claims that he was never advised of his right to have the Jordanian consulate notified of his arrest. See Ber-man Aff. ¶29. For the purposes of this motion, the government does not dispute this allegation. See Gov’t Mem. at 55 n.12. Awadallah further claims that his purported consents to search his home and his cars were given without the advice of counsel that flowed directly from the violation of the Vienna Convention. Like other circuits, the Second Circuit has foreclosed Awadallah’s argument. In United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157 (2d Cir.2001), the Second Circuit held: “[The] Government’s failure to comply with the consular-notification provision [of the Vienna Convention] is not grounds for dismissal of [an] indictment.” Id. at 165. See also United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir.2000)(“[T]here is no right in a criminal prosecution to have evidence excluded or an indictment dismissed due to a violation of [the consular notification provision of the Vienna Convention].”); United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1026, 121 S.Ct. 599, 148 L.Ed.2d 513 (2000)(holding that dismissal of an indictment is not an available remedy for a violation of the Vienna Convention); United States v. Nai Fook Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir.2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 956, 121 S.Ct. 378, 379, 148 L.Ed.2d 292 (2000)(“[T]he appropriate remedies [for lack of consular notification] do not include suppression of evidence or dismissal of the indictment.”). Accordingly, Awa-dallah’s motion to dismiss the Indictment on this ground must be denied. Process Awadallah argues that the perjury indictment must be dismissed “because of the denial of due process by the government in its treatment of defendant, both during the twenty days he was in custody prior to his testifying in the grand jury, as well as during his grand jury appearance.” Berman Aff. ¶ 13. Defendant claims: mistreatment directly impacted on defendant’s ability to testify calmly and effectively before the grand jury, requiring dismissal of the indictment herein. But this mistreatment was so horribly at odds with the very notion of due process that, even if the mistreatment did not directly impact on defendant’s ability to testify calmly and effectively before the grand jury, the only appropriate sanction is dismissal of the indictment. ¶ 13. In support of this motion, the defendant cites one Second Circuit case, United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.1974). See id. ¶ 27. The government recognizes that Toscanino provides “a very narrow exception under which a court may, under some circumstances, dismiss an indictment based on extreme United States Government misconduct.” Gov’t Mem. at 51. “Under Toscanino, a court must divest itself of jurisdiction over a criminal defendant where that jurisdiction was ‘acquired as the result of the government’s deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused’s constitutional rights.’” Id. (quoting Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275). But “[e]ven accepting the allegations in Ber-man’s affirmation as true, the defendant has not come close to making the threshold showing required to justify even a hearing”"on the motion. Id. at 49. The government is partially correct: The alleged abuse is not so outrageous as warrant a dismissal under Toscanino and its progeny. As I explain below, however, this does not end the inquiry into whether Awadallah’s due process rights were violated. 1. Toscanino In Toscanino, an Italian national, Francisco Toscanino, alleged that Brazilian officials in cooperation with United States agents kidnapped him while he was living in Uruguay. See Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 269. Toscanino was then brought to Brasilia, where he was incessantly and brutally tortured over seventeen days by Brazilians acting as agents of the United States government. See id. at 270. Moreover, according to Toscanino, a member of the Department of Justice participated in the interrogation and an Assistant U.S. Attorney was provided reports of the torture. See id. Toscanino was then flown to the United States where he was arrested and convicted by a jury for conspiring to import drugs into the United States. See id. at 269. The question before the Second Circuit was whether the court could exercise its jurisdiction if the defendant proved that such outrageous acts had occurred. See id. at 271. Under the long-standing Ker-Frisbie doctrine, the manner in which an indicted individual comes before a court does not affect the court’s jurisdiction. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886). Thus, a federal court generally has jurisdiction over a foreign national whenever he has been brought before the court even if the appearance is involuntarily. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669-70, 112 S.Ct. 2188, 119 L.Ed.2d 441 (1992). After holding that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine could no longer stand as an absolute bar to judicial inquiry into how the defendant was brought before the court, the Second Circuit held: [W]e view due process as now requiring a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant where it had been acquired as the result of the government’s deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused’s constitutional rights. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the district court to determine if Toscanino’s allegation could be proved. A year after Toscanino, the Second Circuit emphasized that it “did not intend to suggest [in