Full opinion text
ORDER CARNES, District Judge. This case is presently before the Court on defendant’s Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [26] and plaintiffs Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [29]. The Court has reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties and, for the reasons set out below, concludes that defendant’s Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [26] should be SUSTAINED and plaintiffs Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [29] should be OVERRULED. The Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [25] as to all claims, except the retaliatory discipline claim. The Court OVERRULES the Report and Recommendation as to that claim and GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment on it, as well. BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges that her employer, Norfolk Southern Corporation (hereinafter “NS”), is liable to her under Title VII for (1) sexual harassment resulting in a hostile work environment, (2) discriminatory discharge, (8) discriminatory discipline, and (4) retaliation. After a thorough recitation of the facts, Magistrate Judge Hagy concluded that plaintiff had failed to state a claim under Title VII for a hostile work environment or for discrimination in the terms of her employment. (Mag. J.’s Rep. & Rec.[25].) As to the claim for retaliation, the magistrate judge concluded that plaintiff had failed to state a claim as to her discharge, but had sustained her burden in alleging retaliation in regard to the loss of her bonus and suspension in 1997. (Id. at 45-61.) Both parties have filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. Defendant NS argues that the magistrate judge erred in allowing to go forward the retaliation claim based on the loss of plaintiffs bonus and suspension. (Def.’s Objs. to Mag. J.’s Rep. & Rec. [26].) Plaintiff agues that the magistrate judge erred in dismissing her hostile work environment, sexual discrimination, and retaliatory discharge claims. (Pl.’s Objs. to Rep. & Rec. [29].) The Court addresses plaintiffs objections first, then defendant’s. DISCUSSION 1. Plaintiffs Objections Plaintiff brings several objections to the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation dismissing her sexual harassment and discrimination claims. (Pl.’s Objs. to Mag. J.’s Rep. & Rec. [29].) First, plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge erred in concluding that because much of Her-ren’s abuse of female coworkers was not in plaintiffs presence, the environment was not hostile. (Id. at 3.) Second, plaintiff claims that the magistrate judge should have considered the behavior he classified as “boorish,” predominantly the “silent treatment” behavior, in assessing the hostility of the environment. (Id. at 4.) Third, plaintiff claims that the magistrate judge was incorrect in concluding that the term “bitch” was not a gender specific term. (Id. at 5-6.) Next, plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that much of Herren’s behavior was attributable to a “personality conflict” between him and plaintiff rather than sexual discrimination. (Id. at 7.) Lastly, plaintiff claims that the magistrate judge- erred in dismissing her retaliatory discharge claim. (Id. at 17.) After a review of plaintiffs objections, this Court concludes that they are unfounded. The magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation addressed each of the issues contained in plaintiffs objections and rejected them. This Court agrees with the reasoning contained in the very thorough Report and Recommendation and concludes that the magistrate judge was correct to dismiss plaintiffs hostile work environment and discriminatory discharge claims. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES plaintiffs objections and AFFIRMS the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation as to these claims. II. Defendant’s Objections Having prevailed on its motion for summary judgment on all claims except one, defendant brings only one objection to the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation — that the magistrate judge erred in allowing plaintiffs retaliatory discipline claim to go forward. (Def.’s Objs. to Mag. J.’s Rep. & Rec. [26].) In particular, defendant objects to the following conclusions: (a) the Magistrate Judge’s determination that a jury issue exists as to whether NS’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for suspending Plaintiff and elim-mating her bonus is pretextual. (R & R, p. 60). (b) the Magistrate Judge’s determination that Plaintiffs November 5, 1997 email, combined with her subsequent meeting with Taylor, Holliday and Thomas, and her November 18, 1997 letter, constitutes protected opposition under Title VII (R & R, p. 48); (c) the Magistrate Judge’s determination that Plaintiff had a “good faith, reasonable belief’ that NS engaged in unlawful discrimination (R & R, pp. 48-51); and (d) the Magistrate Judge’s determination that a causal connection existed between any protected activity and Plaintiffs suspension and bonus elimination. (R & R, pp. 53-54). (Id. at 2.) III. Plaintiffs Retaliatory Discipline Claim A. Background Plaintiff was employed by NS from 1974 until her termination on June 26, 1998. It appears that plaintiff had no problems at work until 1991, when she was disciplined for making a large number of personal photocopies on a NS copy machine. Plaintiff admitted to making the copies, but maintained that they were authorized. As a result of this incident, her bonus for that year was eliminated and she was issued a warning that any further instances of failing to tell the truth could result in stronger sanctions, including dismissal. Around May 1995, plaintiffs title changed to systems coordinator in network support services. This position entailed shift work, either from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m., 3 p.m. till 11 p.m., or 7 a.m. till 3 p.m. Clyde “Buster” Herren was also a systems coordinator in network support services. Although Herren and plaintiff necessarily worked different shifts, they periodically encountered each other on shift changes when it was sometimes necessary to exchange information. Plaintiff states that, initially, she had no problems with Herren. Plaintiffs next disciplinary episode occurred in August 1997. Herren filed a complaint against plaintiff alleging that she had made false statements about him to a co-worker, Kim Lyons. Specifically, Herren alleged that plaintiff told Lyons that Herren had made a clandestine phone call to supervisor Taylor complaining that Lyons was late for work. Plaintiff maintains that she never made such a statement to Lyons, but Lyons confirmed Her-ren’s account. At a meeting held with plaintiff, Herren, Lyons, Taylor, and Don Holliday, NS’s director of computer operations, plaintiff was told that a record of the meeting and a copy of Herren’s complaint would be placed in her employment file, but that no further action would be taken provided there were no future incidents. It was after this incident that the relationship between plaintiff and Herren began to sour. Plaintiff claims that Herren began to give her the “silent treatment” during shift changes and refused to answer her questions. Plaintiff alleges that she also became aware, through conversations with co-workers, that Herren used abusive language in the workplace. Plaintiff, however, only heard one such conversation directly, and this involved Herren making fun of gays. (Hudson Dep. at 78.) Plaintiff states that she also witnessed an incident in which Herren refused to speak to co-worker Connie Walden, who was relieving him on a shift change, and an incident in which Herren and co-worker Gary Joiner got in an argument over smoking. Plaintiff first complained about Herren on November 5, 1997. The basis for plaintiffs complaint was that she- felt “threatened” by Herren. Management investigated the claim and concluded that the complaint was without merit.. On November 18, 1997, plaintiff again wrote management, complaining about the outcome of the investigation and making further allegations regarding Herren’s workplace behavior. Approximately a month later, management informed plaintiff.that it had conducted a follow-up investigation and had found that there was no evidence that Herren had created an unsafe or hostile work environment. The letter also stated that, nonetheless, they had found that Herren had used racial and other inappropriate language in the workplace and that he would be disciplined accordingly. The letter further stated that the investigation showed that plaintiff had not been completely forthright during the investigation. In response to this finding of untruthfulness, taken together with her past incidents of untruthfulness at work, NS suspended plaintiff for thirty days without pay and took away her annual bonus. The letter further noted that any future episodes of untruthfulness would result in termination. In response to this action, plaintiff filed an EEOC complaint, alleging discrimination based on sex. Several months later, plaintiff allegedly assaulted a black coworker, Denise Clark, who was annoying plaintiff by making noises while she, Clark, was eating an apple. Plaintiff jammed her fingers into Clark’s jaw, causing substantial pain, according to Clark. Although plaintiff insisted that she had administered only a light touch that was meant to be reassuring to Clark, Clark indicated that the “touch” was forceful enough to cause her pain and to trigger an immediate trip to a doctor, as well as' two subsequent medical visits and the usé of pain medication. (Mag. J’s Rep. & Rec. [25] at 9; Clark Dep. at 10-21; Ptf. Dep. at 136). In investigating this incident, NS found that plaintiff had engaged in inappropriate behavior toward another employee. Plaintiff was dismissed, as a resuit of the incident with Ms. Clark. Plaintiff then filed a second EEOC complaint, and later filed this lawsuit. As discussed above, the magistrate judge dismissed all of plaintiffs claims except for her claim of retaliatory discipline involving the December 1997 suspension and loss of bonus. That is the only claim discussed by the Court , herein. B. Prima Facie Retaliation Claim Under Title VII To make out a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, plaintiff must show that she “(1) engaged in protected opposition to Title VII discrimination or participated in a Title VII proceeding; (2) was disadvantaged by an action of the employer simultaneously with or subsequent to such opposition or participation; and (3) that there is a causal connection between the protected activity ahd the adverse employment action.” Morgan v. City of Jasper, 959 F.2d 1542, 1547 (11th Cir.1992) (quoting Whatley v. M.A.R.T.A., 632 F.2d 1325, 1328 (5th Cir.1980)). Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to present evidence that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff. If the defendant is able to put forth such a reason, the burden of going forward shifts again to the plaintiff, who must show that the reason put forth by defendant was a pretext for discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The Court, therefore, must first decide if plaintiff has established a prima facie case of retaliation. C. Legal Standard for Statutorily Protected Activity As an initial matter, the Court must decide if plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected activity. The Eleventh Circuit recognizes “two forms of statutorily protected conduct” under Title VII. See Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.1999). “An employee is protected from discrimination if (1) ‘he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchap-ter’ (the opposition clause) or (2) ‘he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter’ (the participation clause). 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-(3)a.” Id. 1. The Participation Clause Regarding the participation clause, the Clover court stated that “although sub-chapter VI of chapter 21 of title 42 does not define the term ‘investigation ... under this subchapter,’ it is clear that, at a minimum, the term encompasses EEOC investigations of alleged unlawful discrimination.” Id. at 1352-53. Noting that “Congress chose to protect employees who ‘participate[ ] in any manner’ in an EEOC investigation,” the Clover court concluded that the participation clause encompassed the situation where an employee “participat[ed] in her employer’s investigation in response to an EEOC notice of charge of discrimination.” Id. at 1353. Thé court declined to decide, however, whether “the participation clause extends to cover an employee’s participation in an investigation conducted by her employer before receiving a notice of charge of discrimination from the EEOC.” Because there is no evidence in this case that plaintiff participated in either an EEOC or internal investigation at the time she was disciplined in December 1997, the Court concludes that the participation clause is inapplicable. Plaintiff, therefore, must show that she engaged in protected conduct under the opposition clause. 2. The Opposition Clause As to the opposition clause, the Clover court reiterated that “an employee who seeks protection under the opposition clause must have a ‘good faith, reasonable belief that her employer has engaged in unlawful discrimination.” Id. at 1351. The court elaborated, stating that “[t]he objective reasonableness of an employee’s belief that her employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice must be measured against existing substantive law.” Id. And, although the conduct opposed need not “actually be [unlawful discrimination], ... it must be close enough to support an objectively reasonable belief that it is.” Id. See also Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir.1997) (In determining whether a plaintiff is engaged in statutorily protected activity, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to have “prove[d] the underlying conduct that [s]he opposed was actually unlawful in order to establish a prima facie case and overcome a motion for summary judgment.” The plaintiff must show, however, that she “subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed that [her] employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices, [and] also that [her] belief was objec tively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented.”) Therefore, it “is not enough for a plaintiff to allege that [her] behef in this regard was honest and bona fide; the allegations and record must also indicate that the behef, though perhaps mistaken, was objectively reasonable.” Id. D. Did Plaintiff Have an Objectively Reasonable Belief that She Was Opposing an Unlawful Employment Practice of NS? 1. Background In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that she opposed an unlawful employment practice in a series of communications over a period from November 5 to November 25, 1997. The first communication was an email sent by plaintiff to Holliday and Taylor in a November 5 e-mail. In totality, the e-mail states: On the occasions when I am alone on second shift and relieved by Buster Herren on third, may I please have a railroad pohce person or another IT employee present. Due to Buster’s exhibition of hostility toward me, including refusing to speak or face me when I am giving him a report for turnover, I have become increasingly concerned for my safety. While this behavior is most likely only juvenile and unprofessional manifestations, I must be concerned as this behavior could escalate given Buster’s reputed capacity for volatility and unpredictability. Serious consideration to my request would be appreciated. (See Hudson Dep. at Ex. 12.) Nowhere does plaintiffs e-mail mention that she felt that she was being harassed by Herren on the basis of her sex. In fact, in her deposition, plaintiff admitted that her e-mail did not contain these sorts of allegations because at the time, she “just wanted protection.” (Id. at 120.) When asked in her deposition why she felt Herren was potentially dangerous, plaintiff stated that it was mainly because he gave her the “silent treatment” on shift changes, had gotten into a heated argument with Joiner, and had made comments that he wanted plaintiff to be fired. (Hudson Dep. at 99.) Plaintiff admits, however, that the bad feelings between her and Herren could have been because of the earlier incident involving Kim Lyons. (Id. at 102.) After receiving the e-mail, Taylor, Holli-day, and Thomas requested a meeting with plaintiff to discuss her complaint. Plaintiff was unclear in her deposition about whether she made any specific allegations of harassment of minority groups in this meeting, but thought she probably had. (Id. at 120, 122.) She stated that she did teh the men that Herren would not speak to her and slammed things around, scaring her. (Id. at 107.) Plaintiff also states that she told them that co-workers Connie Walden, Kim Lyons, Gary Joiner, and Scott Pickard also felt threatened by Herren. (Id. at 108-09.) Plaintiff asserts that the relief she requested was to have another NS employee present at all times when she would otherwise be alone with Herren. (Id. at 110.) After the meeting, Taylor apparently wrote a “file” memo recounting what occurred at this meeting. (Hudson Dep. at Ex. 13.) In this memo, there is no mention of allegations of discriminatory harassment. (Id.) Rather, the memo states that plaintiff had told the group that she feared for her physical safety while alone with Herren because of “(his) reputed capacity for volatility and unpredictability.” (Id.) As plaintiff stated in her deposition, the memo states that plaintiff told the supervisors that Herren manifested hostility toward her by refusing to speak to her when she was giving a report at shift turnover and by slamming things around on the desk. (Id.) The memo also reflects that plaintiff named.Lyons, Joiner, and Walden as employees who would also state that they felt threatened by Herren. (Id.) The memo, however, states that when asked by the group what action could solve her problem, plaintiff, supposedly said that she wanted Herren to speak to her and say “good morning” when he saw her. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that the reason this memo contained no references to Herren’s “minority tirades” was that she had felt that Herren’s statements had all been hearsay at that point, and she had told them the names of other employees who could actually confirm what Herren had said. (Id. at 121.) ■ After receiving a follow-up e-mail from Thomas regarding the November 6 meeting, plaintiff wrote Thomas a letter on November 18, 1997. (Hudson Dep. at Ex. 16.) In this letter, plaintiff expressed concern that her co-workers thought that her recent absence from work was due to “the office scuttlebutt” regarding her complaint about Herren, rather than,her unrelated health issue. The remainder of plaintiff’s letter reads as follows: Unfortunately, but with . respect, I cannot accept your assessment and resolution of my complaint, as outlined in your letter. Not only do I feel I have been treated with the utmost lack of dignity and professionalism by you and Messrs. Taylor and Holliday- concerning this matter, I feel my concerns were unwelcome and ridiculed by all of you in our meeting as exhibited by your almost sneering attitudes. Not only were you not receptive and obviously biased, you were actively hostile to my concerns, and therefore I do not feel your “investigation” results have much validity. As stated, I will be returning to work, unless I hear otherwise. However, after receiving your letter, I feel even more strongly that I am returning to a hostile and offensive work environment and I do resent it. I feel you should be aware of my feelings, and that if I continue to have these feelings and encounter any further unprofessional behavior exhibited toward me upon my return, I will most certainly pursue this with a higher authority, and hopefully one that is less biased. Also for the record, upon my return to work, I certainly intend to perform my duties at Norfolk Southern with the same high degree of professionalism, expertise, and integrity as have I always in the past. (Id.) The last communication leading up to plaintiffs December 16 discipline is a letter she wrote to Taylor on November 25, stating that Herren had a reputation for being irrational, unprofessional, belligerent and making tirades against minorities. (Id. at 126.) The letter reads: I am deeply offended as a result of my finding it necessary to write you again concerning the “Mr. C.W. Herren, Jr.” incident. Upon my returning to work today, I was approached by one of my co-workers who was under the apparent widespread assumption that my absence was related to their being questioned by Alan Taylor concerning Mr. Herren’s past behavior. This co-worker, without any prompting or solicitation from me, confided her conversation with Mr. Taylor and the fact that he even called her back at home to reconfirm with her that her description of Buster’s behavior as “very intimidating” was accurate. She gave the same account to Alan that I have heard from her before and others concerning Mr. Herren’s behavior, which can only be described at best as inappropriate and at worst as threatening, repeated behavior patterns.As I have known these people for quite some time and have always found them to be honest, unbiased, and decent people, I have great confidence that they will be willing to sign notarized statements testifying to Buster’s reputation for irrational, unprofessional, belligerent tirades against minority groups, and his inappropriate behavior toward them resulting in a stressed and hostile working environment when he was present. Jesse, this leaves me with the conclusion that only two possible scenarios could have existed at the time of your letter to me on November 12 — either Alan had lied to you and your letter was in good faith, or both of you decided to ignore, misconstrue, or lie about the interviewees’ declarations. However, either scenario leaves me with a personal dilemma. Even though I feel I have no professional future with Network Support Services at Norfolk Southern, I do feel a moral and personal obligation to pursue this matter as a result of my friendship with and respect for these co-workers. Would it be at all productive to discuss this with you again, even though I will not tolerate the hostile and harassing atmosphere to which I was exposed in the last meeting, before I proceed to a higher authority? I am willing to extend this courtesy to you, even though no such courtesies have ever been extended to me. (Id. at Ex. 17.) In her deposition, plaintiff stated that she wrote this letter because “[n]umber 1, they had not done anything to rectify the situation with Herren, but it was mainly because of all the gossip that I was hearing.” (Id. at 118.) In response to plaintiffs November 25 letter, NS initiated another investigation of Herren’s behavior. (Id.) NS wrote plaintiff on December 16, 1997, informing her that while the investigation did not reveal that Herren created an unsafe or hostile work environment, the investigation did show that he had used racial and other inappropriate language. (Id. at 129.) This letter also stated that NS had found that plaintiff had not been completely forthright in the investigation and therefore was to lose her 1997 bonus and be suspended without pay for 30 days. (Id. at 131.) 2. Discussion Taking all of these allegations in the light' most favorable to plaintiff, the issue before the Court is whether plaintiff held an objectively reasonable belief that she was objecting to an unlawful employment practice, which necessarily means that plaintiff had to have held an objectively reasonable belief that Herren’s behavior amounted to illegal sexual harassment. In making this determination, the Court considers the alleged harassment by Her-ren that plaintiff claimed to have been aware of at the time she complained to management. The allegations made by plaintiff fall into four categories: (1) racial comments, (2) comments about homosexuality, (3) comments and behavior based on gender, and (4) other comments. As to race, plaintiff claims that Pickard told her at some point that he had heard Herren engage in “a tirade against minorities.” (Hudson Dep. at 84-85.) Plaintiff, was uncertain, however, of when the comment was made and to whom it was made. While Johnson testified that she had heard Herren use the term “nigger,” plaintiff did not state when she became aware of Her-ren’s use of this slur. As to anti-gay comments, plaintiff claims that she personally overheard Herren make a derisive comment about homosexuals and tell some co-workers that he had once beat up a gay man. (Id. at 78-79.) Plaintiff also stated that Joiner, whom Herren believed to be gay, told her that he had made several complaints about Herren to Taylor and Holliday. (Id. at 101.) There was also an incident of which plaintiff was aware in which Joiner and Herren had an argument and Herren “almost assaulted” Joiner. (Id. at 99.) As to comments and behavior based on gender, plaintiff claims that following the Kim Lyons incident, Herren often gave her the silent treatment during shift changes and would slam things on his desk in her presence. (Hudson Dep. at 107.) Plaintiff further claims that she once witnessed Herren giving co-worker Connie Walden the silent treatment, which caused Walden to become upset. (Id. at 80.) Plaintiff further testified in her deposition that she heard second-hand that Herren also gave other women the silent treatment and upset them. (Id. at 76.) In addition, Herren accused Walden of lying about buying a new car. (Id. at 185.) Plaintiff states that Walden had also told her that she found Herren threatening. (Id. at 109.) Plaintiff stated that she had also had learned second-hand that Lyons found Herren to be intimidating. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that Johnson told plaintiff that she had overheard Herren talking to Taylor about getting plaintiff fired. (Id. at 84, 179.) Plaintiff further stated that either Johnson or Pickard told her that Herren had stated, some time prior to August 1997, that he hated all women and plaintiff was at the top of his list. (Id. at 85.) In addition, it also appears that Johnson told plaintiff at some point prior to November 1997 that Herren had made negative comments about overweight women. (Id. at 128.) Plaintiff also mentions several miscellaneous comments and acts as supporting her discrimination claims. For example, plaintiff states that Herren talked about guns and his Marine Corps background on a regular basis. In addition, plaintiff states that Herren would practice martial arts in the office. Plaintiff apparently claims to have found this behavior frightening. “To recover for retaliation, the plaintiff ‘need not prove the underlying claim of discrimination which led to [his] protest;’ however, the plaintiff must have a reasonable good faith belief that the discrimination existed.” Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1566 (11th Cir.1997) (quoting Tipton v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 872 F.2d 1491, 1494 (11th Cir. 1989)). See also Rollins v. Florida Dep’t of Law Enforcement, 868 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir.1989) (“[T]he statute shields an employee from retaliation regardless of the merits of her complaints so long as she can show a god faith reasonable belief that the challenged practices violated Title VIL”) There are close cases where the underlying claim of discrimination fails but the retaliation claim survives. See, e.g., Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759 (2d Cir.1998). This, however/ is not one of those cases. As discussed above, when an employee seeks protection under the opposition clause, he must put forth evidence that he had a “good faith, reasonable belief’ that his employer was engaged in unlawful discrimination. Clover, 176 F.3d at 1351. This “reasonableness” has an objective component, which is measured against existing substantive law. See id.; Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 n. 2 (11th Cir.1998) (“The plaintiffs also argue that when judging the reasonableness of their belief, we should not charge them with substantive knowledge of the law .... We reject plaintiffs’ argument because it would eviscerate the objective component of our reasonableness inquiry. If plaintiffs are free to disclaim knowledge of the substantive law, the reasonableness inquiry becomes no more than speculation regarding their subjective knowledge.”). As discussed in greater detail below, the Court concludes that plaintiffs belief was not objectively reasonable. This Court agrees with the magistrate judge that a significant difference between the objective reasonableness standard for a retaliation claim and that for the underlying discrimination claim lies in the time at which the reasonableness of plaintiffs belief is assessed. In reviewing a retaliation claim, the Court must consider the evidence available to plaintiff at the time she expressed her opposition and not consider new facts developed in discovery. The magistrate judge found this distinction to be determinative in the present case, holding that at the time plaintiff complained, Herren’s conduct appeared more egregious than it played out to be in discovery. While this may be so, this Court nevertheless concludes that the evidence known by plaintiff at the time she complained to NS was insufficient to support a reasonable belief in a hostile work environment. As to the racial comments allegedly made by Herren, the Court notes that plaintiffs discrimination claim was based solely on gender, not race. While the Court recognizes the holding of Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir.2000), that remarks' targeting other minorities may contribute to the overall hostility of a working environment, this Court does not agree that evidence of race discrimination can be used to support a claim of sex discrimination. In Cruz, where a Hispanic, female plaintiff alleged race discrimination, one of the issues was whether it was appropriate for the court to consider racially derogatory comments made about black employees as well. The Second Circuit concluded that such comments were relevant to plaintiffs claim of a racially hostile work environment! Nothing in Cruz, however, indicates that evidence of derogatory comments based on race could be used to support a claim of sex discrimination. Accordingly, for racial comments to be pertinent, the Court concludes that plaintiff must be alleging that she was opposing not only a hostile work environment based on sex, but also a hostile work environment based on race. The problem with such a claim is that nowhere does plaintiff allege that the racially derogatory comments were made in front of minority employees, nor does she allege that the employees who heard the comments felt that Herren was making their working environment intolerable. As mentioned above, plaintiff herself never heard Herren make these comments. Although plaintiff would have the Court believe that Herren made regular tirades against minorities, in her deposition, she mentions only one tirade of which she was told by Pickard. Although Johnson testified in her deposition that she heard Her-ren make a few racist remarks, plaintiff has not stated whether she was aware of these remarks at the time she complained in November 1997.' Even if plaintiff were aware of the remarks overheard by Johnson, these allegations do not result in more than isolated incidents, which come nowhere close to being actionable. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.1982) (“the mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee ‘does not rise to a Title VII violation.’ For harassment to state a claim under Title VII, it must be sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.”) See also Edwards, 49 F.3d at 1521 (“[T]he racial slurs allegedly spoken by co-workers had to be so ‘commonplace, overt and denigrating that they created an atmosphere charged with racial hostility.’ ”) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Beverage Canners, Inc., 897 F.2d 1067, 1068 (11th Cir.1990)); Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir.1982). In Edwards, the court stated that “[i]n deciding whether a hostile work environment was created factors to consider include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, whether the conduct is threatening or humiliating, and whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the plaintiffs performance at work.” 49 F.3d at 1521-22. Plaintiff simply has not presented evidence that the racially derogatory comments allegedly made by Herren were sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. In fact, as she and Herren did not even work together and only occasionally passed each other on shift changes, she has not demonstrated how Herren’s behavior even affected her work environment. The mere complaint by a white woman that she “heard through the grapevine” that a co-worker was making negative remarks against blacks does not .constitute opposition to an unlawful employment practice. Accordingly, the Court concludes that plaintiffs belief that she was complaining of race discrimination was not held in objective good faith and could not form the basis of her retaliation claim. Regarding the “gay comments,” as discussed in the Report and Recommendation, sexual orientation is not a classification protected under Title VII. See Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 705 (7th Cir.2000). Accordingly, although plaintiff may have found Her-ren’s behavior offensive, because it is not illegal under Title VII to discriminate against homosexuals, these comments cannot provide the basis of a discrimination claim. In addition, because it is clear under the law that Herren’s alleged behavior, if true, was hot illegal, these allegations provide no support for plaintiffs claim that she had a good faith belief that she was opposing an unlawful employment practice. As to Herren’s interest in guns and martial arts, and other comments not based on a protected class of persons, there can be no claim. As discussed in the Report and Recommendation, these and other “boorish” comments allegedly made by Herren have no place under Title VII law, as Title VII specifically prohibits only that discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Although behavior need not be sexual in nature to support a claim of hostile work environment based on gender, the behavior must be based on gender, Curde v. Xytel Corp., 912 F.Supp. 335, 341 (N.D.Ill.1995), and there is no evidence that this conduct was. Title VII is not meant to be a “ ‘general civility code’ ” and cannot give life to these statements that are unrelated to a protected class. Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 571 (11th Cir.2000). Accordingly, if plaintiff held a good faith belief that Herren was engaged in unlawful discrimination, it could only have been on the basis of his comments and actions toward women. Although the magistrate judge found that the evidence was insufficient to support a claim for sex discrimination, he concluded that it was objectively reasonable for plaintiff to have believed in November 1997 that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her gender. (Mag. J.’s Rep. & Rec. [25] at 49.) The magistrate judge based this finding on the fact that plaintiff believed that Herren-had stated that he hated all women and plaintiff was at the top of his list and that Herren gave plaintiff and other female employees the silent ■ treatment. This Court concludes, however, that these allegations are simply insufficient to support an objectively reasonable belief in discrimination. First, the Court concludes that these incidents were neither severe or pervasive enough for plaintiff to have reasonably felt that Herren had created a hostile work environment based on gender. The Court adopts the magistrate judge’s conclusion that neither Herren’s disbelief that Walden had purchased a Corvette, Herren’s wish that plaintiff would be fired, nor Her-ren’s comments about overweight women constituted harassment. (Mag. J.’s Rep. & Rec. [26] at 24.) Further, the Court concludes that Herren’s alleged “silent treatment” toward plaintiff and other female co-workers did not constitute sexual harassment in violation of Title VII. In short, examining Herren’s conduct for its frequency and severity, as well as whether it was physically threatening or unreasonably interfered with plaintiffs or another employee’s job performance, the Court concludes that Herren’s behavior did not even approach actionable sexual harassment. See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir.1999) (citing with approval cases in which courts concluded that conduct fell short of sexual harassment). Second, plaintiff has come woefully short of demonstrating a reasonable belief that she, herself, encountered a hostile work environment as a result of Herren’s conduct. Indeed, most of plaintiffs knowledge about Herren’s conduct was gained second-hand by plaintiff through the office grapevine. In fact, it appears that plaintiff actually had very little interaction with Herren. In her deposition, she stated that she “avoided him as much as possible” and that they rarely worked the same shift. (Id. at 81.) It seems that she only saw Herren for a brief period of time during shift changes. While Herren’s silence during these shift changes may have been uncomfortable, any belief by plaintiff that a few moments of awkward silence with a co-worker constituted a hostile work environment was not an objectively reasonable belief. ■ Finally, even if plaintiff could reasonably belief that Herren’s behavior was severe enough to create a hostile work environment for plaintiff or others, she could not have held a reasonable belief that Herren’s conduct was based on gender, which is a prerequisite for a claim of sexual harassment. Indeed, harassment is not a freestanding tort;' instead, it becomes actionable only if the harassment is motivated by the gender of the victim. As to other employees, the record shows that Herren was disagreeable to both men and women. As to plaintiff, alone, the Court agrees with the magistrate judge that Herren’s alleged comment that he hated plaintiff was not based on her sex. (Id.) (Mag. J.’s Rep. & Rec. [26] at 24.) As noted in the earlier recitation of facts, the discord between plaintiff and Herren began, not as a gender feud, but originated as a result of plaintiffs false accusation of Herren regarding Kim Lyons. Supra at 1306. Her-ren thereafter viewed plaintiff with distrust. The evidence, however, shows only that there was personal animosity between plaintiff and Herren, not that Herren was pursuing a vendetta against plaintiff because of her sex. Indeed, Herren could just as well have complained that plaintiff had created a hostile environment for him, by virtue of her constant gathering of intelligence against him in an effort to get him fired and talking about him behind his back with co-workers. Yet, such a claim by Herren would fail for the same reason that plaintiffs claim must fall: plaintiffs hostility toward Herren was based on her dislike of him, not his gender. Similarly, were plaintiffs claim viable, Denise Clark would arguably have both a racial and sexual harassment claim, as Clark is both black and female, and as plaintiff allegedly assaulted Clark while she was chewing an apple in a noisy manner. Plaintiffs answer to such a charge would likely be that any animus she bore to Clark was personal, not racial or sexual: a response that Herren could likewise make on this record. Having decided that plaintiffs belief that Herren sexually harassed her by creating a hostile work environment was an objectively unreasonable belief, the Court concludes that plaintiffs November 18 letter could not constitute an objection to an illegal employment practice. Reiterating that a plaintiff need not be able to prove the underlying discrimination claim in order to state a claim for retaliation, the Court concludes that in the present case, the behavior about which plaintiff complained came nowhere near actionable sexual harassment and plaintiffs belief that it was sexual harassment was simply not reasonable. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to state a retaliation claim based on the November 18 letter. Having failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, there is no need to examine whether defendant’s proffered explanation for disciplining plaintiff was legitimate. Plaintiffs retaliatory discipline claim therefore fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS defendant’s objections, OVERRULES that part of the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation addressing this claim, and GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the retaliatory discipline claim. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court overrules plaintiffs objections [29] and sustains defendant’s objections [26] to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [25], The Court otherwise ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [25] as to all claims except the retaliatory discipline claim. As this Order grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety, the Clerk is directed to close this action. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION IN AN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACTION HAGY, United States Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff filed the above-styled civil action on September 7, 1999. She claims that Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of sex, subjected her to sexual harassment, and retaliated against her, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. The action is presently before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [15]. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant Norfolk Southern Corporation on Counts One and Two of Plaintiffs complaint, and in favor of Defendant Norfolk Southern Railway Co. on all counts of Plaintiffs complaint. I. BACKGROUND FACTS Until her termination on June 26, 1998, Plaintiff had been employed by Norfolk Southern Corporation (hereinafter, “NS”) at least since 1974. She began her employment as a system coordinator in the information services group. Ptf. SMF at 1. In or about 1979, she was promoted to the position of supervisor in computer network operations in the information technology department of NS. In 1991, Plaintiff was accused by her then-supervisor, R.F. Tritt, of making a large number of personal copies on an NS copy machine and of lying about having had approval to do so. Although Plaintiff admitted to making between one hundred and one thousand personal copies, she continues to insist that her use of the copier was authorized. Ptf. SMF at 3. As a result of this incident, Plaintiffs annual bonus for that year was eliminated and she was issued a letter warning her that further unauthorized use of NS equipment and supplies, or further instances of failure to tell the truth, could result in stronger sanctions including dismissal. In or about May 1995, Plaintiffs title changed to systems coordinator in network support services. In that capacity, she frequently worked alone on the third shift, which covered the period from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m., but she also at times worked on both the second shift, which lasted from 3 p.m. until 11 p.m., and the first shift, which lasted from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. Ptf. Dep. at 40, 57. Plaintiff, who is diabetic, preferred working the third shift, but had been advised by a doctor to avoid that shift because of her health. When Plaintiff was not working the third shift, it was instead staffed by Clyde “Buster” Herren, who held the same rank as Plaintiff. Although they did not regularly work together on the same shift, Plaintiff periodically encountered and was required to exchange information with Herren during shift changes. In August 1997, Herren filed a complaint with NS’s manager of network support services, Alan Taylor, alleging that Hudson had made false statements about Herren to a co-worker, Kim Lyons. Taylor was the immediate supervisor for both Hudson and Herren. The complaint alleged that Hudson had falsely told Lyons that Herren made a clandestine phone call to Taylor complaining that Lyons (who had permission to be absent) was late for work. Lyons gave a written statement confirming Herren’s account. Plaintiff insisted at that time, and maintains today, that she did not make any such statement to Lyons. A meeting to discuss the matter was convened, involving Plaintiff, Lyons, Taylor and Don Holliday, NS director of computer operations. Plaintiff was told that a record of the meeting and a copy of the Herren complaint would be placed in her personnel file, but that no further action would be taken provided that there were no future incidents. Following this incident, relations between Hudson and Her-ren soured. Herren began giving Hudson the “silent treatment” during shift changes, refusing to acknowledge her questions or volunteer information to her. Ptf. Dep. at 88,107-08. Hudson became aware through conversation with co-workers of a number of instances in which Herren used abusive language at work. Although Hudson had heard from other NS employees of Her-ren making such statements on several occasions, the only instance she observed first-hand was a conversation between Herren and a co-worker, Dee Tomlin, during which Herren made several anti-gay remarks and mockingly imitated a gay coworker. Ptf. Dep. at 78. Plaintiff also witnessed another incident in which Her-ren refused to speak to or answer questions from another co-worker, Connie Walden, when Walden was relieving him during a shift change, which caused Walden to become upset. Ptf. SMF at 10, Walden Dep. at 8-10. Plaintiff also learned from co-workers of an incident during the summer of 1997 in which Her-ren and another NS employee, Gary Joiner, had a heated confrontation over Her-ren’s habit of smoking in the office with the windows open. Ptf. SMF at 19-21. On November 5, 1997, Plaintiff sent an e-mail to Taylor and Holliday in which she requested a railroad police escort during shift changes when she was alone and Her-ren was relieving her. In the e-mail, Plaintiff stated that she had “become increasingly concerned for [her] safety” because of Herren’s “hostility.” Further, she stated that she was concerned that Herren’s behavior could escalate into violence “given [Herren’s] reputed capacity for volatility and unpredictability.” The e-mail message resulted in a meeting on November 6, 1997, involving Plaintiff, Taylor, Holliday, and Jesse Thomas, an NS assistant vice president. At the meeting, Plaintiff told these supervisors that other employees in the department— Kim Lyons, Gary Joiner and Connie Walden — also felt threatened by Herren and would confirm her account. As a result of the meeting, Thomas ordered an investigation into Plaintiffs allegations. Taylor conducted the investigation. Thomas wrote to Plaintiff on November 12, 1997, reporting that management’s investigation found “no merit to [her] allegations of inappropriate behavior.” The letter advised Plaintiff that her e-mail account of her dealings with Herren was inaccurate, and that there were “material discrepancies and contradictions” between the e-mail, her personal account at the November 6 meeting, and the statements of other employee witnesses. The letter went on to warn that “an employee who makes unsupported charges could be subject to disciplinary action.” Plaintiff wrote to Thomas on November 18, 1997, rejecting the conclusions of the investigation as invalid, and stating that she considered her work environment to be “hostile and offensive(.)” Plaintiff followed this letter with another letter to Thomas on November 25, 1997. Plaintiff related that several co-workers had told her about their interviews with Taylor, and that their accounts of Herren’s conduct corroborated Plaintiffs version. She stated that she believed these co-workers would sign sworn statements attesting to Herren’s “reputation for irrational, unprofessional, belligerent tirades against minority groups, and his inappropriate behavior toward them resulting in a stressed and hostile working environment(.)” Plaintiff indicated that she intended to pursue her complaint with a higher authority at NS. Responding to this letter, NS management decided to conduct a further investigation, in which Taylor was not involved, headed by Shari Cohen, a personnel officer in the Virginia Beach home office of NS. Cohen’s interviews with NS employees confirmed that Herren used racial and anti-gay slurs, that several employees felt discomfort in working around Herren, and that Herren made hostile remarks about Hudson. In his interview, Herren acknowledged having used the slurs “nigger” and “fucking faggot” in conversations at work. Thomas notified Plaintiff by letter dated December 16, 1997, that NS management had concluded its follow-up investigation. The letter stated that “(although there was no evidence indicating Mr. Herren had created an unsafe or hostile work environment, the investigation did reveal that Mr. Herren had used racial and other inappropriate language in the workplace(.)” The letter promised that “appropriate action” would be taken. Thomas further advised Plaintiff, however, that she was being suspended for thirty days without pay, effective immediately, and that her annual bonus for 1997 would be eliminated because “the investigation also revealed that you were not completely forthright during the course of the investigation.” The letter cited three specific instances of false statements Plaintiff was alleged to have made to investigators: that a co-worker, Bill Hutto, offered to accompany Plaintiff to the office when she relieved Herren; that Walden thanked Plaintiff for bringing Her-ren’s conduct to the attention of management; and that Lyons felt uncomfortable around Herren. In addition to these alleged false statements, the letter referred to the 1991 copier episode and the August 1997 Herren complaint as prior “disciplinary notations” about dishonesty. The letter concluded that any further episode of untruthfulness would result in dismissal. Plaintiff responded to the suspension and loss of her bonus by filing a charge of. discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on January 7, 1998. The complaint alleged that Defendant discriminated against her by disciplining her because of her sex, and retaliated against her for complaining about discrimination. See Def. Ex. 22 (attached to Deposition of Plaintiff). For his admitted use of profanity and for making disparaging remarks about coworkers, Herren underwent a “counseling session” with Thomas on January 5, 1998, and was docked fifty percent of his annual bonus for 1997. Ptf. Ex. 8 (attached to Thomas Dep.). Further, he was warned that future episodes of improper behavior could result in stronger sanctions, including dismissal. The lost bonus amounted to about $1,000. Herren Dep. at 74. Following this disciplinary action, Herren moderated his behavior in the office. ' See Ptf. Dep. at 130-31; Joiner Dep. at 37; Walden Dep. at 47. On or about June 24, 1998, Plaintiff became involved in a disagreement in the office with a co-worker, Denise Clark, over Plaintiffs displeasure with noises Clark was making while eating an apple. During this conversation, Plaintiff touched Clark on the face. Although Plaintiff maintains that the contact was merely a light touch meant to be reassuring, Ptf. SMF at 27, Clark sent an e-mail complaint to her supervisor, Sherry Partain, alleging that Plaintiff had “jammed” her fingers into Clark’s upper jaw, causing substantial pain. Partain reported this complaint to Thomas, who called Plaintiff and Clark to his office seeking an explanation. Plaintiff acknowledged during this meeting that she touched Clark, but denied that the contact could have been forceful enough to cause injury. Nevertheless, Clark made two trips to the doctor to receive pain medicine. She sent a memo to Thomas on June 26,1998, complaining that she continued to experience pain. Plaintiff was dismissed on June 26, 1998. In the dismissal letter, Thomas informed Plaintiff that she was being terminated for “conduct unbecoming an employee of Norfolk Southern Corporation” because she engaged in “unacceptable activities” toward a fellow' employee, a reference to the touching incident with Clark. See Def. Ex. 21 (attached to Deposition of Plaintiff). Defendants were aware of Plaintiffs January 7, 1998, EEOC charge when they made the decision to terminate her. Cohen Dep. at 76. Plaintiff filed an additional ehargé with the EEOC on October 2, 1998, alleging Defendant unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of sex and in retaliation for complaining about discrimination by dismissing her. See Def. Ex. 23 (attached to Deposition of Plaintiff). She alleges that she received a right to sue notice from the EEOC on June 9, 1999, and timely filed this action within ninety (90) days thereafter. See Def. Ex. 27 (attached to.Deposition 0f Plaintiff). Because many of the Court’s findings of fact are intertwined with its analysis of whether the parties have met their respective evidentiary burdens, the remaining relevant facts are set forth in the Discussion below. II. DISCUSSION 1. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Summary judgment is authorized when all “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as' a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 175, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Bingham, Ltd. v. United States, 724 F.2d 921, 924 (11th Cir.1984). The movant carries this burden by showing the court that there is “an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In making its determination, the court must view the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Once the moving party has adequately supported its motion, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts that demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The nonmoving party is required “to go beyond the pleadings” and to present competent evidence designating “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Generally, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” supporting the nonmoving party’s case is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When considering motions for summary judgment, the court does not make decisions as to the merits of disputed factual issues. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Ryder Int’l Corp. v. First American Nat’l Bank, 943 F.2d 1521, 1523 (11th Cir.1991). Rather, the court only determines whether there are genuine issues of material fact to be tried. Applicable substantive law identifies those facts that are material and those that are irrelevant. Anderson, 477 U.S, at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Disputed facts that do not resolve or affect the outcome of a suit will not properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Id. If a fact is found to be material, the court must also consider the genuineness of the alleged factual dispute. Id. An issue is not genuine if it is unsupported by evidence, or if it is created by evidence that is “merely colorable” or is “not significantly probative.” Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Moreover, for factual issues to be genuine, they must have a real basis in the record. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. The nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Id. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ’ ’ Id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)). Thus, the standard for summary judgment mirrors that for a directed verdict: “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 259, 106 S.Ct. 2505. 2. STANDARDS OF PROOF IN TITLE VII CLAIMS Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). To prevail on a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent. Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 980-981 (11th Cir.1989); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir.1983). Such discriminatory intent may be established either by direct evidence of discriminatory intent or by circumstantial evidence meeting the four-pronged test set out for Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 86 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); see also Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1561-62 (11th Cir.1997); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Comm., 738 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir.1984). Direct evidence is defined as “evidence, which if believed, proves existence of fact in issue without inference or presumption.” Black’s Law Dictionary 413 (6th ed.1990); see also Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1226 (11th Cir.1993); Carter v. City of Miami 870 F.2d 578, 581-82 (11th Cir.1989); Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 n. 6 (11th Cir.1987). Evidence that merely “suggests discrimination, leaving the trier of fact to infer discrimination based on the evidence” is, by definition, circumstantial. Earley v. Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081-82 (11th Cir.1990). Because direct evidence of discrimination is seldom available, a plaintiff must typically rely on circumstantial evidence to prove discriminatory intent, using the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Bur-dine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1561-62 (11th Cir.1997); Combs v. Plantation. Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1527-1528 (11th Cir.1997). Under this framework, a plaintiff is first required to create an inference of discriminatory intent, and thus carries the initial burden of establishing a prima fac