Full opinion text
AMENDED MEMORANDUM of OPINION AND ORDER LEVI, District Judge. Plaintiffs challenge the validity of compacts entered into under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq., between the State of California and certain Indian tribes. The compacts permit the tribes to offer Las Vegas style high stakes gaming, including slot machines. The compacts were specifically authorized by a California constitutional amendment, Proposition 1A, which gives the Governor the authority “to negotiate and conclude compacts ... for the operation of slot machines and for the conduct of lottery games and banking card games by federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands in California.” Cal. Const. Art. IV, sec. 19(e). The plaintiffs are California card clubs and charities who are prohibited under state law from offering similar sorts of gambling, and thus have been placed at a competitive disadvantage. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants, various state and federal officers, including the Governor and the Secretary of the Interior, violated IGRA and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by creating a tribal monopoly on Las Vegas style gaming. Plaintiffs seek both declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate the existing compacts and to block the execution of any future compacts. The state and federal defendants contend that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ claims and that neither Proposition 1A nor the compacts violate federal law. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court finds that it has jurisdiction over most of the plaintiffs’ claims and further finds that neither the compacts nor Proposition 1A violate federal law. Because of the opinion’s length and the wide range of issues addressed, the court provides the following summary. On the standing issues, the court has jurisdiction to resolve the claims against the federal defendants, the claims against the Governor related to existing’ compacts, and the claims against the State Attorney General and the Director of the California Division of Gambling Control as to the enforcement of state gaming laws against plaintiffs. The court concludes that as to count II, brought against the state defendants as to existing and future compacts, plaintiffs have demonstrated an injury in fact with respect to the Governor and the existing compacts. However, they fail to demonstrate an immediate and imminent threat of harm from possible future compacts, and thus, are not entitled to seek equitable relief as to any future compacts, including potential compacts involving the Lytton Ranchería under count III. Also as to count II, the plaintiffs have established that the Governor’s conduct caused their alleged injuries and that a favorable ruling would redress their alleged harms. Further, they have established causation and redressability as to the Attorney General and the Director, but not the Commission, under count IV which seeks to enjoin enforcement of California Penal Code provisions prohibiting plaintiffs and others from engaging in Las Vegas style gambling. The court further concludes that it has jurisdiction over the Governor, Attorney General,’ and the Director under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). As to count I, which is brought against the federal defendants, the court concludes that plaintiffs may bring a claim to enforce IGRA and the Johnson Act under § 701(a)(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. Further, because matters related to the approval of tribal gaming compacts are not committed by law to agency discretion, plaintiffs’ claims are not precluded by § 701(a)(2) of the APA. The court also concludes that the plaintiffs fall within the zone of interests arguably sought to be protected by IGRA and the Johnson Act. Finally, because the legal interests of California’s Indian tribes are adequately represented by the Secretary of the Interior, the tribes are not necessary and indispensable parties under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19. With respect to the merits of the case, the court holds that the class III gaming compacts are valid under IGRA and the Constitution. Because California law through Proposition 1A permits class III gaming for Indian tribes with compacts, it satisfies IGRA’s requirement that the state “permit” class III gaming “for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity.” 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B). The court finds that this statutory language cannot reasonably be understood to condition class III Indian gaming on the state’s permission of class III gaming to all persons for any purpose. If this were the proper interpretation, IGRA would be a virtual nullity because no state would ever grant class III gaming privileges to all comers for any purpose. Rather, the language is best understood to open the way to class III Indian gaming if the state grants permission to any one group or person, including Indian tribes. For these reasons, the court concludes that the defendants are in compliance with IGRA and the Johnson Act. The court further finds that the tribal class III gaming monopoly does not discriminate on the basis of race. Under well established Supreme Court precedent, “[fjederal regulation of Indian tribes ... is governance of once-sovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’ .... ” United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n. 24, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974)). So long as the compacts are rationally related to Congress’ trust obligation to the tribes, the compacts will not be set aside on constitutional grounds. Because the compacts, including the monopoly on class III gaming, promote tribal economic development, they are rationally related to Congress’ trust obligations and do not violate equal protection. This ease presents significant, complex legal issues against a background of even more important and complex policy questions. Those policy questions must be resolved by the political branches and the electorate. The court decides only that the state and federal defendants did not violate federal law by entering into the compacts at issue. I. Facts and Procedural History A. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act was enacted by Congress in 1988 shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987). In Cabazon the Court invalidated California’s regulation of Indian bingo on the ground that such regulation was civil rather than criminal in nature and therefore was not authorized by Public Law 280. As a practical result of Cabazon, Indian tribes were free to offer gaming on tribal lands subject only to federal regulation or to state criminal prohibitions. Although Congress had been considering bills to regulate Indian gaming for several years, Cabazon left something of a regulatory vacuum that made the issue of Indian gaming regulation more pressing. IGRA was Congress’ compromise solution to the difficult questions involving Indian gaming. The Act was passed in order to provide “a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments” and “to shield [tribal gaming] from organized crime and other corrupting influences to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation.” 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1), (2). IGRA is an example of “cooperative federalism” in that it seeks to balance the competing sovereign interests of the federal government, state governments, and Indian tribes, by giving each a role in the regulatory scheme. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-68, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (collecting examples of cooperative federalism). IGRA functions by dividing gaming into three categories and intensifying the level of regulatory oversight depending on the category of gaming. “Class I gaming” includes social games with prizes of minimal value, as well as traditional forms of Indian gaming, and is subject to exclusive regulation by Indian tribes. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(6), 2710(d). “Class II gaming” includes bingo and card games explicitly authorized by the State, or not explicitly prohibited by the State if such games are actually played in the State, but does not include any banking card games or slot machines. Id. § 2703(7)(A). Class II gaming is subject to joint regulation by the federal government and tribal authorities. Id. § 2710(d). Class III gaming is defined as all forms of gaming that “are not class I gaming or class II gaming.” Id. § 2703(8). Class III gaming includes parimutuel horse race wagering, lotteries, banking card games, slot machines, and all games with non-Indian origins. Class III gaming is only lawful on Indian lands if three conditions are met: (1) approval by the governing body of the Tribe and the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”); (2) permission by the state, in the sense that the state permits “such gaming,” “for any purpose by any person”; and (3) existence of a Tribal-State compact that is approved by the Secretary of the Interior. The Tribal-State compact is the key to class III gaming under IGRA. Under such a compact, the federal government cedes its primary regulatory oversight role over class III Indian gaming, and permits states and Indian tribes to develop joint regulatory schemes through the compacting process. In this way, the state may gain the civil regulatory authority that it otherwise lacks, and a tribe gains the ability to offer class III gaming. See Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. United States, 136 F.3d 469, 472 (6th Cir.1998). IGRA provides that the Tribal-State compact may include provisions relating to a number of issues that arise once class III gaming begins, including the application of state criminal and civil laws, the allocation of jurisdiction between the state and the tribe necessary for the enforcement of gaming laws, and the assessment by the State of gaming activities in order to defray the costs of regulation. The compacting process begins when a tribe requests negotiations with the state in which its lands are located. Id. § 2710(3)(A). IGRA provides jurisdiction in the federal courts to hear a claim by a tribe that a state has failed to negotiate in “good faith.” Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A). If a court finds that a state failed to negotiate in good faith, IGRA permits the court to order the state and the tribe to conclude a compact within 60 days. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii). If the parties are unable to agree to a compact within this period of time, IGRA directs the parties to submit their “last best offer for a compact” to a mediator who will then select the more appropriate plan. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv). In determining whether a state negotiated in good faith, IGRA permits courts to “take into account the public interest, public safety, criminality, financial integrity, arid adverse economic impacts on existing gaming activities.” Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ni)(II). Finally, IGRA explicitly prohibits gaming on lands taken into trust for the benefit of a tribe after October 17, 1988. Id. § 2719(a). This restriction does not apply, however, if the Secretary, having consulted with tribal and state and local officials, and having secured the agreement of the Governor, determines that gaming on the newly acquired lands would benefit the tribe and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community. Id. § 2719(b). B. California Gaming Following the enactment of IGRA, the State of California and various Indian tribes in California attempted to conclude Tribal-State compacts. However, the State and the tribes disagreed about the forms of gaming that would be permitted and the content of the compacts. See,.e.g., Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir.1994); Hotel Employees and Rest. Employees Int’l Union v. Davis, 21 Cal.4th 585, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 56, 981 P.2d 990 (1999). These disagreements were ultimately set-tied, and on September-10, 1999, Governor Davis approved fifty-seven class III gaming compacts on behalf of the - State of California. (Complaint at ¶ 39). The compacts, which are effective until December 31, 2020, are identical in most respects. The compacts point to the preferred position accorded to the tribes, noting that the compacts “create a unique opportunity for [each] Tribe to operate its Gaming Facility in an economic environment free of competition from the Class III gaming ... on non-Indian lands in California.” (Tribal-State Compact Between the State of California and the Augustine Band of Mission Indians (“Compact”), at 2, § 11.2.1(a), Exh. 1 to St. Defs.’ App. of Authorities). The compacts permit each signatory tribe to operate “gaming devices” or slot machines, banking or percentage card games, and any devices or games that the California State Lottery is authorized to offer. Id. at § 4.1. The tribe may initially operate up to 350 slot machines, but, by participating in a series of draws, a tribe may acquire licenses to operate up to 2,000 slot machines. Id. at §§ 4.3.1, 4.3.2.2. The tribe must, however, pay a one-time non-refundable fee of $1,250 for each gaming device it operates that goes into a “Revenue Sharing Trust Fund,” which distributes up to $1.1 million per year to tribes without compacts. Id. at §§ 4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.2(3).’ Two agencies, the “Tribal Gaming Agency” and the “State Gaming Agency,” are responsible for the bulk of regulatory oversight under the compacts. The Tribal Gaming Agency is defined as the regulatory agency designated to carry out the signatory Tribe’s regulatory responsibilities, and it has primary responsibility for the on-site regulation of Indian gaming. Id. at §§ 2.20, 7.0. The State Gaming Agency, defined as the “entities authorized to investigate, approve, and regulate gaming licenses” under Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code § 19800 et seq., includes the California Gambling Control Commission and the Division of Gambling Control in the California Department of Justice. Id. at § 2.18; Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code §§ 19809, 19810A. Members of the Commission are appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the State Senate, and serve four year terms. Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code § 19812A. As part of its regulatory function, the Tribal Gaming Agency may promulgate rules and regulations governing the management and operation of tribal gaming facilities, although its regulations must be consistent with the State Gaming Agency’s statewide rules. Compact at §§ 8.1, 8.4. In certain circumstances, the State Gaming Agency may also promulgate rules directly applicable to Indian gaming facilities. Id. at § 8.4.1. As part of its regulatory oversight, the Tribal Gaming Agency licenses all Indian gaming facilities and all persons who work in and with them. Id. at § 6.4.1. However, subject to a variety of exceptions, a person who has been denied a determination of suitability by the State Gaming Agency may not work in or with a gaming facility. Id. at §§ 6.4.4(c), 6.4.5. Further, except for “non-key Gaming Employee[s],” the Tribal Gaming Agency must require license applicants to file an application with the State Gaming Agency for a determination of suitability for licensure under the California Gambling Control Act. Id. at § 6.5.6. The Tribal Gaming Agency is also charged with inspecting class III gaming facilities to determine if they are in compliance with IGRA, the governing compact, and the Agency’s regulations, although the State Gaming Agency may also conduct inspections of its own. Id. at § 7.0. Finally, the compacts specify three conditions that must be met before they become effective. The compacts must be ratified by the State Legislature and be approved by the United States Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”). Also, because California prohibits class III gaming under Cal. Cons. Art. TV, sec. 19(e), and CaLPenal Code §§ 380, 330a, 330b, California voters must approve the California Senate’s proposed Constitutional Amendment 11 (“Proposition 1A”), that would permit the Governor to enter into class III gaming compacts, thereby exempting Indian tribes from the general prohibition on gaming. Id at § 11.1. All three conditions have been satisfied. In September 1999, the California Legislature ratified the fifty-seven compacts that were signed by the Governor on September 10, 1999, and enacted provisions to expedite the approval of additional identical compacts. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12012.25. On March 7, 2000, California voters approved Proposition 1A which amended the California Constitution as follows: Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) and (e), and any other provision of state law, the Governor is authorized to negotiate and ' conclude compacts, subject to ratification by the Legislature, for the operation of slot machines and for the conduct of lottery games and banking card games by federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands in California in accordance with federal law. Cal. Const. Art. IV, sec. 19(e). On May 5, 2000, the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, approved the compacts on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior, expressly finding that “[t]he Governor can, consistent with the State’s amended Constitution, conclude a compact giving an Indian tribe, along with other California Indian tribes, the exclusive right to conduct certain types of Class III gaming.” (Letter from Kevin Gover, May 5, 2000, Exh. B to Complaint). The Secretary’s approval was published in the Federal Register on May 16, 2000. (Notice of approved Tribal-State Gompacts, 65 Fed.Reg. 31,189 (May 16, 2000)). Since the first 57 compacts became effective, five additional compacts have been entered into by the Governor and approved by the Secretary. (Notice of approved Tribal-State Compact, 65 Fed.Reg. 41721 (July 6, 2000); Notice of approved Tribal-State Compact, 65 Fed. Reg. 62749 (October 19, 2000); Pis.’ Resp. to State Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) at ¶ 15). Further, at least two additional tribes have requested class III gaming compacts, but their requests have been placed on hold by the State until the conclusion of this lawsuit. {See Shelley Anne Chang Letters, May 2, 14, 2001, Exhs. K, L to Pis.’ Reply). Thirty-nine of the 62 tribes with compacts currently operate casinos with slot machines, 18 of which are located in Northern California. Some 44 California tribes remain without compacts. (Eadington Decl. at ¶¶ 3, 4). C. The Lytton Band On March 22, 1991, the Lytton Ranche-ría, a tribe previously terminated by the federal government under Pub.L. 85-671, 72 Stat. 619, was reinstated according to the terms of a stipulation entered into between the Tribe, the United States, and the County of Sonoma where the Tribe’s lands historically were located. (Indians of the Sugar Bowl Rancheria, et al. v. United States, No. C-86-3660 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 22, 1991) (Stipulation for Entry of Judgment), Exh. G to State Defs.’ Motion to Dismiss; Notice of Reinstatement, 57 Fed.Reg. 5214-01 (Feb. 12, 1992)). The stipulation included provisions which permitted the Secretary of the Interior to take land into trust for the then landless Ranchería in the Alexander Valley in So-noma County. {Id. at ¶ 5). Following the Lytton Rancheria’s reinstatement, the Tribe acquired land in San Pablo in Contra Costa County, less than 20 miles from downtown San Francisco. (Eadington Decl. at ¶ 6). Although the Ranchería has not yet requested negotiations to conclude a gaming compact with respect to this land, (Pis.’ Resp. to State Defs.’ SUF at ¶ 24), in September, 1999, it entered into a Municipal Services Agreement with the City of San Pablo stating that the Ranchería “intends to enter into a compact with the State of California (“State”) which provides for the joint exercise of jurisdiction of the Band and the State to regulate gaming on the Property pursuant to the IGRA.” (Municipal Services Agreement at 2, Exh. J to Pis.’ Exhs. to Motion). However, because the San Pablo land was not acquired until 1999, it fell under 25 U.S.C. § 2719’s restriction on class III gaming on lands acquired after October 17, 1988, and the Lytton Tribe could not offer gaming on the San Pablo tract unless it satisfied one of the exceptions enumerated in § 2719(b). On December 27, 2000, the Omnibus Indian Advancement Act of 2000, Pub.L. 106-568, Stat. 2868, went into effect. (Complaint at ¶ 52). Section 819 of the Act (“San Pablo Legislation”), which was passed without hearings or debate, (Pis.’ SUF at ¶ 18; Complaint at ¶ 53), effectively “backdated” acquisition of the Lytton Rancheria’s land in San Pablo prior to October 17, 1988. Thus, if the Lytton Ranchería seeks to conclude a class III gaming compact covering its land in San Pablo, the San Pablo Legislation apparently exempts it from the consultation requirements in § 2719. D. Plaintiffs’ Allegations This complaint was filed on February 7, 2001. The plaintiffs in this case consist of four card clubs and two charities that offer class II gaming in Northern California and that are prohibited by the California Penal Code from offering any form of class III gaming including banking card games and slot machines. Plaintiffs attack the monopoly on class III gaming accorded by the compacts and allege that various state and federal officers violated IGRA and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by entering into, approving, and administering the compacts. The named federal defendants are Gale Norton, Secretary of the Interior, and James McDivitt, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs (“federal defendants”). The named state defendants are Gray Davis, Governor of the State of California; Harlan W. Goodson, Director of the California Division of Gambling Control; John E. Hensley, Chair of the California Gambling Control Commission; Michael C. Palmer, J.K. Sasaki, and Arlo Smith, members of the California Gambling Control Commission; and Bill Loekyer, Attorney General of the State of California (“state defendants”). Id. at ¶¶ 21-26. Plaintiffs argue that the state’s prohibition on class III gaming keeps them from competing for part of a significant market — tribal gaming in California may generate up to $4.7 billion per year by 2004. (Eadington Decl. at ¶ 8). According to plaintiffs, the class II gaming they are permitted to offer cannot compete with the Las Vegas style gaming offered by the tribes. (Id. at ¶ 19). Banking and percentage card games offer gamblers the chance to win more money and are more profitable for class III operators because the operator can take a stake in the action. (Id. at ¶ 20). And because of their stake in the activity, class III operators do not need to charge players by the hand or the hour the way that class II operators do. Slot machines also contribute to the popularity of class III gaming casinos. In most casinos, slot machines account for “in excess of 70% of total gaming winnings,” and depending on location, competition, and how they are regulated, each machine may generate between $88 and $440 per day. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 18). As of January 25, 2001, there were over 25,000 slot machines in use on Indian lands in California. (Id. at ¶ 11). Plaintiffs argue that “[m]any customers who presently patronize California card-rooms and charity bingo games are likely to be attracted by the greater variety of games, and the greater payoffs, offered at casinos conducting class III gaming, particularly those that offer slot machines,” an effect documented in other states that have introduced tribal gaming. (Complaint at ¶ 29; Eadington Deck at ¶¶ 25-29 (noting effect of class III Indian gaming in Arizona, Michigan, and New Orleans)). Plaintiffs are especially concerned that a tribe will be permitted to offer class III gaming in an urban area putting class III gaming casinos in closer proximity to the plaintiffs’ establishments. (Complaint at ¶ 8). Plaintiffs’ complaint contains four counts. In count I, plaintiffs allege that the federal defendants’ approval of the compacts violated the APA, because the compacts, and hence the approvals, violate IGRA, the Johnson Act, and the Fifth Anendment to the United States Constitution. (Complaint at ¶ 75). Plaintiffs essentially make two arguments; they argue that extending a class III gaming monopoly to Indian tribes (1) violates IGRA’s “any person, organization, or entity” requirement, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d), and (2) constitutes illegal discrimination on the basis of race and violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The remaining three counts are all directed against the state defendants and are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count II, brought against the Governor, the Director of the California Division of Gambling Control (“Director”), and the Chair and members of the California Gambling Control Commission (“Commission”), alleges that Proposition 1A and the compacts violate IGRA, the Johnson Act, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at ¶ 78). In count III, which is directed at the Governor alone, plaintiffs allege that the San Pablo legislation violates IGRA and the Johnson Act, and is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at ¶ 82-83). Count IV, brought against the Attorney General, the Director, and the Commission, seeks to preclude enforcement of CaLPenal Code §§ 330, 330a, 330b which prohibit class III gaming in California. Plaintiffs allege that continued enforcement of these laws, when tribal gaming is exempted, constitutes illegal discrimination on the basis of race or ethnic origin. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunc-tive relief on all counts. Specifically, plaintiffs seek a judgment to set aside the federal defendants’ approval of the compacts and a declaration that such approvals violate IGRA, the Johnson Act, the APA, the Fifth Amendment, and aid and abet the state defendants’ violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at 31). The plaintiffs also seek (1) with respect to the Governor, Director, and Commission, a declaration that Proposition 1A and the compacts violate IGRA, the Johnson Act, the Supremacy Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment, an injunction to prevent their continued participation in the administration of the compacts, and an injunction to prevent the Governor from executing any additional compacts; (2) with respect to the Governor, a declaration that any compact with the Lytton Ranchería based on H.R. 5528 violates IGRA, the Johnson Act, the Supremacy Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment, and an injunction to prevent the Governor from entering into such a compact; and (3) with respect to the Governor, the Attorney General, the Director, and the Commission, a declaration that Article IV, Sec. 19(e) of the California Constitution and Cal.Penal Code §§ 330, 330a, 330b violate the Equal Protection Clause, and an injunction to prohibit enforcement of the Penal Code’s general prohibition on class III gaming. Plaintiffs and defendants have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on all claims, and the state defendants have filed a motion to dismiss. In addition to arguing that Proposition 1A and the compacts are consistent with IGRA, the Johnson Act, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the state and federal defendants raise a number of jurisdictional objections. The court has also received several amicus curiae briefs. Before turning to the merits, it is necessary to address the multitude of objections to jurisdiction raised by the state and federal defendants and several amici curiae. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (federal courts must resolve jurisdictional issues before merits). The state defendants argue that: (1) the plaintiffs lack standing; (2) the state defendants are not proper defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908); and (3) the case cannot proceed if the state defendants are dismissed because they are necessary and indispensable parties. The federal defendants challenge the court’s jurisdiction under the APA. They contend that plaintiffs have no cause of action under the APA and that the plaintiffs are not within the zone of interests protected by IGRA. Finally, the court considers the arguments of amicus curiae, California Nations Indian Gaming Association (“CNIGA”), that the case must be dismissed because the absent Indian tribes are necessary and indispensable parties. Although all of these jurisdictional objections raise issues that potentially preclude the court from reaching the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, and have significantly increased the length and complexity of this opinion, all but a very few fail, and those that succeed do not greatly affect the scope of the inquiry on the merits. II. Standing The requirements for demonstrating standing to sue are well-established. As an “irreducible minimum,” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982), parties who seek to establish standing must show (1) a concrete and imminent “injury in fact”, (2) a causal connection between the defendants and the alleged injury, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir.2002). Invoking these concepts, the state defendants advance two arguments on standing. First, they argue that there is no injury in fact with respect to the Governor’s future decisionmaking concerning additional compacts; and second they argue that there is no causation or re-dressability with respect to any of the state defendants. A. Injury in Fact and Equitable Relief as to Governor Davis on Counts II and III Plaintiffs who seek prospective injunctive relief must demonstrate both a sufficient likelihood of future injury, Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 251 F.3d 1230, 1236 (9th Cir.2001), and that there is “a ‘likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.’ ” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974)); see also Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir.2000). The former stems from the Article III case or controversy requirement; the latter is a function of the traditional limits on the power of federal courts to grant equitable relief. Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1042, 1044 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc). To determine the likelihood of future harm courts are guided “not only by the defendants’ past conduct but also by the defendants’ avowed future intent.” LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1330 (9th Cir.1985). Further, when a plaintiff seeks to enjoin a state agency and its officers, the plaintiff must “ ‘contend with the well-established rule that the Government has traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the dispatch of its own internal affairs.’ ” Midgett v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist. of Oregon, 254 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-79, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976)); see also Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1042 (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that, absent a threat of immediate and irreparable harm, the federal courts should not enjoin a state to conduct its business in a particular way.”). 1. Count II: Existing and Future Compacts As to the Governor and future compacts, it is unnecessary to determine whether the plaintiffs satisfy the Article III injury in fact requirement, because even if they did, plaintiffs would still not be entitled to injunctive relief to prevent the approval of additional compacts by the Governor because they have not demonstrated “a threat of immediate and irreparable harm.” Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1042. The plaintiffs argue that there is an immediate threat of future injury because the Governor has already approved sixty-two compacts, the legislature has enacted an expedited approval provision, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12012.25(b), and the Governor would be subject to suit if he failed to negotiate in good faith with a tribe that requests a class III gaming compact. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7). However, while the plaintiffs contend that as many as twenty tribes have expressed an interest in entering into gaming compacts, only two tribes have actually sought to enter into negotiations with the Governor following the approval of the first sixty-two compacts. (Eadington Decl. at ¶ 5). Negotiation of these compacts has not begun and the terms of these hypothetical compacts are, as yet, unknown. Moreover, it is also unclear if the Governor will approve additional compacts, especially compacts for casinos located in urban areas which allegedly pose the greatest risk to the plaintiffs. In fact, the Governor has declined to enter into further negotiations at least until this lawsuit is resolved. In response to inquiries by the two tribes about entering into class III gaming compacts, the Governor replied negatively stating that “commencing formal negotiations at this time, amidst the uncertainty attending the current status of th[is] litigation, would not ... be prudent.” (Chang Letter, May 2, 2001, Exh. K to Pis.’ Reply). The substantive legal issues presented in this lawsuit, and the greater policy and empirical issues that lie behind this litigation, are of such magnitude and complexity that it cannot be assumed that a responsible state officer would automatically continue to enter into further, identical compacts no matter the accumulation of experience, the pressures against permitting urban tribal gaming establishments, public opinion, and other potentially relevant economic and legal developments. The many unknowns about additional class III gaming compacts preclude a finding that there is a danger of an immediate and irreparable harm from future compacts when no such compacts are even in the negotiation stage. When a plaintiff both satisfies Article III and demonstrates an immediate and irreparable injury, courts will appropriately grant prospective injunctive relief against state officials. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111-12, 103 S.Ct. 1660. But where, as here, there is an inadequate showing of immediate future irreparable injury, the need to “maintain!] the delicate balance between ‘federal equitable power and State administration of its own law,’ ” Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1042, compels deference to state officials who are in the consideration phase of their decision-making and have not committed to a future course of action. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111-12, 103 S.Ct. 1660. Such restraint is especially important when the requested injunction is a broad one that would apply to “whole categories of potential future acts,” in this case, any class III gaming compact. Hillblom v. United States, 896 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir.1990) (upholding district court’s refusal to “declare the inapplicability to the Northern Mariana Islands of any law ‘which substantially affects the lives of the inhabitants’ ”). Moreover, it is also relevant that the plaintiffs may seek declaratory relief as to the existing compacts, a less intrusive remedy than an injunction, and one that can resolve the most pressing issues related to Indian gaming under IGRA in a setting best suited to resolution in the federal courts because the terms of the compacts are not hypothetical. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 465-68, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) (describing declaratory relief as less intrusive remedy as compared to injunction); Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 627 (5th Cir.1985) (“There is no question but that the passive remedy of a declaratory judgment is far less intrusive into state functions than in-junctive relief that affirmatively commands specific future behavior under the threat of the court’s contempt powers.”). Having failed to demonstrate an immediate and irreparable harm, plaintiffs may not seek in count II prospective injunctive relief against the Governor to prohibit him from entering into additional compacts. In addition, the plaintiffs’ “failure to establish a likelihood of future injury similarly renders their claim for declaratory relief unripe” as to future, hypothetical compacts. Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1044. As the Ninth Circuit recently explained, “[i]n suits seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief against a defendant’s continuing practices, the ripeness requirement serves the same function in limiting declaratory relief as the imminent-harm requirement serves in limiting injunctive relief.” (Id.) Thus, for the same reason that there is no imminent future injury that justifies prospective injunctive relief, the plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief with respect to future compacts fails because it is unripe. Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998)(“A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’ ”). With respect to the existing compacts and the Governor, the plaintiffs have properly alleged an injury in fact which could merit declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2201 et seq. Plaintiffs allege both a violation of their right to equal protection of the laws and economic injury. Together these allegations form an adequate basis for standing to seek declaratory relief. In sum, as to count II, which in part seeks prospective injunctive and declaratory relief against the Governor, the court finds that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they face an immediate and imminent threat of harm from future compacts. For this reason, plaintiffs are only entitled to seek declaratory relief as to existing compacts under count II. 2. Count III: Lytton Ranchería A similar analysis applies to count III of the complaint which seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the Governor with respect to the Lytton Ranchería. Because the Lytton Ranchería is no closer to entering into a gaming compact than any other tribe without a compact, plaintiffs’ injuries with respect to count III are no more imminent than they are with respect to count II. Although the Municipal Services Agreement between the Lytton Ranchería and San Pablo states that the Lytton Ranchería will seek to enter into negotiations for a class III gaming compact, it has not yet done so. (St. Defs.’ SUF at ¶ 24). Moreover, because it would permit gaming in an urban area, an eventuality that the plaintiffs contend would be novel and particularly damaging to existing gaming operations, the Governor might be even more reluctant to negotiate a compact with the Lytton Ranchería. For these reasons, equitable relief is improper because there is no threat of immediate and irreparable harm that would warrant an injunction, and the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief is, therefore, unripe. Further, plaintiffs may not establish jurisdiction on the basis that they have been deprived of a procedural right to petition the Governor and the Secretary concerning the potential adverse affects of a proposed casino. (Pis.’ Reply at 39-41). Assuming that § 2719 may afford plaintiffs a procedural right of consultation that was foreclosed by the San Pablo legislation, any such procedural right is not implicated until a tribe requests negotiations for a class III gaming compact on land that was acquired after October 17, 1988. Therefore, Congress’ decision to “backdate” the acquisition of the San Pablo land is of no consequence unless and until the Lytton Ranchería seeks to enter into a class III gaming compact. Because any attempt to exercise rights based on § 2719 at this point in time would be premature, plaintiffs’ argument that the San Pablo legislation deprived them of procedural rights under § 2719 is also not suited for review. B. Causation To demonstrate causation, the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries—competitive economic harm and violation of equal protection— must be “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct, Pritikin v. Dep’t of Energy, 254 F.3d 791, 796 (9th Cir.2001), and the injuries must not be “ ‘the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.’ ” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)(quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976)). Further, [wjhen ... a plaintiffs asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed [than when the plaintiff is the subject of the government’s regulation]. In that circumstance, causation and re-dressability ordinarily hinge on the response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action or inaction—and perhaps on the response of others as well. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (emphasis in original); see also G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 156 F.3d 893, 899-900 (9th Cir.1998) (same). Thus, in order to demonstrate causation, plaintiffs must show that the alleged harms flow directly from the state defendants’ actions. 1. Count II: Governor, Commission, and Director With respect to count II of the complaint, plaintiffs’ claim against the Governor satisfies the causation requirement because the Governor approved the compacts that gave rise to the plaintiffs’ injuries. (Complaint at ¶¶ 23, 79). It is not material to the causation analysis that Governor Davis does not have ongoing responsibilities under the compacts, once approved. It is enough that his past approval of the compacts caused the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. Plaintiffs have failed, however, to adequately respond to the state defendants’ argument that neither the Director nor the Commission have duties that caused class III tribal gaming. (St. Defs.’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 12). Without addressing the issue of causation, plaintiffs’ argue only that there is redressability because an injunction preventing the Director and the Commission from renewing their determinations of suitability for persons working in or with the casinos would hamper the casinos’ ability to operate. Because causation and redressability are frequently duplicative of one another, plaintiffs presumably hope that in establishing redressability, they will also establish causation. Causation and redressability, however, are not always two sides of the same coin. “Despite ... similarities, ... each inquiry has its own emphasis. Causation remains inherently historical; redressability quintessentially predictive.” Freedom Republicans, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 13 F.3d 412, 418 (D.C.Cir.1994); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) (noting differences between causation and re-dressability). Here, even if the plaintiffs established redressability, their predictions about the impact of an injunction on the Director and the Commission would not establish an historical connection between the actions of the Director and the Commission, and the plaintiffs’ injuries. As to redressability, plaintiffs rely principally on §§ 6.4.4(b), 6.4.5, 6.4.6, of the compacts which, subject to certain exceptions, prohibit persons from working in or with casinos, or from financing them, if they had an application for a determination of suitability denied by the State Gaming Agency. (Pis.’ Reply at 68; Pis.’ Reply to St. Defs.’ SUF at ¶ 23). These provisions might suggest that the State Gaming Agency is responsible for licensing most persons who work in or with Indian casinos. If true, this might satisfy the causation requirement because without the Director and the Commission fulfilling their licensing duties, tribal gaming might not have been possible. Yet, a closer reading of the compacts reveals that the licensing responsibilities of the State Gaming Agency are relatively minor. Rather, the Tribal Gaming Agency has primary responsibility for issuing licenses to virtually every person who works in or with Indian casinos. (Compact § 6.4.1). Sections 6.4.4(b), 6.4.5, and 6.4.6, of the compacts merely prohibit the Tribal Gaming Agency from licensing persons who have had determinations of suitability denied by the State Gaming Agency, but they do not require persons working in or with tribal casinos to apply for licenses from the State Gaming Agency. Thus, even if the licensing of such persons satisfied the causation requirement, the compacts themselves demonstrate that it is the actions of the Tribal Gaming Agency, and not the State Gaming Agency, that are fairly traceable to the plaintiffs’ injuries. Finally, even if they had established causation, plaintiffs have not demonstrated re-dressability. An injunction to prevent the State Gaming Agency from issuing or renewing determinations of suitability would do little to hamper the casinos’ ability to operate because virtually all persons receive both their initial licenses and license renewals from the Tribal Gaming Agency. 2. Count IV: Attorney General, Director, Commission and Penal Code Enforcement The state defendants offer two arguments as to why there is no causation with respect to count IV of the complaint which seeks to enjoin the Attorney General, the Director, and the Commission from enforcing Penal Code §§ 330, 330a, 330b, the state criminal law provisions that prevent the plaintiffs from offering class III gaming. First, the state defendants argue that there is no causal connection between the Attorney General and the alleged harm, class III gaming by Indian Tribes. (St. Defs.’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 12-13). This argument, however, incorrectly treats the alleged harm under count IV as class III gaming by Tribes in violation of IGRA and the Equal Protection Clause, when the actual harm alleged here is the inequitable application of the Penal Code provisions to the plaintiffs thereby preventing them from offering class III gaming. (Complaint at 32-33). If the plaintiffs’ allegations are correct, then they are entitled to seek this relief because the equal protection violation may be remedied either by prohibiting class III gaming as to every one, or by permitting it as to every one. The state defendants next argue that there is no causation because none of the individuals named in count IV, the Attorney General, the Director, and the Commission, has authority to prevent all enforcement of the Penal Code provisions, for example, by a District Attorney. (St. Defs.’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 13). This argument confuses causation analysis with redressability. The question is not whether these defendants can prevent enforcement of the Penal Code provisions. Rather, the causation question is whether the alleged injury — the threatened or actual enforcement of the Penal Code provisions against the plaintiffs such that they are unable to offer the same class III gaming offered by the tribes — is fairly traceable to the state defendants. The history of letters written by the Attorney General and the Director to the plaintiffs and other California card clubs, as well as their interaction with local law enforcement officials adequately satisfies the causation requirement. “Here, there has clearly been a specific threat of prosecution ... [and] such an express threat instills a fear of criminal prosecution that cannot be said to be ‘imaginary or wholly speculative.’ ” Culinary Workers Union, Local 226 v. Del Papa, 200 F.3d 614, 617 (9th Cir.1999). Specifically, in 1988, then Attorney General Van De Kamp and the Manager of the Gaming Registration Program wrote to Artichoke Joe’s stating that if Artichoke Joe’s offered a game called “Texas hold-em,” it would be in violation of Cal.Penal Code § 330 and “administrative action will be taken against [its] registration.” (Van de Kamp, Watson Letter, Exh. 0 to Pis.’ Motion). The letter was also sent to local law enforcement officials. (Id.) Similarly, in 1989, Attorney General Van de Kamp and the Director of the Division of Law Enforcement sent a notice to all “California Card Club Owners,” a category that includes several of the plaintiffs, stating that if they offered “percentage games,” they would be in “violation of the Penal Code and the Gaming Registration Act which may result in administrative action on the part of the State Gaming Registration Program as well as possible criminal prosecution.” (Van de Kamp, Clemens Letter, Exh. P to Pis.’ Motion). Another letter that year addressed to “California Card Club Owners” again warned of administrative action and “possible criminal prosecution” if they offered “jackpot poker.” (Van de Kamp, Clemens Letter, Exh. Q to Pis.’ Motion). In 1997, Attorney General Lungren and the Manager of the Office of Gaming Registration notified all card club owners that percentage card games are illegal. (Van de Kamp, Letter Exh. R to Pis.’ Motion). The letter was also sent to “All Affected Law Enforcement Agencies,” and it stated that the Attorney General was requesting that “they monitor compliance to ensure that all gaming clubs are charging the proper fees of their patrons.” (Id.) Moreover, Attorney General Lockyer and the current Director of the Division of Gambling Control, Harlan Goodson, have published several law enforcement advisories on issues related to gambling. One advisory, sent to “All Police Chiefs and Sheriffs,” described “Tab Force,” an illegal bingo operation. (Tab Force Advisory, Exh. S to Pis.’ Motion). The letter noted that although the Division of Gambling Control lacked jurisdiction over bingo operations, it could investigate suspected violations of state gambling laws and provide advice to local law enforcement agencies for use in the regulation of bingo. (Id.) The letter specifically advised law enforcement agencies that “Tab Force constitutes an unlawful gambling device within the meaning of sections 330b and 330.1 of the Penal Code.” (Id.) In other advisories, the Attorney General and the Director discussed what constitutes a “Gaming Activity,” the need for card clubs to report to the Division of Gambling Control the forms of gambling offered by the clubs, and the legality of “Jackpot Poker.” (Exh. N to Pis.’ Motion). On at least one occasion in 1998, the San Bruno District Attorney wrote to the Director to inquire about the legality of a specific gaming practice and whether it constituted an illegal percentage game. (Exh. T to Pis.’ Motion). The District Attorney’s letter specifically stated that Artichoke Joe’s had requested an opinion on the game and that the District Attorney was seeking the opinion of the Division of Gaming Control because “[w]e need to have a uniform policy in the state in order that card clubs can have a level playing field upon which to conduct their games.” (Id.) As in Culinary Workers Union, Local 226, where the Ninth Circuit found a case or controversy because the Attorney General had written a letter specifically threatening to cause the statute to be enforced, the Attorney General' and the Director have an unambiguous record of warning clubs of potential criminal prosecution and administrative action if they violate Penal Code provisions prohibiting class III gaming. They also have taken the lead in setting statewide policy with respect to gambling. Thus, the threat of criminal prosecution under the Penal Code provisions by these defendants, as well as administrative action, is not “ ‘imaginary, speculative or chimerical.’ ” Snoeck v. Brussa, 153 F.3d 984, 987 (9th Cir.1998) (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Noel, 608 F.2d 208, 213 (1st Cir.1979)). For these reasons, the plaintiffs have satisfied the Arti-ele III causation requirement as to the Attorney General and the Director. The plaintiffs have failed, however, to provide evidence demonstrating that the threat of enforcement of the Penal Code provisions is fairly traceable to the Commission. None of the documents provided by the plaintiffs bears the names of any of the members of the Commission.- Thus, although the Commission may well be empowered to revoke plaintiffs’ gaming licenses if they violate the Penal Code provisions, the plaintiffs have done nothing more than restate their original allegations to this effect. This is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. Los Angeles County Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.1992) (“At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts, rather than mere allegations, that if true would suffice to establish standing.”). In summary, as to causation, the court finds that with respect to count II, plaintiffs have satisfied the causation requirement as to the Governor, but not the Director or the Commission. With respect to count IV, plaintiffs have satisfied the causation element as to the Attorney General and the Director, but not the Commission. C. Redressability: Governor and Count II To establish redressability, plaintiffs must show that it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 869 (9th Cir.2002). A “claim may be too speculative if it can be redressed only through ‘the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the court.’ ” Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). However, a plaintiff can still satisfy the redressability requirement in such a case by meeting “the burden ... to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such manner as to ... permit redressability of injury.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Thus, in Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), decided less than two weeks after Lujan, the Court held that the plaintiffs satisfied redressability in a suit brought against the Secretary of Commerce to require her to reallocate the apportionment of overseas military personnel in the 1990 census, even though the President would make a final determination on the census. A plurality of the Court held that declaratory relief against the Secretary would redress the plaintiffs’ injuries because “she has an interest in litigating [the census’s] accuracy ... [and] it is substantially likely that the President and other executive and congressional officials would abide by an authoritative interpretation of the census statute and constitutional provision by the District Court, even though they would not be directly bound by such a determination.” Id. at 803, 112 S.Ct. 2767. Therefore, although redressability depended at least in part on the actions of third parties, the Court was satisfied that the third parties would follow and enforce the law thus making redressability likely. As to count II and the IGRA and equal protection claims on the existing compacts, the state defendants contend that redressability is too speculative to support standing because the tribes are not parties to the suit and a decision in the plaintiffs’ favor would, therefore, not be binding on them. (St. Defs.’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 13). Moreover, they argue that if the court invalidates the compacts and Proposition 1A, the State would lose its power to stop any continued class III gaming because, in the absence of a valid IGRA-sanctioned compact, 18 U.S.C. § 1166 gives the federal government exclusive enforcement authority over Indian gaming. (Id. at 13-14). See United States v. E.C. Investments, Inc., 77 F.Sd 327, 330 (9th Cir.1996) (“Section 1166(d) grants the United States ‘exclusive jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions of violations of State gambling laws that are made applicable under this section to Indian country.’ ”). Thus, the state defendants contend that if the plaintiffs prevail on the merits, the state defendants will be powerless to stop any illegal Indian gaming. The state defendants’ arguments are misplaced for several reasons. First, the plaintiffs do not need to prove a negative, namely that the tribes would not engage in illegal gaming in order to demonstrate re-dressability. If plaintiffs had to “negate ... speculative and hypothetical possibilities ... in order to demonstrate the likely effectiveness of judicial relief,” they would rarely ever be able to establish standing. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 73, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). Second, even if the tribes were inclined to violate IGRA and state penal code prohibitions, there is no reason to assume that the federal government would shirk its enforcement responsibilities under 18 U.S.C. § 1166 by countenancing illegal class III 'gaming by Indian tribes. Thus, although redressability may depend, at least in part, on the actions of third parties, this case more closely resembles Franklin than it does Lujan. Indeed, unlike in Lujan where it was unclear whether outside agencies would be bound by the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation to require consultation for international projects, a ruling that invalidates the compacts and Proposition 1A would conclusively establish the illegality of any continued class III gaming by Indian tribes. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555, 112 S.Ct. 2180. The sole contingency, therefore, would be whether the federal authorities responsible for prosecuting illegal gaming would do so, and, as in Franklin, Made in the USA, and E.C., the court is entitled to expect that they will follow the law. Because “[pjlaintiffs need not demonstrate that there is a ‘guarantee’ that then- injuries will be redressed by a favorable decision,” it is likely, and not merely speculative, that a declaratory judgment invalidating the existing compacts and Proposition 1A would redress the plaintiffs’ injuries. Graham v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 149 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cir.1998); see also Competitive Enter. Inst. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 901 F.2d 107, 117-18 (D.C.Cir.1990) (“Petitioners need not prove that granting the requested relief is certain to redress their injury, especially where some uncertainty is inevitable.”). Therefore, the court concludes that the plaintiffs have demonstrated that a favorable ruling would likely redress their alleged injuries. III. Ex Parte Young The Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment permits suits for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief if suit is brought against a state official acting in an official capacity. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). The “obvious fiction” of Ex parte Young, however, only stretches so far and is subject to several constraints. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 270, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997). For example, Young may not be invoked to provide declaratory relief against a state official for a wholly past violation of federal law, Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985), unless accompanied by an ongoing violation of federal law. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 282, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). Another important limit on Young is the causation requirement. As the Court explained in Young, not every state officer is subject to suit simply by virtue of being a state officer. Rather, the “officer must have some connection with the enforcement of the act, or else