Full opinion text
ORDER VOLLMER, Senior District Judge. This case presents a constitutional challenge to Public Law 106-230, codified at I.R.C. §§ 527(i) and (j). In its previous order addressing the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs’ challenge to Section 527(i) is barred because: (1) Section 527(i) imposes a “tax” for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421; (2) the organizational plaintiffs do not satisfy any exception to the Anti-Injunction Act; and (3) the only individual plaintiff to challenge Section 527(i) lacks standing to do so. National Federation of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 148 F.Supp.2d 1273, 1283, 1285-87 (S.D.Ala.2001). This case is now being prosecuted by seven plaintiffs as a challenge to Section 527(j). The case is before the Court on the parties’ competing motions for summary judgment. (Docs. 35, 41). While the parties have submitted evidentiary materials in support of their respective positions, they have represented that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the case may be resolved without an evidentia-ry hearing. (Doc. 34 at 3). After carefully considering the parties’ arguments as expressed in their briefs on motion for summary judgment, (Docs. 35, 42, 44-46), in their briefs on motion for preliminary injunction, (Docs. 4, 17, 20), and in their briefs on motion to dismiss, (Docs. 16, 19, 23), as well as their submitted evidentiary materials and all other relevant materials in the file, the Court concludes that each motion for summary judgment is due to be granted in part and denied in part. BACKGROUND In 1975, Congress added Section 527 to the Internal Revenue Code, which recognized “political organization” as a class of taxpayer. A “political organization” was defined as an organization “organized and operated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures, or both, for an exempt function.” I.R.C. § 527(e)(1). An “exempt function” was defined as “the function of influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public office or office in a political organization, or the election of Presidential or Vice-Presidential electors, whether or not such individual or electors are selected, nominated, elected, or appointed.” Id. § 527(e)(2). Section 527 established a “general rule” that a political organization is subject to income taxation, but only on its taxable income. I.R.C. §§ 527(a), (b)(1). “Taxable income” was defined as “an amount equal to the excess (if any) of ... the gross income for the taxable year (excluding exempt function income), over ... the deductions allowed by this chapter which are directly connected with the production of the gross income (excluding exempt function income),” subject to certain modifications. Id. § 527(c)(1). “Exempt function income” was defined as “any amount received as ... (A) a contribution of money or other property, (B) membership dues, a membership fee or assessment from a member of the political organization, (C) proceeds from a political fundrais-ing or entertainment event, or proceeds from the sale of political campaign materials, which are not received in the ordinary course of any trade or business, or (D) proceeds from the conducting of any bingo game (as defined in section 513(f)(2)), to the extent such amount is segregated for use only for the exempt function of the political organization.” Id. § 527(c)(3). Thus, political organizations received a tax exemption with respect to certain income streams related to their principal purpose of influencing elections. As amended in 1978, Section 527 set the applicable tax rate on taxable income as the highest rate of tax applicable to corporations, id. § 527(b)(1), presently 35%. Id. § 11(b)(1)(D). In late June 2000, without producing any committee report and after only brief floor debate, Congress passed Public Law 106— 230, which in pertinent part added subsections (i) and (j) to Section 527. President Clinton signed the bill into law on July 1, 2000. Section 527(i) provides that a political organization “shall not be treated as an organization described in this section” until and unless it provides a specified notice to the Secretary disclosing its name, address, purpose, and certain related individuals and entities. I.R.C. § 527(i)(l) — (3). Those political organizations reasonably anticipating gross receipts of under $25,000 in a taxable year, or subject to the disclosure requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”), need not provide notice. Id. § 527(i)(5)— (6). “In the case of an organization failing to meet the requirements of paragraph (1) for any period, the taxable income of such organization shall be computed by taking into account any exempt function income (and any deductions directly connected with the production of such income).” Id. § 527(i)(4). Under Section 527(j), “[a] political organization which accepts a contribution, or makes an expenditure, for an exempt function during any calendar year shall file” periodic reports with the Secretary. I.R.C. § 527(j)(2). The reports “shall” disclose: “(A) The amount of each expenditure made to a person if the aggregate amount of expenditures to such person during the calendar year equals or exceeds $500 and the name and address of the person (in the case of an individual, including the occupation and name of employer of such individual)”; and “(B) The name and address (in the case of an individual, including the occupation and name of employer of such individual) of all contributors which contributed an aggregate amount of $200 or more to the organization during the calendar year and the amount of the contribution.” Id. § 527(j)(3). For purposes of the disclosure provision, “a person shall be treated as having made an expenditure or contribution if the person has contracted or is otherwise obligated to make the expenditure or contribution.” Id. § 527(j)(4). Disclosures are not required of organizations not required to give notice under Section 527(i), of “any State or local committee of a political party or political committee of a State or local candidate,” or “with respect to any expenditure which is an independent expenditure (as defined in section 301 of [FECA]).” Id. § 527(j)(5). For “failure to make the required disclosures” or to include complete, correct information, “there shall be paid by the organization an amount equal to the rate of tax specified in subsection (b)(1) multiplied by the amount to which the failure relates.” Id. § 627(3X1). The plaintiffs allege that Section 527(j) violates the free speech and free association prongs of the First Amendment, the equal protection component of the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Tenth Amendment. In addition to challenging the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs lack standing to pursue a challenge to Section 527(j). DETERMINATIONS OF UNCONTROVERTED FACT The Assembly plaintiffs are all “political organizations” as defined in Section 527(e). None of the Assembly plaintiffs has given the notice specified by Section 527(i). (Doc. 35, Exhibit A). The Assembly plaintiffs have experienced a decline in contributions due to contributors’ concerns that their identities may be disclosed pursuant to Section 527(j). (Doc. 4, Declarations of Stephen Frank, Elaine Little and Oweh McDonnell, Jr.). CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991). Once the moving party has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to make ‘a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,’ the moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)) (footnote omitted). “In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir.1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). I. Standing. The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” is three-fold: (1) “the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, ... and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) “there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of’, such that “the injury [is] fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant”; and (3) “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)(internal quotations omitted). The defendants offer various reasons why the remaining seven plaintiffs lack standing to challenge Section 527(j). With respect to the Assembly plaintiffs, the defendants’ sole argument is that, because they have not given notice pursuant to Section' 527(i), these plaintiffs are not required to make disclosures under Section 527(j) and therefore have not experienced “injury in fact.” The plaintiffs respond that Section 527(j) is, “mandatory,” such that they are required by law to provide disclosures even if they would decline tax-exempt status. The plaintiffs note that Section 527(j) “require[s]” ■ a “political organization” to make disclosures and that Section 527 defines a “political organization,” in essence, as an organization organized and operated primarily for the purpose of influencing the selection of individuals to public office. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) — (2). They conclude that any organization meeting the definition of Section 527(e) is required by Section 527(j) to make disclosures, regardless of whether thé organization has given notice under Section 527(i). The plaintiffs’ argument will not withstand a review of the statute. Section 527(i) expressly states that “an organization shall not be treated as an organization described in this section” until and unless it provides the prescribed notice. I.R.C. § 527(i)(l)(emphasis added). An organization is “treated as” an organization under Section 527 by: (1) being granted a tax exemption as to certain income under Section 527(c); and (2) being required to provide certain disclosures under Section 527(j). By the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, an organization that does not provide notice under Section 527(i) is not subject to the disclosure requirements of Section 527(j). The plaintiffs suggest that, even if only those political organizations that give notice under Section 527(i) become subject to the disclosure requirements of Section 527(j), the notice provision of Section 527(i) is itself mandatory for all organizations meeting the statutory definition of a “political organization,” effectively making disclosure under Section 5270) mandatory as well. Section 527(i), however, identifies the sole effect of a failure to give notice as that “the taxable income of such organization shall be computed by taking into account any exempt function income.” I.R.C. § 527(f)(4). The plain language of the statute again refutes the plaintiffs’ argument. The defendants assume that, since the Assembly plaintiffs have not given notice under Section 527(i) and thus are not required to make disclosures under Section 5270), they cannot have suffered “injury in fact” as required to establish their standing to challenge the latter provision. As discussed below, the defendants are mis-' taken. Prior to the enactment of Public Law 106-230, federal law granted the Assembly plaintiffs the right to protect contributions from government exaction while providing no information about those contributions. Since the passage of Section 5270), the Assembly plaintiffs can no longer shield their larger contributions from both disclosure and government exaction; they may maintain privacy or maintain freedom from government exaction, but they cannot do both. Either option carries adverse economic consequences. If the Assembly plaintiffs elect not to disclose their larger contributions, they must pay the government an amount equal to 35% of those contributions. If they elect to disclose, they face the loss of larger contributions by those unwilling to have their support of the organizations made public. Both increased government exaction and decreased contributions constitute economic injury and satisfy the “injury in fact” requirement of standing. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 266, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984)(that wholesalers were ultimately liable for remittance of a sales tax “plainly” supported standing to challenge the tax); Florida Right to Life, Inc. v. Lamar, 273 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir.2001)(organization’s loss of donations due to statutory-restrictions on contributors constituted economic injury and supported standing to challenge the statute). Similarly, prior to July 2000 the Assembly plaintiffs could make expenditures to influence elections without disclosing these expenditures or being subject to government exaction. With the passage of Section 527(j), the Assembly plaintiffs may retain anonymity or freedom from government exaction, but they cannot have both. Just as increased government exaction represents injury in fact, the alternative loss of anonymity in political speech represents an infringement on the Assembly plaintiffs’ First Amendment freedoms, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 342, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995), and thus an injury in fact. In short, a political organization may choose which sort of injury it will suffer at the hands of Section 527(j), but it cannot choose to avoid injury altogether. The Assembly plaintiffs’ choice — to maintain privacy and sacrifice their tax exemption— satisfies the “injury in fact” element of standing. The defendants do not challenge the other constitutionally mandated elements of standing, and they plainly are satisfied. The Assembly plaintiffs’ injury is fairly traceable to Section 527(j) because, but for that statute, they would still be able to avoid government exaction without disclosing their larger contributions and expenditures. A favorable decision will strike down Section 527(j), redressing the Assembly plaintiffs’ injury by eliminating its source. In addition to the constitutional elements of standing are several non-constitutional, prudential concerns: “ ‘[T]he general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.’ ” Devlin v. Scardelletti, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 2009, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002)(quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). The defendants assert no argument based on the prudential aspects of standing, and the Courts of Appeal are split as to whether a defendant’s silence works a waiver obviating consideration of these concerns. Because the Eleventh Circuit apparently has not resolved the issue, the Court proceeds to consider the prudential aspects of standing sua sponte. No contention could plausibly be made that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit raises political questions committed to other branches of government. Nor could it be argued that the First Amendment is unconcerned with coerced disclosures of political contributions and expenditures, that the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause is unconcerned with the disparate treatment of organizations as to such disclosures, or that the Tenth Amendment is unconcerned with federal statutes regulating matters dear to state sovereignty. Only the prudential restriction on third-party standing merits extended discussion. With respect to their equal protection claim, the Assembly plaintiffs assert that they are required to provide disclosures when similarly situated tax-exempt organizations are not. They thus seek to vindicate their own Fifth Amendment rights. Similarly, the Assembly plaintiffs complain under their First Amendment claim that the disclosure of their expenditures burdens their own speech. The Assembly plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim also challenges the requirement that political organizations disclose the sources of their larger contributions. “[T]he act of contribution [to a political committee] involve[s] some limited element of protected speech,” California Medical Association v. Federal Election Commission, 453 U.S. 182, 196 n. 16, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981), but it is the speech of the contributor, not the recipient. While the Supreme Court has recognized generally a First Amendment right to receive speech, the plaintiffs have not identified any authority for the proposition that a candidate or political organization has a First Amendment right to receive contributions. But see Florida Right to Life v. Lamar, 273 F.3d at 1323, 1329 (indicating without discussion that a state statute prohibiting candidates from contributing to certain organizations implicated the First Amendment rights of the recipient organizations). The Assembly plaintiffs’ contributors, however, do have a qualified First Amendment right to make anonymous contributions. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Assembly plaintiffs may assert their contributors’ rights if they have suffered an injury in fact from the disclosure requirement, if they “have a close relation to” their contributors, and if there “exist[s] some hindrance to the [contributors’] ability to protect [their] own interests.” Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991). As discussed previously, the Assembly plaintiffs have suffered injury in fact because they have sacrificed their preferred tax. treatment so as to preserve their contributors’ anonymity. The Assembly plaintiffs, as beneficiaries of their contributors’ bounty, have a sufficiently close relation to them, and there is an obvious impediment to the contributors’ assertion of their own right to anonymity: “To require that it be claimed by the [contributors] themselves would result in nullification of the right at the very moment of its assertion.” National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958); accord Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 449, 118 S.Ct. 1428, 140 L.Ed.2d 575 (1998).. At first blush, the plaintiffs’ Tenth Amendment claim might appear to-require application of third-party standing principles. That amendment, however, “does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political .entities, or even for the protection of the public officials governing the States. On the contrary, the Constitution distributes authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992). Thus, a private party subjected to federal regulation in an area reserved to the states has first-party standing to challenge the regulation as violative of the Tenth Amendment. See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1116, 120 S.Ct. 934, 145 L.Ed.2d 813 (2000); Frank v. United States, 78 F.3d 815, 825 (2nd Cir.1996), vacated on other grounds, 521 U.S. 1114, 117 S.Ct. 2501, 138 L.Ed.2d 1007 (1997), reinstated in pertinent part, 129 F.3d 273 (2nd Cir.1997); Wilson v. Jones, 45 F.Supp.2d 945, 949 (S.D.Ala.1999), aff'd, 220 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir.2000). While the Eleventh Circuit apparently has never expressly addressed this issue, it has repeatedly upheld the standing of private parties to raise a Tenth Amendment challenge without suggesting the existence of any prudential barriers to such standing. See Dillard v. Baldwin County Commissioners, 225 F.3d 1271, 1275-77 (11th Cir.2000); Seniors Civil Liberties Association v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1034 n. 6 (11th Cir.1992); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. United States Department of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1368 n. 16 (11th Cir.1982). In summary, the Assembly plaintiffs satisfy the constitutional and prudential requirements of standing. Because these plaintiffs have standing, it is unnecessary to address separately the standing of the remaining plaintiffs. II. First Amendment. The parties agree that the constitutionality of disclosure requirements affecting political speech is ordinarily determined in accordance with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). Buckley dictates that disclosure requirements “must survive exacting scrutiny,” with the regulation bearing a “ ‘substantial relation’ ” to a “sufficiently important” or “substantial governmental interest.” Id. at 64, 66, 80, 96 S.Ct. 612 (quoting Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 546, 83 S.Ct. 889, 9 L.Ed.2d 929 (1963)). However, “there is no right to have speech subsidized by the Government,” Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 256 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986), and a tax exemption represents such a subsidy. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 450 & n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 1438, 113 L.Ed.2d 494 (1991)(“[A] legislature is not required to subsidize First Amendment rights through a tax exemption or tax deduction.”). The defendants contend that Section 527(j) permissibly conditions a tax exemption on disclosure and so satisfies the First Amendment independently of Buckley. A. Taxation with Representation. Federal tax law provides income tax exemptions to several types of organizations, including charitable organizations recognized under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and social welfare organizations recognized under Section 501(c)(4). Contributions to charitable organizations are tax-deductible by the contributor (providing an incentive for such contributions and potentially increasing the organization’s income), but such organizations may not engage in substantial lobbying. Conversely, contributions to social welfare organizations are not tax-deductible, but such organizations may engage in substantial lobbying. The plaintiff in Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983), sought recognition as a charitable organization, but its application was rejected because it intended to engage in substantial lobbying. Id. at 542, 103 S.Ct. 1997. The plaintiff, desiring both the increased revenue incident to tax-deductibility and the political influence incident to substantial lobbying, argued that Section 501(c)(3) violated its First Amendment rights by conditioning its receipt of tax-deductible contributions on its forbearance from political expression in the form of substantial lobbying. Id. at 545, 103 S.Ct. 1997. In response, the Supreme Court distinguished two similar but subtly different tax schemes. In the first, the government denies a tax subsidy because the taxpayer engages in speech; in the second, the government denies a subsidy that underwrites the taxpayer’s speech. The first sort of scheme was involved in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958), in which California denied a property tax exemption to taxpayers who advocated the forcible overthrow of the government (or refused to take an oath disavowing such advocacy); this scheme implicated the First Amendment because it “penalized [the taxpayers] for such speech.” Id. at 518, 78 S.Ct. 1332. The second sort of scheme was involved in Taxation with Representation; unlike in Speiser, Congress did not penalize the taxpayer for engaging in speech but “merely refused to pay for the [speech] out of public monies.” 461 U.S. at 545, 103 S.Ct. 1997. The latter scheme, the Court held, simply does not implicate the First Amendment. Id. at 546, 103 S.Ct. 1997; accord Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513, 79 S.Ct. 524, 3 L.Ed.2d 462 (1959). The issue becomes whether Section 527 falls within Taxation with Representation or Speiser. By definition, the primary purpose of political organizations is to receive contributions and/or make expenditures to influence electoral results. These expenditures represent speech. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990)(“[I]ndependent campaign expenditures constitute ‘political expression ‘at the eore of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.’ ’ ”)(quoting earlier Supreme Court cases). By excluding contributions and certain other receipts from the gross income of political organizations, Section 527 provides a subsidy that “has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on [this] income.” Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 544, 103 S.Ct. 1997. This subsidy effectively allows the political organization to increase its expenditures and thus its speech; ■ Because the tax exemption of Section 527 underwrites the speech of political organizations, it falls within Taxation with Representation rather than Speiser. The plaintiffs do not seriously suggest that Section 527 fits the model of Speiser. Instead, they argue that Section 527 does not in fact grant a tax exemption. Since Section 527 does not grant a tax. exemption, they conclude, neither could Section 527(j) offset the exemption, and it must therefore impose an additional, affirmative exaction rendering Taxation with Representation inapposite. The plaintiffs correctly note that Section 527 could not exempt from taxation contributions received by a political organization unless those contributions were subject to incoine tax to begin with. They continue that, as a matter of constitutional law, “Congress lacks the power to-tax political contributions” because of “their unique character as First Amendment protected activity.” (Doc. 19 at 8,10). The plaintiffs rely on Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983); Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943); and Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936). Political contributions do indeed constitute speech for purposes of First Amendment analysis,. Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 533 U.S. 431, 440, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 150 L.Ed.2d 461 (2001), but the plaintiffs’ authorities do not support the proposition that such contributions are therefore constitutionally immune from income taxation. Murdoch struck down a tax “the payment of which [was] a condition of the exercise of these constitutional [First Amendment] privileges.” 319 U.S. at 111, 63 S.Ct. 870. Section 527, however, does not tax contributors for exercising their First Amendment right to contribute; rather, it taxes the recipient political organizations on their income. The plaintiffs’ other cases struck down statutes that taxed the press discriminatorily, but each expressly confirmed that “[i]t is beyond dispute that ... the Federal Government can subject newspapers to generally applicable economic regulations [including taxes] without creating constitutional problems.” Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. at 581, 103 S.Ct. 1365; accord Arkansas Writers’ Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. at 228, 107 S.Ct. 1722; Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U.S. at 250, 56 S.Ct. 444. The federal income tax, of course, is a “generally applicable” tax. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the First Amendment does not immunize political contributions from income taxation. The plaintiffs next argue that, even if the First Amendment does not prophylac-tically prohibit an income tax on political contributions, the Internal Revenue Code does so. The Code purposefully defines gross income with exceptional breadth. The opening section of its subtitle addressing income taxes defines gross income as “all income from whatever source derived,” except as otherwise provided in the subtitle. I.R.C. § 61(a). Congress intended this definition to reach the outermost limits of its power under the Sixteenth Amendment, encompassing “any ‘acces-sio[n] to wealth.’ ” United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233, 112 S.Ct. 1867, 119 L.Ed.2d 34 (1992)(quoting Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431, 75 S.Ct. 473, 99 L.Ed. 483 (1955)). Thus, anything that constitutes “gross income” is subject to income taxation unless otherwise provided elsewhere in the Code. HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 5, 101 S.Ct. 836, 67 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). , The plaintiffs first point to the legislative history of Section 527 as establishing that political contributions could not have been taxed even absent its passage. In particular, the accompanying Senate report states that “political activity (including the financing of political activity) as such is not a trade or business which is appropriately subject to tax.” S.Rep. No. 93-1357 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7478, 7502. While this language may express the 93rd Congress’s sense as to “appropriate” subjects of income taxation, it says nothing about whether the Code prior to 1975 in fact shielded political contributions from such taxation. The plaintiffs also rely on the Internal Revenue Service’s position concerning the status of political contributions. Since at least the 1930’s the Service has considered political contributions not to constitute taxable income. See Rev. Rui. I.T. 3276, 1939-1 C.B. 108 (“[A] political gift received by an individual or by a political organization is not taxable to the recipient.”); Rev. Rui. 54-80, 1954-1 C.B. 11, 1954 WL 8915 (“Where a political gift is received by an individual or a political organization and it is held or used for the purposes intended, i.e., for present or future expenses of a political campaign or for some similar purpose, it is not taxable income to the recipient.”); Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14, 1974 WL 34746 (“[CJampaign contributions are not includible in the gross income of the organization.”). The Congress that enacted Section 527 understood the Service’s position to be based on the view that political contributions constitute “gifts” so as to be excluded from gross income by I.R.C. § 102(a). S.Rep. No. 93-1357, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7502. A gift rationale appears highly dubious, and it has been rejected by the Service. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,664 & n. 1 (Feb. 8, 1974). Instead, prior to Section 527’s enactment the Service treated political contributions as excluded from gross income under a “conduit” or “quasi-trust” theory. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,813 & n. 32 (Mar. 19, 1990). The conduit approach proceeds on the theory that contributions “are restricted donations subject to an offsetting obligation to spend them for charitable [or political] purposes.” Gen. Couns. Mem. 39, 813 & n. 12. In other contexts in which the concept is employed, the Service has “consistently sought to limit its use — taxing the recipient organization if it has more than ministerial powers over disposition of the receipts, or if there is no obligation to refund unexpended balances to the contributors upon termination.” Id. & n. 30. Thus, the Service has rejected conduit analysis with respect to contributions to organizations whose tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) is retroactively revoked. Although such organizations “have a general obligation under their charters and state law to apply funds to their stated purposes,” they “do in fact exercise considerable discretion and control in most cases over the disposition of contributed funds.” Id. To qualify for conduit theory treatment, the Service has concluded, the organization must be “clearly functioning as an agent,” and the contributor must have “earmarked the funds for a specific recipient or purpose.” Id. (emphasis added). The parties have not addressed the conduit approach. The Court’s independent research suggests that transfers properly subject to conduit theory may lie beyond the reach of Section 61 — and hence beyond Congress’s power to tax under the Sixteenth Amendment — because they do not constitute gain to the recipient. If so, and if conduit theory properly applies to political contributions, such contributions are not susceptible to federal income taxation and Section 527 thus could not provide political organizations a tax exemption as to such contributions. The Court, however, concludes that political contributions are not properly subject to conduit theory. . The same attributes of charitable contributions that render them unfit for treatment under conduit theory apply equally to political contributions. . As with charitable organizations, political organizations must use contributed funds consistently with their organizational purpose, but they retain substantial discretion in how, when and even whether to expend contributed funds. Unless the contributor earmarks the contribution otherwise, the political organization need' not employ any particular means of advancing the organization’s purpose and need not necessarily expend the funds at all. With respect to political organizations interested in more than one issue or candidate, the' contributor of unearmarked- funds cannot require the organization to expend the contribution on a particular' issue or candidate. Nor, absent a specific agreement to the contrary, does it appear that a political organization upon dissolution is required to return unexpend-ed contributions to its contributors. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.527-(5)(c)(2001)(ex-cess funds of a political organization are not considered as expended for the personal use of the organization if distributed to entities other than the original contributor); Ala.Code § 17-22-5(d)(requiring a political committee desiring to dissolve to file a notice of dissolution setting forth the intended disposition of any residual funds). As the Service recognizes, its application of conduit theory to political contributions “was never tested in court.” Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,813. Moreover, the Service has suggested that its treatment of political contributions under conduit theory may have been an error corrected by the enactment of Section 527. Id. & n. 35. The Court agrees with this assessment and concludes that conduit theory cannot justify the treatment of political contributions as not constituting “gross income” within Section 61. Because political contributions fall within “gross income” as defined in Section 61, they are subject to income tax unless effectively excluded from taxation elsewhere in the Code. By its terms Section 527 declares that, until and unless the notice required by Section 527(i) is given, “the taxable income of such organization shall be computed by taking into account any exempt function income,” I.R.C. § 527(i)(4), and exempt function income includes political contributions. Id. § 527(c)(3). Because political contributions are potentially subject to income taxation, and because Public Law 106-230 expressly renders them taxable, Sections 527(c) and (i) do in fact grant a tax exemption, and Taxation with Representation is not, as the plaintiffs contend, inapposite. That Taxation with Representation applies does not mean that it applies to the entirety of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge. Taxation with Representation demonstrates that Congress at its pleasure may withdraw a tax subsidy that underwrites taxpayer speech (so long as the withdrawal is not based on viewpoint) without implicating the First Amendment. To the extent that Congress goes beyond the cancellation of a subsidy and imposes an additional exaction, the analysis reverts to that required by Buckley. The defendants insist that Section 527(j) does no more than offset the tax exemption/subsidy enjoyed by political organizations that give notice under Section 527(i), but this is true only in part. The tax exemption granted by Section 527 extends to income in the form of contributions, membership dues and similar assessments, and proceeds from fundrais-ing and similar events. I.R.C. § 527(c)(3). Section 527(j) requires political organizations to file reports disclosing information concerning both the sources of contributions of $200 or more in a calendar year and the recipients of expenditures of $500 or more in a calendar year. Id. § 527(j)(2), (3). The penalty for failing to make these disclosures is “an amount equal to the rate of tax specified in subsection (b)(1) multiplied by the amount to which the failure relates.” Id. § 527(j)(l). That is, the penalty is imposed in exactly the amount of the tax exemption the organization would receive with respect to the same amount of exempt income. Because disclosable contributions are exempt from tax under Sections 527(c) and (i), and because the penalty imposed by Section 527Q) is equal to the tax break the political organization enjoys as to the undisclosed contributions, the application of Section 5270) to a political organization’s undisclosed contributions does no more than offset the organization’s tax exemption. Section 527 defines the. term “contributions” as having “the meaning given to such term by section 271(b)(2).” I.R.C. § 527(e)(3). Section 271 defines contributions as including not only actual receipts but also “a contract, promise, or agreement to make a contribution, whether or not legally enforceable.” Id. § 271(b)(2). Were this definition applicable to disclosures of contributions under Section 5270), there might be serious questions whether Taxation with Representation would apply, because such a definition would allow the taxpayer to be penalized for failing to disclose contributions (such as pledges) promised but not received. In the case of a taxpayer long on receivables but short on receipts, Section 5270) would then Impose a penalty exceeding the amount of the organization’s tax exemption. Public Law 106-230, however, provides a narrower definition of contributions to govern its disclosure requirements: “For purposes of this subsection, a person shall be treated as having made an expenditure or contribution if the person has contracted or is otherwise obligated to make the expenditure or contribution.” I.R.C. § 5270)(4). Thus, while for other purposes of Section 527 a promise to make a contribution need not be “legally enforceable,” a promise to contribute need be disclosed under Section 5270) only if the promise is legally enforceable. See also Rev. Rul. 200(M9, 2000 WL 1517702 (disclosure, requirement extends only to “binding contracts”); Instructions for Form 8872 at 3 (“Treat contributions as accepted if the contributor has contracted or is otherwise _ obligated to make the contribution.”).’ While the parties have not briefed the issue, it appears doubtful that any significant amount of contributions not actually received would be disclosable under this definition. Even in the context of charitable contributions, as to which the public policy of upholding pledges is at its zenith, most jurisdictions require consideration or detrimental reliance to render them enforceable. E.g., King v. Trustees of Bos ton University, 420 Mass. 52, 647 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (1995); Arrowsmith v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 313 Md. 334, 545 A.2d 674, 677 (1988). See generally R. Donaldson, Annotation, Lack of Consideration as Barring Enforcement of Promise to Make Charitable Contribution or Subscription—Modem Cases, 86 A.L.R.4th 241, 1991 WL 741603 (1991). A true pledge to make a political contribution is unsupported by legal consideration. If the pledge is made in exchange for legal goods or services, consideration may be present but the pledge is no longer a contribution but a market transaction. Most such pledges, when received, will constitute “proceeds from a political fund-raising or entertainment event,” which Section 527 expressly recognizes as something different than a “contribution.” I.R.C. § 527(c)(3)(A), (C). If the pledge is made in exchange for an improper consideration (such as political favors from an incumbent), the promise also is presumably unenforceable as against public policy. Assuming that it is theoretically possible for a political pledge to become a legally binding obligation based on the political organization’s detrimental reliance on the pledge, the plaintiffs have made no showing that such legally binding pledges occur with such predictability and frequency as to raise a reasonable possibility that the contribution disclosure requirements of Section 527(j) will in practice impose on political organizations a penalty in excess of their tax exemption. While Section 527© as applied to contributions raises at most a remote possibility of isolated instances in which the penalty imposed exceeds the amount of the political organization’s tax exemption, as applied to expenditures Section 527© virtually guarantees that this will occur on a predictable basis. Most if not all political organizations that decline to disclose their expenditures will also decline to disclose their contributions. Thus, the political organization’s tax exemption as to such contributions will be offset by penalty before expenditures are even considered. To • the extent the political organization’s exempt-function expenditures of $500 or more exceed its tax-exempt income from non-disclosable sources, Section 527© ceases to represent the offset of a subsidy and becomes an additional exaction. While not all political organizations will face this prospect, many will. For example, political organizations that depend on large contributions for support will have little or no other tax-exempt income against which their penalty for failing to disclose expenditures could be offset. Even organizations with significant tax-exempt income other than disclosable contributions may well spend more in large exempt-function expenditures during a particular year (especially an election year) than they receive in non-disclosable tax-exempt income. This is especially so if the organization receives (and spends) a substantial amount of income that is not tax-exempt to begin with (such as investment income and the net proceeds of a trade or business). The problem is only exacerbated by Section 527(j)(4), which requires political organizations to disclose expenditures they have not yet made if they are contractually or otherwise obligated to make them. Two features of Public Law 106-230 might be argued to eliminate the prospect of political organizations being penalized in an amount exceeding their tax exemption, but neither does so. First, while Section 527(j) exempts from disclosure independent expenditures made for express electoral advocacy, the determination of political organizations such as the plaintiffs to eschew express electoral advocacy in an effort to avoid regulation suggests that the exemption will have little effect. Second, a political organization can choose not to give notice under Section 527(i) and thereby cap its losses at the amount of its tax exemption without any danger of penalty under Section 527(j). See Part I, supra. Even indulging the generous assumption that political organizations will routinely and repeatedly weigh the risk of a penalty exceeding their tax exemption if they do give notice against the risk of unnecessarily forfeiting a tax exemption if they do not, mistakes will certainly be made in these predictions, and Section 527(j) applies equally whether or not the decision ultimately proves advantageous to the organization. Another provision of the Code, noted but scarcely addressed by the parties, must still be considered. Section 7203 provide.s in pertinent part: Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return, keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to ... supply such information, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000 ($100,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 1 year or both, together with the costs of prosecution. I.R.C. § 7203 (emphasis added). Section 527(j) describes its disclosures as “required.” Id. § 527(j)(a)(A), (B). In its previous order the Court, noting the key term “required” in both statutes, assumed without deciding that Section 7203 applies to Section 527(j). 148 F.Supp.2d at 1282-83. The parties have not discussed whether Section 7203, if it applies to disclosures under Section 527(j), would render Taxation with Representation inapplicable. The defendants moot the issue by declaring that Section 7203 does not apply to Section 527(j) and that they are powerless to prosecute any political organization for failing to make disclosures under that section. (Doc. 23 at 10). It is unnecessary to resolve whether Section 7203 would otherwise apply to Section 527(j), because the defendants’ disavowal of any legal authority to apply Section 7203 to Section 527(j)effectively establishes that it will not be used to sanction nondisclosing political organizations. Accordingly, Section 7203 need not be considered in assessing whether Section 527(j) does more than offset a tax exemption. In summary, as applied to contributions Section 527© represents only the permissible withdrawal of a tax subsidy through a corresponding, offsetting penalty, so that no First Amendment issue is implicated. As applied to expenditures, however, Section 527(j) imposes an additional exaction, rendering Taxation with Representation inapplicable. With respect to expenditures, Section 527(j) must therefore pass muster under Buckley v. Valeo to survive the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge. B. Buckley v. Valeo. Scrutiny under Buckley is required if Section 527© “burdens the exercise of political speech.” Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. at 652, 110 S.Ct. 1391. As noted in Part II.A, independent campaign expenditures such as those made by political organizations constitute political speech, and “mandatory reporting [of expenditures by a political group] undeniably impedes protected First Amendment activity.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 355, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995). Because Section 527(j) thus burdens the exercise of political speech, “the Court’s focus must turn to an assessment of the [government’s] interest and of the means utilized to advance that interest.” Richey v. Tyson, 120 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1309 (S.D.Ala.2000). As in Richey, however, the Court must first address the plaintiffs’ contention that any disclosure requirement, regardless of ends and means, is unconstitutional if the regulated organization does not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a particular candidate. 1. Express electoral advocacy. Each of the organizational plaintiffs claims to be a “political organization” as defined in Section 527(e). That is, each is organized and operated primarily to accept contributions and/or make expenditures for influencing (or attempting to influence) the nomination, election or other selection of an individual to public office, and each has confirmed in this litigation its desire to debate the qualifications of candidates for public office. (Doc. 20 at 5). The plaintiffs, therefore, are not disinterested commentators on the great issues of our day but political players whose primary purpose is to help place in office individuals they deem sufficiently sympathetic to their views. In advancing their goals, however, they never expressly advocate the election or defeat of any candidate. (Doc. 42 at 11). The plaintiffs, relying on Buckley, maintain that their avoidance of express electoral advocacy places them beyond the reach of any constitutional disclosure requirement. According to the plaintiffs, Buckley divided all political speech into two categories: (1) “express advocacy,” by which the speaker explicitly advocatés the election or defeat of a candidate by employing unambiguous language such as “vote for (or against),” “elect (or defeat),” “support (or reject)”; and (2) “issue advocacy,” which encompasses all other political speech, regardless of its message or purpose. According to the plaintiffs, Buckley held that the First Amendment forbids any regulation — including disclosure requirements— in connection with speech that does not éonstitute “express advocacy.” Thus, they conclude, their failure to expressly advocate the election or defeat of any candidate insulates them from Section 527(j)’s disclosure requirement. .The Court agrees that Buckley identified “express electoral advocacy” as a form of political speech and that this form of speech is limited to “communications containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat.” 424 U.S. at 44 & n. 52, 96 S.Ct. 612. However, the Court rejects the plaintiffs’' assertion that only express electoral advocacy is susceptible to regulation consistent with the First Amendment; at least with réspect to organizations such as the plaintiffs and other Section 527 political organizations, Buckley affirmatively demonstrates that disclosure requirements are constitutionally permissible even absent express electoral advocacy. The plaintiffs’ threshold error is their insistence that all political speech that is not express electoral advocacy perforce constitutes “issue advocacy.” The Supreme Court in Buckley employed no such terminology and recognized no such dichotomy. Rather, the Buckley Curt saw political speech as comprised of “issue discussion” and “advocacy of a political result.” 424 U.S. at 79, 96 S.Ct. 612. This would represent only a semantic difference if “advocacy of a political result” were confined to express electoral advocacy, for then “issue discussion” would occupy the same territory that the plaintiffs claim for “issue advocacy” — that is, all political speech that is not express electoral advocacy. The Buckley Court, however, recognized that advocacy of a political result extends beyond express electoral advocacy. In construing FECA’s cap on independent expenditures, which applied to expenditures “advocating the election or defeat of [a] candidate,” the Court found the quoted language vague because “the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application.” 424 U.S. at 42, 96 S.Ct. 612. Lacking a bright line between issue discussion and electoral advocacy, speakers might self-censor their speech in an effort to avoid crossing the indistinct border. Id. at 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Buckley Court introduced express electoral advocacy as a benchmark to provide speakers the clear boundary that the statutory cap on independent expenditures otherwise lacked. Id. at 43-44, 96 S.Ct. 612. If express electoral advocacy were the only form of electoral advocacy that exists, the Court would not have been concerned that speakers could not tell the difference between issue discussion and electoral advocacy; the Court established the express electoral advocacy standard precisely because other forms of electoral advocacy exist but may prove difficult to distinguish from issue discussion. Because many communications that do not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate nevertheless contain a greater or lesser element of electoral advocacy, it is at best imprecise to employ the term, “issue advocacy,” to denote all political speech other than express electoral advocacy. Use of the term in this manner incorrectly suggests that all political speech falling short of express electoral advocacy is essentially issue discussion (thereby skewing the constitutional analysis), regardless how plain the communication’s electoral purpose. Buckley employed no such term, and the Supreme Court later used it to describe a much more limited range of political speech. See Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 252 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986)(distinguishing “issue advocacy” from “activities on behalf of political candidates”); see also Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 406, 120 S.Ct. 897 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(describing “advertisements that promote or attack a candidate’s positions without specifically urging his or her election or defeat” as “so-called issue advocacy”)(emphasis added). For the sake of accuracy and neutrality, the Court avoids the term “issue advocacy.”' No other accurate, neutral and satisfactorily brief term presenting itself, the Court employs the lengthy but unobjectionable phrase, “speech falling short of express electoral advocacy.” The plaintiffs’ second error is their insistence that Buckley held that all political speech other than express electoral advocacy lies beyond the reach of constitutional regulation, including disclosure requirements. As discussed below, Buckley articulated an express electoral advocacy benchmark in order .to avoid deciding the permissible reach of disclosure requirements. At any rate, Buckley employed an express electoral advocacy standard only in the context of organizations whose major purpose is not the nomination or election of candidates; Buckley makes plain that disclosure may, consistent with the First Amendment, be required of organizations whose major purpose is the nomination or election of candidates even if those organizations do not engage in express electoral advocacy. ■ The plaintiffs rely on that portion of Buckley which addressed a challenge to the disclosure requirements imposed by FECA on organizations other than political committees. As then enacted, Section 434(e) required disclosures by such organizations making “contributions” or “expenditures” of over $100 in a calendar year. 424 U.S. at 160, 96 S.Ct. 612. The required disclosures included information concerning the contributions and expenditures made by the reporting organization. Id. at 157-59, 96 S.Ct. 612. “Contributions” and “expenditures,” in turn, were defined in terms of their having been made “for the purpose of influencing” the selection of a person for federal office. Id. at 145-47, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Supreme Court found this language ambiguous, id. at 77, 96 S.Ct. 612, because it harbored the “potential for encompassing both issue discussion and advocacy of a political result.” Id. at 79, 96 S.Ct. 612. As with any exercise in statutory construction, the Buckley Court sought to interpret this phrase by identifying Congress’s intent. Because the legislative history contained no discussion of the intended meaning of the phrase “for the purpose of influencing,” the Court turned to the purpose underlying the disclosure provisions, since Congress presumably intended the phrase to be construed consistently with the legislation’s overall purpose. The Court identified Congress’s purpose as being “to promote full disclosure of campaign-oriented spending to insure both the reality and the appearance of the purity and openness of the federal election process.” 424 U.S. at 77-78, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Buckley Court had two constitutional issues to consider as well before arriving at a construction of the phrase, “for the purpose of influencing.” First, a statute that both regulates speech and carries criminal sanctions for its violation must be sufficiently definite as to its scope that an ordinarily intelligent speaker has adequate notice of what is and is not proscribed, so that he may avoid unlawful speech without unnecessarily avoiding lawful speech as well. 424 U.S. at 40-43, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court considered that the disputed phrase’s ambiguity “raise[d] serious problems of vagueness.” Id. at 76-77, 96 S.Ct. 612. Constitutional jurisprudence thus compelled the Court to adopt a construction of the phrase, if one existed, that would be both consistent with Congress’s identified purpose and sufficiently definite “to avoid the shoals of vagueness.” Id. at 77-78, 96 S.Ct. 612 (citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954)). Second, “[t]he overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning [or permissibly abridging] unprotected speech if a substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process.” Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 1395, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002). However, “[application of the overbreadth doctrine ... is ... strong medicine [and] has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). Thus, “[w]hen a federal court is dealing with a federal statute challenged as overbroad, it should, of course, construe the statute to avoid constitutional problems, if the statute is subject to such a limiting construction.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n. 24, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). The Buckley Court, while labeling this section of its opinion “Vagueness Problems,” 424 U.S. at 76, 96 S.Ct. 612, suggested the possibility of lurking overbreadth issues by stating that its construction of the phrase, “for the purpose of influencing,” would “insure that the reach of § 434(e) is not impermissibly broad.” Id. at 80, 96 S.Ct. 612. So as to accord with legislative intent, avoid unconstitutional vagueness about the scope of Section 434(e), and avoid any issue of overbreadth, the Buckley Court construed the phrase “for the purpose of influencing” to mean “used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” 424 U.S. at 80, 96 S.Ct. 612. So construed, the Court concluded that Section 434(e) was narrowly tailored to serve a sufficiently important governmental interest and thus survived First Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 80-82, 96 S.Ct. 612. The plaintiffs insist that “Buckley stands for the proposition that Congress may only place reporting and registration requirements like those at issue [in this case] on ‘express advocacy.’ ” (Doc. 42 at 10 (emphasis in original)). Buckley, however, made no such pronouncement. Nor could it easily have done so, since such a conclusion would have required a holding that the phrase, “for the purpose of influencing,” was unconstitutionally overbroad in the context of Section 434(e) to the extent it encompassed anything beyond express electoral advocacy. The plaintiffs appear to assume that the