Full opinion text
ORDER DENYING SUPERVISEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR REVOCATION OF SUPERVISED RELEASE GONZALEZ, District Judge. Presently before the Court is supervisee John G. Reynard’s (“Reynard”) motion to dismiss the United States Probation Officer’s petition for revocation of Reynard’s supervised release. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Reynard’s motion. BACKGROUND On October 5, 1998, Reynard pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). [Doc. No. 15.] On December 21, 1998, the Court sentenced Reynard to 30 months in custody, followed by 3 years of supervised release. [Doc. No. 18.] The Court ordered Reynard to comply with several conditions of supervised release, including (1) to “[s]ubmit to a search of person, property, residence, abode or vehicle at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner by the Probation Officer”; and (2) to refrain from “commit[ting] another federal, state, or local crime.” [Doc. No. 19.] On November 3, 2000, after serving time in custody, Rey-nard’s term of supervised released commenced. (June 13, 2002 Petition, p. 1.) On December 19, 2000, shortly after Reynard commenced his supervised release, Congress enacted the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (“the DNA Act”). The DNA Act requires U.S. Probation Offices to collect a DNA sample from each individual on supervised release “who is, or has been, convicted of a qualifying federal offense.” 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(2). Robbery is a qualifying offense. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d)(l)(E). The DNA Act expressly indicates that cooperation by qualifying individuals in the collection of the DNA sample is “a condition of that probation, parole, or supervised release.” 42 U.S.C. § 14135c. Additionally, simultaneously with passage of the DNA Act, Congress amended the supervised release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583, to state: “The court shall order, as an explicit condition of supervised release, that the defendant cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample from the defendant, if the collection of such a sample is authorized pursuant to the DNA [Act].” 18 U.S.C. § 3583. The DNA Act provides that, once a sample is taken, the Probation Office sends the sample to the FBI for entry into the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”), a national DNA database linking DNA evidence in a nationwide computer network. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(b). In accordance with the provisions of the DNA Act, the U.S. Probation Office for the Southern District of California complies with its duties under the Act as follows. First, qualifying individuals receive notice of the Act’s requirements by correspondence and are required to read and sign a disclosure form. Second, an appointment is made for the individual to have a single blood sample drawn by a licensed health care professional. Third, the blood sample is mailed to the FBI in Quantico, Virginia. (Gov’t Exhibit 10.) On May 31, 2002, the U.S. Probation Office sent a letter to Reynard’s counsel stating that Reynard was “required to cooperate in the DNA collection process as mandated by” the DNA Act. (Gov’t Exhibit 4.) The letter stated that Reynard’s probation officer would soon contact Reynard to arrange for the taking of Reynard’s blood. The letter further stated that failure to cooperate in the collection of a blood sample: (1) would be a Class A misdemeanor; and (2) would constitute a violation of Rey-nard’s mandatory conditions of supervision. (Id.) On June 4, 2002, Reynard met with his probation officer, David Dilbeck, who informed Reynard that Reynard must comply with the DNA Act. Additionally, Rey-nard received a one-page “DNA Collection Letter of Instruction,” which again informed Reynard that compliance with the DNA Act was mandatory, and non-compliance would constitute a Class A misdemeanor and a violation of a mandatory condition of his supervised release. Rey-nard signed the DNA Letter of Instruction, indicating that he “understood] the requirements and agree[d] to abide by them.” (Gov’t Exhibit 5.) Also on June 4, 2002, Reynard received a notice informing Reynard that he must arrive for a blood draw at the Probation Office on June 10, 2002 at 10:00 a.m.. On June 10, 2002, Reynard timely appeared for his blood draw appointment, yet, after a discussion with his defense counsel, declined to submit to having his blood drawn. On June 13, 2002, probation officer Dilbeck petitioned for an order to show cause why Reynard’s supervised release should not be revoked. Officer Dil-beck alleged that Reynard violated a mandatory condition by violating a federal law. Specifically, officer Dilbeck alleged that Reynard “declined to cooperate in the collection of his blood in order to obtain a DNA sample, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 14135a.” On July 11, 2002, Reynard filed the instant motion to dismiss Probation Officer Dilbeck’s petition for revocation. Rey-nard’s motion raises eight issues: (1) whether applying the DNA Act to Rey-nard would be impermissibly retroactive under the Supreme Court’s St. Cyr decision; (2) whether applying the DNA Act to Reynard would be impermissibly retroactive under principles of due process; (3) whether applying the DNA Act to Rey-nard would violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws; (4) whether applying the DNA Act to Reynard would be an unlawful bill of attainder; (5) whether mandatory collection of a DNA sample from Reynard falls within the “special needs exception” to the Fourth Amendment; (6) whether the DNA Act violates separation of powers principles; (7) whether the DNA Act violates the Commerce Clause; and (8) whether compelled extraction of blood samples under the DNA Act violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court will address these issues in turn. I. Whether applying the DNA Act to Reynard would be impermissibly retroactive under the Supreme Court’s St. Cyr and Landgraf decisions A. Legal Principles Governing Ret-roactivity In 1998, Reynard pleaded guilty to robbery and accepted the terms of his custody and supervised release. Subsequently, in 2000, Congress enacted the DNA Act, thereby altering the conditions of Reynard’s supervised release by requiring Reynard to give a DNA specimen. According to Reynard, the DNA Act is inapplicable to Reynard under the two-step test articulated in Landgraf and St. Cyr because: (1) Congress did not clearly and unambiguously express its intent to apply the DNA Act retroactively; and (2) the DNA Act impairs vested rights, or creates a new obligation, duty, or disability with respect to past transactions or considerations. To determine whether it is permissible to apply an act of Congress retroactively, courts apply the two-prong approach set forth in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) and Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). In the first step, the court should “ascertain whether Congress has directed with the requisite clarity that the law be applied retrospectively.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316, 121 S.Ct. 2271. The statutory language must be “so clear that it could sustain only one interpretation.” Id. at 317, 121 S.Ct. 2271. A statute fails to achieve this high level of clarity if it is possible to “plausibly” interpret the statute in a manner suggesting that Congress did not intend retroactive application. If the legislation satisfies this first step, the statute applies retroactively in accordance with clear congressional intent, and the court need not proceed to step two. However, if the statute and the legislative history do not clearly specify whether Congress intended the statute to apply retrospectively, courts proceed to step two and determine whether application of the provision in question would have a retroactive effect. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483. A retroactive effect is one that “would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.” Id. If a provision would have such an effect, then the court should presume that Congress did not intend the statute to apply retroactively. 1. Step One: Congressional Intent to Apply the DNA Act Retroactively With regard to the first St. Cyr step, Reynard asserts that it is unclear whether Congress intended the DNA Act to apply retroactively. Reynard notes that the DNA Act applies to any individual “who is, or has been, convicted of a qualifying federal offense....’' 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(l) and (2) (emphasis added). Reynard argues that this “or has been” language does not necessarily support the conclusion that Congress intended the DNA Act to apply retroactively. Reynard asserts, for example, that Congress, by using this “or has been” language, could have intended the Act to cover individuals who committed non-qualifying offenses (e.g., drug offenses) after the enactment of the DNA Act, yet who also committed a qualifying offense at some point prior to the enactment of the DNA Act. Thus, according to Reynard, the DNA Act does not contain retroactivity language “so clear that it could sustain only one interpretation.” In opposition to Reynard’s retroactivity argument under the first prong of St. Cyr, the government proffers four sources of evidence which purportedly demonstrate Congress’s clear and unambiguous intent to apply the DNA Act retroactively. First, the government cites to the language of § 14135a(a)(2) stating that the probation office “shall collect a DNA sam-pie from each individual who is, or has been, convicted of a qualifying Federal offense.” 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(2) (emphasis added). The government argues that this language indicates clear congressional intent to apply the DNA Act to all individuals currently on supervised release who “have been” convicted of a qualifying crime, regardless of when the qualifying conviction occurred. Second, the government cites a second provision of the DNA Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(l), which applies to “each individual in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons who is, or has been, convicted of a qualifying Federal offense.... ” 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(l) (emphasis added). The government asserts that this provision of the DNA Act necessarily indicates congressional intent to apply the DNA Act retroactively. According to the government, on the date of the DNA Act’s enactment, an individual in federal custody with a qualifying offense on his or her record necessarily committed the qualifying offense prior to the enactment of the DNA Act. Thus, according to the government, § 14135a(a)(l) demonstrates that Congress intended to apply the DNA Act to every individual who has committed a qualifying offense at any time, without regard to when the qualifying offense occurred. Third, the government cites several sources of legislative history suggesting that Congress perceived the absence of federal offenders in the nationwide CODIS databank to be a serious problem in need of an immediate remedy. From this, the government concludes that Congress must have intended the DNA Act to apply retroactively to speedily fill the federal “gap” in CODIS by including all qualifying offenders who have committed a qualifying offense at any time in the past. Fourth, the government cites a Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) cost estimate for implementation of the DNA Act. See Appendix, Exhibit 14, p. 58-59 (H.R.Rep. 106-900(1), at *14). In this cost estimate, the CBO estimated that it would cost $500,000 to collect DNA samples from each person in federal custody who “has been” convicted of a qualifying felony. The CBO stated: Based on information from the Department of Justice, CBO estimates that there are roughly 6,000 such persons now and that there would be another 2,000 persons incarcerated in fiscal year 2001 and in each year thereafter. (H.R.Rep.l06-900(I), at *14.) In addition, the CBO estimated that it would cost $500,000 to collect DNA samples from each person under federally supervised release who “has been” convicted of a qualifying felony. The CBO stated: The Administrative Office of the United States Courts estimates that there are about 1,500 such individuals now and that there would be a few hundred more offenders under federal supervision in fiscal year 2001 and in each year thereafter. (H.R.Rep.l06-900(I), at *14.) According to the government, this CBO cost estimate indicates that Congress intended for the DNA Act to apply retroactively to: (1) all qualifying inmates already in prison at the time of the Act’s enactment; and (2) all qualifying persons already on supervised release at the time of the Act’s enactment. The Court has carefully reviewed the parties’ arguments, the text of the DNA Act, and the legislative history of the DNA Act. On the basis of this review, the Court concludes that, while Congress may have intended the DNA Act to apply retrospectively, Congress failed to clearly and unambiguously express such intent. In other words, the Court finds that the text and legislative history of the DNA Act are not “so clear that [they] could sustain only one interpretation.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316, 121 S.Ct. 2271. The Court’s finding is based on four considerations. First, the plain language of the DNA Act does not clarify the extent to which the Act applies to persons whose qualifying convictions occurred prior to the date on which the Act took effect. While §§ 14135a(a)(l) and (2) expressly apply to a person who “is, or has been” convicted of a qualifying offense, this language does not demonstrate that Congress “affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272-73, 114 S.Ct. 1483. For example, by inserting the “or has been” language into § 14135a(a)(l), Congress may have intended the Act to cover individuals: (1) who enter federal custody subsequent to enactment of the DNA Act; yet (2) who have been convicted of a qualifying offense at any time in the past. Similarly, by inserting the “or has been” language into § 14135a(a)(2), Congress may have intended to cover individuals: (1) who enter federal custody subsequent to enactment of the Act; and (2) who have been convicted of a qualifying offense at any time. Thus, because the plain language of the DNA Act is not “so clear that it could sustain only one interpretation,” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316, 121 S.Ct. 2271, the Court finds that the DNA Act is subject to the presumption against retroactive interpretation. Second, while the legislative history of the DNA Act suggests that Congress passed the Act to fill a gap in the CODIS database resulting from the absence of federal offenders, it does not necessarily follow that Congress intended to fill this gap by applying the Act retroactively. Certainly, many members of Congress believed that the DNA Act served an important purpose by requiring qualifying federal offenders to contribute to the CODIS databank. Moreover, it is possible that Congress desired to fill this “gap” as rapidly as possible by applying the Act retroactively.- Nevertheless, the legislative history of the Act contains not a single statement demonstrating that Congress “specifically considered the potential unfairness that retroactive application would produce.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 317, 121 S.Ct. 2271. In the absence of any direct legislative history pertaining to the retro-activity issue, the Court cannot find that “Congress has directed with the requisite clarity that the law be applied retrospectively.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316, 121 S.Ct. 2271. Third, the Court finds that congressional silence on the retroactivity or non-retroac-tivity of the DNA Act is significant in itself. Congress presumably understands the somewhat formulaic textual requirements for expressing congressional intent to make a statute retroactive. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 318-19, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (stating that Congress may express non-retroactive intent by failing to explicitly expand scope of statute to cover “conviction[s] ... entered before, on, or after” statute’s enactment date); Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir.2000) (“Congress is presumed to be familiar with Supreme Court precedent and to expect that its enactment will be interpreted accordingly”). Moreover, congressional leaders working to secure support for new legislation may not always be capable of resolving potential retroactivity issues. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 261, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (“It is entirely possible' — indeed, highly probable — that, because it was unable to resolve the retroactivity issue..., Congress viewed the matter as an open issue to be resolved by the courts”). Thus, the dearth of discussion pertaining to ret-roactivity in the legislative history may simply indicate that Congress did not decide whether the DNA Act would apply retroactively. Fourth, the Court is not persuaded that the CBO cost report clearly and unambiguously indicates that Congress intended the DNA Act to apply retrospectively. Congress did not include the figures set forth in the CBO cost report in the final version of § 14135a(a). Moreover, it appears that the purpose of the cost report was to inform Congress of the CBO’s estimate of the potential budgetary ramifications of the passage of legislation. While the cost estimate certainly suggests that CBO believed the DNA Act would apply retroactively, the cost report does not definitively show what Congress intended by passing the amendments. See, e.g., Lee v. Yee, 643 F.Supp. 593, 599-600 (D.Hawai’i 1986) (declining to accept congressional intent argument premised on CBO estimate); Sundberg v. Mansour, 627 F.Supp. 616, 621 (W.D.Mich.1986) (“The Court does not consider either general references to Congress’ intent to decrease public assistance expenditures or the Congressional Budget Office’s assumption that § 602(a)(38) would produce net Medicaid costs as sufficient indications of Congress’ intent to apply § 602(a)(38) to determinations of Medicaid as well as AFDC eligibility”); J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Southern Stress Wire Corp., 575 F.Supp. 365, 368 n. 4 (N.D.Ga.1982) (“To the extent that congressional intent can be inferred from a CBO cost estimate, this court draws a different inference”). Thus, although the Court recognizes that the CBO report provides evidentiary support in favor of construing the DNA Act to be retroactive, the Court is unwilling to rely on the report as a clear indication of congressional intent, especially given the lack of clear corroborating evidence in the legislative history. In sum, the Court finds, on the basis of the above four considerations, that the express language of the DNA Act is not “so clear that it could sustain only one interpretation.” Although the question is extremely close, the Court finds that the legislative history of the Act does not direct with the requisite clarity that the DNA Act be applied retrospectively. Accordingly, the Court proceeds to the second prong of the St. Cyr/Landgraf retroac-tivity test. 2. Step Two: Retroactive Effect of the DNA Act As discussed above, when a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court’s first task is to determine whether Congress expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483. If Congress has done so, the court need not resort to judicial default rules. Yet, if the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have a “retroactive effect.” Id. That is, the court must determine whether the statute would: (1) impair rights a party possessed when he or she acted; (2) increase a party’s liability for past conduct; or (3) impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would create such a retroactive effect, the traditional anti-ret-roactivity presumption should apply. Id. Although the “retroactive effect” analysis appears relatively straightforward, the determination of whether a statute has a retroactive effect is not a simple or mechanical task. Id., 511 U.S. at 268, 114 S.Ct. 1483. As the Landgraf Court recognized, the Supreme Court has utilized numerous valid formulas for identifying retroactive effect. The “retroactive effect” analysis, however, is not formulaic, but instead relies on judicial conceptions of the nature and extent of the change in the law, and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and the relevant past event. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483. “Any test of retroactivity will leave room for disagreement in hard cases, and is unlikely to classify the enormous variety of legal changes with perfect philosophical clarity. Retroactivity is a matter on which judges tend to have sound instincts, and familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations offer sound guidance.” Id. (quoting Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472, 476, 59 N.E. 1033, 1034 (1901) (Holmes, J.)). In the instant case, Reynard argues that the DNA Act imposes a new obligation, duty, or disability on him. Reynard contends that the DNA Act has an obvious and severe retroactive effect on Mr. Reynard. The DNA Act “creates a new obligation,” “imposes a new duty,” and “attaches a new disability” on Mr. Reynard by requiring him to submit to the physical intrusion of a blood extraction so that his genetic makeup can become a part of permanent law enforcement files. (Memo. ISO Motion, p. 5.) As a factual matter, Reynard’s contention is at least partially incorrect because it relies on an overly broad construction of the DNA Act. The DNA Act does not impose on Reynard the duty to contribute his “genetic makeup” to “permanent law enforcement files.” In fact, the national DNA identification index, created by Congress in 1994, is comprised of particular genetic markers — known as “junk sites”— that are purposely selected because they are not associated with any known genetic trait. “[T]he effect of the system is to provide a kind of genetic fingerprint, which uniquely identifies an individual, but does not provide a basis for determining or inferring anything else about the person.” H.R. Rep. 106-900(1), at *27. Thus, to the extent that Reynard argues that the DNA Act has an impermissible retroactive effect because it reveals Reynard’s genetic code to the government, Reynard’s argument is factually unsupported. Furthermore, the DNA Act sets forth express privacy protection standards that prohibit any person from using or disclosing DNA samples for any purpose other than those authorized by the DNA Act. 42 U.S.C. § 14135d. Under these standards, public or private entities that prepare DNA samples for inclusion in the national DNA index must use such samples solely for identification purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b). Thus, the DNA Act does not, as Reynard contends, impose on Reynard a duty to reveal his “genetic makeup” to federal authorities, or anyone else. Moreover, while Reynard correctly asserts that the DNA Act imposes on Rey-nard a duty “to submit to the physical intrusion of a blood extraction” (Memo. ISO Motion, p. 5), the Court finds that the extraction of blood does not, in itself, constitute a “new” duty for retroactivity purposes. On December 21, 1998, the Court sentenced Reynard to 30 months in custody, followed by 3 years of supervised release. [Doc. No. 18.] On that date, the Court imposed upon Reynard the broad duty to “[s]ubmit to a search of person, property, residence, abode or vehicle at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner by the Probation Officer.” Reynard and the government agree that the extraction of blood constitutes such a “search.” (Reply Memo. ISO Motion, p. 18.) Thus, although Reynard raises serious questions as to the reasonableness of a blood extraction search, the Court finds that, Fourth Amendment issues aside, blood extraction falls within the scope of Reynard’s duty, imposed in 1998, to “submit to a search of [his] person.... ” The DNA Act does appear to impose a new disability on Reynard insofar as the Act obligates Reynard to contribute his DNA “fingerprint” to the nationwide DNA identification index. Prior to passage of the DNA Act, Reynard may have been unaware of any potential obligation to contribute his DNA “fingerprint” to CODIS. Moreover, the obligation to contribute a DNA sample to CODIS may effect a disadvantage on Reynard because, should Rey-nard commit an offense in the future, Rey-nard’s contribution of DNA to CODIS may expose him to an increased risk of arrest, prosecution, and conviction. The Court, however, finds it unlikely that this new obligation upsets Reynard’s reliance interests and settled expectations to a degree sufficient to create a retroactive effect. The Court bases this finding on a close reading of the Supreme Court’s St. Cyr decision. Reynard asserts that the Supreme Court’s St. Cyr decision did not establish a “conscious reliance” test for determining whether a new statute disturbs reliance interests and settled expectations. The Court agrees with Reynard’s reading of St. Cyr. However, in St. Cyr, the Supreme Court unquestionably based its decision on the existence of sufficient evidence showing that “[Mr. St. Cyr], and other aliens like him, almost certainly relied upon th[e] likelihood of [relief from deportation] in deciding whether to forgo their right to a trial....” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 325, 121 S.Ct. 2271. Thus, while the Supreme Court in St Cyr did not create a strict “actual reliance” test, the St. Cyr Court did indicate that the purported reliance interest at issue cannot be wholly speculative, and must have some basis in fact. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321-26, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (reviewing importance of § 212(c) relief in plea agreements prior to AEDPA and IIR-IRA, and concluding that “[St. Cyr], and other aliens like him, almost certainly relied upon th[e] likelihood [of § 212(c) relief] in deciding whether to forgo their right to a trial, [such that] the elimination of any possibility of § 212(c) relief by IIR-IRA has an obvious and severe retroactive effect”). In the instant case, Reynard argues that the DNA Act has a retroactive effect because it upsets the settled expectations of persons who pleaded guilty to qualifying offenses prior to 2000 in reliance on certain considerations regarding “aspects of life after conviction.” Reynard asserts that the Supreme Court found [in St. Cyr] that “as a general matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions.... ” Similarly, all criminal defendants, as a general matter, consider the aspects of life after conviction, such as supervised release and other requirements, when entering into a plea agreement. (Reply ISO Motion, p. 8.) The Court agrees with the inarguable proposition that “criminal defendants, as a general matter, consider the aspects of life after conviction.. .when entering into a plea agreement.” However, this statement is extremely broad and fails to identify or suggest the existence of any particular settled expectation or reliance interest that the DNA Act disturbed. By advancing this proposition, Reynard may be suggesting that he pleaded guilty to robbery in 1998, at least in part, because he knew that his conditions of confinement and supervised release would not require him to contribute a DNA fingerprint to federal authorities. However, the Court is aware of no evidence suggesting that, prior to 2000, persons who pleaded guilty to federal offenses generally did so with awareness of, and reliance on, their non-obligation to provide a DNA sample. Moreover, the legislative history of the DNA Act suggests that federal defendants in October of 1998 were not “acutely aware” of any non-obligation to provide a DNA sample because, in October of 1998, a federal law already existed by which Congress attempted to create such an obligation. In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, authorizing the FBI to establish a national index of DNA samples from convicted federal offenders. The FBI exercised this authority by creating CODIS, the national DNA index. In addition, all 50 state legislatures enacted statutes requiring convicted offenders to provide DNA samples for entry into the CODIS system. H.R. Rep. 106-900(1), at *8. Between 1994 and 1996, however, the FBI lacked authority to include DNA data from federal offenders in the CODIS databank. Id. In 1996, Congress, as part of AEDPA, expressly provided the FBI with authority to include in CODIS all DNA samples taken from federal offenders. At least some members of Congress believed that the 1996 legislation authorized the FBI to begin collecting DNA samples from federal offenders immediately. However, at some point after the passage of AEDPA, the Department of Justice reached the conclusion that the 1996 legislation did not confer the Department with sufficient authority to collect DNA samples from federal offenders. H.R. Rep. 106-900(1), at *9. Despite the Department of Justice’s belief, in October of 1998, the month in which Reynard pleaded guilty to robbery, AEDPA § 811(a)(2) continued to authorize the FBI to include DNA samples from all federal offenders in the CODIS index. Not until December of 1998 did the FBI request Congress to enact more explicit statutory authority to allow the FBI to take DNA samples from federal offenders for inclusion into CODIS. Id. (citing FBI Laboratory Report to Congress, Implementation Plan for Collection of DNA Samples from Federal Convicted Offenders Pursuant to P.L. 105 — [119] (December, 1998)). Thus, in October of 1998, when Reynard pleaded guilty to robbery, federal law appeared to grant the FBI authority to collect a DNA sample from Reynard, although the Department of Justice believed that Congress had not conferred sufficient authority to do so. For purposes of the instant case, the above legislative history tends to undermine the proposition that, in 1998, federal offenders pleaded guilty with an expectation that they would not have to contribute a DNA fingerprint to CODIS. In 1998, federal law expressly authorized the FBI to expand CODIS by including DNA samples from all such federal offenders. Although some ambiguity persisted regarding the Department of Justice’s authority to collect the DNA samples, the wilting was clearly on the wall, in the form of an express provision in the United States Code. Moreover, legislative history aside, Rey-nard has made no affirmative showing that federal offenders who pleaded guilty to an offense prior to 2000 considered the lack of a federal DNA fingerprinting obligation to be an important consideration in entering their guilty pleas. As such, the Court finds that the 2000 DNA Act, by obligating Reynard to contribute a DNA “fingerprint” to CODIS, does not upset Reynard’s rebanee interests or settled expectations. Accordingly, the Court finds that the DNA Act does not have a retroactive effect on Reynard and, consequently, applies retroactively to him. II. Would application of the DNA Act to Reynard be impermissibly retroactive under principles of due process? Reynard advances a second retro-activity argument. Reynard’s second retroactivity argument is not based on the two-step St. Cyr/Landgraf test, but instead relies on principles of due process. According to Reynard, even assuming arguendo that the DNA Act applies retroactively under St. Cyr and Landgraf, the retroactive application of the DNA Act to Reynard does not pass muster under the Due Process Clause. Reynard correctly notes that retroactive legislation is subject to a more stringent rationality requirement than is prospective legislation. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730, 104 S.Ct. 2709, 81 L.Ed.2d 601 (1984); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-17, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). Like any legislation, retroactive legislation must meet the basic due process requirement of being “supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by a rational means.” Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 729, 104 S.Ct. 2709. Furthermore, with retroactive legislation, there must be an independent rationale for retroactivity. Id., 467 U.S. at 730, 104 S.Ct. 2709. A purpose that supports a law’s prospective application is not sufficient, in itself, to justify retroactive application. Id. According to Reynard, retroactive application of the DNA’Act cannot survive scrutiny under this due process test because Congress has not offered any rationale for applying the Act retroactively- In response, the government argues that the legislative history of the DNA Act indicates that an independent rationale existed (and exists) for retroactive application of the Act. According to the government, Congress believed that the lack of federal offenders in the nationwide CODIS databank created an “urgent” and “glaring” need to close the “inexplicable” loophole for federal offenders. According to the government, this perceived “urgent” and “glaring” need created a rational basis for applying the DNA Act retroactively because Congress desired to add as many DNA samples as possible, as rapidly as possible, to the CODIS databank. By authorizing the collection of DNA samples from all persons in federal custody or on supervised release, without regard to their dates of conviction, Congress could rationally expect to meet this temporal goal. After once again examining the legislative history of the DNA Act, the Court agrees that Congress did believe that the prior omission of federal offenders from the national CODIS databank created the need for a rapid remedial action. While this legislative history does not necessarily indicate a clear and unambiguous intent by Congress to make the DNA Act retroactive, the legislative history does appear to provide a rational basis for applying the DNA Act retroactively. In other words, the DNA Act’s legislative history indicates that retrospective application of the DNA Act is not arbitrary and irrational, but is consistent with Congress’s intent in passing the law — i.e., to include DNA samples from federal offenders in the CODIS databank, with all possible speed. III. Would application of the DNA Act to Reynard violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws? A. Legal Principles Governing Ex Post Facto Laws The U.S. Constitution provides that “No.. .ex post facto law shall be passed” by Congress. U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 9, cl. 3. The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits two types of laws that purportedly are at issue in this case: (1) a law that criminalizes an action done before the passing of the law; and (2) a law that inflicts a greater punishment for a crime than was possible when the crime was committed. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 456, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 521-525, 120 S.Ct. 1620, 146 L.Ed.2d 577 (2000); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798) (Chase, J.). With regard to whether a law “inflicts a greater punishment for a crime than was possible when the crime was committed”— i.e., the second category of ex post facto law at issue here — the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have provided ample guidance for identifying such laws. In Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987), the Supreme Court stated that the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids the application of any retrospective law that “disadvantage[s] the offender affected by it.” Miller, 482 U.S. at 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446. In United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873 (9th Cir.1993), the Ninth Circuit adopted this Miller “disadvantage the offender” test. The Paskow court held: “[T]he ex post facto clause is violated when an amendment to the supervised release statute disadvantages a defendant who committed the underlying offense before the amendment became effective — even if, as here, the defendant committed the act that led to revocation of his supervised release after the amendment was adopted.” Id. at 883 (emphasis added). Two years after the Ninth Circuit decided Paskow, the Supreme Court disavowed the Miller “disadvantage the offender” test upon which the Paskow court relied. In California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (April 25, 1995), the Supreme Court stated: Our opinion[] in Miller suggested that enhancements to the measure of criminal punishment fall within the ex post facto prohibition because they operate to the “disadvantage” of covered offenders. But that language.. .is inconsistent with the framework developed in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990). After Collins, the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of “disadvantage,” ... but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588. Three months after the Supreme Court decided Morales, the Ninth Circuit, in Rise v. State of Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1562 (July 18, 1995), addressed an ex post facto challenge to an Oregon statute requiring all convicted sex offenders, past and present, to provide DNA samples to the state. A group of convicted sex offenders asserted that Oregon’s DNA statute increased their “punishment” for past convictions. The Rise court stated that “[n]ot every change in a convicted person’s situation violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.” The Rise court further stated that “legislation may lawfully impose new requirements on convicted persons if the statute’s ‘overall design and effect’ indicates a ‘non-punitive intent.’ ” Rise, 59 F.3d at 1562 (citation omitted). The Rise court went on to hold that the State of Oregon could require convicted sex offenders to provide DNA samples because the “obvious purpose” of the law was “to create a DNA data bank to assist in the identification, arrest, and prosecution of criminals, not to punish convicted murderers and sexual offenders.... ” Id. at 1562. Two years after the Rise decision, in Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir.1997), the Ninth Circuit set forth a clear test for courts to follow in determining whether a law inflicts a new “punishment” for a prior conviction. In Russell, convicted sex offenders challenged the State of Washington’s community notification statute, which required registration by offenders, as well as disclosure of offenders’ conviction information to the local community. Two such offenders challenged the Washington statute on ex post facto grounds, arguing that the community notification provision imposed a greater “punishment” on them for past convictions. To address this argument, the Russell court adopted the “intent-effect” test for determining whether a statute imposes an impermissible post-sentencing “punishment” under the Ex Post Facto Clause. Under the “intent-effect” test, a court determines: (1) whether the legislature intended the statute at issue to be punitive, and (2) whether the sanction is “so punitive” in effect that it prevents the court from legitimately viewing the statute as regulatory or civil in nature, notwithstanding the legislature’s nonpunitive intent. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1087. Thus, the first part of the intent-effect test (“intent”) looks solely to the declared purpose of the legislature, as well as the structure and design of the statute. Id. The second part of the intent-effect test (“effect”) requires the party challenging the statute to demonstrate that the statutory scheme is so punitive in effect that it negates any non-punitive intent. Id. If, after applying the “intent-effect” test, a court determines that a statute does not impose “punishment,” then the statute does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. B. Reynard’s Ex Post Facto Arguments Reynard argues that application of the DNA Act to him violates the Ex Post Facto Clause in two ways. First, Reynard argues that the DNA Act criminalizes an action that was innocent prior to passage of the Act. Specifically, Reynard asserts that “when [Reynard] pled guilty to a qualifying offense, it was innocent for him to fail to test. Now, his failure to test constitutes a criminal offense.” (Motion, p. 7.) Second, Reynard argues that application of the DNA Act to him violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because it increases Reynard’s punishment for his 1998 conviction. Specifically, Reynard asserts that “the DNA Act changes punishment, or inflicts greater punishment, than the law allowed when defendant sustained his conviction.” (Memo. ISO Motion, p. 8.) Rey-nard argues that the DNA Act imposes greater punishment on him because the Act exposes Reynard to revocation of supervised release if Reynard declines to allow the probation office to draw blood. Reynard asserts that he did not face this potential for revocation prior to passage of the DNA Act. In connection with this second argument, Reynard cites the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Paskow, discussed above, and asserts that Paskoiu is “the controlling Ninth Circuit authority on this issue.” Reynard argues that, under Paskow, Reynard’s supervised release cannot be revoked on the basis of a DNA Act violation because the DNA Act was passed after Reynard’s underlying conviction. C. The Government’s Opposition In response to Reynard’s first argument, the government asserts that the DNA Act does not criminalize any act (or omission) that Reynard committed prior to passage of the Act. According to the government, Reynard’s refusal to give blood occurred over 18 months after Congress passed the DNA Act. Thus, the government argues the DNA Act criminalizes only new conduct — i.e., Reynard’s recent refusal to provide a DNA sample — not Reynard’s conduct predating the Act. In response to Reynard’s second argument, the government asserts that the DNA Act does not increase Reynard’s “punishment” for his 1998 conviction. In support of this assertion, the government advances two arguments. First, the government argues that revocation of supervised release is, by definition, not punishment. The government argues that supervised release is merely “a component of the defendant’s sentence for the underlying offense.” Thus, because supervised release (and its attendant conditions) is simply a part of Reynard’s original sentence, the revocation of supervised release is not a “new punishment.” Second, the government argues that, under the “intent-effect” test articulated in Russell v. Gregoire, the DNA Act is regulatory, not “punitive,” in nature. Applying the first step of the Russell “intent-effect” test, the government argues that Congress’s central goal in passing the DNA Act was: (1) to augment an informational, nationwide database; (2) to enhance public safety; and (3) to increase the overall accuracy of the criminal justice system by allowing for more accurate adjudication of guilt and innocence. Applying the second step of the Russell “intent-effect” test, the government argues that the overall effect of the DNA Act is not punitive. The government notes that the DNA Act is administrative in nature, and carries only a misdemeanor penalty for non-compliance. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1088-89 (misdemeanor crime of failing to register as sex offender constitutes a separate punishment for a separate offense, and is not a “punishment” for prior offense). Next, the government cites to at least five cases in which courts have rejected ex post facto challenges to state DNA statutes by holding that such statutes are non-punitive in nature. Finally, the government notes that at least one federal court has sustained the federal DNA Act against an ex post facto challenge. United States v. Lujan, Cr. No. 98-480-02 HA, Opinion and Order, pp. 5-8 (D.Or. July 9, 2002) (unpublished) (holding that DNA Act does not increase the punishment for defendant’s original offense, and that the Act is not punitive in intent or effect under Russell two-part test). D. Analysis of Ex Post Facto Arguments As stated above, Reynard first argues that application of the DNA Act to Reynard criminalizes an act — i.e., failing to provide DNA to the government — that was innocent prior to passage of the Act. This Court is not persuaded by this first argument. The probation office seeks to revoke Reynard’s supervised release based on Reynard’s June 10, 2002 refusal to comply with the DNA Act. Thus, the DNA Act does not criminalize an act (or omission) that occurred prior to enactment of the DNA Act. Instead, the DNA Act criminalizes Reynard’s June 10, 2002 failure to comply with the previously enacted DNA Act. Reynard’s second argument presents a closer question. As stated above, Reynard contends that application of the DNA Act to Reynard increases the “punishment” for his 1998 conviction by exposing him to revocation of supervised release. To resolve this second issue, the Court must apply the Russell “intent-effect” test to the facts of this case. 1. The DNA Act: Punitive Congressional Intent? The legislative history of the DNA Act demonstrates that Congress did not create the Act as a means for punishing qualifying offenders for past convictions. Instead, Congress desired to assist law enforcement agencies to perform their basic law enforcement function by “match[ing] DNA samples from crime scenes where there are no suspects with the DNA of convicted offenders.” 146 Cong. Rec. H8572-01, at *H8575. Additionally, Congress intended to increase the efficacy of the criminal justice system by “eliminating] the prospect that innocent individuals w[ill] be wrongly held for crimes that they did not commit.” Id. at *H8576. Furthermore, Congress desired to prevent violent felons from repeating their crimes in the future. 146 Cong. Rec. S11645-02, at *S11646 (“Statistics show that many of these violent felons will repeat their crimes once they are back in society”). This legislative history indicates that Congress did not authorize blood draws under the DNA Act to “punish” qualifying offenders. 2. The DNA Act: Punitive Effect? The Court next must determine whether the blood contribution provisions of the DNA Act are “so punitive” in effect that they override Congress’s non-punitive intent. In making this determination, the court is guided by seven factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963). Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 986-87 (9th Cir.2001). The seven factors are: (1) whether the DNA Act imposes an affirmative disability on qualifying offenders; (2) whether collection of blood has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether the DNA Act’s provisions are effective only upon a finding of scienter; (4) whether operation of the DNA Act will promote the traditional aims of punishment-i.e., retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the DNA Act regulates behavior that is already a crime; (6) whether the DNA Act serves some non-punitive purpose; (7) whether the DNA blood-draw provisions are excessive in relation to the non-punitive purpose, if any. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168, 83 S.Ct. 554; Doe I, 259 F.3d at 986-93; Russell, 124 F.3d at 1089, 1093. Application of the Mendoza-Martinez factors does not support a finding that the DNA Act is “so punitive” in effect that it prevents the Court from legitimately viewing the DNA Act as regulatory in nature. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1087. First, the DNA Act imposes a minimal affirmative disability on qualifying individuals because the Act requires such individuals to contribute a single DNA fingerprint to the nationwide DNA index. Compare Doe I, 259 F.3d at 987 (Alaska law required sex offenders to re-register at police stations four times per year, every year, and to provide under oath a wide variety of personal information); Russell, 124 F.3d at 1082, 1088 (onetime only registration requirement is not affirmative disability or restraint). Second, the Court finds no authority, and Reynard cites none, to support the proposition that the collection of blood, for identification purposes or otherwise, has historically been regarded as punishment. Third, the penalty provisions of the DNA Act do not require a specific showing of scienter. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(5). Fourth, conditions of supervised release have not historically been regarded as punishment, but instead as a means to further the deterrent, protective, and rehabilitative goals of sentencing. United States v. Eyler, 67 F.3d 1386, 1393 (9th Cir.1995). Fifth, while the DNA Act does criminalize an individual’s failure to submit to a blood draw, such non-compliance is punished as a separate offense, which diminishes potential ex post facto problems. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1088-89. Sixth, the DNA Act reasonably serves a non-punitive purpose by “eliminat[ing] the prospect that innocent individuals w[ill] be wrongly held for crimes that they did not commit.” 146 Cong. Rec. H8572-01, at *H8576. See also id. at *H8578 (“It is crucial for defendants to have access to the CODIS system in circumstances that possibly establish innocence”); 146 Cong. Rec. S11645-02, at *S11646 (finding that DNA testing has exonerated over 75 convicted persons in the United States and Canada). In sum, the Court finds that the DNA Act does not criminalize any act (or omission) that Reynard committed prior to enactment of the Act. The Court further finds that the DNA Act does not inflict a greater “punishment” on Reynard for Rey-nard’s 1998 robbery conviction. Accordingly, the Court finds that the DNA Act does not, as applied to the facts of this case, violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. IV. Is the DNA Act, as applied to Rey-nard, an unconstitutional bill of attainder? A. Applicable Legal Principles Article I, § 9, cl. 3, of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o Bill of Attainder... shall be passed” by Congress. For a law to constitute a bill of attainder, it must possess three elements. The law must: (1) “single out an identifiable group”; (2) inflict punishment; and (3) dispense with a judicial trial. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 468, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977); Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 846-7, 104 S.Ct. 3348, 82 L.Ed.2d 632 (1984). With regard to the “punishment” element, courts apply a three-pronged test for determining whether a challenged act imposes a “punishment” for bill of attainder purposes. First, a court should determine whether the challenged legislative act “falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment.” Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475, 97 S.Ct. 2777. Second, courts should determine whether “the law under challenge, viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further non-punitive legislative purposes.” Id. Third, courts should determine whether the legislative record evinces a “Congressional intent to punish.” Id. at 478, 97 S.Ct. 2777. B. Analysis Reynard argues that the DNA Act exhibits all three features of a bill of attainder. First, Reynard argues that the DNA Act singles out individuals based on their past commission of specific qualified offenses. Second, Reynard argues that the DNA Act punishes these individuals by requiring them to provide blood and by authorizing detention of those who refuse. Third, Reynard argues that the DNA Act imposes such punishment without a judicial trial. The government does not dispute that the DNA Act possesses the first feature of bills of attainder-i.e., "singling out of an identifiable group." The government's opposition focuses on the second two features. With regard to the “punishment” feature, the government argues that the DNA Act is not punitive because the Act merely imposes new burdens on Reynard. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472, 97 S.Ct. 2777 (“Forbidden legislative punishment is not involved merely because [a statute] imposes burdensome consequences”). Next, the government argues that the DNA Act is not a bill of attainder because it does not “dispense with a judicial trial.” The government argues that the instant revocation proceeding is not a mere administrative hearing, but is a full evidentiary hearing before an Article III judge. Moreover, the government asserts that “[e]ven if Reynard had been charged under the misdemeanor provisions of the Act..., he would have been afforded the same trial rights as any other misdemean- or defendant.” (Memo in Opp., p. 20.) After considering the parties’ arguments, the Court finds, for two reasons, that the DNA Act is not a bill of attainder. First, with regard to the “punishment” element, the extraction of a blood sample from Reynard does not appear to “punish” Reynard when considered in light of the factors elucidated by the Supreme Court in Nixon. The obligation of providing a DNA fingerprint to the FBI does appeal to place a new burden on Reynard. However, the taking of an offender’s DNA fingerprint is closely analogous to the administrative taking of an offender’s standard fingerprint or the recordation of an offender’s physical characteristics. Moreover, the DNA Act promotes at least two non-punitive goals: (1) establishment of a national DNA database; and (2) greater accuracy in future adjudications of guilt and innocence. Finally, as discussed in connection with Reynard’s ex post facto argument, nothing in the legislative history suggests that members of Congress passed the DNA Act as a means of punishing qualifying individuals, including Rey-nard. Second, the DNA Act does not deprive Reynard of a judicial trial. Reynard, in support of his argument that a parole revocation hearing is not a judicial trial, cites to a footnote from the Supreme Court’s decision in Selective Service, 468 U.S. at 847 n. 3, 104 S.Ct. 3348. In Selective Service, the Court addressed a bill of attainder challenge to the Selective Service Act, under which persons who failed to register for selective service were ineligible for certain educational benefits. Selective Service, 468 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 3348. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ bill of attainder argument, the Court noted, in dicta, that an administrative hearing is not equivalent to a judicial trial. Selective Service, 468 U.S. at 847 n. 3, 104 S.Ct. 3348. This elementary statement from Selective Service does not support Reynard’s argument. Here, the Probation Office has petitioned an Article III court to revoke Reynard’s supervised release on the basis of Rey-nard’s violation of the DNA Act. Reynard has received a hearing and an opportunity to present evidence on his behalf, before a neutral fact finder, in an open Article III court. Accordingly, the Court finds that the DNA Act has not deprived Reynard of a judicial trial. For this independent reason, the Court finds that the DNA Act is not an unconstitutional bill of attainder as applied to Reynard. V. Does mandatory collection of a DNA sample from Reynard violate Reynard’s Fourth Amendment rights? (Does the collection of DNA fall within the “Special Needs Exception” to the Fourth Amendment?) A. Applicable Legal Principles The parties agree that the DNA Act requires Reynard to submit to a “search” without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The parties also agree that the sole Fourth Amendment issue in this case is whether the “special needs exception” to the Fourth Amendment permits the collection of DNA samples from individuals on supervised release pursuant to the DNA Act. Under the “special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment, a suspi-cionless search may be allowed where the search is designed to serve “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 69, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001) (special needs exception does not apply where state hospital performs non-consensual diagnostic tests on pregnant women, in cooperation with police, to obtain evidence of a patient’s crime of using drugs while pregnant); Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000) (special needs exception does not apply to highway checkpoint program with primary purpose of discovering illegal narcotics); Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995) (special needs exception allows random drug testing of student-athletes); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-55, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990) (special needs exception applies to sobriety checkpoints aimed at removing drunk drivers from the road); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 621-33, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (special needs exception applies to drug and alcohol testing program for railway employees involved in team accidents or found to be in violation of particular safety regulations); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666-67, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) (special needs exception applies to U.S. Customs Service’s mandatory testing of employees who applied for promotion or transfer to positions involving interdiction of illegal drugs or positions requiring employees to carry firearm). Thus, to determine whether a particular search falls within the special needs exception, a court must first examine whether the purpose of the search goes “beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 80-86, 121 S.Ct. 1281. If the purpose of the search does go beyond the normal need for law enforcement, then the court must balance: (1) the expectations of privacy held by persons subject to the search; (2) the degree of intrusion into these persons’ privacy interests; (3) the public’s interest in allowing such searches; and (4) the likelihood that such searches will advance this interest. Rise v. State of Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1562 (9th Cir.1995). If the results of a purported “special needs” search may ultimately be used for law enforcement purposes, then the search must not involve an undue amount of official discretion. Purported “special needs” searches that may ultimately be used for law enforcement purposes are more likely to pass Fourth Amendment muster if the searches are conducted in a uniform, non-diseretionary manner. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667, 672 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (Customs Service’s testing of employees who applied for particular positions was reasonable because no official discretion was involved, and all such employees were tested on blanket basis). See also Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79-80 (2d Cir.1999); Rise, 59 F.3d at 1561-62 (explaining that “evenhandedness” of search contributes to reasonableness of special needs search because evenhandedness prevents such searches from being random or arbitrary acts of government agents). The Ninth Circuit has applied the special needs exception to uphold a state DNA databank statute against a Fourth Amendment challenge. Rise, 59 F.3d at 1562. In Rise, the Ninth Circuit upheld an Oregon statute requiring felons convicted of murder or specific sexual offenses to submit blood samples to state authorities for the creation of a DNA databank. The Rise court concluded that Oregon’s statute was rationally related to the public’s interest in preventing recidivism and in accurately identifying and prosecuting murderers and sex offenders. The Rise court further concluded that the persons affected by the Oregon statute had reduced expectations of privacy. On the basis of these conclusions, the Rise court held that the statute fell within the special needs exception. Id. The Second Circuit also upheld a state DNA collection statute under the “special needs” exception. In Roe v. Mar