Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION SMITH, District Judge. This case is before the court on remand from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for further consideration of plaintiffs’ as-applied constitutional challenge to an Alabama statute prohibiting the distribution of “any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs.” Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (1975) (Supp.2001). See Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 955-56 (11th Cir.2001), rev’g Williams v. Pryor, 41 F.Supp.2d 1257 (N.D.Ala.1999). For convenience, the prohibited appliances will be referred to in this opinion as “sexual devices.” Plaintiffs are either vendors or users of such sexual devices. Defendant is William H. Pryor, Jr., the Attorney General for the State of Alabama. “Vendor” plaintiffs B.J. Bailey and Sherri Williams, and “user” plaintiffs Alice Jean Cope, Jane Doe, Deborah L. Cooper, Benny G. Cooper, Dan Bailey, Jane Poe, and Jane Roe, have moved for summary judgment, and seek a declaration that Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(l) is unconstitutional. Defendant also has filed a motion for summary judgment. He argues that plaintiffs lack standing to assert a constitutional challenge and, further, that plaintiffs seek recognition of a right not protected by the Constitution. When confronted with cross motions for summary judgment, “[t]he court must rule on each party’s motion on an individual and separate basis, .determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard.” 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil Sd § 2720, at 335-36 (1998) (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., Arnold v. United States Postal Service, 649 F.Supp. 676, 678 (D.D.C.1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides, in part, that summary judgment not only is proper, but “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 'file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Thus, “the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc) (quoting Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir.1995)); United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc). The motion pierces the pleadings, and “strikes at the heart of the claim. In effect it argues that as a matter of law upon admitted or established facts the moving party is entitled to prevail.” Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 99, at 705 (5th ed.1994). I. SUMMARY OF DECISION When a state statute is alleged to burden a fundamental constitutional right, the district court’s review of the challenged provision must be strict and exacting. Plaintiffs have submitted a great deal of unrefuted evidence to demonstrate that the Alabama statute at issue contravenes the “user” plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional right to privacy. That evidence has convinced this court that there exists a substantial history, legal tradition, and contemporary practice of deliberate state non-interference in the private, consensual, sexual relationships of married persons and unmarried adults. The ultimate result is that plaintiffs have shown that the fundamental right of privacy, long-recognized by the Supreme Court as inherent among our constitutional protections, incorporates a right to sexual- privacy. Plaintiffs also have shown that this Nation’s history, tradition, and contemporary treatment of sexual devices themselves evidences that this right of sexual privacy, even in its narrowest form* protects plaintiffs’ use of sexual devices like those targeted by Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(l). Accordingly, plaintiffs assert that the challenged statute impermissibly infringes their right to sexual privacy, insofar as the statute burdens the user plaintiffs’, right to employ sexual devices within their private, adult, consensual, sexual relationships. The constitutional guarantees that accompany plaintiffs’ fundamental right to privacy will not permit the State of Alabama to prohibit plaintiffs from purchasing sexual devices for use within the confines of their private, adult, consensual, sexual relationships, unless the State can demonstrate that it has a compelling interest to do so, and, that the challenged statutory provision is narrowly tailored to accomplish that objective. Given plaintiffs’ overwhelming evidence that the State of Alabama cannot make that showing, the Attorney General’s failure to attempt an argument to the contrary, and this court’s conclusion that Alabama has not narrowly constructed Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) to accomplish its objectives, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is due to be granted and defendant’s denied. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY The original plaintiffs in this action— Sherri Williams, B.J. Bailey, Betty Faye Haggermaker, Sherry Taylor-Williams, Alice Jean Cope, and Jane Doe — filed then-complaint on July 29, 1998, following the Alabama Legislature’s enactment of amendments to the “Alabama Anti-Obscenity Enforcement Act” on April 29, 1998. See Act No. 98-467, 1998 Acts of Alabama (subsequently codified as Alabama Code §§ 13A-12-200.1 through 13A-12-200.12 (1975) (Supp.2001)). Those amendments became effective on July 1, 1998, and made it unlawful to sell or otherwise distribute “any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs .... ” Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(l). The original plaintiffs were users or vendors of such sexual devices and, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, sought injunctive relief from this court, arguing that § 13A-12-200.2 — facially and as-applied — burdened and violated their right to privacy and personal autonomy under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Plaintiffs initially sought a temporary restraining order to preclude defendant from enforcing the amendments to the State’s obscenity statute. The parties subsequently stipulated that “the status quo would be maintained and the amendments not enforced with respect to plaintiffs[ ], pending the Court’s determination following a hearing on plaintiffs’ claims for preliminary injunctive relief.” In an order entered on December 9, 1998, however, this court advanced plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction to a final hearing on the merits of their application for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief. This court thus solely considered plaintiffs’ motion for permanent injunctive relief, and granted that motion on March 29, 1999, thereby enjoining the Attorney General from enforcing Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1). See Williams v. Pryor, 41 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1293 (N.D.Ala.1999). The Attorney General appealed and the Eleventh Circuit reversed, remanding the action for further consideration of plaintiffs’ as-applied constitutional challenges to the statute. See Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 955-56 (11th Cir.2001). These as-applied challenges are the subject of this court’s consideration, infra, at Part V. Following remand, plaintiffs amended their complaint to add five plaintiffs — Deborah L. Cooper, Benny G. Cooper, Dan Bailey, Jane Poe, and Jane Roe — who appear in this action as users of sexual devices proscribed by the challenged statutory provision. All plaintiffs again request that this court declare Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) to be unconstitutional, as it is applied to these plaintiffs, and to the extent that it restricts the sale and purchase of sexual devices. Plaintiffs- seék-perma-nent injunctive relief barring the Attorney-General from enforcing the statute. As grounds for this demand, plaintiffs argue that, by prohibiting the distribution and sale of sexual devices designed to stimulate orgasm, the State of Alabama has intruded into the most- intimate of places — the bedrooms of its citizens— and the lawful sexual conduct that occurs therein. While the statute’s reach does not directly proscribe the sexual conduct in question, it places- — without justification — a substantial and undue burden on the ability of the plaintiffs to obtain devices regulated by the statute. By restricting sales of these devices to plaintiffs, Alabama has acted in violation of the fundamental rights of privacy and personal autonomy that protect an individual’s lawful sexual practices guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also claim that similar constitutional violations have occurred because the State of Alabama has, “[b]y prohibiting the distribution and sale of sexual devices and aids designed to stimulate orgasm, ... intruded upon the lawful treatment decisions of its citizens to alleviate a common medical condition treatable by use of many of the devices covered by the statute.” The day after filing their amended complaint, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied without prejudice, in order to permit the parties to reopen the discovery process. The Attorney General subsequently moved to dismiss plaintiff Sherry Taylor-Williams from the action for failure to prosecute her individual claims. (“User” plaintiff Sherry Taylor-Williams is not related to “vendor” plaintiff Sherri Williams.) The evidence presented to this court demonstrated that Ms. Taylor-Williams had moved from her previous residence without contacting her attorneys, or leaving information regarding her new address. Neither plaintiffs’ counsel nor defendant could locate Ms. Taylor-Williams, despite numerous attempts to do so. Consequently, the court granted the Attorney General’s motion, and dismissed the claims of Ms. Taylor-Williams. Meanwhile, plaintiff Betty Faye Haggermaker and the Attorney General stipulated to the dismissal of Ms. Haggermaker’s claims, due tq her declining health and unwillingness to proceed. The court accordingly entered an order dismissing Ms. Haggermaker from the action on February 27, 2002. The remaining plaintiffs renewed their motion for summary judgment on April 12, 2002, asserting that Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(l) violates their constitutional right to privacy. The Attorney General filed his own motion for summary judgment on April 15, 2002, arguing that plaintiffs lack standing to bring their constitutional challenge, and cannot claim that the fundamental right to privacy protects the right to distribute or purchase sexual devices. III. STATEMENT OF FACTS Many of the same issues and parties previously considered by this court in the memorandum opinion entered on March 29, 1999 now reappear before the court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. See Williams v. Pryor, 41 F.Supp.2d 1257 (N.D.Ala.1999). For that reason, the court adopts the statement of facts from its prior opinion where relevant, and briefly reviews those facts here. With the addition of new parties, the dismissal of former parties, and the passage of more than three years, however, this court also undertakes a consideration of the facts and circumstances as they presently stand. The Alabama Legislature originally enacted an “Anti-Obscenity Enforcement Act” in 1989. See Act No. 89-^102, 1989 Acts of Alabama, at 791 et seq. (subsequently codified at Alabama Code §§ 13A-12-200.1 through 13A-12-200.10 (1975) (1994 Replacement Vol.)). Nine years later, the Alabama Legislature broadened the scope of that act — which previously had governed solely the distribution of “obscene material” — through enactment of Act No. 98-467 during the 1998 regular session. See Act No. 98-467, 1998 Acts of Alabama (subsequently codified as Alabama Code §§ 13A-12-200.1 through 13A-12-200.12 (1975) (Supp.2001)). The 1998 amendments inserted a proviso that criminalized the distribution of “any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs .... ” The amended provision reads, in pertinent part, as follows: It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute any obscene material or any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value. Material not otherwise obscene may be obscene under this section if the distribution of the material, the offer to do so, or the possession with the intent to do so is a commercial exploitation of erotica for the sake of prurient appeal. Any person who violates this subsection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) and may also be imprisoned in the county jail or sentenced to hard labor for the county for not more than one year. A second or subsequent violation of this subdivision is a Class C felony if the second or subsequent violation occurs after a conviction has been obtained for a previous violation. Upon a second violation, a corporation or business entity shall be fined not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,-000). Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(l) (Supp.2001) (emphasis added to 1998 amendments). The statute does not state, as in the form of examples, which sexual devices are prohibited from distribution. A. The Vendor Plaintiffs “Vendor” plaintiff Sherri Williams is a Florida resident who owns and operates “Pleasures,” an Alabama corporation. The company has two retail outlets in Alabama that sell sexual aids and novelties: one located in Huntsville, and another in Decatur. The Huntsville Pleasures store has been operating since June of 1993, and it is located in a small shopping mall near other retail establishments, including an adult video store, a liquor store, a hair salon, a health spa, an O’Charley’s restaurant, and a Wal-Mart Super Center. As of December 3, 1998, the date of the parties’ stipulation of facts, the Huntsville store had approximately 14,960 customers annually and, during calendar year 1997, sold approximately 22,440 items, generating gross revenues of approximately $448,837. In 1998, through July 1, the Huntsville store sold approximately 10,060 items and generated gross revenues of approximately $201,314. The Decatur Pleasures store has been operating since February of 1996, and it also is situated in a small shopping mall in a retail business district, close to other retail establishments, including a Texaco gasoline station, a chiropractor’s office, a pet grooming facility, a tanning salon, a printer, a specialty kite shop, and a clothing store catering to women and children. During calendar year 1997, the Decatur Pleasures store had approximately 5,600 customers and sold approximately 8,455 items, generating gross revenues of approximately $169,093. In 1998, through July 1, that store sold approximately 5,170 items and generated gross revenues of approximately $103,438. The parties have stipulated that the Pleasures stores do not purport to operate as, or resemble, “adult” bookstores, although a limited number of adult-oriented, “soft porn” or “R”-rated videos and magazines are sold. Both stores have signage on the front doors stating: “If offended by explicit sexuality, Please do not enter, You must be 21 years of age.” Both stores also have brick storefronts with large display windows that feature lingerie, massage oils, adult games, hosiery, instructional videos, bath powders, aromatherapy candles, romance novels, and similar products. Both stores are strictly retail operations, and do not offer sexual performances or video shows. The products sold at both stores include novelties with an adult theme, and items that are marketed to facilitate sexual relations, such as condoms, lubricants, and vibrators. More specifically, Pleasures promotes an extensive line of lingerie, exotic oils, lotions, lubricants, instructional videos, reading materials, and vibrating and non-vibrating sexual aids, which include vibrators, vibrating and non-vibrating dildos, penis extensions, penis enlargement devices, anal beads, penis rings, creams to prolong erection, artificial vaginas, and inflatable dolls. Each store offers counseling on the use of these products, and also sells cakes, gourmet chocolates, and various types of coffee. Although neither Sherri Williams nor her agents have been arrested in connection with the operation of Pleasures, Ms. Williams challenges the constitutionality of the statute — on her own behalf and also on behalf of her customers — because she fears arrest and prosecution under Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(l) unless she discontinues the sale of sexual devices. Similarly, vendor plaintiff B.J. Bailey is an Alabama resident who owns and operates “Saucy Lady, Inc.,” an Alabama corporation that “conducts in-house ‘Tupperware’-style parties at which sexual aids and novelties are displayed and sold.” (Plaintiff Dan Bailey, newly added to this action, is B.J. Bailey’s husband, and owns 49% of the stock in Saucy Lady, Inc., although Mr. Bailey presents himself in this action as a “user” plaintiff.) Saucy Lady, Inc. has been organizing and conducting such parties throughout Alabama since 1993, although the company was not incorporated until 1995. Sexual paraphernalia, devices, and novelties are sold at the parties, including lubricants, massage oils, books and instruction manuals, adult games, lingerie, vibrating and non-vibrating dildos, products to strengthen or tighten the vagina, products to prolong erection, and anal beads. Mrs. Bailey asserts that at least some of these items may be covered by the statute, thereby subjecting her and her agents to arrest and prosecution. During 1997, approximately 10,500 such products were sold at Saucy Lady parties, generating revenue of approximately $160,000. Through .July 1, 1998, the parties were responsible for the sale of approximately 5,250 products, generating revenues of approximately $80,000. Saucy Lady parties are conducted in the-privacy of a host home and are marketed exclusively to adult women. The company does not advertise, and instead relies on word-of-mouth to generate attendance. In 1997, approximately 770 Saucy Lady parties were conducted throughout Alabama (in Franklin, Jackson, Lauderdale, Lawrence, Limestone, Madison, Marshall, Morgan, Shelby, and, Walker counties), while approximately 380 parties had been hosted in 1998, as of July 1. Generally, between three and thirty-five women attend each Saucy Lady party. Total attendance in 1997 was approximately 7,700, while total attendance through July 1, 1998 was approximately 3,800. Saucy Lady customers typically are adult women (married, single, and divorced) from nineteen to seventy years of age, and are of diverse religious, racial, and ethnic backgrounds. The customers also belong to a variety of professions and occupations, and differ extensively in their level of sexual experience and knowledge. Mrs. Bailey asserts that the majority of women who attend her parties have told her that they previously were either anorgasmie, or had experienced extreme 'difficulty reaching orgasm through sexual intercourse alone. Some of these customers have consulted a physician or therapist about such issues. A significant number of customers allegedly have reported that products purchased at the Saucy Lady parties helped-them to become orgasmic, and greatly improved their sexual and marital relations. Mrs. Bailey' further contends that numerous Saucy Lady customers attend the parties and purchase sexual devices' because they prefer to avoid sexual relations with others, due to prior negative relationships, or the risk of sexually transmitted diseases, or other risks associated with developing ah intimate relationship. Other attendees state that they are unable to establish a relationship with another person, but still desire to be sexually active. These women often purchase sexual devices in order to pursue personal sexual goals within the privacy of their homes without involving another person as a sexual partner. As with plaintiff Sherri Williams, there have never been any arrests or threats of prosecution in connection with Saucy Lady parties. B. The User Plaintiffs “User” plaintiff Alice Jean Cope is an Alabama resident, a customer of Saucy Lady, Inc., and a user of the sexual devices that Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(l) seeks to prohibit. Mrs. Cope is a thirty-year-old married woman who uses sexual devices during intimate relations with her husband. Before beginning to use. such devices, Mrs. Cope was anorgasmie for approximately ten years, despite being sexually active during that time period. Like the other user plaintiffs in this action, Mrs. Cope has not been arrested or threatened with prosecution for her purchase of sexual devices. User plaintiff Jane Doe is an Alabama resident, a customer of Saucy Lady, Inc., and a user of sexual devices that the 1998 amendments seek to proscribe. Ms. Doe is a fifty-year-old woman who now is single, but who previously has been married and divorced. Ms. Doe began using sexual devices on the advice of her therapist, as a means to combat post-partum depression and to improve her marital relationship. Ms. Doe currently uses the devices to avoid sexually transmitted diseases, while remaining sexually active. User plaintiff Deborah L. Cooper is thirty-three years old, and an Alabama resident. She is married to user plaintiff Benny G. Cooper. The Coopers began using sexual devices in order to repair their deteriorating sexual relationship and marriage. To that end, Mrs. Cooper attended an “adult toy” party at a friend’s home, at which she purchased a sexual device that she “subsequently introduced into her marriage.” Both Mr. and Mrs. Cooper attribute the use of sexual devices to “restoring ... trust, dialogue, and understanding in their marriage.” User plaintiff Dan Bailey also is an Alabama resident, and is married to vendor plaintiff B.J. Bailey. Mr. Bailey, who is sixty-one, and fourteen years older than his wife, has suffered in recent years from a respiratory condition and problems with arousal. Mr. Bailey asserts that the use of sexual devices has improved his sexual relationship with his wife. User plaintiff Jane Poe is a twenty-four year-old Alabama resident who has been married for two years. Ms. Poe contends that her inability to achieve orgasm caused problems in her marriage. After seeking advice from friends and other women facing similar marital problems, Ms. Poe attended an “adult toys” party, and subsequently introduced sexual devices purchased at the party into her marriage. As a result, Ms. Poe avers that she and her husband enjoy a tension-free sexual relationship, and are happier as a couple, “both in and out of the bedroom.” Finally, user plaintiff Jane Roe is a thirty-eight year-old Alabama resident who suffers from a chronic disability that makes it extremely painful to engage in sexual intercourse. Ms. Roe has lived with this condition since she was twenty-four, and claims that sex has become increasingly less enjoyable since that time. Ms. Roe asserts, however, that she was invited to an “adult toys” party, at which she was able to discuss her condition with other women in a “private, supportive environment.” Ms. Roe purchased sexual devices at this party that allow her to experience sexual pleasure without pain or discomfort. This plaintiff states that, while she hopes to marry or have a consistent sexual partner in the future, any sexual relationship will require her partner to use such a sexual device to enable her to experience sexual pleasure without pain. All plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1), as it is applied to them, arguing that Alabama has unduly burdened the rights of plaintiffs to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into their private practices — practices which have not been made unlawful in Alabama. Neither masturbation nor stimulation of the genitalia by a sexual device is a crime in Alabama. Indeed, many of the devices covered by the statute are the recommended treatment choice by therapists treating sexual dysfunction. The constitutional right of privacy established in a long line of United States Supreme Court decisions forbid[s] this type of intrusion into an individual’s lawful-sexual practices and intimate medical affairs. Plaintiffs emphasize that purchasers of sexual devices have “a wide variety of therapeutic needs,” and that such devices also are purchased by persons seeking to avoid sexually transmitted diseases, or who are unable or unwilling to marry, or to enter into a sexual relationship with another person. The Attorney General has stipulated to all of these facts. Even so, he responds in his motion for summary judgment that this court does not possess subject matter jurisdiction, as both the user and vendor plaintiffs allegedly are without standing to pursue their claims. Attorney General Pryor also argues that the constitutional right to privacy relied on by plaintiffs cannot be expanded to include a fundamental right of plaintiffs to sell or purchase sexual devices. These arguments are considered in greater detail below. IY. STANDING In order to determine whether a “specific person is the proper party to bring a matter to the court for adjudication,” a plaintiff must demonstrate each of the elements of the tripartite standard that the Supreme Court has characterized as an “irreducible constitutional minimum.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury'in facU^an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second,' there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 (citations, internal quotation marks, and bracketed alterations omitted). . Only the first of these three elements is disputed by the Attorney General: he contends that none of the plaintiffs can demonstrate that she or he has experienced an “injury in fact.” This court briefly considered plaintiffs’ standing to bring this action in the memorandum opinion entered on March 29, 1999: The Attorney General challenges the vendor plaintiffs’ ability to assert a challenge to Alabama Act No. 98-467 on behalf of their customers: that is, of unnamed users of the proscribed devices. Clarifying this position at oral argument, the Assistant Attorney General representing defendant said: “[w]e think the sellers can have standing as sellers of the products but not on behalf of the users, ... given the fact that users are here ” (emphasis supplied). As an initial matter, this court finds that the vendor plaintiffs independently satisfy standing requirements. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194, 97 S.Ct. 451, 455, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976). Furthermore, this court agrees with the Attorney General’s implicit concession that the user plaintiffs have standing to assert a due process challenge. Cf. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 683-84, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 2015, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977). As a consequence, it is not necessary to decide the standing of the vendor plaintiffs to act as advocates for the rights of unnamed users of the proscribed devices. See id. at 682, 97 S.Ct. at 2014. The Article III “case or controversy” requirement has been satisfied for the challenges to the legislation presented in this action. Williams, 41 F.Supp.2d at 1273-74. The Eleventh Circuit did not consider plaintiffs’ standing on appeal of that decision. See Williams, 240 F.3d at 944. The Attorney General argues in his present motion for summary judgment, however, that because “the complexion of this litigation has ... changed since 1999,” issues regarding plaintiffs’ standing to sue require further consideration. This court agrees. A. Standing of the User Plaintiffs Attorney General Pryor contends that, “[b]ecause any vendor who sells a sexual device to the user plaintiffs has a statutory affirmative defense that shields them from a successful prosecution, there is no real legal impediment to the plaintiffs purchasing sexual devices in Alabama.” Specifically, he refers to Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.4, which provides that “[i]t shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of violating Sections 13A-12-200.2 and 13A-12-200.3 that the act charged was done for a bona fide medical, scientific, educational, legislative, judicial, or law enforcement purpose.” Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.4 (1975) (1994 Replacement Vol.). This affirmative defense provision was part of the original obscenity legislation enacted in 1989, and was not affected by the state legislature’s 1998 amendments. The section of Alabama’s obscenity law challenged by all plaintiffs, § 13A-12-200.2(a)(l), is specifically included in this affirmative defense provision. Consequently, the Attorney General argues, “the affirmative defense undeniably applies.” The affirmative defense provision embodied in § 13A-12-200.4, according to the Attorney General, would protect sales by vendors to these user plaintiffs because the vendors “would come within the ‘safe harbor’ set forth [ini section 13A-12-200.4 such, that they could never be successfully prosecuted for an alleged violation of section 13A-12-200.2.” The Attorney General’s reliance on the affirmative defense provision stems from the fact that, “[i]n the depositions and declarations filed in this case, it is made plain that each of the user plaintiffs have a bona fide [medical or psychological] need for sexual devices such that a vendor could sell to them without incurring criminal liability.” Attorney General Pryor thus asserts that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they have been or will be prosecuted, or threatened with arrest or prosecution, for purchasing sexual devices of the type governed by Alabama- Code, § 13A-12-200.2. The affirmative defense of § 13A-12-200.4 leads the Attorney General to contend that the user plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that an Article III case or controversy exists, because the user plaintiffs cannot produce evidence that they have suffered, or will suffer, an injury by the challenged statute. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 2136. He argues that “plaintiffs have shown nothing more than an imaginary or speculative fear of prosecution to support their assertion of standing.” Finally,'the Attorney General contends that, because the challenged statutory provision targets solely distributors, the user plaintiffs “could not be prosecuted at all for their mere use and possession of sexual devices.” The Supreme Court has held that, for a plaintiff to contest the constitutionality of a criminal statute, “ ‘it is not necessary that [the plaintiff] first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge [the] statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.’ ” Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 2309, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1216, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974)). Further, “[w]hen the plaintiff has alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, he ‘should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.’ ” Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298, 99 S.Ct. at 2309 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188, 93 S.Ct. 739, 745, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973)). On the other hand, it also has been said that, when a plaintiff fails to claim that he or she has “ ‘ever been threatened with prosecution, that a prosecution is likely, or even that a prosecution is remotely possible,” ’ that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the offending statute. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298-99, 99 S.Ct. at 2309 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42, 91 S.Ct. 746, 749, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971)). The gravamen of the standing inquiry concerning the user plaintiffs, then, would seem to be solely whether these plaintiffs can show that they have “ever been threatened with prosecution, that a prosecution is likely, or even that a prosecution is remotely possible” for violation of Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(l). Id. Given that this' statutory provision 'targets solely distributors of sexual devices, the immediate impulse-is to answer this question in the negative. In response, the user plaintiffs direct this court’s attention to a body of Supreme Court precedent that, they claim, permits them to maintain their constitutional challenge. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973). According to plaintiffs, the “common denominator in all these cases is that the statute at issue sought to choke off or constrict the supply of information, services, or products by imposing criminal sanctions on those who provide them.” For example, in Roe v. Wade, plaintiff Jane Roe was unable to obtain an abortion in Texas due to a state statute that made it illegal for physicians to perform an abortion unless the mother’s life was endangered. The court immediately acknowledged Ms. Roe’s standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute, although she was not a provider of such services and thus not targeted by the statute’s language: “[T]here can be little dispute that [Ms. Roe] presented a case or controversy and that, wholly apart from the class aspects, she, as a pregnant single woman thwarted by the Texas criminal abortion laws, had standing to challenge those statutes.” 410 U.S. 113, 124, 93 S.Ct. 705, 712, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (emphasis supplied). Similarly, in Doe v. Bolton, decided the same day as Roe, the Supreme Court considered a plaintiffs constitutional challenge to a Georgia statute that prohibited physicians from performing abortions unless the mother’s life was endangered, or the pregnancy resulted from rape, or the fetus was likely to be born with a serious defect. The plaintiff there failed to meet any of these criteria, and sued when she was denied an abortion. Under the same rationale relied on in Roe, the Doe Court determined that the plaintiff had standing to challenge the statute’s constitutionality, although the criminal provisions of the statute were directed at providers of abortions (distributors), rather than those who sought the services of the providers (consumers). 410 U.S. 179, 187, 93 S.Ct. 739, 745, 35 L.Ed.2d 201. Once again, in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, consumers of prescription drugs were permitted to bring a constitutional challenge to a Virginia criminal statute that prohibited pharmacists from advertising drug prices. The consumers were held to possess standing to challenge the statute, although they were not targeted for criminal prosecution by the legislative language, because they were able to demonstrate that they would benefit from the drug pricing information, and that the statute thus infringed First Amendment free speech guarantees. 425 U.S. at 755, 757, 96 S.Ct. at 1822, 1823. Finally, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court permitted terminally-ill patients who desired to commit suicide while assisted by a physician to challenge the constitutionality of a Washington criminal statute that prohibited a physician from aiding a person to commit suicide. 521 U.S. 702, 707, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2261, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1976). Given these decisions, and their factual similarity to the present case, in which consumer plaintiffs challenge a state criminal statute targeting distributors of sexual devices, the court concludes that the user plaintiffs have demonstrated independent standing to challenge the contested statute. Further, the decisions reviewed above implicitly recognized those plaintiffs’ standing, although none was prosecuted or threatened with prosecution under the state criminal statute at issue. Consequently, the user plaintiffs’ contention that enforcement of Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) unconstitutionally burdens their access to sexual devices is sufficient to satisfy Article III standing requirements. B. Standing of the Vendor Plaintiffs The Attorney General contends that vendor plaintiffs Sherri Williams and B.J. Bailey do not have standing to sue, because they cannot demonstrate that they have suffered injury, pursuant to Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at 2136. The Attorney General asserts that this is because “any vendor who sells a sexual device to the user plaintiffs has a statutory affirmative defense that shields them from a successful prosecution ....” Plaintiffs respond that the vendor plaintiffs have independent standing to bring suit. Additionally, they assert that there is a fundamental “problem” with defendant’s affirmative defense argument, because enforcement of the statute is left to the discretion of local law enforcement officials who can close a business down, seize the stock and place the owner and employees in jail pending trial. Moreover, there is no assurance that this defense will be successful. It ultimately lies with the trier of fact in a criminal proceeding. The Defendant has offered nothing to show that prosecutors across the state would uniformly interpret the statute to allow the sale of sexual devices under the circumstances involving the plaintiffs in this case. Nor can [the Attorney General] demonstrate[ ] that jurors would uniformly come to the same conclusion. It is this very uncertainty over how the law will be enforced that makes it impossible for the vendors to continue to operate their business. The record shows that retailers would shut down rather than risk prosecution and jail time. A search of reported cases failed to uncover any decision applying the affirmative defense embodied in Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.4. Plaintiffs assert further that the vendor plaintiffs also possess standing to sue on behalf of those “individuals who use sexual devices and are not before this court,” because [p]laintiffs Sherri Williams and B.J. Bailey[ ] each sell the type of products that come within the coverage of the statute. They allege third party standing to bring the challenge on behalf of the past, present and future customers whose privacy rights would be burdened by the enforcement of the statute. This court concludes that the vendor plaintiffs have standing to pursue this action in their own right, and, on behalf of their potential customers. See Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 683, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 2015, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977) (holding that corporation engaging in mail-order retail sale of non-medical contraceptive devices had standing to challenge New York statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives in its own right and on behalf of its customers). The vendor plaintiffs satisfy Article III standing requirements because Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(l) operates to inflict an injury on these vendor plaintiffs “sufficient to guarantee [their] ‘concrete adverseness.’ ” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194, 97 S.Ct. 451, 455, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)). In Craig, the Supreme Court considered a constitutional challenge by a licensed beer vendor to an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of twenty-one, and to females under the age of eighteen. 429 U.S. at 194, 97 S.Ct. at 455. The Court concluded that the vendor there had standing, both to challenge the statute independently and to bring an equal protection challenge on behalf of males between the ages of eighteen and twenty, because: The legal duties created by the statutory sections under challenge are addressed directly to vendors such as appellant. She is obliged either to heed the statutory discrimination, thereby incurring a direct economic injury through the constriction of her buyer’s market, or to disobey the statutory command and suffer ... sanctions and perhaps loss of license.... As a vendor with standing to challenge the lawfulness of [the Oklahoma statutory provisions at issue in Craig], appellant is entitled to assert those concomitant rights of third parties that would be “diluted or adversely affected” should her constitutional challenge fail and the statutes remain in force. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1679, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) .... Otherwise, the threatened imposition of governmental sanctions might deter appellant Whitener and other similarly situated vendors from selling 3.2% beer to young males, thereby ensuring that “enforcement of the challenged restriction against the [vendor] would result indirectly in the violation of third parties’ rights.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 510, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2211, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Accordingly, vendors and those in like positions have been uniformly permitted to resist efforts at restricting their operations by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or junction. See, e. g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, [396 U.S. 229, 90 S.Ct. 400, 24 L.Ed.2d 386 (1969)]; Barrows v. Jackson,[346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953)]. Craig, 429 U.S. at 195, 97 S.Ct. at 455-56 (emphasis supplied) (some citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Craig Court relied on Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972), in arriving at this conclusion. In both Craig and Eisenstadt, “a state statute ... imposed legal duties and disabilities upon the claimant.” Craig, 429 U.S. at 196, 97 S.Ct. at 456. While the claimant in Eisenstadt actually had been convicted of distributing contraceptive foam, in the case before this court — as in the case confronting the Craig Court— there has been no arrest, prosecution, or conviction under Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1). The Craig Court nevertheless made it plain that the rationale of Eisen-stadt applied when finding that the vendor plaintiff there had standing to bring a constitutional challenge: Since the statute was directed at Baird and penalized his conduct, the [Eisenstadt] Court did not hesitate ... to conclude that the “case or controversy” requirement of Art. Ill was satisfied. In considering Baird’s constitutional objections, the [Eisenstadt] Court fully recognized his standing to defend the privacy interests of third parties. Deemed crucial to the decision to permit jus tertii standing was the recognition of “the impact of the litigation on third-party interests.” Just as the defeat of Baird’s suit and the “[ejnforcement of the Massachusetts statute will materially impair the ability of single persons to obtain contraceptives,” ... so too the failure of Whitener [the vendor plaintiff in Craig] to prevail in this suit and the continued enforcement of [the Oklahoma 3.2% beer statute] will “materially impair the ability of’ males 18-20 years of age to purchase 3.2% beer despite their classification by an overt gender-based criterion. Craig, 429 U.S. at 196, 97 S.Ct. at 456 (emphasis supplied) (citations and footnote omitted). In the omitted footnote, the Craig Court added these helpful observations: The fact that Bail'd chose to disobey the legal duty imposed upon him by the Massachusetts anticontraception statute, resulting in his criminal conviction, does not distinguish the standing inquiry from that pertaining to the anticipatory attack in this case. In both Eisen-stadt and here, the challenged statutes compel jus tertii [read “third party”] claimants either to cease their proscribed activities or to suffer appropriate sanctions. The existence of Art. Ill “injury in fact” and the structure of the claimant’s relationship to third parties are not altered by the litigative posture of the suit And, certainly, no suggestion will be heard that Whitener’s [the vendor plaintiffs] anticipatory challenge offends the normal requirements governing such actions.... Id. at 196 n. 5, 97 S.Ct. at 456 n. 5 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted). In like manner, the vendor plaintiffs before this court are “obliged either to heed the statutory discrimination, thereby incurring a direct economic injury through the constriction of [their] buyer’s market, or to disobey the statutory command and suffer ... sanctions.” Craig, 429 U.S. at 194, 97 S.Ct. at 455-56. Indeed, the vendor plaintiffs complain that they have lost business since the challenged statutory provision was adopted. These vendor plaintiffs also .have standing to “resist efforts at restricting their operations by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or function.” Id. Accordingly, vendor plaintiffs Sherri Williams and B.J. Bailey have demonstrated that they have standing to pursue their constitutional challenge against defendant — both independently and on behalf of third party purchasers of sexual devices. V. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS AND PLAINTIFFS’ AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES Plaintiffs initially brought facial and as-applied challenges to the 1998 amendments to Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1). This court rejected plaintiffs’ facial challenge to the statute in the memorandum opinion entered on March 29, 1999, a holding that was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit on appeal. See Williams, 240 F.3d at 953. Even so, the appellate court remanded the case for further consideration of plaintiffs’ as-applied challenges. See id. at 955. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit instructed: Although the statute is not facially unconstitutional because ... .it may constitutionally be applied to those who sell to minors sexual devices which are deemed harmful to minors, the. as-applied challenges raised by the plaintiffs, married or unmarried, implicate different and important interests in sexual privacy. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86, 85 S.Ct. at 1682 (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding. the marriage relationship.”); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.Ct. at 2267 (citing Griswold as holding the Constitution protects a fundamental right “to marital privacy”); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 898, 112 S.Ct. at 2831 (invalidating provision requiring notification of married woman’s spouse before abortion could be performed because “[w]omen do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty when they marry. The Constitution protects all individuals, male or female, married or unmarried, from the abuse of governmental power, even where that power is employed for the supposed benefit of a member of the individual’s family”); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453, 92 S.Ct. at 1033 (“[T]he rights of the individual to [have] access to contraceptives ... must be the same for the unmarried and married alike.”); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 209 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2853 n. 1, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (questioning validity of categorizations of sexual activity depending on marital status); id. at 216, 106 S.Ct. at 2857 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Ei-senstadt and Carey as holding that fundamental rights protection in sexual matters “extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons”). We remand the as-applied challenges for due consideration by the district court because the record and stipulations in this case simply are too nan-ow to pemit us to decide whether or to what extent the Alabama statute infringes a fundamental right to sexual privacy of the specific plaintiffs in this case. In Glucksberg, its most recent case in which an argument for recognition of a new fundamental right was presented, the Supreme Court instructed that a fundamental right must be “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [the right] were sacrificed.” 521 U.S. at 720-21, 117 S.Ct. at 2268 (citations and quotations omitted). In concluding the Constitution did not include such a fundamental right of physician-assisted suicide, the Court discussed at length not only the long history of the proscription of suicide and assisting suicide but also the considerable contemporary nationwide legislative action to preserve such laws. See id. at 710-19, 117 S.Ct. at 2262-67. By contrast, in this case the district court considered in two paragraphs only whether the “use of sexual devices” is a deeply rooted and central liberty. See 41 F.Supp.2d at 1283-84 & n. 33. The court analyzed neither whether our nation has a deeply rooted history of state interference, or state non-interference, in the private sexual activity of married or unmarried persons nor whether contemporary practice bolsters or undermines any such' history. The record is bare of evidence on these important questions. Absent the kind of careful consideration the Supreme Court performed in Glucksberg, we are unwilling to decide the as-applied fundamental rights analysis and accordingly remand those claims to the district court. Williams, 240 F.3d at 955-56 (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ as-applied challenges are the subject of the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. As the excerpted language from the Williams opinion evidences, the Eleventh Circuit relied in significant part on Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997), to arrive at its holding. In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court considered a due process challenge to the State of Washington’s ban on assisted suicide by a group of practicing physicians, three gravely ill patients considering physician-assisted suicide, and a nonprofit organization. The Supreme Court emphasized its long-standing reluctance to expand the “concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this un-chartered area are scarce and open-ended.” Id. at 720, 117 S.Ct. at 2267 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)). In the interest of exercising “utmost care” to avoid unprincipled decisionmak-ing, federal courts employ a two-part substantive due process analysis to determine whether constitutional protection should be extended to an asserted right. Id. at 720, 117 S.Ct. at 2268. The first feature of this test requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the fundamental right alleged is, objectively, “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” [Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1938, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plurality opinion)]; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) (“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”), and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed,” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937). Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21, 117 S.Ct. at 2268. The second part of the substantive due process test requires that this court carefully describe the fundamental liberty interest at issue. See id. at 720, 117 S.Ct. at 2268 (collecting cases). This court now turns to the first part of the substantive due process test — namely, whether the fundamental right alleged is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition. The Glucksberg Court began its analysis, as the Supreme Court “do[es] in all due process cases, by examining our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices.” Id. at 710, 117 S.Ct. at 2262. To that end, the Court looked to more than 700 years of Anglo-American common-law tradition, including the legislation of the American colonies. Significantly, Glucksberg extended this analysis to include a review of the contemporary practices and attitudes regarding assisted suicide: specifically, the Court looked to current statutes and those of “recent years,” “public concern,” “democratic action,” and twentieth century model legislation and its effect on state legislation. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 715-16, 117 S.Ct. at 2265-66; see also Williams, 240 F.3d at 955 (instructing this court to conduct a review of “contemporary practice” in light of Glucksberg’s similar analysis). The Court accordingly considered current statutes, legislative debates, voter initiatives, and the positions of contemporary task forces and commissions on the issue of assisted suicide. The Glucksberg Court ultimately held that the Washington ban on assisted suicide did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, either facially or as-applied, because there was no history, tradition, or contemporary practice of permitting persons to commit, or assist in the commission of, suicide. See 521 U.S. at 719, 734, 117 S.Ct. at 2267, 2275; see also Williams, 240 F.3d at 955 (citing Glucksberg’s discussion of the “long history of the proscription of suicide and assisting suicide” and the “considerable contemporary nationwide legislative action to preserve such laws”). Applying that mode of analysis here, plaintiffs contend that this country’s history and legal tradition reflect that states have intentionally refrained from interfering in the private, consensual, sexual relations of married persons. According to plaintiffs, “[a] survey of the regulation of adult consensual sexual activity in the United States from Colonial times to present does not support state interference with lawful, private sexual conduct when engaged in by individuals married to each other.” Historically, “most legislation in this area is directed at sexual conduct which occurs outside the marital chamber (i.e. fornication and adultery).” This historical, legislative focus on extra-marital sexual relationships has changed in the modern era, according to plaintiffs, because the “sexual revolution” that occurred in the United States during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries “resulted in changing attitudes about state interference with adult consensual activity — regardless of marital status.” These facts lead plaintiffs to declare that there is a deeply rooted history of state non-interference in the private, consensual, sexual activity of married persons, and, that contemporary practice has extended that state non-interference to include the private, consensual, sexual activity of unmarried adults. This history, legal tradition, and contemporary practice will be examined in greater detail, below. The Attorney General concedes that “there is no genuine dispute as to the historical chronology set forth by. the plaintiffs’ experts,” to the effect that there is a “history or tradition of state noninterference in persons sex lives.” The Attorney General further admits that, “[t]aken as a whole, it is incontestable that society’s attitudes about sex in general have become increasingly liberal, especially across the last several decades.” Attorney General Pryor argues, nevertheless, that “section 13A-12-200.2’s general prohibition on the sale of' sexual devices [is] misdefined as a bullish invasion of the marital bedroom.... The statute itself makes no direct demands on what couples (or individuals) may or may not do when secreted in their bedrooms.” The second part of the substantive due process test requires that this court carefully describe the fundamental liberty interest at issue. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.Ct. at 2268 (collecting cases). The Attorney General would have this court cast the fundamental right alleged herein as one to “purchase dildos and vibrators.” In fact, however, the Eleventh Circuit in Williams v. Pryor properly and more broadly characterized the liberty interest at issue as “a fundamental right to sexual privacy of the specific plaintiffs in this case.” 240 F.3d at 955 (emphasis supplied). While the conflict in this case does concern plaintiffs’ right to use sexual devices when engaging in lawful, private, consensual, sexual activity, plaintiffs correctly observe that the “major problem with the Defendant’s formulation of the issue is the misplaced emphasis on the sale or purchase of sexual devices, rather than the important constitutional interests at stake . ...” In light of Glucksberg and the two-part substantive due process test outlined above, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the fundamental right to privacy recognized by the Supreme Court incorporates a fundamental right to sexual privacy between married persons and between unmarried persons which, in turn, “encompasses a light to use sexual devices.” Williams, 240 F.3d at 954 (emphasis supplied). This court will recognize a fundamental right to sexual privacy if plaintiffs’ evidence of our national history, legal traditions, and contemporary practices establishes that such right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710, 720-21, 117 S.Ct. at 2262, 2268. What follows, then, is an exploration, based on the evidence submitted by the parties, of American history, legal tradition, and contemporary practices regarding the “private sexual activity of married or unmarried persons.” Williams, 240 F.3d at 955-56. Before engaging in that exploration, however, the court notes that it is extremely significant, if not dispositive, that the Attorney General concedes that “there is little evidence to show that sexual devices, or consensual sexual activities in general, have historically been subject to governmental regulation,” and that “it is evident that states have historically exerted little effort in interfering with persons’ private, consensual sexual activities.” The Attorney General’s concession seems to answer the Rule 56 inquiry, and signify that there is no genuine issue of .material fact for this court to consider on the question of whether this Nation’s history, legal tradition, and contemporary practice evinces a fundamental right to sexual privacy between married or unmarried persons, grounded in state non-interference in the sexual relationships of married and unmarried people. This court nevertheless examines the evidence put forth by the parties, in the manner of Glucksberg, in further consideration of plaintiffs’ claim that they have a fundamental constitutional right to sexual privacy, which encompasses a right to use sexual devices, and that such right is impermissibly infringed by Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(l). A. History and Legal Tradition Regarding Sexual Privacy Between Married Persons As s