Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION LAMBERTH, District Judge. This matter comes before the Court after a twenty-nine day bench trial to determine whether defendants Gale Norton, Secretary of the Interior, and Neal McCa-leb, Assistant Secretary of Interior for Indian Affairs, should be held in civil contempt of court. After carefully reviewing of all the evidence presented and representations made at trial, the record in this case, and the applicable law, the Court finds that these defendants are in civil contempt of court. The Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are detailed below. I. INTRODUCTION The Department of Interior’s administration of the Individual Indian Money (“HM”) trust has served as the gold standard for mismanagement by the federal government for more than a century. As the trustee-delegate of the United States, the Secretary of Interior does not know the precise number of IIM trust accounts that she is to administer and protect, how much money is or should be in the trust, or even the proper balance for each individual account. Because of the Secretary’s systemic failure as a trustee-delegate, the federal government regularly issues payments to benefieiaries-of their own money-in erroneous amounts. In fact, the Interi- or Department cannot provide an accurate accounting to the majority of the estimated 300,000 trust beneficiaries, despite a clear statutory mandate and the century-old obligation to do so. As the Court observed more than two years ago, “[i]t is fiscal and governmental irresponsibility in its purest form.” Cobell v. Babbitt (“Cobell V”), 91 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 (D.D.C.1999). Equally troubling is the manner in which the Department of Interior has conducted itself during the course of this litigation. In February of 1999, the Court held Bruce Babbitt, then-Secretary of the Interior, and Kevin Gover, then-Assistant Secretary of Interior for Indian Affairs, in civil contempt for violating two of this Court’s discovery orders. Among other things, the Court found that almost immediately after proposing a clear and unambiguous order which the Court signed, “the defendants disobeyed that order and successfully covered up their disobedience through semantics and strained, unilateral, self-serving interpretations of their own duties.” Cobell v. Babbitt (“Cobell IV”), 188 F.R.D. 122, 140 (D.D.C.1999). The defendants’ misconduct did not end there. Since holding then-Secretary Babbitt and then-Assistant Secretary Gover in contempt, the Court has had to sanction the Department of Interior for filing frivolous motions, enter several temporary restraining orders to prevent the Department from taking potentially adverse actions, and appoint both a Special Master (to oversee discovery) and a Court Monitor (to review the defendants’ trust related activities). Moreover, there are several motions currently pending before the Court regarding alleged misconduct by the Interior Department. In short, the Department of Interior has handled this litigation the same way that it has managed the IIM trust-disgracefully. The issue now before the Court is whether the Secretary of the Interior and the Assistant Secretary of Interior for Indian Affairs should again be held in civil contempt of court. Specifically, the Court ordered these two government officials to show cause why they should not be held in civil contempt for: (1) failing to comply with the Court’s Order of December 21, 1999, to initiate a Historical Accounting Project; (2) committing a fraud on the Court by concealing the Department’s true actions regarding the Historical Accounting Project during the period from March 2000, until January 2001; (3) committing a fraud on the Court by failing to disclose the true status of the TAAMS project between September 1999 and December 21, 1999; (4) committing a fraud on the Court by filing false and misleading quarterly status reports starting in March 2000, regarding TAAMS and BIA Data Cleanup; and (5) committing a fraud on the Court by making false and misleading representations starting in March 2000, regarding computer security of IIM trust data. The Court will address each of these specifications below in turn. II. BACKGROUND A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1. History During the early 1800s, the United States’ policy towards Native Americans-which included entering into (and frequently violating) treaties as well as the use of force-led to the removal and relocation of many tribes from the East and Midwest to unsettled lands in the West. In the late 19th century, the United States’ policy of relocation was replaced with a policy of assimilation. Under this new policy, the federal government allotted land that had been set aside for tribes to individual tribe members instead. The policy of assimilation was designed “to extinguish tribal sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries, and force assimilation of Indians into society at large.” Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 254, 112 S.Ct. 683, 116 L.Ed.2d 687 (1992). The assimilationist policy, which began with individually negotiated treaties, became federal law when Congress passed the General Allotment Act of 1887, also known as the “Dawes Act.” Under the Dawes Act, beneficial title of the allotted lands vested in the United States as trustee for individual Indians. The trust was to last for 25 years or more, at which point a fee patent would issue to the individual Indian allottee. During the trust period, individual accounts were to be set up for each Indian with a stake in the allotted lands, and the lands would be managed for the benefit of the individual allottees. Indians could not sell, lease, or otherwise burden their allotted lands without government approval. Where tribes resisted allotment, it could be imposed. Cobell VI, 240 F.3d at 1087. The United States’ policy of assimilation and its allotment of tribal lands ended with the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (“IRA”). Although the IRA provided that unallotted surplus Indian lands would be returned to tribal ownership, the statute did not disturb lands already allotted to individual Indians, and actually extended the trust period for allotted lands indefinitely. Thus, under the IRA the federal government maintained control of lands already allotted but not yet fee-patented, and accordingly retained its fiduciary obligations to administer the trust lands and funds arising therefrom for the benefit of individual Indian beneficiaries. These lands form the basis of the IIM trust accounts that are at the core of this lawsuit. 2. Federal IIM Trust Responsibilities There is no question that as a result of the allotments made from 1887-1934 and the IRA’s indefinite extension of the trust period, the United States has assumed the fiduciary obligations of a trustee. United States v. Mitchell ("Mitchell II"), 463 U.S. 206, 225, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983) (noting that “a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when the Government assumes ... elaborate control over forests and property belonging to Indians.”). Although the United States itself is the trustee of the IIM trust, under current law the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of the Treasury are the designated trustee-delegates. The failure of either Secretary to perform his or her particular fiduciary responsibilities results in the United States breaching its fiduciary obligations to the IIM trust beneficiaries. Cobell VI, 240 F.3d at 1088. Within the Department of Interior, several agencies have' specific trust obligations. These agencies include, among others, Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), Office of Trust Fund Management (“OTFM”), and Office of the Special Trustee (“OST”). BIA is primarily responsible for trust land management, including the approval of leases and land transfers, and income collection. The vast majority of transactions involving IIM trust lands must be approved by BIA. OTFM, in conjunction with the Treasury Department, deposits IIM land revenues, maintains the individual IIM accounts, and ensures that money is distributed to IIM account holders. OST, which was created in 1994, oversees the IIM trust reform efforts. The Department of Interior and its su-bagencies have utterly failed to manage the IIM trust in a manner consistent with the fiduciary obligations of a trustee-delegate. The D.C. Circuit succinctly noted this failure in February of last year when it wrote that: The federal government does not know the precise number of IIM trust accounts this it is to administer and protect. At present, the Interior Department’s system contains over 300,000 accounts covering an estimated 11 million acres, but the Department is unsure whether this is the proper number of accounts... [In fact,] [n]ot only does the Interior Department not know the proper number of accounts, it does not know the proper balances for each IIM account, nor does Interi- or have sufficient records to determine the value of IIM accounts ... Current account reconciliation procedures are insufficient to ensure that existing account records, reported account balances, or payments to IIM beneficiaries are accurate... As a result, the government regularly issues payments to trust beneficiaries in erroneous amounts-from unreconciled accounts-some of which are known to have incorrect balances. Cobell VI, 240 F.3d at 1089. 3. The Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act Concern over the Department of Interi- or’s management of the IIM trust is not a recent development. Since at least the mid-1980s there has been widespread disapproval of the manner in which the Department of Interior has administered the IIM trust. Time and again, however, Department officials pledged to address these concerns. Finally, in 1988, Congress began holding oversight hearings on the Interior Department’s management of the IIM trust. These hearings resulted in the issuance of a report in 1992, entitled Misplaced Trust: The Bureau of Indian Affairs’ Mismanagement of the Indian Trust Fund (“Misplaced Trust”), which harshly criticized the Department of Interior’s handling of the IIM trust accounts. Among other things, the report found “significant, habitual problems in BIA’s ability to fully and accurately account for trust fund moneys, to properly discharge its fiduciary responsibilities, and to prudently manage the trust funds.” Pis.’ Ex. 55 at 3. As a result of the findings made in Misplaced Trust, Congress passed the Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act in 1994 (“1994 Act”). The 1994 Act codified certain preexisting trust duties that the United States owes to the IIM beneficiaries. In addition, the 1994 Act identified some of the Secretary of Interior’s duties to ensure “proper discharge of the trust responsibilities of the United States.” 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d). Moreover, because Congress recognized that the Interior Department’s pattern of historic failures could not be allowed to continue, the 1994 Act also created OST “to provide for more effective management of, and accountability for the proper discharge of, the Secretary’s trust responsibilities to Indian tribes and individual Indians[.]” 25 U.S.C. § 4041(1). OST is headed by the Special Trustee, a sub-cabinet level officer who reports directly to the Secretary of the Interior. Despite the “general oversight” duties of the Special Trustee, ultimate decision-making power over the IIM trust accounts remains with the Secretary of Interior. 25 U.S.C. § 4043(b)(1). 4. The High Level Implementation Plan The 1994 Act requires the Special Trustee to develop a “comprehensive strategic plan” for trust management reform and an appropriate reform timetable to ensure “proper and efficient discharge of the Secretary’s trust responsibilities.” 25 U.S.C. § 4043(a)(1). In accordance with these obligations, the Special Trustee submitted a “strategic plan” to the Secretary of Interi- or and Congress in April of 1997. After reviewing the Special Trustee’s strategic plan, the Secretary of Interior issued his own plan in July of 1998, known as the High Level Implementation Plan (“HLIP”). The HLIP consisted of twelve “subprojects” which focused on ensuring the accuracy of information regarding the IIM trust accounts and developing uniform policies and procedures to guide trust management in the future. The two sub-projects that are particularly important to the instant proceeding are Data Cleanup and Computer Systems. Under the BIA portion of the Data Cleanup subproject, the Interior Department sought to “have a level of data in the [computer] system that allows for proper land title records and every allottee and every tribe to receive the correct dollars that they’re supposed to get.” Phase I Trial Tr. at 2504. As for the Computer Systems subproject, the Department of Interior committed itself to the acquisition and implementation of two new computer systems to help it better manage the IIM trust accounts. The principal new computer system is known as the Trust Asset and Accounting Management System (“TAAMS”). TAAMS, when implemented, is supposed to allow BIA to administer trust assets, generate timely bills, identify delinquent payments, track income from trust assets, and distribute proceeds to the appropriate account holders. On March 1, 2000, the Department of Interior filed its Revised and Updated High Level Implementation Plan with the Court. Although the Revised HLIP was different than the original in many respects, for purposes of the instant matter it is sufficient to note that it maintained subprojects regarding BIA Data Cleanup and TAAMS. Since the Revised HLIP supplanted the original, it will be considered the HLIP for the remainder of this opinion. fi. PROCEDURAL HISTORY The plaintiffs filed the instant action against the Secretary of the Interior and other federal officials on June 10,1996, “to compel performance of trust obligations.” They alleged that the federal government’s trustee-delegates, including the Secretary of Interior, breached (and continue to be in breach of) their fiduciary duty to plaintiffs by mismanaging IIM trust accounts. On February 4, 1997, this Court certified the named plaintiffs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) as class representatives for all present and former IIM account beneficiaries. Cobell I, 30 F.Supp.2d at 28. The Court bifurcated proceedings in the case on May 5, 1998 [Docket Entry # 94], Phase I would address “fixing the system,” or reforming the management and accounting of the IIM trust to bring the defendants into compliance with its fiduciary obligations. Phase II, on the other hand, would address “correcting the accounts,” or performing a historical accounting of the IIM trust accounts. The Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and their first motion for summary judgment on November 5, 1998. Specifically, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ claims since, pursuant to Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act, the government had waived its sovereign immunity. Id. at 30-42 (finding that “[t]he case law and legislative history with respect to § 702 clearly evince the federal government’s consent to suit in the present case.”). At the same time, however, the Court granted the government’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim for mandamus “because the duties alleged by the plaintiffs in this case cannot be construed as ministerial.]” Id. at 36. On February 22, 1999, after a two-week bench trial, the Court found Bruce Babbitt, then-Secretary of the Interior, Robert Rubin, then-Secretary of the Treasury, and Kevin Gover, then-Assistant Secretary of Interior for Indian Affairs, in civil contempt for violating two of this Court’s discovery orders. Cobell v. Babbitt (“Cobell II”), 37 F.Supp.2d 6, 9 (D.D.C.1999). In particular, the Court found by clear and convincing evidence that these defendants were in violation of its November 27, 1996 production order, and its May 4, 1998 scheduling order. Id. In concluding that these defendants were in civil contempt, the Court explicitly rejected their contention that they had made a good faith effort to produce the applicable documents to the plaintiffs. Id. at 38 (opining that “[t]he defendants have fallen far short of proving their defense of good faith substantial compliance.”). Instead, the Court found that almost immediately after proposing a clear and unambiguous order which the Court signed, “the defendants disobeyed that order and successfully covered up their disobedience through semantics and strained, unilateral, self-serving interpretations of their own duties.” Cobell IV, 188 F.R.D. at 140. Notwithstanding “defendants’ reckless disregard for this court’s orders and their attorneys’ mismanagement of this case,” the Court limited “compensatory relief to monetary sanctions and coercive relief to the appointment of a special master.” Cobell II, 37 F.Supp.2d at 38. The Court noted, however, that “[s]hould it appear at any point that the defendants are not taking all reasonable steps to comply with the orders of this court, then harsher relief will be duly administered.” Id. at 38. On June 7, 1999, the Court denied another motion for summary judgment filed by the government. Cobell v. Babbitt (“Cobell III”), 52 F.Supp.2d 11, 34 (D.D.C.1999). As an initial matter, the Court observed that “the controlling Supreme Court case law on point clearly provides [that] the establishment of this trust creates certain substantive rights in favor of its beneficiaries, the plaintiffs, and violations of these rights by actions taken or not taken by federal officials may be remedied by prospective relief.” Id. at 20. In accordance with this elementary yet fundamental finding, the Court concluded that, “[c]ontrary to defendants’ position, Congress has subjected defendants to the full range of relief that plaintiffs seek, in terms of sovereign immunity.” Id. The Court accordingly found that “plaintiffs may seek prospective redress for breaches of these duties through common law remedies such as an injunction and declaratory relief, with the ultimate goal being the rendering of an accounting.” Id. at 24. The Court also recognized, however, that “these remedies, as well as the [plaintiffs’] underlying substantive rights, must be construed in light of the common law of trusts.” Id. at 28-29. Having denied the government’s motion to dismiss and its motions for summary judgment, the Court held a six-week bench trial during the summer of 1999 to address the plaintiffs’ Phase I claims. The Court issued its Memorandum Opinion, which included extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, on December 21, 1999. After determining that it had jurisdiction, the Court found that the federal government was in breach of certain fiduciary duties that it owed to plaintiffs. Specifically, the Court accepted a written stipulation filed by the defendants on the eve of trial in which they admitted that they were not in compliance with several obligations prescribed in the 1994 Act. In addition, the Court ruled, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702 & 706, that: 1.[The 1994 Act requires defendants to] provide plaintiffs an accurate accounting of all money in the IIM trust held in trust for the benefit of plaintiffs, without regard to when the funds were deposited. 2. [The 1994 Act requires defendants to] retrieve and retain all information concerning the IIM trust that is necessary to render an accurate accounting of all money in the IIM trust held in trust for the benefit of plaintiffs. 3. [Defendants owe plaintiffs, pursuant to the statutes and regulations governing the management of the IIM trust, the statutory trust duty to: (a) establish written policies and procedures for collecting from outside sources missing information necessary to render an accurate accounting of the IIM trust; (b) establish written policies and procedures for the retention of IIM-related trust documents necessary to render an accurate accounting of the IIM trust; (c) establish written policies and procedures for computer and business systems architecture necessary to render an accurate accounting of the IIM trust; and (d) establish written policies and procedures for the staffing of trust management functions necessary to render an accurate accounting of the IIM trust. 4. [D]efendant Lawrence Summers, Secretary of the Treasury, owes plaintiffs, pursuant to the statutes and regulations governing the management of the IIM trust, the statutory trust duty to retain IIM trust documents that are necessary to render an accurate accounting of all money in the IIM trust held in trust for the benefit of plaintiffs. 5. Defendants are currently in breach of the statutory trust duties declared in subparagraphs II(2)-(4). 6. Defendants have no written plans to bring- themselves into compliance with the duties declared in subparagraphs II(2)-(4). 7. Defendants must promptly come into compliance by establishing written policies and procedures not inconsistent with the court’s Memorandum Opinion that rectify the breaches of trust declared in subparagraphs II(2)-(4). Cobell V, 91 F.Supp.2d at 58. In order to allow the defendants the opportunity to come into compliance with its fiduciary obligations, the court remanded “the required actions to defendants for further proceedings not inconsistent with the court’s Memorandum Opinion.” Id. at 58. In addition, the Court retained jurisdiction over the case for five years and ordered the defendants to submit “quarterly status reports setting forth and explaining the steps that [they] have taken to rectify the breaches of trust declared” by the Court and “to bring themselves into compliance with their statutory trust duties embodied in the” 1994 Act. Id. at 59. The defendants appealed this Court’s decision, alleging that it improperly construed the nature and extent of the government’s fiduciary duties to the IIM trust beneficiaries. After considering all of the arguments raised by the government, the D.C. Circuit affirmed this Court’s decision on February 23, 2001. Specifically, the D.C. Circuit found that: The government’s broad duty to provide a complete historical accounting to IIM beneficiaries necessarily imposes substantial subsidiary duties on those gov-eminent officials with responsibility for ensuring that an accounting can and will take place. In particular, it imposes obligations on those who administer the IIM trust lands and funds to, among other things, maintain and complete existing records, recover missing records where possible, and develop plans and procedures sufficient to ensure that all aspects of the accounting process are carried out. Cobell VI, 240 F.3d at 1105. The D.C. Circuit further affirmed this Court’s conclusion that the defendants were in breach of these fiduciary duties. Id. at 1105-08, 1110 (finding that “the Department [of Interior] is still unable to execute the most fundamental of trust duties-an accurate accounting.”). In addition, the D.C. Circuit found that the plaintiffs could seek judicial relief to rectify these breaches by the defendants. Id. at 1105-10 (noting that “[flederal courts have repeatedly recognized the right of Native Americans to seek relief for breaches of fiduciary obligations ....”). At the same time, however, the D.C. Circuit observed that “[t]he actual legal breach is the failure to provide an accounting, not [the government’s] failure to take the discrete individual steps that would facilitate an accounting.” Id. at 1106. In accordance with these findings and conclusions, the D.C. Circuit remanded the case back to this Court for further proceedings. Id. at 1110 (stating that “[w]hile the district court may have mis-characterized some of the government’s specific obligations, its broader conclusion that government officials breached their obligations to IIM beneficiaries is in accordance with the law and well supported by the evidentiary record. Therefore, we affirm the order of the district court and remand to that court for further proceedings ”)• On the same day that the D.C. Circuit issued its Opinion affirming this Court’s order regarding the Phase I trial, Dominic Nessi (“Nessi”), then-Chief Information Officer for BIA and one of the principal witnesses for the Interior Department during the Phase I trial, sent a memorandum to the Special Trustee which stated, inter alia, “that trust reform is slowly, but surely imploding at this point in time.” See Pis.’ Ex. 2, Tab A at 1. In light of this memorandum, on April 16, 2001, the Court appointed-with the consent of the plaintiffs and the Interior defendants -a Court Monitor to “monitor and review all of the Interior defendants’ trust reform activities and file written reports of his findings with the Court.” The Court Monitor filed his First Report on July 11, 2001. The First Report addressed the DOI’s efforts towards conducting a historical accounting for the IIM trust beneficiaries. The Court Monitor found that “the status of the actual accounting, with few exceptions, was, for lack of a better term, at ground zero.” Pis.’ Ex. 1 at 2. The Court Monitor’s Second Report, filed on August 9, 2001, reviewed the DOFs actions regarding TAAMS. The Court Monitor concluded that the Quarterly Reports submitted by the DOI (beginning in March of 2000) did not accurately reflect the status of TAAMS. The Court Monitor’s Third Report, filed on September 17, 2001, addressed the HLIP’s BIA Data Cleanup subproject. The Court Monitor found that the DOI’s Quarterly Reports consistently failed to provide the Court with an accurate picture of BIA Data Cleanup. On October 16, 2001, the Court Monitor filed his Fourth Report. In the Fourth Report, the Court Monitor reviewed, among other things, the portion of the Interior Department’s Seventh Quarterly Report that addressed BIA Data Cleanup and TAAMS. The Court Monitor found that the Seventh Quarterly Report, like the first six, failed to describe accurately the status of the BIA Data Cleanup subproject or the TAAMS subproject. On November _ 14, 2001, the Special Master submitted his Report and Recommendation Regarding the Security of Trust Data at the Department of Interior (“Report on IT Security”). In the Report on IT Security, the Special Master examined the trust data security systems of the Department of Interior. The security of these systems is critically important because they contain sensitive individual Indian trust information. After making extensive findings, the Special Master concluded that the Department of Interior “has demonstrated a pattern of neglect that has threatened, and continues to threaten, the integrity of trust data upon which Indian beneficiaries depend.” Pis.’ Ex. 15 at 153. In short, the Special Master found that the Department of Interior knew that its computer systems were insecure and did little to nothing about it. Id. at 141-53. C. THE ORDER & SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE On November 28, 2001, the Court ordered Gale Norton, Secretary of the Interior, and Neal McCaleb, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs, to show cause why they should not be held in civil contempt of court in their official capacities for the following: 1. Failing to comply with the Court’s Order of December 21, 1999, to initiate a Historical Accounting Project. 2. Committing a fraud on the Court by concealing the Department’s true actions regarding the Historical Accounting Project during the period from March 2000, until January 2001. 3. Committing a iraud on the Court by failing to disclose ‘the true status of the TAAMS project between September 1999 and December 21,1999. 4. Committing a fraud on the Court by filing false and misleading quarterly status reports starting in March 2000, regarding TAAMS and BIA Data Clean-up. Cobell v. Norton, 175 F.Supp.2d 24, 27 (D.D.C.2001). On December 6, 2001, the Court issued a supplemental order that required these defendants to show cause why they should not be held in civil contempt for: 5. Committing a fraud on the Court by making false and misleading representations starting in March, 2000, regarding computer security of IIM trust data. Id. These five specifications formed the basis of the instant contempt trial. The Court will make findings of fact and conclusions of law relevant to each of these specifications below. Specifically, the Court will address the Department of Interior’s efforts to carry out a historical accounting project for the IIM trust accounts, which is relevant to the first two specifications; the Interior Department’s TAAMS and BIA Data Cleanup subpro-jects, which are relevant to the third and fourth specifications; and, finally, the defendants’ actions regarding IT security, which is relevant to the fifth specification. Before turning to those issues, however, the Court must delineate the legal standards governing this proceeding. In this regard, the Court will provide the applicable law concerning civil contempt of court, fraud on the court, and courts’ inherent power to sanction litigation misconduct. III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS A. CIVIL CONTEMPT It is beyond peradventure that courts have the inherent authority to enforce their orders through the exercise of their contempt powers. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (observing that "it is firmly established that `the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts.' "); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (1966) (stating that "[t]here can be no question that courts have inherent power to enforce compliance With their lawful orders through civil contempt."). Specifically, courts may utilize civil contempt proceedings to obtain compliance with an order or to compensate for damage sustained as a result of noncompliance with an order. Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1016 (D.C.Cir.1997); NLRB v. Blevins Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173, 1184 (D.C.Cir.1981). At the same time, however, because “[t]he judicial contempt power is a potent weapon,” see Common Cause v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 674 F.2d 921, 927 (D.C.Cir.1982), courts should be prudent in exercising that power. Joshi v. Professional Health Services, Inc., 817 F.2d 877, 879 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1987) (noting that “in light of the remedy’s extraordinary nature, courts rightly impose it with caution.”). Cf. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980) (admonishing courts to exercise their inherent powers with “restraint and discretion.”). Two elements must be established before a party may be held in civil contempt for violating an order. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.Sd 1274, 1289 (D.C.Cir.1993). First, the Court must have issued an order that is clear and reasonably specific. Id. at 1289; Project B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp, 947 F.2d 11, 16-17 (1st Cir.1991) (noting that in order for a party to be held in civil contempt, the court must have issued "a clear and unambiguous order that left no reasonable doubt as to what behavior was expected and who was expected to behave in the intended fashion."). In determining whether an order is clear and reasonably specific, courts apply "an objective standard that takes into account both the language of the order and the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the order." United States v. Young, 107 F.3d 903, 907 (D.C.Cir.1997). See also Project B.A.S.I.C., 947 F.2d at 16-17 (finding that "the party enjoined must be able to ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden" or what acts are required.”). Second, the putative contemnor must have violated the court’s order. Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1289 (recognizing that “civil contempt will lie only if the putative contemnor has violated an order that is clear and unambiguous.”). It is not necessary in civil contempt proceedings for the violation of the court order to be intentional or for the putative contemnor to have acted in bad faith. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191, 69 S.Ct. 497, 93 LEd. 599 (1949) (opining that since the purpose of civil contempt is remedial, "it matters not with what intent the defendant did the prohibited act."); Food Lion, 103 F.3d at 1016 (observing that "the law is clear in this circuit that `the [contem-nor's] failure to comply with the court decree need not be intentional" and that a "finding of bad faith on the part of the contemnor is not required.") (emphasis in original). In fact, for purposes of civil contempt, "the intent of the recalcitrant party is irrelevant." Blevins, 659 F.2d at 1184. A declaratory judgment, by itself, cannot serve as the foundation for a finding of civil contempt. Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1290 (noting that a finding of civil contempt may not be based on a declaratory judgment alone); Burgess v. Ryan, 996 F.2d 180, 184 (7th Cir.1993) (recognizing that "declaratory judgments are not enforced by contempt[.]"). The reason why noncompliance with a declaratory judgment cannot result in a contempt citation is that: even though a declaratory judgment has ‘the force and effect of a final judgment,’ 28 U.S.C. § 2201, it is a much milder form of relief than an injunction. Though it may be persuasive, it is not ultimately coercive; noncompliance with it may be inappropriate, but is not contempt. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 125-126, 91 S.Ct. 674, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (Brennan, J., concurring)). See also Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1289. For example, in Perez v. Ledesma, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief from a criminal obscenity law that they believed was unconstitutional. Perez, 401 U.S. at 83-84, 91 S.Ct. 674. In his concurring opinion (in which he also dissented in part), Justice Brennan observed that declaratory relief would have a significantly different impact on the administration of the state’s criminal law than an injunction. Id. at 124, 91 S.Ct. 674. Specifically, he recognized that while an injunction against enforcement of the statute “paralyzes the [sjtate’s enforcement machinery,” a declaratory judgment, in contrast, merely delineates the parties’ “legal status and rights; it neither mandates nor prohibits state action.” Id. Thus, in the context of state criminal laws, a prosecutor can not be held in civil contempt for charging an individual under a statute declared unconstitutional by a court, while she presumptively could be found in civil contempt if the court had enjoined enforcement of the statute altogether. Id. at 124-25, 91 S.Ct. 674; see also Steffel, 415 U.S. at 469-71, 94 S.Ct. 1209. Applying this principle in a slightly different context, in Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, several private parties challenged certain federal agencies’ guidelines regarding the retention of records stored on their computer systems. Armstrong, 810 F.Supp. 335 (D.D.C.1993). Ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, the Court “ORDERED, that the Plaintiff[s] shall have a Declaratory Judgment that the guidelines issued by and at the direction of the Defendant Agencies are inadequate and not reasonable and are arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law in that they permit the destruction of records contrary to the Federal Records Act[.]” Id. at 350. The Court did not, however, rule that the agencies had to promulgate new guidelines. Id. Nevertheless, the Court subsequently found those agencies in civil contempt for failing to take such action. Armstrong, 821 F.Supp. 761 (D.D.C.1993). On appeal, the D.C. Circuit vacated the contempt citation on the ground that the agencies “were never directly ordered to promulgate new regulations.” Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1289. In so doing, the D.C. Circuit explicitly relied upon the reasoning provided by the Supreme Court in Ledesma and Steffel. It is worth noting that a party can, consistent with these cases, be held in civil contempt for violating an order issued in a case, notwithstanding the fact that the ultimate relief sought in the action is a declaratory judgment. See, e.g., Doe v. General Hospital of the District of Columbia, 434 F.2d 427, 429-32 (D.C.Cir.1970). The burden of proof in civil contempt proceedings rests on the moving party. Food Lion, 103 F.3d at 1016. In particular, the party seeking a finding of contempt must "demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged con-temnor violated the court's prior order." Id.See also Blevins, 659 F.2d at 1183 (noting that “[i]n civil contempt proceedings the clear and convincing evidence standard applies[.]”). The “clear and convincing evidence” standard requires the Court to “reach a firm conviction of the truth of the evidence about which he or she is certain.” United States v. Montague, 40 F.3d 1251, 1255 (D.C.Cir.1994). After the thoving party makes a prima fade showing of civil contempt-that is, demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the putative contemnor violated an unambiguous order-the party charged with contempt can still defend itself on the ground of "good faith substantial compliance" with the court order. Food Lion, 103 F.3d at 1017. The burden of proving good faith substantial compliance "is on the party asserting the defense{.]" Id. In order to raise this defense successfully, the putative contemnor must demonstrate "that it took all reasonable steps within [its] power to comply with the court's order." Id. Good faith alone, however, is not sufficient to relieve a party from a finding of civil contempt. Id. at 1017-18 (noting that "[a]lthough a party's good faith may be a factor in determinihg whether substantial compliance occurred, and may be considered in mitigation of damages, good faith alone is not sufficient to excuse contempt"). Courts have the power to impose both coercive and compensatory sanctions upon parties found in civil contempt. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947). Specifically, courts may impose coercive sanctions “to compel the contemnor into compliance with an existing court order” and compensatory sanctions to “compensate the complainant for losses suffered as a result of the contumacy.” United States v. Dowell, 257 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir.2001). See also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Yashinsky, 170 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that “[c]ompensatory contempt orders compensate the party harmed by the other party’s contemptuous actions; coercive orders seek to cajole the party in contempt to act in the manner desired by the court.”). Moreover, courts have considerable discretion in imposing coercive and compensatory sanctions. United States v. Berg, 20 F.3d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1994) (recognizing that “the district court has broad discretion in imposing those sanctions.”); Rodriguez v. IBP, Inc., 243 F.3d 1221, 1231 (10th Cir.2001) (noting that “[a] district court may exercise broad discretion in using its contempt power to assure compliance with its orders.”). In fact, “[t]he measure of the court’s power in civil contempt proceedings is determined by the requirements of full remedial relief.” McComb, 336 U.S. at 193, 69 S.Ct. 497. Thus, for example, “[w]hen fashioning a sanction to secure compliance, a district court should ‘consider the character and magnitude of the harm threatened by the continued contumacy and the probable effectiveness of any suggested sanction in bringing about the result desired.’” Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 943 F.2d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 304, 67 S.Ct. 677). B. FRAUD ON THE COURT The authority to respond to and punish fraud on the court is, like the contempt power, among a court's inherent powers. See, e.g., Universal Oil Products v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580, 66 S.Ct. 1176, 90 L.Ed. 1447 (1946) (noting that the "inherent power of a federal court to investigate whether a judgment was obtained by fraud, is beyond question."); Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1119 (1st Cir.1989) (recognizing that "[t]here is an irrefragable linkage between courts' inherent powers and the rarely-encountered problem of fraud on the court."). Most cases addressing the concept have arisen where a party seeks to set aside a judgment already entered, invoking the court's inherent power, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), or both. See, e.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944), rev'd on other grounds; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 97 S.Ct. 31, 50 L.Ed.2d 21(1976); Baltia Air Lines, Inc. v. Transaction Management, Inc., 98 F.3d 640, 642-43 (D.C.Cir.1996). Courts have also utilized their power to punish fraud on the court, however, during the pendency of a case. See, e.g., Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118; Synanon Church v. United States, 579 F.Supp. 967, 972 (D.D.C.1984) (noting that "[a]llegations of fraud upon the court arise in two contexts: first, as in this case, before there has been an adjudication, and second, in cases where a party seeks to overturn a final judgment, usually under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)."), aff'd, 820 F.2d 421 (D.C.Cir.1987). Courts appear to apply the same standard for determining if a party has committed a fraud on the court regardless of whether the misconduct is discovered before or after a final judgment has been entered. In both instances, the concept of fraud on the court "embraces that species of fraud which does or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases presented for adjudication.” Transaero v. La Fuerza Area Boliviana, 24 F.3d 457, 460 (2d Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118 (stating that a fraud on the court occurs when “a party ... sentiently set[s] in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system’s ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party’s claim or defense.”). For example, in Hazel-Atlas Glass Company v. Hartford-Empire Company, the court found out&emdash;several years after the entry of final judgment&emdash;that Hartford (with the assistance of counsel) had procured the publication of an article, ostensibly written by a disinterested ex- pert, supporting its legal position. Hazel-Atlas Glass, 322 U.S. at 239-43. The court learned that the article, which Hart- ford relied upon greatly, was actually writ- ten by Hartford’s officials and attorneys. Id. In concluding that this misconduct con- stituted a fraud on the court, the Supreme Court found that: tampering with the adof justice in the manner indisputably shown here involves far more than an injury to a single litigant. It- is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be to- lerated consistently with the good order of society. Id. at 246, 64 Id. at 246,S.Ct. 997. Similarly, in Synanon Church v. United States, the court found, before judgment had been entered in the case, that Synanon execu- tives and counsel had engaged in an exten- sive effort to destroy pertinent documents, to destroy pertinent documents, and then tried to conceal their actions from the court and the opposing party. Synanon Church, 579 F.Supp. at 972-76 (noting that “[t]his destruction and coverup were conducted under the direction of ... Synanon’s ‘Archivist,’ with the ‘knowledge and approval of Synanon’s legal department.’ ”) (quoting Synanon Foundation, Inc. v. Bernstein, et. al., Civil Action No. 7189-78 (D.C.Super.Ct. Oct. 12, 1983)). Based upon this evidence, the court had no trouble finding that Synanon (with the assistance of counsel) had committed a fraud on the court. Id. at 974-77. The relief ordered based upon a finding of fraud on the court has consistently been both swift and severe. In cases where the fraud is unearthed prior to the entry of final judgment, courts almost always dismiss the case (if the plaintiff was the party that perpetrated the fraud) or enter a default judgment (if the defendant committed the fraud). See, e.g., Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1119 (noting that “the caselaw [is] fully consonant with the view that a federal district judge can order dismissal or default where a litigant has stooped to the level of fraud on the court.”). Likewise, in cases where the fraud is discovered after judgment has already been entered, courts typically vacate or set aside the fraudulently begotten judgment no matter how long it has been in effect. See, e.g., Hazel-Atlas Co., 822 U.S. at 244, 64 S.Ct. 997 (observing that “[f]rom the beginning there has existed ... a rule of equity to the effect that under certain circumstances, one of which is after discovered fraud, relief will be granted against judgments regardless of the term of their entry.”). For example, in Hazel-Atlas, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he total effect of all this fraud ... calls for nothing less than a complete denial of relief to Hartford[.]” Id. at 250, 64 S.Ct. 997. Similarly, in Synanon Church, the court found that its inherent powers were “properly invoked to dismiss Synanon’s case to regain its tax-exempt status because Synanon engaged in a ‘deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme to defraud.’ ” Id. at 974. Because the sanctions imposed on the defrauding party are so severe, courts require the fraud to be proven-like civil contempt-by clear and convincing evidence. Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118 (noting that the fraud must be demonstrated “clearly and convincingly!.]”). In this regard, courts have recognized the strong policy interests in favor of both finality of judgments and adjudications on the merits. With respect to the former, “[fjederal courts, both trial and appellate, long ago established the general rule that they would not alter or set aside their judgments after the expiration of the term at which the judgments were finally entered.” Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 244, 64 S.Ct. 997. The reason for this rule is that courts have usually found that society is best served by putting an end to litigation after a case has been tried and judgment entered. Id. (recognizing further the “deep rooted policy in favor of the repose of judgments entered during past terms[.]”). At the same time, however, courts have also acknowledged “the fundamental importance of trying cases on the merits ....” Shepherd v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 62 F.3d 1469, 1476 (D.C.Cir.1995). See also Shea v. Donohoe Construction Co., 795 F.2d 1071, 1076 (D.C.Cir.1986) (noting that “our system favors the disposition of cases on the meritsf.]”). The reason for this rule is that parties should normally be allowed to present their case or defense to a court for adjudication. Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118 (stating that courts “should carefully balance the policy favoring adjudication on the merits with competing policies such as the need to maintain institutional integrity and the desirability of deterring future misconduct.”). In light of the severe sanctions and policy interests involved in determining that a party has committed a "fraud on the court," courts also require "a showing that one has acted with an intent to deceive or defraud the court." United States v. Buck, 281 F.3d 1336, 1342 (10th Cir.2002). The reason for this requirement, at least in the context of granting relief from a final judgment, is that "[a] proper balance between the interests underlying finality on the one hand and allowing relief due to inequitable conduct on the other makes it essential that there be a showing of conscious wrongdoing-what can properly be characterized as a deliberate scheme to defraud-before relief from a final judgment is appropriate[.]" Id. (quoting Robinson v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft, 56 F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir.1995)). The same principle (and requirement) applies in the context of dismissing actions and entering default judgments based on fraudulent conduct by a party. Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 589 (9th Cir.1983) (noting that "courts have inherent power to dismiss an action when a party has wilfully deceived the court and engaged in conduct utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice."). To the extent the Court has framed four of the five specifications in terms of fraud on the court, it is important to note that the commission of a fraud on the court can form the basis for a finding of contempt. Cf. Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 63 S.Ct. 268, 87 L.Ed. 368 (1943) ("To use bribery and fraud on the Court to obtain its order for disbursement of nearly $10,000,000 in trust in its custody is not only contempt but contempt of a kind far more damaging to the Court’s good name and more subtly obstructive of justice than throwing an inkwell at a Judge or disturbing the peace of a courtroom”) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 838 (5th Cir.1980) (noting that “[t]he defendants in Pendergast perpetrated a fraud on the court, punishable as criminal contempt!.]”); South Beach Suncare, Inc. v. Sea and Ski Corp., 1999 WL 350458 (S.D.Fla. May 17, 1999) (observing that “a district court may hold a party in contempt for fraudulently presenting evidence.”); Kelly v. SEG Sports Corp., 1997 WL 374745 (Mich. June 4, 1997) (finding that “while the representations were not incorporated in an injunction or order, the court refrained from considering and possibly issuing an injunction on the strength of these representations. If they were made with the knowledge that the promises could not or would not be kept, the making of the representations might constitute fraud on the court, leading to contempt penalties”). C. POWER TO SANCTION LITIGATION MISCONDUCT In addition to the powers discussed above, this Court undoubtedly has the inherent authority to address all types of party (and attorney) misconduct. Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1472 (D.C.Cir.1995) (recognizing that "[t]he inherent power encompasses the power to sanction attorney or party misconduct, and includes the power to enter a default judgment."); F.J. Hanshaw Enterprises, Inc. v. Emerald River Development, Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1136-37 (9th Cir.2001) (noting that "[c]ourts have the ability to address the full range of litigation abuses through their inherent powers."); Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 663 F.2d 371, 386 (2d Cir.1981) (observing that “[a] federal district court possesses broad inherent power to protect the administration of justice by levying sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices.”). Indeed, there is no question that courts have “broad authority through means other than contempt-such as by striking pleadings, assessing costs, excluding evidence, and entering default judgment-to penalize a party’s failure to comply with the rules of conduct governing the litigation process.” International Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 833, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994). See also Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1475 (observing that “inherent power sanctions available to courts include fines, awards of attorney’s fees and expenses, contempt citations, disqualifications or suspensions of counsel, and drawing adverse evidentiary inferences or precluding the admission of evidence.”). District courts have "considerable discretion" in sanctioning party misconduct. Perkinson v. Gilbert/Robinson, Inc., 821 F.2d 686, 689 (D.C.Cir.1987). As the Supreme Court noted in Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. at 44-45, 111 S.Ct. 2123, "[a] primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process." In this regard, the entry of a default judgment or outright dismissal of a complaint, though severe, is within the court's discretion. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45, 111 S.Ct. 2123. In deciding the appropriate sanction to impose on the wrongdoing party, courts "must properly `calibrate the scales' to ensure that the gravity of [the] inherent power sanction corresponds to the misconduct." Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1479 (noting further that "[t]he graver the sanction under consideration, the more precision this calibration requires."). See also Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir.1994) (finding that "a district court must ensure that there is an adequate factual predicate for flexing its substantial muscle under its inherent powers, and must also ensure that the sanction is tailored to address the harm identified.”). “This does not mean that courts must first impose a lesser sanction, for ... a district court need not exhaust other options before dismissing a suit or imposing a default judgment.” Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1479 (emphasis in original). See also Webb v. District of Columbia, 146 F.3d 964, 971 (D.C.Cir.1998). Rather, it means that before imposing a litigation-ending sanction, such as default or dismissal, the court must explain why lesser sanctions were likely to be ineffective. Id.See also Bonds v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 801, 808 (D.C.Cir.1996) (stating that “[pjarticularly in the context of litigation-ending sanctions,” courts have found that “dismissal is a sanction of last resort to be applied only after less dire alternatives have been explored without success or would obviously prove futile.”). In addition, before a court can impose a litigation-ending sanction, the misconduct must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1476-78. On the other hand, the imposition of lesser sanctions, such as adverse evidentiary rulings, “do not require a heightened standard of proof.” Id. In order to impose those sanctions, the misconduct need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (noting that “[b]ecause issue related sanctions are fundamentally remedial, rather than punitive and do not preclude a trial on the merits, we conclude that they do not require a heightened standard of proof.”). IV. FINDINGS OF FACT Upon consideration of all the evidence presented and representations made at trial, and in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), the Court finds the following facts established by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Cifra v. General Electric, Co., 252 F.3d 205, 215 (2d Cir.2001) (noting that the “obligations of the court as the trier of fact are to determine which of the witnesses it finds credible, which of the permissible competing inferences it will draw, and whether the party having the burden of proof has persuaded it as factfinder that the requisite facts are proven.”). As noted above, first the Court will address the Department of Interior’s effort to carry out a historical accounting project, which is relevant to Specifications 1 and 2. Next, the Court will address the Interior Department’s TAAMS and BIA Data Cleanup subprojects, which are relevant to Specifications 3 and 4. Finally, the Court will address IT security, which is relevant to Specification 5. A. HISTORICAL ACCOUNTING PROJECT-SPECIFICATIONS 1 & 2 The Court has organized its findings of fact pertinent to Specifications 1 and 2 chronologically. To put the findings of fact relevant to these specifications in context, however, the Court will briefly discuss its earlier rulings regarding the historical accounting project and describe the circumstances surrounding the Department’s decision to publish a notice in the Federal Register. 1. Prior Decisions by this Couri Regarding the Historical Accounting (1998-1999) The Court bifurcated this case on May 5, 1998. Specifically, the Court ordered that “to the greatest extent feasible, this case shall be divided between that aspect which seeks to institute new trust management practices, often referred to as ‘fixing the system,’ and that aspect which seeks to obtain an accounting or approximation thereof and to correct the accounts of the members of the plaintiff class, often referred to as ‘correcting the accounts.’ ” Order of May 5, 1998 at 2. See also Cobell III, 52 F.Supp.2d at 19 (noting that “[t]he second phase of this suit concerns plaintiffs’ claim for an accounting, which is their ultimate goal in this case and unambiguously provided for by statute.”). Notwithstanding this bifurcation, the Court observed in its Memorandum Opinion regarding the Phase I trial that “[t]he interplay between the two components ... is an important issue.” Cobell V, 91 F.Supp.2d at 31. In particular, the Court found that: Everyone understands that the second phase of this case will involve a trial regarding defendants’ rendition of an accounting. In general terms, that process will involve the government bringing forward its proof on IIM trust balances and then plaintiffs making exceptions to that proof. The government mistakenly assumes, however, that because ‘trial two’ involves the actual accounting then the scope of the required accounting-even at its most basic level-is a matter that need not be addressed today. On this point, the government is incorrect. The government alludes to the argument that the Trust Fund Management Reform Act does not require a ‘historical’ accounting. This argument necessarily brings the issue of whether the Act requires an accounting of all IIM trust money within the scope of today’s decision. Simply put, the Court cannot declare defendants’ duties and assess whether defendants are in compliance with these duties without establishing the funds to which the duties apply. The disposition of this narrow (but threshold) issue leaves all other accounting issues as matters for the second component of this litigation. Id. at 31-32 (internal citations omitted). In deciding whether “the Trust Fund Management Reform Act imposes on the United States, and, a fortiori, its trustee delegates, the duty to render a ‘historical’ accounting,” see Cobell V, 91 F.Supp.2d at 40, the Court had to determine if the statutory provision that requires the Secretary of Interior to account for the daily and annual balance of “all funds” held in trust by the United States for the benefit of an individual Indian really means all funds. 25 U.S.C. § 4011. As the Court found this statutory interpretation question rather straightforward, its analysis was necessarily brief. The Court concluded that “all funds” does mean all funds-as opposed to only some subset of the individual Indian trust funds managed by the Department of Interior. Cobell V, 91 F.Supp.2d at 41 (emphasis added). The Court could not then and it can not now “put a finer point on it than that.” Id. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the 1994 Act “requires defendants to provide plaintiffs an accurate accounting of all money in the IIM trust held in trust for the benefit of plaintiffs, without regard to when the funds were deposited.” Id. at 58. As a corollary to that finding, the Court further ruled that the 1994 Act “requires defendants to retrieve and retain all information concerning the IIM trust that is necessary to render an accurate accounting of all money in the IIM trust held in trust for the benefit of plaintiffs.” Id. at 58. The Court did not, however, prescribe the precise manner in which the accounting should be performed. Id. at 40 n. 32. Rather, the Court “explicitly left open the choice of how the accounting would be conducted, and whether certain accounting methods, such as statistical sampling or something else, would be appropriate.” Cobell VI, 240 F.3d at 1104. The Court issued its decision regarding the Phase I trial on December 21, 1999. Cobell V, 91 F.Sup