Full opinion text
ORDER CARNES, District Judge. This case is before the Court on defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [45]; defendants’ Motion to Compel the Production of plaintiffs medical records [38-1]; defendants’ Motion to File a Brief in Excess of Pages [44]; and plaintiffs Motion to File a Reply Brief in Excess of Pages [53-1]. The Court has reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties and, for the reasons set out below, concludes that defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [45] should be GRANTED; defendants’ motion to compel the production of plaintiffs medical records [38-1] should be DENIED AS MOOT; defendants’ motion to file a brief in excess of pages [44] should be GRANTED; and plaintiffs motion to exceed page limitation in responding to defendants’ brief that exceeds the page limit [53-1] should be GRANTED. BACKGROUND On June 11, 2000, plaintiff Margaret Collier (“Collier” or “plaintiff’) filed suit against the defendants alleging various causes of action relating to race discrimination and retaliation pursuant to several federal statutes. Collier is an African-American woman who was formerly employed as the Associate Director of the Clayton County Community Service Center (the “Center”). She alleges that she was not appointed to the position of Interim Executive Director due to her race and was subsequently “constructively discharged” from her position at the Center on June 15, 2000. (Compl. [1] ¶ 1.) She alleges that her constructive discharge was the result of racial discrimination and retaliation for complaining about the racial composition of the Clayton County Community Service Board (“the Board,” the “the Center Board,” or “CCCSB”), for filing a charge with the Equal Employment Commission (“EEOC”), and for exercising her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.. The defendants in this action are the CCCSB, the CCCSB Chairman Bob Reynolds (“Reynolds”), CCCSB member A. Gene Gaissert (“Gaissert”), CCCSB member Mike McBroom (“McBroom”), CCCSB member Debbie Hibben (“Hibben”), and the individual appointed Interim Executive Director of the Center, Jimmy Wiggins (“Wiggins”), who, after the events at issue in this litigation, eventually became the permanent Executive Director. Unless otherwise indicated, the Court draws the undisputed facts from “Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts” (“SMF”) [29]. If, however, plaintiff has disputed a specific fact and pointed to evidence in the record supporting its version of events, the Court has viewed all evidence and factual inferences in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as required on a defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1560 (11th Cir.1994); Reynolds v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 989 F.2d 465, 469 (11th Cir.1993). Accordingly, the following facts are either not disputed or are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. I. Factual Background A. The CCCSB and the Center The CCCSB is a statutorily created agency. Section 37-2-6 of the Georgia Code states in relevant part that: There shall be created community mental health, mental retardation, and substance abuse service boards, in conformity with the areas established pursuant to subsection (b) of the Code Section 37-2-3, which shall govern publicly funded programs for the purpose of providing certain disability services not provided by other public or private providers under contract with the regional board. The programs shall be governed by the community service boards, which shall be established as public agencies. O.C.G.A. § 37-2-6. The CCCSB is vested with the authority to oversee the Center, the vehicle through which it funnels mental health, mental retardation, and substance abuse services to Georgia residents. The Executive Director of the Center answers directly to the CCCSB. The CCCSB’s members are appointed by the county governing authorities, in this case the Clayton County Commissioners, and serve in a voluntary capacity. See O.C.G.A. § 3T — 2—6(b)(3). The enabling statute does provide that the board membership will reflect the various groups served, taking into consideration cultural and social characteristics, such as gender, race, ethnicity, age, and disability demographics of the regional and county populations. See O.C.G.A. § 37-2-6(c). Community Service Boards, like the CCCSB, are the “third tier” of service providers for mental health, mental retardation, and substance abuse consumers in Georgia. The Georgia Department of Human Resources Division of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse is the first line of services for persons seeking such assistance. See O.C.G.A. § 37-2-2.1. The second tier service providers are the regional boards. See O.C.G.A. § 37-2-5. The regional boards provide fiscal and clinical services oversight for community service boards and other agencies within their regions. See O.C.G.A. § 37-2-5-2. The Region II Board is the regional board that provides fiscal and clinical services oversight for the CCCSB. At all times relevant to the instant action, the CCCSB was comprised of six volunteer members and one ex-officio member. (Hibben Dep. at 13-14.) The relevant members and their corresponding races are as follows: (1) defendant Reynolds, a white male who served as Chairperson of the CCCSB, (2) defendant McBroom, a white man; (3) Cecilia Owens (“Owens”), a black woman, (4) defendant Hibben, a white woman, (5) defendant Gaissert, a white woman, and (6) Paula Sherrer, a white woman. (See Br. In Supp. Of Summ. J. Mot. [45] at 5-6.) It is undisputed that all individually named defendants acted within the scope of their official duties as members of the CCCSB during all times relevant to this action. (SMF ¶¶ 8-11.) The ex-officio member of the CCCSB was Crandle Bray (“Bray”), a white man, who served as Chairperson of the Clayton County Commissioners. Beginning in August 1999, the Center experienced severe financial problems and low staff morale. (SMF ¶ 16.) First, the Center operated under a budget deficit. Collier attributes the deficit situation not to her management, but to severe legislative budget cuts and to a change in the way Medicaid money was to be reimbursed to the organization. (PSMF ¶ 29.) Collier asserts that the fiscal situation was not unique to the Center, because community service centers throughout the State of Georgia were facing the same fiscal challenges due to the legislative reduction in the funding of such service centers. (Id.) In addition to the financial strain on the Center, staff morale was low. (Owens Dep. at 23-24.) In November 1999, the CCCSB hired a consultant to conduct a confidential employee survey (the “Employee Survey”) to gather the employees’ comments regarding the operation of the Center. The result of the survey showed that 80-90% of the staff was displeased with the management of the Center. (SMF ¶ 17.) Although the Employee Survey was mostly multiple choice, approximately ten employees specifically wrote in criticism of the management style of plaintiff Collier and Executive Director David Ashe (“Ashe”). (Pl.’s Resp. To SMF [52] ¶ 17.) The survey revealed a strong distrust among many employees for Collier, and some staff threatened to “walk-out” if Collier was elevated in rank. (SMF ¶ 18.) Collier, however, avers that the survey results were not intended to nor designed as a rating or performance instrument and that the CCCSB was informed of this fact by the consultant who performed the survey. (Pl.’s Resp. To SMF [52] ¶ 17.) B. Collier’s Employment at the Clayton County Service Center Collier first became affiliated with the Center in 1994 as a contract employee. (Pl.’s Stmt. Of Mat. Facts [52] (“PSMF”) ¶ 12.) The duties of Collier’s contract position included review of the child adolescent services program and design of day treatment services for the organization. (Id.) Collier’s, next position at the Center was entitled Child Adolescent Service Coordinator. (PSMF ¶ 14.) Her duties were to continue with the day treatment services program, to assume the responsibilities for child and adolescent services, and to perform a variety of administrative duties. (Id.) She served in this position until sometime in 1996. (PSMF ¶ 15.) In 1996, the Center underwent a reorganization. The result of the reorganization was the creation of the Executive Director and Associate Director Positions, under whom the managers of various Center programs served. (PSMF ¶ 16.) Ashe served as Executive Director from 1997 until the end of January 2000. (PSMF ¶ 17.) In the 1996 reorganization, Collier applied for and received the position of Manager of Behavior Health Services. (PSMF ¶ 18.) Collier states that she spent most of her time reviewing service implementation issues and the remainder of her time completing administrative duties. (PSMF ¶ 20.) After almost a year of serving as Manager of Behavior Health Services, Collier was promoted to the position of Associate Director of Clinical Services. (PSMF ¶ 22.) Collier had applied for the promotion and competed for the position against two other applicants, one of whom was defendant Wiggins. (PSMF ¶ 28.) Wiggins was given the position of Associate Director of Administrative Services, and was responsible for facilities maintenance and administration. (PSMF ¶ 25.) Collier notes that, by her estimation, approximately 85% of the personnel of the Center reported directly to her. (PSMF ¶ 24.) Collier served in this position from 1997 until her resignation in June of 2000. (SMF ¶ 1; PSMF ¶ 26.) In August 1999, around the time that the Center began experiencing the above mentioned financial difficulties, Collier began to develop a business plan for the Center that would purportedly be responsive to the new fiscal environment. (PSMF ¶ 32.) She asserts that she assumed some of the responsibilities for fiscally managing the Center after the Assistant Director retired in November 1999. Part of the “corrective action plan” developed by Collier included a reduction in force (“RIF”). (PSMF ¶33.) Collier states that she created the RIF plan based on her assessment of whether a position was necessary, and did not examine the qualifications of the individual who occupied the position. (SMF ¶ 36.) Kelly Hai-ney (“Hainey”), who served as Personnel Manager for the Center under Collier from January of 1999 until June of 2000, testified that, in deciding which positions to abolish, Collier and Hainey evaluated all positions in the Center. (PSMF ¶¶ 36, 37.) Collier states that she decided that the position of Associate Director of Facilities Management, defendant Wiggins’ position, was not needed as his duties could be assumed by a manager level position. (Id.) Ashe approved Collier’s suggested “corrective action plan” and accompanying RIF selections. By letter dated January 21, 2000, Ashe informed all individuals selected for the RIF that their jobs were being eliminated and that their last day of employment at the Center would be February 4, 2000. (PSMF ¶ 40.) Hainey testified that the RIF provided thirty days notice to the employees affected, the effect being that they would remain on the payroll as employees for thirty days before being terminated. (PSMF ¶ 39.) Under the terms of the RIF letter, Wiggins would continue to be employed by the Center until February 29, 2000. Wiggins, however, was the only employee actually asked to leave the Center, as part of the RIF plan, at the close of business on January 21, 2000. Collier asserts that he was offered the option of working from home during the thirty day period so that he could search for other employment, and that Wiggins chose to work from home. (Id.) C. The Interim Director Position On January 27, 2000, without the approval of the CCCSB, Ashe appointed Collier as Interim Executive Director. (SMF ¶ 20; PSMF ¶ 44.) According to defendants, but disputed by plaintiff, this action by Executive Director Ashe represented a change in the policy regarding administrative coverage of the Center. That same day, Ashe sent the CCCSB a memorandum informing the CCCSB of his plan to take extended FMLA leave, the new change in the policy, and his selection of Collier as Interim Executive Director. (Reynolds Dep. at 34.) Ashe took FMLA leave on January 29, 2000, due to a serious illness in his family. (PSMF ¶ 41.) Prior to January 26, 2000, Ashe had developed a written policy that called for the rotation of administrative coverage when the Executive Director was absent from the Center. (PSMF ¶ 44.) This policy provided that in the absence of the Executive Director, the Assistant Director, the Associate Director of Administrative Service (Wiggins) and the Associate Director over Clinical Services (Collier) would rotate as Interim Executive Director. (PSMF ¶ 45.) Because Collier and Ashe were in the process of eliminating, or trying to eliminate, the position of Mr. Wiggins, who had competed against plaintiff for the Associate Director of Clinical Services position, this meant that plaintiff would be the only official on the rotation list who would still be employed and thus able to fill in for Ashe temporarily. Accordingly, Ashe amended the Center policy to state that “when the Executive Director is absent from the office, the Associate Director will be administratively in charge.” (PSMF ¶ 47.) Collier asserts that, under both the old policy and new policy, she was the only person eligible to assume the position of Interim Executive Director. (PSMF ¶ 48.) Of course, Collier’s assertion concerning the old policy is accurate only if Wiggins had been effectively RIF’d. Defendants respond that the new policy developed by Ashe on January 26, 2000 could not have been properly implemented without the approval of the CCCSB. (SMF ¶ 20.) The CCCSB states that Ashe did not enjoy the unilateral power to determine who would occupy the position of Interim Executive Director, a position answerable directly to the CCCSB, while he was on FMLA leave. Collier asserts that Ashe did in fact enjoy the authority to develop the new policy and appoint her to the position of Interim Executive Director. To buttress this contention, Collier points to language in the policy manual purportedly delegating authority to the Executive Director to establish rules and regulations affecting employment within the Center. Policy 1110-04 provides in relevant part: With respect to any area of organizational activity wherein the Board has rendered no policy guidance, the Executive Director is free to create and follow any policy which is legal, ethical, and in compliance with the spirit of the policy which has been stated, subject to subsequent Board review and approval. Generally the Executive Director is empowered to assign and utilize resources within budget restrictions; to employ, promote, discipline and deploy staff, to translate policies of the Board into actions; to speak on behalf of the agency as the agent of the Board; and to organize and delegate for results as she/he deems appropriate. (PSMF ¶ 43) (emphasis added). This delegation language does not directly afford the Executive Director the authority to choose who will replace him or her when absent from the office on an extended stay, however. Furthermore, the clear language of the passage provided by Collier to support her contention that Ashe enjoyed the unilateral power to determine a policy who would replace him indicates that the opposite is true: the passage states that any policy enacted by the Executive Director is subject to the “subsequent Board [the CCCSB] review and approval.” (Id.) It is undisputed that the CCCSB did not approve of Ashe’s new policy concerning his replacement during absences. Therefore, pursuant to the language quoted by Collier, Ashe’s amended policy that effectively named Collier as acting Interim Executive Director was not implemented. The CCCSB states that due to the financial crisis at the Center and the results of the Employee Survey, they disagreed with Ashe’s decision to appoint Collier as Interim Executive Director. (Owens Dep. at 54.) Further, prior to taking FMLA leave, Ashe had previously forwarded Collier’s proposed “corrective action plan,” and accompanying RIF proposal, to the CCCSB and the Regional II Board for its review and approval. After learning of Ashe’s planned FMLA leave, the Region II Board sent Collier and the CCCSB a letter dated February 3, 2000, that indicated the corrective action plan developed by Collier would only be viable as long as the Center did not change the Executive Leadership. The Region II Board stated that: key to the overall success of this plan is to have consistent executive leadership throughout the planning and implementation. To date the Region 2 Board has been pleased to work with you [Collier] in your capacity as the designated CSB board management liaison and Ms. Cecilia Owens as the designated CSB liaison during this process. This continues to be both an effective and good working relationship and we have confidence that our continuing work will result in a successful outcome. With the recent development last week in which your organization’s Executive Director, David Ashe took a leave of absence it becomes very critical that existing agency executive leadership remains stable and continues in support of your organization’s defined plan. Any further leadership changes will further impact the feasibility of the submitted plan. (Letter dated February 3, 2000 attach, as Ex. R to Pl.’s Br. In Opp’n Of Summ. J. Mot. [52].) Collier infers that this letter indicates that the Region II Board supported her candidacy for Interim Executive Director. (PSMF ¶ 75.) On February 4, 2000, the CCCSB had a closed-door meeting. At this meeting, they decided not to implement the RIF and also tentatively decided to appoint defendant Wiggins as preliminary Interim Executive Director. Although the CCCSB did not realize it at the time, they were not allowed to conduct a vote in a closed meeting, due to the State open records/open meetings laws. (Owens Dep. at 53-54.) On February 7, 2000, Collier and members of her management board sent a letter to the Region II Board. In that letter, Collier and her colleagues complained that the CCCSB violated the State open records/open meetings laws in the closed session February 4, 2000 meeting. (PSMF ¶ 53.) The letter also complained that the CCCSB had placed “the provision of services to its 2,438 consumers at serious risk” by failing to implement the RIF as proposed by Collier. (Id.) In addition, the letter claimed that the CCCSB’s incumbent membership had been appointed in violation of the law, which required the representatives of the CCCSB to reflect the race of the people served by the CCCSB, although the letter does not indicate that anyone in the CCCSB or at the Center actually engaged in any racially discriminatory activities toward plaintiff or anyone else. Plaintiff indicates that the contents of the February 7, 2000 letter were reported to the local media. (PSMF ¶ 54.) In addition, Collier claims that she had previously spoken out against the CCCSB because the racial make-up of the CCCSB did not mirror those serviced by the Center, but she has failed to provide specific examples of such conduct. Upon receipt of the letter, the Region II Board informed the CCCSB of its content. (PSMF ¶ 55.) CCCSB Chairman Reynolds stated that Collier’s letter was “kind of upsetting” because he interpreted the letter to indicate that Collier wanted the CCCSB replaced. (Id.) At some point, the CCCSB discussed Collier’s letter and was concerned by her complaints. (Id.) On February 10, 2000, Collier’s legal counsel threatened the CCCSB with legal action if it did not appoint Collier as the Interim Executive Director. (Br. In Supp. Of Defs.’ Mot. For Summ. J. [45] at 10.) The letter also complained of the CCCSB’s intention to appoint defendant Wiggins as Interim Executive Director. (Id.) On February 14, 2000, the CCCSB voted to appoint Wiggins to the position of Interim Executive Director. (SMF ¶ 26.) On February 14 and 15, 2000, Collier and six of her management team members abruptly took FMLA leave. Defendants vigorously assert that these seven individuals’ exercise of FMLA leave was improper and that their action constituted a “walk-out,” as a result of their pique over plaintiff not receiving the interim appointment. (SMF ¶ 27.) Collier responds that she properly took FMLA leave due to stress and ulcers. (PSMF ¶ 27.) The facts, which strongly support defendants’ characterization, are discussed infra on pages 1357-59. On March 7, 2000, Collier filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. In their position statement, defendants responded to the allegation by stating that: Collierfs] appointment to the position of Interim Executive Director by Ashe was an illegal and improper use of administrative authority... the Board chose to place ... Wiggins in the position of Interim Executive Director because he was the person deemed most capable of managing the Center during a difficult period of financial crisis given his background and experience with the Center. (PSMF ¶ 66.) In support of their position that Wiggins was better qualified, the defendants stated that: Mr. Wiggins was the appropriate person to fill the position of Interim Executive Director given that his seniority at the Center and his excellent rapport with staff members. Given the climate at the Center at that time, it was imperative to have someone at the helm who could manage the financial crisis and boost the morale of the staff following the Reduction in Force. Mr. Wiggins has been with the Center for approximately twenty-eight years and served in a number of capacities, including Interim Executive Director during the absence of the Executive Director. Moreover, in his most recent prior assignment as Assistant MH/MR/SA Area Program Director, Mr. Wiggins was responsible for managing and supervising a staff of 260 persons and facilitating a budget of twelve million dollars. Additionally, it was clear from Employee Survey results gathered in 1999 that Ms. Collier was not able to endear herself to the staff in a constructive manner which would facilitate building morale during downsizing. (CCCSB’s Position Stmt, attach, as Ex. M to Defs.’ Br. In Supp. Of Summ. J. [45].) Collier, however, asserts that she was more qualified than Wiggins to serve in the position of Interim Director. (PSMF ¶ 77.) Collier notes that her direct experience in overseeing the main functions of the Center and her good working relationship with the Region II Board uniquely qualified her to serve as Interim Director. (Id.) Furthermore, during the time that Collier served in the Associate Director of Clinical Service position, Collier supervised approximately 300 employees during which time she contends that there was not one formal complaint filed against her by staff or consumers concerning her management style. (PSMF ¶¶ 78, 83.) In contrast, she notes that Wiggins managed no employees at the Center as the Assistant Director of Facility Management. (Id.) Collier further notes that she “met, exceeded, or far exceeded” all of the goals and objectives that were given to her and that Ashe always rated her performance above average. (PSMF ¶¶ 79, 80.) Collier has also presented evidence that she indicates is suggestive of an improper racial motivation by the Board. The Court will discuss these allegations infra. D. Collier’s FMLA Leave and Claims Emanating Upon Return From That Leave Collier took FMLA leave on February 14, 2000 because she claims she suffered from severe stress and developed stomach ulcers. (PSMF ¶ 91.) On that same day, six members of Collier’s management team also requested FMLA time and did not report to work. As a result, defendants assert that Collier and her team improperly took FMLA leave in an attempt to organize a “walkout,” when it became clear that the CCCSB was not going to appoint her to the Interim Executive Director position. (Defs.’ Br. In Supp. Of Mot. For Summ. J. [45] at 16.) In support of their contention that Collier’s asserted FMLA leave was improper, defendants submit the affidavit of Debra Hoobler (“Hoobler”), a former member of Collier’s management team. In her affidavit, Hoobler states that prior to February of 2000, Collier had used employees’ fears about the financial crisis to foster an “us against them” mentality. (Hoobler Aff. ¶ 3.) Hoobler continues that Collier demanded loyalty from her management team members and “castigated those who held divergent views.” (Id.) When Hoo-bler returned in early February of 2000 from leave that she took due to a family illness, Collier informed her that Wiggins was slated to be appointed Interim Executive Director and stated that Wiggins was going to fire all persons on Collier’s management team when he took office. (Hoo-bler Aff. ¶ 4.) As a result of the proposed appointment of Wiggins, Hoobler claims that Collier “orchestrated a ‘walk-out’ of her management team to foil Mr. Wig-ginses] appointment and to show the [CCCSB] that without Ms. Collier’s team, the Center would be left in ruin.” (Id.) Collier stated to Hoobler that “as a result of the ‘walk-out,’ the Center would be a ‘mess’ and the Board would realize that Mr. Wiggins was not the appropriate person to manage the affairs of the Center.” (Id.) Hoobler explained that: [according to Ms. Collier, the management team members were taking leave pursuant to the [FMLA], Ms Collier further stated that the FMLA documents would be approved prior to Mr. Wig-ginses] appointment and either left in a location at the Center where they would be found on the day of the “walk-out,” or mailed to Mr. Wiggins on the day of the “walk-out,” on February 15, 2000. Additionally, all the management team members were to meet at a restaurant in Stockbridge, Georgia to discuss the ‘walk-out’ and make further plans. (Id. ¶ 5.) Because Hoobler was ineligible for FMLA leave, Collier recommended that Hoobler instead resign. (Id. ¶ 6.) Due to the fact the “Center was undergoing considerable strain and to ‘walk-out’ at that time would only be detrimental to the Center, its consumers, and to those staff who chose to ‘walk-out’,” Hoobler decided not to participate in the walk-out. (Id.) When Hoobler informed Collier of her decision not to participate, Hoobler states that Collier became “indignant and aggressive.” (Id. at 7.) Hoobler notes that Collier used “manipulative tactics to get her to participate in the ‘walkout,’ ” including calling her “at least three times to get me to change my mind [and] telling me I did not have to go to work on the ‘walk-out’ day.” (Id.) In addition, defendants point to the affidavit of Rhonda Wood (“Wood”), a personnel clerk at the Center under the direct supervision of Hainey. Wood notes that Hainey, a member of Collier’s management team, discussed with Wood her intention “to join Ms. Collier and the other members of Ms. Collier’s management team in a ‘walk-out’ on the Center.” (Wood Aff. ¶ 3.) Wood states that Hainey said to her that she and the other members of the management team were planning to “jointly take” FMLA leave “solely to thwart the appointment of Jimmy Wiggins to the position of Interim Executive Director.” (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) Collier denies that she organized a “walk-out” and denies that she took leave for any reason other than due to her “stress” and “ulcers.” (Collier Aff. ¶ 11.) She states that during the time she took the leave, she saw “various professionals,” including a pulmonary specialist, psychiatrist, licensed clinical social worker and a gastroenterologist. (Collier Dep. at 201.) Collier states that Ashe signed her FMLA leave form, which seems impossible as Ashe was out of the office on FMLA leave, himself. (Id. at 246-247.) Collier also states that she cannot recall whether she or Ashe approved the FMLA forms for the other members of her management team to take the FMLA leave around the same time. (Id. at 242-246.) Collier does recall that she ate lunch at an IHOP in Stock-brige, Georgia on the day that she took her FMLA leave with three other individuals from her management team, who either were on leave at that point or who took leave soon thereafter. (Collier Dep. at 233-236.) In addition, she states that two other members of her management team, Haynie and Jan Hecker, who also subsequently went on leave, may have been at the IHOP lunch. (Id. at 236.) Haynie admits that she and Heckler were, in fact, present at the IHOP lunch. (Haynie Dep. at 63.) When Collier returned to employment at the Center in May, after twelve weeks of claimed FMLA leave, she had the same title of Associate Director of Clinical Services and had the same pay. (PSMF ¶ 92.) She claims, however, that she did not have the same responsibilities. (Id.) Collier states that she was not given an update on the status of the corrective action plan and was not given a key to enter the building. (Id.) She asserts that she was only allowed to supervise approximately ten employees in Utilization Management, all of whom were African-American. (PSMF ¶¶ 92, 93.) Collier claims that she was also excluded from management team meetings. (PSMF ¶ 94.) Wiggins admits that Collier initially was greeted with a reduction in her former duties following her return from FMLA leave. Wiggins testified that the reason for this action was: [bjecause when she left, she and the other managers that left on February 15 and right around that particular time we didn’t have the layer of managers. So these folks stepped up and did what needed to be done. [Collier] was out twelve weeks. And for her to walk back in and assume those duties over those people, I didn’t feel was right to them. I had some managers express they did not want that to take place. They had worked hard during that period of time, so I didn’t feel it was the right thing to do to the other employees. (PSMF ¶ 97.) Wiggins has also stated that Collier received new duties because he placed her in a position of Utilities Management Supervisor upon return from her FMLA leave. Wiggins’ deposition testimony indicates that Wiggins’s selection of Collier to the position of Utilization Management appears to be based in part on her “clinical skills” and “prior managerial experience.” (Wiggins Dep. 66-67.) The Utilities Management program was funded by a federal grant that was expected to increase despite the fact that other areas at the Center were decreasing due to the financial crisis. (Id.) Due to the “gutting of [her] responsibilities” and reduction of prestige within the Center, Collier asserts that she was constructively discharged in June of 2000. (PSMF ¶ 99.) Collier testified that she submitted a letter of resignation in June of 2000 because she felt that she “had no choice.” (Id.) Collier testified as follows: I felt that the situation I came back to [after] Family Medical Leave was pretty unbearable with all the changes that occurred in my job. I felt that the environment was pretty hostile, individuals were, pretty removed at that point, my job duties changed and frankly that was pretty insulting to me, also, it was pretty much a situation that was intolerable to me. (Id.) Collier further testified that she resigned because: My duties and responsibilities were stripped from me. I had a lower reporting responsibility within the Center. Prior to taking FMLA leave I was second in charge of the [Center], However, when I returned I was one of approximately twelve peer employees reporting to Mr. Wiggins... I had ho choice to resign because my reputation was destroyed, I was not able to contribute to the organization, I was being scrutinized unjustifiably when I came back from FMLA leave, I had been threatened with termination by a Board Member, Crandle Bray, and my capacity to function as a professional was ruined. (Id.) When Collier resigned, she provided a letter that indicated the reason she decided to resign was because of the “extreme hostility of the work environment at the Clayton Center.” (PSMF ¶ 101.) II. Collier’s Claim and Procedural Background On June 20, 2000, Collier filed suit in the Northern District of Georgia. (Compl.[l].) In her Complaint, Collier asserted a claim for race discrimination, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (“Section 1983”), for a violation of her right to equal protection under the laws (Count I). She asserted a claim for race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”), in violation of her right to equality of contract (Count II). She has asserted a claim for retaliation for opposing racially discriminatory practices under Section 1981 (Count III) and also a claim for retaliation for exercising her rights to freedom of speech, under Section 1983 (Count IV). Finally, she has asserted a claim under the FMLA for retaliation for exercising her rights under that statute (Count V). On October 4, 2000, plaintiff moved to amend her Complaint to add a claim for race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (Count VI). Defendants did not oppose that motion. Further, Collier alleges that the Center Board’s acts and omissions caused her “severe emotional pain and suffering, sadness, anger, humiliation, loss of self worth, depression and stress.” (Compl. [1] § 27.) On August 22, 2000, defendants filed a Motion for a More Definite Statement or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss [7], In an Order dated January 11, 2001, the Court denied defendants’ motion for a more definite statement, but granted in part defendants’ motion to dismiss [7], Specifically, all claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities were dismissed. In addition, plaintiffs claims under Title VII and the FMLA were dismissed as to defendants Reynolds, Wiggins, McBroom, Hibben, and Gaissert, in their individual capacities. Furthermore, plaintiffs claims under Section 1981 were merged into her claims under Section 1983 so that, in addition to plaintiffs claims under the FMLA and Title VII, the claims proceeding are a claim for racial discrimination under Sections 1983 and 1981, a claim for retaliation for opposing racial discrimination under Sections 1983 and 1981, and a claim for retaliation under Section 1983 for plaintiffs exercise of her right to freedom of speech by speaking out on a matter of public concern. At that time, plaintiff Collier’s Motion to Amend the Complaint [12] to add a claim for race discrimination .and retaliation under Title VII was also granted. On November 13, 2001, defendants filed a Motion to Compel the Production of Collier’s Medical Records [38]. As a result of having placed her medical condition at issue through her emotional distress claim and FMLA claim, Collier agreed to provide defendants with an executed medical release and authorization forms for all “practitioners of the healing arts” with relevant knowledge of the facts in the above-styled action. (PI. Br. In Opp. To Mot. To Compel [43] at 4.) Subsequently, defendants were provided with a copy of Collier’s medical records maintained by Karen Sack (“Sack”), a licensed social worker. Defendants contend that the documents produced by Sack were redacted in two places, and possibly others, at the request of plaintiffs counsel. (Br. To Compel [48] at 3.) Therefore, defendants petition the Court to order the production of Collier’s unredacted medical records from Sack. (Id.) In the alternative, they ask the Court to conduct an in-camera inspection of the unredacted medical records in order to ascertain whether the defendants are entitled to Collier’s complete medical records from Sack. (Id.) ■ On December 10, 2001, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment [45] based on their assertion that Collier fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and because the defendants are protected by qualified immunity. On that same day, defendants also filed motion for permission to file a brief in excess of twenty-five pages [44], On February 5, 2002, Collier filed a motion to exceed the page limitation in its reply brief in opposition to summary judgment [52]. Because the issues involved in this case are numerous and complex, the Court GRANTS both parties’ motions and will consider the briefs in deciding the pending summary judgment motion. In her brief filed on February 5, 2002, Collier argues that there are genuine issues to be tried with respect to her claims of race discrimination and retaliation. She asserts that she was uniquely qualified for the position of Interim Director of the CCCSB. She contends that she was passed over for this “promotion” because of her race and out of retaliation for the past exercise of her protected speech rights. Additionally, upon return from FMLA leave and after her filing of an EEOC charge, she asserts that her duties and responsibilities were “entirely gutted” in that she was excluded from meetings, her employment was threatened by management officials, and she was thus constructively discharged. Plaintiff has brought a Title VII claim for alleged retaliation against her upon her return from her FMLA leave. DISCUSSION Plaintiff Collier’s claims appear to be based on two incidents: (1) the CCCSB’s failure to appoint her Interim Executive Director, a decision that she asserts was based on discrimination against her because she is African-American and in retaliation against her for “speaking out” on issues of public concern in a letter she sent to the Region II Board, and (2) the Center’s “constructive discharge” of her from employment in retaliation for her taking FMLA leave and filing an EEOC charge. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment as to all of plaintiffs claims based on the two above mentioned incidents. I. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is not properly viewed as a device that the trial court may, in its discretion, implement in lieu of a trial on the merits. Instead, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of every element essential to that party’s case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, as a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The movant bears the initial responsibility of asserting the basis for his motion. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Apcoa, Inc. v. Fidelity Nat’l Bank, 906 F.2d 610, 611 (11th Cir.1990). The movant is not required to negate his opponent’s claim, however. The movant may discharge his burden by merely “ ‘showing’ — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. After the movant has carried his burden, the non-moving party is then required to “go beyond the pleadings” and present competent evidence designating “ ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). While the court is to view all evidence and factual inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir.1988), “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material when it is identified as such by the controlling substantive law. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citations omitted). An issue is not genuine if it is unsupported by evidence, or if it is created by evidence that is “merely colorable” or is “not significantly probative.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Thus, to survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific evidence of every element material to that party’s ease so as to create a genuine issue for trial. II. First Amendment Retaliation Claim Under Section 1983 A. Background Collier has asserted claims against all defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as a result of the defendants’ refusal to appoint her, or to honor Ashe’s decision to appoint her, as Interim Director of the Center during the pendency of Ashe’s temporary absence on FMLA leave. She argues that this refusal constituted retaliation directed at her because of protected First Amendment activity. Section 1983 prohibits a governmental entity from depriving a citizen of rights secured by the federal Constitution or law. In order to establish a claim under Section 1983, the plaintiff must show a violation of a right secured by the Constitution of the United States, and also that the deprivation of that right was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Cummings v. DeKalb County, 24 F.3d 1349, (11th Cir.1994); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“ § 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred”) (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). Plaintiff asserts that she engaged in First Amendment protected speech when she sent a letter on February 7, 2000 to Region II members, complaining about the racial composition of the Center Board and about budgetary and management issues at the Center, itself. (Feb. 7th Letter attach, as Ex. K to PIt.’s Opp. to Mot. Sum. J. [52].) She contends that because she voiced these complaints, the Board declined to appoint her as interim director during Ashe’s period of FMLA leave. The Court will first address the potential liability of the Board, itself, on this claim and next address the potential liability of individual defendants who have been sued. B. Liability of Center Board 1. Can the Board even be sued? Defendant Board has argued that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars plaintiffs suit against it or its members in their official capacity. Defendant correctly notes that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against a state in federal court brought by its own citizens or by citizens of another state. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890); see also DeKalb County Sch. Dist. v. Schren-ko, 109 F.3d 680, 687 (11th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (the Eleventh Amendment constitutes an “absolute bar” to suits against a state by its own citizens); Stevens v. Gay, 864 F.2d 113, 114 (11th Cir.1989) (“The Eleventh Amendment insulates a state from suit brought by individuals in federal court unless the state either consents to suit or waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity.”) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, An assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity essentially challenges a court’s subject matter jurisdiction: “The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed on federal jurisdiction.” Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). The issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity must be resolved before a court may address the merits of the underlying claims. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94-103, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (courts must have Article III jurisdiction before addressing merits of action). Plaintiff does not dispute that the CCCSB is a state agency. State agencies and state officials sued in their official capacities are afforded immunity from suits in federal court, unless the state has waived its immunity or Congress has exercised its right to override the state’s immunity pursuant to the Constitution of the United States. See, e.g., Robinson v. Georgia Dep’t of Transp., 966 F.2d 637, 638, 640 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1022, 113 S.Ct. 660, 121 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992); Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1502 (11th Cir.1995). To constitute waiver, state law must provide “unequivocal indication that the state intends to consent to federal jurisdiction. Otherwise, it will be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985). There is clearly no evidence that waiver or abrogation exists in this case. Further, plaintiff concedes that she cannot sue the Board or its members in their official capacity for monetary damages. As a result of this concession, the Court does not have to determine whether the Eleventh Amendment would protect the defendant Board from imposition of monetary damages in this case. Yet, plaintiff makes only a partial concession, noting that the Eleventh Amendment does not insulate state officials acting in their official capacities from suit in federal court, at least to the extent the complainant seeks prospective injunctive relief. Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir.1995). In that vein, plaintiff asserts that a state employee’s demand for reinstatement constitutes prospective relief that is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490 (11th Cir.1995) (prospective relief of reinstatement not barred by Eleventh Amendment). Defendants have not disagreed with plaintiffs contention that she can still sue the Board for prospective relief — that is, reinstatement — notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the equitable remedy of reinstatement is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., Bd. of Trs., 28 F.3d 1146, 1152 n. 9 (11th Cir.1994) (adopting conclusions reached by the panel in Lassiter II); Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., Bd of Trs., (Lassiter II), 3 F.3d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir.1993) (§ 1983 claim against University President in his official capacity, seeking prospective relief of reinstatement, was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Flood v. State of Ala. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 948 F.Supp. 1535 (M.D.Ala.1996) (finding no jurisdictional impediment to an action against defendant in his official capacity under § 1983 for the sole purpose of obtaining prospective in-junctive relief of reinstatement); LaFleur v. Wallace State Cmty. Coll., 955 F.Supp. 1406, 1423 (M.D.Ala.1996) (an order of reinstatement is type of prospective relief). Therefore, the Court concludes that the Eleventh Amendment poses no bar to this claim, to the extent that plaintiff seeks only reinstatement. Therefore, the Court will next deal with the merits of plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation claim, before returning to the question whether reinstatement would be available to her. 2. Merits of First Amendment Retaliation Claim a. Legal Standards for Claim Courts have developed a four step analysis by which to judge an employee’s claim that he was retaliated against by his public employer as a result of the employee’s exercise of his right to freedom of speech. Anderson v. Burke County, 239 F.3d 1216, 1219-20 (11th Cir.2001). The first two steps constitute questions of law that must be determined by the court. First, the court must determine the threshold legal question of whether the employee’s speech may be “fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern.” Brochu v. City of Riviera Beach, 304 F.3d 1144, 1157 (11th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). This determination involves an examination of the content, form, ^nd context of the speech. Id. Only if the court answers this question affirmatively does it need to move to the next inquiry: weighing the interest of the public employee against the interest of the public employer. This balancing test, derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), has become known as the Pickering balancing test. Id. The factual questions that constitute the third and fourth prongs of the test arise only if the first two prongs test are satisfied. The third prong requires a determination whether the protected speech played a substantial part in the employment decision. Brochu, supra, citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). Finally, if the particular speech did play a part in the employer’s decision then the burden switches to the employer to satisfy the “but for” test: that is, to show that the employer would have made the same decision even had it not been aware of the employee’s protected speech. Id. Accord Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir.2001) (mixed motive defense remains viable in both Title VII and § 1983 First Amendment retaliation cases, notwithstanding weakening of same in substantive Title VII claims). b. Facts in this Case Defendants have provided a time line of some of the relevant events in this litigation. (See Def.’s Br. [45] at 9-11.) In August of 1999, Ashe notified the Board of severe concerns about the financial stability of the center. In November of 1999, employees at the Center were surveyed and they revealed dissatisfaction with the leadership of Ashe and plaintiff. On January 21, 2000, David Ashe unilaterally changed the Center Policy 110-04 regarding administrative coverage of his position in his absence to read only “Associate Director” (plaintiffs position), rather than “Assistant Director,” as the policy had originally been written; Ashe neither advised the Board of this change nor sought their approval. Around this same time, Ashe, together with plaintiff, devised a plan to reduce the work force and included, as part of their RIF, Jimmy Wiggins, who like plaintiff was an Associate Director. This action, combined with the change made by Ashe to the Center Policy, meant that plaintiff would automatically become Interim Director upon Ashe’s taking of FMLA leave. Then, on January 27, 2000, without the knowledge of the Board, Ashe took his FMLA leave. Once aware of what has transpired, on February 4, 2000, the Board swung into action and informally decided that it would instead name Jimmy Wiggins, not the plaintiff, as the Interim Executive Director, in Ashe’s absence. Three days later, on February 7, 2000, plaintiff and members of her management team wrote a letter to the Region II Board, complaining about various matters with regard to the Center Board and the Center, itself. On February 10, 2000, plaintiffs legal counsel threatened the Center Board with legal action if Wiggins were named over plaintiff as the interim director. Nevertheless, on February 14, 2000, the Board officially appointed Wiggins as the Interim Executive Director. On that same date, plaintiff and six members of her management team “walked-out,” taking leave under the FMLA. Defendant has produced evidence by people to whom plaintiff directly spoke that the walk-out was done intentionally with the hope of bringing the operations of the Center to a halt. Plaintiff then stayed out of work for the entire three month period permitted by the FMLA. c. Application of the Law to these Facts The first question that the Court must address is whether plaintiff engaged in protected speech. Of course, the answer to that question depends on whether plaintiffs speech constituted a matter of public concern, as opposed to a matter connected to plaintiffs own personal ambitions. Plaintiff has contended that the February 7th letter to the Regional Board, signed by her and members of her management team, constituted protected speech. Summarized, this letter complains about the following matters: (1) the Board’s holding of a secret meeting in which it rescinded Ashe and plaintiffs proposed reduction in force; (2) the Board’s undermining of the Center’s “present leadership;” (3) the deficits under which the Center was operating; (4) past non-compliance with Georgia law in the appointment of the Center Board; and (5) the failure of the Board to represent, in terms of racial and disability demographics, the population that it serves, as required by Georgia law. (Feb. 7th letter attach, as Ex. K to Pl.’s Br. [52].) The letter ends by urging the Regional Board to relieve the Center Board of its duties, to implement the deficit reduction correction action previously submitted to the Regional Board, and to “sustain and support present leadership” at the Center. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that this letter touches on matters of public interest. In determining whether speech involves matters of public interest, a reviewing court must attempt to determine the goal of the speech. If the governmental employee speaks “not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest,” a federal court will rarely be the appropriate forum to gauge the wisdom of any decision taken by the public employer in response to the employee’s speech. Stanley v. Dalton, 219 F.3d 1280, 1288 n. 13 (11th Cir.2000), citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Moreover, the court must look to the context of the speech and, “when there is a personal element to the speech, complaints of wrongdoing within a public agency may not constitute speech on a matter of public concern.” Stanley, 219 F.3d at 1288 n. 13. See Anderson v. Burke County, 239 F.3d 1216, 1221 (11th Cir.2001) (plaintiff employee’s questionnaire concerning deficiencies in department had more to do with plaintiffs grievances as an employee than with concerns of a public nature.) Examined with the above guidance in mind, the Court concludes that the February 7th letter to the Regional Board was drafted largely to further plaintiffs personal ambitions to become the interim director, and that any matters of public interest referenced in the latter were secondary to that overall purpose. It is true that plaintiff did mention the allegedly improper appointment process of the Board and the latter’s failure to represent demo-graphieally its constituents: both of which facts arguably connote a matter of public interest. Plaintiff also cited the deficit budget figures: a fact that arguably invokes the public interest, but that also was a fact likely already well known to the Regional and Center Board. The overriding “thrust” of the letter, however, was a complaint about the Board’s countermanding of the proposed RIF action— which action would have eliminated plaintiffs only competition for the interim spot, Jimmy Wiggins — and the Board’s undermining of the “present leadership,” both of which comments, taken in context, constitute an indirect complaint by plaintiff that she was not going to be named the interim director. Further, plaintiffs conclusion— that the Board should be temporarily relieved of its duties and that the “present leadership” of the Center should be supported and sustained — -was likewise a not so thinly veiled effort to have plaintiff named as the interim director. Thus, the Court concludes that plaintiff has failed the first prong of the test, meaning that her § 1983 First Amendment claim must fail. Yet, more dispositive even than the nonpublic nature of plaintiffs letter is the fact that there is no conceivable way that this letter could have caused plaintiff to lose out on the interim job, as the Board had made its decision prior to plaintiff having sent the letter. Indeed, the only reasonable inference from the undisputed facts is that plaintiff only sent the letter because she had learned of the Board’s plan to name Wiggins as interim director. Plaintiff attempts to argue that, because the Board did not formally name Wiggins until February 14th, her February 7th letter preceded the Board’s action. Yet, the evidence is uncontroverted that the Board had laid the groundwork to name Wiggins during its February 4th meeting. In fact, plaintiffs own conduct supports that inference. Specifically, her own reference in her February 7th letter to the Board’s intention to roll-back the RIF plan — which would mean that her competition, Wiggins, would not be fired- — and her repeated concerns that the Board was not supporting “present leadership” confirms that plaintiff was aware what was afoot. In addition, Rhonda Woods’ testimony, described supra, indicates that the walk-out was being planned by plaintiff and her team prior to the date on which Wiggins was officially named the interim director. Finally, plaintiffs counsel’s communication to the Board on February 10th, in which counsel threatened the Board with legal action if they did not appoint plaintiff as the interim director, resolves any doubt that plaintiffs letter follmved the Board’s informal decision to name Wiggins as the interim director. Thus, even if the letter constituted a matter of public interest, its timing means that plaintiff has shown no causal relationship between the letter and the Board’s decision not to name her as the interim director. Cf. Brochu v. City of Riviera Beach, 304 F.3d 1144, 1155-56 (11th Cir.2002) (one cannot impute knowledge of protected speech to a decisionmaker who swears that he had no actual knowledge of speech). That is, as a logical matter, a letter that had not yet been sent could not have influenced the Board’s earlier decision. Thus, as defendant Board has demonstrated that it had no knowledge of the speech prior to making the adverse decision, it has necessarily shown that it would have made the same decision, even had the speech not occurred, which is the fourth prong of the test. In short, plaintiff has failed to prove a claim for retaliation in response to her exercise of First Amendment rights, in violation of § 1983, and defendant Board is entitled to summary judgment on this ground, as well. 3. Even If Plaintiff Has Asserted A § 1983 First Amendment Retaliation Claim, She Has No Remedy As noted supra, plaintiff cannot receive monetary damages from a state agency, as a result of the Eleventh Amendment immunity that defendant concedes the agency to enjoy. She can, however, enjoy prospective relief: specifically, reinstatement to the position in question. Yet, leaving aside the legal implications of the question whether plaintiff ever held the interim position, such that the Court would be ordering reinstatement, or whether she never held this position, such that the Court would be ordering a promotion, it appears clear that there is no position to which the Court can return plaintiff. That is, plaintiff sought an interim position; yet, there is no longer an interim position. Accordingly, as the Court cannot order the plaintiff reinstated to a job that no longer exists, there appears to be no remedy that can be ordered for plaintiffs claim and, accordingly, defendant Board appear entitled to summary judgment on that ground as well. C. Liabilit