Full opinion text
WILSON, District Judge. INDEX Page I. Introduction .992 II. The Long History Of Desegregation Litigation In Pulaski County t> O 03 A. 1956 Through 1973 . t-05 03 B. Events leading to the initiation of this action. O 03 03 C. Inter district Litigation And Inter district Relief. O O O t*H D. The 1990 Settlement Agreement And Settlement Plans. CO O O tH LRSD’s Implementation Of Its Desegregation Obligations Between 1991 And 1995 .1005 W Joshua’s Request For An Interim Award Of Attorney’s Fees For fe Performing Monitoring Activities After The 1990 Settlement .. O T*H o r — i LRSD’s First Attempt To End Federal Court Jurisdiction. T — I o 1 — 1 The Perplexing Final Resolution Of Joshua’s Request For Still More Attorneys’ Fees From LRSD . CO T — I o T — ( Final Approval Of Revised Desegregation And Education Plan. C"-7 — i o 7 — 1 t — 5 J. LRSD’s Implementation Of Its Obligations Under The Revised Plan ... GO l-H o 7 — 1 1020 LRSD Seeks Unitary Status Based Upon Its Substantial Compliance With The Revised Plan. M III.Relevant Provisions Of Revised Plan. 1-L o DO H A. LRSD’s Obligation Of Good Faith. o K> W B. LRSD’s Student o N> CO 1023 C. LRSD’s Obligations To Improve And Remediate The Academic Achievement Of African-American Students.•. 1023 D. LRSD’s Obligations Regarding Extracurricular Activities, Advanced Placement Courses, And Guidance Counselors. 1024 E. LRSD’s Obligations To Develop Remedies, Where Appropriate, For Racial Disparities In Programs And Activities. 1024 F. Procedure For Raising Compliance Issues. 1025 G. Duration Of Revised Plan. 1025 H. Procedure For Seeking Unitary Status. I. Effect Of LRSD’s Failure To Meet “Specific Goals” In The Revised Plan ...1025 IV. Controlling Principles Of Law.1026 A. The Evolving Concept of Unitary Status.1026 B. Applicable Standard For Determining If LRSD Is Unitary.1031 C. Burden Of Proof.1033 D. Meaning Of “Substantial Compliance”.1035 E. The Metaphysics Of Using The “Achievement Gap” As A Factor In Deciding Unitary Status.1036 V. Findings Of Fact. 1040 A. Good Faith .1041 B. Student Discipline.1046 C. Extracurricular Activities.1057 D. Advanced Placement Courses .1061 Promote Participation and Remove Barriers .1062 Identify and Encourage .1066 Assist.1068 E. Guidance And Counseling.1069 F. Academic Achievement.1070 G. Program Assessment/Program Evaluation.1076 VI.Conclusions Of Law.1082 A. Unitary Status.1082 B. Burden Of Proof.1082 C. Substantial Compliance.1082 D. Good Faith .1082 E. Student Discipline.1082 F. Academic Achievement.1082 G. Partial Unitary Status.1083 H. Time To Fly.1084 VII.Compliance Remedy.1087 VIII. Conclusion. .1088 MEMORANDUM OPINION I. Introduction On December 12, 1990, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals approved the “Pulaski County School Desegregation Case Settlement Agreement,” as revised September 28, 1989; separate Settlement Plans for the Little Rock School District (“LRSD”), the North Little Rock School District (“NLRSD”), and the Pulaski County Special School District (“PCSSD”), dated January 31, 1989; and a separate Interdistrict Settlement Plan. LRSD v. PCSSD, 921 F.2d 1871 (8th Cir.1990). At that time, both the district court and the Eighth Circuit believed that this historic settlement created the “benchmark for the future path of this case,” Appeal of LRSD, 949 F.2d 253, 255 (8th Cir.1991), and “a sure guide for ending this dispute and getting the parties out of court.” LRSD v. PCSSD, 769 F.Supp. 1491, 1494 (E.D.Ark. 1991), order vacated, 949 F.2d 253 (8th Cir.1991). In the years following the Eighth Circuit’s approval of the parties’ final settlement of this case, all three Pulaski County school districts implemented their respective Settlement Plans under the supervision of the district court and the Office of Desegregation Monitoring (“ODM”). Subsequently, the district court and Eighth Circuit established guidelines for allowing the parties to make agreed changes to the details of the Settlement Plans, as long as they did not affect the “major substantive commitments to desegregation” embodied in those Plans. Appeal of LRSD, 949 F.2d at 256; see also LRSD, 769 F.Supp. 1491; LRSD v. PCSSD, 769 F.Supp. 1483 (E.D.Ark.1991), order vacated, 949 F.2d 253 (8th Cir.1991). Between 1991 and 1996, LRSD worked toward implementing its desegregation obligations under the settlement documents. On May 1, 1992, the district court entered an Order (docket no. 1587) approving certain changes to LRSD’s 1990 Settlement Plan and the Interdistrict Settlement Plan. A copy of LRSD’s modified settlement plan and interdistrict plan, referred to as “LRSD’s May 1992 Desegregation Plan” and the “May 1992 Interdistrict Desegregation Plan,” were attached to the court’s May 1,1992 Order. By 1996, it had become apparent to the parties and the district court that some of the desegregation obligations imposed on LRSD by the settlement documents might never be successfully implemented, regardless of LRSD’s best efforts. Accordingly, on September 25, 1996, Judge Wright entered a Memorandum Opinion (docket no. 2821) in which she “invite[d] the parties to modify the parts of the [settlement] plan that are ineffective or unworkable.” As a result, in late 1996 and 1997, LRSD and the Joshua Intervenors (“Joshua”) entered into protracted negotiations to modify various aspects of LRSD’s Settlement Plan. These negotiations bore fruit in the January 16, 1998 Revised Desegregation and Education Plan (the “Revised Plan”), which LRSD and Joshua jointly submitted to the district court for approval on January 21, 1998 (docket nos. 3107 and 3136). On April 10, 1998, the district court entered an Order (docket no. 3144) approving the Revised Plan, which it viewed as “an entirely new consent decree or settlement agreement between LRSD and Joshua.” Unlike LRSD’s 1990 Settlement Plan, as modified by the May 1992 Desegregation Plan, the Revised Plan included a section establishing a specific procedure and time schedule under which LRSD might achieve unitary status: SECTION 11: Unitary Status. At the conclusion of the 2000-01 school year, the district court shall enter an order releasing LRSD from court supervision and finding LRSD unitary with regard to all aspects of school operations 'provided that LRSD has substantially complied with its obligations set forth in this Revised Plan. In anticipation of release, LRSD shall issue a report on March 15, 2001 indicating the state of LRSD’s compliance with the Revised Plan. Any party challenging LRSD’s compliance bears the burden of proof. If no party challenges LRSD’s compliance, the above-described order shall be entered without further proceedings. (Emphasis added.) Because none of the parties appealed the district court’s April 10 Order approving the Revised Plan, it became a final consent decree, which now governs LRSD’s desegregation obligations and establishes the path that LRSD must follow to achieve unitary status and release from federal court supervision. On March 15, 2001, LRSD filed a Request for Scheduling Order and Compliance Report (docket no. 3410), pursuant to Section 11 of the Revised Plan, seeking “an order finding LRSD unitary with regard to all aspects of school operations.” On June 25, 2001, Joshua filed an Opposition to LRSD’s Compliance Report (docket no. 3447), which vigorously challenged LRSD’s contention that it was entitled to a declaration of unitary status and argued that LRSD was not in “substantial compliance” with certain of its desegregation obligations under the Revised Plan. On July 5 and 6, August 1 and 2, and November 19 and 20, 2001, my colleague and predecessor in this case, United States Chief District Judge Susan Webber Wright, conducted five and one-half days of evidentiary hearings to develop the facts surrounding what Joshua believed were their three strongest grounds for challenging LRSD’s request for unitary status: first, that LRSD had not acted in good faith in implementing its desegregation obligations (§ 2.1 of the Revised Plan); second, that LRSD was not in substantial compliance with its obligations regarding student discipline (§§ 2.5 through 2.5.4 of the Revised Plan); and third, that LRSD was not in substantial compliance with its obligations to implement programs, policies, and procedures designed to improve the academic achievement of African-American students (§§ 2.7, 2.7.1, and 5.1-5.8 of the Revised Plan). In a scheduling conference on December 11, 2001, Judge Wright designated the week of January 28, 2002, to hear no more than five additional days of testimony regarding the last three areas of the Revised Plan in which Joshua claimed LRSD had failed to substantially comply with its obligations: advanced placement courses (§§ 2.6 and 2.6.2 of the Revised Plan); extracurricular activities (§§ 2.6 and 2.6.3 of the Revised Plan); and guidance counseling (§ 2.6.1 of the Revised Plan) (docket no. 3597 at 31-37). Judge Wright made it clear that, after she had heard the testimony concerning these last three areas of LRSD’s alleged noncompliance, she would decide the question of unitary status. Id. at 36-37. On January 3, 2002, after presiding over this case with great perseverance and distinction for eleven years, Judge Wright determined that it was the “appropriate time to reassign this case to another judge with minimal disruption to the parties and to allow a smooth transition” (docket no. 3569). That same day, the case was assigned to me by random selection (docket no. 3570). On March 15, 2002, one year to the day after submitting its Request for Scheduling Order and Compliance Report, LRSD filed a Motion for an Immediate Declaration of Unitary Status (docket no. 3580) and Supporting Memorandum Brief (docket no. 3581). On May 9, 2002, I entered a fourteen-page Order (docket no. 3598) explaining to the parties my understanding of the current status of the case. Because the passing of the baton is a key factor in any relay race, the May 9 Order noted: Judge Wright, my immediate predecessor in this case, has done an outstanding job of narrowing the issues and establishing a schedule that should allow me to conduct no more than five additional days of evidentiary hearings on the four remaining issues and then be in a position to decide the LRSD’s Motion for an Immediate Declaration of Unitary Status. For that reason, the Court intends to pick up where Judge Wright left off, without disturbing the schedule that was established and agreed to by the parties and the Court during the December 11, 2001 hearing. May 9, 2002 Order at 12 (docket no. 3598) (footnote omitted). In a telephone conference with counsel on May 14, 2002, I rescheduled for July 22-26, 2002, the last five days of evidentiary hearings on the question of whether LRSD had substantially complied with its obligations under the Revised Plan. In an Order (docket no. 3600) entered the next day, I set forth the schedule adopted during the May 14 telephone conference. On May 30, 2002, Joshua filed their Response in Opposition to LRSD’s Motion for an Immediate Declaration of Unitary Status (docket no. 3604). On June 7, 2002, LRSD filed a Reply Brief in Support of Motion for an Immediate Declaration of Unitary Status (docket no. 3607). During the week of July 22, I completed the evidentiary hearings to develop the facts relevant to the determination of whether LRSD is entitled to a declaration of unitary status. Thus, the record is now complete, and the issue of unitary status is ready for decision. During the last eight months, I have spent many an hour trying to educate myself on the significant rulings and agreements that have shaped the current contours of this twenty-year-old case. I have also read a ground-slide load of cases to gain an understanding of the evolution of school desegregation litigation during the last five decades and to grasp the issues a court must resolve in deciding whether a school district has achieved unitary status. I have learned that desegregation cases are invariably complex, involve difficult-to-understand jargon, and frequently generate book-length appellate decisions, with seemingly obligatory concurring and dissenting opinions. Of course, I have found none of these discoveries to be surprising. After all, the issue of desegregation goes to both the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of “equal protection” and the dark soul of what was, in many parts of the country in the 1950’s, a de jure segregated public school system that only grudgingly gave ground to integration — after most school districts had exhausted all available means of delay. In 1954, the Supreme Court rendered its landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) (“Brown /”), holding that “in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place” and that segregation of public education is a denial of “equal protection of the laws.” Three years later, Little Rock suddenly found itself at the epicenter of this country’s first major school desegregation effort. In early August of 1957, LRSD school officials (including the school board) were prepared to implement a plan to admit a small number of African-American students to Central High School. Arkansas’s Governor, Orval Faubus, ostensibly supported that plan, which, if implemented with the support of the State, may well have led to the peaceful integration of Central. As it turned out, however, just as school started, Faubus called out the Arkansas National Guard to prevent the “Little Rock Nine” from entering Central. Faubus, who was known as somewhat of a moderate up to that time, shamelessly fanned the flames of racism under the rubric of “state’s rights,” “interposition,” and the like. Thus, Little Rock became the first great legal battleground in the long struggle to desegregate this country’s public school system, a distinction that has left lasting wounds in this community. One can only wonder how the history of school desegregation might have been different if the first southern governor to squarely face the dictates of Brown I had done his plain, sworn constitutional duty. In view of the historical importance of this case, I believe I should review the long and winding path trod by LRSD in carrying out its constitutional duty, under Brown I and its progeny, to rid the Little Rock school system; to the extent practicable, of the vestiges of de jure segregation. Without at least some understanding of that history, it is impossible to appreciate the deep passions this case still stirs in the litigants, lawyers, and judges who have been involved in almost five decades of continuous, unremitting school desegregation litigation in Pulaski County. II. The Long History Of Desegregation Litigation In Pulaski County A. 1956 Through 1973 In LRSD v. PCSSD, 584 F.Supp. 328, 331-32 (E.D.Ark.1984), the late and distinguished United States District Judge Henry Woods, the first judge to preside over this case, chronicled in great detail the history of desegregation in Pulaski County. In his scholarly decision, Judge Woods described: the operation of LRSD in 1930, when it was a de jure segregated school district operating under the “separate but equal” doctrine; the Court’s decision in Brown I, which overturned Plessy v. Ferguson; the court-ordered implementation of a plan to admit a small number of African-American students to Little Rock Central High School in September of 1957; Governor Faubus’ use of Arkansas National Guard troops at Central to place it “off limits” to African-American students and the subsequent removal of those troops after the issuance of an injunction by United States District Judge Ronald Davies in Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F.Supp. 220 (E.D.Ark.1957); the nine courageous African-American students entering Central on September 23, 1957, in the face of a large, threatening mob of whites; and, finally, President Eisenhower dispatching troops to Central to ensure the safety of the African-American students and to enforce Judge Davies’ desegregation order. Judge Woods also traced desegregation plans advanced by LRSD in “the decade of 1960 in a good faith effort to provide a solution to continuous litigation” and the failure of those plans in “the hysterical political atmosphere of that period.” LRSD, 584 F.Supp. at 334. In 1966, the Eighth Circuit approved LRSD’s “freedom of choice” desegregation plan, which remained in effect through the 1968-69 school year. Clark v. Board of Education of LRSD, 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir.1966). Significantly, in its decision, the Court noted LRSD’s good faith commitment to desegregation: Many of the problems encountered are not of the Board’s making or choosing and, we believe, the Board has evidenced a genuine desire to follow the commands of the Brown case to ultimately place into effect a non-racially operated school system. Id. at 666. In Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 439-40, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968), the Court' held that school districts such as LRSD, which were the product of de jure segregation, could not satisfy their constitutional obligations under “freedom of choice” plans. Therefore, LRSD formulated a new desegregation plan for the 1969— 70 school year that was based on geographic attendance zones. However, because segregated housing patterns created a number of racially identifiable schools under the plan, the Eighth Circuit found it to be unconstitutional. Clark v. Board of Education of LRSD, 426 F.2d 1035, 1043 (8th Cir.1970). In the 1971-72 school year, LRSD began crosstown busing to achieve racial balance in grades 6 through 12. Clark v. Board of Directors of LRSD, 328 F.Supp. 1205, 1209, 1214 (E.D. Ark.1971), rev’d in part, 449 F.2d 493 (8th Cir.1971). The following school year, crosstown busing was used to achieve racial balance in grades 4 and 5. Clark v. Board of Education of LRSD, 465 F.2d 1044, 1046 (8th Cir.1972). Finally, during the 1972-73 school year, all LRSD schools and all LRSD grade levels were racially balanced. B. Events Leading To Initiation Of This Action On July 9, 1982, United States District Judge William R. Overton entered a Memorandum and Order in Clark which contained many of the findings that underpinned LRSD’s subsequent decision to file this action. In many respects, Judge Overton’s decision was a ringing endorsement of LRSD for successfully implementing its school desegregation plan over the last nine years. For example, Judge Over-ton explicitly found: (1) “no evidence of vestiges of discrimination in the district policies or practices”; (2) “the district has done an admirable job in the task of desegregation”; and (3) “the Little Rock School District has operated in compliance with court decrees for nine years as a completely unitary desegregated school system and isolated complaints of discrimination without persuasive specific evidence to the contrary do not detract from that record.” July 9, 1982 Memorandum and Order at 16 (docket no. 3581) (emphasis added). Although Judge Overton found that LRSD was operating “as a completely unitary desegregated school system,” he made a number of findings that raised serious questions about the future prospects for LRSD remaining an integrated school district. For example, Judge Over-ton found that: (1) in the years after the desegregation of LRSD elementary schools in 1973-74, “there has been a steady trend of increasing black enrollment and decreasing white enrollment in the elementary schools ... and [to a lesser extent] in the upper grades”; (2) despite LRSD’s efforts to modify student assignment plans to correct the growing disparity in the black-white student ratio in elementary schools, “[a]ll of the persuasive evidence indicates the school district will have enrollment which is essentially all black, particularly in the elementary grades, within the next few years”; and (3) by the fall of 1981, LRSD faced a host of problems surrounding the school attendance plan, including a “significant disparity in the black-white ratio at the various elementary schools,” complaints of black parents “that their children were being bused across the city to attend all black classes,” and the defeat of “the last two millage increase proposals ... by the electorate ... [creating] severe financial problems and an eroding financial base.” July 9, 1982 Memorandum and Order at 1-6, attached as Exhibit 1 to LRSD’s Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion for an Immediate Declaration of Unitary Status (docket no. 3581). In an effort to retain and supplement the shrinking pool of white students, Judge Overton approved the Partial K-6 Plan, which created twelve K-6 neighborhood schools and retained fourteen paired schools with grades K-3 at one site and grades 4-6 at another. Eight of the twelve neighborhood schools were racially balanced, and four were virtually all black. Under the plan, Booker Junior High School became an intermediate school; a magnet school was to be created west of University Avenue; and a committee was appointed to ensure that the four virtually all black schools would be treated equally. See July 9, 1982 Memorandum and Order at 6-11. Finally, Judge Overton noted that LRSD had taken a number of steps to address the problems that confronted it. First, LRSD had commissioned a study and report by a “Desegregation Assistance Team” at Stephen F. Austin University on its desegregation efforts and the challenges it faced in the future. Second, LRSD had begun investigating “the possibility of seeking an interdistrict remedy through legal proceedings against the adjacent County School District and [had] hired a law firm to pursue that remedy.” See July 9, 1982 Memorandum and Order at 6. C. Interdistrict Litigation And Inter-district Relief On November 30, 1982, LRSD filed this action — a new case — against PCSSD, NLRSD, the State of Arkansas, and the Arkansas Department of Education (“ADE”) seeking consolidation of the three Pulaski County School Districts as the most appropriate and effective desegregation remedy for all three school districts. In its- Complaint (docket no. 10), LRSD alleged that PCSSD and NLRSD engaged in “a series of intradistrict constitutional violations with interdistrict effects” and that the State of Arkansas and Arkansas Department of Education (hereinafter referred to collectively as the “State/ADE”), through funding and other state action, “operated, maintained and/or condoned a racially segregated structure of public education under color of state law.” After conducting a trial on the merits of the claims asserted in LRSD’s Complaint, Judge Woods entered a Memorandum Opinion setting forth detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law to support his determination that each of the three Defendants had violated the Constitution by creating “racial isolation between and among the districts” that had caused six specific “interdistrict effects.” LRSD, 584 F.Supp. at 349-51. Judge Woods noted that, at a later date, he would conduct a hearing to take evidence regarding the precise nature of the remedy that should be fashioned to cure the interdistrict effects of “substantial interdistrict segregation.” Id. at 852-53. During the subsequent remedial hearings, PCSSD advanced a plan that retained the three autonomous school districts and relied on the development of specialty or magnet schools to attract students from one district to another. LRSD v. PCSSD, 597 F.Supp. 1220, 1222-23 (E.D.Ark.1984). NLRSD advanced a plan that retained the three autonomous school districts, transferred certain geographic areas from PCSSD to LRSD and from LRSD to PCSSD, and depended heavily on the use of majority to minority transfers (“M to M transfers”) to achieve racial balance. Id. at 1223. Although not advancing a specific plan, Joshua used testimony from two expert witnesses to suggest three options: (1) altering boundary lines in accordance with the NLRSD plan; (2) altering boundary lines to transfer other geographic areas among all three districts; or (3) transferring certain geographic areas to LRSD and having all of the remaining area of PCSSD consolidated with NLRSD. Id. at 1223-24. LRSD advanced a plan that involved the countywide consolidation of all three school districts. Id. at 1224-25. After considering all of the evidence, Judge Woods concluded that “a countywide interdistrict remedy must be utilized to correct the countywide interdistrict violation found to exist and that this is the only manner of placing the victims of this discrimination in the position they would have occupied absent the discrimination.” Id. at 1225. Judge Woods also concluded that the State/ADE: (a) failed to discharge its affirmative duty to encourage desegregation, which had an interdistrict effect on LRSD, PCSSD, and NLRSD; and (b) had “remedial responsibilities with respect to this case.” Judge Woods noted that the “precise nature of [the State/ADE’s] financial and oversight responsibilities must await further refinement of the consolidation plan and development of a budget for such consolidated district.” Id. at 1228. PCSSD, NLRSD, and the State/ADE appealed Judge Woods’ decisions in LRSD, 584 F.Supp. 328, and LRSD, 597 F.Supp. 1220. The Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed Judge Woods’ finding on liability for interdistrict constitutional violations by PCSSD, NLRSD, and the State/ADE, but reversed his remedy of consolidation on the ground that, while the interdistrict violations of the Constitution called for an interdistrict remedy, consolidation of the three school districts was not required. LRSD v. PCSSD, 778 F.2d 404, 429-34 (8th Cir.1985). Rather than remanding the case to the district court for further findings and a detailed remedial decree, the Court spelled out its own interdistrict remedy. Id. at 434-36. Although this interdistrict remedy allowed LRSD, NLRSD, and PCSSD to remain autonomous, it called for, among other things: changing boundaries between PCSSD and LRSD; revising attendance zones so that each school would reasonably reflect the racial composition of its district within a permitted variance of plus or minus 25% of the minority race; encouraging intradistrict and interdistrict M to M transfers; and creating a limited number of magnet or specialty schools. Id. at 435-36. The principles of the inter-district remedy outlined in the majority opinion later became the basis for the desegregation plans that were implemented in each of the three Pulaski County school districts. LRSD proceeded to develop a “controlled choice” desegregation plan, which was approved by Judge Woods on February 27, 1987 (docket no. 739). Under this plan, LRSD was divided into two attendance zones of approximately equal racial balance. Students were assigned to schools so that each grade at each school reflected the racial balance within that attendance zone. After a student was assigned to a school, the student’s parents could request reassignment to another school within their attendance zone. That request would be granted so long as each school would remain within a range of plus or minus 12.5% of the black student population at the school. The plan also provided for eight magnet schools (four elementary, two junior high, and two high schools), with seats reserved for students of each of the three Pulaski County school districts. The target racial composition of the magnet schools was 50%-50%. Finally, the plan established a Magnet Review Committee, with representatives of each of the three districts, along with a non-voting member representing Joshua and the Knight Intervenors. The controlled choice plan was implemented beginning with the 1987-88 school year (docket no. 670). While the controlled choice plan was intended to create racial balance, it resulted in many central and east Little Rock schools having fewer than fifty white students. For that reason and others, Judge Woods later found the plan to be “ill-conceived.” LRSD v. PCSSD, 716 F.Supp. 1162, 1188 (E.D.Ark.1989), rev’d., 921 F.2d 1371 (1990). LRSD submitted a new desegregation plan for the 1988-89 school year, which all parties agreed would be a “stabilizing year” to allow LRSD to carefully plan for the 1989-90 school year and beyond. Id. With that understanding, Judge Woods approved LRSD’s proposed desegregation plan for the 1988-89 school year. Id. D. The 1990 Settlement Agreement And Settlement Plans After long and difficult negotiations that began in 1988, LRSD, PCSSD, NLRSD, Joshua, and the State/ADE agreed to a global settlement of all aspects of this case. In the spring of 1989, the parties submitted the following final settlement documents to Judge Woods: (a) The Pulaski County School Desegregation Case Settlement Agreement, which, among other things, fixed the State/ADE’s total financial liability to the three school districts to be an amount “not to exceed $129,750,-000”; and (b) separate comprehensive “Settlement Plans” for LRSD, NLRSD, and PCSSD and a comprehensive “Inter-district Settlement Plan.” Judge Woods rejected each of the four separate Settlement Plans and the 1990 Settlement Agreement, as submitted; ordered the parties to implement a more comprehensive plan known as the Tri-District Plan; appointed Eugene Reville to the position of Metropolitan Supervisor; and conferred upon Mr. Reville a wide array of powers over all three school districts that, in many respects, closely resembled consolidation— the remedy the Eighth Circuit had previously rejected. LRSD, 716 F.Supp. at 1164-69. Shortly after Judge Woods entered his decision, the Arkansas Legislature passed a bill funding the over $100,000,000 that the State/ADE was obligated to pay to the three school districts under the 1990 Settlement Agreement. Based on this new development, the parties resubmitted the Settlement Agreement to Judge Woods for approval. On December 11, 1989, Judge Woods entered an Order which added certain new conditions to the Settlement Agreement; approved it, as modified; and directed the parties to carry out its terms. LRSD v. PCSSD, 726 F.Supp. 1544, 1549-51 (E.D.Ark.1989). Judge Woods’ December 11 Order also specifically disapproved that portion of the Settlement Agreement which called for LRSD to pay $2,000,000 of the $3,150,000 in attorneys’ fees that the parties had agreed to pay to Joshua’s counsel. Id. at 1554-56. Each of the school districts and Joshua appealed the district court’s decisions to the Eighth Circuit, which reversed and remanded the case with instructions to approve the 1990 Settlement Agreement and the four Settlement Plans, as submitted by the parties. LRSD, 921 F.2d 1371. In reaching that decision, the Court made a number of important rulings that have had a profound influence on future developments in the case. First, the Court noted that the appeal arose from settlements agreed to by all the parties (a “most important fact”) and that “[t]he law strongly favors settlements” which should be “hospitably” received: This may be especially true in the present context — a protracted, highly divisive, even bitter litigation, any lasting solution to which necessarily depends on the good faith and cooperation of all the parties, especially the defendants. Id. at 1383. As further support for that conclusion, the Court made the following observation: This is, after all, no ordinary litigation. The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, its lawyers and its predecessors, have vigorously prosecuted this case and its ancestors for more than 30 years. Absent an extremely good reason — and we have been given none — we are reluctant to disregard their judgment as to what is best for their own clients. Id. at 1386. Second, the Court explicitly recognized the important role of future monitoring in the case and the need for it to continue “for a long time”: “In the present case, for example, any remedy will necessarily require some judicial supervision — monitoring, at least — for a long time.” Id. at 1383 (emphasis added). The Court also emphasized the importance of the district court ensuring that “the settlement plans [are] scrupulously adhered to,” that monitoring is done effectively, and that “appropriate action is taken if the parties do not live up to their commitments.” Id. at 1386. Third, the Court recognized that “a necessary condition of our holding that the plans are not facially unconstitutional is that the parties’ compliance with them will be carefully monitored.” Id. at 1388. Therefore, the Court directed the creation of the ODM “to be headed by a Monitor appointed by the District Court,.with such additional personnel as the District Court shall deem appropriate.” Id. Finally, the Court reversed Judge Woods’ decision on attorneys’ fees and awarded counsel for Joshua $3,150,000, the full amount of attorneys’ fees provided for under the Settlement Agreement. These attorneys’ fees were allocated and payable among the parties as follows: LRSD ($2,000,000); State/ADE ($750,000); PCSSD ($300,000); and NLRSD ($100,-000). Id. at 1390. In an Order entered July 6, 1990, Judge Woods concluded that, because he was “unable to successfully implement a plan to bring equity to the children of this county under the restrictions imposed by the Court of Appeals,” the time had come “for another judge to assume the burden of this litigation since it is my unalterable decision to recuse.” LRSD v. PCSSD, 740 F.Supp. 632, 636 (E.D.Ark.1990). Later that day, the case was reassigned, by random selection, to the Honorable Susan Webber Wright (docket no. 1373). E. LRSD’s Implementation Of Its Desegregation Obligations Between 1991 And 1995 Section IV of the Settlement Agreement explicitly provided that the State/ ADE “conditions this settlement upon its dismissal from this Litigation with prejudice in accordance with the terms of Attachment A.” Attachment A was a “Release of All Claims Against the State,” pursuant to which all parties to this litigation released all claims they might have against the State/ADE relating “to racial discrimination or segregation in public education in the three school districts in Pulaski County, Arkansas or to the violation of constitutional or other rights of school children based on race or color in the three school districts in Pulaski County, Arkansas.” Attachments B, C, and D were identical releases that ran in favor of LRSD, PCSSD, and NLRSD. Finally, Attachments A, B, C, and D each contained the same language providing that this action (LR-C-82-866) “is to be dismissed with prejudice” as to the State/ADE, LRSD, PCSSD, and NLRSD. Thus, the Settlement Agreement expressly provided for the dismissal of this case, with prejudice, “except that the Court may retain jurisdiction to address issues regarding implementation of the Plans. ” Attachments A, B, C, and D to the Settlement Agreement (docket no. 1174) (emphasis added). On the date the Eighth Circuit entered its decision approving the 1990 Settlement Agreement and Settlement Plans, only the State/ADE had moved to be dismissed, with prejudice, as a party to this action. Thus, one of Judge Wright’s first rulings in this case was a January 18, 1991 Order that: (1) dismissed the State/ADE as a party to this action “pursuant to the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement”; and (2) converted the Office of Metropolitan Supervisor to the ODM, which she “vested with the authority to monitor the school districts’ compliance with the settlement plans and settlement agreement, including "any future modification of, or addition to, such plans and agreements” (docket no. 1418). Ann Marshall, Arma Hart, Polly Ramer, and Linda Bryant, all of whom previously worked for Mr. Reville in the Office of Metropolitan Supervisor, were allowed to “continue in their present positions subject to the later approval of the court-appointed monitor.” In a Memorandum Opinion entered February 28, 1991 (docket no. 1442), the district court made it clear that, even though the State had now been dismissed as a party, it remained obligated to comply with its settlement obligations, which “when understood in conjunction with the language in both the Eighth Circuit’s order of December 12, 1990, and this Court’s order of January 18,1991, also obligate the State to continue funding the ODM” by making the annual contribution of $200,000 required in Judge Woods’ June 27, 1989 Order. Likewise, LRSD, NLRSD, and PCSSD were required to continue their annual funding of the ODM on a per pupil pro-rated basis. On April 5, 1991, Judge Wright entered a Memorandum and Order (docket no. 1459) that appointed Ms. Ann Marshall Desegregation Monitor, at an annual salary of $98,000. During the first few months of 1991, LRSD, PCSSD, NLRSD, and Joshua entered into negotiations that resulted in numerous modifications to the 1990 Settlement Plans. It was the parties’ position that they were authorized to make those changes based upon language in the Eighth Circuit’s December 12, 1990 decision providing that the parties were “free, by agreement, to modify the settlement plans ... subject, of course, to the approval of the District Court.” LRSD, 921 F.2d at 1393 n. 15. Subsequently, the parties submitted the modified Settlement Plans to the district court for approval. On June 21, 1991, Judge Wright entered a Memorandum and Order rejecting all of the “legion of proposed modifications” to the Settlement Plans on the ground that they fell “outside the narrow realm of modifications and adjustments deemed permissible by the Eighth Circuit [in its December 12, 1990 decision].” LRSD, 769 F.Supp. at 1483,1489. On July 15, 1991, the district court entered a lengthy Memorandum and Order denying the parties’ motion to reconsider its rejection of their proposed modifications to the 1990 Settlement Plans. LRSD, 769 F.Supp. 1491. In doing so, Judge Wright made it clear that: (a) she disagreed with the parties’ position that the Settlement Plans are “fluid, open to continual and considerable revision as long as the parties agree and the changes are not facially unconstitutional”; and (b) she viewed the Eighth Circuit’s approval of the Settlement Plans as being “akin to establishing a benchmark ... a sure guide for ending this dispute and getting the parties out of court.” Id. at 1494. LRSD, NLRSD, PCSSD, and Joshua appealed on the ground that the district court’s decisions “confined them within limits that are too narrow, and that all of their proposed changes, being constitutional, workable, and fair, should have been approved.” Appeal of LRSD, 949 F.2d at 255. In affirming in part and reversing in part, the Eighth Circuit noted that “[t]here is much in the District Court’s opinions with which we agree,” including the observation that the 1989 settlement “should indeed be a benchmark for the future path of this case.” Id. However, the Court went on to hold that the district court was “too strict with itself’ in not allowing the parties to modify details of those settlement plans that did not affect the three school districts’ “major substantive commitments to desegregation”: The desegregation obligations undertaken in the 1989 plan are solemn and binding commitments. The essence and core of that plan should not be disturbed. ... If a question is truly one only of detail, not affecting the major substantive commitments to desegregation, the District Court has the authority to consider it. Id. at 256. Finally, to provide guidance to the district court, the Eighth Circuit set forth seven elements that form the “essence and core” of the Settlement Plans and from which there can be “no retreat ”: It may be helpful for us to state those elements of the 1989 plan that we consider crucial, and with respect to which no retreat should be approved. They are as follows: (1) double funding for students attending the incentive (virtually all-black) schools; (2) operation of the agreed number of magnet schools according to the agreed timetable; (3) operation of the agreed number of inter-district schools according to the agreed timetable; (4) intradistrict desegregation of PCSSD according to the agreed timetable; (5) the agreed effort to eliminate achievement disparity between the races; (6) the agreed elements of early-childhood education, at least in the incentive schools; and (7) appropriate involvement of parents. Id. (emphasis added). On May 1, 1992, Judge Wright entered an Order approving most of the proposed modifications to LRSD’s 1990 Settlement Plan and the Interdistrict Settlement Plan, which the parties referred to as “LRSD’s May 1992 Desegregation Plan” and the “May 1992 Interdistrict Desegregation Plan.” Judge Wright attached copies of both of these Plans to her May 1, 1992 Order (docket no. 1587). LRSD’s implementation of its obligations under the 1992 Plans did not always go smoothly. For example, on March 19, 1993, Judge Wright delivered a strong statement to LRSD’s School Board and attorneys explaining the importance of LRSD fully and completely implementing its desegregation obligations under the Settlement Plans: Since the time of victory by the Little Rock School District in this case, when the Court of Appeals granted almost every facet of relief requested by Little Rock, the Little Rock School District has shown a tendency to drag its feet and act as if it had lost, rather than won, the litigation which it instituted. The Little Rock School District and the other school districts are in court because the Little Rock School District won its case and won the relief it requested. Yet the major complainer, the chief whiner, the number one barrier to a legitimate declaration of a unitary desegregated school system is the victorious complaining party, the Little Rock School District. The biblical reference, in a different context, is to the effect that if you ask, you will receive. Well, you asked, you got it, and it is the basic job of this Court to see that you receive it in full measure. I have never seen, heard or read of a case in which the victors conducted themselves like the vanquished — until now. If we have to have two full hearings a month, in which Board members are required to be present, then we will do so. We will do everything that is required to see that you take the medicine to achieve the cure that you asked the Federal Courts to give you. Judge Wright’s Statement to LRSD Board members and Counsel at 2-3 and 6, attached as Exhibit 1 to docket no. 2730. - Between 1991 and 1996, almost all of the district court’s Orders involving LRSD related to the following issues: the approval of LRSD’s annual budgets (docket nos. 1759; 1897, 1958, 2216, 2280, 2319, and 2709); LRSD’s closing of certain elementary schools (docket nos. 1926 and 2351); and LRSD’s designation and construction of the interdistrict and magnet schools called for under the Settlement Plans (docket nos. 1550, 1832, 1848, 1895, 2225, and 2329). During this period of time, the Eighth Circuit also entered several important decisions that: (1) extended school district millages under the 1990 Settlement Agreement, LRSD v. PCSSD, 971 F.2d 160 (8th Cir.1992); (2) upheld the new zoning plan for electing school board members for LRSD and PCSSD, LRSD v. PCSSD, 56 F.3d 904 (8th Cir.1995); and (3) clarified language in the 1990 Settlement Agreement regarding the State’s funding obligations to LRSD, PCSSD, and NLRSD, LRSD v. PCSSD, 83 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir.1996). On November 30, 1995, LRSD filed a Motion for Order of Dismissal (docket no. 2573), requesting the district court to dismiss this case, with prejudice, pursuant to Attachment B to the 1990 Settlement Agreement. Attachment B stated, in pertinent part: It is further understood and agreed that the litigation now pending in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Western Division, entitled Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, et al, No. LR-C-82-866 and cases consolidated therein and their predecessors (including, but not limited to, Cooper v. Aaron, Norwood v. Tucker, and Clark v. Board of Education of Little Rock School District (the “Litigation”) is to be dismissed with prejudice as to the LRSD and the former and current members of its board named in the Litigation.) This dismissal is final for all purposes except that the Court may retain jurisdiction to address issues regarding the implementation of the Plans. Attachment B to the 1990 Settlement Agreement (docket no. 1174). In seeking that relief, LRSD acknowledged that the dismissal would not affect the district court’s jurisdiction to address issues regarding the implementation of its desegregation obligations or to conduct proceedings to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement or the terms of the Settlement Plans. On March 11, 1996, the district court entered a Memorandum and Order (docket no. 2640) denying LRSD’s Motion for Order of Dismissal on the ground that: The LRSD has frequently exhibited indifference or outright recalcitrance towards its commitments and has been slow to implement many aspects of its agreements (although some improvements have been made). Therefore, the Court finds that an order of dismissal should be deferred in order to ensure compliance with the plans and the agreement. Even had the LRSD acted in good faith throughout the years, the logistics and complexity of this case are such that this Court’s monitoring function would be impaired by entering an order of dismissal at this time. LRSD appealed that decision to the Eighth Circuit. On December 15, 1997, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to enter an order dismissing the case with prejudice, as provided for under the terms of the 1990 Settlement Agreement. LRSD v. NLRSD, 131 F.3d 1255 (8th Cir.1997). In reaching this decision, the Court stated the following: Although we can well understand the frustration the district court has experienced over the years in carrying out our instructions, we conclude that the District’s motion should have been granted. As we held in our 1992 decision, the terms of the settlement agreement became the law of the case. See Little Rock School District, 971 F.2d at 165. As the agreement specifically provides, the district court is permitted (and indeed must, in order to comply with our instructions), to retain jurisdiction to address issues regarding the implementation of the desegregation plans. Moreover, the desegregation plaintiffs may bring proceedings to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement and' the terms of the desegregation plans. In short, the entry of such an order would do nothing to relieve the three districts of their continuing obligation to honor their commitments as set forth in the settlement agreement and the plans. Id. at 1257-58 (footnote omitted). On January 26, 1998, the district court entered an Order (docket no. 3109) that dismissed this case and “cases consolidated herein, including, but not limited to, Cooper v. Aaron, Norwood v. Tucker, and Clark v. Board of Education of LRSD,” with prejudice, as to LRSD and “its current and former board members named in this litigation.” The district court also entered a Memo to the File (docket no. 3110) stating that, because the Plaintiff in this case was dismissed with prejudice, “the Clerk is instructed to administratively terminate this case,” but to “keep the case files open and in their current location in the Clerk’s office” so that the Court can continue to perform its ongoing duties regarding the supervision and implementation of the desegregation plans. F. Joshua’s Request For An Interim Award Of Attorneys’ Fees For Performing Monitoring Activities After The 1990 Settlement On November 22,1995, counsel for Joshua moved for an interim award of attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $805,611.81 for monitoring work performed after the Eighth Circuit approvéd the settlement of this case on December 12, 1990 (docket no. 2565). Counsel for Joshua later reduced the amount of this request-to $795,301.81 (docket no. 2791) and argued that it should be apportioned among the three Pulaski County school districts as follows: LRSD: 75% to 80%; NLRSD: 5% to 10%; and PCSSD: 15% to 20%— with the final percentages totaling 100% (docket no. 2792). LRSD filed a Response and Supporting Memorandum of Law (docket nos. 2636 and 2637) challenging Joshua’s right to be awarded any attorneys’ fees or costs for post-settlement monitoring activities. LRSD argued that, as a part of the consideration for LRSD paying Joshua’s counsel $2,000,000 in attorneys’ fees in connection with the 1990 settlement, Joshua’s counsel had specifically agreed, on the record, that they would not seek future fees from LRSD for monitoring activities during the life of the settlement plans. In support of its position, LRSD relied upon the following colloquy between counsel and the Eighth Circuit appellate panel during oral argument in LRSD, 921 F.2d 1371: NORMAN CHACHKIN, ATTORNEY FOR JOSHUA INTERVENORS: I just want to make one other observation and Mr. Heller can confirm this. Although it is not written into the settlement agreement we are happy to confirm it here and to be bound by it. The agreement between Little Rock and Joshua was that the fee payment from the Little Rock School District would also cover out of the court monitoring activities by the attorneys for Joshua during the life of the settlement plans so long as it wasn’t necessary to go back to court. If the settlement plans go forward as Mr. Walker suggested, the parties are committed to a monitoring system and committed to working together to ease any implementation problems and avoid any difficulties. That’s going to take attorney time. We have committed to Little Rock that we will not seek any fees from them for those activities unless it is necessary to go back to court for enforcement purposes and in that instance we’ll simply be free to make an application if we think we’re entitled to it. JUDGE RICHARD S. ARNOLD: Alright, thank you. Now, Mr. Heller, you are recognized. CHRIS HELLER, ATTORNEY FOR LRSD: s|« Hí ‡ # H* * I’d like to confirm what Mr. Chachkin said about the agreement. Because of the responsibilities assigned to the Joshua Intervenors in our settlement plans, there is significant work for them to do over the next six or seven years, and our agreement on the fees did contemplate that there would [be] no further payment for that work. (Emphasis added.) In a Memorandum Opinion and Order (docket no. 2821) filed on September 23, 1996, Judge Wright concluded that LRSD and Joshua contractually agreed that the $2,000,000 in attorneys’ fees paid by LRSD in connection with the 1990 settlement also covered all monitoring activities performed by Joshua’s counsel during the life of the Settlement Plans. Therefore, Judge Wright ruled that Joshua’s counsel was not entitled to recover any attorneys’ fees from LRSD for performing monitoring activities. On October 3, 1996, Joshua’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Fee Petition (docket no. 2833) and supporting Memorandum of Law (docket no. 2834), in which he urged the district court to award attorneys’ fees under the “bad faith” exception to the general rule that, absent .a statute or enforceable contract, litigants must pay their own attorneys’ fees. On March 24, 1997, Judge Wright entered an Order (docket no. 2959) denying Joshua’s Motion for Reconsideration. On April 22, 1997, counsel for Joshua filed a Notice of Appeal (docket no. 2966) of the district court’s March 24, 1997 Order denying his request for interim attorneys’ fees. I will return to discuss the final resolution of this issue later in this decision. G. LRSD’s First Attempt To End Federal Court Jurisdiction On May 17, 1996, LRSD filed a Motion to End Federal Court Jurisdiction (docket no. 2665) and supporting Brief (docket no. 2666). In these pleadings, LRSD argued that: (1) it was only required to implement its desegregation obligations under its Settlement Plan and the Interdistrict Settlement Plan for six years; (2) it had implemented the Settlement Plan, beginning with the 1990-91 school year, and “the six year term of the Plans will expire at the end of the 1995-96 school year”; and (3) “LRSD has implemented in good faith many desegregation plans for more than three decades. LRSD was a substantially unitary school district in 1982, but it nevertheless filed this interdistrict litigation in a good faith effort to maintain a biracial public school system in Little Rock. A recent and exhaustive audit of LRSD’s desegregation obligations shows that LRSD is in substantial compliance with the Plans.” Docket no. 2665. On August 1, 1996, Joshua filed a Memorandum Opposing LRSD’s Motion to End Federal Court Jurisdiction (docket no. 2730) in which they challenged LRSD’s contention that the 1990 Settlement Plans called for a six-year implementation period. In support of their position, Joshua pointed out that no provision in any of the settlement documents limited LRSD’s implementation of its desegregation obligations to six years. Joshua also argued that LRSD had failed to discharge its burden of establishing “the requisite implementation of the court-approved settlement.” On September 23, 1996, Judge Wright entered a Memorandum and Order (docket no. 2821) denying LRSD’s Motion to End Federal Court Jurisdiction on the grounds that: (1) the 1990 Settlement Agreement and Settlement Plans do not contain any provision that allowed LRSD to terminate “its duty to comply with the settlement plans after ... six years;” and (2) LRSD failed to provide sufficient evidence that it had “substantially complied” with its obligations under the Settlement Plans. The district court went on to urge LRSD and Joshua to modify “the parts of the plan that are ineffective or unworkable” so that LRSD could better position itself to argue that it is entitled to unitary status and relief from court supervision: Instead of presenting substantial evidence of its compliance with its goals as set forth in the plan, the LRSD submits arguments that it has achieved unitary status because data from the LRSD compares favorably with data from districts which have been declared unitary. The Court would be inclined to agree with the LRSD with respect to many of these arguments if the LRSD were not contractually bound by the plan which it voluntarily adopted. The Court has encouraged the parties to consider modifying those parts of the plan that are ineffective or unworkable. The Court has provided the parties with the testimony of experts to assist in the modification process. Instead, the LRSD has used the testimony of these experts to ask the Court to end Court jurisdiction without first proceeding with plan modifications. The Court cannot so easily relieve the district of its contractual obligations. Once again the Court invites the parties to follow procedures to modify the parts of the plan that are ineffective or unworkable. Docket no. 2821 at 12 (emphasis in original). On December 6, 1996, LRSD filed a Motion for Approval of Plan Development Period (docket no. 2878) that requested Judge Wright: (1) to allow a six to nine month period for LRSD to concentrate its efforts to develop plan modifications to improve education and desegregation within the district; (2) to allow LRSD to use the ODM as a consultant to participate in the development of plan modifications in areas such as budget development, staff development, student assignments, and resolution of discipline issues; and (3) to withhold any further monitoring of the LRSD desegregation plan during this six to nine month period. In support of its Motion, LRSD noted that the Knight In-tervenors, PCSSD, and NLRSD supported its request. On December 18, 1996, Joshua filed a Response (docket no. 2891) that did not oppose LRSD’s request for an interval of time to develop a new desegregation plan, but expressed reservations about ODM, “as an arm of the court,” participating in the negotiations between the parties. Joshua also urged Judge Wright to appoint additional monitors to work on a matter of particular concern to them — the alleged “ill-treatment of class members.” On December 27, 1996, Judge Wright entered an Order (docket no. 2901) granting LRSD’s Motion. In this Order, Judge Wright held that: (1) LRSD “will benefit from a temporary hiatus from monitoring and from the expertise of the ODM, in order to develop proposed modifications to the LRSD desegregation plan”; and (2) ODM can advise LRSD and other parties during the negotiations for plan modifications and ODM can “participate in negotiations as a facilitator,” but “ODM cannot be a negotiator for any party.” Judge Wright also denied Joshua’s request to hire “additional monitors to handle complaints about mistreatment of class members.” December 27, 1996 Order at 3 (docket no. 2901). H. The Perplexing Final Resolution Of Joshua’s Request For Still More Attorneys’ Fees From LRSD On September 26, 1997, LRSD filed a Motion for Approval of Revised Desegregation and Education Plan (docket no. 3049) and a supporting Memorandum Briefidocket no. 3050). After Joshua objected to a number of provisions in the proposed revised plan, LRSD and Joshua engaged in extensive negotiations to develop a revised plan which both parties could support. As part of these negotiations, LRSD and Joshua took up the still unresolved issue of Joshua’s request for $795,301 in attorneys’ fees for performing post-settlement monitoring activities, which was pending on appeal to the Eighth Circuit. On January 21, 1998, LRSD and Joshua filed a Joint Motion for Approval of LRSD’s Revised Desegregation and Education Plan (docket no. 3107) in which they admitted that ongoing negotiations were taking place on the attorneys’ fees issue: “Joshua has agreed that they will request that the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit hold their two pending appeals in abeyance, and LRSD and Joshua have further agreed that they will attempt to resolve Joshua’s past, present, and future claims for attorneys’ fees and. costs by mediation.” January 21, 1998 Joint Motion at 2 (docket no. 3107). See also Renewed Joint Motion for Approval of LRSD’s Revised Desegregation and Education Plan filed on March 23,1998 (docket no. 3136). On February 27, 1998, the Eighth Circuit entered a Mandate (docket no. 3125) which granted “the stipulation of the parties for dismissal of the appeal” of Judge Wright’s March 24, 1997 Order denying Joshua’s request for interim attorneys’ fees. The entry of this voluntary Judgment dismissing Joshua’s appeal of the attorneys’ fees issue strongly suggests that, sometime prior to February 27, 1998, LRSD and Joshua arrived at a settlement of that issue. In a letter agreement dated June 10, 1998, LRSD and Joshua formally documented their settlement of all past and future claims for attorneys’ fees and costs as follows: LRSD will make the following payments [to counsel for Joshua] for past fees and costs: $100,000.00 on or before June 30, 1998; $100,000.00 on or before August 31, 1998; and $500,000.00 on or before October 31, 1998. For fees and costs incurred for implementing and monitoring the Revised Desegregation and Education Plan, LRSD will reimburse your firm up to $4.8,333.33 per year for three years beginning July 1, 1998. The payments described in this letter will constitute full and complete payment in satisfaction of all past or future claims for attorney’s fees and costs except as specifically set forth in the Revised Desegregation and Education Plan. June 10, 1998 letter agreement, attached as Exhibit 7 to LRSD’s Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion for an Immediate Declaration of Unitary Status (docket no. 3581) (emphasis added). Although not directly relevant to the issue of unitary status, I can think of no good explanation f