Full opinion text
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PART, INTER ALIA MCDONALD, Senior District Judge. BEFORE THE COURT is the Motion of defendants Perez, Badgley, Tilly and City of Wenatchee for Summary Judgment (Ct.Rec.117); plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Ct.Rec.130); plaintiffs Motion for Rule 56(g) Sanctions and/or Order on Contempt (Ct.Ree.202); and plaintiffs Motion to Supplement Summary Judgment Response. Per LR 7.1(h)(3) the court has exercised its discretion to consider all of these motions without oral argument. I. BACKGROUND Defendant Robert Perez of the City of Wenatchee Police Department was the lead investigator in what became known as the ‘Wenatchee Sex Ring” cases. His investigation led to the arrest of plaintiff Ralph Gausvik. On November 2, 1995, a Chelan County jury found plaintiff guilty of six counts of rape of a child and child molestation. In January 1998, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed plaintiffs convictions on two of the counts, but affirmed on the remaining counts. On November 18, 1998, plaintiff was résentenced to a term of imprisonment of 260 months. In June 2000, pursuant to a personal restraint petition filed by plaintiff, the Washington Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the Chelan County Superior Court for a reference hearing to determine the reliability of the victims’ accusations. The matter was specifically remanded to Hon. Wallace Friel, a Whitman County Superior Court Judge. The State thereafter voluntarily dismissed all of the charges against Mr. Gausvik because Judge Friel had made findings in previous reference hearings in other cases that Perez had improperly interviewed alleged abuse victims. The State therefore, believed it could not prevail in Mr. Gausvik’s case. After the charges against him were dismissed, Gausvik commenced the suit which is now before this court. This suit alleges violations of plaintiffs federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It also alleges various state law tort causes of action. Named as defendants are: Robert Perez, Kenneth J. Badgley, Chief of the Wenatchee Police Department during the relevant time, Earl Tilly, Mayor of the City of Wenatchee and Director of the Public Safety Committee at the relevant time, City of Wenatchee and Wenatchee Municipal Police Department. By previous order of the court, summary judgment was granted in favor of defendants Chelan County, Barker & Howard, P.S., Inc., and Jeffrey Barker and Keith Howard, the principals of Barker & Howard. Those defendants are no longer part of this litigation. II. FACTS Robert Ricardo Perez (“Perez”) is a sixteen year law enforcement veteran. For the past thirteen years he has served the City of Wenatchee as a police officer. Kenneth C. Badgley, at all material times to this lawsuit, was the Chief of the Wenatchee Police Department, having served as chief since September 1978. Earl F. Tilly, at all material times to this lawsuit, was the Mayor of the City of Wenatchee, serving as director of the city’s Public Safety Committee. On January 1, 1994, Perez was appointed to the Detective Unit of the Wenatchee Police Department. He was assigned to be the detective in charge of crimes against persons which included investigation of child abuse, both physical and sexual abuse. This was a two year rotational assignment and on December 31, 1995, Perez went back to being a patrol officer. Perez received some training in child sex abuse investigations. He attended a three day, twenty-one hour seminar put on for the prosecutors and law enforcement personnel in Wenatchee from December 1, 1993 to December 3, 1993. In May 1994, Perez attended the five day, forty hour Washington State Criminal Justice Training Course on investigating child abuse. On or about March 13, 1995, Perez and Washington Child Protective Services (CPS) worker Kate Carrow drove Perez’s foster daughter, Donna Everett, through Wenatchee and East Wenatchee. Everett identified plaintiffs home as one of the homes in which she claimed she had been sexually abused. Everett stated that plaintiff Gausvik and his wife, Barbara Ga-raas, had sexually abused her, as well as their own children. Ralph Gausvik and Barbara Garaas are the father and mother of three children: Troy W. Garaas, Delilah Garaas, and Christa Garaas. Barbara Garaas is also the mother of another child, Travis V. Garaas, who lived with his mother and Ralph Gausvik. Gausvik is not the biological or adoptive father of Travis. On May 30, 1995, Perez and Carrow went to the elementary school attended by Delilah, age 5 at the time. Perez and Carrow interviewed Delilah. Delilah did not make any allegations of abuse by her father at this time. Following the interview with Delilah, Perez and Carrow went to the home of Ralph Gausvik and Barbara Garaas. The Garaas children were taken into CPS protective custody and placed with foster parents. . On June 5, 1995, Troy Garaas, then twelve years old, was taken out of his elementary school by Perez and Carrow and interviewed at the CPS office. During this interview, Troy related sexual abuse by his mother and father. On. June 6, .1995, Carrow and CPS filed Dependency Petitions relating to .Travis, Troy and Delilah Garaas. On June 12, 1995, Carrow interviewed fifteen year old Travis Garaas. Travis denied any abuse by his mother or Ralph Gausvik. On June 29, 1995, Troy and Travis Ga-raas were taken to James Jantzen, M.D., for physical examinations. Both boys denied to Dr. Jantzen that they had been sexually abused. On July 5, 1995, Delilah Garaas was taken to Dr. Jantzen for a physical examination. She told Dr. Jantzen she had not been abused by her parents. Dr. Jantzen reported that his physical examination findings of all three children were “suggestive” of sexual abuse. In early July 1995, Travis Garaas was interviewed by Douglas County detectives. He did not make any statements that he had been sexually abused by his mother or Ralph Gausvik. On July 7, 1995, Perez arrested Ralph Gausvik and on July 8, the Chelan County Superior Court found probable cause for Gausvik’s arrest. On July 15,1995, Chelan County Deputy Prosecutor Roy Fore filed a criminal information against Gausvik alleging rape of a child in the first degree and child molestation in the first degree perpetrated against Troy Garaas. On August 16, 1995, Travis and Delilah were interviewed. In attendance at the interview were Perez, Carrow and Fore. Each of the children made statements that they had been sexually abused by Barbara Garaas and Ralph Gausvik. On September 15, 1995, the Chelan County Prosecutor amended the criminal information against plaintiff to include counts that plaintiff had sexually abused Travis and Delilah. On October 31, 1995, Travis Garaas testified at plaintiffs criminal trial that he had been sexually abused by the plaintiff. On November 1, 1995, Troy and Delilah Garaas testified at the plaintiffs criminal trial that they had been sexually abused by the plaintiff. On November 2, 1995, a jury convicted plaintiff on all six counts of child molestation and rape of a child. On December 1, 1995, the Chelan County Juvenile Court entered Orders of Dependency finding that Travis, Troy and Delilah were abused or neglected by a person legally responsible for their care. On December 21, 1995, the plaintiff was sentenced to 280 months imprisonment. On March 31, 1997, the Chelan County Superior Court held a hearing on the termination of the plaintiffs parent/child relationship as it applied to Troy, Delilah and Christa Garaas. The court found in each case that there was clear, cogent and convincing evidence of sexual abuse. Plaintiffs parental rights were terminated. In January 1998, the "Washington Court of Appeals reversed plaintiffs convictions on the two counts relating to Troy, but affirmed the convictions on the other four counts relating to Travis and Delilah. On November 18,. 1998, plaintiff was re-sentenced to .a term of imprisonment of 260 months. In June 2000, pursuant to a personal restraint petition filed by plaintiff, the Washington Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the Chelan County Superior Court for a reference hearing to determine the reliability of the victims’ accusations. On June 28, 2000, Chelan County Prosecutor Gary Riesen and plaintiffs attorney stipulated to an order dismissing plaintiffs personal restraint petition and providing for the immediate release of plaintiff from confinement based on.Chelan County’s dismissal of all criminal charges against plaintiff. III. DISCUSSION A. Summary Judgment Standard The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute as to the facts before the court. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025, 96 S.Ct. 469, 46 L.Ed.2d 399 (1975). Under Fed. R.Civ.P. 56, a party is entitled to summary judgment where the documentary evidence produced by the parties permits only one conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir.1985). Summary judgment is precluded if there exists a genuine dispute over a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The moving party has the initial burden to prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56, “its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Id. The party opposing summary judgment must go beyond the pleadings to designate specific facts establishing a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, all inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Nonetheless, summary judgment is required against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of a claim, even if there are genuine factual disputes regarding other elements of the claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983-Federal Constitutional Claims § 1983 provides a mechanism for seeking redress for an alleged deprivation of an individual’s federal constitutional and statutory rights by persons acting under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981) overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). There is no dispute that the actions taken by the officers in this case were “under color of state law.” Plaintiff alleges defendants violated his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth And Fourteenth Amendment rights, including the right to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure of his person and property, freedom from the deprivation of his liberty and property without due process of law, right to a fair trial and right to compulsory process. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants conspired to violate his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 1. Collateral Estoppel/Judicial Es-toppel Defendants contend plaintiff is collaterally estopped from arguing he did not abuse Travis, Troy and Delilah because of the Orders of Dependency entered on December 1, 1995 by the Chelan County Juvenile Court and the findings of the Chelan County Superior Court entered on March 31, 1997 in conjunction with the termination of plaintiffs parental rights regarding Troy and Delilah. Defendants rely on Miles v. State, Child Protective Services, 102 Wash.App. 142, 6 P.3d 112 (2000), review denied, 142 Wash.2d 1021, 16 P.3d 1266 (2001). In Miles, the parents of three children filed a complaint alleging they were wrongfully separated from their children. The complaint alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, negligent investigation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent diagnosis and outrage. Fifteen months prior to filing their complaint, the parents had agreed to and signed an “Agreed Order of Dependency” entered by Pierce County Superior Court. The superior court concluded the children were dependent pursuant to RCW 13.34.030(4)(b). The Washington Court of Appeals found the parents were precluded from claiming their children were not abused or neglected: Collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating an issue of fact that the party has already litigated to final judgment, so long as injustice does not result. A key issue of fact in the dependency action was whether the Miles had abused or neglected their children prior to December 5, 1994. The dependency court resolved that issue by entering a judgment that was final and appealable. In that judgment, it ruled that the children were dependent within the meaning of RCW 13.34.030(4), which is equivalent to saying the children were abused or neglected. Assuming without holding that the Miles could attack the trial court’s judgment directly (i.e., by motion made in the dependency action), they may not attack it collaterally (i.e., by relitigation in a separate action such as this). For purposes of this case, the Miles are bound to the proposition that their children were abused or neglected in 1994. Id. at 153, 6 P.3d 112 (emphasis in text). Regarding their, § 1983 claim, the parents claimed the defendants had deprived them of a fundamental right to their children’s companionship. The court of appeals held “there is no weR-established constitutional right to the companionship of children whom one has abused or neglected, and thus made dependent, according to a final and appealable dependency judgment that one agreed to while represented by counsel.” Id. at 158, 6 P.3d 112. Therefore, the court concluded the parents lacked a valid § 1983 claim against the State of Washington and its caseworker. Id. In a footnote, the court of appeals observed that even if collateral estoppel did not apply, judicial estoppel would. Judicial estoppel precluded the parents from agreeing in open court in the dependency case that their children were abused or neglected, then arguing in open court in their civil rights/personal injury action that their children were not abused or neglected. Id., n. 21. With respect to the parents’ various claims of negligence, the court of appeals found the parents would be unable to establish causation: To prove a negligence cause of action, a plaintiff must establish causation. To do that, a plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to support an inference that the claimed harm would not have occurred but for the claimed negligence. When the Miles agreed in the dependency court that their children were dependent within the meaning of RCW 13.34.030(4), they agreed that the children were abused or neglected, and it was that abuse or neglect, not the diagnosis of [Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy], that caused the children’s removal from the home. Given the evidence here, a rational trier of fact could not infer that the claimed harm (removal of the children from the home and resulting emotional distress) would not have occurred but for the claimed negligence (diagnosis and reporting of [Mun-chausen Syndrome By Proxy]). Id. at 160, 6 P.3d 112. The court added that the parents’ claim for outrage also failed because no reasonable person could find the defendants engaged in outrageous conduct. Id. Dependency petitions regarding Travis, Troy and Delilah Garaas were filed in Che-lan County Juvenile Court on June 6,1995. (Exs. H, I and J to Declaration of Patrick McMahon). Hearings on these petitions were not held until December 1, 1995, after plaintiff had been convicted in Chelan County Superior Court of sexually abusing Travis, Troy and Delilah. Orders of Dependency were entered by the Chelan County Juvenile Court on the same date of the hearings (December 1,1995). Plaintiffs conviction was among the “Findings” made by the Chelan County Juvenile Court in concluding the children were dependent. (Exs. K, L and M to Declaration of Patrick McMahon). The “Findings” with regard to Troy and Delilah also included the following: Although the parents deny that their children were neglected, the parents [Ralph Gausvik and Barbara Garaas] stipulate that, if this matter proceeded to a contested hearing, the Department would present testimony of neglect, including: a. When the children were placed in care, Delilah’s hair was excessively dirty and matted; b. When the children were placed in care, Christa’s teeth were rotting and required extensive dental care; c. When the children were placed in care, Troy had not been wearing his leg/foot brace and needed surgery for the disability. A similar finding was made with regard to Travis, but since plaintiff is not the biological or adoptive father of Travis, the finding reflected only that Travis’ mother, Barbara Garaas, stipulated that if the matter proceeded to a contested hearing, the Department of Social and Health Services would present testimony of neglect. (Ex. K to Declaration of Patrick McMahon). The Chelan County Juvenile Court found that Travis, Troy and Delilah had been abused or neglected as defined in RCW 26.44 by a person legally responsible for their care, and had no parent, guardian or custodian capable of adequately caring for them and therefore, concluded the children were dependent pursuant to RCW 13.34.030(4)(b) and (c). On March 31, 1997, the Chelan County Juvenile Court held parental rights termination hearings regarding Troy, Delilah and Christa Garaas. On April 21, the court entered orders terminating plaintiffs parental rights. (Exs. N, O and P to Declaration of Patrick McMahon). The court found that with regard to each of the children, there was clear, cogent and convincing evidence the children had been victims of sexual abuse. The court noted that plaintiff had appealed his criminal conviction and his appeal was currently pending, but found no evidence “regarding the likelihood of success for Mr. Gausvik’s appeal of his criminal convictions.” The court found because of the fact plaintiff was “a convicted rapist of his children, it is in the best interests of the children to terminate his parental rights as well.” Among its “Conclusions of Law” was that as to plaintiff, the allegations under RCW 13.34.180(1)(2)(5) and (6) “have been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” What plaintiff alleges in the litigation before this court is that defendant Perez deliberately fabricated evidence of sexual abuse against the plaintiff which led to his arrest and conviction. Plaintiff’s arrest and conviction preceded the Chelan County Juvenile Court’s orders on dependency and orders terminating plaintiff’s parental rights. The plaintiff could not challenge the fact of his arrest and conviction at either the dependency hearing or the termination hearing. Any such challenge would have been futile. He had to challenge that via direct appeal from his conviction and, if that failed, through collateral proceedings (a personal restraint petition). On direct appeal, he managed to get his conviction on some of the counts reversed in January 1998 (seven months after his parental rights had been terminated) and ultimately, after filing his personal restraint petition, the county prosecutor was persuaded to dismiss the remaining charges against him in June 2000. June 2000 was four years after the Garaas children had been adjudged “dependent” and over three years after plaintiffs parental rights had been terminated. What plaintiff “stipulated” to in the dependency proceedings was that “if this matter proceeded to a contested hearing, the Department would present testimony of neglect.” Plaintiff did not stipulate that he had in fact neglected his children. Indeed, the findings of the dependency court were that “the parents deny that' their children were neglected.” Moreover, the evidence of neglect which the parents acknowledged DSHS would present was that they had failed to provide for the hygiene and health care needs of their children, not that they had sexually abused them. Miles is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. The parents in Miles had not been convicted of child abuse at the time of the dependency hearing. There was an “Agreed Order of Dependency” entered in Miles which was “expressly agreed to and signed by Mr. Miles and his attorney, and Ms. Miles and her attorney.” 102 Wash.App. at 150, 6 P.3d 112. The “signed” parties agreed to the establishment of dependency pursuant to RCW 13.34.030(4)(b) (abused or neglected). Here, plaintiff did not expressly agree to or sign any “Agreed Order of Dependency.” He may not have “disputed” the allegations of dependency or presented any evidence or witnesses, but that is of little significance considering he had already been convicted of sexually abusing his children. Disputing the allegations of dependency would have been futile. In Washington, collateral estoppel applies only when the party seeking estoppel can show that: 1) the issues between the first action and the second action are identical; 2) the parties to be estopped in the second action were parties in the first suit; 3) the first suit resulted in a judgment on the merits; and 4) there would be no injustice if the parties were estopped from relitigating the issues. Everett v. Perez, 78 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1136 (E.D.Wash.1999). Plaintiff is not estopped from asserting in the litigation currently before this court that evidence of sexual abuse was fabricated against him by defendant Perez which led to his arrest and conviction. To preclude him from doing so would “work an injustice” because plaintiff did not have any opportunity, let alone a “full and fair opportunity,” to challenge the validity of his conviction in the dependency or the termination proceedings. Hanson v. Snohomish, 121 Wash.2d 552, 561, 852 P.2d 295 (1993) (doctrine of collateral es-toppel prevents relitigation of an issue after the party estopped has had a full and fair opportunity to present its case). Plaintiff is not judicially estopped from asserting evidence of sexual abuse was fabricated against him. Defendants claim it would be “completely inconsistent to allow Mr. Gausvik to disavow child abuse which he acknowledge^] in the previous dependency proceedings.” As explained above, plaintiff did not expressly and volitionally acknowledge at either the dependency or termination hearings that he had sexually abused his children. Therefore, it is not inconsistent for him to assert in this litigation that he did not sexually abuse his children and that evidence of such abuse was fabricated against him. 2. Statute of Limitations Re § 1983 False Arrest Claim Defendants assert that plaintiffs § 1983 false arrest claim is time-barred because it was not brought within three years after the date of plaintiffs warrant-less arrest on July 7, 1995. Washington’s three year personal injury statute of limitations, RCW 4.16.080(2), applies in § 1983 actions. Rose v. Rinaldi, 654 F.2d 546, 547 (9th Cir.1981). Defendants acknowledge the holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), that when allowing recovery of damages would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, a § 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her conviction has been reversed, vacated, or otherwise called into doubt before he or she can proceed under § 1983. Defendants contend, however, that plaintiff did not need to wait until all of the charges against him were dismissed in June 2000 before bringing his claim for false arrest in the original complaint filed in this court in March 2001. Defendants say this is because “additional evidence surfaced after the plaintiff was arrested, in the form of statements made by the Garaas children which implicated the Plaintiff’ (presumably referring to the statements made by Travis and Delilah Garaas during their August 16, 1995 interviews). In Heck, the Supreme Court stated that if a § 1983 action for damages will not demonstrate the invalidity of the conviction or sentence, the claim accrues at the time of the event in issue, and the action should be allowed to proceed in the absence of any other bar to the suit. 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Although state law determines the applicable statute of limitations on a § 1983 claim, federal law determines when a cause of action begins to run on such a claim. Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 379 (9th Cir.1998). In Cabrera, the plaintiffs conviction for disturbing the peace was ultimately invalidated. The plaintiffs civil suit included a claim for false arrest which the defendants argued was barred by California’s one year limitation period measured from the time of plaintiffs arrest. The Ninth Circuit held the false arrest claim did not accrue until the plaintiffs conviction for disturbing the peace was invalidated. It reasoned that any finding in a civil suit that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff would have necessarily implied plaintiffs conviction was invalid and accordingly, the civil determination had to wait until the conclusion of criminal proceedings. Id. at 380. Cabrera recognized, however, that each case must be examined on its own facts and notwithstanding Heck, a false arrest claim could, in some circumstances, still accrue upon a person’s arrest. Id., n. 7. Any finding that Perez lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff on July 7, 1995 would necessarily imply that plaintiffs convictions for sexually abusing Travis, Troy and Delilah were invalid. The question of whether Perez had probable cause to arrest plaintiff on July 7, 1995 goes to the heart of the criminal convictions against plaintiff, four of which remained in effect until June 2000. Plaintiff asserts Perez did not have probable cause to arrest him for sexually abusing his children. Plaintiff was convicted of sexually abusing his children. Had plaintiff brought a § 1983 suit for false arrest on or before July 7, 1998 (within three years after his arrest), he would have been collaterally attacking criminal convictions which had not yet been invalidated. This is precisely what Heck forbids. Plaintiffs § 1983 false arrest claim accrued in June 2000, not on the date of his arrest (July 7, 1995). Accordingly, plaintiffs § 1983 false arrest claim, as first asserted in the original complaint filed in March 2001, is not barred by the applicable three year statute of limitations. 3. Effect of Plaintiffs Conviction on Ability to Assert § 1983 Claims Regarding Probable Cause to Arrest and Prosecute In Hanson v. Snohomish, 121 Wash.2d at 560, 852 P.2d 295, the Washington Supreme Court held that “a conviction, although later reversed, is conclusive evidence of probable cause, unless that conviction was obtained by fraud, perjury, or other corrupt means .... ” (emphasis added). Defendants contend that plaintiffs conviction by a jury, even though later reversed, establishes probable cause as a matter of law and vitiates his § 1983 claims premised on lack of probable cause, as well as his state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and negligent investigation. Defendants assert that plaintiffs conviction was not obtained through fraud, perjury or other corrupt means. In Hanson, the plaintiffs § 1983 claim was “predicated on [his] claim that he [had] a constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment .... ” Id. at 564, 852 P.2d 295. Because these underlying claims were unsupported, the court reasoned that the federal claim should also be dismissed. Id. In Fondren v. Klickitat County, 79 Wash.App. 850, 860, 905 P.2d 928 (1995), the Washington Court of Appeals observed that the U.S. Supreme Court’s determination in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), did not repudiate the rule announced in Hanson and “never conclusively addressed the effects of a prior conviction on the question of probable cause.” The court of appeals therefore declared the question “unresolved under federal law.” Id. In Fon-dren, the court of appeals found that an allegation that evidence favorable to the plaintiff was not discovered, or was lost, destroyed, or rendered unusable, arguably supported a claim or claims involving plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights, “unrelated to the malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment claims.” Id. at 860-61, 905 P.2d 928 (emphasis added). Therefore, the court of appeals concluded plaintiffs § 1983 claim should not have been dismissed. Id. at 861, 905 P.2d 928. Here, plaintiffs alleged federal constitutional violations unrelated to the existence of probable cause are not impacted by the rule in Hanson, but his claims which are related to the existence of probable cause apparently must overcome the hurdle established in Hanson. This court has not found any federal or state case suggesting otherwise. Plaintiff contends that in his case, the Washington Court of Appeals “all but found there was no probable cause” in its “Order Remanding Personal Restraint Petition For Reference Hearing” filed June 5, 2000. The court of appeals, however, did not make a specific finding that there was a lack of probable cause. All it found was that plaintiff had satisfied the prerequisites for a reference hearing: In [Gausvik’s] petition, he points out that none of the accusations against him were made before Detective Perez interviewed the children. The first allegation against him came from D.E. [Donna Everett], Detective Perez’s foster daughter, who identified Mr. Gausvik’s home, along with 24 others, as a place where abuse had occurred. This court has already recognized D.E.’s unreliability in its granting of Harold and Idella Everett’s and Manuel Hidalgo-Rodriguez’s personal restraint petitions. As to the allegations made against Mr. Gausvik by his children, he points out that they all initially denied abuse, then made certain accusations, followed by more accusations of multiple acts of abuse by an increasing number of persons. And, even after Detective Perez elicited the allegations from the children, Mr. Gausvik contends they reverted to their original denials of abuse when persons other than Detective Perez questioned them. For example, one of the children, T.G. [Travis Garaas], told another defendant’s attorney that Detective Perez would not accept his statement that his father had not abused him. Detective Perez told him he knew Mr. Gausvik had molested him, and made it clear he wanted T.G. to confirm that abuse had occurred .... Other evidence of Detective Perez’s improper tactics is contained in Mr. Gausvik’s declaration and that of the children’s mother, Barbara [Garaas], both filed in this petition. (Plaintiffs Ex. 141 at pp. 2-3). In a footnote, the court of appeals added: The court views the foregoing reports in the context of newly discovered evidence that Detective Perez routinely used improper interview tactics with other children who were allegedly victims of sexual abuse. In a reference hearing conducted in the personal restraint petitions of Harold and Idella Everett, the court found Detective Perez regularly used a threatening tone, accused child witnesses of lying when they denied abuse, confronted children with ‘disclosures’ made by other children, including siblings, asked the same question over and over to children until he obtained an answer'he desired, used leading questions and drafted his reports to make them look as though he had not used leading questions. (Plaintiff’s Ex. 141 at p. 3, n. 1). Of course, there was no subsequent reference hearing in Mr. Gausvik’s case because the Chelan County Prosecutor, shortly after the remand from the court of appeals, stipulated to a dismissal of all the charges against Gausvik. While the order of remand from the court of appeals cannot be considered a finding of a lack of probable cause, the evidence discussed therein, and submitted by plaintiff in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this case (discussed infra), raises a genuine issue of material fact whether Gausvik’s conviction was obtained by “fraud, perjury, -or other corrupt means.” More specifically, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Perez deliberately fabricated evidence against Gausvik by using investigative techniques that were so coercive and abusive he knew or should have known those techniques would yield false information about Gausvik.. . 4. Individual Liability — Perez a. Fabrication of Evidence Plaintiffs constitutional claims boil down to ■ an allegation of “deliberate fabrication of evidence” by defendant Perez: fabrication- of evidence to establish probable cause for plaintiffs warrantless arrest and fabrication of evidence to obtain his conviction. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2001), is another § 1983 action arising out of the “Wenatchee Sex Ring” investigation. In that case, the Ninth Circuit (en banc) stated there is a “clearly established constitutional due process right not to be subjected to criminal charges on the basis of false evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the government.” Id. at 1074-75. In order to support a claim for deliberate fabrication of evidence, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, produce evidence that supports one of the following propositions: (1) the defendants continued their investigation of an individual despite the fact that they knew or should have known he was innocent; and (2) defendants used investigative tech-ñiques that were so coercive and abusive that they knew or should have known those techniques would yield false information. Id. at 1076. At the same time, the circuit was persuaded that there is no constitutional right to have child witnesses in a child sexual abuse investigation interviewed in a particular manner, or to have the investigation carried out a particular way. Id. at 1075. According to the circuit: Interviewers of child witnesses of suspected sexual abuse must be given some latitude in determining when to credit witnesses’ denials and when to discount them, and we are not aware of any federal law — constitutional, decisional, or statutory — that indicates precisely where the line must be drawn. Id., citing Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1460-61 (8th Cir.1987). Thus, “mere allegations that Defendants used interviewing techniques that were in some sense improper, or that violated state regulations, without more, cannot serve as a basis for a claim under § 1983.” Id. The Ninth Circuit added: [I]nterviewers of child witnesses of suspected sexual abuse must be permitted to exercise some discretion in deciding when to accept initial denials at face value and when to reject them (or withhold judgment on them) and proceed further. Consequently, an allegation that an interviewer disbelieved an initial denial and continued with aggressive questioning of the child cannot, without more, support a deliberate-fabrication-of-evidenee claim, even if the allegation is amply supported by the evidence. What is required is an allegation or a showing that the interviewer knew or should have known that the alleged perpetrator was innocent, or that the interview techniques employed were so coercive and abusive that the interviewer knew or should have known that they would yield false information. Id. at 1077. In Devereaux, the district court granted the summary judgment motion of the defendants and Devereaux appealed. Pursuant to a settlement agreement, Dever-eaux’s appeal with respect to Perez and Badgley was dismissed with prejudice. The Ninth Circuit did not have to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support a deliberate fabrication claim against Perez. The only matter on appeal was Devereaux’s challenge to the grant of summary judgment in favor of Linda Wood, Timothy Abbey, Laurie Alexander and Kate Carrow, all of whom were Washington Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) employees. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment to these defendants. In doing so, the circuit made several observations. The circuit observed that repeated admonitions to a child to be truthful cannot amount to deliberate fabrication of evidence in the absence of independent allegations or evidence that the interviewer knew or should have known the accused was innocent and that the child, in testifying to that effect (at one point denying she was a victim of abuse and then later changing her story), had already told the truth. 263 F.3d at 1077. In Devereaux, the plaintiff argued the defendants held an animus and preconception against him which led to their intentional manipulation of child witnesses. The circuit found the “animus and preconception” referred to could just as well have been defendants’ good-faith belief the plaintiff was guilty, “which could lead to aggressive or manipulative questioning of the child witnesses in order to get them to testify truthfully, if reluctantly, to his guilt.” The circuit therefore concluded that plaintiffs deliberate fabrication of evidence claim could not be based on any allegation that defendants knew or should have known he was innocent. Id. at 1078. Devereaux pointed out that Carrow was involved in the “parade of homes,” an incident in which one of Devereaux’s foster children was driven around Wenatchee and asked to point out the locations at which abuse had occurred. The Ninth Circuit stated that “driving a child around the community and asking where the crimes that the child allegedly witnessed took place is surely not such a coercive and abusive technique that Carrow should have known it would lead to false information.” Id. at 1079. The circuit found use of a parent’s confession in questioning the parent’s child did not amount to the use of an investigative technique that is so coercive or abusive that a person would actually know or should know it would yield false information. Id. The circuit also found that truth-: fully informing a witness about another witness’ corroboration is not such an inherently coercive or abusive technique that a person would actually know or, should know it would lead to false information. Id. at 1081. In the case at bar, the first allegation of sexual abuse against Gausvik was made by 10 year old Donna Everett (D.E.) on March 13, 1995. Perez was Donna’s foster parent. Donna had been placed in Perez’s home in March 1994. On March 13, 1995, Donna drove with Perez and two CPS caseworkers to “various locations where Donna claimed to have been sexually abused, along with other children, by numerous adults over a period between approximately January of 1988 and March 23, 1994.” One of the locations identified by Donna was the home of Ralph Gausvik and Barbara Garaas. (Plaintiffs Ex. 3). In his March 31,1998 “Memorandum Decision On Reference Hearing” in State of Washington v. Harold Everett and State of Washington v. Idella Everett, Hon. Wallis W. Friel noted issues concerning Donna’s credibility (“known that at age 10, at the time of her initial allegations, Donna Everett had an I.Q. of 72 and a mental functioning level of a child 6 [and 1/2] years old”) and the concern arising from her relationship with her foster father Perez who was the lead investigator in the sex ring cases (“did not check on Donna’s reliability when she began making far-reaching allegations .... ”). (Plaintiffs Ex. 33 at pp. 20-26). In her May 30, 1995 interview by Perez and CPS worker Carrow, Delilah Garaas denied any abuse by her parents, although Perez’s report indicates Delilah stated that her mother had told her not to talk about touching of private parts. Furthermore, according to Perez’s report, Delilah indicated she had witnessed the Everett children (Donna, Melinda, Erick and Shawn) being sexually abused by their parents (Harold and Idella Everett). (Plaintiffs Ex. 4). After this interview, Perez and Carrow went to the Gausvik/Garaas residence. Barbara Garaas says Perez accused her of sexually abusing her kids as well as other kids. Despite her denial of abuse, Garaas said Perez told her that “little girls don’t lie” and encouraged Garaas to confess in order to get help and avoid prison. (Plaintiffs Ex. 135). In a declaration dated June 10, 2002, Travis Garaas, who was at home on May 30, 1995 when Perez and Carrow arrived, claims Perez came into his room and “told me he wanted to talk about the fact that I was being molested.” Travis says he denied this statement but that: Perez didn’t accept my denial. He continued to demand that I admit that I was being abused by my parents. He told me that he knew I was being abused, and that it wasn’t my fault. I told him again that he was wrong. Perez made it clear that I was supposed to agree with him. He started to get angry with me, and he got red in the face. He called me a liar. I started to get scared .... I kept denying my parents had done anything to me, or my brother and sisters, but he wouldn’t leave me alone. He kept bullying me for about 15-20 minutes. I could tell he was mad when he left the room. (Declaration of Travis Garaas at pp. 2-3). Interestingly, however, in a deposition taken on July 22, 2002, Travis testified that all he remembered was Perez coming into his room and telling him he was going to be taken into “custody” (foster care). (Ex. A to Supplemental Declaration of Patrick McMahon at pp. 58-60). All three of the children, Travis, Troy, and Delilah, were taken into CPS protective custody on May 30,1995. Troy Garaas suffers from cerebral palsy. He was eleven years old at the time of Perez’s investigation and functioning at the level of a five year old. He was “mildly to moderately delayed.” (Plaintiffs Ex. 76, Jantzen Depo. at pp. 21-22). Perez and Carrow picked up Troy at his school and brought him to the CPS office for an interview on June 5, 1995. During that interview, Troy alleged he had been sexually abused by both his mother and father. The interview lasted two hours. Carrow’s notes indicate that Troy asked for a break but it was “denied” because he was drinking a pop. After the interview was completed, Perez and Carrow took Troy to McDonald’s for lunch. (Plaintiffs Exs. 4 and 75). In his report, Perez states he asked Troy if he wanted a break and Troy declined the offer (Ex. 4 at p. 8). Travis was interviewed by CPS caseworkers Carrow and Tim Abbey on June 12, 1995. Perez was not present. During this interview, Travis made no allegations of sexual abuse by his mother and/or Ralph Gausvik. (Plaintiffs Exs. 7 and 27). In his incident report of May 30, 1995, Perez stated that Travis, during his June 12 interview with Carrow and Abbey, “name[d] various adults who sexually abused him and corroboratelcl] many of Troy Garaas’s statements to me.” (Plaintiffs Ex. 4 at p. 11). While plaintiff asserts that Perez’s statement about corroboration is false, Perez did not say that Travis corroborated Troy’s June 5, 1995 statement that he had been sexually abused by his mother (Barbara Garaas) and his father (Ralph Gausvik). In his recent deposition (Ex. B to Supplemental Declaration of Patrick McMahon at pp. 217-220), Perez testified that Travis had corroborated Troy in certain respects, including statements Travis made regarding the Everetts, statements concerning the church the two boys attended, statements about a man named “PhiUipe” or “Felipe,” and statements about problems at home when Barbara Garaas and Ralph Gausvik consumed alcohol. Based on this court’s review of Carrow’s notes from the June 12 interview of Travis (Plaintiffs Ex. 7) and her notes from the June 5 interview of Troy, it appears that in certain respects, Travis did corroborate Troy. Travis also made no allegations of sexual abuse by his mother and/or Ralph Gausvik when he was interviewed by Douglas County sheriffs deputies on July 8, 1995. (Plaintiffs Ex. 28). The report from the Douglas County Sheriffs office does not indicate that Travis was specifically asked about abuse by his mother and/or Ralph Gausvik and indeed that may have been intentional since his mother and Ralph Gausvik resided in Chelan County. Troy, Travis, and Delilah were all medically examined by James Jantzen, M.D. Troy and Travis were examined on June 29,1995. Troy denied any sexual abuse by his parents, although Jantzen reported in his “Progress Notes” that Troy “seemed quite hesitant in answering, initially saying T don’t know several times and looking at his brother as if wondering what he should say .... ” According to Dr. Jantzen, Troy had “a mildly abnormal anal exam with decreased sphincter tone” which was “suggestive but not specific for sexual abuse, specifically rectal penetration.” Travis “strongly denied” any sexual abuse. His exam revealed “decreased sphincter tone” which was “suggestive but not specific for sexual abuse, specifically rectal penetration.” (Plaintiffs Ex. 136). Delilah was examined by Dr. Jantzen on July 5, 1995. Jantzen opined that his examination was “consistent with rectal penetration, with large fissures present,” but not an acute injury. He added that the vaginal examination was “very suspicious for vaginal penetration as well ....” In his report, Jantzen stated: [Delilah] divulged to me that she had been abused when questioned. The family, consisting of 2 brothers, 2 sisters, and both parents, live across the street from Harold and Idella Everett, who were implicated in other sexual abuse cases and named the Garaas children as people who had been victimized. Troy, Delilah’s older brother, had stated that he witnessed Delilah being abused by the Everetts and also by Delilah’s father. Delilah confirmed this to authorities when she was questioned as well, and the children were all removed to foster care with Micki Reyes on May 30. I questioned Delilah about good touch and bad touch, but she did not want to talk to me about this and shook her head in response to all questions. (Plaintiffs Ex. 136). According to Perez’s police report, Troy did indicate during his June 5, 1995 interview that Delilah had been sexually abused by a man named Felipe in the Ga-raas/Gausvik home, had been abused by Idella Everett, and that “[m]y dad [Gaus-vik] does stuff to Delilah at home in bed.” (Plaintiffs Ex. 4). There is no indication, however, that Delilah had “confirmed this to authorities” on or before July 5, 1995 (date of Dr. Jantzen’s examination), particularly that she had been abused by her father (Gausvik). Plaintiff takes issue with the accuracy of the findings of Dr. Jantzen, offering the Declaration of Joyce A. Adams, M.D. (Plaintiffs Ex. 132). Her declaration was also offered in plaintiffs personal restraint petition proceedings. Adams is an Associate Clinical Professor of Pediatrics at the University of California-San Diego who claims she has “extensive training and experience in identifying the physical signs of sexual abuse in children” and has “previously testified as an expert on this topic.” Adams opines that “no significance should be attached to the findings of Dr. Jantzen regarding the anal dilation and venous congestion of the children, as Dr. Jantzen failed to disclose factors relevant to those observations” and “the alleged physical symptoms observed by Dr. Jantzen were either non-existent (no increased size in hymenal opening) or non-specific for sexual abuse (anal dilation, vepous congestion).” Plaintiff also asserts that because of the training Perez received, he should have known that anal dilation is “a non-specific and ... 'irrelevant finding.” Plaintiff, however, does not point to any evidence that an officer should simply ignore anal dilation. Certainly, the Declaration of Colleen Wilson who instructed the April 1994 Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission Course on sexual abuse investigation, in which Perez was a participant, does not indicate an officer is to ignore a finding of anal dilation. (See Ex. S to Declaration of Patrick McMahon.) Plaintiff asserts Perez “falsified” his May 30, 1995 police report in writing that Jantzen’s examinations of Troy and Travis were “positive” for sexual abuse and that the examination of Delilah was “positive for sexual abuse and penetration, both vaginally and anally.” In light of Jantzen’s findings set forth above, “positive” may be an exaggeration, but a reasonable person would not necessarily be persuaded it is an outright fabrication. Furthermore, Perez indicates he wrote down what had been reported to him by others. Perez wrote as follows: On June 5, 1995 ... Delilah and Christa Garaas were examined at Central Washington Hospital in Wenatchee by Dr. James Jantzen .... I contacted Laura Gaukroger at Central Washington Hospital after the examinations were completed to retrieve the films. Ms. Gau-kroger advised that the exams of the Garaas girls had been positive for sexual abuse and penetration, both vaginally and anally. I was later advised by Kate Carrow that examinations of Travis and Troy Garaas had also been positive for sexual abuse, showing signs of anal penetration. (Plaintiffs Ex. 4 at p. II). Plaintiff asserts Perez presented false information to the Chelan County Superior Court on or about July 8, 1995 in support of probable cause to continue holding the plaintiff who had been arrested by Perez without a warrant on July 7. According to plaintiff, this false information included the following: 1) that eight children accused Gausvik of molesting them; 2) that Travis Garaas had been sexually molested; 3) that Troy Garaas had made disclosures in the absence of coercion; and 4) that the children’s pediatric sexual abuse exams were “positive” for sexual abuse. Perez’s affidavit of probable cause, which the Chelan County Superior Court relied upon in finding probable cause, stated: “Defendant has been identified by at least 8 child victims as having been sexually abused by defendant between 1-1-94[and] 5-1-95” (emphasis added). The affidavit indicates the reader should then look at the “attached report.” On the first page of Perez’s May 30, 1995 “Incident Report” (presumably the “attached report”) is a list of alleged victims of sexual abuse including Troy, Travis and Delilah Garaas, as well as Melinda Everett, Donna Everett, Shawn Everett, and Erik (believed to be Ronnie Everett). Melinda, Shawn and Ronnie are the siblings of Donna Everett. If the youngest Garaas child, Christa, had been included in this list, it would make eight alleged victims of sexual abuse perpetrated by Gausvik. Christa had also been examined by Dr. Jantzen on July 5, 1995 and his findings with regard to her were “[E]xamination consistent with rectal penetration, not in the last few days, however,” and “[v]aginal examination, which is probably normal, but cannot absolutely rule out vaginal penetration in the past.” (Plaintiffs Ex. 136). The record indicates that of these eight children, only two, had in fact “identified” Gausvik as a perpetrator of sexual abuse as of July 10, 1995: Donna Everett and Troy Garaas. In his “Incident Report” dated March 13, 1995 (Plaintiffs Ex. 3), Perez reported that Donna Everett stated that Barbara Garaas and Ralph Gausvik came over to the Everett house with their children (Delilah, Travis, Troy and Christa) and “the same things happened to them when they came over,” referring to sexual abuse. Perez also reported that Donna stated she and her sister went to the Ga-raas/Gausvik house and “[t]he Garaas mom and dad did the same things to us as they did at my house” and “[t]hey also did this stuff to their kids at their house.” (Ex. 3 at pp. 10 and 15). As noted above, Troy, in his June 5, 1995 interview by Perez, indicated he had been sexually abused by his parents. Up to July 10, 1995, both Travis and Delilah Garaas had denied any abuse by their parents. By this time, however, Perez had the medical examinations from Jantzen which Jantzen said were “suggestive” of abuse, although Perez reported them as being “positive” of abuse. As discussed previously, the initial “Information” filed against Gausvik on July 12, 1995 charged him only with sexual abuse of Troy. It was not until after the August 16,1995 interviews with Travis and Delilah that the Information was amended to add charges of sexual abuse involving Travis and Delilah. Gausvik was never charged with abusing any of the Everett children. Travis was interviewed on August 16, 1995 with Perez, Carrow and Chelan County Deputy Prosecutor Fore present. Carrow’s notes suggest this interview was conducted by Fore. (Ex. E to Declaration of Patrick McMahon). At this interview, Travis finally made some accusations that he had been sexually abused by his mother (Barbara Garaas) and by Ralph Gausvik. He also made statements that Troy and Delilah had been abused by Barbara Ga-raas and Ralph Gausvik. (Plaintiffs Ex. 11). In’ his declaration, Travis now has this to say about the interview: I ... remember that they were all staring at me, and they made it immediately clear that I was going to make allegations that day. They started asking me questions about my parents almost immediately, telling me that my parents had molested me. I denied these allegations. They would take turns asking me questions. I would deny that my parents did anything. To get them off the subject, I made up some stuff about Phillipe again. When I continued to deny that my parents had done anything, one of them told mé that the Doctor’s exam was suspicious, and that I needed to stop lying and tell the truth. They told me I was not in trouble. I sure felt like I was though. It felt again like I was a suspect being interrogated. They just wouldn’t take no for an answer. I started to make stuff up about my mom molesting me. They weren’t satisfied so I just gave up. I made some stuff up about my dad as well. Then they wanted more so I said some stuff about the Everett’s house and seeing orgies going on there. In truth, I was never molested by my parents or anyone. I never saw my parents or anyone molest anyone. I never saw any orgies involving kids. (Declaration of Travis Garaas, Paragraphs 10 and 11). Delilah was also interviewed on August 16, 1995. Kate Carrow conducted the interview with Fore and Perez in attendance. Carrow testified at Gausvik’s trial that Delilah had divulged during this interview that her father had sexually abused her. (Exs. C and D to Declaration of Patrick McMahon). Travis (currently age 21) is the only one of the children to have recanted his allegations of abuse by Ralph Gausvik. There is no indication that either Troy (currently age 18), or Delilah (currently age 14), have recanted. There are no declarations from Troy and Delilah alleging they were coerced by Perez to accuse their parents of abuse. Each of the children testified against Gausvik at his trial in late October/early November 1995. (Ex. T to Declaration of Patrick McMahon). Plaintiff offers evidence of children, other than Travis, Troy and Delilah, who claim Perez coerced or attempted to coerce them into making false allegations of abuse. These other children include Jessika Still (Ex. 93), Melinda Everett (Exs. 94 and 137), Clarissa Chavez (Ex. 96), Richard Everett (Exs. 109 and 110), Shawn Everett (Ex. Ill), Kimberly Allbee (Ex. 112), Sarah Doggett (Ex. 113), Melissa Henkel (Ex. 115), and Amber Doggett (Declaration of Amber Doggett). While defendants object to this evidence as improper character evidence, it seems to this court it is admissible, at least for summary judgment purposes, under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) as proof of either motive, intent, plan, or knowledge by Perez. Having reviewed this evidence, some of it does not seem particularly persuasive that Perez coerced allegations of abuse, but that is for a jury to decide. Plaintiff has retained psychologist Phillip Esplín, Ed.D., as an expert witness. Dr. Esplín says he has been employed as a consultant by a number of police departments and state agencies to assist in training police officers on proper forensic interview techniques. Esplín opines that “on a more probable than not basis, to a reasonable degree of certainty that the child interview techniques that Perez employed in the Gausvik [case] were so coercive and abusive that Perez, and his supervisors who reviewed his reports, knew or should have known, that the interviews would yield false information.” Esplín asserts, based on his review of the record, that there was “interviewer” bias in both Delilah’s May 30, 1995 interview by Perez and Troy’s June 5, 1995 interview by Perez; that Perez repeatedly asked the children within a single interview whether they had been abused in order to finally get an answer he wanted (citing again as an example, Delilah’s May 30 interview); that Perez subjected the children to repeated interviews to finally get the answers he wanted; that Perez during his interviews used an emotional tone which was harsh and intimidating; that Perez rewarded the children when he got answers he wanted, and punished them when he did not (i.e., Troy was “denied” a break before making allegations against his parents; after he made those allegation, the interview was terminated and he was taken to McDonald’s -for lunch); that Perez used his “high status” as a police officer to influence the children; and that the accuracy of Perez’s reports must be questioned since he did not mention questioning Travis on May 30, 1995, although Travis asserts that Perez did question him on that date at the Gausvik/Ga-raas home. Esplín concludes that “the police work and interview techniques exhibited by Mr. Perez and the Wenatchee Police Department in the Gausvik case are among the most egregious I have ever seen in my career,” and the “so-called Tour of Homes, along with the follow-up extended interviews is one of the most abusive circumstances I have seen in my professional career.” The Ninth Circuit, of course, has indicated that disbelieving an initial denial of abuse and continuing with aggressive questioning of a child cannot, without more, support a deliberate fabrication of evidence claim. The circuit has also said that the “Tour of Homes” is not per se an abusive or coercive investigative technique that one should know would yield false information. Furthermore, Dr. Esplín was not present for any of these interviews and his assessment is based merely on his looking at pieces of paper. There is no indication that Esplín has spoken to any of the Garaas children or any of the other children involved in the various Wenatchee Sex Ring investigations. The only conceivable basis for Esplín to say that Perez used an emotional tone during his interviews with the Garaas children which was harsh and intimidating would be the Declaration of Travis Garaas, but that is not among the documents Esplín indicates he reviewed. (Ex. B to Esplín Declaration). Esplín indicates that he did review declarations and excerpts of testimony from children, other than the Garaas children, who were involved in the Wenatchee Sex Ring investigations. Defendants contend Esplin’s opinion is improper because he is opining about the credibility of the Garaas children, effectively saying they did not tell the truth under questioning by Perez. Defendants cite a Second Circuit case, U.S. v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 142 (2nd Cir.1988), in support of their position (“expert witnesses may not offer opinions on relevant events based on their personal assessment of the credibility of another witness’s testimony” because “the credibility of witnesses is exclusively for the determination by the jury .... ”). Esplín does not directly opine the Garaas children could not have been telling the truth when they made stateme