Full opinion text
OPINION PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge. This ease is before the Court on defendant’s Motion No. 1 (to Dismiss the Indictment for Violation of Due Process), Motion No. 2 (to Dismiss Counts in the Indictment for Their Positive Repugnance to the Federal Election Campaign Act), Motion No. 3 (to Dismiss Count 1 of the Indictment for Failure to State an Offense), Motion No. 5 (to Dismiss Counts 2 through 6 for Failure to State an Offense (Causation)), Motion No. 6 (to Dismiss Counts 2 through 6 for Failure to State an Offense (False Statements)), Motion No. 7 (to Dismiss Count 4 and 5 for Failure to State an Offense (Soft Money)), Motion No. 9 (to Dismiss Indictment Because it Offends the First Amendment) and Motion No. 10 (to Dismiss Indictment Because It Selectively Prosecutes Maria Hsia). For the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses Counts 2-6, the false statements counts, and denies all other motions. I. BACKGROUND Maria Hsia has been indicted on one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States by impairing and impeding the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and five counts of causing others to file false statements with the FEC, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 2(b). All six counts are predicated on political campaign solicitations by Ms. Hsia that allegedly involved the use of “conduit” contributors to hide the “true” or “actual” sources of the funds in violation of various provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, et seq. FECA provides a detailed and comprehensive scheme to regulate the financing of federal elections by, among other things, limiting contributions to electoral campaigns and requiring candidates to report receipts and expenditures. Of specific relevance to this case, FECA provides that “[n]o person shall make contributions” that exceed certain limits set forth in the statute, 2 U.S.C. § 441a; that “[n]o person shall make a contribution in the name of another person or knowingly permit his name to be used to effect such a contribution,” 2 U.S.C. § 441f; and that it is unlawful for “any corporation whatever ... to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which presidential or vice presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices.” 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a). A “contribution” is defined by the statute, in relevant part, as “money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.” See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A) (emphasis added). Because most of FECA’s restrictions apply only to funds contributed “for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office,” many political committees have set up separate accounts for money that has been donated: money that has been contributed subject to the proscriptions of FECA (“hard money”) is deposited into a “federal” account and is used to finance federal election campaigns, while all other money that is donated (“soft money”) is deposited into a “non-federal” account and is used for, among other things, state and local campaigns or issue advertising. FECA requires “political committees,” including national political parties, to exert “best efforts” to identify each person who made “contribution[s]” in the aggregate annual amount of $200 or more and to report that information to the FEC. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432(i), 434. FEC regulations require national political party committees to report any receipt of funds over $200, regardless of whether the funds are deemed “hard” or “soft” money. 11 C.F.R. § 104.8(a), (e). The statute charges the Federal Election Commission with the administration of FECA and grants the FEC exclusive jurisdiction over civil enforcement. 2 U.S.C. § 437c. It provides for both civil and criminal enforcement, and specifies criminal penalties for certain violations, up to a maximum of one year imprisonment and/or a fine. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d). The Department of Justice prosecutes criminal violations of the statute. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5)(C). Count 1 of the indictment charges that Ms. Hsia, a Buddhist, conspired with the International Buddhist Progress Society (“IBPS”), a tax-exempt religious organization doing business as the Hsi Lai Temple (the “Temple”), and other unnamed co-conspirators to defraud the United States by impairing, obstructing, impeding and defeating the lawful functions and duties of the FEC and the INS in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The indictment alleges that Ms. Hsia solicited IBPS to make contributions and donations through “conduits” (some of whom were monks, nuns and volunteers from IBPS) and that Ms. Hsia in some instances acted as a conduit for donations or contributions. The indictment alleges that Ms. Hsia (1) impaired and impeded the FEC by concealing the fact that IBPS was the true source of the contributions, and (2) impaired and impeded the INS by submitting documents to the INS stating that IBPS was not participating in political campaigns so that the INS would permit foreign nuns and monks associated with IBPS to enter or remain in the United States when she knew that IBPS in fact was making political contributions. Counts 2-6 charge Ms. Hsia with causing the making of false statements to the FEC in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1001. These counts appear to be based on conduct similar to (if not the same as) that alleged in Count 1. The indictment alleges that Ms. Hsia knowingly and willfully caused various political committees to submit material false statements to the FEC by concealing the identity of the trae source of contributions from the committees which relayed the false information to the FEC. Each count addresses a different report submitted to the FEC by a political committee which allegedly contained false statements about the identity of actual contributors. Count 2 pertains to a July 18, 1995 report and Count 3 to an October 17, 1995 report by the Clinton-Gore ’96 Committee; Count 4 relates to an April 15, 1996 report and Count 5 to a July 15, 1996 report by the Democratic National Committee; and Count 6 pertains to an October 24, 1996 report by the Patrick Kennedy Committee. Counts 2 and 3 do not identify the actual source of the contributions, but Counts 4-6 allege that IBPS was the actual contributor. Counts 2-6 all allege that Ms. Hsia solicited the contributions at issue, but only Count 6 alleges that Ms. Hsia herself wrote a contribution check for which she was reimbursed by IBPS. II. MOTIONS TO DISMISS INDICTMENT ON FIRST AMENDMENT GROUNDS A. Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss Indictment For Its Positive Repugnance to the Federal Election Campaign Act Ms. Hsia argues that the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 431, et seq., impliedly repeals the more general provisions of the Federal Criminal Code, specifically the false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and the conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371. This Court already has ruled that under accepted principles of statutory construction, repeals by implication are not favored and there must be substantial evidence that Congress expressly intended to preempt a general statute with a more specific statutory scheme in order to deprive a prosecutor of discretion to determine on which of a variety of seemingly applicable statutes to base a prosecution. Under this traditional analysis, FECA does not impliedly repeal or preempt the more general criminal statutes on which the prosecutor and grand jury have proceeded. See United States v. Trie, Criminal No. 98-0029, 1998 WL 427550, at *9 (D.D.C. July 17, 1998). Ms. Hsia maintains, however, that because the conduct regulated by FECA is political speech subject to.First Amendment protection and because Congress carefully crafted and later amended FECA in order to avoid infringing on First Amendment rights, FECA necessarily occupies the field and impliedly repealed more general criminal statutes that are not tailored to protect First Amendment rights of political speech and association. 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 1001 broadly proscribe criminal conduct and have been applied in a wide range of circumstances. FECA, on the other hand, specifically proscribes certain conduct in the context of federal elections and provides both civil and criminal penalties for certain violations of the Act. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d). The government does not argue that FECA’s criminal provisions are unavailable to it in prosecuting Ms. Hsia. Rather, it argues that the more general criminal provisions also are available regardless of whether FECA provides a criminal penalty for the charged conduct and that the government has the discretion to decide under which statutes to proceed, the misdemeanor provisions of FECA or the felony provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 1001. It relies on the established principle that “whether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.” United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979). See also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978); United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 138, 96 S.Ct. 335, 46 L.Ed.2d 333 (1975). Ordinarily, general criminal provisions remain available to supplement a specific statutory scheme unless there is evidence either (1) that Congress expressly intended to preempt a general statute with the more specific statutory scheme, or (2) that there is what the Supreme Court has labeled “a positive repugnancy” between the provisions of the specific statutory scheme and the more general statutes such that Congress must have intended to repeal the more general provisions by implication. See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-99, 60 S.Ct. 182, 84 L.Ed. 181 (1939). The parties here agree that when Congress enacted FECA it did not expressly repeal the more general criminal provisions and that repeal by implication is not favored. See United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. at 198, 60 S.Ct. 182; United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 566 (3d Cir.1994); United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 218 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Oakar, 924 F.Supp. 232, 244-45 (D.D.C.1996), aff'd in part, rev’d on other grounds, 111 F.3d 146 (D.C.Cir.1997). The question is whether the pervasive First Amendment implications of federal election regulation necessarily alter the framework of analysis. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub.L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (“1971 FECA”), sought to regulate campaign financing in a more comprehensive way than its predecessor campaign financing statute. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 92-564 at 3 (1971). The major provisions of the 1971 Act focused primarily on limiting the activities of candidates for federal office, rather than on placing limitations on contributors. The Act imposed spending limits on the amount of personal funds a candidate could use in a federal election, 1971 FECA § 203, amending 18 U.S.C. § 608, and on the amount a candidate could spend for the use of communications media. 1971 FECA § 104. The Act also set forth a variety of disclosure requirements and, as part of those requirements, it prohibited contributions in the name of another, so-called conduit contributions. 1971 FECA § 310, 2 U.S.C. § 440 (1970 ed. Supp. II 1972). A number of specific criminal provisions for violations of the Act were enacted and made a part of Title 18 of the United States Code, the general Federal Criminal Code, but Congress also provided that “[a]ny person who violates any of the provisions” of Title III, Disclosure of Federal Campaign Funds, which included the prohibition against contributions in the name of another, “shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.” 1971 FECA § 311(a), 2 U.S.C. § 441 (1970 ed. Supp. II 1972). In 1974, Congress amended the Federal Election Campaign Act to impose individual contribution limits and overall candidate expenditure limits and to establish a Federal Election Commission. Pub.L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (“1974 FECA Am.”), The Senate version of the bill made the FEC the “primary civil and criminal enforcement agency for violation of the provisions of the Act” and provided that the Attorney General could only prosecute violations of the Act “after the [FEC] is consulted and consents to such prosecution.” S.Rep. No. 93-1237 at 93 (1974) (emphasis added). The Conference Committee deleted that provision and made clear that while “the [FEC] is given power to bring civil actions in Federal District courts to enforce the provisions of the Act ... [t]he primary jurisdiction of the [FEC] to enforce the provisions of the Act is not intended to interfere in any way with the activities of the Attorney General or Department of Justice personnel in performing their duties under the laws of the United States.” H.R.Rep. No. 93-1438 at 94 (1974). The 1974 Amendments maintained the prohibition of contributions in the name of another, but moved the prohibition to Title 18 of the United States Code. A separate criminal enforcement provision for violations of that section was passed which retained the maximum one year imprisonment penalty but increased the maximum fine to $25,000. 1974 FECA Am. § 101(f)(1), adding 18 U.S.C. § 614; 1974 FECA Am. § 101(f)(4). Both in 1971 when it passed FECA and in 1974 when it amended it, Congress was aware that regulation of elections had First Amendment implications, and the issue of First Amendment rights was discussed during the crafting of FECA’s provisions. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 92-229 at 122-28 (supp. views of Messrs. Prouty, Cooper and Scott) (explaining that 1971 Act did not contain limitation on individual contributions because “such a limitation probably is unconstitutional”); H.Rep. No. 92-564 at 33 (add’l. views of Mr. Frenzel) (commenting on provision of 1971 House bill that would have limited individual contributions: “the limitations of contributions by individuals may ... be unconstitutional.... The suppression of free speech and the reduced participation in political processes is not justified”). In 1976, the Supreme Court held that a number of the provisions of FECA unconstitutionally restricted the First Amendment rights to political expression and association. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam). The Court first noted that the “Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution.” Id. at 14, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court concluded, however, that “although the Act’s contribution and expenditure limits both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do its limits on financial contributions.” Id. at 23, 96 S.Ct. 612. “The expenditure limitations contained in the Act represent substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech, [while limitations on contributions] entail[s] only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.” Id. at 19-21, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court therefore upheld the constitutionality of the contribution limitations but struck down the expenditure limits because they “place substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens and associations to engage in protected political expression-” Id. at 58-59, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court next turned to the disclosure requirements of FECA. It found that compelled disclosure “can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment” and “cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64, 96 S.Ct. 612. The constitutionality of the disclosure provisions requiring major political committees to report contributions was not challenged, but petitioners did challenge the constitutionality of the reporting requirements that FECA imposed on individuals and minor political parties. Id. at 68, 96 S.Ct. 612. FECA required any individual who made “contributions or expenditures” aggregating over $100 to entities other than political committees or candidates to file a statement with the FEC. 2 U.S.C. § 434(e) (1970 ed. Supp. V). The Court found that in order to avoid problems of constitutional vagueness, the definition of “expenditure” had to be narrowed to “reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” Id. at 80, 96 S.Ct. 612. As construed and narrowed, the disclosure provision “bears a sufficient relationship to a substantial governmental interest” and therefore passes constitutional muster. Id. The Court noted that it was especially necessary to clearly define the scope of the reporting requirement because “the violation of its terms candes criminal penalties and fear of incurring these sanctions may deter those who seek to exercise protected First Amendment rights.” Id. at 76-77, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Chief Justice expressed concern that because FECA was intended to operate as a holistic response to campaign financing abuses, the decision in Buckley to strike down discrete portions of FECA would undermine the Act as a whole. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 235, 96 S.Ct. 612 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“the Court’s result does violence to the intent of Congress in this comprehensive scheme of campaign finance ... the Court fails to recognize that the whole of this Act is greater than the sum of its parts”). The Chief Justice, demonstrating a certain degree of prescience, also predicted that “the Court’s holding will invite avoidance, if not evasion, of the intent of the Act, with ‘independent’ committees undertaking ‘unauthorized’ activities in order to escape the limits on contributions.” Id. at 253, 96 S.Ct. 612 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For similar reasons, Justice White would have upheld both the contribution and expenditure limits as constitutional: “There is nothing objectionable ... in the attempt to insulate the political expression of federal candidates from the influence inevitably exerted by the endless job of raising increasingly large sums of money. I regret that the Court has returned them all to the treadmill.... The holding is perhaps not that federal candidates have the constitutional right to purchase their election, but many will so interpret the Court’s conclusion in this case.” Id. at 265-66, 96 S.Ct. 612 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Rather than attempting to enact a new comprehensive law in reaction to Buckley, Congress again amended the statute. While the 1976 Amendments primarily focused on reconstituting the Federal Election Commission and correcting the constitutional violations, the Amendments also moved the criminal enforcement provisions of the Act from Title 18 and consolidated them into one provision in Title 2. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (May 11, 1976) (“1976 FECA Am.”) §§ 112, 201. Under the new consolidated enforcement provision, any person who “knowingly and willfully commits a violation of any provision or provisions of this Act which involves the making, receiving, or reporting of any contribution or expenditure having a value in the aggregate of $1000 or more during a calendar year shall be fined in an amount which does not exceed the greater of $25,000 or 300 percent of the amount of any contribution or expenditure involved in such violation, imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or both.” 1976 FECA Am. § 201. In addition, the 1976 amendments provided that where the FEC finds probable cause to believe there is such a knowing and willful violation, it may refer such apparent violation to the Attorney General, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5)(D), although such a referral is not a prerequisite to a criminal prosecution. See infra'&t 16. Against this backdrop of legislative and judicial decisions, Ms. Hsia argues that because FECA operates in areas protected by the First Amendment and because Congress so carefully crafted a comprehensive enforcement scheme to assure that it does not violate- the Constitution, FECA necessarily pro tanto displaces the more general conspiracy and false statements statutes. For her argument, she relies primarily, if not exclusively, on. the D.C, Circuit’s opinion in Galliano v. United States Postal Service, 836 F.2d 1362 (D.C.Cir.1988). Ms. Hsia maintains that Galliano establishes a different framework for analysis of implied repeal in the FECA context, where a complex regulatory statute sets forth an enforcement scheme in an area permeated by First Amendment concerns. In Galliano, Americans for Phil Gramm (“APG”), a political action committee that was not the authorized committee of then-Congressman Gramm, solicited money in a series of mailings. APG’s first mailing failed to include a disclaimer required by FECA stating that the solicitation was not authorized by Representative Gramm or his senatorial campaign committee. Subsequent mailings, however, did contain an appropriate disclaimer. The FEC found “probable cause” to believe that the first mailing violated FECA and entered into a conciliation agreement with APG, but it did not pursue any action with respect to the later mailings. Meanwhile, the United States Postal Service took administrative enforcement action against the APG for all of its mailings, invoking a Postal Service statute prohibiting the use of any scheme or device “for obtaining money ... through the mail by means of false representations.” 39 U.S.C. § 3005 (1982). A Judicial Officer of the Postal Service issued two remedial orders, one of which essentially directed the postmaster to stop each piece of mail addressed to APG, inspect it and return it to the sender if it was a response to APG’s solicitations. APG filed suit in federal court to require the Postal Service to set aside its order. On appeal, the court of appeals held that “the Postal Service, in its enforcement of [its false statements statute], may not impose constraints upon the names or disclaimers of organizations mailing solicitations for political contributions beyond those imposed by FECA.” Galliano v. United States Postal Service, 836 F.2d at 1367. In an opinion by now Justice Ginsburg, the court acknowledged the arguments of the Postal Service that Congress did not expressly repeal the Postal Service statute when it passed FECA and that “repeals by implication are not favored.” Id. at 1369. Nonetheless, it concluded that to “permit the Postal Service to base findings of false representation on a political action committee’s name and disclaimers that are consistent with FECA requirements would defeat the substantive objective of that Act’s first-amendment-sensitive provisions.” Id. at 1370. The court therefore held that if “FECA requirements are met, then as we comprehend that legislation, no further constraints ... may be imposed by other governmental authorities.” Id. The Court also held that if the mailings contained false representations of a sort not covered by FECA, for instance if APG made false representations concerning its past fundraising successes, the Postal Service could apply its false statements statute to that conduct even if the mailings were done for a political purpose. Id. at 1371. “The tension between the general false representation provisions of [the Postal Service false statements statute] and the specific disclosure requirements of [FECA]” at issue in Galliano has clear parallels to the tension between FECA and the criminal false statements and conspiracy statutes at issue here. See Galliano v. United States Postal Service, 836 F.2d at 1367. The essence of the charges against Ms. Hsia center on alleged conduit contributions which led to false statements by political committees in their disclosure reports to the FEC, and FECA contains a comprehensive enforcement scheme for the civil and misdemeanor prosecution of conduit contributions. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d). Moreover, the legislative history cited by the court in Galliano for the proposition that the name and disclaimer provisions at issue in that ease specifically safeguard the “full enjoyment of the First Amendment rights of individuals and groups to make expenditures for political expression” arguably applies also to the disclosure provision at issue in this ease. See H.R.Rep. No. 94-917 at 5 (1976), cited in Galliano v. United States Postal Service, 836 F.2d at 1370. The Court concludes, however, that Galliano does not control this case. First, in Galliano, the court of appeals found that the FEC’s authority displaced the authority of the Postal Service; in other words, the authority of one administrative agency under a specific statutory scheme preempted the authority of another administrative agency under a different statutory scheme. The court relied heavily on the fact that both FECA and its legislative history state that only the FEC, “and no other governmental authority,” has jurisdiction to enforce the civil provisions of FECA. Galliano v. United States Postal Service, 836 F.2d at 1368. It therefore held that “the FEC is the exclusive administrative arbiter of questions concerning the name identifications and disclaimers of organizations soliciting political contributions.” Id. at 1370 (emphasis added). In this case, by contrast, Ms. Hsia proposes displacing the authority of the Attorney General, the chief law enforcement officer of the United States, to bring criminal charges under the general provisions of the Federal Criminal Code. The Attorney General, however, is in a fundamentally different position from administrative agencies such as the Postal Service. She is charged with prosecuting criminal violations of the federal election laws as well as other criminal laws, and her authority is in no way limited by the FEC. See Galliano v. United States Postal Service, 836 F.2d at 1368 n. 6 (Attorney General has authority to criminally prosecute FECA violations regardless of whether FEC refers investigation to her); United States v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 701, 638 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir.1979) (same). Unlike the situation presented in Galliano, there is no issue of another agency infringing on the FEC’s authority; in this case, the authority to criminally prosecute rests exclusively with the Attorney General. Second, the court in Galliano found it significant that the FEC is required to conciliate civil violations of FECA prior to instituting any formal civil enforcement action. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(4). If conciliation is not successful, the FEC cannot administratively impose civil penalties; instead it must institute a civil action in federal district court. See 437g(a)(6)(A). If the Postal Service had the authority to administratively impose sanctions for conduct that is covered by FECA, the “first-amendment-prompted arrangements Congress devised for FECA enforcement actions” would be sacrificed. Galliano v. United States Postal Service, 836 F.2d at 1370. The “first-amendment prompted” conciliation provisions, however, apply only to civil enforcement actions and do not apply to criminal actions. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5)(C). Because the Attorney General may directly prosecute violations of FECA regardless of whether the FEC has attempted to conciliate the violation, see United States v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 701, 638 F.2d at 1163, no procedural protection is sacrificed by allowing her to charge violations under the general provisions of the Federal Criminal Code as well as under FECA. Moreover, unlike the Postal Service in Galliano, the Attorney General cannot impose penalties for violations of criminal statutes without instituting a proceeding in court. Regardless of whether she chooses to criminally prosecute someone under FECA or under a more general provision of the Federal Criminal Code, she must institute an action in a court of law. Allowing the Attorney General to proceed under general provisions of the Federal Criminal Code rather than exclusively under FECA therefore sacrifices none of the “first-amendment prompted” procedural protection of FECA. Third, the court in Galliano focused on the fact that the finding of the Postal Service that the statements were misleading was inconsistent with the FEC’s determination that the solicitations met the disclaimer requirements of FECA. The criminal provisions at issue in this case, however, rely for their meaning on the proscriptions and the definitions of FECA itself, and the definition of “contribution” and other relevant terms will control the scope of the jury’s considerations and be included as part, of the jury instructions. The criminal statutes invoked merely provide additional enforcement mechanisms; they do not seek to penalize conduct that is expressly permitted by FECA. If this were a case in which Ms. Hsia was being prosecuted for conduct that was permissible under FECA, Galliano would be more on point. In this case, however, the conduct allegedly at issue — the use of conduits to conceal corporate contributions from the FEC — is specifically proscribed by FECA; there is no inconsistency between FECA and the general criminal provisions employed by the government here. Nor is there any indication in the language or legislative history of FECA to indicate that Congress intended the criminal provisions of the Act to displace any of the more general federal criminal provisions in Title 18 of the United States Code. In the 1976 Amendments, Congress created one criminal penalty provision in Title 2 for violations of FECA and relocated the various criminal penalties for FECA violations that had been in Title 18. 1976 FECA Am. § 201, 2 U.S.C. § 437(g). The legislative history concerning the new FECA criminal provision, however, focused on the need to simplify the enforcement scheme and makes no mention of repealing the more generally applicable provisions of Title 18. H.R.Rep. No. 94-917 at 3 (1976) (“[o]n the occasion of reconstituting the Federal Election Commission the Committee concluded that it was appropriate to simplify and rationalize the present enforcement system”). The only legislative history cited by Ms. Hsia indicating that Congress may have reduced criminal enforcement power when it consolidated the criminal provisions is in the statements of those who were opposed to the legislation, not those who supported it. See Defs Motion No. 3 at 7. The characterizations of opponents to legislation, however, are entitled to little weight. See United States v. International Union of Operating Engineers. Local 701, 638 F.2d at 1168. While the defendant’s preemption argument is intriguing, it ultimately fails. Wisely or not, Chief Justice Burger’s holistic approach to the statute was rejected in Buckley, and there is no language or legislative history anywhere in the “comprehensive scheme” that is FECA to indicate that Congress intended to repeal any of the general criminal provisions of Title 18 when it enacted or amended the statute. Finally, while there are facial similarities between the situations presented by Galliano and this case, the significant differences that appear upon careful analysis ultimately carry the day. The Court therefore concludes that FECA does not displace pro tanto the general criminal provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 2(b). B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment Because It Offends the First Amendment (Religion) Ms. Hsia next asserts that the indictment infringes on the right to free exercise of religion in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. The indictment is premised on the government’s allegation that Ms. Hsia orchestrated a scheme in which monks and nuns from the Hsi Lai Temple wrote cheeks to political committees for which they were reimbursed. According to the government, the contributions therefore were made with money that “actually” belonged to the Temple and the monks and nuns were acting as conduits for the Temple, the “true contributor.” Ms. Hsia maintains that the government’s theory misperceives religious doctrine and the role and use of wealth within the Buddhist community at the Temple. According to her, the Temple does not possess “property” separate from the monks’ and nuns’ property; all of the property that “belongs” to the Temple “belongs” to each of the monks and nuns. Under the Temple’s religious doctrine, funds are held communally but are used for individual personal expenses; a monastic who incurs personal expenses may receive a payment for the expense from a Temple account, but this personal expense is not thereby converted into a Temple or “corporate” expenditure. Ms. Hsia argues that because the entire premise of the indictment is that monks and nuns acted as “conduits” for the Temple, the indictment necessarily relies on a notion of property that fundamentally is opposed to the religious doctrines of Humanistic Buddhism espoused by members of the Temple. She therefore contends that the indictment must be dismissed because it violates the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Alternatively, she has requested an evidentiary hearing on the issue of Buddhist beliefs and particularly the beliefs and practices of members of the Hsi Lai Temple. The government first contends that Ms. Hsia has no standing to assert a free exercise defense because any such First Amendment right that might be implicated in this case belongs to the Temple and its monastics rather than to Ms. Hsia. Ms. Hsia argues that she meets the requirements for third party standing, and the Court agrees. A criminal defendant has standing to raise the constitutional rights of a third party provided that (1) the defendant has suffered an “injury-in-fact” giving her a concrete interest in the outcome of the issue; (2) the defendant has a close relationship to the third party; and (3) there is some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect its own interests. See Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, --, 118 S.Ct. 1419, 1422-23, 140 L.Ed.2d 551 (1998); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-11, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991). First, Ms. Hsia has suffered a cognizable injury from the alleged violation of constitutional rights in this case. If the government’s theory of property truly infringes on the religious rights of the Temple and its monastics, Ms. Hsia’s guilt or innocence may well turn on whether she can assert the free exercise right. Unlike a case in which a criminal defendant is trying to assert the rights of a third party to suppress illegally obtained evidence, it is not clear that the indictment in this case can stand without the government’s notion of property that allegedly violates the right to free exercise. Second, Ms. Hsia has a close relationship to the Temple and its monastics. Not only is she a member of the Buddhist community, the Temple is an unindicted co-conspirator. She and the Temple therefore have “a common interest” in the religious practices of the Temple and in asserting First Amendment free exercise interests in response to the indictment,, and she has “an incentive to serve as an effective advocate” on these issues. Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. at -, 118 S.Ct. at 1423. Finally, although the Temple is an unindicted coconspirator, there is no affirmative process by which the Temple can challenge the government’s theory of property unless and until it is indicted. On the merits of Ms. Hsia’s First Amendment argument, the government asserts that the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), alters the analysis of Ms. Hsia’s claim because the Supreme Court in Smith held that in most circumstances, the right of free exercise is not a defense against the application of an otherwise valid and neutral law of general applicability. Id. at 879, 884-85, 110 S.Ct. 1595. The Court also recognized, however, that the First Amendment may bar application of such a law to a religiously motivated action in cases where the free exercise claim arises “in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press.” Id. at 881, 110 S.Ct. 1595. See also E.E.O.C. v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C.Cir.1996). In this case, Ms. Hsia’s free exercise claim arises in conjunction with the First Amendment protection of political expression and association, see supra at 39-41, and is thus one of those “hybrid situation[s]” involving both free exercise and free speech that the Court catalogued in Smith. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82, 110 S.Ct. 1595. The Court therefore concludes that Smith does not prevent Ms. Hsia from asserting her free exercise claim as a defensé to the application of the generally applicable laws she is charged with violating. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). The question is whether that defense may or must be resolved on a motion to dismiss or whether it is more properly a factual matter for resolution by the jury at trial. While the government does not dispute that the Temple has the right to maintain a “community treasury” from which its monks and nuns withdraw funds, it argues that Ms. Hsia’s First Amendment argument raises factual issues that must await resolution by the jury at trial. Relying on United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944), Ms. Hsia counters that the indictment must be dismissed before trial because the jury cannot consider the truth or falsity of a religious belief. The import of Ballard is clear: In the United States of America, there is no state religion, “the law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.” United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86, 64 S.Ct. 882 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 728, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871)). No particular religion may be established by law, nor may the exercise of any be prohibited. U.S. Const., amend. I. And “[i]f one could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment found [particular religious] teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious freedom.” United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87, 64 S.Ct. 882. Accordingly, when jurors in a criminal trial are asked to decide whether they accept or reject a particular religious doctrine— what Justice Douglas called deciding upon the “truth or falsity” of a religious belief— “they enter a forbidden domain.” Id. See In re Grand Jury Matter, Gronowicz, 764 F.2d 983, 987-88 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055, 106 S.Ct. 793, 88 L.Ed.2d 770 (1986). By contrast, juries routinely are asked to determine whether a person sincerely holds a religious belief and whether she acted out of or was motivated by that belief or for some other reason. See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 847-48 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1031, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982). “The First Amendment does not protect fraudulent activity performed in the name of religion,” and a properly instructed jury may consider the intent or motivation of a person who invokes religious beliefs as a justification for her actions. Id. Indeed, while the Supreme Court in Ballard found that the validity of the defendants’ religious beliefs was of no concern of the jury, it upheld a jury instruction that the jury could convict if it found that the defendants did not in good faith believe their representations about spiritual healing but made those representations for the’ purpose of obtaining money. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 84, 64 S.Ct. 882. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (“while the ‘truth’ of a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant question whether it is ‘truly held.’ This is the threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case”). In this case, Ms. Hsia has presented evidence that Buddhists from the Temple believe that personally possessing property gives rise to greed, which obstructs a person’s spiritual development. Defs Motion No. 9, Exh. 5 at 32. The Temple’s monks and nuns therefore are encouraged to avoid managing personal accounts and instead to deposit all personal wealth into a community treasury and to withdraw funds only as needed for personal expenses. It would be inappropriate for the jury to consider whether that belief is true or false, acceptable or unacceptable. For instance, the jury may not consider whether it in fact is true that personal wealth obstructs spiritual development or whether it is reasonable to hold such beliefs. The jury may and in fact must consider, however, Ms. Hsia’s motivation and the extent to which her conduct was motivated by the asserted religious beliefs. See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 848. The government represents that it expects to prove at trial that “the reimbursement money actually belonged to the Temple and that the Temple and the defendant understood that the Temple was the true (and illegal) source of the funds,” Gov’t Memorandum in Opposition to Defs Pretrial Motions 1-11, 13 & 14 at 46, and that the Temple reimbursed individuals for reasons other than religious doctrine. Gov’t Response to Def.’s Supplement to Motion to Dismiss at 4. It argues that the defendant’s claim that all Temple monies are communal is a factual question and a matter of defense for the jury to consider at trial. Transcript at 45. If the jury finds that Ms. Hsia and the Temple orchestrated the alleged scheme with the intent to defraud the United States and with the intent to cause false statements to be made to the FEC, then it may find Ms. Hsia guilty. On the other hand, if the jury finds that Ms. Hsia’s conduct in this case was motivated by a good faith belief that the Temple’s property belonged to the monks and nuns, then the jury cannot find her guilty, regardless of whether it thinks that her belief or the beliefs of the Buddhists are reasonable or “true.” These and similar questions of fact relating to intent or motive (as opposed to truth of falsity of a religious belief) are jury questions to be decided at trial. Accordingly, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing now. Nor is Ms. Hsia entitled to dismissal of the indictment. III. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT BECAUSE IT SELECTIVELY PROSECUTES MARIA HSIA Ms. Hsia claims that the Campaign Finance Task Force selected her for prosecution because she is Asian, in violation of the equal protection guarantee of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Ms. Hsia contends that the government’s impermissible motivation requires dismissal of the indictment or, at the very least, limited discovery to perfect her ability to demonstrate discriminatory intent and effect. The Court concludes that Ms. Hsia has failed to present “clear evidence” that the decision to prosecute her had a discriminatory effect and was motivated by a discriminatory purpose, and she therefore is not entitled to dismissal of the indictment. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996); United States v. Magana, 127 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir.1997). While she has provided “some evidence tending to show” that the prosecutorial decision both was motivated by a discriminatory purpose and had a discriminatory effect, the government in response has provided evidence that it has not discriminated against her or acted from impermissible motives. In view of the sensitive nature of the discovery sought, the fact that the government has proffered a legitimate explanation to rebut Ms. Hsia’s showing of discriminatory intent and the fact that Ms. Hsia’s showing of discriminatory effect is not particularly strong, the Court will exercise its discretion to deny Ms. Hsia’s request for limited discovery. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 469, 116 S.Ct. 1480. A defendant bringing a selective prosecution claim carries a very heavy burden because there is a strong presumption that prosecutors are properly discharging their official duties. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480. So long as the prosecutor has “probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in [the prosecutor’s] discretion.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 364, 98 S.Ct. 663; see Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985) (prosecutor in better position than court to assess “the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan”). The reluctance of courts to look behind a prosecutor’s charging decision rests in part on separation of powers principles and in part on a recognition that the public prosecutor, constrained by the ethics of the legal profession and the oath to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States, will act properly and exercise reasoned discretion. In the case of a Justice Department prosecutor, the courts’ reluctance to intervene is also based on a level of judicial confidence in the systems of checks and balances and review at various levels of the Department of Justice and its hierarchy of full-time, experienced professional prosecutors, up to and including the Attorney General. Judicial deference has been accorded to the Executive in these matters precisely because it has been earned, that is, because discretion traditionally has been exercised. It is, of course, quintessentially the responsibility of the judiciary to deal — and to deal firmly — with prosecutorial overreaching or abuse of power. Prosecutorial discretion is not unlimited, and its exercise is subject to constitutional constraints. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 125, 99 S.Ct. 2198. A prosecutor may make legitimate choices but may not select to prosecute an individual on the basis of race, religion or other arbitrary classifications. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480 (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)). Thus, even where “the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). In order to prevail on a selective prosecution claim and to obtain dismissal of an indictment, a defendant must clearly establish (1) that the prosecutorial decision was motivated by a discriminatory purpose or intent, and (2) that it had a discriminatory effect. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480. Discriminatory purpose, may be established either with direct evidence of intent or with “evidence concerning the unequal application of the law, statistical disparities and other indirect evidence of intent.” Branch Ministries v. Richardson, 970 F.Supp. 11, 17 (D.D.C.1997); see King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C.Cir.1985). A showing of discriminatory effect requires the defendant to demonstrate that similarly situated persons of other races, religions, national origin. or ethnicity have not been prosecuted. For obvious reasons, the selective prosecution standard is a “demanding one,” and. the defendant must present “clear evidence” of both discriminatory intent and effect to establish her claim. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463, 465, 116 S.Ct. 1480. Similarly, because granting discovery with respect to a selective prosecution claim may require an examination of investigative files or secret grand jury materials, including information relating to ongoing investigations in other eases, and “will divert prosecutors’ resources and may disclose the Government’s prosecutorial strategy ... [there is] a correspondingly rigorous standard for discovery in aid of such a claim.” United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 468, 116 S.Ct. 1480. Absent a direct admission of discriminatory intent or purpose, a defendant seeking to obtain discovery must provide “some evidence tending to show the existence” of each of the two essential elements of her selective prosecution claim: (1) that her prosecution was improperly motivated, and (2) that she was singled out for prosecution from among others similarly situated. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 469, 116 S.Ct. 1480; United States v. Al Jibori, 90 F.3d 22, 25 (2d Cir.1996); Branch Ministries v. Richardson, 970 F.Supp. at 16. To make out such a “colorable claim” sufficient to warrant discovery, the defendant must provide something more than mere speculation or “personal conclusions based on anecdotal evidence,” but the standard necessarily is lower than the “clear evidence” standard required for dismissal of the indictment. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 470, 116 S.Ct. 1480. Until 1996, the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice had primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting criminal violations of FECA and campaign finance violations generally. In November 1996, however, the Attorney General created the Campaign Financing Task Force to investigate and prosecute campaign finance abuses stemming from the 1996 election cycle. Since its creation, the Task Force has initiated prosecutions against eleven individuals, including Ms. Hsia. Of those eleven individuals, nine are Asian or Asian American. Ms. Hsia claims that the Task Force has im-permissibly selected her for prosecution on the basis of her Asian ancestry. The government does not dispute that nine out of a total of eleven or 82% of the individuals that the Task Force has prosecuted are Asian or Asian-American. Moreover, the two non-Asians have been charged only with misdemeanors, while eight of the nine Asians and Asian Americans face or have faced felony charges. Because the Task Force to this point has returned only eleven indictments, the sample available to Ms. Hsia is quite small. Nevertheless, the statistical disparity could, if left unexplained, suggest a discriminatory purpose or motive. In an attempt to explain why nine of the eleven eases brought by the Task Force have involved Asians or Asian Americans, the government stated at oral argument: Well, Your Honor, I think that everyone knows the reason why this whole Task Force developed in part because of the allegations that arose in October of 1996 concerning John Huang’s activities and the activities on the West Coast and the allegations that surfaced. As a matter of fact, one of the first, if not the first allegation involved the Hsi Lai Temple and the potential illegal contributions that flowed from various events at the Temple. So, Your Honor, initially the government was pointed in that direction by the press and by things that came out concerning the community out in the Los Angeles area, specifically John Huang, and among the first people who it was alleged had engaged in potentially illegal conduct were Charlie Trie, Maria Hsia, Pauline Kancha-nalak, the other people who were indicted. ... [A]nd the Government received some of its information from those sources ... through the press and others. Transcript at 59-61. The government also acknowledged that some of the press reports on which it relied related to testimony and statements made at congressional hearings. Id. at 61. The government maintains, however, that its charging decisions have not been influenced by the press or by Congress. At the time of argument on this motion, it appeared from the public record that the only connections between Mr. Huang, Mr. Trie, Ms. Hsia and Ms. Kanchanalak were (1) that they are Asian or Asian American, and (2) that three of them were indicted by the Task Force grand jury. There was no suggestion that the four people mentioned acted in concert or that the violations they allegedly committed were connected or that Mr. Trie, Ms. Hsia and Ms. Kanchanalak were connected to “the West Coast” and to John Huang. If the only commonality between them was their Asian ancestry, the government’s general statements at argument would be insufficient to explain away the statistics and might leave a colorable basis for Ms. Hsia’s claim that the prosecutors’ decision to prosecute her for felonies was motivated by discriminatory intent or motive. See United States v. Al Jibori, 90 F.3d at 26. Since the argument, however, the government has provided a bill of particulars indicating that there was indeed a connection between Ms. Hsia, her California-based co-conspirators and Mr. Huang and that they did act in concert. It has indicated that it intends to prove at trial that Ms. Hsia met John Huang at the Hsi Lai Temple and that one of the monastics provided checks either to the defendant or to Mr. Huang. See Bill of Particulars at 6, 18-19. Furthermore, recent press accounts indicate that a central feature of the case against Pauline Kancha-nalak and her co-defendant, Duangnet “Geor-gie” Kronenberg, was a Democratic-sponsored coffee with the President that John Huang orchestrated and that Ms. Kanchana-lak and Ms. Kronenberg attended with Mr. Huang on June 18, 1996. See Robert L. Jackson and Ronald J. Ostrow, Primary Target Charged in Probe of Clinton Donors, L.A. Times, July 14, 1998, at Al. See also United States v. Kanchanalak, Criminal No. 98-0241 (D.D.C.), Indictment at ¶ 51. Thus, the government has provided evidence of more of a connection between Mr. Huang and Ms. Hsia, Ms. Kanchanalak and Ms. Kronenberg than originally appeared and has demonstrated that the Huang and West Coast connections have some factual basis. Its explanation of why at least -four of the nine Asians or Asian Americans have been indicted provides a legitimate nondiscriminatory motive for the prosecutions. While the government has offered an explanation to rebut Ms. Hsia’s statistical showing of discriminatory intent or motive, intent is difficult to establish without some discovery. See Branch Ministries v. Richardson, 970 F.Supp. at 17. Accordingly, if her evidence of discriminatory effect were stronger, Ms. Hsia probably would have a sufficient showing to warrant some discovery. Ms. Hsia’s showing of discriminatory effect, however, is quite fragile. In order to establish discriminatory effect, Ms. Hsia must provide evidence that there are individuals or entities who (1) are not Asian or Asian-American, (2) committed similar offenses in connection with the 1996 federal election cycle, and (3) have not been prosecuted by the Task Force. See Attorney General v. The Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928, 946 (D.C.Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1172, 103 S.Ct. 817, 74 L.Ed.2d 1015 (1983). The government contends that Ms. Hsia has pointed to no similarly situated persons who have not been prosecuted by the Task Force, but that is not so. Ms. Hsia initially pointed to at least 13 and perhaps as many as 39 instances in which she maintains that similarly situated non-Asian individuals and entities were not prosecuted. Defs Motion to Dismiss Indictment Because It Selectively Prosecutes Maria Hsia at 4-10. While on closer analysis it appears that only two of the instances identified in her initial filing, General Cigar Company, Inc. (“GCC”) and Elgin Builders, Inc., may have been similarly situated, the alleged violations in those two instances do bear similarities to the alleged violations in Ms. Hsia’s ease. In both cases, the FEC investigated concealment violations committed during the 1996 federal election cycle and found reason to believe that those persons and entities had violated the law. See Defs Motion 10, Exh. 4-5, 21. In both cases, the laws that the FEC found reason to believe the individuals had violated are the same laws that form the basis for the charges in Ms. Hsia’s case: the prohibition against contributions in the name of another and the prohibition against corporate contributions. To date, however, none of the individuals or entities involved in those two schemes has been prosecuted by the Task Force. In a recent filing, Ms. Hsia also argues that the Task Force has made a decision not to prosecute Haley Barbour (a Caucasian American), the former Chairman of the Republican National Committee (“RNC”), with respect to foreign contributions and possibly false statements made to the FEC in RNC reports. See Supplement to Motion to Dismiss Indictment Because It Selectively Prosecutes Maria Hsia at 2-3. The allegations against Mr. Barbour and the allegations in the indictment against Ms. Hsia undoubtedly both involve campaign finance improprieties, but the alleged schemes in the two situations appear to be different. Ms. Hsia characterizes Mr. Barbour’s offense as one in which the Republican National Committee “received foreign money in the form of a ‘loan’ from a related organization.” Id. at 2. While Ms. Hsia may be correct that “no-one should be held to a higher standard than an individual who heads a national political party,” id. at 2 (emphasis in original), her characterization of Mr. Barbour’s situation, even if true, raises additional complexities not present in her case. The two cases therefore are not similar. The Court is left with only two arguably similar eases to establish discriminatory effect. If Ms. Hsia had provided stronger evidence of discriminatory intent or if the government had not proffered a legitimate explanation of the glaring statistics, the showing of discriminatory effect may have constituted a “colorable basis” sufficient to warrant discovery. Cf. United States v. Al Jibori, 90 F.3d at 25. Under the circumstances, however, the Court cannot conclude that Ms. Hsia has met the rigorous standard set forth in Armstrong. In view of the facts alleged in the bill of particulars and in the Kanchanalak/Kronenberg indictment, as well as those contained in an ex parte, in camera submission filed by the government and accepted for consideration by the Court, the Court concludes that discovery into the pros-ecutorial process is not warranted. IV. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS CONSPIRACY COUNT FOR FAILURE TO STATE AN OFFENSE The indictment alleges in Count 1 that Ms. Hsia “knowingly and willfully” conspired to defraud the United States, by impairing, obstructing, impeding, and defeating the lawful functions and duties of the FEC and the INS in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Indictment at 4. Ms. Hsia has moved to dismiss the conspiracy count for failure to state an offense or, in the alternative, to strike the Immigration and Naturalization Service as an object of the conspiracy. Ms. Hsia asserts that the conduct alleged in the indictment has only an attenuated connection to the FEC and virtuall